Politik : Indonesian Political Science Review 4 (1), January 2019, pp. 21-42 ISSN 2477-8060 (print), ISSN 2503-4456 (online) DOI: https://doi.org/10.15294/ipsr.v4i1.13528 ©Political Science Program, Universitas Negeri Semarang

Combining Clientelism and Incumbency Advantage: Political Strategy in Candidate Selection for the 2017 Local Head Election in

Caroline Paskarina Universitas Padjdjaran, Indonesia Rina Hermawati Universitas Padjdjaran, Indonesia Desi Yunita Universitas Padjdjaran, Indonesia

Abstract This article discusses the post-clientelist initiatives used by political parties in the selection of candidates within the party to determine the regent and vice regents nominated for the local election. Candidate selection is the political domain of political parties, but in the context of figure-based politics, parties tend to play more as political vehicle in the candidacy of local head. Through this role, resource exchanges take place between parties and candidates within the internal party candidacy arena. Using qualitative methods through in-depth interviews and observations of candidate selection in the Bekasi Regent 2017 election, this article seeks to reveal how post-clientelist initiatives are used by party elites to optimize the incumbency advantage as main political resource in the candidate selection to determine who will pair the incumbent. The results show that the dominance of party elites in candidate selection process determines how financial resources and political support are optimized to win the incumbent. Decision to choose the vice-regent from the same party while still forming coalitions with other parties indicates that post-clientelistic strategy is operated both internally and externally. This practice confirms the tendency of the candidate selection model to be more inclusive because it involves other parties, but remains pragmatic.

Keywords: Post-clientelist; Incumbency Advantage; Candidate Selection

INTRODUCTION initiatives used by political parties in the This article is about the post-losing of selection of candidates within the party to a governor/vice governor clientelistic determine the regent and vice regents nominated for the local election. The Caroline Paskarina is a lecturer at Department of Political Science, Universitas Padjdjaran, selection of candidates is in most cases a Indonesia. Her focus research in Personalist Networks and Patronage Politics. E-mail: nonpublic and largely unknown political [email protected]. Rina Hermawati is a lecturer at Department of process. Nonetheless, it is one of the Anthropology, Universitas Padjdjaran, Indonesia. most relevant elements affecting the E-mail: [email protected]. Desi Yunita is a lecturer at Department of quality of democracies since criteria and Sociology, Universitas Padjdjaran, Indonesia. E- mail: [email protected]. procedures to select candidates lead to The authors would like to thank Universitas Padjadjaran for funding this research through the electoral lists from which citizens select Hibah Internal Unpad Riset Fundamental (Unpad Internal Grants Fundamental Research) scheme their representatives (Cordero, Jaime- for 2017-2018.

Received Feb 25th, 2018; Accepted January 1st, 2019; Published Jan 15th, 2019. 22 Politik Indonesia: Indonesian Political Science Review 4 (1), January 2019, pp. 21-42

Castillo & Coller, 2016). The phase of among public. Meanwhile, studies candidacy is chosen as the focus in this focusing on the dimension of power article because of the strategic role of this structure reveal varieties of power phase. Cordero, et.al. (2016) reveal that relations which mark the practice of what is behind every selection process in politics at some levels of election, multilevel democracies is the tension including elections for local leaders, such between regional or local political as patronage and clientelism (Aspinall, leadership and the central headquarters of 2014), politics of dynasty (Agustino & parties. How this tension is managed and Yusoff, 2010), informal network solved is a matter of political strategy in (Paskarina, 2016; Sulistiyanto, 2009), managing power relations. oligarchy and cartel of political parties The study on local election generally (Ambardi, 2009; Mietzner, 2013). focuses on the phase of campaign which Some studies elaborated before show obviously shows how candidates compete the breadth of research dimension of against each other to get the vote (Hill, elections for local head, both in the 2009; Lindsay, 2009). In those studies, dimension of structure and agency, but local election becomes the arena for most of the research analyze the actors, both candidates and political dynamics at the stage of campaign parties, to build their self-images as because at this stage the battle among the popular as possible among the public. political actors is relatively easy to The other studies focus on the figure of observe. A number of research studies candidates competing in local election, which focus on the selection of which resulted in research on the candidates generally make political parties incumbency (Gordon, S. C. & Landa, as the unit of analysis because it is the 2009; Iskandar, 2015; Lestari, 2011; function of political parties (Daalder, Stone, 2011; Sulistiyanto, 2009). Those 1992; Pennings & Hazan, 2001; studies reveal the incumbents‟ strategy to Poguntke, et.al., 2016). Nevertheless, the win local election, while some studies dynamics of politics in Indonesia show a also reveal why the incumbents lose in different phenomenon. While the capacity the next period of local election, though of political parties is decreasing, the they have advantages such as access to emergence of potential figures as bureaucracy, experience, and popularity candidates is more frequently promoted

Paskarina, et.al. / Combining Clientelism and Incumbency Advantage: Political Strategy in... 23 by institutions other than political parties. takes the form of resource allocation or Moreover, the opportunity given to access (from parties to voters) and of independent candidates to join electoral support (from voters to parties). competition in elections for local head has Although useful, these explanations are made figure-based politics and support unclear what happens in those settings from volunteers play a bigger role in where brokers have low capacity because promoting the candidates. party membership organizations are Politicians also have to attract voters minimal. from wider sections of the population, Given the opportunity of regime including through populist measures. changes in many of the most frequently Thus, figure-based politics is not just covered cases of clientelism, the literature increase popular participation, but also gradually focused on the connection creating new strategies to obtain public between political transformations and the support. Therefore the competition is adaptive reactions of agents involved in expanding in variety of strategies to clientelistic practices (Gherghina & distribute resources or at least Volintiru, 2017). Patronage is sometimes complement distribution of patronage by misallocated, so that key interest groups way of „post-clientelist‟ initiatives (Manor, that are the intended recipients do not 2013). This change has come about as receive enough to maintain their loyalty. patronage distribution has become costly Patronage distribution alone is an and insufficient for maintaining popularity inadequate response to mounting and political legitimacy. demands from organized interests and Earlier studies have shown that many from ordinary people who have become contemporary clientelistic linkages more politically aware, assertive and assume the existence of exchanges impatient. Post-clientelist initiatives do not between patrons (parties) and clients replace patronage distribution, they (voters) with the help of brokers (party supplement it (Manor, 2013). organizations) (Gallego, 2015; Gans- Post-clientelist initiatives entail efforts Morse, Mazzuca, & Nichter, 2014; to execute development projects, and to Gherghina & Volintiru, 2017; Kitschelt, deliver goods and services, in ways that 2000; Muno, 2014; Rofieq & Nuryono, conform to authoritative norms, so that 2016). In this scheme, the exchange they are implemented in an impersonal 24 Politik Indonesia: Indonesian Political Science Review 4 (1), January 2019, pp. 21-42 manner through disciplined and relatively candidate selection phase within political impartial bureaucratic channels according parties. There are 3 types of resource to policy criteria, rules and sometimes conventionally associated with laws established by political leaders organizational strength: money, staff and (Manor, 2013). Futhermore, Manor members (Poguntke, et.al., 2016). All are (2013) categorize post-clientelist potentially important resources that can initiatives into 7 strategies, which are: (1) help parties to win elections. In this case, curtailing clientelism; (2) supplementing all are also the bases for political clientelism; (3) classic clientelism; (4) bargaining between parties and classic clientelism, centralized; (5) candidates who seek for support in radically centralized, partisan clientelism; candidacy. Marijan (2016) uses the (6) systematically reinforcing clientelism; concept of capital to describe resources and (7) „Feckless Governments‟, that needed to compete in election, which are obliviously ignoring clientelism and post- political scapital, social capital, and clientelism. These strategies indicate how economic capital. From these concepts, political actors' response to clientelism as the meaning of resources implies to any political strategy to obtain public support. material, relation, networks, and even Those who ignore and even what to symbol which could be capitalize to diminish clientelism tend to practice obtain public support. curtailing clientelism and feckless Post-clientelist initiatives applied as government. Meanwhile, those who try to political strategy by incumbent Regent of addapt clientelism with popular Bupati to strengthen her bargaining representation, tend to practice the other position in candidate selection within her initiatives, especially supplementing party and later on to optimize public vote clientelism (Gherghina & Volintiru, 2017; for her. Politically, she is the head of Manor, 2013) Golkar party regional structure in Bekasi Although those strategies are useful to Regency, which is the majority party in identify which pattern of post-clientelis Bekasi Regency. Socially, she is the operated in the local election, but they do daughter of Haji Muhammad Yasin, one not reveal what resources significant as of local bosses in Bekasi. Although both base for political bargaining, and how have become sufficient capital for the these resources transactioned in incumbent to win the local election, but

Paskarina, et.al. / Combining Clientelism and Incumbency Advantage: Political Strategy in... 25 the candidacy in this second period is brokers and mass, the selection also vulnerable to the possibility of defeat. mechanism of candidates is full with the In various other local elections, struggle of interests. On the other side, incumbents face considerable competition informal mechanism outside the party from a new candidate with high also determines the selection process of popularity. Therefore, although incumbent candidates, particularly in determining the have advantages, but the candidacy in the running mate for the candidates. second period also needs to be balanced By revealing the power struggle at the with the right choice for the vice figure, stage of candidacy, both in formal and which can maximize the incumbency informal mechanisms, this article intends advantage. to identify how post-clientelist initiatives This article focuses on the process of are operated to optimize incumbency candidacy selection to investigate the advantage in determining the pair of process of competition, negotiation, and candidates and to win the election. The compromise occurring at the beginning of result gives contribution to a deeper the emergence of candidates and pairs of analysis on the institutionalization of candidates. In the practice of politics in democracy in concurrent election, Indonesia, a number of mechanisms have particularly in the matter of political been developed by political parties to parties and political actors in candidate choose candidates and/or pairs of selection. candidates who will compete in general and local elections for local heads, among RESEARCH METHOD other things, through the mechanism of This study uses qualitative approach, convention and coalitions among parties. aiming to gain indepth and However, the political process which comprehensive information about how actually occurs in the mechanism has not political actors respond to changing yet been clearly revealed (Hazan & Rahat, context of candidate selection, and vice 2010). In fact, due to the oligarchical versa, how local political context of power character of political parties, politics of networks shape or reshape actors‟ cartel, and patronage that marks the behavior. This interaction is considered as relation between elites and mass, pattern of power that emerged in between elites and brokers, and between candidate selection. 26 Politik Indonesia: Indonesian Political Science Review 4 (1), January 2019, pp. 21-42

To elaborate how the networks of RESULTS AND DISCUSSION power operate, this study collects primary The Political Setting of Local Election in data through in-depth interviews with a Bekasi Regency number of key informants, which are the The election of Bekasi Regent holds campaign teams (tim sukses) and parties‟ the record as the election for local head elites who have important role as decision with the largest budget at the level of makers in internal party. Besides through regencies/cities in Indonesia in the 2017 in-depth interviews, data were also Concurrent Elections for Local Head, with collected through observation when the approved budget of IDR129 billion. researchers‟ joint in the meetings of The number of polling stations of the parties or campaign teams to obtain visual election is also the highest with 3.958 impression of the process and interaction polling stations (Komisi Pemilihan among actors in important moments of Umum, 2017). The election for Local the selection of candidates. Observation is Head of Bekasi Regency had 5 pairs of also an instrument of data triangulation candidates, two of them were female hence validity of the data obtained from candidates. Five of the 10 candidates of interviews can be tested. regents and vice regents were members of The obtained data subsequently the Bekasi Legislative Council for 2014- would be analyzed based on categories of 2019. Besides that, there were 2 (two) data which were arranged referring to the pairs of independent candidates. The five problem formulation, comprising: (1) pairs of candidates competed in the identification of the political context of Bekasi Regent Local Election were: power networks; (2) significant resources 1. Obon Tabroni and Bambang to bargain; and (3) post-clientelist Sumaryono initiatives applied in distributing Both were independent candidates resources. with the background of the industry. Interpretation of the obtained data They were unique because the pairs became part of analysis to reveal the post- came from professions known to clientelist strategy operated in candidacy frequently be in conflict, a laborer within political parties and what kind of and a manager of a company. Obon resources significant as bargaining power Tabroni is a labor activist who is also for candidates. Vice President of Federation

Paskarina, et.al. / Combining Clientelism and Incumbency Advantage: Political Strategy in... 27

of Indonesian Metal Workers Unions, were known to have thousands of while Bambang was a member of top volunteers. management of a company. Bambang is not a new figure in 2. Meiliana Kartika Kadir and Abdul Bekasi Regency. Since the 2007 Kholik Election for Local Head Region, Indonesian Democratic Party of Bambang has been known as a Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia member of the campaign team of a Perjuangan or PDI-P) carried the former candidate. Networking with Chairman of the Branch Executive senior politicians was considered to Council of PDI-P of Bekasi Regency, be political capital owned by Meiliana Kartika Kadir who was Bambang to enlarge support from the paired with the Chairman of the mass. The presence of Bambang also Branch Executive Council of National gave a signal and guarantee for Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan business sector for a conducive Bangsa or PKB) of Bekasi Regency, environment for doing business and Abdul Kholik (Lik). Lik was known to industry. It was taken into have the basis of big families and consideration because Bambang was networking with businessmen in a former member of top management Bekasi Regency and other area of PT Wavin Duta Jaya, the biggest surroundings. This pair was pipe factory in Indonesia. Bambang, supported by a coalition of political who has lived in South Tambun -- parties: PDI-P, PKB, Crescent Star one of sub-district in Bekasi Regency Party (Partai Bulan Bintang or PBB), -- since 1991, was known for his and United Development Party ability to make networks with leading (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or figures in the region. Thus, there was PPP). potential for earning votes considering that South Tambun was the electoral 3. Neneng Hasanah Yasin and Eka district with the most voters. Besides Supria Atmaja that, Bambang‟s managerial capacity Golkar (Functional Groups Party or was considered to be influential in Golongan Karya) was the only party managing supporters of the pair who in Bekasi Regency which could 28 Politik Indonesia: Indonesian Political Science Review 4 (1), January 2019, pp. 21-42

nominate a pair of candidates without 4. Sa‟duddin and Ahmad Dhani making a coalition because it had Both were supported by Prosperous majority voters with ten seats in the Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Bekasi Legislative Council. Neneng Sejahtera or PKS), Great Indonesia Hasanah Yasin was the incumbent Movement Party (Partai Gerakan Bekasi Regent of the previous period, Indonesia Raya or Gerindra), and while Eka Supria Atmaja was the Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat or speaker of the Bekasi Legislative PD). Compared to the other Council who had submitted the candidates of vice regents, Ahmad resignation when he decided to Dhani‟s popularity was the highest. compete in the 2017 as Bekasi His profession as a celebrity and his Regent and Vice Regent Election. personality which often became Before becoming the candidate of controversy increased Ahmad Dhani‟s deputy regent accompanying the popularity. The condition of the incumbent, Eka was the Head of region of Bekasi Regency, most of Waluya Village, Sub-District of North which is rural areas, where their Cikarang. Eka also had mass-based communities still look up to force from his family that was somebody for their popularity, was considered to have big influence considered to be good potential. among the public. Eka‟s network with Besides that, Ahmad Dhani‟s businessmen was also utilized to participation in the Action of 4 increase the potential of votes for the November which demanded a legal pair candidates. process for the case of blasphemy of This pair was carried by a coalition of the former Governor of Jakarta, political parties: Golkar, National Basuki Tjahja Purnama or Ahok, has Mandate Party (Partai Amanat made his name well-known. It Nasional or PAN), People‟s became important capital for Ahmad Conscience Party (Hati Nurani Rakyat Dhani to attract the sympathy of or Hanura), and National Democrat residence voters of Bekasi Regency Party (Nasional Demokrat or whose religious aspect was Nasdem). considered to be robust.

Paskarina, et.al. / Combining Clientelism and Incumbency Advantage: Political Strategy in... 29

This pair was supported by a Each candidate, both nominating as coalition of political parties: PKS, head of the region or as vice local head, is Gerindra, and PD. a political actor who has the resources. Competition in the election of Bekasi 5. Iin Farihin and K.H. Mahmud (IMAM) Regent is basically a battle of capacity This pair was independent and capability of actors in optimizing the candidates, supported by about 157 resources or capital they have. Incumbent thousand of people in Bekasi candidate has an advantage in terms of Regency, proven by the amout of ID access and ownership of resources cards as the requirement for because of their position as incumbent, supporting independent candidates. thus having a greater opportunity to Iin Farihin was a member of the optimize support from the government Bekasi Legislative Council for the bureaucracy, establishing performance period of 2014-2019. Besides that, performance claims from the Iin was also the chairman of PBB achievements of development programs and the chairman of National during their tenure and fostering support Committee of Indonesian Youth networks of other political actors through (Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia the approach of programatic politics. or KNPI) of Bekasi Regency. K.H. However, other candidates who are not Mahmudin al-Hafiz who became the an incumbent also have similar resources, candidate of deputy regent is an such as popularity, financial support, and influential scholar in Bekasi Regency social legitimacy of the organization's and he also serves as the Chairman affiliation. of Mosque Council of Bekasi Regency for the period of 2017-2022. Identifying Significant Resources for Besides that, at the local level, K.H. Political Bargaining is also known as a teacher who had The presence of five pairs of networks with religious figures, public candidates in the Election for Local figures, and Islamic boarding schools Leaders of Bekasi Regency showed the in Bekasi Regency. He is also known big potential of Bekasi as a governmental for his closeness with art activies in area. Local own revenues of Bekasi Bekasi. Regency are one of the highest in West 30 Politik Indonesia: Indonesian Political Science Review 4 (1), January 2019, pp. 21-42

Java. In 2014, the local own revenues of Karawang Regency which has the highest Bekasi Regency were IDR 1,124 trillion, minimum wage of IDR 3,605 million. exceeding the local own revenues of Bekasi Regency, which is semi- Bekasi City which amounted to IDR urbanized in the presence of industry, 1,042 trillion. Likewise, it also exceeded raises the middle class as well as the the local own revenues of Depok City workers as a voting entity with its own which only amounted to IDR 588,606 interests (Savirani, 2017). The existence billion. Local Revenues and Expenditures of labor is also a resource for candidates Budget of Bekasi Regency in 2017 has to build a mass base outside of political amounted to over IDR 5 trillion. The high parties. Couples of individual candidates achievement of local own revenues proves Obon Tabroni and Bambang Sumaryono, that Bekasi Regency is rich of resources. for example, are figures who use labor The industrial sector which comprises and labor issues to build a support base. hundreds of businesses becomes the With the large number of workers in heart of the economy of Bekasi Regency. Bekasi Regency, this has become a Contribution of processing industry to the significant source of both candidates domestic product of Bekasi regency has (Savirani, 2017), as evidenced by the reached 78 percent. Bekasi Regency also belief of these candidate pairs to run becomes a home for about 400 thousand through individual channels. workers whose economy depends on the The presence of candidate pairs industrial sector. Workers of Bekasi may through individual channels and political be proud of their minimum wage, which parties shows a heterogeneous political is one of the highest minimum wages in configuration in Bekasi Regency, as a Indonesia. In 2017 it has reached an result of its social and economic position. amount of IDR 3,530 million, far Although the development of the region in exceeding the minimum wage of the Bekasi Regency is directed to the Jakarta Special Capital Region which only development of industry, but the amounts to IDR 3,355 million. Indeed, agricultural area still dominates the area the minimum wage of Bekasi Regency is of Bekasi Regency. The distinction slightly less than that of Bekasi City which between industry and agriculture is not amounts to IDR 3,601 million or only in terms of regional development, but also has implications for the character of

Paskarina, et.al. / Combining Clientelism and Incumbency Advantage: Political Strategy in... 31 its social dynamics. Urbanized districts obtained votes less than Sa‟duddin‟s. Out are the centre of locations where there are of 187 villages/sub-districts, Neneng also concentrated factories and labor houses. won the most, 146 villages. Then, In contrast, the rural districts are a sub- Sa‟duddin won 27 villages, Obon Tabroni district where Bekasi residents who are won 8 vilages, and Iin Farihin won 6 not labor live. Spreading in 23 districts or villages. In eight districts, Neneng even 187 villages/sub-districts, there were won all villages in the districts. They were 3,958 polling stations. Districts of Bojongmangu, Central The participation rate of the 2017 Cikarang, East Cikarang, North Cikarang, Election for Bekasi Leaders decreased to Pebayuran, Setu, Tambelang, and 60.9% compared to the 2012 Election for Tarumajaya. In North Tambun District, Local Leaders (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, which was Sa‟duddin‟s base, one of eight 2017). Meanwhile, it turned out that at polling stations was won by Neneng. the district level, urban regions, which During her administration, Neneng tend to have a dense population, had a did not have a good report card. Data low participation rate. In fact, districts from Statistics Indonesia (BPS) shows with the highest participation rate were that the unemployment rate increased in located in the “rural” regions such as Bekasi Regency. In 2012 only 93,375 Bojongmangu (72.1%), Sukakarya people were unemployed. Some years (71.2%), and Pebayuran (70.5%). In later, in 2015 the number increased by South Tambun, a region with dense 60 percent to 149.859 people. The population, the rate was just 57.0% and number of people in poverty was not low. in Cibitung it was 58.1% (Komisi In 2014 there were 136,670 families in Pemilihan Umum, 2017). poverty (4.37%). It was surely a high In almost all districts Neneng number considering that Bekasi Regency obtained the most votes. Out of 23 had a population of 3.122 million districts, Neneng won 20 districts. (2014). Neneng won with a landslide win (over However, in fact the incumbent 50%) in Districts of Bojongmangu, candidate was still able to gain significant Central Cikarang, Pebayuran, Setu, and support in the 2017 Election for Bekasi Tarumajaya. Only in South Tambun, Leaders. Neneng and her running mate North Tambun, and Babelan, Neneng Eka, who both represented the executive 32 Politik Indonesia: Indonesian Political Science Review 4 (1), January 2019, pp. 21-42 and legislative incumbents in Bekasi members of the Bekasi Legislative Regency managed to obtain the most Council. The next position was occupied votes and they were elected as Regent by PDIP (8 people), Gerindra (7 people), and Deputy Regent of Bekasi Regency for PKS (5 people), Democratic Party (5 the next five years. The General Election people), PAN (5 people), PPP (3 people), Commission (KPU) of Bekasi Regency, Nasdem Party (3 people), Hanura Party West , has officially named Neneng (2 people), PBB (1 person), and PKB (1 Hasanah Yasin-Eka Supriatmaja as the person). Based on this configuration, winner in the 2017 Simultaneous candidates who had a bigger chance to be Election for Local Leaders. Based on the elected as local leaders were those who recapitulation result of votes of the were supported by Golkar and/or PDIP. Election for Bekasi Leaders, Neneng-Eka Golkar with 10 seats in the Bekasi obtained the most votes in the 2017 Legislative Council actually could Election for Local Leaders. Neneng-Eka nominate their own candidates without managed to obtain 471,483 votes or making a coalition with other parties. 39.83%. Sa'dudin-Dhani were the runner up with 309,205 votes (26.12%). The Post-Clientelist Initiatives in Candidate next were Obon Tabroni-Bambang Selection Sumaryono with 207,940 votes Although Golkar Party had a right to (17.57%), Meilina Kartika Kadir-Abdul nominate a pair of candidates from its Kholik with 113,664 votes (9.60%) and own party, Golkar Party still attempted to Iin Farihin-Mahmud with 81,496 votes obtain supports from other parties which (6.88%). had seats in the Bekasi Legislative The result proved that the incumbent Council, hence eventually Neneng Yasin pair of candidates still had a big political and Eka Suria Atmaja were nominated by support, although their performance a coalition of political parties consisting of achievement in the government had not Golkar, PAN, Hanura, and Nasdem with showed an optimal result in the previous total seats of 20 in the Bekasi Legislative period. The map of political power in Council. The support almost reached Bekasi Regency was dominated by Golkar 50% of total seats in the local parliament; Party which in the 2014 Legislative hence it might become strong capital to Election managed to placed 10 cadres as establish legitimation in the relationship

Paskarina, et.al. / Combining Clientelism and Incumbency Advantage: Political Strategy in... 33 between the executive and the local The map of distribution of political legislative council. power (Table 1) also indicates the On the other side, the stipulation incumbent‟s position in the dynamics of about the nomination of pairs of local politics. Conceptually, the candidates which enables political parties incumbent has advantages formed by a to make temporary coalitions becomes a number of factors, namely direct office- challenge of its own to the majority party. holder, campaign discount, and district Compared to the number of coalitions of partisan bias (Gordon, S. C. & Landa, political parties which nominated 2009), or because the leadership quality candidates other than the incumbent, in such as personal characters and fact the majority of seats in the local performance and skill demonstrated by legislative council were occupied by the the incumbent (Stone, 2011). Although opposing side. Based on data in the those factors were also owned by the following table, 30 seats in the Bekasi incumbent pair, winning the Election for Legislative Council were shared among Bekasi Leaders needed other preparation the sides of Meiliana Kartika Kadir/Abdul for Bekasi Leaders needed other Kholik and Sa‟duddin/Ahmad Dhani, 13 preparation to establish more consolidated seats for the side of Meilina and 17 seats support from various political powers. It for the side of Sa‟duddin respectively. encouraged Golkar Party to make a Besides that, there were two pairs of coalition with other parties to strengthen independent candidates who competed the support for the incumbent in based on direct support from the public. It competing with the opposing candidates, indicated that political power in Bekasi particularly to guarantee the achievement Regency was not wholly dominated by of maximum votes to win the nominated Golkar although it was the party which pair of candidates. held the most seats in the local legislative council. 34 Politik Indonesia: Indonesian Political Science Review 4 (1), January 2019, pp. 21-42

Table 1. Map of Political Power Based on the Number of Seats in the Bekasi Legislative Council

Number of Seats in Supporting No. Pairs of Candidates the Bekasi Legislative Parties Council Obon Tabroni and Bambang 1 Independent Sumaryono Meiliana Kartika Kadir and Abdul PDIP 8 Kholik PKB 1 2 PBB 1 PPP 3 Total 13 Neneng Hasanah Yasin and Eka Golkar 10 Supria Atmaja PAN 5 3 Hanura 2 Nasdem 3 Total 20 Sa‟duddin and Ahmad Dhani PKS 5 Gerindra 7 4 PD 5 Total 17 5 Iin Farihin and K.H. Mahmud Independent Source: Processed Data, 2017.

In an interview with Deputy Secretary interest, for example because of the lack of Legal Affairs of the Regional of seats in the local legislative council and Executive Council of Golkar Party the interest to gain significant public‟s conveyed that the candidacy process is votes for the candidate‟s victory. The conducted democratically, referring to the decision making to determine strategies norm of the party, in which candidacy is for winning the election for local leaders, prioritized for the party cadres. It was the including determination of candidates and base for the decision making to nominate coalitions, is the authority of the structural Neneng Yasin and Eka Suria Atmaja, who board of the party, such as secretary both were cadres of Golkar Party. Then, general and other board members. There Deputy Secretary of Legal Affairs of the is no public‟s involvement or convention West Java Regional Executive Council of mechanisme in this process. Golkar Party explained that the coalition is The main consideration in made with any party, depending on the determining candidates that will be

Paskarina, et.al. / Combining Clientelism and Incumbency Advantage: Political Strategy in... 35 nominated is popularity. It is expected to To strengthen the validity of be legitimation that the public‟s aspiration popularity, the regional executive council is also taken into consideration in the and the central executive council can candidacy process by the party. Therefore, conduct a survey of the proposed although actually the party elites candidates‟ popularity, involving a survey determine the final decision in candidacy, institution which is specifically assigned there is still the willingness to listen to the to conduct a survey for the party‟s public‟s aspiration which is reflected in interest. This survey is conducted candidates‟ degree of popularity. The internally and the result will not be popularity remains important because it published, but it will become a relates to potential votes that can be consideration in the decision making for gained in the election for local leaders. the selection committee (members of the Formally, parties have a mechanism to structural board of the party). This survey accommodate the assessment of becomes an instrument that is expected popularity through bottom-up selection will make the decision more objective, not which involves the party‟s organization at only based on the consideration of the the branch level. party elites. Inclusiveness, which means Each branch suggests 10 candidates the extent to which the public have at most from various backgrounds, both access and chance to participation in the party cadres and non-party cadres. Based candidacy process (Rahat & Hazan, on this suggestion, at the regency level 3 2001), is relatively limited because the to 5 candidates will be determined and involvement is indirect. The public‟s subsequently they will undergo an involvement is assumed to have been advanced selection process, nominated at represented in the suggestion the province level. Then, the party‟s hierarchically proposed by the party‟s organization at the province level organization. determines 3 candidates that will be In another phase of candidacy proposed to the central executive council process, the nomination phase, the in Jakarta, which will determine the last 1 degree of inclusiveness in fact is so open person who will become a candidate of that all citizens, both party cadres and local leader or a candidate of deputy local non-party cadres, are allowed to nominate leader. themselves to participate in the candidacy 36 Politik Indonesia: Indonesian Political Science Review 4 (1), January 2019, pp. 21-42 internally in the political party. It was public, including cadres of other parties. affirmed by informants from Golkar Party The selected names would be verified and and other parties. Head of Selection submitted to the West Java Regional Committee of the Bekasi Local Executive Executive Council of Hanura Party to be Council of Hanura Party, for instance, selected again and submitted to the said that the selection of local leaders had central board of the party. been conducted by Hanura Party for Deputy Secretary of Legal Affairs of about 3 weeks to offer the broadest the West Java Regional Executive Council opportunity to the citizens who have an of Golkar Party conveyed the same interest in competing as candidates of information: “Chairman of the West Java local leaders in the 2017 Election for Regional Executive Council of Golkar Party Local Leaders of Bekasi Regency. The wants input from the grass root relating to selection of local leaders was conducted candidates that deserve to be nominated in accordance with the command of the as local leaders. Therefore, the party Central Executive Council of Hanura Party openly announces the registration of and it showed the seriousness of Hanura candidate nominees through the existing Party in facing the Election for Local media. For those who intend to run in the Leaders of Bekasi Regency. The selection election, please go ahead.” Then, the was conducted openly, not only for the listed names were selected hierarchically internal cadres. Related to the mechanism and they were decided in a plenary of selection, Agus Nur Hermawan as session of the Central Executive Council of Secretary of Selection of Local Leaders of Golkar Party as the final determiner of the the Beaksi Local Executive Council, said pair of candidates of regent and deputy that registrants must personally pick up regent that would be nominated. the registration form of Candidates of In determining the pair that would be Regent and Deputy Regent at the nominated, both for the position of regent secretariat office of the Bekasi Local and deputy regent, Deputy Secretary of Executive Council of Hanura Party. The Legal Affairs of the West Java Regional informant also explained that the selection Executive Council of Golkar Party of candidates conducted by Hanura Party explained that the main consideration was of Bekasi Regency was not only for the the figure‟s popularity which was tested internal part of the party but also for the through a survey. In the survey, the

Paskarina, et.al. / Combining Clientelism and Incumbency Advantage: Political Strategy in... 37 popularity of names that had been certain names had consistent popularity determined as pairs was compared. For in several surveys, the political party example, if A was positioned as the regent would approach the party where the and B was positioned as the deputy figures became the cadres or the party regent, would they be more popular than that had made a statement to support the if B was positioned as the regent and A figures. was positioned as the deputy regent. The Negotiation among parties joining in a final decision on the position of the coalition occurs in the phase of candidates was determined based on the determination of the deputy candidate. result of the survey. The informant gave Although Golkar Party had sufficient seats an interesting illustration of the case of to nominate a pair of candidates from its the 2004 Presidential Election, in which own party, a coalition had been made the figure‟s popularity was not always therefore the determination of the deputy synchronous with the pair‟s popularity. candidate was discussed with other The degree of popularity in fact does parties in the coalition. The informant not only determine who the candidates from the campaign team of Golkar Party that will be nominated by political parties said that before determining Eka Suria are. The making of coalitions with other Atmaja as the deputy candidate, some parties actually is also determined by the other names, the incumbent Deputy popularity of the figures that will be Regent and Regional Secretary of Bekasi nominated. In an interview, a member of Regency, happened to be strong campaign team of the candidates Neneng candidates to be paired with the Yasin and Eka Suria Atmaja, Sonhaji from incumbent regent. However, because the Golkar Party, informed that other parties survey result showed again that the name joined with Golkar to nominate the pair of of Eka Suria Atmaja was more popular candidates because of the survey result than other candidates, they nominated that showed the high popularity of the him as the deputy regent. The survey was candidate figures among the public. The conducted as an instrument to bridge informant said that each political party between the aspiration and interest of conducted a survey of popularity which each party. Not all names were approved included the names of the potential by parties in the coalition therefore to figures. If the survey result showed that 38 Politik Indonesia: Indonesian Political Science Review 4 (1), January 2019, pp. 21-42 determine the decision making they officially gave recommendation to the considered the survey result. Regent Neneng Hasanah Yasin to run Although popularity became an again in the 2017 election for local important factor, electability also affects leaders in Bekasi Regency, West Java candidacy. The informant from Golkar (Okezone.com, 2016). In the inaugural Party stated that if they merely relied on ceremony of members of the Bekasi Local popularity, surely candidates from among Executive Council of Golkar Party, West celebrities would be known more by the Java for the period of 2016-2021, the public. In fact, not all celebrities were Chairman of the West Java Regional elected as local leaders or deputy local Executive Council of Golkar Party, Dedy leaders. It means the public have their Mulyadi, affirmed that the own consideration whether the candidates recommendation was given to the deserve to be elected as local leaders or incumbent based on her performance, but deputy local leaders. This electability is if a problem was found in her leadership, generally viewed from their track records the recommendation would be revoked. or performance in the government. In an The reason was that a leader must be interview an informant from the public more attentive in serving people, not informed how the public assessed the serving himself or herself. Therefore, incumbent pair of candidates. According collective consciousness was needed to to the informant, the incumbent regent evaluate the local leader‟s leadership. The candidate was quite known by the public granting of recommendation was because she frequently met the public. accompanied by the notes and evaluation Besides that, the public admitted that to be carried out if the candidates won the they knew the figure of Neneng not only Election for Local Leaders of Bekasi from her position as the Bekasi Regent, Regency. Political contracts between but also from the background of her Golkar Party and the cadres nominated as family, particularly her father, who was the candidate of Bekasi Regent concerned known as a rice businessman. some matters, among other things, a This information was also affirmed by more optimum usage of Local Revenues secondary data accessed from the news of and Expenditures Budget (APBD) to the mass media when the West Java improve the quality of human resources Regional Executive Council of Golkar Party regarding their prosperity, particularly in

Paskarina, et.al. / Combining Clientelism and Incumbency Advantage: Political Strategy in... 39 the health sector, by collecting data on process, made the internal selection the number of poor and rich people, so mechanism tend to be closed and elitist. that the utilization was more guaranteed The dominance of party elites in by giving priority to the low class people candidate selection process determines and improving the health service by how financial resources and political making the requirement easier. Those support are optimized to win the contracts affirm the interest of political incumbent. Decision to choose the vice- parties to retain their electability, not only regent from the same party while still the candidates‟ electability because forming coalitions with other parties candidates represent political parties. It indicates that post-clientelistic strategy are shows that the dynamics of candidacy are operated both internally and externally. not merely a matter of figure-based, but This practice confirms the tendency of the also lead to the effort of political parties to candidate selection model to be more survive by taking the advantage of inclusive because it involves other parties, electability of the figures they nominate. but remains pragmatic.

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