Estonian Interwar Radio-Intelligence*

By Ivo Juurvee**

They were asked about intelligence, and started to recall, probably due to torture, 1. Estonian radio-intelligence something had to be answered. To speak and one of the first things he confessed in historiography about the importance of Section D was was that “radio-intelligence gave a lot.”4 secure, since its leadership managed to flee Another reason to believe in the power The Estonian pre-war military intelli- the country in time, and its personnel of Section D is less pragmatic but politi- gence service - the Second Department of was known to the Soviet authorities.2 cal. Since radio-intelligence against the the General Staff - and especially its ra- Therefore, information on radio-intelli- was most probably orga- dio-intelligence1 branch, Section D, have gence could not cause more arrests, which nized in co-operation with , it not been researched much, although it is would have been possible while uncover- was used to discredit the leadership of rather frequently mentioned in histori- ing other collaborators of the Second the Republic of and its Armed ography. Due to different reasons its sig- Department. For example, the former Chief Forces as pro-Nazi in Soviet Estonian nificance has probably been overesti- of the General Staff, General , historiography and as an indirect justifi- mated. The first to promote the myth of said that he knew very little about intelli- cation for the events of the summer 1940. its influential role were officers of the gence, since the Head of the Second De- Investigations of several authors of the General Staff who were arrested and in- partment had to report directly to the partnership between the Second Depart- terrogated by the NKVD (the Soviet se- Commander-in-Chief, General Johan ment and the German military intelligence cret service, a predecessor of the KGB). Laidoner (which was not true).3 Soon Reek service Abwehr show that special radio * This article is based on the author’s Master’s Thesis MilitaryIntelligence Services in Small States: A Case Study of Pre-war Estonia and (Budapest: Central European University, 2003). The author expresses his gratitude to everybody who has contributed to this work, especially Professor Karl Hall (CEU) and Mr Karl Ruf (EADS RACOMS). ** Ivo Juurvee is a Consultant at the State Chancellary of the Republic of Estonia.

123 intelligence equipment and optics were gence. The existence of cameras in the light- dio messages of the during the donated to Estonians by their German houses could be possible, although so far War of Independence (1918-1920).8 How- counterparts.5 The same has been con- no documented evidence has been found ever, radio-intelligence has not been men- firmed in recent publications.6 It has be- to support the claim. tioned among its primary functions.9 It come ‘common knowledge’, as the origi- was probably just a coincidence, which nal source proving that fact is compli- 2. Radio-intelligence before had to happen while working in a receiv- cated to detect because of cross-quoting Section D ing mode for long periods. and missing quotes. After some research There are known some examples of naval it was possible to find the original source, Estonians were already eavesdropping radio-intelligence. After the War of Inde- which is a book by East-German histo- on Soviet radio-communication before pendence a long-wave station was located at rian Julius Mader. He writes: the formation of Section D in the Sec- the post of Naval Communications of “In June [1936] the Head of the Sec- ond Department. The extent of system- Stenskäri. Among other functions it had to ond Department of the Estonian General atic work is complicated to detect. In the take care of radio-intelligence. By the end Staff, Maasing, visits Canaris in 1920s and 1930s there was no essential of the 1920s the station had lost its impor- Berlin. Abwehr gets the permission of the difference between conventional radio tance because the Red Baltic Fleet seldom Estonian government to use Estonian ter- equipment and equipment used for tasks used long-wave transmissions while at sea.10 ritory for anti-Soviet espionage. To fulfil of radio-intelligence. Almost all military In July 1928, Colonel Karl the task, the Estonian secret service is receivers could be used to monitor the Laurits, Head of the Second Department equipped with long-distance photo-cam- enemy’s communication. With some at that time, informed the Chief of Staff eras and radio-intelligence tools to be sta- simple reconstruction civilian broadcast of the Navy: tioned along the Estonian-Soviet border. receivers could also be used for such pur- “With the consent of the Commander Cameras were installed in the lighthouses poses. The same applies to devices used of the Navy the radio-station of Island on the Gulf of in order to pho- by radio-amateurs, which in some cases Naissaare, the personnel of which will be tograph Soviet navy ships passing by”.7 was more sophisticated than the equip- reinforced with one civilian hired by the This short excerpt without any cita- ment in the Armed Forces. Second Department, is going to be used tion has been for a long time the basis The Wireless Station of the General for radio-intelligence purposes. Actual for all studies on Estonian radio-intelli- Staff in intercepted the first ra- radio-intelligence work is going to be

124 organized by the Commander of Radio munications .14 Although in used for intelligence purposes. The four Station of the General Staff, Lieutenant 1931 the Head of the Second Department direction-finding stations worked in the Lõhmussaar from Communications Bat- Laurits described the theoretical views and period mentioned above altogether for talion, under my supervision.”11 importance of direction-finding in the 1350 hours, which makes 3 h 42 min per In the same document it was foreseen booklet “Intelligence Service in Staffs”, the day on average. (This number is purely that until the arrival of the fourth radio- Estonian Army did not have the modern theoretical, since for finding a transmit- operator the station had to work in a re- equipment described at that time.15 ter, at least two stations had to work at ceiving mode for 18 hours per day, and When the staff of the the same time. However, it reveals a rela- 24 hours a day once the fourth operator moved from (next to the Russian tively low intensity of direction-finding.) had arrived. From here it is possible to border) to (100 km west of Narva) The most actively used (2 h 20 min per conclude that a shift lasted for six hours. in 1932, the radio-station was left in its day) Marconi direction-finding station was The document “Signals and Working previous location to accomplish “special located in Petseri (a town on the Russian Hours of Army and Navy Radio Stations”, tasks”. It stayed there at least until the end border in South-East Estonia), in the same which went into effect on October 1, 1928, of 1933, when the Inspector of Engineer place where the intelligence station was stated that the navy radio-stations of Troops was asked to leave it there or re- located, monitoring Soviet communica- Kuressaare, Pärnu and Coastal Fortifica- place it with a station of the same kind.16 tion for 9 h 10 min per day.17 tions had to monitor the communication It is not known if “special tasks” meant Although the data above proves that Es- of the Soviet naval ships on the Baltic Sea radio-intelligence. Nevertheless, during the tonians had made some efforts in the field for five minutes every hour, in addition period from April 1932 until April 1933 of radio-intelligence, the letter of the Chief to their routine. No Army station was the transmitter of the station had worked of the General Staff General Nikolai Reek given duties of the same kind.12 for 217 hours and the receiver for 7998 addressed to the Chief of Communications In 1925 three long-wave direction-find- hours (which makes 22 hours per day on of the Army gives the impression that the ing stations were purchased for the average), i.e. the receiver worked approx. work was not systematic. Reek writes: Army,13 i.e. equipment for intelligence 37 times longer than the transmitter. The “ Already during peacetime we purposes. By April 1933 this rather primi- average for all stations of the Communi- have to start preparations to carry out tive equipment was out of active service cations was 24.5 times. This al- radio-intelligence. It means skills in and stayed in the storage of the 3rd Com- lows to argue that the Narva station was finding [enemy] stations and decipher-

125 ing intercepted messages. An appropri- the direct wave cannot be received any- (vacuum tubes) in it could usually indi- ate plan has to be drawn and several more, and the reflected wave has not cate the level of sophistication of the sta- young officers from the Higher Mili- reached the surface of earth yet).20 tion. Radio amateurism was popular tary School included in this task.”18 During this period the two receiver among Estonians. It was the time of “ra- brands of “Audion” and “Super” were used. dio romantics”. Some equipment built by 3. Radio communication in the “Super” was more sophisticated and made amateurs was even better than the gear used second half of the 1930s “Audion” redundant. The number of valves in the Armed Forces. At the same time they

In the second half of the 1930s three One of Section D short wave receivers. Source: Estonian State Archive (ERA), wavebands were mainly used for radio 498-14-488, p. 213. communication: long waves (band width ca 1-10 km, frequency 300-30 kHz), me- dium waves (ca 100-1000 m, 3000-300 kHz) and short waves (ca 10-100 m, 30000-3000 kHz). Ultra long waves (more than 10 km, less than 30 kHz) were rarely used, but research on ultra short waves was still at a stage that did not allow wide-spread use. Medium and long waves were more reliable, but due to some peculiarities short waves were more promising for military communication.19 Since the short waves reflect from ionosphere, transmit- ters with low power could create commu- nication to distances of thousands of kilometres. Vast shortcomings were low reliability and the ‘area of silence’ (i.e. that

126 were a reserve of radio specialists for the Telefunken Spez. 445 b Bs ”Tornister” ‘5-valve’ of Communications Battalion military who could be deployed in the case (3 items) (out of date, 1 item) of need, especially by the Defence League.21 Telefunken D 770 (4 items) Direction-finding stations: Telefunken E 381 H ”Allwellen” (2 items) Telefunken TP/L.M./ 6/315 (3 items) 4. Equipment22 Telefunken L.Mw H.E/24b 316 (1 item) Transmitters: Telefunken 876 WR (1 item) Quarts Crystal (out of date, 2 items) Data on the equipment of the Estonian Kerting-Ultramar 37 SV 8360 (1 item) ‘1-valve’ (out of date, 1 item) 23 radio-intelligence is from the summer 1940, when it had to be handed over to the Red Army. In separate parts Section D handed over all together 25 radio stations, transmit- ters, receivers, direction-finding stations and several hundred pieces of other equipment (antennas, cables, batteries, valves, etc.). The possibility, that some equipment was miss- ing – hidden, handed over to some other Estonian military unit before or stolen – can- not be completely excluded, although it is implausible. By the summer 1940, there was the following equipment in use:

Radio stations (including both, re- ceiver and transmitter): Telefunken Torn. Fu f/24 b211 (1 item) Telefunken Torn. Fu B 1 (1 item) Receivers: Telefunken Torn. EB (4 items) Telefunken radio direction finding stations. Source: Estonian State Archive (ERA), 498-14-488, p. 217. 127 Out of these 25, 22 had receiver func- Estonia were made in 1936. This may in- but an operator had to carry three differ- tion and only five transmitter function dicate that 1) they had already been used ent coils (for short, medium and long (three of them were out of date). It shows by Germans and handed over to Section waves) with him. Spez. 445 could receive a clear focus on monitoring. Neverthe- D as second-hand receivers during the bands of 40-3000 metres and, regardless of less, all three radio-intelligence units had replacement process of 1937-1939 or 2) several imperfections, could be used for their own transmitter and one in the Sec- the same process had been going on in radio-intelligence purposes. Torn EB was ond Department.24 (The Second Depart- Estonia, the original number of Spez. 445s an update of Spez. 445. One of the differ- ment was located on Pagari Street, in the was larger, and some of them had already ences was that bandwidth was changed by Old Town of Tallinn in the building of been replaced with Torn EBs or 3) the switching, and there was no need to change the General Staff. Its radio-station in the process had already been completed, and coils. This receiver was produced in huge same house was probably also available for four Torn EBs had replaced three Spez. amounts and was the mainstay of German intelligence officers in case of need, e.g. 445s which were in reserve by then. infantry and armour troops radio com- for contacting the radio-intelligence units.) The Spez. 445 was a receiver developed munication throughout World War II.27 ”Tornister-Empfänger25 Spez. 445 b especially for field conditions. Therefore, ”Telefunken D 770” and ”Telefunken Bs” was a portable 4-valve Audion-receiver operational reliability was a priority. All 876 WR” were 7- and 6-valve super-receiv- that could be carried in a backpack by four vacuum tubes were of the same type ers. Although their construction was much one man. In the German Wehrmacht it was (RE 074). Although four different valves more sophisticated than Spez. 445, D 770 used from 1930 up to 1937. During the would have provided better receiving and 876 WR were only civilian broadcast period of 1937-1939 it was replaced with quality, German engineers preferred easy receivers. After the outbreak of war in more sophisticated “Telefunken Torn. EB” replacement – it was obviously much easier September 1939, the Second Department which was used until the end of World to carry only one valve for replacement received additional funds to obtain five War II. These two were also the main re- in the field than four different ones. It receivers to monitor foreign public ceivers used in German tanks and other was also easier for the Estonians to order broadcasts (mainly news).28 This explains armoured vehicles.26 Section D possessed only one type of reserve valve from Ger- the purpose of these receivers and gives three Spez. 445s and four Torn EBs by many. The primitive design of the receiver the approximate date of purchase. the summer of 1940. The serial numbers is demonstrated by the fact that the band- With a simple and cheap reconstruction show that all three Spez. 445’s used in width could not be changed by a switch, and a better antenna, D 770 and 876 WR

128 could be used for much wider purposes with an additional stick-antenna, which than just listening to radio news. The cru- allowed determining the direction of en- 5. The question of obtaining cial difference between military and civil- emy transmitters more precisely. The set the equipment ian equipment was that the latter could not included several other extras up to leather receive text in Morse code. To rebuild these transportation bags.31 In the second half of the 1930s the radios to receive Morse code was not com- Bearing in mind the small number of Estonian Armed Forces mainly used ra- plicated, especially compared with various personnel in Section D, the amount of dio technology of Telefunken. The larg- experiments carried out by the Commu- equipment is remarkable. Obviously not est purchases during the period were six nications Battalion.29 After that they would all of it was used at the same time but division and six brigade radio-stations, have been even more useful for the intelli- according to need. Some of it could be ordered from Telefunken in the second gence than Spez. 445 and Torn EB, although in reserve, some temporarily out of ser- half of 1938.32 A competitive tender was it is not known if they were rebuilt. Be- vice. When air was quiet, one operator announced, and extensive documentation cause of their nature, D 770 and 876 WR could monitor several different frequen- has remained intact.33 There is no rea- did not bear much transportation and es- cies using several receivers at the same time. son to doubt in the quality of the tech- pecially working conditions in the field. Twenty items out of twenty-five were nology, since at least in the field of short- “Telefunken Torn. Fu f/24 b211” and made by the German company Telefunken. waves Telefunken was one of the (if not “Telefunken Torn. Fu B 1” were portable The documents state that four items made the) best in the world. As early as 1912 radio-stations (i.e. they included transmit- elsewhere were out of date. It is clear that the company had succeeded, after con- ter and receiver) widely used in the Ger- the great majority of technology used by stant research, in creating short-wave ra- man Army from 1937 until the end of the summer of 1940 was made by dio connection at a distance of 20,000 World War II.30 Telefunken. The equipment was modern, km. ”Telefunken TP/L.M./ 6/315” was a mostly only a few years old and on the No documentation of the purchasing portative long and medium wave radio same level as in the German ground forces. process of the equipment exists. This gives finding station. In addition to an ordi- On the other hand, it consisted of de- space for historical discussion. One pos- nary moving loop-antenna, which appears vices used for communication rather than sibility could be that the files were de- to be the basic element of every direc- special radio-intelligence tools, except stroyed or lost during World War II. The tion-finding station, they were equipped maybe direction-finding stations. other possibility is that such documenta-

129 tion has never existed, which in turn leads Radio-intelligence had gone through for NCOs of radio-intelligence) on whom to two options. two major enlargements. The first of them data can be found were graduates from Firstly, the tender was never announced was at the beginning of 1937, when Sec- the Radio Class of the Communications publicly in order to cover the intentions tion D had just started its work. The sec- Battalion. The two exceptions were the of the Estonian radio-intelligence. The ond occurred in summer of 1939, when, Administrative Sergeant, who was work- decision was made by a narrow circle of according to President Konstantin Päts’ ing in the office and did not need train- military radio specialists.34 secret decree from July 10, “due to com- ing in the radio field, and one NCO, who Secondly, the equipment may have plex situation [in Europe] naval radio- was trained as a radio-operator in the been aid from the German Abwehr, as has intelligence has been reinforced”. With the Navy. been argued by East-German historian order of the Commander-in-Chief Gen- Information NCOs were professionals. Julius Mader. This possibility is more re- eral from July 22, the ra- Some of them had more than ten years of alistic, although it cannot be confirmed dio crew of the Second Department was practice as military or civil radio-opera- enlarged “substantially”.37 yet. tors, many had commendations from their After the entry of the Red Army into superiors for excellent service. Estonia at the end of September of 1939, 6. Personnel of Section D The two officers were well-educated. In there is only one known new NCO in addition to military school, they had Section D. In contrast to other parts of the Sec- According to a Commander-in-Chief’s graduated from full-time gymnasium, ond Department, the personnel of Sec- top-secret decree No. 223, from 1936 the which was not as common in the 1930s as tion D as of summer 1940 is precisely peacetime personnel of Section D was 33 it is now. Both had been instructors at known: it was 26 people – two officers, 23 people.38 It leaves two possibilities: Section the Joint Military Education Establish- NCOs and one private. Nobody had been D was not staffed to its full strength or some ment, and were fluent in German and hired before 1936. This confirms the sup- civilian radio-operators were also employed. Russian. Captain Kalmus had followed position that Section D was formed in military radio courses abroad.39 Major 1936-1937.35 The second officer, Olev 7. Training of personnel Reino Hallamaa, the head of Finnish ra- Õun, was taken to service only in March dio-intelligence during World War II, 1938; so far Andres Kalmus had managed Most of the Information NCOs under whose supervision Captain Kalmus to supervise the section alone.36 (informatsiooniallohvitserid – official name and Captain Õun were working after flee-

130 ing Estonia in 1940, has said that both to the North-East from city centre)41 and 1939.44 This was presumably caused by men were very talented. Olev Õun was (probably in some of the units of changed priorities of radio-intelligence especially talented, who was, in Hallamaa’s the ). after establishing the Red Army bases in opinion, a “phenomenal decipherer” and By July 1, 1940, fourteen Information Estonia according to a bilateral treaty had managed to break the latest code of NCOs were stationed in Merivälja, five from September 28, 1939 (a precursor to the Red Army during the Polish campaign in Tartu and four in Narva.42 They had occupation and annexation of Estonia by in September 1939.40 Unfortunately, no been regrouped recently, and their previ- the Soviet Union). Bases were found in materials are available to support or ar- ous positions are impossible to trace nowa- Paldiski (a town 60 km west of Tallinn) gue the words of that high-ranking Finn- days. Note that for keeping one receiver and on the Island of Saaremaa (in the ish intelligence officer. working 24 hours per day, four radio- Baltic Sea, off western Estonian coast), and Taking into consideration the afore- operators were needed. concerned the Second Department much said, the personnel of Section D could be Distribution of equipment between more than the Red Army units in the evaluated as highly professional and ex- units is not clearly known. There was one Leningrad Military District. It explains perienced. They were the best that direction-finding station in each unit. the movement of focus of radio-intelli- Estonia’s tiny Army could provide. Other equipment was slowly gathered in gence work from the Estonian eastern Merivälja, as in the summer of 1940 Sec- border to Tallinn. 8. Positions of tion D was prepared for closing down. Between January and September 1938 radio-intelligence units There is no evidence about Section D’s the Head of Section D, Captain Kalmus, unit in Petseri, although it has been men- had five times “accomplished special tasks” In 1939-1940 Section D units were sta- tioned in the literature.43 Possibly it had in Võru, once in Tapa and in Narva. These tioned in Merivälja (7 km to the East from been closed down earlier, and crew and trips lasted for 4-5 days each.45 In Octo- the city centre of Tallinn, probably next equipment had been transferred to ber Captain Õun was fulfilling the same to the lighthouse of Viimsi, where the Merivälja; it would also explain higher duties for three days in Tartu.46 It can post of Naval Communications was situ- concentration of people and equipment provide ground for speculations (e.g. that ated, or somewhere in the area of nowa- there. there was a radio-intelligence unit in Võru, days Ranniku Road or Mõisa Road), The transfer of crew and devices from which permanently had problems and was Narva (probably at Olgino Mason 5 km Narva to Merivälja started in October transferred to Tartu in September-Octo-

131 ber 1938), but unfortunately not for fea- sible conclusions. In 1938 the General Staff had the idea to create a mobile radio-intelligence unit the following year. The action plan of the Staff under the heading “Intelligence” stated: “To develop and expand radio-in- telligence. To acquire mobile a radio-in- telligence base for radio-intelligence and for eavesdropping telephone communi- cation in the territories near to the bor- der.”47 There is no evidence on the realisation of this idea, although its imple- mentation should not have been compli- cated. All military radios of Telefunken were portable and developed with the intention that one or two men on the battlefield could carry all needed equip- ment, including batteries or a generator. Therefore, some receivers and batteries on a truck could already be named a mobile radio-intelligence unit, as it could easily carry the crew and devices needed. The other side of the coin is whether this was a necessity. Estonia is a small country and there were already at least three perma- Positions of Section D radiofinding stations and their approximate range nent radio intelligence units with relatively in 1939–1940.

132 small distances to each other. (At the same of the forefront troops of the other side In addition to the finding stations of time the Signals Intelligence Service of the in battle conditions.52 During peacetime Section D, some were also located on Navy United States had only seven permanent these devices could not be used, since, due ships. However, it is not known whether units, although most probably staffed and to security concerns, single-wire telephones they were used for intelligence or naviga- equipped much better.)48 One more trans- were mostly abandoned after , tion purposes. The location and functions portable unit could not give a new quali- and field-phones were not used in peace- of “Marconi” direction-finding station tative level. Probably the idea was just an time. Furthermore, there was no direct exploited by the Army in the second half attempt to implement the general trend of access to the Soviet telephone lines any- of the 1930s are also not known. making communications troops mobile49 . way. Tapping the communication lines of The effectiveness of radio finding re- the Soviet Embassy in Tallinn was techni- mains unknown. When between 1936-1937 9. Telephone eavesdropping cally possible, but the question whether several transmitters of ‘radio-hooligans’ it was actually conducted requires some (radio-amateurs who used their sophisti- The idea of a mobile unit included further investigations. cated equipment “to have fun”) emerged eavesdropping of telephones. The Second in the Tallinn area, it took more than half Department was familiar with this task. 10. Direction-finding a year before the best known of them, In the 1930s the Estonian Armed Forces “Kapa-Kohila,” which used frequencies purchased more than twenty field devices There was one direction-finding station reserved for civil air-traffic navigation, was for eavesdropping telephone lines,50 and in every unit of Section D, which is also hunted down.53 This does not prove the by 1940 Section D had at least one of the most pragmatic solution. The range pitiful state of radio-intelligence. (Former them (type “LE 36”).51 These were primi- of stations was at that time 250-300 km. officers of Communications Battalion tive and light and were usable only if the Therefore, it was theoretically possible to have told afterwards that they knew per- enemy had low quality or single-wire (in find all transmitters working on long and fectly the location of “Kapa-Kohila”.)54 that case ground was used as the second medium waves in whatever spot in Esto- Fighting radio-hooligans was not a func- wire) communication. In both cases the nia and also on the Gulf of Finland, in tion of Section D. There is a possibility eavesdropping equipment had to be near western part of the Leningrad Military that the Postal Service did not even ask the line of the enemy. The system was for District (including the city itself), in the Armed Forces for help. Nevertheless, tapping field-telephone communications Southern Finland and Northern Latvia. only a need to conceal Estonian radio-

133 intelligence real capabilities from the pos- items concerning cryptology, a Russian- ing some of the codes of the Red Army.60 sible enemies could excuse this almost Estonian military dictionary and three Probably as a consequence of torture Reek criminal ignorance. Krypto “ciphering clocks”.57 To deal with told the NKVD what it wanted to hear, the own code of the Second Department, yet it is also possible that it is true. 11. Deciphering these machines were not needed,58 which leads to the conclusion that there was some 12. The targets of radio-intelligence The success of Captain Õun in deci- work being done in breaking Soviet ci- phering soon after the outbreak of World phers in addition to intercepting radio Although the transmitters of the So- War II was already mentioned. War was a communications. One can only speculate viet ground forces were certainly moni- key factor allowing a breakthrough in about the duration and results of this tored, priority for Section D was sup- dismantling enemy military codes. In work. posedly the Red Baltic Fleet, which since peacetime ground troops preferred wire In 1936 a former Head of the Second 1918 had been pushed to a narrow strip connections due to their higher reliabil- Department Artur on the eastern coast of the Gulf of Fin- ity.55 In contrast to radio messages, tele- Normak told to a Swedish intelligence of- land, with the main base in Kronstadt. grams and telephone conversations did ficer, Captain Hallenborg, that there had In the 1930s the ground troops were not have to be coded, which made them been a breakthrough in deciphering So- initially reluctant to use radios, mainly faster and more user-friendly. In wartime, viet codes. The clue to the mystery was due to their complexity and security con- when large troops had to move and could obtained after one station of the Red Army cerns. The Red Army was still under- not stay in their permanent bases, there repeated its enciphered message in plain equipped with radio-stations at the time.61 was no alternative to radio communica- text after it had not been understood by Therefore, radio communication between tion. Therefore, the number of broadcast the recipient. Both messages were inter- the units in the Leningrad Military Dis- messages increased substantially, provid- cepted by the Estonian radio intelligence.59 trict could not be very active, while the ing more data for cryptographic analysis, After imprisonment in 1941 a former fleet had no choice and had to use wire- which is the foundation to break codes.56 Chief of the General Staff General Nikolai less connection. When the Second Department closed Reek told NKVD interrogators that the Secondly, the German Abwehr suppos- down, it handed 51 items of literature Head of the Second Department Colonel edly supported Estonian radio-intelligence, over to the Red Army, including nine Maasing had reported to him about break- and the main concern to Germany in the

134 area was the Red Baltic Fleet. Until the ish Civil War (1936-1939). Most of it was radio communication in order to lay battleship Bismarck became operational in delivered from the ports of Sevastopol ground for a successful deciphering pro- 1940, there were no ships in the German and Odessa on the Black Sea, while some cess. How Section D actually accomplished Navy that would have had as strong ar- ships departed from Leningrad (now St. the task of transforming the intercepts into mament as the Soviet battleships Marat Petersburg), passed through the Danish useful informations remains a topic for and Oktyabrskaya Revolutsiya. These ships Straits and the English Channel and de- further research. were modernized between1928-193462 and livered their cargo to the ports of could arrive at the East-Prussian coast only Santander and Bilbao on the southern 1 Radio-intelligence is a process of monitoring within 24 hours after departure from their coast of the Gulf of Biscay. These vessels, (enemy) radio communication, collecting, ana- lyzing, and deciphering the intercepts, and the base in Kronstadt. equipped with short-wave radio-stations, agency, which deals with this process. Important Thirdly, Section D had stationed its had to pass by Section D units at a close is a systematic and conscious work, since inciden- two best-equipped units near the sea, while distance. During the journey they tried tal hearing of other’s messages cannot be called the third one (Tartu) was at some distance to keep radio silence as much as possible. intelligence. The field grew rapidly with the devel- opment and wider use of radio-communications from the Soviet border and still had the Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that in the interwar period. Now the term SIGINT Gulf of Finland in the range of its direc- already as early as 1936/1937 there was a (signals intelligence) is also widely used. tion-finding station (see map). possibility that the Estonian radio-intel- 2 EE ERA, 495-12-121, pp. 21-22; 495-12-277, pp. Fourthly, in the period before and ligence was eavesdropping Soviet commu- 16-18. 3 Reports of the military attaches were forwarded during World War II radio-intelligence nications within the zone of war. One of from the intelligence service to Reek. had more importance for the navies than the main stations exchanging signals with 4 ERAF, 130-1-9861/3, pp. 52-55. for the ground troops.63 the Soviet instructors was situated in 5 Leonid Barkov, Abwehr Eesti. [Abwehr in Esto- nia] (Tallinn: Eesti Raamat, 1974) p. 35; Heino In the long run the Germans may have 64 Leningrad, so most of its transmissions Arumäe, Kahe ilma piiril [On the Border between been interested in Estonian radio-intelli- and receiving should have been within Two Worlds] (Tallinn: Eesti Raamat, 1979) p. 111. gence to provide their specialists with the range of the Section D unit in Narva. 6 Tiit Noormets, Eesti sõjaväeluure tegevusest, more raw data for cryptographic analy- By the personnel strength, its training meetoditest ja vahenditest aastail 1920-1940, p. 58; sis. Nonetheless, some material of opera- Jari Leskinen, Vendade riigisaladus: Soome ja Eesti and the equipment used it can be con- salajane sõjaline koostöö Nõukogude Liidu võimaliku tional value might have been obtained. cluded that Estonian radio-intelligence had rünnaku vastu aastatel 1918-1940 [Secret of the Broth- Soviet aid had a great impact on the Span- enough capacity for intercepting Soviet ers: The Finnish and Estonian Secret Military Co-

135 operation Against Possible Soviet Aggression, Short-Wave Band] Kaitse Kodu, No. 2, 1939, pp. 46- 30 “Sende- und Empfangsgeräte des Heeres.” 1918-1940] (Tallinn: Sinisukk, 2000) p. 49. 48. 31 EE ERA, 495-12-277, p. 9. 7 Julius Mader, Hitlers Spionagegenerale sagen aus: 20 O. Saarep, “Lühilained maailmaruumis” 32 In the Estonian Army the power (i.e. range) Ein Dokumentarbericht über Aufbau, Struktur und [Short-Waves in Space] Kaitse Kodu, No. 2, 1939, of radio stations was defined by unit for which Operationen des OKW-Geheimdienstamtes Ausland/ pp. 49-50. they were meant. The five categories were: Com- Abwehr mit einer Chronologie seiner Einsätze von 1933 21 “Kaitseliit raadioasjandust arendamas” [De- mander-in-Chief’s Station, Division’s Station, bis 1944 [Hitler’s Espionage Generals Speak: A fence League is Developing Radio Communica- Brigade’s Station, Regiment’s/Battalion’s Station, Documental Report on Construction, Structure, tion] Kaitse Kodu, No. 7, 1936, p. 209. Defence and Company’s Station. See: Toe Nõmm, p. 45. and Operations of OKW Secret Service Ausland/ League (Kaitseliit) was a voluntary military orga- 33 EE ERA, 498-14-486; 498-14-572. Abwehr with a Chronology of Its Action from 1933 nization, the Estonian equivalent to the National 34 Recent study by Craig C. McKay and Bengt until 1944] (Berlin: Verlag der Nation, 1970) p. 308. Guard in the United States. With its 40,000 mem- Beckman, Swedish Signal Intelligence (London: Frank 8 Tiit Noormets, Eesti sõjaväeluure tegevusest, bers it was a considerable military force. Cass, 2003), supports this possibility. See Craig C. meetoditest ja vahenditest aastail 1920-1940, pp. 59-60. 22 All technical data below, if not cited, is from McKay and Bengt Beckman, p. 84. 9 J. Vingisaar, Raadioside Vabadussõjas. [Radio materials obtained from EADS-RACOMS by the 35 Tiit Noormets, p. 59. Communication in the War of Independence] author. 36 EE ERA, 495-12-277 and the personal files of Sõdur, No. 46-47, 1938, p. 1154. The possibility 23 EE ERA, 495-12-277, pp. 2-3; 9-10 verso; 49. the servicemen. that it was a secret task cannot be excluded. Indicated number of valves means that equip- 37 EE ERA, 498-9-272, p. 57. 10 EE ERA, 527-1-1575, p. 100. ment was made by the Estonian Armed Forces, 38 EE ERA, 495-3-16, p. 205. 11 EE ERA, 642-1-230, pp. 5-6. probably in Communications Battalion’s work- 39 EE ERA, 495-7-1553, p. 13 verso; 28-30; EE 12 Ibid., p. 18. shops. ERA, 495-7-6875. 13 Toe Nõmm, “Eesti kaitsejõudude raadioside” 24 EE ERA, 495-12-277, p. 10 verso. 40 Jari Leskinen, pp. 303-305. German military [Radio Communications of Estonian Defense 25 Tornister-Empfänger - ‘rucksack-receiver.’ attaché in Tallinn, Colonel Horst Rössing, evalu- Forces] Tehnika ja Tootmine. No 7. 1992, p. 46. 26 “Sende- und Empfangsgeräte des Heeres” ated the Estonian radio-intelligence against the 14 EE ERA, 512-1-268, p. 151. In 1940 Section D [Transmitters and Recievers of the Ground Forces.] Soviet Union as more successful than the Finnish used also three radio-finding stations, but these In: Lexicon der Wehrmacht, available in the Internet, one (Ibid., p. 50). were modern and obtained later. http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Waffen/ 41 Tiit Noormets, p. 60. 15 Karl Laurits, Luureteenistus staapide. [Intelli- Funkgeraete.htm, last accessed in June 2003. 42 ERA, 495-12-277, p. 9; 18. gence Service in Staffs] (Tallinn: Kaitsevägede Staabi 27 Hans-Peter Dohmen, Torn E.b., available in the 43 E.g Tiit Noormets, p. 59. VI Osakonna Kirjastus, 1931) pp. 18-19. Internet, http://home.t-online.de/home/dohmen- 44 EE ERA, 495-12-277, pp. 32-32 verso. 16 EE ERA, 512-1-268, p. 28. hape/torn_eb.html, last accessed in June 2003. 45 EE ERA, 495-7-6875, pages without numbering. 17 Ibid., pp. 151-151 verso. 28 EE ERA, 498-9-272, p. 258. 46 EE ERA, 495-7-1553, p. 29. 18 Tiit Noormets, p. 59. 29 H. Jens, “Rahuaegne töö Sidepataljonis” 47 EE ERA, 495-12-478, pp. 253-254. 19 Raadiosidemest ja sidepidamise võimalustest [Peacetime Work in Communications Battalion] 48 These units were spread over a large area, lühilainel [About Communication Possibilities on Sõdur, No. 46-47, 1938, p. 1158. incomparable with Estonia. They were: Corozal

136 (Panama Canal Zone), Fort Hancock (N.J.), Fort were tools based on several wheels and meant for Hunt (Va.), Fort McKinley (near Manila, Philip- encoding and decoding messages. For descrip- pines), Fort Sam Huston (Texas), Fort Scott tion of such machines see: Nikolai Liventhal, pp. (Presidio San Francisco, Calif.), and Fort Shafter 29-30. (Hawaii). (Norman Polmar and Thomas B. Allen. 58 See codebooks of the Second Department. EE Spy Book: The Encyclopedia of Espionage (New York: ERA, 495-12-304; 495-12-902. Random House, 1998) p. 514.) 59 Craig G. McKay and Bengt Beckman, Swedish 49 Richard Tomback, “Sideüksuste Signal Intelligence (London: Frank Cass, 2003) p. motoriseerimine ja mehhaniseerimine” [Making 85. the Communications Units Mobile and Mecha- 60 EE ERAF, 130-1-9861/3, p. 55. Note that nized] Sõdur, No. 35-36, 1938, pp. 865-869. Maasing was the Head of the Second Department 50 Toe Nõmm, p. 46. only till January 1939. 51 EE ERA, 495-12-277, p. 10 verso. 61 Toe Nõmm, p. 46. 52 Karl Laurits, Luureteenistus staapides [Intelli- 62 Mati Õun, Lahingud kaugetel meredel 2: Lahingud gence Service in Staffs] (Tallinn: Kaitsevägede Staabi Atlandil ja polaarmeredel 1939-1945, [Battles on VI Osakonna Kirjastus, 1931) p. 19. Distant Seas Vol. 2.: Battles on the Atlantic Ocean 53 Aleksander Lipp, Miljon kilomeetrit õhus: Lenduri and Northern Seas, 1939-1945] (Tallinn: Olion, meenutusi [Million Kilometres in Air: Memoirs of 1996) pp. 6-8; 164-169; Mati Õun, Võitlused a Pilot] (Tallinn: Eesti Raamat, 1982) pp. 18-19. Läänemerel: Suvi 1941. [Battles on the Baltic Sea: 54 Ivo Juurvee, “Wabariigi moodsad salakõrvad” Summer 1941] (Tallinn: S.n., 1996) p. 15. In addi- [Modern Secret Ears of the Republic] tion to the mentioned battleships, the Red Baltic Tehnikamaailm. No. 2. 2003. p. 66. Fleet had two brand new cruisers, Kirov and Maxim 55 Alex Roland, Science and War, OSIRIS, 2nd Gorki, which in the case of conflict would be diffi- series, Vol. 1, 1985, p. 262; A. Kalm, “Raadioside cult to handle for the German Navy. (Ibid.) jalaväerügemendis” [Radio Communication in 63 See: Juergen Rohwer, “The Wireless World at Infantry Regiment] Sõdur, No. 17, 1939, pp. 383- War, 1939-1945,” International History Review, Vol. 386; Sõdur, No. 18, 1939, pp. 406-409. 16, No 3, 1994, pp. 536-548; Codes and Ciphers: 56 Nikolai Liventhal, Krüptoloogia ja salaluure Radio Communication and Intelligence, in: To Die [Cryptology and the Secret Intelligence] (Tallinn: Gallantly: The Battle of Atlantic (Boulder: Westview S.n., 1994) p. 99. Press, 1994) pp. 38-54. 57 EE ERA, 495-12-277, pp. 49-50. It is not clear 64 M. Boltunov, pp. 30-35. what these three machines were for. In the Red Army’s documents they are called chasy dlya shifrovki (ciphering clocks). Most probably they

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