Contents v The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Southeast Asia vii Editorial viii List of Abbreviations
1 Conference Background Norbert von Hofmann
3 Opening of the Conference Hans-Ulrich Klose
5 First Panel: The Contribution of Track-two Dialogue to Crisis Prevention Jürgen Rüland: The Role and History of Track-two Institutions in Asia Norodom Sirivudh: The Cambodian Experience
25 Second Panel: The ASEAN Regional Forum and European Security Interests Lee Seo-hang: Multilateralism in East Asia: The Role of ARF and Its Future Gert Weißkirchen: The CSCE Process in Europe
39 Third Panel: Security Policy and Global Stability Rudolf Scharping
47 Fourth Panel: German/European Security Interests in Asia Gernot Erler: German/European Security Interests in Asia Wang Guoqiang: Both China and the European Union Shall Play a More Important Role in the New Century Ashok K. Mehta: The India Case
63 Fifth Panel: Multipolarism and ‘Global Players’ in Asia Hans-Joachim Gießmann: Multipolarism and ‘Global Players’ in Asia Tan See Seng: Great Power Politics in Contemporary East Asia: Negotiating Multipolarity or Hegemony? Naeem Ahmad Salik: The Situation of Pakistan
89 Sixth Panel: Reasons for Regional Instability: Internal Fractures and Crises Riefqi Muna: Reasons for Regional Instability: Internal Fractures and Crises Wolf Oschlies: The Situation in the Balkan Region
iii 107 Seventh Panel: Reasons for Regional Instability: Inter- governmental Tensions Surin Pitsuwan: The ASEAN Way in Southeast Asia and Beyond Antti Turunen: Inter-governmental Tensions and European Union Contribution to Crisis Management
121 Conference Summary Norbert von Hofmann
127 Conference Programme and Participants
iv The-Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Southeast Asia
The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung has been active in Southeast Asia for more than 30 years. Its country offices in Bangkok, Jakarta, Manila and Hanoi have been active in implementing national cooperation programmes in partnership with parliaments, civil society groups and non-governmental organizations, academic institutions and ‘think-tanks’, government departments, political parties, women’s groups, trade unions, business associations and the media.
In 1995, the Singapore office was transformed into an Office for Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia. Its role is to support, in close cooperation with the country offices in the region, ASEAN cooperation and integration, Asia-Europe dialogue and partnership, and country programmes in Cambodia and other ASEAN member states where there are no Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung offices.
Its activities include dialogue programmes, international and regional conferences (e.g. on human rights, social policy, democratization, comprehensive security), Asia-Europe exchanges, civil education, scholarship programmes, research (social, economic and labour policies, foreign policy) as well as programmes with trade unions and media institutes.
Dialogue + Cooperation is a reflection of the work of the Office for Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Singapore: it deals with ASEAN cooperation as well as the Asia- Europe dialogue. n Dialogue + Cooperation will tell you about our activities in Southeast Asia by publishing important contributions to our conferences and papers from our own work. n Dialogue + Cooperation will contribute to the dialogue between Asia and Europe by systematically covering specific up-to-date topics which are of concern for the two regions. n Dialogue + Cooperation will be an instrument for networking by offering you the opportunity to make a contribution and use it as a platform for communication.
Head of Office: Norbert von Hofmann
Address: 7500A Beach Road #12 - 320/321/322 The Plaza Singapore 199591 Tel: (65) 62976760 Fax: (65) 62976762
E-mail: [email protected]
Website: http://www.fesspore.org
v Editorial: Dialogue+Cooperation: 1/2002
Dear Reader
On 19 and 20 October 2001, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung convened an international conference on ‘Security Policy: An Asian-German Dialogue’ in Berlin. More than 50 representatives from governments and parliamentary commissions, scientists from notable research institutions and high-profile military experts from Asia and Europe gathered to exchange their experiences, profoundly discuss security policy concepts and challenges, and identify common ground for future collaboration. However, the convention was overshadowed by the brutal terrorist attacks in New York and Washington D.C. on 11 September 2001. Though the attacks were not considered in the conference programme, the situation in Afghanistan and its implications, the anti-terror alliance and the challenges to nation-states were reflected in all statements and discussions during the conference.
This documentation of the conference contains the research papers submitted and presented by scientists from research institutions, and policy papers and speeches delivered by political representatives. The papers, statements and speeches reflect the opinions of the individual authors. They provide the reader with excellent analysis of and insight into, from various perspectives, the history, institutions, main actors, security fields, roots of conflict, instruments and methodologies for conflict prevention and solution, regional challenges and developments, in light of enhancing the security policy dialogue and in bringing peace and stability to the world.
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung would like to express their sincere appreciation to the conference participants and conference speakers for their contributions.
The Editors Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Office for Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia Singapore
vii List of Abbreviations
ABM Anti-ballistic Missile ISIS Institute of Security and AFTA ASEAN Free Trade Area International Studies (Thailand) AMM ASEAN Ministerial Meeting ISDS Institute of Security and APA ASEAN People’s Assembly Development Studies APEC Asia Pacific Economic ISG Intersessional Support Groups Cooperation JIIA Japan Institute of International ARF ASEAN Regional Forum Affairs ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian KFOR Kosovo Force Nations KLA Kosovo Liberation Army ASEF Asia Europe Foundation LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil ASEM Asia-Europe Meeting Eelam ASEAN-ISIS ASEAN Institutes of Strategic MTCR Missile Technology Control and International Studies Regime CAEC Council for Asia-Europe NATO North Atlantic Treaty Cooperation Organization CBM Confidence-building Measures NGO Non-government Organization CICP Cambodian Institute for NMD Nuclear Missile Defence Cooperation and Peace OSCE Organization for Security and CIDA Canadian International Cooperation in Europe? Development Agency PAFTAD Pacific Trade and Development CSCA Conference for Security and Conference Cooperation in Asia PECC Pacific Economic Cooperation CSCAP Council for Security Conference Cooperation in the Asia Pacific PMC Post-ministerial Conference CSBM Confidence- and Security- SAARC South Asian Association for building Measures Regional Cooperation CSCE Conference for Security and SDSC Strategic and Defense Studies Cooperation in Europe Center CSIS Center for Strategic and SEANWFZ Southeast Asian Nuclear International Studies Weapons Free Zone CUESP Chulalongkorn University SIIA Singapore Institute for European Studies Program International Affairs EIAS European Institute for Asian SOM Senior Officials Meeting Studies TAC Treaty of Amity and EU European Union Cooperation FES Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung TMD Theatre Missile Defence IDP Internally Displaced Person UN United Nations IIR Institute for International UNHCR United Nations High Relations Commission for Refugees IMF International Monetary Fund UNMIK United Nations Mission in INTERFET International Force for East Kosovo Timor UNTAET United Nations Transitional ISEAS Institute for Southeast Asian Administration in East Timor Studies USSR Union of Soviet Socialist ISIS Institute of Strategic and Republics International Studies (Malaysia); WTO World Trade Organization viii Conference Background Conference Background
Norbert von Hofmann*
Since reforms began to take place in the Indonesia gives cause for concern. The People’s Republic of China and with the disintegration of a large country like end of the Cold War, the foreign and Indonesia will challenge the stability in security policy in Asia has changed Southeast Asia and will have unforeseeable fundamentally. While a major war has consequences. In addition, there is a become more and more unlikely, regional growing number of conflicts in Central conflicts are increasing in both dimension Asia, including the political instability in and frequency. The open nuclear armament Afghanistan and its neighbouring countries, in South Asia since India and Pakistan and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in carried out nuclear tests has changed the that region. strategic situation in Asia and this calls for a new regional and international dialogue. The Asian Economic Crisis made many Asia needs a new security architecture, Europeans aware of how closely the two taking into account the security needs and continents are linked. Any destabilization interests of all states, including the People’s in Asia has a direct impact on Europe Republic of China. economically, and economic consequences can easily develop into social turmoil. ASEAN + 3 (Southeast Asia, China, Korea and Japan), the ASEAN Regional Forum The promotion of democracy and social (ARF) and the Shanghai Cooperation justice and the strengthening of human Organization are promising starting points rights are the key strategies and long-term for future cooperation. However, there has objectives of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. been no real input into strengthening the To attain these goals, the Friedrich-Ebert- ties between South Asia and Southeast Asia. Stiftung gives high priority to the support The development of the South Asian of peaceful conflict resolutions and crisis Association for Regional Cooperation prevention. Further to cooperation with (SAARC) is presently blocked due to the governments, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Kashmir conflict, and alternatives have fosters dialogue, particularly with civil hardly been discussed. society organizations and international and multilateral institutions. Within its In many Asian countries, there exist framework of activities, the Friedrich- economic, social, political, cultural, ethnic Ebert-Stiftung attempts to bridge different and religious conflicts, leading quite often interests through the encouragement of to violent war-like situations. The dialogues, preparing the ground for expanding distribution and usage of small sustainable problem resolutions and arms is resulting in an increase in violent mechanisms. A peaceful future in Asia will conflicts and victims. Next to the war of make the world safer and is therefore also secession in Sri Lanka, the situation in in the interests of Europe and Germany.
* Norbert von Hofmann was at the time of the conference Head of the East Asia Desk at the Friedrich-Ebert- Stiftung Headquarters in Germany. Currently he is the Head of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Office for Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia, in Singapore. 1 Dialogue + Cooperation 1/2002
To strengthen the international and regional Stiftung’s security-oriented projects and dialogue on security policy between Asia activities in Asia, had the unique and Europe, and to discuss European and opportunity of discussing in depth security Asian concepts for peaceful conflict policy concepts and exchanging their resolution and crisis prevention, the experiences with representatives from Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung organized an governments, parliamentary commissions, International Conference on Security Policy research institutions, universities and major in Germany and Asia in October 2001, in non-government organizations, from Berlin. Conference participants, many of Germany, the European Union and Asia. them partners of the Friedrich-Ebert-
2 Conference Background Opening of the Conference
Hans-Ulrich Klose
It is with great pleasure that I welcome you cooperative via the United Nations and via today to the international conference on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization security policy in Asia. I feel particularly (NATO). NATO, as you may know, stated honoured, since I am the Chairman of the that the terrorist attack against the United Foreign Affairs Committee of the German States is an attack against NATO too. The Federal Parliament and also a member of United Nations Security Council recognized the Executive Board of the Friedrich-Ebert- and approved unanimously the right of the Stiftung. United States government to defend individually or collectively its territory. In particular, I would like to express my deepest appreciation to those conference The German government, like all allies, participants who have come from abroad made it quite clear from the very beginning to Berlin. I have been studying the list of that we stand firmly alongside the United participants and was very impressed that States of America, which includes giving there are representatives from Korea, the military assistance. Philippines, India, China, Pakistan, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand and This conference has not been convened to Cambodia. We all appreciate you accepting discuss the situation in Afghanistan. The our invitation and know that German situation and its global impact, however, participants will benefit substantially by cannot be bypassed. The developments of your presence and by your contributions. the last month demonstrate how fragile peace and stability are, not only in Asia, in This conference will focus on security and around Afghanistan, but also in all other policy. Sadly, I realize that our conference parts of the world, and this unfortunately will be overshadowed by tragic events which on a daily basis. have placed security policy at the top of the world’s agenda. Because of the terrorist Peace and stability, I am afraid to say, are attacks on New York and Washington, the never secure or safe indefinitely. Constant United States government is now waging a efforts on the part of governments and military campaign in Afghanistan. The responsible leaders are necessary to initiate objective, the goal of this campaign, is to and foster dialogue and cooperation so as crush the terrorist network al-Qaeda and to prevent and eradicate violence and those who offer shelter and support to counter violence. terrorists. This means the United States is not fighting against the people in Hence, I am very pleased to welcome this Afghanistan, and the United States is not group of responsible leaders to this fighting against Islam. We have to make conference – diplomats, politicians and this quite clear every time we talk about experts. We are all part of the game that this campaign. We are fighting terrorism. ought to be a game of peace. Once again, I stress the word we because the United thank you very much for coming, and thank States government has not reacted you in advance for your contributions. unilaterally. The procedure was and is 3 The Role and History of Track-two Institutions in Asia
First Panel The Contribution of Track-two Dialogue to Crisis Prevention
3 The Role and History of Track-two Institutions in Asia The Role and History of Track-two Institutions in Asia*
Jürgen Rüland
Introduction
Globalization, economic liberalization and authoritarianism, an admission by military the concomitant growth in interdependence and civilian rulers alike that they had lost have given rise to the emergence of new the capacity of handling the growing actors in international relations. complexities of newly industrializing International organizations and regimes as societies. It was a conservative and well as transnational actors, such as minimalist way of power sharing to multinational corporations and preserve the economic miracle and, by internationally organized non-government coincidence, their legitimacy through the organizations (NGOs), are not only professionalization of government proliferating, as empirical evidence operations. Such think tanks were suggests (Kaiser, 1969; Shanks, Jacobson considered conservative and minimalist, and Kaplan, 1996), but are also playing an since they delegated some advisory and increasingly prominent role in recommendatory authority to a small group international politics. So visible have they of persons whose only resource was become that liberal institutionalists see technical and scientific knowledge in a them as seriously challenging the nation specific and narrowly defined policy sector. state as the main actor in international These technocrats could hardly challenge relations (Keohane and Nye, 1989; authoritarian rule because they lacked a Czempiel, 1999). Accordingly, these new constituency of their own. Moreover, many actors have ceased to be considered merely of them with a decidedly elitist outlook as dependent variables of international firmly believed that popular participation relations. There is growing recognition that in political decision making was at variance they are well able to influence international with technical rationality and therefore had relations as an independent variable. to be curtailed.
Think tanks are part of this new set of Think tanks proliferated in two policy transnational actors. They have been a well- sectors: the economic sphere and the field known phenomenon in the United States of security. Both sectors, however, were for a long time, but it was only in the 1980s closely interconnected. Economic growth that they began to mushroom in Asia. Their – endowing East and Southeast Asia’s rise went hand in hand with the period of authoritarian regimes with the ‘legitimacy unprecedented rapid economic growth in of results’ (Simon Tay)1 – was strongly East and Southeast Asia prior to the Asian dependent on a favourable international Crisis. In many instances, the emergence environment in which tension and armed of Asian think tanks was a product of conflicts were to be minimized, or better modernization under the auspices of still, completely eradicated. Development
* The article will be published in the autumn 2002 issue of ASIEN. 1 See Far Eastern Economic Review, 1 September 2000 (Internet edition). 4 Dialogue + Cooperation 1/2002
was seen as the best remedy against In the process, this academic community communist insurgencies, which at the time became the backstop for an emerging track- were viewed as the most serious internal two diplomacy which gained increasing security threat. External and domestic influence on policy making both in the stability were thus regarded as major economic and in the security domain. The prerequisites for the attraction of foreign latter was designed by security thinkers in investment on which the East and Southeast the region as an approach to discuss, analyse Asian growth model hinged. and minimize the manifold security risks of the post-bipolar era in the Asia-Pacific The close relationship between economic region. Whereas official government growth and security called for a specific diplomacy has become known as track one, concept of security: a concept of track two brings together think tank cooperative and comprehensive security. experts, diplomats, military officers and Cooperative, because peace and an politicians – the latter three in an unofficial economically favourable international capacity. Track two is accorded the task of climate depend on congenial neighbours focusing on issues too sensitive for official and, hence, on joint efforts to address negotiations, which, as a consequence, are sources of interstate conflict. bracketed by track one. The non-official, Comprehensive, because economic growth informal and, to a certain extent, was obviously interlinked with a great confidential format of these meetings gives variety of social, cultural and environmental participants ample opportunity to discuss ‘issue-areas’ which were basically regarded issues frankly and free from fears that any as domestic risks. As a result, the need for party would be embarrassed in the process a regionally coordinated security policy (Wanandi, 1995). Issues are discussed until became a major catalyst for the networking a solution takes shape. At this point the of think tanks on a regional scale. By the issue is swiftly transferred back to track late 1980s and early 1990s, academics one for final resolution (Rüland, 1995; from the leading Southeast Asian think Johnston, 1999:301). The Asian version of tanks had evolved into epistemic track-two diplomacy thus deviates from communities, defined by Peter M. Haas North American and European as ‘a network of professionals with connotations of the concept. The latter recognized expertise and competence in a regard track-two processes as only one particular domain and an authoritative among many tracks in a so-called multi- claim to policy-relevant knowledge within track diplomacy which relies much more that domain or issue-area’ (1992:1). than the Asian format on the mediatory roles of NGOs and other elements of civil society (Notter and McDonald, 1996).
The Rise of Track Two in Asia Pacific
Track-two processes in Asia first developed Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). in the field of economic cooperation under the auspices of the Pacific Economic Security-related track-two processes in Asia Cooperation Council (PECC). Founded in were spearheaded by the ASEAN Institutes 1980, the PECC evolved into an of Strategic and International Studies international network of scholars, officials (ASEAN-ISIS). Building on contacts among and business representatives, and is widely individual scholars and their institutions, acclaimed as the precursor of the Asia ASEAN-ISIS was officially launched in 5 The Role and History of Track-two Institutions in Asia
1988.2 The main objective of ASEAN-ISIS, States. CSCAP formed four working which is registered with the Association of groups which undertake studies in the areas Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) of Maritime Cooperation, Security Secretariat as an NGO, is to strengthen Cooperation in the North Pacific/ cooperation in the field of research on Northeast Asia, Comprehensive and strategic and international problems. Cooperative Security, well as Confidence ASEAN-ISIS also organizes the prestigious and Security-Building Measures.4 In the annual Asia-Pacific Roundtable, which in meantime CSCAP has expanded to 20 the past was attended by more than 300 member committees.5 policy makers, business leaders and academics (Ball, 1993b:42).3 A third major track two process was launched in the immediate aftermath of the ASEAN-ISIS soon became a key player in first summit of the Asia-Europe Meeting the establishment of a wider Asia-Pacific (ASEM), held in Bangkok in March 1996. network known as the Council for Security Formed in June 1996 by 12 European and Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP). Asian institutes,6 the main purpose of the CSCAP was organized ‘for the purpose of Council of Asia-Europe Cooperation providing a structured process for regional (CAEC) is ‘to encourage and facilitate confidence building and security greater cooperation among Asian and cooperation among countries and European intellectuals and policy specialists territories in the Asia Pacific region’ in order to enhance discussions about the (CSCAP, 1993:9). Established in 1993, the future direction of Asia-Europe relations’.7 founding members, apart from ASEAN- Subsequently, CAEC task forces studied ISIS, were the Strategic and Defense the functional and institutional Studies Center (SDSC) at the Australian contributions to global governance of the National University, the University of Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) or discussed Toronto-York Joint Center for Asia Pacific more specifically security-related topics. Studies in Canada, the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), the Seoul Apart from these major track-two Forum for International Affairs and the dialogues, a plethora of other frequently Pacific Forum Center for Strategic and overlapping track-two meetings emerged. International Studies (CSIS) in the United Some of them, such as the meetings in
2 The four founding institutes were the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Indonesia; the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), Malaysia; the Singapore Institute for International Affairs (SIIA); and the Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS), Thailand. These were complemented by an individual scholar from the Philippines who later became the director of the Institute of Security and Development Studies (ISDS). The Institute for International Relations (IIR), Vietnam and the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace (CICP) joined in 1995 and 1997, respectively. See Kao, 2000:135. 3 For a critical assessment of the Asia-Pacific Roundtable, see Dickens, 2000. 4 A fifth working group on Transnational Crime was added in 1996. See CSCAP Homepage (http://www.cscap.org). 5 Member committees have been set up by Australia, Cambodia, Canada, the European CSCAP, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, North Korea, Papua New Guinea, China, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, United States and Vietnam, See CSCAP Homepage, (http://www.cscap.org). 6 These are: the Centre for Pacific Asia Studies, Stockholm University; the French Institute of International Relations, Paris; the German Society for Foreign Affairs, Berlin; the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London; the Italian Institute of International Affairs, Rome; the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta; the Ilmin International Relations Institute, Seoul; the Institute for Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing; the Japan Center for International Exchange, Tokyo; the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London; the Institute of Policy Studies, Singapore; and the School of Pacific-Asian Studies, Australian National University, Canberra. The Australian membership is surprising as Australia, despite expressing great interest, is not a member of ASEM. 7 See Japan Center for International Exchange, n.d. 6 Dialogue + Cooperation 1/2002
Venice (1995) and Manila (1996) were European Studies Program (CUESP) in partly funded and organized by the Bangkok, the European Institute for Asian European Union, others by governments Studies (EIAS) in Brussels, the Foundation or foundations, such as Germany’s major for Science and Policy in Berlin (previously political foundations, the Herbert Quandt Ebenhausen), the APEC Study Centres set Foundation in Munich, the Asia up by in the Pacific Rim countries and Foundation and, with increasing frequency, prestigious British conference organizers the Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF). Other Wilton Park and Ditchley, to name a few. frequent organizers were the Institute for As a result, by the mid-1990s, track-two Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) in meetings had virtually evolved into a Singapore, the Chulalongkorn University growth industry in the region.
Track Two and Crisis Prevention
After having briefly sketched the genesis in the region. This was seen as facilitating and the key actors of the track-two the rise of new regional powers with processes in the Asia-Pacific region and suspected hegemonic ambitions such as between Asia and Europe, this section China, India and Japan. Many states in seeks to assess the performance of track the region responded to these developments two in terms of crisis prevention. All in by deftly increasing defence spending, all, pre-empting the answer, security-related thereby creating the spectre of an arms track-two processes represent an innovative race. response to the region’s security problems and, at the same time, help shape an Asian Viewed against this background, the security identity.8 However, while track- ASEAN-ISIS track-two dialogue must be two processes had their merits, they did credited for keeping the region’s emerging not match the high, sometimes exaggerated security dilemma manageable. ASEAN-ISIS expectations placed on them, although they has successfully lobbied Southeast Asian did better than the economic track two. A and other governments in Asia Pacific to few examples may illustrate this. accede to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), which may be One of the avowed objectives of security- regarded as a Southeast Asian ‘Magna Carta’ related track-two processes in the Asia- for the peaceful settlement of disputes.9 Pacific region is the prevention of armed, interstate conflict through reducing Although the proposal to create a Southeast uncertainties and threat perceptions. Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Paramount among these uncertainties (SEANWFZ) dates back to the mid-1980s, which helped to generate track two was the and hence cannot in the first place be transition from the old bipolar to a new, attributed to track-two dialogue, ASEAN- still unknown world (dis)order. The most ISIS persistently pushed for its realization. salient of the sources of post-cold war In 1995, ASEAN’s Fifth Summit, held in uncertainty was the reduction of the Bangkok, finally launched the SEANWFZ American military presence in Asia which, to which all ten Southeast Asian nations many feared, would create a power vacuum acceded. Unfortunately, however, track two
8 Such a conclusion may be drawn from assessments such as Desmond Ball’s. He argues that ‘the importance of the track-two process to the new CSBM activity is distinctively Asian’ (see Ball, 1994:173). 9 For details, see Hänggi, 1992. 7 The Role and History of Track-two Institutions in Asia was unable to convince the five officially the European security regime. Among them recognized nuclear powers to sign a protocol were confidence-building measures,10 of accession. preventive diplomacy and moves to establish an Asian arms register. In the Equally important, ASEAN-ISIS was also process, Defence White Books were instrumental in the launch of the ASEAN published by a number of countries, Regional Forum (ARF), which now military manoeuvres announced in advance constitutes the framework for a fledgling and intentions declared to contribute to the multilateral security architecture where arms register. Yet, while these moves previously there had only been bilateral enhanced to some extent the transparency alliances. A memorandum prepared by of military strategies and defence policies, ASEAN-ISIS in 1991 for the Fourth many of them had a placebo effect at best. ASEAN Summit in Singapore (1992) called The White Books, for instance, were of for the establishment of an Asia-Pacific limited value as for the most part they were Political Dialogue which, supported by little more than statements of well-known similar initiatives from Canada and Japan, facts and figures. In most cases – though was adopted by ASEAN leaders and paved China is usually singled out in this respect the way for a decision made at the ASEAN – they did not provide any deeper insights Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Singapore into the country’s arms modernization and in 1993 to establish the ARF (Ball, defence expenditures, which remained 1993b:41; Kerr, 1994:402). The first ARF anyone’s guess, even well-informed defence meeting was held as part of the annual analysts. Moreover, Asian track-two AMM Post-ministerial Conferences (PMC) dialogues did little to address the enormous in Bangkok in 1994. Since then, the ARF rise in the region’s defence spending. has met regularly every year after the AMM. Military acquisitions – even of a power The Forum was further strengthened by the projecting and, hence, offensive quality – creation of an intersessional Senior were usually downplayed to mere acts of Officials Meeting (SOM) which was defence modernization. Dangers that the entrusted with preparing and implementing purchases of military hardware could decisions of the ARF (Ball, 1993b:41; Kerr, escalate into an arms race were in most 1994:397; Nesadurai and Stone, cases flatly denied. Unlike in Europe, few 2000a:26). CSCAP, for its part, was paving voices lobbying for disarmament were the way for engaging seclusive North Korea heard from inside the track-two dialogues. which first participated in CSCAP’s North Pacific/Northeast Asia working group In other areas, too, track two failed to before becoming a member of the ARF in substantially reduce uncertainties. The fact 2000. that Asian governments distanced themselves from proposals for a CSCA, Although the ARF proposal replaced earlier may, in the first place, be attributed to the Canadian and Australian initiatives for the pivotal role democracy and human rights establishment of a Conference for Security played in Basket One of the Helsinki and Cooperation in Asia (CSCA), a security Declaration (von Bredow, 1991:58), which regime to be patterned after the was widely – not only in Asia – interpreted Conference for Security and Cooperation as a factor facilitating the implosion of the in Europe (CSCE) (Uhe, 1996), ARF socialist bloc. Adopting such norms was nevertheless adopted key components of seen as seriously undermining national
10 Proposed were bilateral military exercises, exchange visits and training programmes of military officers, exchange of intelligence information and the notification of forthcoming military exercises. 8 Dialogue + Cooperation 1/2002
sovereignty, thereby subjecting Asian succeeded in extracting from China (and, countries to interference in their internal by coincidence, ASEAN members as well) affairs. Moreover, these norms were at an unambiguous commitment to the variance with ‘the Asian Way’ – a relativist acceptance of a ‘Code of Conduct’. and essentialist response to Western Consequently, the ongoing talks at various conditionality. It may be noted here only levels notwithstanding, claimants have not incidentally that ASEAN-ISIS has been a abstained from unilateral actions which prime mover behind these exercises of raise tensions in the region.11 identity building. Cooperative security as propagated by the region’s track-two Viewed through the lens of a European dialogues may thus be characterized as the observer it must appear that the strengths CSCE’s tool kit minus the normative of Asia’s track-two dialogues undoubtedly substance. lie in the area of preventing and defusing interstate conflicts. Yet, it is a well-known While it was undeniable that ASEAN-ISIS fact that armed interstate conflicts have gained tangible influence over ASEAN been declining in frequency. Instead, the governments – perhaps most adequately post-World War II period has seen the rise represented by the fact that since 1993 of violent domestic conflict.12 Much of this ASEAN-ISIS delegations have annually met conflict has its roots in ethnic, religious with ASEAN’s senior officials prior to the and linguistic grievances. The 11 September AMM – its impact on the region’s other attacks on the World Trade Center and the lingering problems was less clear. Although Pentagon have tragically but unequivocally ASEAN-ISIS has consistently discussed the highlighted another, though not entirely conflicting maritime claims in the new, danger – the threats emanating from potentially resource-rich South China Sea, transnationally organized terrorism. While in more than a decade it has not brought Asia – in consonance with the rest of the the issue closer to a solution. Neither has world – has virtually been unprepared to CSCAP. Yet, members of both networks deal with the latter threat, Asian track-two support – and, in fact, are involved in – a dialogues also did little to address the series of informal ‘Workshops on Managing region’s internal rebellions and thereby may Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea’ have, at least to some extent, unwittingly organized by the Indonesian government helped to compound the latter problem. and the Canadian International Addressing the numerous insurgencies in Development Agency (CIDA), which in ASEAN member countries has been an more than ten meetings has discussed a anathema for track-two dialogues as well wide range of maritime topics, but has as they have adopted the track-one mantra conspicuously avoided the key political and that these conflicts constitute internal jurisdictional issues. Although early affairs and their discussion would be a workshop resolutions may be regarded as violation of ASEAN’s sacred principle of a precursor to ASEAN’s ‘Declaration of the non-interference. NGO conferences on South China Sea’ (1992) (Busse, 2000:175), East Timor, organized in Manila, Bangkok neither the workshops, nor ASEAN-ISIS, and Kuala Lumpur in the second half of nor CSCAP initiatives have so far the 1990s, were obstructed by the
11 For a more optimistic assessment of the norm-building effects of ARF and the South China Sea workshops see Busse, 2000:172-180. 12 Asian security experts did not seem to concur with this assessment. An ASEAN-ISIS memorandum, for instance, states that internal disturbances have dramatically declined if not definitely arrested. The main security challenge consists of defence of their (ASEAN countries, J.R.) territories, including their exclusive economic zones (EEZs). See ASEAN-ISIS, 1993:9. 9 The Role and History of Track-two Institutions in Asia governments of the host countries at two dialogues may have enhanced Indonesia’s insistence. Participants were consciousness for these problems, generated harassed by security forces and in one case new ideas and served as agenda-setters, they even by mobilized mobs. It is thus hardly have had little impact on crisis prevention. surprising that ASEAN as a regional Although individual ASEAN members such organization was unable to formulate a as the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia collective response to the East Timor crisis have set up human rights commissions, unfolding in 1999. ASEAN’s silence – there is – frequent calls for it which must basically be attributed to its notwithstanding – no such body at the unresolved debate over the non- ASEAN level.14 Track-two concerns over interference principle – left the leadership Burma’s accession to ASEAN were ignored of the intervening international force to by policy makers, as was the ASEAN-ISIS Australia, a problematic choice if taking memorandum on the Cambodian coup in into account the sensitive love-hate 1997. Similarly, track-two dialogues could relationship between Indonesia and neither prevent the repeated disastrous Australia. The laudable participation of forest fires in Indonesia and the resultant large Philippine and Thai INTERFET smoke haze which choked many parts of (International Force in East Timor) and the region, nor were they able to delineate UNTAET (United Nations Transitional workable strategies to decisively combat the Authority for East Timor) contingents problem. ASEAN’s functional cooperation mitigated, but could not repair the damage – though elevated to a priority in 1995 – done to the reputation of ASEAN as a has never received the same attention as regional peace broker. ‘high politics’ and economic issues. Moreover, many of ASEAN’s modest In line with their comprehensive security activities in this area are overly dependent concept, ASEAN-ISIS, the Asia-Pacific on external funding. Roundtable, as well as CSCAP have been busily addressing so-called non- Economic development has likewise been conventional security threats. Annual a persistent topic of Asian track-two seminars on human rights and occasional dialogues which could draw from earlier conferences on democratization, international dialogue networks such as the Pacific Trade migration, environmental problems, and Development Conference (PAFTAD) disaster relief, transnational crime and and the PECC (Ball, 1994:169). It would social security are among the topics certainly be unfair to blame participants discussed.13 This shows that the close for failing to predict the collapse of several interrelationship between these ‘issue-areas’ Asian currencies in 1997 and the on the one hand, and security and subsequent Asian economic crisis. Virtually economic development on the other hand, nobody did, calling into question the has been recognized by the policy prognostic capacities of social scientists communities of Asia Pacific. In the ASEAN and economists.15 Perhaps the only case, this has facilitated in good exception was American economist Paul functionalist tradition the establishment of Krugman, although his famous Foreign functional cooperation. Yet, while track- Affairs article, forecasting the slowing down
13 See, for instance, ‘Regional Security Dialogue: A Calendar of Asia-Pacific Events’, January-December 1998 and January-December 1999, (http://aus-cscap.anu.edu..au/calendar98.htm). 14 The topic was inconclusively treated at the Thirty-fourth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Hanoi. See ‘Joint Communiqué of the Thirty-fourth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting’, Hanoi, 23-24 July 2001. 15 As happened during the conference ‘Asien: Zum Wandel verdammt – Wege aus der Krise’, organized by the German Society of Asian Studies, The Institute of Asian Affairs Hamburg, on 20 November 1998 in Bonn. 10 Dialogue + Cooperation 1/2002
of Asia’s economic growth, rested on during the boom years and the firm belief arguments different from those causing the that the twenty-first century would be the collapse. Yet, while Krugman – as he Pacific Century and see ‘Asia’s rise to the himself would maintain – was 10 per cent sun’ (Mahbubani, 1993) left virtually no right, think tank economists in the Asia- room for the discussion of more austere Pacific region (and, of course, elsewhere scenarios.17 Political decision makers as too) were 150 per cent wrong.16 The great well as epistemic communities thus majority of them were unable or unwilling ignored the well-known aphorism of to read the signs, such as high current ancient Chinese strategic thinker Sun Tzu: account deficits, mounting foreign debt ‘To rely on rustics and not prepare is the and a sluggish export performance. greatest of crimes, to be prepared Educated in the United States, many of beforehand for any contingency is the them were – and still are – unperturbed greatest of virtues’.18 adherents of a neo-liberal growth model, which they saw thriving on the economic The Asian-European policy networks, virtues of the Asian value hypothesis. As which, beyond a somewhat bumpy political the Asian value hypothesis was a deliberate dialogue, also chiefly centred on economic attempt to construct a distinct Southeast relations, likewise did little to prevent the and East Asian regional identity, few Asian crisis. One may even argue that the Asian- scholars were prepared to admit publicly European dialogue accelerated the the contradictions between an intransparent unfolding of the crisis. It induced European (because highly personalized) patronage- banks and other investors, who, as driven political culture and the neo-liberal latecomers, felt they were losing out in the agenda which needs a certain degree of race for a foothold in the world’s most predictability, good governance and rule of economically dynamic region, to law. Critical voices refusing to consent with indiscriminately step up investments. The the all-too-familiar euphemisms portraying race to Asia’s markets resulted in less than corruption and nepotism as personalism, prudent investment decisions as investors pragmatism and flexibility, and warning of teamed up with dubious partners and the widening social disparities and regional channelled large amounts of money into imbalances, were branded as mavericks intransparent projects. On the eve of the rocking the boat. When the crisis finally crisis, European banks were much more struck, it became very obvious that Asia’s exposed to non-performing loans than their think tanks and track-two dialogues had competitors from North America and even failed to develop contingency plans to deal Japan. As a result, when the crisis struck, with a major recession. This is surprising panicking European bankers feverishly as some Southeast Asian countries had struggled to pull out their investments from already gone through a short, yet painful the region, thereby only exacerbating the recession in the mid-1980s. Evidence for downward spiral. CAEC, as most think this was the fact that in the ASEAN track- tanks and track-two networks, also two dialogues as well as in the ASEAN responded belatedly to the crisis. A steering ministerial rounds, monetary issues had committee meeting in November 1997 played an absolutely subordinate role. The decided to set up a task force on the hubris displayed by some public figures ‘Changes in the Global Financial System’
16 Quoted from Rüdiger Machetzki’s lecture at the conference ‘Asien: Zum Wandel verdammt – Wege aus der Krise’, organized by the German Society of Asian Studies, The Institute of Asian Affairs Hamburg, on 20 November 1998 in Bonn. 17 For a more positive evaluation of Asian multilateralism to crisis management, see Harris, 2000. 18 Quoted from Ball, 1994:173. 11 The Role and History of Track-two Institutions in Asia half a year after the crisis erupted. in Asia. ASEM in cooperation with the Moreover, none of CAEC’s task forces World Bank has set up a trust fund to study addressed the social security issue. This is social security systems and Europe has surprising, since the crisis has tragically considerable expertise to offer in this exposed the lack of social security networks domain.
Conclusion
Summing up, there is no doubt that track- overlooked that in the aftermath of the two dialogues have enhanced the Asian crisis and the concomitant consciousness of decision makers and the intensification of democratization in some wider public of a broad range of policy ASEAN countries, track-two dialogues issues in the region which, if left have also developed a more open, more unattended, would have the capacity to pluralist and more discursive format. evolve into serious crises. But there is also no doubt that, except for the area of ‘high This proximity to government circles may politics’, track-two dialogues did not meet explain why track-two dialogues are still high expectations that they would be a identified with a conservative, essentially mechanism towards crisis prevention. They state-centric approach to security (Kraft, have not effected paradigmatic changes in 2000). The cooperative security rhetoric the region’s strategic thinking, and their of the dialogues, which seem to pave the role as ‘propellers of policy learning’ way for institutionalist policies such as (Nesadurai and Stone, 2000b:183) must preventive diplomacy and confidence- be seen in proper perspective. In fact, building measures, are frequently exposed track-two dialogues are no panacea where as a thin veneer over deeply entrenched track one has failed. Much depends on the realist thinking. As a result, eminent realist framework within which they operate. In concepts such as ‘balancing’ and ‘power’ this regard, several constraints must be still permeate track-two dialogues discussed. (Cheeseman, 1999:335). In classical realist tradition, military power is still viewed by Undeniably, most track-two participants many as the resource most able to influence were renowned experts in their domain. the outcome in other ‘issue-areas’ as well. However, taking into account the Institutionalist policies are further authoritarian origins of think tanks and inhibited by the norms of ‘the ASEAN track-two meetings, the issue of autonomy Way’, which eschews institution-building inevitably emerges (Kraft, 2000). Most and favours relationship building (Ba, think-tank scholars and other track-two 1997). The primacy of sovereign statehood participants, even though attending in an tallies well with an intergovernmental unofficial capacity, are closely affiliated concept of cooperation and ‘à la carte with their governments. While this does multilateralism’19 targeting the not necessarily mean there is ‘self- enhancement of national power.20 More censorship’ as maintained by Pauline Kerr advanced concepts of sovereignty pooling (1994:400), it is nevertheless true that there and supranational cooperation, however, are limits to the scope of experimentation have been an anathema to this discourse with reformist ideas. Yet, it should not be (Rüland, 2000). Accordingly, track-two
19 For this term, see Goody, 2001:40. 20 This, at least, is the substance of concepts such as national and regional resilience. 12 Dialogue + Cooperation 1/2002
discourses have been unable to prevent civil society (Kerr, 1994:399). Although the governments from resorting to unilateralist problem has been acknowledged and is moves whenever such exit-behaviour being tackled with the establishment of the seemed to pay off for them. This failure ASEAN People’s Assembly (APA), track- became most evident during the Asian two dialogues by and large have not been crisis when ASEAN, as a regional able to serve as a bridge between the organization, did not even attempt to authorities and the activist NGO networks formulate a common position vis-à-vis the known as track three. Neither have track- International Monetary Fund in the two meetings been able to bridge the negotiations over the bail-out packages. generational gap. Participant observation Disunity in times of crisis sets a bad in Asian-European track-two meetings precedent for future cooperation. Even suggests that younger ASEAN scholars take though persistently denied by high-ranking a more critical view of the orthodoxies of ASEAN spokesmen, there is no question ASEAN cooperation and are less inclined that since then the grouping has been in to be remote-controlled by their serious disarray. governments. ‘Track-two meetings are noted for the great regularity with which The strong involvement of government certain people are invited to different officials is not only making a fiction out of meetings while others are excluded’, writes the non-official nature of track-two Herman Joseph Kraft, calling track two an dialogues, it is also creating new ‘exclusivist club’ (2000:349). His criticism orthodoxies to which bureaucracies not only reflects a lack of inclusiveness,21 tenaciously cling. Based on my own but also a lack of diversification of think observations, diplomats are particularly tanks in the region, While in the West think cautious and averse to bold brainstorming, tanks specialize along sectoral lines as a even if operating under the protection of response to the growing complexity of Chatham House rules. Discussions are policy matters, in Southeast Asia ASEAN- thus rarely the frank discourse which ISIS dominates most themes. The organizers advertise them to be. There is contribution made by the recycling of still the tendency – well known from track conventional wisdom to the enhancement one – to avoid controversial exchanges of of knowledge is limited. opinion, to resort to euphemisms, to indulge in self-congratulatory rhetoric and These deficiencies, however, must be to sweep problems under the carpet. This weighed against the continuity provided by holds true for Asian and European ASEAN-ISIS and CSCAP. Their member diplomats alike. Consequently, as a rule of institutes are a stabilizing factor, especially thumb, it may take two to three years to in countries with a clientelist political convince them that ossified, often culture such as the Philippines, Thailand, essentialist formulas, maintained for the Indonesia and, to a lesser extent, South sake of political correctness, need to be Korea. While governments come and go, adjusted to changing political realities. usually reshuffling the upper echelons of the bureaucracy, ASEAN-ISIS remains in Track-two dialogues in Asia Pacific have place serving as an ‘institutional memory’ also been rightly and repeatedly criticized (Kerr, 1994:399), providing badly needed for failing to incorporate the NGO expertise to the novices in the cabinet and community and other representatives of the bureaucracy.
21 See also Dosch, 1997:95. 13 The Role and History of Track-two Institutions in Asia
While there is ample room for discussing and a historically and culturally deeply reforms of track two based on the foregoing entrenched distrust toward the outside analysis, the crux of the matter is the world, it must be suspected that think tanks political will of governments to adopt the and track-two processes in Asia Pacific will advice provided by the policy community. fight an up-hill battle towards a truly Yet, given a foreign policy establishment cooperative security concept for a long time that is still exposed to the strong influence to come. of the military in many Asian countries,
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16 The Cambodian Experience The Cambodian Experience
Norodom Sirivudh
I wish to take this opportunity to express Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung has made it a my most sincere appreciation to the leading think tank on security and foreign Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung for inviting me to policy issues in the country. At the same participate in this very important security time, over the years, the CICP has joined dialogue conference. The Friedrich-Ebert- well-established networks of friends and Stiftung has been a very close partner of partners with which it has regular contacts, the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation dialogues and consultations through and Peace (CICP), of which I am the strategic track-two frameworks, such as the Chairman of the Board of Directors, since Association of Southeast Asian Nations its inception in 1994. Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) and the Council on As a leading track-two think tank in Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Cambodia, the CICP’s role is very similar (CSCAP). Through these strategic to many other track-two institutions in the networks, the CICP has reached out beyond Asia-Pacific region, the only exceptions Cambodia’s borders and has engaged other perhaps being the approach, style, level of like-minded institutions on strategic issues engagement and complexity of issues facing such as peace, security and development. each society. Nevertheless, I want to share Besides working on national issues of great the Cambodian experience with regard to importance, the CICP has engaged in the role of a policy-oriented institute in regional and international issues affecting engaging policy dialogue on a number of Cambodia’s vital interests. In addition, in critical issues at the national, sub-regional, terms of crisis prevention, I believe the regional and international levels, in CICP has played an instrumental role in a particular the security dialogue. Indeed, the number of areas, as outlined below. close cooperation of the CICP with the
(1) Confidence and Trust Building
At the national level, the role of track-two The critical factor is to initiate a institutions, such as the CICP, is important constructive policy dialogue in which for the promotion of confidence-building parties would begin to interact with one measures (CBMs) as well as enhancing trust another and to build trust in the process of among key political leaders across political interaction. At the regional level, informal parties, where suspicions and diplomacy or track-two consultation is a misunderstandings have been the order of very useful, important process in which the day. A newly established institution officials, semi-officials and track-two people would often be quickly labelled one way or engage in a consultative process and open the other. The approach here is to get key discussion on vital issues of shared interest. political actors to engage in a policy dialogue The process could certainly be expanded with the opportunity to exchange views and to the international level. In essence, the perspectives on issues of mutual interest. promotion of CBMs is essential to the 17 Dialogue + Cooperation 1/2002
building of an environment conducive to between Cambodia and other countries. political dialogue and engagement. Over the This is important for crisis prevention and years, the CICP has been active in the a critical factor for conflict management. promotion of CBMs in the country and
(2) Contribution to the Change of Mindsets or Building a Broader View Another important contribution of the some years to change the mindsets of some track-two institution is the promotion of a key people so they can better understand change of mindset among policy makers the region and the world around us. Key and the public at large, especially through policy makers at various levels need to have intellectual debate and active discussion, longer and broader views and perspectives where the logic of reason and the art of in order to understand the policy options persuasion prevail. Policy makers from that they have. Given the current process countries which have been isolated from of globalization and growing the world for some time, such as Cambodia, interdependence, leaders and intellectuals need to be actively engaged in order to need to have a broader view of regional change their mindsets and their views of and global perspectives. The change of the region and the world. Changing mindsets could contribute to growing mindsets could be considered one of the tolerance, mutual understanding and most critical contributions of the work and improved relations. In this context, the activities of track-two organizations. For change of mindsets could contribute to crisis example, the CICP has been working for prevention and conflict settlement.
(3) Promotion of an Integrationist Policy as an End to Isolationist Policy
Another important contribution of policy organizations helped end the country’s research institutes such as the CICP is to decades of isolation and made it a ‘normal’ actively promote the integration process, member of the community of nations. At in particular Cambodia’s integration into the same time, Cambodia’s integration into the region and the world. The CICP ASEAN contributed to positive regional undertook enormous work in preparation political reconciliation, which enhanced for Cambodia’s membership in the regional peace, security and stability. In this Association of Southeast Asian Nations respect, the track-two institution has a (ASEAN) as well as Cambodia’s engagement pivotal role to play in shaping the policy with the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), formulation process and the thinking of and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). leaders in the way countries make their own Cambodia’s membership in these regional decisions.
(4) Promotion of Active Policy Debate and Consultation
One of the most important activities which consultation as a way of brainstorming ideas most think tanks are involved in is the and proposing possible scenarios for policy promotion of active policy debate and makers to deliberate. In this context, the 18 The Cambodian Experience intellectual input or the contribution of vacuum. Most leading think tanks would innovative ideas by track-two institutions have to become more involved in the policy are absolutely essential. The policy debate and policy formation process in formulation process in Third World order to ensure the best policy for the countries becomes even more relevant and country, especially in the area of crisis important, and I would argue that it does prevention. not work in an intellectual or track-two
(5) Promotion of Constructive Partnership between Track-two Institutions and the Government
However, in order to ensure that track-two process, track-two institutions need some institutions become more effective and degree of credibility and legitimacy to take relevant to policy implementation, they have a lead role. In this respective, I would argue to engage in building constructive that think tanks should strengthen their partnerships between themselves and the relations with the government in order to government or government institutions. proactively play a substantial role in crisis Acknowledging that this is a two-way prevention.
Present and Future Roles of Track-two Institutions
Having raised the above issues, I wish to Asia has put added strain on governments, focus on the Cambodian experience. For challenging national labour market policies the immediate future, there are key issues and governmental social services, and may which have an impact on Cambodia as well provoke cultural and ethnic tensions. as regional and international repercussions. These issues include the effects of Cambodia’s re-entry into the international globalization and non-traditional security community exposes the country and its issues or transnational issues such as the political, economic and social institutions environment, trafficking of drugs and more directly to globalization trends and humans, illegal migration and small arms their impact. However, due to its young proliferation. The evolving security threats population – 45 per cent below the age of are not traditional in terms of being 15 – Cambodia has high potential to accept exclusively military, but are transnational rapid change and adapt to it accordingly. in character. Current phenomena, such as Another aspect of Cambodia’s population growth and non-sustainable demographics that has to be considered is development patterns, unregulated the estimated population growth of 50 per population movements and transnational cent in the next ten years, challenging the crime, are particularly pertinent in the structure and all sectors of Cambodian Southeast Asian region. The combination society. The complexity of these human of unmitigated population growth and non- security issues within a rapidly changing sustainable development have resulted in and technology-dominated age may be rapid environmental degradation with the further aggravated by the lack of experience ensuing effect of creating resource and the inability of governments and shortages that may result in increased food countries to deal with them. Countries such shortages. The ever-increasing migration of as Cambodia are just re-emerging on the people within the countries of Southeast regional and international platform. Under 19 Dialogue + Cooperation 1/2002
the prevailing circumstances, the possibility together available experts and resources and of failing to devise solutions or policy concentrate on policy issues. Government options and apply appropriate measures to leaders suggest informally or request address those adequately is high. directly policy studies in certain fields of policy where more input is needed. In light of the challenges mentioned above, Similarly, at times, government officials Cambodian think tanks or the track-two comment positively on the role and the work community have to be much more involved of track-two institutions in Cambodia and in shaping politics and policies. Given the provide feed-back on the studies or daunting tasks ahead, the question arises strategies of institutes. For example, the whether track-two institutions have CICP has received a number of comments sufficient capacity to address the multitude concerning its work in the past seven years. of complex issues with which the country Some suggest that the CICP should is confronted. There is no doubt that today’s consider inviting more government officials global challenges and national trends put to its meetings. Others suggest that the more pressure not only on think tanks but CICP should work more closely with also on civil society organizations as a government institutions. In fact, the CICP whole. Cambodian track-two institutions appreciates suggestions and feedback from have limited staff, skills, resources and government ministries, public institutions funds to carry out necessary research and other organizations helping to improve projects. In order to be more effective and the quality of its activities, its research more dynamic, Cambodian think tanks will agenda, and in meeting the ever-changing have to strengthen their research capacity needs of society. In this context, the CICP as well as expand their resource base. strives to remain a relevant institution taking up the challenges of the day. The Track-two institutions need to cover more need to balance the political interests of all ground and more sectors, including crisis groups within society is one of the most prevention. There is a trend for think tanks critical challenges Cambodian think tanks to increasingly team up to work in are currently facing. Otherwise, they risk collaboration on research projects, pool losing public trust and confidence.
Conclusion
It is evident that the role of think tanks in to crisis prevention. Disseminating Cambodia is vital, making government information through the distribution of leaders and law makers, the private sector think tank publications, using the and the general public cognisant of all ‘information highway’ and hosting lectures aspects and pertinent issues affecting them, and conferences ensures that information in particular the impact of globalization, gleaned by research institutes as well as their regionalism and human security. Policy policy recommendations, are made analysis and vigorous debate remain the accessible to a wide audience. In cornerstone on which policy-oriented undertaking these challenging tasks, track- institutions like the CICP carry out their two institutions assist in creating a mandate. Cambodian think tanks and civil constructive and non-confrontational society institutions strive to build human process for rehabilitation and the rebuilding resource capacity through training and of one of the world’s most recent workshops, contributing to national democracies in the post-conflict era. institutional development and, in particular, 20 Multilateralism in East Asia: The Role of ARF and Its Future
Second Panel The ASEAN Regional Forum and European Security Interests
21 Multilateralism in East Asia: The Role of ARF and Its Future Multilateralism in East Asia: The Role of ARF and Its Future
Lee Seo-hang
Introduction: Background for Emerging Multilateralism
During the Cold War period, security in era. Given the lack of any multilateral the entire Asia-Pacific region was institutions in the region, it is observed maintained on the basis of a network of that greater independence from the old bilateral security arrangements, with the restraints imposed by Cold War bipolarity United States playing the central role. could lead to a dangerous regional power Unlike Europe, Asia Pacific had no region- vacuum. This, in turn, could result in wide anti-communist security alliance, extreme rivalry between potential power mainly due to the diverse histories and contenders for regional military cultural roots as well as the peculiar local predominance. They may seek more patterns of rivalry and enmity in the region. independent security postures and incur As a result, alliances in Asia Pacific greater defence expenditure, perhaps based assumed the familiar ‘hub and spokes’ on an assumption that alliance affiliation architecture whereby states largely dealt with extra-regional powers may diminish with one another on security matters unless such alliances can be adapted to suit through the Washington hub. However, the changing local security situation. there was little in the way of horizontal linkage among alliance partners (Foot, Indeed, the two regional rivalries in East 1995:230). Asia – namely, China and Japan – appear to have been engaged in accelerating Since the end of the Cold War, two military arms proliferation over the past noticeable trends have developed in few years, and this acceleration of regional security thinking, planning and policies arms build-up is made more worrisome by promoting multilateralism1 simultaneously: the absence of any multilateral security regionalization of security politics and the arrangements. Reasons for the military arms growing importance of a cooperative build-up in the region no longer stem from approach to security. The emergence and ideological conflicts but rather from background of these trends in the region growing concerns with strategic uncertainty can be explained in various ways. and differing national interests, that is, the urge to protect or expand a sphere of First, there is a growing need to reduce influence and the fear of losing it. In order political uncertainties in the post-Cold War to avoid or extinguish the risk of this type
1 There are two senses in which the terms ‘multilateral’ and ‘multilateralism’ can be applied to state behaviour. It is important to differentiate between them. The first is as a nominal, or quantitative, descriptor; that is, the term ‘multilateral’ used as an adjective to refer to instances of coordinating national policies or behaviours by groups of three or more states. The term ‘multilateralism’, on the other hand, has come to be used to distinguish the character or qualities of the behaviour of coordination among states. In this qualitative sense, multilateralism is a form of state practice that accords with certain principles and that involves the development of norms, collective identities and institutions (formal and informal) concerning cooperation and conflict management over extended periods of time. For more details on the concept, see Job, 1997:165-191 and Ruggie, 1993:3-47. 22 Dialogue + Cooperation 1/2002
of arms race in the region, it is argued that cooperation among nations. In this context, the need for multilateral security dialogues meeting the unconventional threats to and consultations can no longer be security in the post-Cold War era requires neglected and that the time has come to institutional innovations and an emphasis craft some sort of multilateral security on a multilateral approach in the region framework as a measure to enhance (Harding, 1994:439). confidence, dissipate possible tensions and reduce political uncertainties. Third, interest in regional security arrangements has also been stimulated by Second, another major reason for the economic regionalism in East Asia. emergence of multilateralism or a Generally speaking, economic regionalism multilateral approach to security is the need is believed to enhance self-confidence and to meet the broadening concept of security encourage greater self-reliance in matters itself and the related growing awareness of of security. Over the past few decades, the the non-conventional threats to security in economies of the entire Asia-Pacific region, the region. Today, states in East Asia tend through active regional cooperation, have to articulate security in broad terms and grown more rapidly for a longer period of the phrase ‘comprehensive security’, first time than any other economies in world coined by Japan in 1980, is now gaining history. As a result, the Asia-Pacific region, currency in most other states in the region including East Asia, has become the main (Alagappa, 1998:624). In the entire Asia- source of dynamism in international trade Pacific region, military security has not and the largest source of surplus savings vanished as a key element of regional for international investment, although this security. However, the concept of regional has recently been somewhat weakened. security has expanded to include economic and environmental security, as opposed to Recognizing this, there is a need for being merely the underpinning of multilateral dialogue and cooperation in traditional security concerns. order to maintain regional stability and facilitate the economic development of the Security concerns now include such things region. The preservation of such economic as environmental problems (the pollution cooperation in East Asia has become the of the atmosphere and the oceans, nuclear basis for countries in the region to promote waste dumping and the dangers of climatic and to strengthen cooperative and political change), various forms of transnational relationships. criminal activity (terrorism, drug trafficking and piracy), as well as the Finally, the new set of conditions generated uncontrolled movement of people across by the end of the Cold War – the national frontiers, civil war, poverty, dissolution of the Soviet Union and the political repression and natural disasters. lifting of the common threat – and the These issues do not involve direct military advantages of a multilateral security deployments, but they may give rise to the dialogue, gleaned from the European threat or use of force. experience, have raised the need for a multilateral approach in East Asia. With Governments cannot solve these problems the end of the Cold War, the immense through unilateral means. Moreover, the ideological barrier that for decades gave prevailing bilateral relations in the region rise to distrust and hostility among states are not sufficient to solve such problems. has collapsed. The implications of this new They have the potential to be fully prevented situation are that all regional states in East or resolved with effective international Asia are able to cooperate with each other, 23 Multilateralism in East Asia: The Role of ARF and Its Future promoting peace and security in ways that In particular, the current trend emphasizing were impossible during the Cold War. comprehensive security by states is channelling the regional interest in There are many advantages for each of the multilateral security dialogue and major powers in East Asia in becoming a cooperation to prevent conflict through part of the multilateral security dialogue. confidence- and security-building measures. For instance, the United States would profit from the institutionalization of the However, with the onset of Asia’s financial American presence in the region, since at crisis in recent years, it has been argued the present it has neither the resources nor that multilateralism in the region is almost the political will to become involved in inoperative. Thus far, the regional response security problems in all areas of the region. to the crisis has received heavy criticism It is not necessary to postulate a relative from those who believe that the regional decline in American power in the region multilateral mechanisms have done little to to consider this an advantage. In fact, a resolve Asia’s financial vulnerabilities. multilateral mechanism is not likely to be Paradoxically, the Asian crisis has illustrated established in the absence of assertive and the need for stronger regional institutions creative American diplomacy. The for cooperation, while underscoring the advantage lies not in postponing retreat, incapacity of existing institutions to mount but rather in offering an additional method an adequate response to the crisis. Keeping of engagement and a forum for managing this criticism in mind, the author would a peaceful transition in East Asia (Goodby, like to examine the role of the ASEAN 1992). Regional Forum (ARF), as the foremost example of the existing multilateral security These are the conditions in which mechanisms in East Asia, and explore ways multilateralism or a multilateral approach to strengthen the organization in order to to security has proliferated in the region. secure regional peace and stability.
Existing Multilateral Mechanisms in East Asia: The Case of the ARF 1. Characteristics and General Assessment of the ARF
The ARF, reflecting the abovementioned at the end of the inaugural ARF meeting trend of multilateralism in East Asia, is a in Bangkok, Thailand, in July 1994, regional response to the uncertainty and underscored the commitment of potential for instability resulting from the participating nations ‘to foster the habit of end of the Cold War. It is a ministerial- constructive dialogue and consultation on level annual dialogue established by the political and security issues of common member nations of the Association of interest and concern’ in order to make Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in order ‘significant efforts toward confidence to engage all their Asia-Pacific neighbours building and security cooperation in the for the first time in a structured multilateral Asia-Pacific region’.2 dialogue on broad-ranging Asian security issues. The Chairman’s Statement issued As shown in the Chairman’s Statement, the
2 See the Chairman’s Statement issued at the end of the First ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in Bangkok, 25 July 1994. The complete text of the statement is found in ASEAN Regional Forum: Documents Series 1994-2000 (Jakarta: The ASEAN Secretariat, 2000), pp. 1-3. 24 Dialogue + Cooperation 1/2002
objective of the forum was to create a more of the Cold War. It is not a treaty or alliance predictable and stable pattern of confined to participants from the Asia- relationships between major powers and Pacific region. It also includes the European Southeast Asia. In this conceptualization Union as a member.3 In addition, the ARF was a recognition that regional issues deliberately sought the participation of the required the engagement of the great major powers as well as mid-sized powers powers in regional affairs. The ARF such as the Republic of Korea, as well as introduced a new norm into the ASEAN large India which has a significant impact process of cooperative security that on regional developments. Its membership emphasized inclusiveness through the was not limited to like-minded states. promotion of dialogue among like-minded Instead, the focus was on inclusiveness – as well as non-like-minded states (Desker, bringing in participants with an interest in 2001). broader Asian issues who traditionally had been excluded from the consultative In the context of regional institution processes initiated by ASEAN in its Post- building, the ARF is unique. It was not Ministerial Conference (PMC) dialogues created in the aftermath of war, like several with major Western states and China. (For European institutions that developed in the the structure and members of the ARF, see wake of World War II and in the shadow Table 1).
Table 1: The Structure and Members of the ARF
Formation July 1994
Members ASEAN: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam ASEAN’s Dialogue Partners: Australia, Canada, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Russia, the European Union and the United States ASEAN’s Observer: Papua New Guinea Others: Mongolia and North Korea
Primary • To promote confidence-building measures Objectives • To develop preventive diplomacy • To elaborate approaches to conflict resolution
Organization Annual Ministerial Meeting Senior Officials Meeting Three Intersessional Support Groups (ISG) 1. ISG on Confidence-building Measures 2. ISG on Peace-keeping Operations 3. ISG on Search and Rescue No permanent secretariat
3 Economic cooperation is clearly the most immediate factor in forging closer cooperation between Asia and Europe. However, political-security cooperation should not be deemed unimportant. After all, the world is one and peace is indivisible, and economic globalization as well as the advancement of technology in transportation and information have brought about much closer relations between distant places and different parts of the world. This argument has been ASEAN’s justification for bringing the European Union into the ARF. 25 Multilateralism in East Asia: The Role of ARF and Its Future
In the seven years since its inauguration, First, the ARF is the only regional forum the ARF has taken an important step that discusses sensitive regional issues. It toward the creation of a sense of strategic has even started to discuss sensitive community in a region where there is little domestic issues. While there has been little history of inclusive multilateral approaches progress on Myanmar, a process of to security and defence. It has shown that discussion has begun which would have it has an important role to play in been unthinkable a decade ago. encouraging regional support for international regimes against the Second, the ARF has helped to build proliferation of weapons of mass comfort levels and to create an atmosphere destruction.4 While it is unwise to tackle conducive to cooperative security in a all the challenges it faces at present, the region that has not been accustomed to ARF foresees a gradual evolution. The cooperation on security-related questions. evolution of the ARF could take place in three stages: Third, the ARF has facilitated the reduction of tension and the management of regional 1. the promotion of confidence-building relationships. It has not resolved disputes measures or prevented the outbreak of conflicts but 2. the development of preventive it could be used to minimize the impact of diplomacy mechanisms; and differing perceptions and interests. 3. the elaboration of approaches to conflict.5 Fourth, the ARF has begun the process of creating predictable and stable relationships This evolutionary scheme appears to be a among regional states. It has engendered somehow idealistic vision of development, an increasing awareness of regional norms since the ARF is still located at stage one. among the major powers and has alerted It is noteworthy, however, that the Fourth the regional states to the changing values Ministerial Meeting of the ARF in 1997 and perspectives arising from today’s agreed on moving towards the second stage globalized environment. of consideration of ‘preventive diplomacy’. It is also meaningful that the ARF Despite its significant achievements, the members, including China and the ASEAN ARF receives much criticism. For example, countries, which were sceptical of a rapid Taiwan is not permitted to participate and movement of the ARF to the second stage mainland China has insisted that ‘internal of preventive diplomacy, have agreed to Chinese affairs’ not to be put on the agenda, consider moving to preventive diplomacy effectively blocking ARF discussion of played at the official level, although this cross-strait tensions, despite their obvious consideration will take place in the broad regional implications. Members also intersessional group meetings on CBMs. tip-toe around many sensitive issues due to the need for consensus. For instance, it In the light of these positive was merely noted in the ARF Chairman’s considerations, it is possible to highlight Statement of last year that ‘the Ministers the achievements of the ARF (Desker, exchanged views on the situation in South 2001). Asia and some expressed their continuing
4 The nuclear non-proliferation issue has been a subject of the ARF since the first meeting. 5 See ‘The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper’, in the Annex of the Chairman’s Statement for the Second ARF in 1995. 26 Dialogue + Cooperation 1/2002
concern. The Ministers expressed the hope talks with ASEAN or other claimants on that efforts be made to bring about positive an individual basis. developments in the region’.6 Meanwhile, the need for consensus ensures There are some illusions regarding the that the ARF will move ahead only as fast speed with which the ARF will move ahead. as its most cautious members desire or The agreement at the Second ARF Meeting permit. This indicates that the evolution to ‘move at a pace comfortable to all of the ARF from a confidence-building participants’ was aimed at tempering the measures ‘talk shop’ to a true preventive desire of more Western-oriented members diplomacy mechanism (as called for in its for immediate results in favour of the 1995 Concept Paper) will be a long and ‘evolutionary’ approach preferred by the difficult one (Cassa, 2000). ASEAN states, claiming the process as being as important as its eventual Finally, as an initial step, the view or substantive products. The time-honoured suggestions on specific issues agreed upon Asian principle of ‘non-intereference in one by the ARF members need to be another’s internal affairs’ places some transmitted by the ARF Chair to the important topics essentially off limits. The countries or parties concerned. This is an Chinese have even been reluctant to opportunity to transform the ARF from a address conflicting claims in the South ‘talk shop’ to a genuine body of security China Sea at the ARF, insisting instead on cooperation in Asia and the Pacific.
2. Recent Development of the ARF North Korea’s Participation in the ARF North Korea’s entry. The Chairman’s The most notable development of the ARF Statement issued at the Seventh ARF in the past few years is that North Korea Ministerial Meeting welcomed North joined the Forum as its twenty-third Korea’s participation. Additionally, member in July 2000. Since the end of the referring to the inter-Korean summit of Cold War various frameworks of June, the statement noted with satisfaction multilateral security cooperation and the positive developments on the Korean dialogue have been established in the Asia- Peninsula and expressed hope for further Pacific region, but North Korea had progress in inter-Korean talks, United remained internationally isolated, refusing States-North Korea talks and Japan-North to participate in these arrangements. In Korea talks. The Chairman’s Statement of June last year, however, North Korea held the previous year had expressed ‘concern’ a summit with the Republic of Korea and over the missile launch by North Korea, began to change its diplomatic policy saying that it ‘could heighten tensions and dramatically by taking a range of positive may have serious consequences for stability steps, such as starting dialogue with the in the Korean Peninsula and the region’. United States, Japan and some European Considering that statement, it can be noted countries. North Korea’s entry into the ARF that North Korea made considerable and the changes taking place in the nation diplomatic gains through its participation strongly impressed Asia Pacific. in the ARF. Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan, who chaired the meeting, All ARF member countries welcomed welcomed North Korea’s participation,
6 See the Chairman’s Statement of the Seventh Ministerial Meeting of the ARF, Bangkok, 27 July 2000. 27 Multilateralism in East Asia: The Role of ARF and Its Future saying that it would contribute to regional between confidence-building measures and peace, better understanding and a higher preventive diplomacy with the focus on the level of confidence in the region. concept and principles of preventive diplomacy. In this regard, the ministers However, it remains to be seen how North welcomed the offer by ASEAN to prepare Korea’s presence at the ARF will affect the a report on the concept and principles of multilateral dialogue. In addition to preventive diplomacy. promoting greater understanding, the ARF Ministerial Meeting made it possible for In light of these developments, attention senior officials to meet directly – out of was focused on which agreement on the ARF context such contacts would have preventive diplomacy the ARF would reach been difficult, if not impossible, to arrange. at the Seventh Ministerial Meeting in For instance, the ARF meeting in 2000 set 2000. However, it was not until this year the stage for the first ever official meeting that a report on the concept and principles between the North Korean Foreign of preventive diplomacy was adopted, but Minister and the United States Secretary this was not followed by a specific action of State. And, of course, the ARF meeting plan. provided an opportunity for continued high level and direct interaction between North Regarding overlaps between confidence- and South Korean officials.7 building measures and preventive diplomacy, it was confirmed at the Seventh Slow Progress in Preventive Diplomacy Ministerial Meeting that agreement has At the Second Ministerial Meeting in 1995, been reached in four points: the ARF members agreed to promote the enhancement of the role of the ARF chair, development of the Forum in three broad the preparation of the ARF register of stages, namely, the promotion of security experts and eminent persons, the confidence-building measures, the publishing of the annual security outlook, development of preventive diplomacy and and the voluntary background briefing on the elaboration of approaches to conflict. regional security issues. In this respect, the The ministers agreed to create an ministers requested the ISG on confidence- Intersessional Support Group (ISG) on building measures to further develop the confidence-building measures prior to the implementation of these efforts. next meeting. At the Fourth Ministerial Concerning an enhanced role of the ARF Meeting in 1997, the ministers agreed to chair, the ministers noted that progress had start government-level studies on the been made in promoting exchanges second stage of ARF development, namely, between the ARF and the United Nations, preventive diplomacy, and requested the the Organization of American States and ISG on confidence-building measures to the Organization for Security and clarify approaches to preventive diplomacy. Cooperation in Europe, as well as At the Fifth Ministerial Meeting in 1998 interactions between intergovernmental participants agreed to begin exploring the meetings (track one) and non- overlap between confidence-building intergovernmental meetings (track two). measures and preventive diplomacy, including specific matters. And at the Sixth In addition, the first edition of the Annual meeting in 1999, the ministers requested Security Outlook was published in 2000, the ISG to further explore the overlap which had been prepared voluntarily by
7 However, the North Korean Foreign Minister did not attend this year’s ARF Ministerial Meeting, which was held in Hanoi, sending instead his deputy. 28 Dialogue + Cooperation 1/2002
member states without any editorial role and eminent persons were finally adopted by the ARF chair. Documents on the at the Eighth Ministerial Meeting in July enhancement of the role of the ARF chair 2001. and the ARF register of security experts
Conclusion: The Need to Strengthen the ARF
The ARF, the largest framework of political perspective. There is also a need to and security dialogue in Asia Pacific, has a appreciate the very fact that security large role to play in securing regional peace dialogue during the ARF session itself is and stability. However, in spite of the contributing to promoting confidence- agreement reached on its three-stage building among participants. development process, the ARF has yet to move from the first-stage process of In addition, in the light of concerns raised confidence-building to the second stage of about the Forum’s weakness and the preventive diplomacy. For this reason, changing regional environment, some doubt has been voiced about its measures have to be put in place to effectiveness. Judging from the level of strengthen the ARF, for instance through institutionalization, the ARF has not made the establishment of an institutional much progress. The ARF, however, is a framework for the implementation of security forum flexible enough for North preventive diplomacy, the concurrent Korea to be fully associated with. It is convocation of meetings for senior officials agreed that the ARF’s development process of defence ministries and of foreign must be acceptable to all participating ministries, the establishment of a countries. The level of institutionalization secretariat and a shift from an exchange is just one of the criteria used to evaluate forum to a problem-solving institution. the effectiveness of the ARF. There is a Only a strong ARF will be capable of need for a multidimensional analysis facilitating closer inter-regional security comprehending a medium- and long-term cooperation with Europe.
References
Alagappa, M., ed. 1998. Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influence. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Cassa, R. 2000. ‘Strategies for Peace and Security: A Regional Approach in Asia and the Pacific’, Paper delivered at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament and the UN in the 21st Century, Akita, Japan, 22-25 August.
Desker, B. 2001. ‘The Future of the ASEAN Regional Forum’, PacNet, 36, 7 September.
Fawcett, L. and Hurrell, A., eds. 1995. Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Foot, R. 1995. ‘Pacific Asia: The Development of Regional Dialogue’, in Fawcett and Hurrell, 1995.
29 Multilateralism in East Asia: The Role of ARF and Its Future
Goodby, J. 1992. ‘Cooperative Security in Northeast Asia’, in Disarmament and Security Issues in the Asia-Pacific Region, Disarmament Topical Papers 11. New York: United Nations.
Harding, H. ‘Cooperative Security in the Asia-Pacific Region’, in Nolan, 1994.
Job, B. 1997. Matters of Multilateralism: Implications for Regional Conflict Management’, in Lake and Morgan, 1997.
Lake, D.A. and Morgan, P.M., eds. 1997. Regional Orders: Building Security in the New World. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
Nolan, J.E., ed. 1994. Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
Ruggie, J.G., ed. 1993. Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form. New York: Columbia University Press.
Ruggie, J.G. 1993. ‘Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution’, in Ruggie, 1993.
30 The CSCE Process in Europe The CSCE Process in Europe
Gert Weißkirchen
Professor Lee provided an excellent analysis are not really touching the core issues and on the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) sensitive problems of the Asian region. In process, which I would like to comment my opinion, this is a weakness. A new on. Our former minister, Egon Bahr, attitude would try to tackle the problems introduced a similar process some years from the bottom up. ago: the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or the CSCE There should be the political will and the process. I would like to see the ARF playing readiness to see the real problems. From a parallel role since the outcome of the an analytical point of view, this is no CSCE process was a real step forward. problem. But it may be necessary to fight these problems with a new approach, and It started with the idea of creating a new the new approach could be gleaned from framework for Europe, within which our experiences some years ago in the inherent regional problems could be solved. CSCE process. There was the will and the objective to create a Europe of stability, freedom and You have two good instruments in the ARF peace. If this is the idea behind the creation process. These are the track-one and the of the ARF, I see the potential to share our track-two instruments. The first track deals experiences from the CSCE process. with the official point of view, the interests of the governments, and the second track In the European process, Europe arrived combines this with the non-government at a turning point in the late 1960s and organization (NGO) level, with the society early 1970s. European leaders set out to level. This worked well in the CSCE process create a political sub-region in which all because governments sought to tackle the nation states would defer from using violent hard problems, as this is their interest and means to solve conflicts. This was a they have to do this. But in order to create departure from the military mechanisms a constructive atmosphere, an atmosphere previously used to solve problems. of confidence, you need the support of the people, of the public, the actors in society. The second element and idea in the CSCE process was to strengthen the dialogue, to But again, and this is a second criticism, I negotiate and to work out common think you should not only use this solutions, particularly in three core areas: instrument, but implement it, strengthen security, economy and human rights, or, it, enlarge it, and allow the public to related to the latter, in the development of integrate and participate. And then you democratic structures in the different should allow some of these NGOs to countries of the region. As I understand, criticize their different governments more the ARF also considers negotiations to be openly. This could be helpful too in order a crucial instrument for strengthening to create a new atmosphere, to strengthen regional stability. responsible governments, to give this process more impact, to be more creative The third point I would like to mention is and to find new ways and new instruments that negotiations taking place in the ARF in order to tackle the problems. 31 Dialogue + Cooperation 1/2002
In Asia, I personally think the repercussions development. Those Asian countries which of the deep financial and monetary crisis already had a firm democratic foundation can still be felt if you visit the different in place when the crisis hit, or quickly countries. But most countries have drawn launched democratic and rule of law reforms their conclusions and have introduced in its wake, have either experienced urgent structural reforms. This is a very relatively few repercussions from the crisis good step, and a good indication. The crisis or recovered from it sooner than others. thus not only led to problems but also offered This shows that if you could create a firmer the countries affected great opportunities framework, and the ARF could be such a to bring about substantial reforms, thus framework, it would intensify these creating a firm foundation for lasting and processes from the bottom up and sustainable development. In this regard I strengthen democracies in the whole region. think that the European Union should be This would be very helpful in creating an much more helpful than it was in the past atmosphere of reform. In this regard I think and I see the September conclusion of the that the ARF may have a promising future European Union one of the good outcomes in strengthening all the different forces in of this debate and the changes that are going the region, in trying to create and enhance on in your region. democracy in the region, and, if necessary, in seeking more help from the outside The lesson to be learnt from the Asian Crisis world, meaning the European Union in this in my mind is that good governance based context. I hope that the European Union is on human rights, the division of power and ready to be helpful in this regard. And I a functional legal and constitutional am pleased to note that you now are in the democracy, as well as the protection of the process of rethinking ways in which the environment, are the best basis in Asia for ARF could be more of a catalyst for a better peace and successful economic future for all the different countries in the ARF.
32 Security Policy and Global Stability
Third Panel Security Policy and Global Stability
33 Security Policy and Global Stability Security Policy and Global Stability
Rudolf Scharping
Since 11 September, we have been unpredictable threats, including confronted with a threat directed against international terrorism. It also highlights the values and the security of the whole new chances emerging through the civilized world. This threat can only be development of new partnerships and fought on a world-wide basis. These cooperative relations with non-NATO cowardly terrorist attacks underscore the states, including Russia. profound changes of the strategic landscape since the end of the former East-West The European Union (EU), too, has created conflict. a political framework for both military and civilian crisis management to implement The old threat disappeared more than a its common Security and Defence Policy. decade ago and was followed by a It will increase the range of instruments to substantial gain in stability and security, respond to crises in and outside Europe. both in Europe and elsewhere. However, the threats of the Cold War were replaced In Germany, we have started to implement by a new spectrum of risks and new sources a comprehensive reform of the Bundeswehr of instability, which led to new security to adapt our forces to the new reality of requirements. The broad coalition of states multinational and multilateral crisis and institutions engaged in combating management operations in the framework international terrorism gives impressive of NATO, the EU and the United Nations proof of a new way of thinking about global (UN). In the last few years, NATO has security. The community of states has collaborated with the UN, the EU and the joined forces to stand up against those who Organization for Security and Cooperation are endangering their peace and their in Europe (OSCE) in comprehensive freedom. Germany is part of this coalition. political and military conflict prevention Chancellor Schröder has confirmed and crisis management activities in the continuously our solidarity with the United Balkans. In Kosovo, the Alliance sided with States and our willingness to contribute those who were threatened by ethnic with all our assets to reducing this threat cleansing, intolerance and forces which had to international peace and security. no respect for international law and human rights. The terrorist attacks do not per se constitute a new threat. But they point to a Terrorist attacks have reinforced the logics new reality, characterized by complex new of our approach to security. As NATO challenges to security and global stability. Secretary General Lord Robertson recently In recent years, we have been adapting our said in Berlin, ‘The core of what we do policies and armed forces to the new made sense before 11th September and situation. In 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty continues to make sense after 11th Organization (NATO), for example, September. But international terror has adopted a Strategic Concept which calls shown us that we have to speed up our for an improvement in the ability of our efforts to formulate a security policy that forces to respond to today’s diverse and truly matches the new agenda in the global 34 Dialogue + Cooperation 1/2002
age’. What does this mean? For us, for Asia, I want to answer these questions by and for the German-Asian dialogue? formulating three tasks associated with a modern security policy.
The First Task We must adopt a comprehensive approach to security when we address the complex challenges
Modern security policy is more than This strategy must extend to preventive deterrence and the defence of national measures. In fact, prevention is key to any borders. It cannot be confined to one region successful foreign and defence policy. In and cannot be ensured by military means the world of growing interdependence and alone. Security today is global in scope and cross-border risks, any investment we consists of several dimensions. make in the political and economic future of a country or region, in democracy, in Our security can be endangered by a the rule of law and in the conservation of plethora of new challenges and risks – the natural environment is a preventive among them, ethnic and religious conflicts, investment in our security. economic and social problems, demographic factors, humanitarian We should have no illusions: only the rule disasters, international terrorism, organized of law, democracy and sound economic crime or the proliferation of weapons of and social perspectives provide the basis mass destruction and their means of for internal stability and a peaceful foreign delivery. policy.
To cope with those challenges, we need a This, by the way, is not only a task for the wide spectrum of political, military, international community. The fight against economic and cultural instruments. We poverty, political and social injustice, and must pursue a long-term and unfounded resentments against Western comprehensive strategy aimed at tackling political and cultural values remains, above the roots and causes of crises wherever they all, the responsibility of every single arise. country, its government, its elite and its society.
The Second Task We must promote regional cooperation and stability
The political resolution of conflicts is an of the world – in the Middle East, Central integral part of any comprehensive Asia, the Caucasus, the Maghreb or approach to security. Without determined elsewhere – are important for stability and efforts to defuse the underlying political security, not only in a regional but also in causes of tensions and the use of force, a global context. Progress in the Middle stability will remain an illusion. East peace process in particular is key to isolate terrorism especially in Arab or Cooperative structures in various regions Islamic countries. 35 Security Policy and Global Stability
If we don’t succeed in supporting this The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation progress, the use of force will prevail, (APEC) summit in Shanghai will – for the political developments will have a first time in its history – issue a political destabilizing effect on adjacent regions and declaration on combating terrorism. regional conflicts will act as a catalyst for President Bush and President Putin will international terrorism. attend this summit. This is another excellent example of the coordinated inter- The global age is witnessing the emergence regional action we need today. The EU is of a multipolar world in which key regions ready to engage in regions not only beyond are gaining influence and in which the the territory of its member states, but interdependence between these regions is indeed beyond Europe, to a certain degree rapidly growing in terms of politics, commensurate with both its responsibility economic development and security. There and its resources. is no state or region that remains unaffected by today’s turmoil, conflict or war in The Stability Pact for Southeast Europe, another state or region. Drug trafficking, initiated by the German government and international terrorism, organized crime the EU, reflects our approach to modern, and other developments pay no heed to preventive security. The EU’s role will be national and regional borders. further strengthened through the development of the European Defence and That’s why cooperative approaches within Security Policy. And it will be better regions, like the Association of Southeast prepared to work together with partners Asian Nations (ASEAN) or the newly in other regions, for example in Asia or in founded Shanghai Cooperation the Middle East. Having a history of conflict Organization, are so important for moving and confrontation, Europeans might forward in the field of common regional contribute to further the process of mutual security. That’s why dialogue and understanding and in identifying political cooperation between Europe and Latin solutions in other parts of the world. America, Europe and Africa, or Europe and Asia are key to dealing efficiently with Germany’s foreign and defence policy is developments undermining global security. firmly embedded in the common European The European-Asian cooperation in the Policy for peace and stability. In recent Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) framework, years, in this context, Germany for example, will gain more and more strengthened its relations and its dialogue importance. The ASEM summit in Seoul on politics and security with key countries last year made it clear that the nations of in Asia. This reflects our strong and both continents are ready to accept their common interest in a stable international common responsibility for the manifold environment. challenges ahead.
The Third Task We must strengthen international security organizations and improve cooperation between them
Taking a look at the management of the against terrorism, you will note that crises in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and comprehensive and preventive security Macedonia, and international efforts policy has become the main responsibility 36 Dialogue + Cooperation 1/2002
of international coalitions and institutions. Afghanistan, we are not fighting against Islam – but we are fighting against To respond efficiently to the new and terrorism and regimes that support challenging conditions, we even need more terrorism, we are fighting for our common effective regional and global multilateral values and interests, for our common security organizations. In the Euro-Atlantic security and for our common freedom. area, for example, we need a strong NATO; we need a European Union capable of We are doing this by working together, not taking action in security matters; we need by creating a division between cultures and a strengthened OSCE and other regional religions. We are doing this by promoting organizations. a dialogue between cultures and religions. The attacks of 11 September made it clear At the global level, we need a United to everybody that all of us are part of one Nations organization which is able to world. We should not forget the fact that assume its indispensable role in establishing in these attacks more Germans, more and preserving world peace. They all have Britons, more Indians, more Pakistanis, their role to play in ending conflicts and more Muslims and more Christians were finding political solutions. And they all killed than in any other terrorist attack have their role to play in dealing with the since World War II. No one should believe new transnational threats which are not that making the world a safer place can be confined to any particular state or region. left to others. This is a task for all of us. NATO and the EU are reviewing their Solidarity must go beyond paying lip- political concepts to adapt to the new service. agenda. The UN, for its part, will become a leading and indispensable force in our In Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Kosovo struggle against terrorism. The Security around 50,000 troops from around 34 and Council has codified an important and far- 38 nations, respectively, are working reaching change in international law by together to secure a stable environment, declaring international terrorism to be a to build up democracy and a market ‘threat to international peace and security’. economy system. In Macedonia, troops from 19 states are implementing Cooperation between the various ‘Operation Fox’, Germany being the lead institutions has gained a special weight nation. NATO, the EU and the OSCE are going beyond the potential of any single working closely together to give the multi- organization. We need their ethnic Christian and Muslim society in this complementary strengths to master the country a peaceful future and be part of a globalization of threats and the ever more democratic Europe. For decades such complex political, economic, social, cultural collective action was simply unimaginable. and military context of today’s crisis But it is an excellent example demonstrating management processes. the possibilities and the spirit of cooperation needed for today’s security I am not exaggerating when I say that since environment. the events of 11 September we have entered a new phase of international relations. We In Europe we have witnessed the turns have witnessed horrific scenarios and brutal history can take. European integration and acts of destruction. But we have also taken cooperative structures are features of a new up with chances for cooperation that arise Europe that developed after the end of the whenever mankind faces a threat to their Cold War. We are applying this approach existence. We are not fighting against in southeastern Europe and in Serbia after 37 Security Policy and Global Stability the end of a ruthless dictatorship. This may in and with other regions of the world. not be a blueprint for other regions. It might, however, encourage others not to Broadening and deepening our dialogue abandon their efforts to bring about peace, with our Asian partners is part of this freedom and partnership. Cooperation is endeavour. Conferences like this one, the name of the game when it comes to organized by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, mastering the tasks we are confronted with are important for furthering our mutual today. Germany and its European partners understanding and for promoting common are committed to work for this objective strategies to enhance global stability.
38 German/European Security Interests in Asia
Fourth Panel German/European Security Interests in Asia
39 German/European Security Interests in Asia German/European Security Interests in Asia
Gernot Erler
The events of 11 September have shown the elements of continuity on which we can that conflicts can no longer be confined to build? These are the questions which we a particular region. Now, every regional must answer. conflict almost inevitably has global dimensions. The attacks on New York and Even before 11 September the European Washington confront us with new Union (EU) had stepped up its efforts to international challenges and therefore come to the fore as a foreign policy player. inevitably affect our relationship with Asia. This is reflected for example in its The priorities in international policy intensified efforts in the Middle East Peace making have shifted. The fight against Process and quite specifically in relation terrorism, which is supported by a broad to Asia. The visit of the EU Troika to the alliance of states, is not a war of cultures. Korean Peninsular to support the very Members of this alliance such as Russia, fragile process of reconciliation was China, India and Pakistan, to name a few, ground-breaking and sent out an important are countries that each represent a distinct signal. Europe’s involvement in resolving culture of their own. Recent events show the crisis in East Timor and its active us once again the need to adopt multilateral conflict prevention moves within the approaches in tackling the world’s major framework of cooperation with Indonesia problems. The United Nations Security are further proofs that Europe is not just a Council has, in a number of resolutions, bystander but also an active partner in underscored the need for strong action conflict prevention and resolution. against terrorism. In this way the United Nations is fulfilling its major responsibility Kofi Annan is right again when he says that in the current situation and demonstrating overcoming social conflicts is not sufficient that today, more than 50 years after its on its own to defeat terrorism. It is foundation, it is a vital instrument in the nevertheless an important element of the process of resolving the world’s crises and strategy. The Middle East conflict illustrates conflicts. that Osama bin Laden is exploiting the suffering of the Palestinians in order to Kofi Annan summed the situation up well legitimize his world-wide terrorist by saying: ‘There are those who will hate activities. Of course his main concern is and who will kill, even if every injustice is not really the fate of the Palestinians, but ended, but if the world can show that it the unresolved problems between Israel and will carry on, that it will persevere in Palestine provide him with a welcome creating a stronger, more just, more opportunity to exploit the situation for his benevolent, and more international own benefit and style himself a freedom community across all lines of religion and fighter. race, then terrorism will have failed’. There are other examples in which What has changed over the past five weeks unresolved problems and tensions are in German and European perceptions of exploited for political aims. The United Asia in terms of security policy? Where are States’ military operations in Afghanistan 40 Dialogue + Cooperation 1/2002
against positions of the al-Qaeda network stability. Efforts must be intensified in these and other Taliban installations have caused areas to remove the conditions that enable Muslim extremists and parts of the Islamic terrorism to breed. What are Germany and world, including sectors in such Asian Europe’s concrete security interests in Asia? countries as Indonesia, Malaysia and of course Pakistan, to express their solidarity Our primary interest is stability, and this with the Taliban. This illustrates how vital does not mean only in the region of Pakistan it is to eradicate the breeding ground for and Afghanistan and their neighbouring terrorism. People with social and economic countries, on which attention is currently prospects are generally less susceptible to focused. China and India are two rising seduction by fanatical ideologists. regional powers with an enormous influence on the development of the whole I would like to make a few remarks about of Asia. As their economic power increases Pakistan. We know about the conflict so does their political standing and their between Pakistan and India that has political responsibility. Both have joined persisted for more than 50 years, and the the anti-terror alliance. Perhaps this will still unresolved problem of Kashmir, which provide workable approaches to overcome has claimed thousands of lives in recent other regional conflicts in the future. years. I fully respect the way the Pakistan leadership has behaved in the current Further potential for conflict, in part highly situation. There has been a great deal of explosive, lies in the continued tensions in internal dissent in Pakistan regarding the the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Strait and country’s support for the anti-terror Indonesia. There are other examples too. alliance and there have been many violent The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) plays demonstrations. It is in nobody’s interests an important role in this context. The to see Pakistan destabilized. The collapse ARF’s efforts to contribute to confidence of Pakistan would plunge the entire region building and conflict prevention within the into chaos. Hence, the EU has highlighted framework of multilateral dialogue are the importance of ensuring that actively supported by Germany and the EU. humanitarian aid is channelled without Particular attention is given to the issue of delay to Pakistan. The country needs to be the non-proliferation of weapons of mass strengthened economically and politically. destruction. Multilateral dialogue Such moves must include debt relief. The contributes to confidence building and EU Commission called for a new conflict prevention and is an important cooperation agreement between the EU and element on the way to gaining more security Pakistan to be signed without delay. Perhaps and stability. the present crisis offers Pakistan an opportunity to recognize that only an Another priority concern for the EU is to unconditional commitment to fighting promote the development of the poorer terrorism can guarantee political stability countries of Asia. The EU and its member in the country in the long term. Whoever states already provide 30 per cent of their trades with terrorism is at the mercy of external development assistance funds to terrorism and will ultimately become the Asian countries. The EU Commission is victim of terrorism. The only option working with our Asian partners on a five- therefore is to fight it unconditionally. year development programme that will focus on the areas of health and education. We all know that terrorism cannot be combated by military means alone. Security Another key element of German/ includes political, economic and social European-Asian policy is the assertion and 41 German/European Security Interests in Asia upholding of human rights, good beyond all cultural, political and religious governance and the rule of law. European- borders, will we be able to free the world Asian policy is not in conflict with from this scourge of terrorism. The world American policy for the region. There are has moved closer together, so have Asia many areas of agreement and shared and Europe. The attention that Europe and interests and goals. Europe and the United Asia are currently paying to each other must States have many common partners in Asia be further strengthened. We must look with whom they work in close cooperation. beyond the context of the present crisis and expand and intensify our relations in the I believe that recent events have revealed future. to all of us that only when we act together,
42 Both China and the European Union Shall Play a More Important Role in the New Century Both China and the European Union Shall Play a More Important Role in the New Century
Wang Guoqiang
In geographic terms, Asia and Europe a unified and independent security policy. make up the Eurasian continent. In geo- China needs political stability, economic political terms, the continent is the centre development to be maintained at a higher of the international strategic structure. As level and a definite security policy and political powers, the European Union (EU) corresponding defence strength. A common is located in the west of the Eurasian and important factor to both China and continent, while China is located in the the EU is good geopolitical circumstances. east. Both China and the EU ought to be the key components of the current and up- Analogous to our positions in the coming international strategic structure. international structure, both of us must promote comprehensive cooperation, In the post-Cold War era, the United States whether in a global context or in regional became the unique super power. The security affairs. Both sides are not only appearance of the EU marked the entry of competing counterparts, but also beneficial a new and strong power into the strategic partners. Treating each other like partners game and will propel the world towards the should be the most important element in a multipolar process. China is not a great bilateral relationship. power from a global viewpoint, but quite an influential one from a regional In my personal opinion, both China and perspective. Being a key pole of the current the EU, two of the most important strategic structure, the EU requires several powers in the world, can search for preconditions – harmonious political cooperative opportunities in the following regimes, integrated economic systems and four fields.
(1) The Multipolar Process
The new multipolar world heralds a brand- expression and be stubbornly present at new historical period in international first, but will eventually wane and relations and a ‘fresh’ system in the world disappear. Hence the new structure is both structure. The multipolar system was bred a mutation and an incremental process. within the bipolar system and born after its collapse. The elements determining the There are three aspects to the multipolar nature of the new structure emerged, process. developed and grew up within the old structure, and have inherited from it some First, the new multipolar world is one aspects worth preserving. Other aspects of fraught with struggle and competition. The the old structure, namely certain elements world is unlikely to be tranquil, since representative of its nature, may still give various international forces are trying to 43 Dialogue + Cooperation 1/2002
seek better positions for all, with two kinds Third, the new multipolar world will go of social system existing in parallel and 190 through several developmental stages. In nations attempting to get along with one the early stage, which we are in, a host of another. Nevertheless, the danger of a world powers stand side by side constituting the war has indeed diminished. new multipolarity, with the division and realignment of forces still continuing in Second, the multipolar process will be long. international relations. In the middle stage, In ancient times the history of the old division and realignment of international multipolar world spanned millennia, and forces will come to an end, but new in modern times it has a history of at least divisions and realignments are possible as 300 years. In comparison the bipolar system the international situation changes. There represents nothing but a variation, a flash will be both cooperation and competition in the pan. It is only natural that the new between various international forces. At a multipolar world, having emerged amid the later stage, a new international political upheavals of human society, will also last a and economic order will be realized. All long time. How long it will last is hardly countries will be equally developed predictable, but it will continue for at least economically, with an improved quality of one or two centuries and even longer, unless life for the majority of people. sudden, earth-shaking changes take place.
(2) Structures of Power: From the ‘Concert of Europe’ to the ‘Concert of Powers’ Since the Congress of Vienna, many treating others as equals, mutual statesmen have sought a way to achieve understanding and mutual benefit should eternal peace and security among nations. prevail. Having long-term strategies in At that time it was referred to as the mind, the objective to adjust relations ‘Concert of Europe’. Although the Congress among great powers should be based on didn’t succeed, its very spirit is still of value the development of equal partnerships in to us in posterity. Today, as we continue to which contact, cooperation and seek for harmony among nations, and coordination play a predominant role. peace and security in the world, Europe can, with its profound experience, No great power can possibly attain genuine contribute a lot. To achieve this historical security by jeopardizing the security of goal, China will align with Europe. another power, nor can it seek its own stable development by impeding the In the world today, the security and development of another power. This is true interests of different nations are for both China and the EU. Only through interlinked, so their mutual relationships consultation on an equal footing and mutual should be based on an equal footing, rather compromise will great powers resolve their than relationships in which one great power differences and disputes. As Chinese takes the lead for its own policy objectives. President Jiang, who is also the chairman This would certainly give rise to of the Central Military Commission, contradictions, frictions and conflicts, and pointed out to German Defence Minister even intensify conflicts with other great Rudolf Scharping, ‘The force of one single powers to various degrees. Hence, even polar can not achieve balance and only the though there are differences in national combination of multipolar can ensure strength, the level of development and size, equilibrium’. 44 the general principals of mutual respect, Both China and the European Union Shall Play a More Important Role in the New Century
(3) Arms Control and Disarmament
To achieve world peace and regional rise in factors of uncertainty in China’s stability are the fundamental and long-term surrounding security environment. interests of the 1.2 billion Chinese people. Similarly, it has put the European allies of China will strive for a long-term peaceful the United States in a dilemma, and international environment and work inevitably the nuclear missile defence towards lasting peace and common security (NMD) system will result in the United for all countries in the world. States leaving Europe to face the renewed danger alone. After the Cold War ended, international disarmament, arms control and non- If the United States really cares about global proliferation made some progress. security, it should use its resources to deal Unfortunately, the good start was bogged with the real hurdles the world is facing down and the process of nuclear non- today, such as environmental crises and proliferation is suffering a serious setback. international terrorism, rather than create Obviously, the United States cannot back new scourges to scare the world. out from its responsibility. The United States stepped up its efforts to push Preventing threats to China’s security and through hegemonism and power politics, development is one of the major purposes and tried to establish a unipolar world. It of China’s security policy. China opposes determined to deploy the missile defence arms races in any shape or form. China system, attempted to revise the Anti- does not want a confrontation with the ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, greatly United States, nor a confrontation on increased its military expenditure, refused NMD issues, nor an arms race between to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test the two countries. But China will not allow Ban Treaty, and so on. its legitimate means of self-defence to be weakened or even taken away by anyone, I believe most people understand that the in any way. This is one of the most stability of the world structure relies on the important aspects of China’s national relative balance in strategic forces among security. Similarly we don’t believe that the powers. Seeking absolute security would NMD is in the interests of international break the balance, and it may also cause a peace and security as a whole.
(4) Global Problems
Observing the development of political The importance of the problem of multipolarization and the economic economic security is becoming increasingly globalization of the world, many non- clear. Although present circumstances traditional security factors are playing a make a world war unlikely, with world-wide more and more important role in the peace competition for the growth of and stability of the world. Seeking security comprehensive national strength centred on in economy and finance, preventing group developing sciences and technologies, crime, and the protection and fight against increasing economic power and the international terrorism have been the accelerated development of economic important features of a nation concerned globalization, the issue of economic with security policy. security is a central concern for all nations.
45 Dialogue + Cooperation 1/2002
The threat to economic security lies in the over-population, environmental pollution fact that an economic crisis in a country and food shortages, are increasing in their will likely cause, at the domestic level, seriousness. political turmoil with a decline of national cohesion and even a change in government, The next five to ten years will mark an and at the international level, a lowering in important period for China’s economic and international position, with a drop in world social development, as well as its reform. ranking of national strength, and even Modernization is our central task. Reform forfeiture of sovereignty to the control of and opening up are the basic state policies others. to ensure the accomplishment of this. Over the past two decades, China has deepened In many countries, economic security has the reform of its economic system, visibly replaced military security and leapt to first increased its overall national strength and place in national security interests. At the steadily expanded its foreign economic same time, broader problems relating to cooperation and trade. However, China security in political, social, cultural and still feels the effects of the 1997 East Asia other fields have also become prominent. financial crisis. Terrorist activities, drug World-wide problems, like ethnic and smuggling and other criminal problems are religious conflicts, terrorist activities, cult threats to the stability and security of organizations, drug trafficking, smuggling China. Threats caused by the terrorist of goods and human beings, criminal activities of splinter groups in particular networks and other crimes, as well as will be one of major challenges for China’s problems concerning energy resources, security policy.
Can China Play a Leading Role in the Asia-Pacific Region?
With the end of the Cold War, the strategic the major issues relating to its long-term security situation in the Asia-Pacific region development. Foreign friends told me, ‘In is generally more relaxed. The area is 1997, the Asian financial crisis provided hopefully entering a long period of China with an opportunity to exercise a sustainable peace and development. constructive leadership role in the region. However, as in other regions in the world, China’s refusal to devaluate its currency, potentially unstable elements exist. its support for the International Monetary Nevertheless, nations in Asia Pacific find Fund packages and its contribution to an themselves increasingly integrated and effective response to any future financial interdependent in economic, political and crisis were all noted and welcomed by its even military fields. These countries, neighbours’. With a critical role to play in including China, thus have a strong desire almost all dimensions of Asian to promote economic development and organizations like the Association of social progress in a peaceful environment, Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the as well as further enhance mutual exchanges South Pacific Forum, China will become and cooperation. much stronger economically, more powerful strategically, and more confident How should the responsibility for regional politically over the course of this century. stability and peace be shouldered? How Some people think that China ought to should the important roles in the process hold a leading post in the regional security of constructing the multilateral security structure. But I don’t agree with them. structure be filled? For China, these are 46 Both China and the European Union Shall Play a More Important Role in the New Century
China hasn’t such leadership capability and cooperation. This organization is it cannot be a leader. China would be more undoubtedly a contribution to confident playing the role of competitive regionalization in the Asia-Pacific region. or cooperative partner to other nations. As Although it can’t keep up with the EU, the Dr Helmut Kohl, the former chancellor of most successful regional cooperative Germany, said at the International Forum organization in the world, it has succeeded on China and the World in the Twenty- in promoting substantial cooperation with first Century in Beijing: ‘We are now in a its members on political and security issues. multipolar world. People in the United This is a unique experience and different States must understand that in addition to from the EU development. the United States there are many world powers like Europe, Russia, China and I have reason to believe that closer China- India. The European Union will not EU cooperation within the framework of become a world superpower. It aims to be the United Nations will contribute to arms a reliable partner for America, Russia and, control, the prevention of human of course, China. A powerful, stable and trafficking and a halt to environmental liberal Europe – both economically and deterioration. In the twenty-first century, politically – is in the interests of the there is ample room for bilateral aforementioned nations’. cooperation to be expanded. And a sound China-EU relationship is of much greater In my view, the new security concept of significance for maintaining the world’s ‘cooperative security’, proposed by the stability than it was 25 years ago. China is Chinese government in recent years, has more integrated into the world’s political shown its practical and immediate and economic systems. It shoulders greater significance. This new security concept has responsibility in the international taken shape gradually in response to the community as it has joined several world objective situation, and therefore has organizations. China favours the greater vitality. It was emphasized as a multipolarization of the world and calls for ‘comprehensive security concept’ and closer cooperation to narrow the gap adopted as a ‘cooperative security concept’ between developed and developing which seeks a common security target for countries. all nations in the world, and is in conformity with China’s essential security China’s long-term point of view is that interests. world peace is not obtained through military alliances but is achieved through China faces tough economic and social mutual trust. The development of challenges, particularly in trying to ensure sophisticated arms will only destroy world that development in its western provinces peace and spark new rounds of arms keeps pace with the coastal areas. Regional competition. I believe deepening cooperation can help this effort. The cooperation between China and the EU can inauguration of the Shanghai Cooperation further promote the development of the Organization, comprising China, Russia multipolar process. It should be a win-win and the Central Asian republics, is a model. significant step forward in regional
47 The India Case The India Case
Ashok K. Mehta
I would like to focus on the security Asian security policy and the Asia security situation in South Asia and how we in situation from an Indian perspective. South Asia look at our security relations Following a brief encapsulation of the with Germany and the European Union security situation in South Asia, I will (EU). First of all I would like to raise some provide a statement in broad brush strokes points on the impact the events of 11 on South Asia-EU relations and India- September might have on security policy Germany relations relating to security. in South Asia. I will then look at the South
The Impact of 11 September on Security Policy in Asia
In the wake of the brutal acts of terror on himself from the terrorist acts in his speech 11 September, a common track has on 1 October. Colin Powell, the United emerged. A broad international coalition States Secretary of State, when referring has been formed to fight terrorism together to the security situation in South Asia, and to deal with the most immediate defined the violence in Kashmir as terrorist security problems the world, and in acts, preparing the ground for both parties particular Asia, is facing today. The to fight terrorism together and without understandings and terminology in security forcing either side to identify with and take policy and political affairs in general are responsibility for the terrorist acts in undergoing enduring changes. The Kashmir. distinction between ‘terrorism’ and the ‘fight for freedom’ has been narrowed down In the last 12 years, from a South Asian substantially, or has even vanished. The perspective, India has been crying out same applies to the distinction between against terrorism. However, that cry has ‘internal’ and ‘external’ security threats. The not been heard. I have some figures of German Minister of Defence, while visiting people who were killed and wounded in India last February, noted that there are these conflicts. These casualties make up now both opportunities and risks. almost two thirds of the casualties the Opportunities in the current scenario may Americans suffered in the war in Vietnam. consist of providing the chance for former Sadly, in 12 years there were nearly 30,000 alienated states to form functional casualties. Out of these, there were 12,000 coalitions, establishing dialogue between civilians, and among them 11,000 diplomatic corps and expert groups, or Muslims. Nearly 22,000 people were becoming partners in the programme to wounded. I was a bit surprised when my eradicate terrorism. At this point, reference friend Salik Naeem Ahmad mentioned that is given to India and Pakistan. The United 60 per cent of these casualties had been States president himself referred to this inflicted by our security forces. This is great opportunity for both countries to paramount to barbarity by any standards. march alongside each other and enhance mutual understanding. In fact, President The good news is of course that the terrorist Musharraf of Pakistan clearly distanced bases in Pakistan and the problems 48 Dialogue + Cooperation 1/2002
associated with them will be addressed more security operations will be to drain the aggressively and more seriously in the swamps and eliminate the roots and region. India has given the reassurance via branches of terrorism that have spread in the United States that the next phase of the that region.
Security Policy in Asia and the Indian Perspective
In the last two years, India has hosted two the region and they all share at least one seminars on Asian security. And I am glad border with the other two. Among these to report that almost every Asian country three nuclear powers, India has border attended them. At the end of these problems with China and Pakistan. But seminars, participants agreed that Asia is India and China have peace treaties and too diverse to possess one common security concerning Pakistan, with whom we have concept. There are already many regional an on-and-off political dialogue, we hope groupings in Asia. that the ongoing campaign in Afghanistan will bring our relations to fruition. Asia’s diversity calls for an emphasis on the need to support regional linkages at The area is linked to destabilizing forces. economic and security levels, and to To the north of the subcontinent, in Nepal, strengthen structures and mechanisms that there is a festering insurgency. Five years already exist. Even though references are ago, nobody would have thought that the made to ‘Asian security’ there is really no kingdom, the ultimate Shangri La, would such thing. India has identified six power be riddled by such problems. In the south poles in the Asian security region: these of the subcontinent, you find the LTTE are China, Russia, Japan, the EU, the (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam), the United States and India. Tamil Tigers, one of the world’s most deadliest guerrilla forces. In the east, the The security situation in South Asia is Golden Triangle, and in the west, the unfortunately a hostage of the relations Golden Crescent, now the epicentre of between India and Pakistan. I say terrorism. India, at the heart of the unfortunately because it has resulted in a subcontinent, is affected by this easy access stalemate in regional and economic to drugs and small arms. The spill-over cooperation, and it has brought further effect and destabilizing forces include instability to the region. Looking at the problems associated with migration into Indian subcontinent, in fact looking at India. But, as mentioned earlier, there is South Asia (‘South Asia’ incidentally is a some good news – President Musharraf, term introduced by the United States State since 11 September, has made the right Department to neatly differentiate the strategic choice of dumping the Taliban and regions, whereas India considers the Indian changing course towards modernization. It subcontinent as covering countries from is in the best interests of India, the region Afghanistan to Burma and even including and the subcontinent. China), there are three nuclear powers in
Relations with Europe and Germany
At this point, I regret to note that ironically only took notice of the region after India Germany, and in fact the rest of the EU, and Pakistan carried out nuclear tests. The 49 The India Case same is true for the United States. In fact, joint working groups on terrorism However, that policy towards the region is have been established with several countries changing dramatically. of the EU. There have been conferences on security of the sea lanes in the Indian In 1999, I happened to be in Germany Ocean for the transit of trade, energy and when the German leadership was oil. And there are continuing political and preoccupied with the Presidency of the EU security dialogues, intended to further bind and the war in Kosovo. It seemed to me these relations in the fields of security and then, and to many Germans, that Germany economics. I would like to note that from had no clear vision or strategic position a South Asian and an Indian perspective, towards South Asia, but such a position is there have been great strides in furthering very noticeable now. the security relationship between India and Germany. In India, we realize and recognize At the end of this month, Chancellor that Germany is the fulcrum of the EU in Gerhard Schröder will be visiting India. the political sense, an economic power in There is an institution of strategic dialogue this region, and is considering participating between India and Germany as there is in a peace-keeping mission once with India and other countries of the EU. parliament has approved this proposal. In fact, only last week, the German Foreign Minister visited Delhi with an agenda for The terrorist attacks on 11 September were strategic dialogue, as mentioned earlier. In horrific. We should take the chance now February of this year, the German Defence to enhance the security dialogue, not just Minister was in India, exploring how to with the EU and Asia, but also with the strengthen those relations, the strategic international community. We must ensure dialogue, the security dialogue and military that this opportunity is not passed by, that relations between India and Germany. I’m the tasks are not left incomplete and that glad to report that substantial progress in common responsibilities are taken and this direction has been made. But I think completed, based on the willing cooperation most progress was made in two areas which of the entire coalition of forces that are lend themselves eminently to cooperation: arrayed against the scourge of terrorism. peace-keeping and the fight against terrorism.
50 Multipolarism and 'Global Players' in Asia
Fifth Panel Multipolarism and ‘Global Players’ in Asia
51 Multipolarism and 'Global Players' in Asia Multipolarism and ‘Global Players’ in Asia
Hans-Joachim Gießmann
The most recent terrorist attacks on the Asia may pose a serious threat to the United States of America and the quick security situation of most peoples in Asia. international response to them have altered and will further alter the coordinates of There can be no doubt, however, that global security politics. It may be too early organized global terrorism, which is to provide a conclusive answer to the motivated by fundamentalism and hatred, question of whether the challenge of cross- poses a crucial challenge, and not only to border terrorism will eventually lead to new nation-states and international multilateral patterns of behaviour in organizations. It is also linked to far- security affairs. However, the initial and reaching changes induced by globalization somewhat surprising commonality of views in economy, technology, culture and among the big powers of Asia, Europe and society. Certain uncomfortable questions America on how to react to this specific have to be answered: (1) whether these challenge may hint at new chances of changes and the reactive methods which improved, yet probably limited, political have been applied so far to tackle them interaction on a global scale. For years politically may even have contributed to China, Russia, India, Indonesia and other the further spread of fundamentalism; (2) nations have faced the problem of whether globalization has resulted in spreading violence, fuelled by either ethnic significant losses for large groups of people or religious extremism. The governmental within transforming societies, which people counter-strategies of these nations have attribute to the politics of the ‘rich’ part of usually been criticized by the West, in the world; and (3) whether or not the spread particular with reference to the rights of of political conflicts, triggered by these ethnic and religious minorities in their losses, feeds incentives to either use or home countries. It cannot be excluded that tolerate force as a legitimate tool for this criticism will become less direct and resisting what is being perceived as a threat outspoken in the future, overshadowed by to sustainable living conditions for millions the harsh American counteraction against of people? Although the United States the terror network of Osama bin Laden. appears presently to be the main target for However, the patterns of domestic and cross-border terrorist attacks, it may cross-border security policies of nations in become an issue for other nations as well. Asia may also be affected, having an impact Asia, in particular, could be concerned as on neighbourhood relations and regional the gap between the richest and the poorest stability in an as yet undetermined way. groups of Asian society has widened much Moreover, any military escalation and the more than within the societies of Europe spread of terror and counter-terror into or America.
A Strong Case for Regional Security-building in Asia
At first glance, the basis of post-Cold War of nation-states within regionally structured security politics has shifted to the strength security architectures. However, while few 52 Dialogue + Cooperation 1/2002
nations have maintained global influence even though ‘global players’, whether major in selected areas, only the United States powers, economic actors (e.g. transnational can, and has, acted as a global superpower. corporations), state or non-state Nevertheless, the United States has international institutions or organizations, painfully experienced a relative loss in its may exert significant influence on each of national impact on security matters. At these areas, they can hardly take present security matters are essentially responsibility for solving these issues on driven by globalization and fragmentation. their own. Each issue requires the They can, for the sake of regional stability, cooperation of different actors on different only be tackled through multilateral levels of action. The prospect of solving cooperation. This has become more these issues, however, is not as evident in the case of Asia than in any discouraging as it appears to be at first other part of the world. glance, mainly because any escalation or spread of conflict would be harmful to all Although the significant progress made in international actors’ vested interests, and regional security building in Asia cannot because awareness about the imminent be ignored, certain developments have risks of escalation has grown. triggered a growing concern that this progress may be overturned by parallel Threats to security, however, originate not deteriorating trends, such as the potential only from spreading conflicts, but also from escalation of war and violence in and deteriorating trends that make the around Afghanistan, the difficult cooperative resolution of a conflict more transformation in Indonesia, the situation difficult. The most imminent – and partly in the Kashmir region, the possibility of interrelated – trends can be summarized political backlashes on the Korean as follows: peninsula, the sensitive issue of several territorial claims in East Asia, the ongoing n the growing gap between wealth and arms race, the horizontal and vertical poverty, between prosperity and misery, proliferation of weapons throughout the within the developing societies of Asia; whole region and, last but not least, n the spread of violence, motivated by, growing problems with piracy, cross-border or based on, ethnic, religious or cultural organized crime and the spread of terrorist divergence; threats. Each factor in itself challenges the n xenophobia and the oppression of stability of regional – and probably global human and minority rights; – security. As Howard French has correctly n the weakening competence and ability noted, the region is presently home to many of many states to balance the basic of the most explosive loose ends (IHT, political, social and economic 2000:1, 11), none of which can be tied up equilibrium causing a growing unilaterally. Therefore, the essence of dependence on, and influence on security multipolarism in Asia can be domestic affairs by, foreign states or described in two ways. On the one hand, non-state actors; it is an existing patchwork of relatively n the impact of ‘globalization losses’ or independent yet interdependent areas of negative ‘globalization effects’ on states, conflict, which may possibly be tackled only such as organized crime, drug on the sub-regional or even local level. And trafficking, environmental degradation, on the other hand, if these conflicts are erosion of cultural values and social not resolved or sufficiently harboured, they identities, alienation, the privatization may pose a threat to many other nations of the monopoly of force, etc. in, as well as beyond, Asia. Nonetheless, 53 Multipolarism and 'Global Players' in Asia
Notwithstanding these risks and trends, the Instead, the recent power and policy shifts possibility of Asia successfully coping with of major actors in Asia have even the transformation of the global security contributed towards sharpening the system does not look too bad. For example, contradictory trends of homogenization and over time, Asia has experienced growing fragmentation. The most striking shifts regional coherence (Naisbitt, 1996:11), concern the reorientation of American which is primarily due to the emergence engagement in East Asia, the decreasing of a prospering market that is twice as large influence of Russia after the implosion of as that of Western Europe and the United the Soviet Union, and the undetermined States combined. The growing market future role of China as a potential regional coherence on the one hand and growing hegemony. The ability of these nations, interdependencies on the other have including Japan, to manage their national fostered incentives among the regional interests in a cooperative way, will have a actors to seek closer cooperation, as well tremendous impact on the consolidation as a more stable security environment. It of existing regional security institutions, is clear, however, that the policies of the such as the ASEAN Regional Forum major players, namely the United States, (ARF), as well as on the prospect of other regional powers and not least extending regional integration. On the other international organizations and financial hand, the accession of China to the World institutions, have to contribute in a Trade Organization (WTO) may contribute constructive way if these incentives are to towards strengthening the idea of a be translated into a stable regional security cooperative identity amongst the major system. For the time being, however, the players in Asia, including Japan, thereby prospects for such a ‘constructive opening up a path to extended engagement’ remain uncertain. multilateralism also in the area of security policy.
A Strong Case for a Multi-layered Regional Security Approach
Although several initiatives to create a approach sufficed in the past, it can hardly regional security system sui generis have deal with the requirements of the future, failed in Asia, a strong case can still be especially if new threats and challenges for made for a multi-layered security system. security, such as global terrorism or The complex regional identity, overlapping proliferation, are considered. economic, ethnic and social structures, and also the possibility of searching for face- While the ARF approach can, to some saving trade-offs between the various extent, be compared with that of the former interests of all regional actors constitute a Conference for Security and Cooperation sound basis for a broadened architecture in Europe (CSCE), directly cloning of cooperation. The ARF (1994), Asia European experiences may not be the ideal Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) solution for Asia. The founding conditions (1993) and the Association of Southeast of the CSCE differed extensively from Asian Nations (ASEAN) (1967) have those that presently exist in Asia. Yet while become significant regional actors, but they the bipolarism of the Cold War was lack intrusive security mechanisms. So far, occasionally considered an advantage for security matters have usually been dealt with forming the CSCE in the case of Europe, on the bilateral or sub-regional scale, such the heterogeneous multipolarism of as in the case of Korea. Even if such an present-day Asia – in combination with 54 Dialogue + Cooperation 1/2002
growing economic coherence, political security system in Asia, the already existing pressure for closer cooperation and a long web of organizations and mechanisms may tradition of bilateral pragmatism – may equally serve the purpose if its elements provide a good opportunity for creating a efficiently reinforce each other. Essentially, regional security system. As Klintworth ten mechanisms form the basis of a noted a decade ago already, ‘economic multilateral security system: interdependencies are channelling common interests and structures. Economic 1. global multilateral state-to-state interdependence has opened up new cooperation (UN) channels for regional cooperation, 2. issue-related multilateral state-to-state confidence building and transparency in cooperation (WTO, Missile Technology security relations between Asia-Pacific Control Regime) states. Most countries are speaking the 3. cross-regional state-to-state cooperation same language as far as trade, investment (APEC+) and economic cooperation are concerned. 4. regional state-to-state cooperation This has been matched by a habit of (ARF) dialogue on a broad range of regional, 5. multilateral ad-hoc state-to-state diplomatic, humanitarian, political, cooperation (e.g. Cambodia) environmental, cultural, security, nuclear, 6. sub-regional multilateral state-to-state military, intelligence, trade, development cooperation (ASEAN+) and economic issues’ (1992: 221-231). 7. issue-related sub-regional state-to-state cooperation (e.g. the Korean Peninsula) The comparative advantage of a multi- 8. bilateral state-to-state cooperation layered approach in Asia lies in the 9. regional NGO-interaction (e.g. possibility of trade-offs and the immediate CSCAP) win/win results of cooperation. While it 10.issue-related ‘track-two’ cooperation. hardly makes sense to search for a unique
Multipolarism vs. Multilateralism?
Much has been said and written about why detected in East Asia: high levels of military it would not make sense to directly apply confrontation and mistrust between the Europe’s experiences to East Asia: the regional players; competing vested existence of bilateral disputes on territorial governmental interests; a gradual shift in matters; Russia and mainland China’s the distribution of regional power absorption in domestic politics; the projection; growing interest in stable possibility of nuclear blackmail; patterns of cooperation being a prerequisite heterogeneous political, economic, social for increasing economic prosperity and for and cultural structures; asymmetric and diminishing the likelihood of war; and a asynchronous power balances; greater habit of loose dialogue, especially within distances (land and sea) that are to be the framework of the ARF, on a broad range bridged between the centres of strategic of issues that might serve as a basis of decision making; the lack of neutral generic security networking. intermediaries; and the sharp asymmetries of economic performance. However, some The ARF appears to be more comparable of the conditions that led to initial to the Organization for Security and rapprochement in Europe can also be Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) than, for 55 Multipolarism and 'Global Players' in Asia example, ASEAN, which has a much that the principles and norms underlying stronger focus on economic cooperation, the OSCE may be applicable to East Asia, and which has always ruled out while the mechanisms and instruments commitments in the realm of military must be generated according to the striking security. However, close cooperation challenges in the area. These require a between ASEAN and APEC members with made-to-measure approach. Some should the ARF may provide a supportive be dealt with by an enlarged audience, economic dimension of cooperation to the others may require bilateral negotiations, ARF. Such a scenario did not take place in or mediation based on good services. The the years of the CSCE. The missing link ARF, however, is not likely to transform between multilateral economic and political into a Jack-of-all-trades. This role was, for interests, as well as the lack of regional example, only adopted by the CSCE in security structures, has frequently made Europe at a late point in time, after 15 politicians and experts feel that an OSCE- years of incremental steps and several like organization, an Organization for backlashes. On the other hand, such a role Security and Cooperation in Asia (cf. Gills, may serve the best security role by 2001), could lead to a more stable harbouring, comprising and curbing the environment in East Asia. Yet the analogy most essential security interests of all major itself may lead to wrong conclusions, players, as well as those of all other nations because the OSCE per se could not be and peoples in Asia. implemented in East Asia. It is more likely
References
Giessmann, H.J. 2001. Multilateral Regional Security – OSCE Experiences and Lessons. Seoul: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
Gills, B.K. ‘What CSBMs for Northeast Asia’, OSCE Conference, Seoul, 21 March, mimeo.
International Herald Tribune (IHT), 16 October 2000.
Klintworth, G. 1992. ‘Asia-Pacific: More Security, Less Uncertainty, New Opportunities’, The Pacific Review, 5(3).
Naisbitt, J. 1996. Megatrends Asia. New York: Simon & Schuster.
56 Great Power Politics in Contemporary East Asia: Negotiating Multipolarity or Hegemony? Great Power Politics in Contemporary East Asia: Negotiating Multipolarity or Hegemony?
Tan See Seng1
As proverbial wisdom says, when two adversarial situations’.3 Furthermore, the elephants fight – or mate – the grass inclusion of Japan into the fray makes it a beneath them suffers. The Chinese and the rather complicated menage à trois. From Americans, to be sure, are neither at war the vantage point of tiny Singapore, with nor in love, even though Sino-United States three elephants involved, the ‘grass’ – and ties, following the horrendous terrorist it may also refer to the East Asian region – attacks of 11 September in New York and is in for some ‘very serious trampling’. on the Pentagon, have improved significantly from the difficult relations that The sort of great power dynamics in existed from the time George W. Bush contemporary East Asia that I have just assumed the United States presidency. This described strongly suggests that the region is not to imply that enduring concerns are is characterized by what international now on course for any sort of dramatic relations, theorists and foreign policy resolution. As a Chinese analyst, speaking practitioners call multipolarity. And in the context of Sino-United States although these nations are clearly not the collaboration in the current ‘war against only international subjects, much less ‘global terrorism’, recently put it, ‘Cooperation players’, it would seem that the great powers isn’t changing relations fundamentally. It’s here in question are either de facto world changing the atmosphere. We’re not players or, to that end, ‘wannabes’: the focused on those negative issues’.2 United States, as undisputed superpower (or, as the French foreign minister put it, There are many points in the United States- ‘hyperpower’ [Heisbourg, 1999/2000]); China relationship that continue to worry Japan, the world’s second largest national many in East Asia: the Taiwan ‘question’; economy, although it is strategically reliant the Bush Administration’s definition of on the United States; and China, the (in China as a strategic ‘competitor’ rather than Michael Yahuda’s words) ‘regional power – as per the Clinton era – ‘partner’; with global influence’. American concerns over alleged human rights abuses and religious persecution in Clearly, the smaller nations in the region China, and so on. ‘The US-China are concerned about the effects of multi- relationship is complex and multifaceted’, power diplomacy on their region. At best, Lee Kuan Yew, the Senior Minister of it may compete with existing processes of Singapore, recently observed. ‘Between an multilateral activity – such as the ASEAN incumbent superpower and an emerging Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN ‘10+3’ power there will always be both competition formula, or Asia Pacific Economic and cooperation, both friendly and Cooperation (APEC) – and, at worst,
1 The views shared in this paper are those of the author and do not constitute the official position of the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, much less that of the Singapore government. 2 Cited in Solomon, Hutzler and Dean, 2001. 3 See ‘Interview with SM Lee: The New Power Equation’, Sunday Times, 20 May 2001, p. 46. 57 Dialogue + Cooperation 1/2002
undermine them. Since 1994, the ARF has serious case of navel-gazing is hard pressed been the focal point of much of the to manage the kinds of great power multilateral security dialogue and manoeuvrings that have impeded efforts to cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, with advance the ARF beyond its ‘talk shop’ the Association of Southeast Asian Nations status – not that ASEAN is guiltless in this (ASEAN) in the so-called ‘driver’s seat’ with regard, especially with the inveterate fidelity regard to setting and managing the ARF of some of its members to the ‘non- agenda and process – at times to the interference’ principle. But instances of dissatisfaction of the great powers for great power obduracy have obstructed the different reasons. As Amitav Acharya has multilateral process. For example, more noted, ‘this apparent “bottom-up” approach ambitious confidence-building measures to multilateralism will be threatened if the (CBMs) such as advanced notification of great powers are to organize their military exercises have been stymied by interactions outside of the ARF framework Sino-United States differences. China is with a view to manage and influence the opposed to any role of the ARF in security and stability of the Asia Pacific preventive diplomacy on the grounds that region’ (1999:2) – and, we may add, that it may lead to outside interference in its of the East Asian region. internal affairs (read Taiwan). Indeed, China has expressly rejected any role of Acharya’s concerns are well taken. An the ARF in conflict mediation and ASEAN weakened by financial crisis, resolution, preferring to keep the forum overly rapid expansion, bilateral disputes as a vehicle for dialogue and consultation between members (e.g. Thailand- – ‘out-ASEANing’ the ASEAN Way, so to Myanmar, Malaysia-Singapore), and a speak.
Research Aims
Against this backdrop of great power discussion of multipolarity to eschew diplomacy in the East Asian region, I want discussing the notion of unipolarity – an to revisit some of the theoretical and important conceptual (and, equally for conceptual propositions of multipolarity. many, empirical) distinction that better To be sure, few – if any – analysts and describes and explains the contemporary practitioners who view East Asia as global strategic milieu as well as that of East multipolar actually think, per multipolarity Asia (Krauthammer, 1990/91:23-33). theory, that the great powers therein share Certainly one may say that this is parity or near-parity in terms of capabilities particularly true for many Chinese for and influence. There are those who see a whom American unilateralism in foreign multipolar East Asia as inherently policy can be – and indeed has been – the dangerous, and others who see the region means by which the latter seeks to not as unequivocally peaceful but plausibly consolidate its unipolar position. peaceful under certain conditions. The concern here, whether explicit or implicit, In particular, I will focus on the Bush centres on whether multipolarity would Administration’s proposed development usher in a period of regional peace and and deployment of missile defence – a collaboration, or a perilous one of great policy especially vexing for China, but a power conflict and confrontation. boon for Japan. The United States Department of Defense’s 2001 Quadrennial However, it would be remiss of any Defense Review – released after the 11 58 Great Power Politics in Contemporary East Asia: Negotiating Multipolarity or Hegemony?
September tragedy – reiterates the an aggressive effort by the United States to administration’s commitment to missile deploy missile defence will likely destabilize defence, notwithstanding potential the East Asian region, and (2) all three great disenchantment within the American powers must necessarily exercise reason, public for that policy in the now glaring restraint and responsibility in their policy light of other more obvious threats. making and implementation, or face the Assuming the Bush Administration sobering prospect of East Asia as a future chooses to continue pursuing their missile setting of great power conflict. defence policy, it is my contention that (1)
Multipolarity
Few, in the immediate aftermath of the Europe and Japan meanwhile became Cold War’s abrupt conclusion in 1989- relatively stronger…The heady days of 1990, might have thought that liberals hegemony are gone, never to return. The rather than realists would, in all likelihood United States needs to accept that it is from thereon, dominate the intellectual just one major power among many in a milieu of international relations. As Charles world of great disorder, a disorder that promises to increase considerably into Kegley noted in his presidential address to the next century. the International Studies Association (1993:131-132): Yet it’s worth remembering that the first significant shots fired in the post-Cold War As the Cold War has ended, the emergent international relations debate in the main conditions in this ‘defining moment’ transcend the realpolitik that has were those by a so-called structural realist, dominated discussion of international John Mearsheimer, who raised the spectre affairs for the past five decades and invite of a multipolar world as a great deal more a reconstructed paradigm, perhaps one unstable and war-prone than the bipolar inspired by idealist ideas associated with world of the Cold War period.4 The the Wilsonian vision. argument, in a sense, was irresistible, particularly in the light of the litany of Further, in the view of some former senior regional conflicts that bloodied the 1990s: members of the American foreign policy the Gulf War, Somalia, the Balkans, and establishment – James Baker and Lawrence so on. Treading a well-worn path eked out Eagleburger included – the diplomatic by Kenneth Waltz, Mearsheimer and other horizon of the post-Cold War world was like-minded neorealists, balance-of-power multipolar in kind (Kegley and Raymond, thinkers have argued the benefits of 1994:3, 22). Indeed, no less an authority bipolarity over those of multipolarity. on the notions of global economic hierarchy and hegemony than Immanuel Others, however, taking umbrage at Wallerstein, writing in 1993 (145, 151), Mearsheimer’s claims, proved more lenient has described the transformed strategic and willing to grant that multipolarity, milieu in what seemed like multipolarity: under specific conditions, actually contributes to international stability (Kegley The United States is less strong today, a and Raymond, 1994). They pointed to the lot less strong – economically, politically, fact that the so-called ‘long peace’, as John culturally – than it was in the 1960s. Lewis Gaddis famously christened the
4 See, among others, Mearsheimer, 1992:48-62; 1990a:5-56; and 1990b:194-199. 59 Dialogue + Cooperation 1/2002
bipolar Cold War period, was merely a of accelerating military build-ups and provincial interpretation of the absence of deepening geopolitical rivalries in the hot war between the superpowers – a peace region as the undesirable consequences of evidently denied many parts of the a combination of factors, notably, high- developing world insofar as these were speed economic growth, impending energy treated by Washington and Moscow as shortages and political insecurity. Although playgrounds for their Cold War power- the impact of the recent financial crisis has political games. One recalls, for example, somewhat blunted the force of Caulder’s Hans Morgenthau’s grim indictment argument, not many – including the more (1985:379) of Cold War bipolarity as having optimistic among Asia watchers – would reduced the international system necessarily oppose his contention that energy and politics constitute potentially to the primitive spectacle of two giants serious problems for the region’s eyeing each other with watchful constituents. Finally, Richard Betts, suspicion. They [bent] every effort to reasoning that peace in present-day Europe, increase their military potential to the relative to East Asia, is more plausible due utmost, since this is all they [had] to to ‘the apparent satisfaction of the great count on. Both [prepared] to strike the powers with the status quo’, notes that in first decisive blow, for if one [did] not strike it the other might. Thus, contain Asia ‘an ample pool of festering grievances or be contained, conquer or be [exists] with more potential for generating conquered, destroy or be destroyed, conflict than during the Cold War, when [became] the watchwords of Cold War bipolarity helped stifle the escalation of diplomacy. parochial disputes’ (1993/94:64).
Further, unlike earlier proponents of Clearly, doom-and-gloom scenarios are not multipolarity who preach the normative without warrant. On the other hand, there merits of multipolarity,5 present-day are others who, though acknowledging the advocates expressly assume post-Cold War region’s potential for conflict, are multipolarity as a given and proceed from nonetheless confident that major there to focus on conditions under which conflagration in East Asia can and has been a multipolar system would be peaceful avoided because – as Kishore Mahbubani, (Kegley and Raymond, 1994:3). In any a senior Singaporean diplomat, put it – of case, both camps began at the same starting the ability of the great powers to ‘forge a point, i.e. the post-Cold War world is consensus’ over the region. Indeed, as far essentially multipolar. as Mahbubani is concerned, great power agreements are necessary if East Asia is to Both camps are represented among East defy the historical odds and make a smooth Asia watchers, although more has been transition from one order to another. As made of contemporary East Asia as a rather he once wrote, referring to the 1996 unstable region – a view that, according to missile crisis in the Taiwan Straits: some, has received partial vindication by the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan. Recall, We faced a danger then, but we also firstly, Aaron Friedberg’s grim scenario of saw a new opportunity because it woke post-Cold War East Asia as the future up key minds in Washington DC, Tokyo ‘cockpit of great power conflict’ (1993/ and Beijing on the importance of 94:7). Elsewhere, Kent Caulder (1996) has preserving the status quo. A new consensus emerged in the region: “Let theorized on what he sees as the plausibility
5 See, for example, the classic study by Deutsch and Singer, 1964:390-406. 60 Great Power Politics in Contemporary East Asia: Negotiating Multipolarity or Hegemony?
sleeping dogs lie”. This is why we have Asian nations, namely, China and Japan. not had any major geopolitical crisis in The third in question, the United States, East Asia since March 1996, despite has, for the better part of the last century, phenomenal historical change in our been engaged in this part of the world, 6 region. including active participation in two hot wars of the Cold War period, i.e. the Whether framed in a pessimistic or Korean War and the Vietnam War optimistic light, the foregoing views are (Zekilow, 2000:19-30). Indeed, in the view agreed on an apparently irrefutable ‘fact’: of some, American engagement in East the pervasive influence and persistent Asia almost seems inevitable. According involvement of the great powers in the to Joseph Nye, ‘History, geography, affairs of East Asia. To be sure, two of the demographics and economics make the powers that I have in mind are themselves United States a Pacific power’ (2001:96).
Unipolarity
The argument for American unipolarity in United States. At times such the post-Cold War world is rather ‘bandwagoning’ is not without risk to one’s straightforward: notwithstanding the own domestic stability (and, paradoxically, audacity of Osama bin Laden and al- one’s national security), as is presently the Qaeda, there are few if any state actors case for some Islamic nations or countries ready or willing to challenge the with significant Muslim constituencies in preponderant power of the United States. the Washington-led coalition against According to Mastanduno and Kapstein, terrorism. Although China has two arguments are central to writings on demonstrated its willingness to assist the unipolarity (1999:5). In contrast to United States on that front (and in doing neorealist balance-of-power politics of the so possibly receive help in its effort to sort propounded by Kenneth Waltz (1979), manage Islamic radicalism at home), as a which typically treats unipolarity as an great power it has hitherto been less ready inevitably brief transition to either a to join the bandwagon with the bipolar or multipolar situation (Layne, preponderant power. Nonetheless, it has 1993:5-49), the first proposes that the sought, since the Cold War’s end, to principal post-Cold War foreign policy integrate into the United States-dominated challenge for other East Asian great powers global economic order. In short, neither has been the adjustment of their strategies Japan nor China, nor any other state, to the emergence and likely endurance of whether individually or as part of a a unipolar distribution of power in the collectivity, has attempted to balance region. American power – just the sort of behaviour predicted, erroneously in this case, by neo- According to this reasoning, most regional realist theory. Going further than most states have chosen to ‘join the bandwagon’ unipolar theorists would allow, Peter Van with the United States and depend on Ness, appropriating the Gramscian concept American power for their security. The case of hegemony to international relations (Cox of Japan is somewhat of a moot point since and Sinclair, 1996; Gill, 1993), has argued it is a strategic ally and dependent on the that China and Japan, each in their
6 Comments made during remarks addressed to the Europe Asia Forum held in Singapore, 21 February 1998. See Mahbubani, 1998:150-151. 61 Dialogue + Cooperation 1/2002
different ways ‘strategic dependents’ of the ‘China is not a “status quo” power’ because United States, devise their respective it ‘resents the role of the United States in national security policies according to their the Asia-Pacific region’ (2000:56). common perception of ‘a hierarchical world environment, structured in terms of a The purported absence of balancing, combination of US military-strategic however, does not imply the concomitant hegemony and a globalized economic absence of competition and/or conflict interdependence’ (Van Ness, forthcoming). among the great powers. To that end, the Beginning in the late 1940s, the United second argument emphasizes the States in effect ‘spun a web of institutions significance of ‘positional competition’ that connected other states to an emerging among powers outside the realm of military American-dominated economic and security (Mastanduno and Kapstein, security order’ (Ikenberry, 2001:21). By 1999:5). Such positional competition helps participating in this hegemonic system, a state achieve relative gains over other China, like many other nations, has states against which it competes: positional received and continues to receive competition over resources, markets, substantial benefits as, in this alternative prestige and influence. As Randall Schweller sense, a strategic dependent of America. (1999:47) has put it:
This is not to imply that China is therefore Among the present great powers, the disinterested in balancing preponderant rivalry for status is no longer being fought American power in the future (or, indeed, on battlefields for the purpose of in more subtle ways at present), especially establishing a preferred political, if the hegemony insists on making certain religious, or ideological order. These kinds of conflicts have been replaced by changes to the rules of the system – say, a far less dangerous but equally brutal Washington’s proposed abrogation of the global competition among the developed 1972 Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty as a countries to attract investment, to rationalization for missile defence – strengthen the global competitiveness of thereby rendering bandwagoning a their national firms and workers in key problematic policy choice. As a senior high-tech sectors, and, most noticeably, Chinese ‘track-two’ (or, as some wags are to assist (by any means necessary) wont to say, ‘track-one-and-a-half’) member domestic firms competing for a share of once said, China can ‘tolerate’, but not the more than one trillion dollars in ‘accept’ American strategic dominance in infrastructure megaprojects…in Asia, East Asia.7 ‘China is rapidly modernizing Latin America, and the Middle East. its modest military capability’, Van Ness writes, ‘and its greatest strategic concern China may not yet be involved in this sort is a fear that the United States may in the of positional competition against the United future decide to stand in the way of China’s States – not in any significant way at least rise to power’ (forthcoming). Visions, – but its economic muscle is already being correct or not, of a China biding its time felt by some Southeast Asian countries, on the sidelines and chomping at the bit to particularly over the migration of foreign supplant the United States some day – capital and investment from the latter to economically and technologically, if not the former. From the vantage point of the militarily – have no doubt prompted United States, whose goal is, according to comments such as those by National Bush’s Trade Representative, Robert Security Advisor, Condoleeza Rice that Zoellick, to establish ‘a strategy that will
7 Comment made at a track-two security conference in Kuala Lumpur, June 2001. 62 Great Power Politics in Contemporary East Asia: Negotiating Multipolarity or Hegemony? shape the world so as to protect and that Washington ‘has not wanted a peer promote US interests for the next 50 years’ competitor’, remaining to this day ‘firmly (2000:63), the spectre of a rising China committed to its goal’ of preserving a raises the prospects of future intense certain regional order that precludes positional competition. Indeed, as John another great power from hogging the Mearsheimer recently argued, American limelight (2001:46). interests are so entrenched in East Asia
Missile Defence as a Destabilizing Factor
Loud if not boisterous are the voices to suggest that the United States’ aggressive decrying the missile defence agenda as a promotion of missile defence will likely major destabilizing factor in East Asian destabilize the East Asian region. However, security. The most prominent of these the notion of the Bush Administration belong to the Chinese. China sees the being motivated by the obsession to United States as employing missile defence maintain American unipolarity is, to my as an effective military means to enhance mind, rather suspect. But equally troubling, its strategic superiority in East Asia. to an extent, is the Bush Administration’s According to this reasoning, the United view of China as a plausible ‘rogue state’ States will guard against any potential or, to paraphrase National Security Advisor development on the strategic front in the Condoleeza Rice, a non status quo power region that might be at odds with its will (2000:56). A United States-China and interests, such as the growing economic reconciliation or, at the very least, a joint and military power of China (Wang, commitment by the two powers to manage n.d.:1). In so doing, this reasoning their differences via peaceful means is concludes, America seeks to preserve its cardinal to the current and future stability unipolar position in the world. I, too, want of the East Asian region.
China Today no one contests the notion that of the international system under which it China is a rising power, and for good has gained so much. As such, the status reason. Since opening its doors in 1978 quo has been good for China. Contrary to and embarking on its four modernizations, the Bush Administration’s view of China China, first under Deng Xiaoping and now as a non status quo power with revisionist under Jiang Zemin, has worked hard to intentions, China has sought, for the most ‘save the social revolution’, so to speak, by part, to play by the rules that have served way of a reconciliation with a decidedly its agenda well. capitalist mode of production and consumption. Put differently, China has Nevertheless United States’ concerns over benefited immensely through its alleged Chinese ambitions are not totally participation in a global economic system off-kilter. China’s dependent role rankles – largely underwritten by the United States. a dissatisfaction that has become more In short, China, as Van Ness (forthcoming) apparent today in the light of strong has put it, is a strategic dependent of the nationalist pride that serves, for all intents United States, rather than a revisionist and purposes, as the ideological glue power seeking to revise the existing rules holding the Chinese together in lieu of the 63 Dialogue + Cooperation 1/2002
now bankrupt Marxist-Leninist-Maoist Fundamentally, missile defence, as a ideology. Historical affiliations once denied contemporary expression of the doctrine by red-book-carrying Maoists in the and policy of extended deterrence, disastrous period known as the Cultural constitutes a significant strategic problem Revolution now rekindle Chinese for the Chinese if the deterrence umbrella imaginations seeking to reconnect with the is expanded to cover Taiwan. Strategic glories of their Middle Kingdom past (Van deterrence theory, culminating in the Ness, forthcoming). Add to this the painful doctrine of ‘mutual assured destruction’, is memory of Chinese humiliation at the predicated upon what Henry Kissinger hands of Western powers and Japan during once called ‘the balance of terror’. In this the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, respect, an effective missile defence system and what emerges is a powerful would destabilize the entire structure of contemporary reaction to the fear that the strategic deterrence, mutual assured United States is committed to opposing destruction and arms control (Friedman, China’s rise to power. n.d.:3). The logic of destabilization, understood in this context, is simple. If As such, against American protestations State A fears that State B is building a that missile defence is essentially a missile defence system that can effectively defensive system that will, in effect, stabilize neutralize State A’s nuclear arsenal, State the East Asian region, the Chinese A might be compelled to launch a pre- understandably see missile defence, among emptive nuclear strike against State B. At other things, as an instrumental means to issue here is Beijing’s concern that missile deny China its ‘rightful’ place among the defence would effectively neutralize China’s world’s great powers. Beijing therefore sees second-strike capability. United States-led alliances as the means to encircle – i.e. ‘engage’ or ‘congage’ – China. Ultimately, as David Shambaugh has noted, Further, China sees American intervention Taiwan is a ‘hot-buttoned issue’ as far as in Taiwan as a bald-faced attempt by the Beijing is concerned. In contrast to China’s former to interfere with a so-called ‘family readiness to compromise, say, in the concern’, an in-house matter. From United States spy plane incident, Taiwan is Beijing’s vantage point (in rhetoric at least), an entirely different matter altogether. In two ‘alleged points of contention’8 are the words of one Chinese analyst, ‘China notable: first, the potential direct provision has no room whatsoever for any by the United States to Taiwan of missile compromise on this issue [i.e. Taiwan]. This defence systems and related paraphernalia; is a red hot line. Untouchable’ (Wang, and second, the potential incorporation of n.d.:3). Taiwan into the United States-Japan protection umbrella (Wang, n.d.:5).
8 We use ‘alleged points of contention’ for good reason, for although China is understandably concerned about a Taiwanese missile defence capability, the following conditions hold, nonetheless: (1) China can easily saturate any Taiwanese defence with missiles based in Fujian and other littoral provinces; and (2) China can just as easily pilfer missile defence technology from the Taiwanese – a possibility that might have partly influenced Mr Bush’s decision last April to drop the coveted Aegis destroyers from the arms package bound for Taiwan. See Friedman, n.d.:5. 64 Great Power Politics in Contemporary East Asia: Negotiating Multipolarity or Hegemony?
Japan Much has been made of the fact that Japan, It is quite possible that United States-Japan as the world’s second largest economy and cooperation on missile defence might well boasting the most modern conventional be the prelude to a resurgence of Japanese military in East Asia after the United States, militarism. The same concern has again is not a ‘normal’ nation because it continues been raised most recently in view of Japan’s to opt for strategic dependence on the participation in the Washington-led United States. Part of the answer, of course, coalition against terrorism. This is clearly has to do with history, notably, its self- a ‘non-negotiable’ for many East Asian image as a ‘pacifist state’, the strong countries, and may trigger an arms race in opposition from its Asian neighbours to a the region. Indeed, even in the unlikely greater military role for Japan and its event that Japan’s Asian neighbours may dubious distinction as the only country ever not regard Japan’s potential military to have been attacked with nuclear resurgence as threatening, the fact that weapons (Van Ness, forthcoming). defence spending rose in post-Cold War East Asia, especially Southeast Asia, at a North Korea’s surprise launch of a multi- time when the rest of the world was cutting staged intercontinental ballistic missile over back does not augur well for the region. Japanese airspace in 1998 has been cited as motivation for the Japanese to embark To be sure, post-1997 defence spending in on a missile defence joint development the region has markedly decreased because programme with the United States. of the recent financial crisis. But the However, some analysts, particularly likelihood that the situation will revert once Chinese analysts, seem to think that there regional economies pick up again is strong. are other more compelling reasons than Hence, even if missile defence does not merely responding to the North Korean engender a regional arms race spiral, a missile threat. They point to Japanese militarizing imperative born largely of so- collusion in the United States goal to called ‘prestige acquisitions’ – keeping up maintain strategic deterrence and with the Joneses, in short – is not superiority in the East Asian region using inconceivable, with missile defence systems missile defence as an effective means being the ‘Hello Kitty’ of military (Wang, n.d.:2). In this respect, Japan’s acquisitions rather than, say, F-16s. The contribution can also be interpreted as an United States is expected to lean on its expression of Tokyo’s desire to substantially alliance partners for burden sharing insofar enhance its overall military strength and as missile defence is concerned. Japan is aggrandize its political position on the no exception. Although committed to joint international stage – a move that is partly research and development with the United ‘legitimated’ by coupling its goals with those States on missile defence, Tokyo has, by of the broader United States strategic and large, been tacit in its support for an enterprise. Indeed, it has been suggested operational commitment on its part, due that Japan’s concern is less with North partly to the opposition it will likely face Korea than with China. from other East Asian countries.
The United States
The United States’ relatively recent history oversimplification, the Chinese seem to pales in comparison with China’s millennia treasure continuity and privilege the social of rich historical experience. At the risk of collective, whereas Americans celebrate 65 Dialogue + Cooperation 1/2002
revolution and valorize autonomy and the and sensor systems to missile attack. ‘can do’ spirit – or at least these are their Understood in these terms, American ideals. This is not to imply that Americans missile defence is principally about seizing do not believe in continuity or group the strategic high ground of space. To be identification. But it offers some glimpses sure, there is a symbiotic logic to this, for into an American psyche that is short on missile defence systems cannot function memory and prone to unilateral thinking properly unless the space-based surveillance and doing. Is the United States, by way of systems on which they depend are free strengthening its alliances and rejuvenating from the threat of being tampered with or extended deterrence, bent on maintaining destroyed. If so, missile defence, especially and enhancing its alleged strategic space-based systems, may not prove the best unipolarity, as the Chinese seem to think? option for the United States to pursue, given Is the United States, as the existing the huge price tag from research and hegemony, wilfully resisting the balancing development through to actual deployment. effects of emerging Chinese power in the Missile threats from rogue states, as gradual transition of the international George Friedman has suggested, are better system, as neo-realists have postulated, addressed by way of subsonic Tomahawk from a state of unipolarity to one of or air-launch cruise missiles (n.d.:5). multipolarity? If the protection of space-based assets is Attention to the Bush Administration’s what ultimately concerns the Americans, rhetoric and to the written comments of then current attempts by the Bush some of President Bush’s top officials Administration to either revise or abandon suggests that the United States’s evolving the 1972 Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty should policy toward East Asia is less about not detract us from what the real issue at preserving American unipolarity. Rather, hand might be, i.e. the 1967 Outer Space as William Tow (2001) has observed, Treaty – signed by the United States and President Bush is concerned with the USSR during the height of the Cold generating a functionalist, realist and War – that bans the deployment or use of selective foreign policy aimed, quite weapons of mass destruction, whether in specifically, at promoting and protecting the earth’s orbit or in deep space (Krepon, the United States’ interests in the region. 2001:4). As such, the American push to abrogate the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty If so, what then are America’s interests in could well be the preliminary step toward East Asia today, particularly in the light of subsequent efforts to seek the revision or missile defence? Several analysts have noted elimination of the Outer Space Treaty. From that the key issue is no longer about the this vantage, American protestations that strategic nuclear balance. Instead, in the China is not and never was the primary words of a commission chaired by Donald target of missile defence may well be true. Rumsfeld on outer space management and This may partly explain why some United organization – the other better-known, States officials seem to think – erroneously Rumsfeld-led commission being on missile so – that if the Bush Administration can defence – the United States may someday successfully convince China of the merits soon face a ‘Space Pearl Harbor’ – that is, of missile defence, China would agree to a devastating sneak attack against American theatre missile defence (TMD) deployment satellites orbiting the planet (Krepon, in Australia, though certainly not in Taiwan 2001:2). In other words, it is very possible or Japan (Tow, 2001). that the United States fears a growing vulnerability of satellite communications All this, of course, neither undermines the 66 Great Power Politics in Contemporary East Asia: Negotiating Multipolarity or Hegemony? claim that the United States desires to Vietnam America is war-shy. Indeed, in remain, in Joseph Nye’s words, the ‘top the light of the United States’ success in dog’, nor calls into doubt America’s the Gulf, it might not be inconceivable to commitment to protecting Taiwan, or suggest that the Bush Administration may possibly even future Taiwanese have coupled extended deterrence with the independence, at least where some Powell Doctrine’s ‘neo-Clausewitzian’ members of Congress are concerned. If concept of total war fought with clear anything, China cannot afford to commit political objectives. If so, then missile the analytical error many pundits have defence can be understood as a attributed to Iraq regarding the Gulf War, technologized – in the ‘revolution in namely calling Washington’s ‘bluff’, because military affairs’ sense – version of the Powell of the erroneous conjecture that post- Doctrine (Tow, 2001).
A Call to Reason, Restraint and Responsibility
Given the United States’ overwhelming war’. In other words, careful reasoning and military superiority and China’s rapidly strategic restraint in the making and modernizing, but still modest, capability, practice of great power foreign policy and few if any analysts doubt the outcome of a collective responsibility to the stability and hot war between the two powers. My plea well-being of the region are both called for. is that the great powers in East Asia would In short, one pleads against arrogance but refuse the temptation to take the unilateral welcomes prudence in the great powers: route. The ASEAN states do not want to that they stay the course of reason, restraint be put in a position whereby they are forced and responsibility not only where the to choose between the United States and missile defence question is concerned, but China in a conflict. Missile defence will also, indeed, where all regional security certainly complicate, and quite possibly questions are concerned. Indeed, by destabilize, the East Asian region. The great collectively refusing the all-too-easy powers need to be sensitive to the region’s recourse to ethnocentric policy thinking needs and to be committed to processes of and doing, and instead aiming for a ‘fusion multilateral consultation; they ought to of each other’s security horizons’,9 so to resort to quiet diplomacy, rather than speak, the great powers, in conjunction grandstanding and finger pointing, to with the rest of East Asia, can write the manage and resolve disputes. Better, in region’s future together in cooperation Churchill’s terms, to ‘jaw, jaw’ than ‘war, rather than apart in conflict.
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69 The Situation of Pakistan The Situation of Pakistan
Naeem Ahmad Salik
I would like to bring into perspective the stay on in Afghanistan at the end of the genesis of the current crisis which is war. In fact, most of the Arab countries, unfolding in our part of the world and I refused to accept their own nationals back start with the problem of Afghanistan. It is into their countries. Of those people who commonly said that the Afghans are only stayed back in Afghanistan, Osama bin at peace once they are at war. This reflects Laden is one particular example, a person the volatile nature of the people of who was picked up by the Americans Afghanistan, and they have indeed had a themselves, trained by the CIA, used for very turbulent history. For many years they their own purposes, and is now being were the chess board of the great game dubbed a monster by them. between the Russian and British Indian Empire, and they have suffered for being In addition to the radicalization of Pakistani treated as a buffer between two imperial society, there was a flood of weapons – powers. The Soviet intervention in the early weapons that were provided to the Afghans 1980s created problems, and not only for in abundance by American funding and Afghanistan. It also created a dilemma for some which were taken over from the Pakistan since we were faced with the Soviet forces. Many of these were sold in dreadful two-front war security scenarios. Pakistan, and from one corner of the While we had a hostile relationship with country to another there was pilferage of India on the eastern front, we had at the automatic weapons, creating a very serious western borders a hostile situation with the challenge to the internal security situation. Soviet Union as well. During the crisis in We are trying to grapple with that situation 1987 we almost went to war with India. by devising new policies. Keeping these However, once the Soviets left Afghanistan, weapons has been made illegal and some the United States and other interested people have voluntarily surrendered them. powers chose to leave the Afghans to their Security agencies also still carry out raids fate. That caused the present day problems to recover illegal weapons which have not we are facing. Pakistan had to face the yet been surrendered, but it is a very difficult repercussions of the crisis all by itself, and and gigantic task. in Afghanistan where almost two million people were killed in a decade, turmoil The second problem has been caused by continued infecting the whole region and narcotics and drug trafficking. As everyone still continues to simmer even today. knows, Afghanistan is one of the main sources of narcotics in the world. Due to As a result of the fall-out of the Afghan the crisis in Afghanistan, Pakistan became conflict, Pakistan faced new threats to its the main route for trafficking narcotics from internal security, resulting in the Afghanistan to the outside world, resulting radicalization of Pakistani society. The so- in legal, social and economic problems. A called ‘Arab Afghans’, people who had been large number of Pakistanis became addicted picked up from various Arab countries and to drugs, posing a long-term problem for trained and armed to fight inside the Pakistan state and society. Afghanistan against the Soviets decided to 70 Dialogue + Cooperation 1/2002
Due to the situation in Afghanistan, Our problem in Pakistan was that we had Pakistan is confronted with a number of to live with the Taliban because we could social, economic and environmental not wish them away nor could we push them problems as well. In the northwestern out of the areas adjoining Pakistan. In province of Pakistan live the Pashtuns, the Pakistan, we have a semi-autonomous tribal same ethnic group to which the Taliban belt along the Afghan border. The tribes belong. However, there is not much are divided between the two countries. For sympathy left for Afghanistan amongst large almost 200 years, the British tried to pacify segments of population in the province since this region and to subjugate it by bringing 3 million Afghan refugees came to Pakistan, it under the control of the central authority, and even today around 2 million Afghan but they did not succeed. The tribal belt refugees are settled in the northwestern was permitted an autonomous status, which province, and partly in the Baluchistan they maintained even after independence. province. As a result of this permanent There is nominal control of the federal settlement of Afghan refugees for more than government through political agents but the two decades, vast socio-economic problems structures of governmental authority are have arisen. Pakistanis complain that non-existent there. To further complicate refugees take up the labouring jobs and the situation the border between other manual work for just 50 per cent of Afghanistan and Pakistan stretches to the wages of local Pakistanis. They cause almost 2,500 kilometres. It is a very environmental damage by cutting down inaccessible and mountainous border trees to use as fuel. They also brought along region. Once you consider closing down their animals, making pasture land scarce. the official check points and entry posts, it They occupied land belonging to Pakistani has to be admitted that there are many people and established on it their hidden mountain tracks, which can be used settlements and camps. Where a high by people to move either into Pakistan or percentage of Afghan refugees have settled, into Afghanistan. It is virtually impossible dissent in rural society is widely prevalent. to physically control the border with Afghanistan. As a result of leaving Afghanistan to its own devices, various fragmented groups who However, despite all these historical, social fought against the Russians, war-lords and and geographical linkages with Afghanistan, their armed gangs, contributed to the once the current crisis emerged on 11 persistent instability in Afghanistan, which September, Pakistan took a very decisive in turn gave rise to lawlessness and illegal stand to join the global alliance against business activities, undermining the social terrorism. This is notable because Pakistan fabric of Afghan society. In the beginning, is the only country amongst a large number the Taliban were seen as non-political of professed allies which faces the most real people, recruiting their supporters from threats to its internal social fabric and religious schools. They were able to gain security by taking the decision to join the power in Afghanistan without facing much anti-terrorist alliance. However, we are resistance. They were able to occupy 90 to determined to stick to the principled 95 per cent of the territory of Afghanistan, position we have taken. and were welcomed by people for bringing stability and peace to the areas which were Globalization may provide economic under their control. We may not agree with opportunities to some countries but may the means they used, but they definitely at the same time cause the loss of economic brought peace and stability to Afghanistan. opportunities for others, particularly
71 The Situation of Pakistan underdeveloped or developing countries. to each other, accommodate each other’s The effects of globalization have not really views, and try to understand each other. manifested their true colours, and it is difficult to evaluate whether some of the The nuclearization of South Asia in 1998 problems have been caused by internal or has transformed the security environment global factors. However, the interrelation there. There is potential for devastation and between the two has to be critically at the same time there is potential for examined. For instance, poverty and improving the relations between India and deprivation basically act as a breeding Pakistan. Pakistan has adopted a policy of ground for hatred and terrorism. Unless minimum nuclear deterrence and has these issues are addressed – whether deliberately taken a decision not to get resulting from globalization or the unequal involved in the nuclear arms race with India. distribution of resources amongst various As a manifestation of this policy we have countries – we cannot really address the frozen our defence budget in the last two issue of terrorism. years, despite the fact that the Indian defence budget has in the meantime Another problem is the information increased by more than 40 per cent. revolution, which we have seen emerging in the past few years. Anything happening The other problem is the impact of Sino- anywhere can instantly be seen in the United States relations. Pakistan is in a very remotest corners of the world and these difficult position since China is a traditional images have a lot of power in building the friend and neighbour and we have strong perceptions of people. When people in the ties to China as a friendly nation. We also Middle East and Arab countries are exposed have a very long tradition of friendly to the media and able to witness Israeli relations with the United States. Whenever tanks shooting Palestinian youth or Israeli there is a problem between the United States gunship helicopters firing at Palestinian and China and their relations sour, there is townships, no government can moderate a negative fall-out for Pakistan. It is like the adverse impact of those images on the getting in the line of fire. For instance, there public mind. The second aspect of it is that, is the controversial issue of ballistic missile while we may say that the information defence. Pakistan is not directly affected, revolution promotes the exchange of but we are concerned that if and when a information, it has in fact largely been one- decision is taken to deploy it, China is way traffic. The Western world has been likely to respond, which will in turn have a able to spread its precepts and its values, spill-over effect on South Asia. India will and its media networks dominate this build up its missile forces in response to ‘information exchange’ significantly. This any expansion of Chinese forces, and at has caused a certain degree of resentment some point Pakistan will have to respond against the West amongst certain groups in in one way or another. To us, this is a other societies. Recently we have seen the potential danger for South Asian stability. phenomenon whereby one of the television networks from the Third World, the al- I may now turn to the role of the South Jazeera network, projected certain images Asian Association for Regional depicting the other side of the story to the Cooperation (SAARC). There are several West, but the Western public found it hard successful groupings in multilateral settings to swallow and there have been calls to ban like the European Union and the its transmission. We have to agree that this Association of Southeast Asian Nations cannot be one-way traffic; we have to listen (ASEAN). The SAARC unfortunately has
72 Dialogue + Cooperation 1/2002
not been able to play that kind of role in Pakistan supports multilateral agreements the South Asian region. This might be due and United Nations conventions against to the structural imbalances and associated terrorism. Pakistan has signed nine out of problems in SAARC. On the one hand there eleven United Nations conventions on anti- is a large country like India – the second terrorism, the remaining two are being most populous country in the world and discussed and are under serious which probably will be the most populous consideration by the Pakistani government. country in the next 10 to 20 years – while Pakistan has over the years contributed on the other hand there are the Maldives significantly to United Nations peace- and Bhutan, among the smallest countries keeping missions. I believe at present in the world. With this kind of imbalance Pakistan is one of the largest contributors it is very difficult for the grouping to run of troops to United Nations peace-keeping the organization efficiently. Another major missions. We recently sent 6,000 troops to problem affecting SAARC is the continuing Sierra Leone to replace the Indian tension between the two main partners in contingent there. SAARC, India and Pakistan. For this reason SAARC has not been able to take off or In general, we have always tried to move fulfil the role it was supposed to play. within the multilateral and international framework of security. However, the However, there is a need for a continued present situation on our western borders is dialogue between India and Pakistan. We of major concern to us. The situation is have always welcomed the role of the United extremely difficult but still manageable. I States or any other foreign power as a don’t see any problems or situations really facilitator. Because there is so much threatening Pakistan’s stability. But I think mistrust between the two countries, we feel it is important that the campaign is not that we cannot go far without somebody allowed to linger on indefinitely. The longer cajoling and patting both sides on the back the campaign continues, the more problems and keeping them moving forward in that it will create, not only for Pakistan but for direction. Our commitment to continue many countries in the Middle East as well. this dialogue is clear. President Musharraf It was a surprise to see people getting out called Prime Minister Vajpayee to renew on the streets and demonstrating in a the invitation to visit Pakistan, despite the country like Oman. The situation is very fact that Mr Vajpayee had already uneasy in Saudi Arabia and some other announced publicly that he had cancelled countries, and if a quick solution is not his planned visit to Pakistan. Indian found to this problem, I really think these External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh has countries have the potential to explode. also been invited by our foreign minister. We hope that this process will resume and will bring some positive developments to the whole region.
73 Reasons for Regional Instability: Internal Fractures and Crises
Sixth Panel Reasons for Regional Instability: Internal Fractures and Crises
74 Reasons for Regional Instability: Internal Fractures and Crises Reasons for Regional Instability: Internal Fractures and Crises
Riefqi Muna
Prologue
This paper attempts to address some of However, considering the ‘strategic culture’, the potential causes of regional instability there is a need for careful observation and and insecurity problems in Southeast Asia a cooperative security approach. in the immediate future, with reference to the continuous problem of mass Despite the positive direction of regional displacement. It also discusses the security in the region, there are several Indonesian experience with security aspects that need to be observed. Security problems and displaced persons. concepts are changing, and there is a global shift from interstate to intrastate conflicts. Since the 1990s, the security architecture Identity and sub-nationalism is rising in in Southeast Asia has changed dramatically. ASEAN countries. These trends will shape The cleavages between socialist-oriented internal fractures and crises. They will also ideology and anti-communist thinking have have implications for the problem of mass reduced significantly. In this context, displacement. ASEAN enlargement, which embraces the whole of Southeast Asia, is the most In this situation security policy has to credible move in Southeast Asia’s new adapt to the growing concept of security politico-security complex. The Association itself. Following the progress of human of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has emancipation, its core should enlarge to shown its commitment to building a deal with not only state-centred military security community in the region. security, but also human security. Issues of sovereignty are still important and will A further significant step at the macro level continue to be important. However, the is the notion of the ASEAN Regional focus of security has enlarged to embrace Forum (ARF) providing a larger framework the individual as well as society. The area for security cooperation, not just for of security is also expanding from Southeast Asia but for the whole Asia- traditional/conventional (military) security Pacific region. An attempt to promote to encompass non-traditional issues such confidence-building measures (CBMs), as environmental security, economic directed at avoiding interstate conflict in security and human security. the region, has been seriously undertaken, not only at the track-one diplomacy level, Within this complexity, a new trend in but also at the track-two level. This has international conflict has emerged. In the played a very crucial role. By learning from last ten years international conflict has the European experience of CBMs, the shifted from interstate into intrastate enthusiasm for promoting trust and conflict. Even when a conflict is considered confidence in the Asia-Pacific region has to be a low intensity conflict, it still causes led to a serious debate on how compatible tragic problems in the human security the European approach is with Asia Pacific. sphere. The horizontal conflict or 75 Dialogue + Cooperation 1/2002
communal conflict is the most serious solutions should be promoted, especially aspect that needs to be observed by policy with regard to mass displacement. makers, and human security conflict
Intrastate Conflict, Identity and Sub-nationalism
Another important explanation for growing the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Indeed, intrastate conflict is that identity has been ethno-nationalism has become a source of a potential source of internal conflict. intrastate conflict. Within the framework of identity, the discourse of otherness is developing. This Following the separation of East Timor is happening in major communal conflicts from Indonesia, there has been a growing in parallel with growing sub-nationalism to demand in other regions to separate or to some extent. By the end of the twentieth have a more autonomous status. Some of century, ethno-nationalism had become a these regions are the provinces of Aceh, significant discourse in world politics. It Irian Jaya (Papua), Riau and East is the source for the construction of the Kalimantan. Centrifugal forces are identity of sub-nationalism. Identity, threatening the national identity of however, is not necessarily based on a single Indonesia, and could, in turn, determine ethnological background. It can also be the future status of the unitary state of created by a region’s so-called imagined Indonesia. The interests and demands of community. The process of negotiation and regions to have greater sovereignty could bargaining over interests between local- lead to more violent conflict with the regional forces and the central government central government as struggles develop into has often ended in violence, the scale and insurgency movements. intensity of which has, at times, led to an intrastate conflict or war. Identity, sub-nationalism and political violence will affect the future direction of The world is still witnessing the struggle mass displacement. Indeed it already has. for sub-nationalism, which is sometimes We are witnessing such movements in East expressed through violent conflict. Timor, Aceh, Moro, Papua, Riau, as well Examples include places such as the Balkans, as cases in Kalimantan at the lowest level the Caucasus, many parts of Africa, as well without a sub-nationalist dimension. The as many parts of Asia. Struggles which situation in Burma with armed groups such began as mere ‘dissatisfaction’ and as the Karen, Shan, Kachin, etc., also resentment, have turned into political supports this argument. So, ‘Balkanization’ discontent and fights for independence. The (to use a fashionable word) or so-called disenfranchisement of the nation- ‘disenfranchisement’ based on identity will state, or Balkanization, became a new contribute to the creation of mass political discourse in world politics displacement in the future. following the break-up of Yugoslavia and
Trends of Conflict
In the post-Cold War environment, there is diminishing in the ASEAN region as it is a shift from interstate to intrastate is at the global level. Looking at the nature conflict. The likelihood of interstate conflict of current international relations, few 76 Reasons for Regional Instability: Internal Fractures and Crises nations go to war in the traditional sense. dispersing mostly through the Indonesian Future conflict is most likely to be ‘low archipelago. Indonesia provided a intensity’ to ‘medium intensity’, and mostly processing zone at Galang Island. internal, stemming from religious, ethnic, economic or political disputes. States with Cambodia and Vietnam are no longer poor governance, with ethnic, cultural and sources of displaced people. Many are religious tensions, or with weak economies repatriating voluntarily as the economic or porous borders will be prime areas for and political situations in those countries insecurity (Gannon, 2001). improve. However, Burma has become a source of displaced persons due to the There are two dimensions to intrastate continued political repression there. conflict: (1) vertical conflict ranges from Continued military operations against grievances, rebellion and insurgency to civil guerrilla movements in several states war, which is either manifested or remains (Kachin, Karen, Shan, etc.) has created latent between one or more groups of people much misery and thousands of people have against the state or government; and (2) fled their homes, many of them crossing horizontal conflict is a communal or inter- the border to Thailand, and some, group conflict that can take the form of particularly Muslim Rohingya, to Eastern ethnic, communal or religious conflict – Bangladesh. In the Philippines, the mostly at a low intensity level. ‘Ethnic continued violence in South Mindanao has conflict’ (Roe, 1999; Gurr, 1993) is among also prompted the movement of people. the clearest description of what is going on in Indonesia. The conflicts in Ambon, In Indonesia, the scorched-earth policy of Kalimantan and Aceh all fall into this pro-Jakarta militias sparked violence across category. East Timor and many people fled the region out of terror and insecurity. More than a During the Cold War, as the communist hundred thousand East Timorese are still movement from the North advanced and in the Eastern NusaTenggara Province in gained support in Indochina, it was feared the surrounding Atambua. The fresh that there would be a domino effect communal conflict in the North Maluku/ throughout the region. ASEAN was thus Ambon regencies in Kalimantan and in created, and given Western support to Aceh has displaced around one million counter this threat. people. The government lacks the budget or the commitment to deal with them. ASEAN experienced a high influx of people in the 1970s. The causes of displacement In sum, the problem of displacement in were civil and ideological war, repression Southeast Asia is still continuing at present. and military invasion. In particular, the The main causes are torture and repression ‘boat people’ from Vietnam and ‘monk in the case of Burma, fleeing clashes with people’ from Cambodia created serious the insurgency movement in the case of challenges for ASEAN countries. The fall Moro, and avoiding bloody communal of Saigon triggered mass displacement conflicts in certain areas in the major case from the Indochina sub-region, with an en of Indonesia. masse movement of refugees out by sea,
77 Dialogue + Cooperation 1/2002
Case Study: Indonesia’s Instability
lndonesia will undoubtedly become the occurences. Many politicians believe that third largest democratic country in the he ‘who controls the street controls the world. However, despite a positive state’. democratic process, the nation is in extreme crisis – a multi-dimensional crisis: political, However, ignorance and a lack of a sense economic, legal, social and cultural. It is of crisis, except in terms of political difficult to label the country a ‘normal state’ ambition, are creating more problems for – ‘a state in an emergency’ is more apt. the country. The efforts of the elite to Paradoxically, the culture of consumerism manage the crisis are becoming less clear. of the wealthy elite colours Jakarta, for There are no signs that present policy will example brand new luxury cars meet the challenges. Despite the crisis, the conspicuously contribute to the city’s traffic president has continued to enjoy overseas jams. The elite ‘struggle’ is blended with trips, and some political leaders seem to mass politics, with fighting at the elite level lack concern about the security challenges spilling over to the masses. Parliamentary that have the potential to destroy the nation. street brawls are becoming every-day
Horizontal and Vertical Conflict Areas in conflict continue to proliferate. as 440,000 from Maluku/Ambon, 30,000 There are no exact numbers reported, but Madurese from West Kalimantan, in the last two years an unofficial figure Indonesians displaced from East Timor and estimated that conflict and ‘amok’ claimed East Timorese seeking refuge in West more than 12,000 lives, including Ambon Timor. (8,000) and Sambas (5,000), as well as several in Ketapang, Semangi, etc.1 In the On the other hand, the vertical conflict has new conflict that has just broken out and not ended. Centrifugal forces continue to is still going on, more than 250 people have challenge Jakarta’s legitimacy. Aceh, Irian been killed and mutilated. Two years of Jaya (Papua) and Riau are examples of horizontal conflict in Indonesia has caused states demanding independence. There are more deaths than there were in five years similarities and differences in the content of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, during of movement against Jakarta. All these which around 10,000 people were killed. regions are very rich in natural resources. They cite the centralist model as the major Indeed, conflict has also had another reason for their demands. However, each consequence: the growing number of in- of these regions has its own distinct social border refugees (known as Internally and historical background which Displaced People – IDP). The number of strengthens its demand for independence. IDP in Indonesia is believed to be more At the local level, regional identities are than 650,000 (and they are mostly women forming and demanding their own and children). This includes 50,000 provinces. Consequently, new provinces are Madurese who fled East Kalimantan emerging. (Sampit and surrounding areas),2 as well
1 Based on calculations from several national and local media. 2 This number was released by the Coordinating Ministry for Social Affairs. See Suara Pembaruan, 28 March 2000. The number of IDP from Sampit has not yet been clarified as the conflict is still underway, but several 78 media sources report estimated numbers. Reasons for Regional Instability: Internal Fractures and Crises
Within the framework of vertical conflict, interplay between the community and the human rights abuses still continue, as police. reported by the Commission for Disappearance and Torture (KontraS). Since weapon acquisition is prohibited to Reports released in December 2000 state citizens, the use of bombs to terrorize that, in the year 2000 alone, the number people, light firearms (such as those used of cases of abuse of human rights reached in the bloody communal religious conflict 1,216, with 2,119 victims. Most of these in the Maluccas), grenades (such as those instances were in Aceh.3 used in the attack in Medan), or the explosion of ammunition (such as the Based on these cases, security in the instances in East Java) fuel concerns that broader sense will remain a vital issue in some undisciplined security personnel may the current social-political landscape in be involved. Indonesia. It is related to various complicated aspects of the continuing The continuation of horizontal conflicts multi-dimensional crisis. Indonesia is a (communal conflicts) is another concern. country which faces tremendous problems Sporadic conflicts have emerged in several that relate directly or indirectly to security places, caused by minor incidents. This issues at all levels. trend seems set to continue, especially due to the high degree of frustration within The atmosphere of lawlessness is the society. The absence of preventive action background to determining security in the and the lack of an early-warning system also country. Increasing uncertainty about ensure the continuation of the security security in the community is a concern. problem. There is, for example, anger toward the police, which has not yet been able to At the operational level, questions are being transform into a clean, professional civilian raised in relation to the capability, inability force. The community’s loss of trust in the or unwillingness of the security apparatus police and judicial institutions has to perform its task of securing the nation. unleashed a trend of mass ‘street justice’ A shortage of personnel and a lack of toward criminals. There is a growing trend professionalism and resources are among of militarism and ‘premanism’ the internal causes. On the other side of (hooliganism) in society. the coin, people have psychologically lost control and have chosen muscle over mind The growing use of violence within the to resolve the problem. Thus human community can be traced back to the New security or community security is at stake Order regime, which preferred to use force while the state is challenged by threats such for the purpose of conflict resolution. There as disintegration as well as difficulties in are rumours that in many cases, mobs, establishing order. In general, individual crimes or clashes involve either an security is beyond the capability of the individual or a group of military or police security apparatus as it lacks numbers as personnel. In the Poso upheavals in 2000, well as professionalism. it was disclosed by the military office that 28 soldiers were involved in the unrest. And The clear outcome of these trends and the in 1999, around 80 police posts were badly fact that the conflict is proliferating destroyed in an ‘amok’, according to a horizontally and vertically is the ‘certainty media report – an example of the negative of uncertainty’ itself. The prolongation of
3 As quoted in Riau Post, 10 December 2000. 79 Dialogue + Cooperation 1/2002
multi-dimensional crises indicates that the reformulation. The National Security Act prospect for security is far from certain. is still in the process of submission to the Security and defence policy is still in the House of Representatives (DPR), as is the process of finding a model through the Police Act. institutional/legal process and
Capabilities and Responses The Military
With the current security problems in many Bogor regency, West Java, and in Malang, regions, there is a need to assess existing East Java. Outside Java, the troops are troop posts, the level of protection and scattered in the hinterland of Sumatra, measures which should be taken by the evenly scattered across posts in Kalimantan, military and the police in zones of conflict. and positioned at some strategic points in Sulawesi and in certain areas in the eastern After decades of adopting the doctrine of part of Indonesia. dual functions, which provided the military with the right to get involved in politics In a crisis situation, deployment of troops and security affairs, the armed forces are to the remotest areas takes 8-14 hours, now concentrating on their primary with the most effective combat attack function as a defence force. Only under an needing at least half a day to mobilize. In extreme situation and only if asked, will term of scale, the combined forces of the they help the police force to maintain military and the police can only be deployed internal security and order. However, this to five areas with the highest scale of function as an additional force is also conflict, such as areas marked with limited. insurgencies. This means that if the major hotspots were to explode simultaneously The Indonesian armed forces are slightly into large-scale riots or communal conflict, over 400,000 personnel out of a total the combined forces would fail to control population of more than 210 million. When the situation.4 the police was still part of the armed forces, the overall number was just over 600,000 Jakarta is the most important city to keep personnel. Out of this number, the army under control. Under the first alert is still the largest force, with around situation, such as on the previous annual 250,000 personnel. They are posted in session of People’s Consultative Assembly various locations throughout Indonesia. (MPR), the maximum number of troops deployed in Jakarta was 13,000. This is The highest concentration of troops is still half the number deployed in a similar in Java, which comprises only 6 per cent situation in March 1998, when the of land area, but is inhabited by around 60 assembly elected Soeharto for his seventh per cent of the total Indonesian population. consecutive term as president, and about The largest contingent of troops, which are a fraction of the 120,000 personnel two divisions of the Army’s Strategy Reserve deployed during the riots in May 1998. Command (Kostrad) are located in the
4 These calculations were done by RIDEP in July 2000. See TRACwS – Biweekly Strategic Analysis, 1(3), July 2000. 80 Reasons for Regional Instability: Internal Fractures and Crises
Different units have their posts in different in Batujajar (West Java) and Kartasura areas, according to the degree of their (Central Java) respectively, but their importance and characteristics. For headquarters are located in East Jakarta. example, two of the largest units of the The marines are also concentrated in the Army’s Special Forces (Kopassus), which two most important and largest cities, are now going to be downsized, are located Jakarta and Surabaya.
The Police Since the separation of the police force The ratio between the police and the from the Indonesian armed forces, the population is imbalanced. Ideally, the ratio responsibility of internal security has should be one policeman for every 200 shifted from the military to the police. This people. In reality the ratio is one policeman means that in troubled areas the chain of for every 1,200 people. Indeed, the low command lies in the hands of the police. quality of recruits has made the police force This is more so in non-conflict areas. rank among the least skilled law enforcement agencies. Many of the new The law stipulates that only when the police recruits are youth from lower class families cannot control the situation can they ask who cannot afford to pursue a higher the military for help. The police retain the education. This in turn results in some right to command joint operations. After ‘moral hazard’ for the police. Moreover, three decades as part of the armed forces, the long link with the armed forces has however, it is not easy for the police to resulted in the police adopting a military take over the responsibility for security and appearance and attitudes. They tend to order from the military. apply military security measures rather than preventive measures, with the result that Local police headquarters (Polres - Polisi many police operations do not succeed in Resort [resort police]) are located at the controlling violent conflicts. The regency or city level. With the rise of social demilitarization of the police and the disorder/conflict areas, it is clear that the establishment of a civilian police police force lacks the maximum capability (CIVPOL), then, is a matter of urgency. to control medium and large-scale conflict.
Security Consequences: Mass Displacement In the past decade, millions of peoples have countries. Often IDPs face worse been forced from their homes by armed conditions than refugees who have crossed conflict, internal strife, systematic violation international borders.5 of human rights, etc. Many of them have moved across borders, while others have Internal displacement always has severe stayed within their countries because of humanitarian implications. These geographical considerations or the political displaced persons are at the greatest risk attitudes of bordering countries which of starvation, have the highest rate of prevent them crossing. ‘Internally preventable disease, and are the most displaced’ people are refugees in their own vulnerable to human rights abuses. IDP are
5 See Huggler, 2000. This paper does not attempt to distinguish ‘refugee’ from ‘displaced person’ for humanitarian considerations only. 81 Dialogue + Cooperation 1/2002
a symptom of state dysfunction that poses (UNHCR) on 29 June 2001 that tens of a threat to political and economic stability thousands of people had fled their homes at national, regional and international in the Central African Republic following levels. Violence and instability can spread a failed coup attempt a month earlier that through entire regions, forcing triggered a government crackdown on the neighbouring states to bear the brunt of opposition. There are 4 million internally massive refugee flows. IDP are now as displaced people in Sudan alone. Across acute a problem as the refugee crisis. But the globe, according to the United Nations, in the case of the latter, humanitarian there are around 25-30 million displaced needs, coupled with practical, political and people. Some 60,000-70,000 have been economic interests, have brought about displaced internally in areas south of the international protection and assistance for Central African Republic capital of Bangui. those displaced outside their native Another 14,000-17,000 Central African countries. Republic residents went to Equateur Province in the northwestern corner of the The problem of displaced people is getting Democratic Republic of Congo (UNHCR, worse. It was reported by the United 2001). Nations High Commission for Refugees
ASEAN Burdens
Today the ASEAN region is burdened with It was an attempt to promote economic a huge number of internally displaced and social cooperation, but it is essentially people, mostly scattered across the islands for politico-security purposes. For much of Indonesia and at the Thai-Burma of the Cold War, Southeast Asia was in (Myanmar) border. In Indonesia, following conflict and divided along political, ethnic the rampant violence of pro-Jakarta militias and ideological lines. Yet before the end of in East Timor, the East Timorese left their this century, this once fractious and still homeland for the province of East Nusa diverse region will be under the aegis of Tenggara. The new ethnic conflict in several ASEAN, fulfilling the dream of the group’s Kalimantan districts has forced thousands founding fathers in 1967. The end of the of Madurese to flee their homes to save bipolar Cold War order is compelling their lives. Ambon is also facing the same Southeast Asian states to take on a wider problem. At the Thai-Burma border regional defence and security role for the crossing remains difficult. first time in their modern history (Dupont, 1996). However, looking at ASEAN’s future The Cold War may be over, but low development and its environment, there is intensity conflicts are displacing large a dangerous conflict potential that could numbers of people around the globe from arise from the internal destabilization of the Balkans, Africa, Asia and Latin members of ASEAN (Hermann, 1999). America. Displacement is becoming a global humanitarian problem that is Ethnic and religious tensions persist among complicated, and in many cases politically ASEAN members. These states also have very sensitive, particularly in Southeast to contend with an increasingly complex Asia. range of territorial and resource issues that unless carefully handled could easily flare ASEAN was built on the legacy of into disputes. Domestically, questions of Konfrontasi between Indonesia-Malaysia. political legitimacy and succession will 82 Reasons for Regional Instability: Internal Fractures and Crises continue to confront Southeast Asian elites the political and personal level, have at a time when traditional values and complicated the task of government and ideologies are being eroded by the twin prompted many Southeast Asian political forces of modernization and globalization. leaders to search for alternative ideologies. The decline and loss of old values, both at
Table 1: Refugees and IDP in Southeast Asia
Country Refugees and Displaced Type and Causes Asylum Seekers of Conflict
Burma - 600,000-1million Repression, (Myanmar) Independent movement Cambodia 50 16,000 (in Vietnam) War of intervention 100 (in Thailand) (during Vietnam invasion) Indonesia 120,000 (East Timor) 750,000-850,000 Horizontal conflict, 800 (Others) Insurgency Malaysia 57,000 (Philippines) - Politics and economics 150 (Indonesia) 50 (Burma) 200 (Others) Philippines 200 150,000 Separatism Thailand 216,700 (Burma) - Identity struggle, 600 (Others) especially in the South
Sources: Refugees and Asylum Seekers World Wide; World Refugee Survey 2001.
Prognosis: Contingency Plan
While ASEAN still maintains its non- of non-interference that puts a traditional interference and ‘ASEAN Way’ policy, there definition on sovereignty. ASEAN leaders is little hope that this regional organization have yet to alter its framework from state- can have any active involvement in solving centred security to human-centred security. the problem of displacement in Indonesia It is ironic that ASEAN – established to and its potential repercussions for the combat communism in favour of the ASEAN region. The non-interference Western world – has adopted a policy compels member countries to deal developmentalism that requires stability by with problems unilaterally and bilaterally repression. Today, with the world changing (focused more on a government to and the discourse of security enlarging, government approach) without criticizing ASEAN as an organization is not able to other countries. The over-sensitivity of keep up with the discourse as long as it ASEAN member countries is a stumbling retains the insufficient doctrine of non- block for the future development of the interference that tends to ignore organization. humanitarian considerations.
ASEAN is insensitive toward humanitarian Diverging levels of political stability and problems, especially because of its allegations of political interference in adherence to the rigid principles of the internal affairs easily strain relationships ‘ASEAN Way’ and the old-fashioned policy among the members, as Michael 83 Dialogue + Cooperation 1/2002
Richardson notes in his article ‘Forced challenges in terms of economic recovery Smile in Southeast Asia as Relations Turn as well as in managing its democratic Sour’ (2000). This approach has made transition, which, if not carefully handled, ASEAN unwilling to confront the could result in the Balkanization of the humanitarian issues of displaced persons country. Recovery programmes will as many of them were forcibly displaced determine the future stability of many by political movements and identity ASEAN countries, especially Indonesia. struggles. The national economy that was previously build upon KKN (acronym for corruption, ASEAN is a sovereign and political body, crime and nepotism in Bahasa Indonesia, while the United Nations High i.e. bad governance) needs a clear and clean Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) is a process to recover, otherwise the country non-political and humanitarian agency. One could collapse, regional conflicts could of the crucial points of the contingency plan explode and people will again be on the to deal with possible future mass move to find safer places to live. displacement in Southeast Asia is the promotion of a new partnership between Despite the principles of the ‘ASEAN Way’, the existing regional organization (ASEAN) and other principles agreed upon within and UNHCR. The only ASEAN dialogue ASEAN such as the Treaty of Amity and partner from the United Nations agencies Cooperation, ASEAN countries still is the United Nations Development concentrate on their own national interests Program (UNDP). Cooperation between based on classic sovereignty. Indeed, these two bodies could maximize its ASEAN does not have mechanisms to contingency plan through regional address any conflict that happens in a perspectives. member country. The non-interference policy has destroyed the possibility of Even though this is a difficulty that needs contingency planning that could be used to be addressed, the humanitarian problem externally. of people’s displacement could be handled more easily with a cooperative effort. It is Finally, the most important point is how true that ASEAN is political (sovereign) in to avoid mass displacement in the first its orientation compared to the UNHCR place. For that a peace-building strategy is which is non-political and operates beyond needed to ensure that disputes, armed sovereignty. However, there should be a conflicts and other major crises (including consistent approach that brings the two crises in government) do not arise. Peace closer in order to deal with the magnitude building can only be done by a of problems that exist in the field of comprehensive approach that enables displacement, in particular in Indonesia people to live in harmony. However, in the and on the Burma/Thailand border. case of Indonesia which is currently struggling to recover from multi- Currently, many ASEAN countries are dimensional crises, it seems that the failure experiencing economic crises. Some, such to stage a recovery could bring further as Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines, chaos to the country, or even bring the have been able to move on, but Indonesia country to the verge of collapse, a state that is still suffering from deep economic will bring about the recurring nightmare anaemia. Indonesia is facing tremendous of mass displacement.
84 Reasons for Regional Instability: Internal Fractures and Crises
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United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). 2002. ‘Central African Republic: Tens of thousands have fled’, UNHCR Briefing, 29 June.
85 The Situation in the Balkan Region The Situation in the Balkan Region
Wolf Oschlies
Are we optimists, being convinced that all ‘most civilized and democratic’ country of the problems of security can be resolved the former East-European camp would be through the experience the Europeans have easy to resolve. Therefore, the conflict was accumulated in the course of history, that viewed rather as a ‘training field’ for the common sense and actual evolutions will new kind of conflict management – the soft help to overcome all barriers? Are we one. The results are well known. realists, who believe that people have never developed immunity against evil and Yugoslavia was – like the other countries – violence that know no limits? Or are we a para-state order, which means that it was pessimists, forecasting, especially with constituted upon a totally different principle regard to the latest events in New York, of power, not through an institutionalized that the next decades will make the nineties set of principles. There was a set of of the twentieth century a period of relative constitutional institutions, which were calm despite the tragedies of Yugoslavia and more a kind of constitutional facade. The other parts of the world? second factor is the role and the understanding of ‘nation’ in reference to The contemporary world is undergoing ethnicity – the Balkan obsession with a pre- drastic transformations. On the one hand, political concept of ethnicity: it is the there are unprecedented opportunities for ethnicity which makes the political quick progress toward building a new world community. That has a lot to do with the order, based on undiminished security, historical background: the Balkan peoples joint responsibility and cooperation. On lived for centuries in Empires, the Ottoman the other hand, mankind oftentimes lags and the Austrian, where this feeling of behind the course of events and does not ethnicity was developed in counterposition have effective mechanisms to meet to the state in which they lived. Something contemporary challenges which could be of this has remained as part of their ruinous for international and European political perception. stability – such as inter-ethnic conflicts, international terrorism, belligerent lt was by no means a coincidence that the separatism, gun running and drug three ex-communist multi-ethnic trafficking. federations – the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia – dissolved. Ten years ago we believed that after the Communist powerholders perceived every peaceful collapse of the Soviet Union, huge, constitution only as an instrument of power democratic changes would take place in all and not a limit of power. The bearers of the East European countries. In this sovereignty, the constitutive parties of the context, the major mistake was that federal order, were nations in their Western Europe underestimated the forces republics and provinces – nations in the of hatred behind Yugoslavia’s conflict and sense of ethnicity. The consequences were tried to integrate it into the beautiful picture fatal ones: There was a massive transfer of of peaceful Europe. Many European states political loyalty to republics because only believed that the conflict in the allegedly republics (and autonomous provinces like 86 Dialogue + Cooperation 1/2002
Kosovo) were perceived as a nation’s state away from the others, because the others in the sense of an ethnic state. are always the ones who are potentially endandering your ‘rights’. That is why and Here we have configurations determining how the Albanians in Kosovo perceive their the political situation in the newly emerged ‘rights’, but not only the Albanians: every states of former Yugoslavia: Ethnic states people in Southeast Europe feels deeply can only exist as such in a defensive sense, discriminated against, when in fact they in trying to protect themselves against are all victims of a systematic manipulation, others. Actors of an autocratic nature often perpetuating to the present the negative dominate ethnic conflicts. Inter-ethnic legitimacy which has a never-ending conflict served the function of reinforcing disastrous outcome. intra-ethnic political strength. The federation had to legitimize itself by saying: In former Yugoslavia, the other Balkan forget about individuals – nations are equal nationalisms at play are not morally in their rights. Forget about political superior to Serbian nationalism. Croatian, equality, individual rights, political Albanian and Bosnian Muslim nationalism pluralism, and witness the image of are no less free from the temptations of pluralism created by confronting ethnic violence than Serbian nationalism. interests through representing their mother Nevertheless, President Bush, addressing republics. United States forces in Kosovo last spring, gave a rather optimistic picture of the Another problem of the ex-Yugoslav crux region. The president applauded the fact is the minority question. Yugoslavia was that ‘for the first time in history, all the taken as an example of a nation providing governments of the region are democratic, minority rights, in particular with a legal committed to cooperating with each other, and constitutional relevance. But, viewed and predisposed to joining Europe’. He against the aforementioned background, commended progress made by individual Kosovo is not a problem of minority countries: ‘Croatia has become a question. Not only the nations, but also responsible source of regional stability’... the minorities – especially the most ‘The people of Yugoslavia have chosen numerous in Vojvodina (Hungarians) and democracy over dictatorship’...‘Albania’s Kosovo (Albanians) – were given a recent elections, while less than perfect, constitutional status which enabled them were still a step forward in its democratic not to protect their cultural identity, but development’...‘Moderate governments in to act politically as an ethnic collectivity. Bosnia and Herzegovina are willing to work Minorities had para-state positions too, and as serious partners with the international perceived them as a guarantee of their own community in preparing their country for liberty which had to be defended at federal European integration’. and republic levels. That means, if you have a system which has no positive On the other hand, Bush pointed out, the legitimization at all – like the systems in region still faces difficult challenges: ‘Civil East Europe and Yugoslavia – all political institutions are weak and vulnerable to elites within their collectivities, or ethnic corruption, organized crime is widespread, groups, had to push their differences as a sometimes hiding behind narrow, part of their identity. To be different and nationalistic agendas. There is too much to have problems with others – this is what dependence on foreign assistance and not ensures respective powerholders a long stay enough foreign investment. And ethnic in power. That means your ‘right’ is based extremists are still stoking the flames of on your tactics to remain different and stay intolerance and inciting violence, hoping 87 The Situation in the Balkan Region to subvert democracy, redraw borders, or usually face poor living conditions and high advance pursuits’. unemployment. The lack of educational facilities is also a problem for returnees Bush called on the people of Kosovo to with children. Some areas remain heavily concentrate on developing civil institutions mined. The interest of international donors that work and a political climate that seems to be declining and it is likely that supports and sustains democracy, the rule available funds for housing reconstruction of law, ethnic tolerance and cooperation and de-mining efforts will decrease over with neighbours. But another reality in time. As a result, Bosnia has become an Kosovo was described recently by James open door for masses of illegal immigrants Perdew, Deputy Special Advisor for the – a business where hundreds of millions of President and Secretary of State for Dayton dollars can be earned each year. and Kosovo. Perdew said: ‘There is much left to do. Kosovo remains unstable and Albania remains a land of anarchy. During dangerous. Tolerance and acceptance do not the spring and summer of 1997, the collapse happen overnight, and extremists on both of fraudulent pyramid investment schemes sides use every opportunity to promote brought the Albanian population to violent their agenda and disrupt the efforts of the protest against their government. Many United Nations Mission in Kosovo and areas of the country have fallen under the KFOR [Kosovo Force] to establish peace control of rebel groups or local criminal and security. Resources remain a problem, bands. During the 1997 upheaval, military both in terms of personnel and in terms of bases, barracks, bunkers and police stations prompt delivery of pledged contributions’. were attacked and up to a million personal weapons were looted, together with an Only the criticism in such statements can estimated 1.5 billion rounds of be taken as a realistic description of the ammunition, now destined for use by situation in the Balkan peninsula, where rioters or criminals. The struggle for all the states or provinces are more or less independence in neighbouring Kosovo failed ones – especially those which are in created a huge demand for light weapons fact protectorates of the international across the northern Albanian border. community, Bosnia and Kosovo, and, to a Although intensive terrorist actions by the lesser degree, Albania. Bosnia, divided by Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA [UCK]) did the Dayton Peace Agreement into entities, not start before winter 1997/98, a represents itself as an ensemble of dwarfish significant amount of both Albanian and units fighting each other with all kinds of foreign weaponry reached the area several politically and nationalistically motivated months earlier, very soon after the crisis methods of obstruction. The erupted in Albania. implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement has hardly begun, in particular Kosovo is a special case – an example of Annex 7 which states that ‘all refugees and the decline of state-supported terrorism and displaced persons have the right freely to the increase in terrorist groups engaged in return to their homes of origin’. Many drug trafficking and similar activities. In refugees are still fearful of returning to their any case, we can ask who has overtaken towns and villages because of attacks against whom – criminality over politically returnees. It is rare that those who commit motivated guerrilla groups or vice versa. these crimes are caught and brought to Enduring cooperation between two separate justice, and the attacks appear to be groups – one criminal and the other increasing. In addition to violence and legal political – has occurred in Kosovo, where difficulties in reclaiming homes, returnees the KLA maintained a strategic alliance with 88 Dialogue + Cooperation 1/2002
Albanian criminal syndicates before and Macedonia, and nowadays even to northern during the Kosovo crisis. Greece. The Albanian terrorists – under the pretext of fighting for the human rights After the demise of the Berisha government of the allegedly oppressed Albanian in Albania in 1997, the ensuing disorder minority in Macedonia – went further and allowed Albanian organized criminal further, trying to create a Greater Albania groups to secure their hold on heroin of ethnic cousins now dispersed in four trafficking through the Balkan route – a countries. well-travelled smuggler’s corridor that transports an estimated $400 billion worth That was the situation before 11 of narcotics per year. At roughly the same September. Since that day new findings and time, the KLA emerged as an organized data show that Osama bin Laden’s followers guerrilla force seeking an independent state operated all over the Balkans. Bin Laden’s from Serbia. organization, al-Qaeda, was present in both Albania and Macedonia, and had two bases The next step was a 16-month insurgency each in Bosnia and Kosovo. In the light of in southern Serbia, where ethnic Albanian this penetration of Islamic terrorism into rebels had been using the internationally the Balkans, we are facing an entirely new patrolled buffer zone to launch attacks situation in the region. The Balkan states against Yugoslav forces. Yugoslav security jointly condemned the terrorist attacks on forces showed maximum restraint and did the United States and pledged to cooperate not respond to these numerous attacks and in the fight against terrorism. Each country the Serbian government succeeded in can and will contribute to the global anti- driving the rebels out of the region. As a terrorism campaign knowing that the result, veterans of the (supposedly Balkans had become, more or less, a disbanded) KLA set up a Macedonian stronghold for supporters of Osama bin offshoot, similar to the extremist groups Laden. But according to the Croatian active in southern Serbia. Due to the lack President Stipe Mesic, ‘People must realize of concrete action by the international that concrete crimes must be blamed on community and the unsuccessful concrete people or organizations, and not demilitarization of the KLA, the crisis has on nations or religions’. spilled over from Kosovo to Serbia to
89 The ASEAN Way in Southeast Asia and Beyond
Seventh Panel Reasons for Regional Instability: Inter-governmental Tensions
90 The ASEAN Way in Southeast Asia and Beyond The ASEAN Way in Southeast Asia and Beyond
Surin Pitsuwan
From now on, you will be presented with including those occurring or percolating in examples of the proverbial ‘ASEAN Way’. Southeast Asia and East Asia. One of the definitions of the ASEAN Way stipulates that we always have to explain to The traditional flash points in Asia and others why we do and don’t do certain Southeast Asia are the Korean Peninsula, things in a certain way, and the other side the South China Sea, the Taiwan Straits usually does not fully understand the and, latterly, the southern part of the explanation but is half convinced by our Philippines as well as the Indonesian efficacy. phenomena. Indonesia’s problems have implications for all of us in Southeast Asia. I think the session on Reasons for Regional And then I think it wouldn’t be fair to leave Instability: Internal Fractures and Crises and the situation in Afghanistan out. All of us, this session will dovetail into each other whether immediate neighbours or far-away quite well. The issues that Riefqi Muna friends and allies, will feel the impact of touched upon in the previous session were this turmoil, great or small. of an internal nature, but many of those internal conflicts have a tendency to spill I will provide a quick survey of the over into neighbouring countries and the problems in East Asia and Southeast Asia entire region. Therefore, while some of the and then conclude with Afghanistan, issues that we are now facing in the region drawing on the experiences that we have are purely domestic in nature, somehow, had in dealing with some of those problems as a result of globalization and its driving in ‘the ASEAN Way’. And I will offer my force, information technology, the whole view on the new East-West tension, which world is having to face those problems, is assuming a civilizational dimension.
North Korea’s Entry into the ASEAN Regional Forum
The Korean Peninsula has been a point of ARF forum. It was a long process and contention for a long time and it still is a required tortuous effort on the part of all flash point. But last year there was a very the ARF members. Every year since the interesting development, an attempt to inception of the ARF in July 1994 in bring about a rapprochement between the Bangkok, the issues of the Korean Peninsula two Koreas. And the world has been had been discussed without the mesmerized by the pace of this participation of North Korea. So we reconciliation process. We in the ASEAN considered it not only beneficial but also Regional Forum (ARF) tried to contribute essential to get North Korea into the forum. to that process of accommodation by But the issue was how to create a level of inviting, enticing, North Korea, the last confidence so that North Korea would feel component, the last piece of the jigsaw in comfortable enough to join us without the East Asian security landscape, into the feeling pressured by all the participants. 91 Dialogue + Cooperation 1/2002
Moreover, North Korea, as we realized, is to be available if an occasion came up for not used to dealing with the kind of him to drop by and visit the ARF meeting multilateral, multidimensional and open underway then. Only a week later in dialogue that is used in the ARF. Havana, at the Group of 77 Summit, I courted him again to ‘come by and visit us I happened to be the Chair of the ARF in Bangkok in the third week of July’. That during that crucial year when the was the time of the ASEAN Ministerial momentum was being built – 1999 to 2000. and ARF Meetings. I had to find a way to break the ice wall between North Korea and the other The original idea was only to invite the members of the ARF. I discovered that of North Korean foreign minister to be in the all the countries in Southeast Asia/ASEAN, region at the same time as the ARF was the original and core members of the ARF, taking place in Bangkok, and then the one that had the closest connection with conveniently he would be able to come in North Korea, happened to be the newest and have breakfast with some of the member of ASEAN – Cambodia. When members, but not join the ARF formally. King Sihanouk took refuge abroad during But by the time the meetings came round the crisis in Cambodia, he went to the level of comfort that we had created Pyongyang, North Korea. He still uses for him and the appeal of King Sihanouk North Korean cooks for his meals; his convinced him, or convinced the butlers and his bodyguards are also North leadership of North Korea, that it was safe Koreans. So who would be the best link and it would be acceptable for him to come from the ARF, if not King Sihanouk? to Bangkok and join the ARF. So that was how we contributed to some of the So I appealed to Mr Hun Sen, the Prime relaxation of the tension in the Korean Minister of Cambodia, in March 2000, to Peninsula. Not all of it, but we have made view this as an opportunity for the newest a modest contribution to one of the most member of ASEAN to contribute to contentious issues in the Asia-Pacific ASEAN diplomacy and the ARF. He was security equation. very interested and eager to help. He did his bit by calling King Sihanouk who was We hope that this will evolve into undergoing medical treatment in Beijing. something that will be long lasting. Last I asked that the King would use his July in Vietnam, North Korea didn’t show connections to persuade the North Korean up, I think partly because there was not government to come out and join other enough legwork on the part of the host. I members of the East Asian and Southeast think the host, this being their first ASEAN Asian community in order to complete the Ministerial Meeting, did not want too many jigsaw of our security landscape and fill the issues on the plate. So not enough of the gap that has been so obvious every time preparations necessary to bring North the Korean Peninsula issue comes up for Korea back to the ARF were made. Also discussion in our security forum. That was the change of attitude and approach in the key to the entry of North Korea into Washington as a result of the change in the ARF: a very personal key. leadership there made the issues of Northeast Asia contentious once more. But At the Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers’ at least North Korea is formally in the ARF Meeting in Cartegena, Columbia, in now, despite the fact that more efforts are March 2000, I personally tried to convince needed to integrate it fully into the security the foreign minister of North Korea to be network of the region. in the vicinity of Bangkok ‘next July’ so as 92 The ASEAN Way in Southeast Asia and Beyond
The Taiwan Straits
I think the issue that all of us are always from being fully integrated into mainland concerned about and familiar with in the China before it is ready. At the same time region is that of the Taiwan Straits. Every the United States and Japan can maintain time we want to bring the issue of the their presence and play active roles in the Taiwan Straits into the ARF our Chinese region. colleagues object to it. This is considered ‘an internal affair’. But I think the strategy If the ARF were a forum where any issue of our friends in Beijing would be: keep of concern on the part of any party could politics and security discussion on the be discussed, provided that all the parties Taiwan Straits out of any multilateral forum, agreed to the items on the agenda but let us work on the economic beforehand, Japan and the United States imperatives of the issue, i.e. push for World would certainly be interested in bringing Trade Organization entry first, and then the issue of Taiwan up for discussion. But let economic dynamism, market realities the Chinese would say no to such an item and financial relations help solve the on the agenda. To outsiders this is the problems of the tension between Taiwan weakness of the ARF. It is too rigid, too and the mainland. formalized, not flexible, not spontaneous, and therefore unable to respond to critical And I think that strategy seems to be and sensitive issues relating to the threat working, i.e. let time, let the economic to common security. results, economic development and economic imperatives of the issue solve the But even though we have not been able to problems or at least reduce the tension of bring the issue of Taiwan to the table of the problem. And in the end it will be the ARF, the ASEAN Way has ‘invented’ a resolved. way of accommodating the problem of such sensitivity. For, in the periphery, outside I think the United States and Japan would the meeting room, in the corridors of the also prefer to leave the issue hanging there, main forum, every year, without fail, we unresolved, dragging on. The United States talk about it, joke about it, discuss it. That would guarantee the security of Taiwan, is also an ASEAN Way, not formal, but while Japan would agree to extend the providing the atmosphere, the venue, where security agreement between Japan and the such things can be talked about it in that United States to cover Taiwan in order to way, reducing the prospect of open conflict. keep the issue percolating, to keep Taiwan
The South China Sea
There are many claimants to many islands because of her growing dependency on of the South China Sea, but all the export. The ASEAN states cannot afford claimants realize, and all the powers that to let the South China Sea issue degenerate have interests in the safety and security of into open conflict. So we have attempted the sea-lanes of the South China Sea also to draw up what we call a non-binding realize that the issue cannot be allowed to ‘Code of Conduct for the South China Sea’. degenerate into open conflict. It would Beijing has assured us that once the affect everyone’s interests: the United ASEAN states complete the Code of States, Japan, Korea and now China Conduct, they will join in. But for some 93 Dialogue + Cooperation 1/2002
reason the Southeast Asian/ASEAN the table is important; the accumulative countries have not yet reached a consensus effect of this effort is what we call on a Code of Conduct on the South China ‘preventive diplomacy’, not leading to open Sea. conflict. We are not able to drive at the root cause of it. We are not able to decide Despite the fact that the issue is active and on the lines of sovereignty of all those alive at the ARF every year, year in and islands in the South China Sea, but at least year out, there is an element of caution we keep the situation under control. The and restraint on the part of every party. result is preventive diplomacy itself, But this is exactly the end-result of this confidence building amongst all of us, effort. It doesn’t matter if it is binding or guaranteeing to the other side that force non-binding, or if it leads anywhere will not be used. conclusive, the fact that it is alive and on
East Timor
I think ASEAN has also had a very unique because the ten ASEAN members came experience in the management of the East together not on the bedrock of any Timor conflict. And I want to use this as a commonality of values or common starting point to go into the case of ideology, but on the basis of mutual Afghanistan later. The case of East Timor convenience. Thus the sacredness of the presented us with a dilemma, a real non-interference principal is very difficult dilemma. How to get involved in an internal for outsiders to understand, but for issue of a member who was still ambivalent ASEAN’s continued existence, it is the core about what happened in one of its eastern of the operating procedure, the modus provinces, East Timor. And that member operundi, among us. So we were presented state happened to be the largest state of with a dilemma. The new members ASEAN and has served as the leader of (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar) ASEAN since its inception in 1967. The were afraid that the issue of East Timor principle of non-interference in ASEAN is would serve as a precedent for the future. sacred, but this time it did not concern a They did not want the fact that ASEAN small member of ASEAN or a new member had done something with regard to East of ASEAN, but one of the oldest, the Timor to be a reference point, as ASEAN largest, the most effective leader of would then have grounds for doing the ASEAN. What could ASEAN do? Well, same thing with regard to the internal issues ASEAN had two choices, and neither of of some of its member states, so an them were very appealing: (1) Do nothing absolute ‘no’ from Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos and rest on the principle of non-interference and from Cambodia. but face the consequence of losing the confidence of the international community. The old members of ASEAN – Singapore, The impression would have inevitably been the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia and that ASEAN is ineffective, it is irrelevant, Thailand – were also reluctant because they it cannot even resolve the problems in its did not know where this step forward for own backyard. Or (2) Do something, but the territory of East Timor, already then risk tampering with this sacred strengthened by the overwhelming result principle of non-interference. of the referendum but still not totally separated from the state of Indonesia, The issue was very sensitive for everyone would lead. The process of state building 94 The ASEAN Way in Southeast Asia and Beyond was underway, chaotic situations were more palatable to the prevailing public unfolding, violence raged on. What could sentiment in Indonesia then. ASEAN members do? So, reluctantly, the original members of I went to Jakarta in mid-September 1999 ASEAN went into East Timor at the request and talked to General Wiranto, the of the highest authority of Indonesia. We Supreme Commander of the Indonesian did not take the command of the Armed Forces, and conferred with INTERFET, but we helped bring down the President B.J. Habibie on how ASEAN level of anxiety for the entire international could bring peace and order back to East community by making the operation a Timor. And this was the appeal from both ‘regional’ rather than ‘extra regional’ one. of them: ‘Do come, come in large numbers, But we had to make it clear among ourselves we would like to see our ASEAN brothers that we went in an individual state capacity, in East Timor’. And I told the president, not as ASEAN forces. Thus we preserved ‘Your Excellency, it would be very difficult ASEAN’s principle of non-interference and because we don’t have the numbers, we also fulfilled our regional role of security don’t have the logistics, we don’t have the cooperation. technology, we don’t have the equipment in order to do the job’. And he continued, Why did I say that the East Timor operation interrupting me, ‘And do take the command has some relevance for Afghanistan now? of the International Force in East Timor Because in my view, Afghanistan is even (INTERFET). Let Thailand or the more complicated a situation than East Philippines or Malaysia or Singapore take Timor. There are so many actors, players, the command of the international forces’. local sensitivities, internal complexities, I replied, ‘It would be difficult Your regional dynamics and international Excellency’. And do you know what he said, implications. If we are not careful, the and this is something relevant to Afghan crisis could turn into a long-term Afghanistan now, he said, ‘Then go to one tragedy for all of us. And I know Europe, of the Nordic countries’. What he didn’t Germany in particular, is very determined say was, avoid Australia. But he did say we to play a constructive role there. We need should go to one of the Nordic countries, to be careful. away from our region, because that was
Afghanistan
I am glad that present among us here as the surrounding states has its own agenda our first commentator is someone now in Afghanistan. There would be a lot of working in the office of Mr Solana, who problems trying to create a political has been given the authority or the mandate coalition, trying to establish law and order to work on Afghanistan on behalf of in Afghanistan post-military conflict, if it Europe. Europe should be thinking about were dependent on the states surrounding this issue very carefully. Afghanistan. Whether it were Uzbekistan, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan or China, you The three components of the Afghanistan would have problems of mutual suspicion situation are this: military, diplomacy and of each other’s agendas. the political solution. Humanitarian too, but right now we are looking into the And I think all of us here realize the fact political solution. Each and every one of that the Taliban were so much supported 95 Dialogue + Cooperation 1/2002
in Afghanistan was partly to avoid the leadership could say, ‘we have a role to play influence of Shi’ism from Iran. So there is now’. It would give them a sense of a reason why the Taliban prospered in responsibility. It would be an opportunity Afghanistan. Each and every country for those two governments. So I think the around Afghanistan has a stake in the political components would have to be put development in Afghanistan. My point is together quickly and carefully and this: take a cue from President Habibie comprehensively and creatively, otherwise who said, because of local sensitivities and there will be a prolonged period of regional complexities, ‘go to the Nordic instability, uncertainty and insecurity in countries’. But in this context the European Afghanistan. And the implications for the Union and the United Nations should think entire world are quite obvious. about a country or countries in Southeast Asia where Muslims are present in large If you all think the problem in Afghanistan numbers. Indonesia is the largest Muslim is a problem of Islamic extremism, then country and Malaysia is probably the most you must consider a strategy to handle it successful Muslim country in the world in such a way that moderate Muslim because of its attempt to accommodate countries have a direct role to play. To modernity and globalization. I think those contain Islamic extremism we must try to two countries, and I’m not here speaking promote Islamic moderation. Moderate on behalf of those two countries, have a Muslim countries must be able to play an role to play and a contribution to make. active role in the resolution of the I’m just speaking as an observer. I think Afghanistan problem. Turkey, Malaysia and those two countries are facing their own Indonesia seem to fit the bill at this problems internally because of this problem moment. We should seriously think about in Afghanistan. Their population is agitated involving them meaningfully and effectively. and frustrated. There is a perception that In that way, we will be perceived to be the West is ganging up on the Muslims, all working with the Muslim World to solve Muslims. Islam is facing another Crusade. the problems of a Muslim state, much like A Jihad is the response. But if these the ASEAN countries tried to cooperate countries are given a chance to play a role with the international community on the in Afghanistan they will be able to pacify issue of East Timor. their own dissatisfied elements. ‘Look’, the
11 September and the Clash of Civilizations
I think we are trying to say that this is not imagine the other side coming up with a war between the West and Islam, this is ‘Jihad’. When the operation was called not ‘the clash of civilizations’. But I think ‘Infinite Justice’, the other side saw the the perception of Muslims is that THIS IS West as trying to play God, playing Allah, IT. We are not talking about the reality, we because the name ‘Infinite Justice’ is are not talking about rational definition, reserved for God alone. Do you see the we are talking about the perceptions of cultural elements in this conflict? Do you people on the street. And this has to be see the difference of values in this conflict? taken into consideration. The other day in Bangkok a Filipino friend Already some of the words being used are asked me, ‘Is bin Laden the anti-Christ?’ I putting oil on the fire. When the word said, ‘Why do you ask me that question?’ ‘crusade’ was used in Washington, you could She said, ‘He looks like one’. Now in 96 The ASEAN Way in Southeast Asia and Beyond
Islamic mythology there is also a type of technology, to help us reduce the walls that anti-Christ coming. And if that question separate us, the levels of mutual ignorance were asked in the Muslim world, the that divide us. response from Muslims would be ‘Well someone in the West is also an anti-Christ’. It just so happened that the United Nations So you can see the clashes of religious General Assembly declared this very year symbolism, the conflicts of values. We have the Year of Dialogue amongst Civilizations. to avoid the prospect of these phenomena And it was a Muslim leader, President leading to ‘the clash of civilizations’. No Mohammad Khatami of Iran, who matter how much we try to say that we are proposed in September 1998 that 2001 avoiding it, in the perception of those should be the Year of Dialogue amongst people we are walking down that road – Civilizations. A couple of years before that the clashes are playing themselves out on Anwar Ibrahim, the former deputy prime the world stage, between East and West, minister of Malaysia gave a speech at Islam and the Western World. Georgetown University, proposing what he called then ‘a civilizational dialogue’. These What do we do in the long term, looking two Muslim leaders proposed this in at Afghanistan as the short term? Let me response to the prediction of an inevitable make a proposal. I think the global ‘clash of civilizations’ in 1993. Now I think community needs to learn from each other we should let Iran take the lead on the other more and more urgently now than ever side (we cannot depend on Anwar Ibrahim before. I think the events of 11 September now that he is in jail, not yet anyway) to presented us with two prospects. One is bring the leaders, the thinkers, the spiritual the prospect of destruction, widespread and leaders and the scholars into a forum like non-stop, because you cannot put a break this and talk to the West. Try to learn from on this kind of confrontation. You can say each other what the problems are, what it’s finished today, but the other side won’t the issues of conflict are, what the be finished. They are everywhere. A lot of prospects are for all of us to get out of this the radical elements passed through very, very bleak predicament for the world Germany, didn’t they? They won’t stop. and for humanity.
But precisely because of that event on that I don’t think one year is enough. I think fateful morning in September we now the entire first decade of the new understand that we have the power in our millennium should be devoted to ‘dialogue hands to get to know each other better, to amongst civilizations’. And I think it is reduce the levels of ignorance among us going to be proposed at the General and between us that have been accumulated Assembly and I hope that our German through the ages, to use the power of friends, the German government, will technology and the power of information support the extension of this one year into technology. I think this was the first time ten years at the United Nations. And let us in human history that the entire human work together in order to reduce the family witnessed an experience, saw events prospect of the clash of civilizations that in real time together like never before. We would not be good for anyone, for any would have wished that the first such country, for any nation. experience for all humanity had been a more pleasant one. But it was not like that; There are many reasons for tensions it was a very horrifying experience. But at between states and amongst states in regions least we have the prospect of using the same but there are also ways of handling and technology, the same information managing those tensions and conflicts. Each 97 Dialogue + Cooperation 1/2002
region will have to handle their own The only way forward for finding long-term problems in their own way. You have your solutions to this civilizational tension – not way in Europe. We have our way in ASEAN in any particular region but in the entire or Southeast Asia. But I think since 11 world – is ‘dialogue among civilizations’. It September the issue is too large for one has started. We only have to carry it forward region to manage and to handle. We must with sincerity, mutual respect and be creative and experimental. We must try commitment. And we will, I believe, have to string various elements together in an at least a chance to avoid the wider, more effort to contain the unfolding conflicts. devastating conflicts, the more destructive confrontations, which loom large on the horizon of our common future.
98 Inter-governmental Tensions and European Union Contribution to Crisis Management Inter-governmental Tensions and European Union Contribution to Crisis Management
Antti Turunen
This presentation focuses on the European Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Union’s potential role in enhancing regional ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The EU stability in Asia. After the tragic events of has also launched initiatives like the Asia- 11 September in the United States, the Europe Meeting (ASEM) process in order European Union (EU) has become much to promote wider regional dialogue with more attentive to developments in Asia. Asia and Europe. During the past ten years, International activities against terrorism this trend has been complemented by the and the situation in Afghanistan have been development of an enhanced dialogue with the focus of much EU diplomatic and Japan, China, India and Indonesia. humanitarian action since September. On 17 October 2001, EU foreign ministers Promotion of open markets and human discussed measures to combat terrorism, rights have been key to the EU’s political preparing the ground for the informal engagement in Asia. This will undoubtedly meeting of EU heads of state and continue, but, following the 11 September government in Ghent on 19 October. The events, EU policy in Asia will take on a full impact of the latest events on the EU’s new dimension. I will discuss this later, but policy on Asia remains to be seen, but some let me first turn to current interstate issues aspects can already be outlined at this in Asia, where the EU might also have to stage, on the basis of current policy. focus in the future.
Current EU policy on Asia is characterized The strategic dynamic in Asia has evolved by the following factors: cooperative profoundly during the last ten years owing engagement, a multilateral approach and to a number of contributing factors. One the promotion of basic values. The EU is of these is China’s rapidly developing interested in developing good relations with economic and political influence in the Asian countries, which, until the mid- region; another is Japan’s current economic nineties, were based principally on the stagnation, which is turning it towards a economic interests of member states. Since more inward-looking foreign policy. then, political dialogue has gradually Thirdly, there is a long-term trend of become an important element of the EU’s moving from autocratic regimes towards relationship with Asian countries. A key gradual democratization. The cases of the objective of the political dialogue has been Philippines, Indonesia and inter-Korean to enhance mutual understanding and dialogue illustrate the latter trend. cooperation on issues like non- proliferation, the environment and the fight Fourthly, the potential for violent regional against international threats, drug conflicts remains high in parts of Asia. In trafficking and terrorism. the subcontinent, the ongoing war in Afghanistan and clashes between India and The EU’s multilateral approach in Asia has Pakistan illustrate this point. Likewise, the been characterized by an emphasis on latent tension across the Taiwan Straits and cooperation with the Association of the security and freedom of navigation and 99 Dialogue + Cooperation 1/2002
rival territorial claims in the South China economies and societies are to external Sea continue to be of major concern. shock. The repercussions of the terrorist Fifthly, the Pacific Basin has become the attacks in the United States illustrated this primary area of concern for the United again, with incidents of social unrest in States, and Washington is reorienting its Muslim countries in the region, and with forces away from its traditional European the risk of violent conflict spreading to focus and giving greater attention to the Kashmir and elsewhere. Now, the focus of Pacific and East Asia. the international community has turned to South Asia, notably to Afghanistan and its Furthermore, nuclear and missile neighbours. A failure in Afghanistan, or proliferation and high levels of defence even an extended stalemate, may unleash spending in the region emphasize security forces that could create an unmanageable risks in the present situation. These and situation in countries with large Muslim many unsolved border and minority issues populations. This is also a direct concern maintain inter-governmental tensions in for the EU because of its economic and Asia. From the point of view of conflict political interests in Asia. prevention, the institutional framework for confidence building and conflict resolution How could the EU address these issues? is still very weak compared to the situation in Europe. Nevertheless, the late 1990s It is too early to tell exactly what changes have seen a marked increase in efforts at our foreign and security policy will undergo, regional dialogue and cooperation, but a new emphasis on external security particularly in East Asia, with the birth of issues is one likely outcome. The EU has the ‘ASEAN + 3’ dialogue (and the earlier already decided to enter into deeper establishment of an East Asian presence in dialogue with third countries on terrorism. ASEM), with the gradual strengthening of This will include cooperation in the field the ARF as a confidence-building forum, of information exchange, closer ties and with increasing signs of a growing sense between security and intelligence units and of East Asian identity. a multitude of cooperative measures to track down and bring to justice all At the same time, ASEAN seems to have perpetrators of terrorist acts. In Asia this lost some of its momentum in recent years, could lead to more focused discussion on partly reflecting Indonesia’s preoccupation terrorism with individual countries, with internal concerns, and partly reflecting complementing the work already initiated the underlying difficulty of some of the by the G-7, the United Nations (UN) and issues with which ASEAN has been faced the ARF. (for example, in completing the ASEAN Free Trade Area [AFTA], in responding to Another level of activity will be an enhanced the financial crisis, and in absorbing three information campaign in order to new members). In South Asia, which in overcome the misperception that anti- many respects remains distinct from the terrorist action is directed against Muslim rest of the region, the South Asian nations. The EU is in a good position to Association for Regional Cooperation develop mutual understanding between offers the opportunity for broad regional cultures because of its own multicultural cooperation with diversified aims, even if character and, in particular, its traditionally political tensions continue to hamper it. good relations with Muslim countries.
The economic crisis of 1997 already Moreover, the EU can promote regional showed how vulnerable many Asian stability in South Asia by engaging the 100 Inter-governmental Tensions and European Union Contribution to Crisis Management neighbouring states of Afghanistan in a cooperation with the United States, can dialogue for a peace settlement. The EU complement other international efforts has no ambition to become a major player towards a more stable and secure world. in the peace process, but we can support Furthermore the EU’s financial the UN-led process, which can hopefully contribution to international humanitarian be launched as soon as the military action assistance and reconstruction are an is over. In its contacts with the countries important part of the European tool box in the region, the EU could enhance for conflict prevention and crisis common understanding on an management, which provide possibilities internationally acceptable peace settlement for engagement in Asia as well. in Afghanistan. It is likely that the EU will also play an important role in possible Just before the events of 11 September, the reconstruction efforts as part of an Commission issued a proposal on a new international peace plan. Asia strategy which aims – among other things – to contribute to peace and security The EU’s active engagement in in the region and globally through a strengthening global action against broadening of EU engagement with the terrorism is enhanced by new capabilities region. The first EU Asia Strategy of 1994 in the sphere of foreign and security policy. has served us well, but the world has moved The EU’s external relations have been on since then, with significant economic transformed as a result of the Maastricht and political changes both in Asia and in and Amsterdam Treaties. The EU Common the EU, and with the acceleration of Foreign and Security Policy was created in globalization. In the coming years, the EU 1993. This was strengthened in 1999 by will experience a further transformation, launching a European Security and Defence with enlargement on the horizon, with the Policy and the increasing importance of single market and single currency achieving justice and home affairs issues in our their full potential, and with a continued external relations. The role of the High strengthening in EU policy coordination, Representative, supported by the Policy both in foreign policy and in justice and Planning and Early Warning Unit and the home affairs policies. EU Military Staff, in addition to the enhanced capabilities of the Commission, Preparations are currently well underway have increased the possibilities for the EU’s for the enlargement of the Union from global action. 2003 onwards, with the eventual perspective of a European Union of up to An example of the EU’s timely involvement 28 members, and a population of 544 in Asia was the EU Troika trip last May to million. The Nice Treaty, when ratified, will Pyongyang and Seoul in order to further consolidate EU institutions and reinvigorate the peace process in the prepare the ground for enlargement. With Korean peninsula. In the aftermath of the its enhanced capabilities the enlarged Union 11 September terrorist attacks the EU has will be able to play a more significant role been engaged in dialogue with countries in world politics in support of democracy, in South Asia and Middle East. These peace and prosperity. events highlight the fact that the EU, in
101 Conference Summary Conference Summary
Norbert von Hofmann
From 19-20 October 2001, more than 50 University of Hamburg, posed the following politicians, scientists and military experts questions: from eight Asian countries and Germany gathered in Berlin to discuss common n How far have changes, caused by aspects of security policy and related fields. globalization, in economy, technology, Most of the participants had attended culture and society, contributed to the events on security matters convened by the rise of fundamentalism in the world? Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Asia or n Is the result of this globalization an ever- Germany in the past. In Berlin, the dialogue expanding injustice and inequality? was geared to provide an opportunity to n Does the spread of political conflict exchange experiences, to enhance the legitimize the tolerance or the use of regional and international dialogue on violence as a means to conflict security policy in Asia and in Europe, and resolution? to discuss European and Asian concepts of peaceful conflict settlement and crisis prevention. Most participants agreed that terrorism in its final analysis is only a symptom. It has When this conference was planned in late its roots in poverty, the mismanagement of April 2001, no-one could have foreseen the resources and world-wide inequality. brutal terrorist attacks which would take Therefore the world has to cope with the place in New York and Washington DC in root causes. It is not advisable to start September 2001. Even though the outcome dividing the world into ‘good’ and ‘bad’. of these attacks was not explicitly part of The former foreign minister of Thailand, the conference programme, there was Dr Surin Pitsuwan demanded that we all reference given to the situation in share the moral high ground: the world Afghanistan and its implications in nearly should not be divided into one group all the statements, drawn like a red thread claiming ‘high morality’ exclusively for through the discussions. themselves and another group to which any morality is denied. Nevertheless, the participants came to the conclusion that terrorism had already been It was greatly regretted – and not just by in existence long before 11 September and participants from South Asia and Southeast that the world has therefore not changed Asia – that in the past the West had taken profoundly. In many parts of Asia terrorism very little interest in problems associated has an old and long history. Hence, with terrorism in the Asian region. In Asia international terrorism was seen at most in terrorism is a prevailing problem that a new light, a new dimension, or as a new existed long before the September 2001 factor in transnational relations. attacks.
It was in this context that Professor Hans- German experts provided insightful views Joachim Gießmann, from the Institute for on the threat of terrorism and its impact Peace Research and Security Policy at the on German policy. German Minister of 102 Dialogue + Cooperation 1/2002
Defence Rudolf Scharping outlined the history when the anti-Hitler Alliance was consequences for the German government formed in the 1940s. The global alliance as follows: against terrorism could also result in a new political world order. But joining alliances 1. A comprehensive approach to security carries responsibilities for all participating should be adopted to address those nations, for example, solving regional and challenges. For that purpose a wide local conflicts. In the same way as South spectrum of instruments, not only Asia is hostage to the Kashmir conflict, military, but also political, economic and conflicts in Europe, like those in the former even cultural, have to be put in place. Yugoslavia, Cyprus and Northern Ireland, 2. The promotion of regional cooperation have to be solved when shaping a new and regional stability must be political world order. The anti-terror strengthened substantially. Progress in alliance should be just the first step towards the Middle East process has to be put enhanced long-term cooperation. at the top of the agenda. Regional groupings will gain in their significance, A crucial instrument to link long-term and there are many promising examples visions to short-term actions could be a in Asia like the Association of Southeast dialogue between cultures and civilizations Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Shanghai as demanded by Dr Surin Pitsuwan. The Cooperation Organization and Asia representatives of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). at the conference promised to explore this Europe should share its experiences in idea for further proceedings. regional cooperation with its Asian partners. Mr Gernot Erler as well as Mr Antti Turunen from the Policy Unit of the EU pointed to 3. International security organizations and three main areas of European interest in the cooperation among those Asia: organizations have to be strengthened, including the ASEAN Regional Forum 1. stability; (ARF) in Asia, the North Atlantic Treaty 2. economic and social development; and Organization (NATO) and the 3. compliance with human rights, good Organization for Security and governance and the rule of law. Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Europe, and the United Nations (UN). In the discussion, a main focus was given 4. The enlargement and deepening of the to the role of security institutions in Asia dialogue with Germany’s partners in Asia and in Europe. Asian participants is part of the German government’s highlighted that Asia is too diverse to reach response to the new challenges. Long- a common security policy. Regional powers, term visions are necessary to do justice like China or Russia, are focusing on to all day-to-day decisions. internal policy; nuclear armament is alarming; there are enormous differences Many participants suggested that after the in political systems which span from horrific attacks the world community should absolute monarchy to communist regimes; take the chance being offered to enhance economies vary from the richest cooperation. 11 September also offers, industrialized state to the poorest despite all risks and conflicts, clear developing country; in geographical terms opportunities for the future. Mr Gernot the distance between West and East Asia is Erler, a security expert in the German tremendous. From this perspective, Europe Federal Parliament drew a parallel back to was seen as forming much more of a solid 103 Conference Summary block, sharing a common history and ASEAN and ARF are not institutionalized experiences, and with a profound practice enough. The Western approach is, in his in multilaterialism. For most Asian opinion, too focused on institutionalization participants it was therefore rather difficult and substantial outcome. Asians, for to compare Asian regions or Asia to example, tend to evaluate the simple fact Europe, or to use Europe as a model for that North Korea is joining the ARF as Asia and regional cooperation. remarkable progress already.
In Asia, the ARF is today by far the largest In Asia, non-interference in internal affairs framework for a regional security dialogue. still characterizes the key of inter-regional Unfortunately the ARF has still not gone relations. But there are some cautious beyond the first stage of confidence- chances evolving, and terms like ‘flexible building measures. The second stage, to engagement’ or ‘increased mutual influence’ implement mechanisms for preventive are being used. diplomacy, has not yet been reached. This was partly explained by the lack of Professor Lee Seo-hang from Korea instruments, including the lack of provided his expertise on the institutional institutions. process of the ARF, which has for him the furthest reaching framework for a According to Professor Hans-Joachim continental security dialogue. Professor Lee Gießmann, there are several settings the summarized that only a strengthened ARF Asia of today shares and compares with the will ensure inter-regional security Europe at the beginning of the Helsinki cooperation with Europe. process. At the Helsinki Conference, Europe was also considered too diverse for According to European participants, a common security arrangement: there was current local and regional conflicts in Asia a high degree of military confrontation, might influence the regional and global mistrust amongst political leaders, and stability and security of tomorrow. national interests dominated, but there was Professor Gießmann pleaded for a strong also increasing interest in finding a form multi-layered security system and suggested of cooperation. Professor Gießmann several mechanisms, amongst them global advised against the pure cloning of cooperation within the framework of the European experiences from the Council for United Nations, regional cooperation of Security and Cooperation in Europe NGOs and issue-related cooperation of (CSCE) process to Asia. Instead he track-two institutions. suggested studying the norms and principals of the CSCE process. The two German The role of track-two institutions was parliamentarians and foreign policy experts, examined on the first day of the conference. Gert Weißkirchen and Gernot Erler, Professor Jürgen Rüland from the Arnold- supported this idea and asked the Asian Bergsträsser Institute at the University of participants to at least study and apply some Freiburg argued that the track-two dialogue of the concepts of the CSCE process. was supposed to connect political decision makers with the broad public and raise the Dr Surin Pitsuwan provided several positive consciousness within both groups for examples of how ASEAN dealt with political issues. Unfortunately it did not regional conflicts, like the Korean Peninsula, meet these high expectations. This became the Taiwan Straits, the South China Sea and especially obvious when track two as well East Timor. Europeans tend to see too little as ASEAN itself did not respond sufficiently progress with the ARF and regret that to the financial crisis in Asia. Professor 104 Dialogue + Cooperation 1/2002
Rüland identified several reasons for weak the need for multilateralism. He confirmed track-two institutions: that China’s growing economy would result in a greater strategic role for it in Asia and n track-two institutions rely too much on in more political confidence in the region. their governments (track one); But at the same time he emphasized that n track-two members are often recruited China would not take on a leading role in a from – or work part-time for – public possible regional security structure. China offices like government, administration, does not have, in his words, the capability or the military; for this kind of leadership. In his opinion, n there is very little or no cooperation most Asian participants would prefer a between track two and NGOs/civil collective security system to a society (track three). comprehensive security system like NATO.
But, on the contrary, Prince Norodom The discussions on corporative security, Sirivudh, the Chairman of the Cambodian collective security and comprehensive Institute for Cooperation and Peace (CICP) security were further expanded by Mr Riefqi as well as Dr Surin Pitsuwan, highlighted Muna from the Indonesian Research the outstanding role of track two in Asian Institute for Democracy and Peace. From countries and advised against judging them a different perspective and from his only in the context of the financial crisis. Indonesian experiences he outlined two The CICP, being part of ASEAN-ISIS levels of security: a vertical level starting at (ASEAN Institutes for Strategic and the bottom with human security and ending International Studies), had a crucial role at top with global security; and a horizontal preparing Cambodia for ASEAN level which covers, for example, economic membership and in overcoming the security and environmental security, like the country’s isolation. impact of deforestation. He demanded that we should always raise the questions of who Participants agreed that multipolarism is a would benefit from security and why do result of and an answer to globalization. But we want security? there is also the risk of increasing fragmentation and rising nationalism, as There has been a shift from interstate to observed in Indonesia. The rapprochement intrastate conflicts. Today, 90 per cent of of the United States and China was viewed conflicts are intrastate. Again, such sceptically by several Asian participants. Dr intrastate conflicts can be divided into Tan See Seng from the Singapore Institute vertical conflicts ranging from rebellion to of Defence and Strategic Studies brought civil war and horizontal conflicts in the form the enlightening example, ‘it doesn’t matter of ethnic, communal or religious whether two elephants fight or mate, the conflicts.Very few military personnel suffer grass beneath them suffers’. Whatever big from these conflicts compared with the very or regional powers do, it will affect the large numbers of civilians that do. And they smaller countries. Dr Tan warned against a suffer not only from injuries or death, but scenario where small countries have to side also from mass displacement, malnutrition, with one of the super-powers, inevitably loss of work and educational opportunities dividing Asia as it was before the end of and many more. the Cold War. Mr Wolf Oschlies from Stiftung für Colonel Wang Guoqiang from the Chinese Wissenschaft und Politik in Berlin stated Academy for National Defence also stressed that regional instability and huge mass
105 Conference Summary displacements are not only an Asian issue the following remarks: ‘We in the Friedrich- but still occur in Europe today. Even Ebert-Stiftung have the feeling that this Europeans with all their experience and conference was not only timely but also multilateral institutions were not prepared topical. We have started to exchange our to respond efficiently to the disaster in the views, we even referred to each other’s former Yugoslavia. The Balkans has become opinions during the discussions. I am a stronghold for supporters of Osama bin especially mentioning that because this Laden, demonstrating once again how fast cannot always be taken for granted in such local and regional conflicts may reach a a high level conference. Often participants global dimension. just make statements instead of talking to each other. In this regard we see this Finally, Dr Beate Bartoldus, Head of the meeting here in Berlin as a successful Asia-Pacific Department in the Friedrich- starting point of an ongoing security Ebert-Stiftung closed the conference with dialogue between Asia and Germany’.
106 Programme and Participants Conference Programme
19-20 October 2001, Berlin
Friday, 19 October 2001
9:00 am Opening of the Conference Hans-Ulrich Klose, German Federal Parliament
9:15 am The Contribution of Track-two Dialogue to Crisis Prevention Jürgen Rüland, University of Freiburg, Germany Norodom Sirivudh, Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace
10:45 am The ASEAN Regional Forum and European Security Interests Lee Seo-hang, Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security, Korea Gert Weißkirchen, German Federal Parliament
11:45 am Security Policy and Global Stability Rudolf Scharping, German Federal Ministry of Defence
2:30 pm German/European Security Interests in Asia Gernot Erler, German Federal Parliament Wang Guoqiang, Chinese Academy for National Defence Ashok K. Mehta, Indian Defence Review
4:30 pm Multipolarism and ‘Global Players’ in Asia Hans-Joachim Gießmann, University of Hamburg, Germany Tan See Seng, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore Naeem Ahmad Salik, Ministry of Defence, Pakistan
7:00 pm ‘The Contributions of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung towards International Security Dialogue and Peaceful Conflict Solution’ – Dinner speech by Anke Fuchs, Member of the German Federal Parliament, Vice President of the Deutsche Bundestag, Vice Chairperson of Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
107 Dialogue + Cooperation 1/2002
Saturday, 20th October 2001
9:30 am Reasons for Regional Instability: Internal Fractures and Crises Riefqi Muna, Research Institute for Democracy and Peace, Indonesia Wolf Oschlies, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, Germany
11:15 am Reasons for Regional Instability: Inter-governmental Tensions Surin Pitsuwan, Parliament of Thailand Antti Turunen, EU Policy Unit, Brussels, Belgium
12:30 pm Summary Norbert von Hofmann, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn/Berlin, Germany
1:00 pm Closing Remarks Beate Bartoldus, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn/Berlin, Germany
108 Programme and Participants
Conference Participants (in alphabetical order)
Germany Dr Beate Bartoldus, Head, Department for Asia and the Pacific, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Professor Egon Bahr, former Federal Minister Brigadegeneral Jürgen Bornemann, Federal Ministry of Defence Mr Detlef Dzembritzki, Member of Federal Parliament, Member of the Economic Cooperation and Development Committee in the German Federal Parliament Mr Gernot Erler, Member of Federal Parliament, Deputy Chairman of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) Parliamentary Group Mr Roland Feicht, South East Asia Desk, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Professor Dr Hans-Joachim Gießmann, Deputy Director of the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg Professor Dr Volker Grabowsky, Westfälische Wilhelms-University, Münster Dr Günter Gruber, Head, Southeast Asia Department, Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs Dr Ernst-J. Kerbusch, Director, Division for International Cooperation, Friedrich-Ebert- Stiftung Dr Hans-Ulrich Klose, Member of Federal Parliament, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the German Federal Parliament, Member of the Board of Directors of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Dr Klaus Kübler, Lawyer, former Member of Federal Parliament Dr Kai Möller, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Professor Dr Wolf Oschlies, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Dr Wolfgang Piecha, Head, ASEAN Department, Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs Professor Dr Werner Pfennig, Freie Universität, Berlin Mr Johannes Pflug, Member of Federal Parliament, Member of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the German Federal Parliament Mr Fritz Rademacher, Asia Desk, Federal Ministry of Defence Dr Wolfgang Röhr, Head, East Asia Department, Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs Professor Dr Jürgen Rüland, Director, Arnold-Bergsträsser Institute, University of Freiburg Mr Dirk Sawitzky, Expert, German Social Democratic Party (SPD) Parliamentary Group Mr Dieter Schanz, Advisor on Asia Affairs, German Social Democratic Party (SPD) Parliamentary Group Mr Rudolf Scharping, Member of Federal Parliament, Federal Minister of Defence Dr Walter J. Schmid, Head, Disarmament and Arms Control, Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs Mr Erwin Schweisshelm, Southeast Asia Desk, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 109 Dialogue + Cooperation 1/2002
Mr Antti Turunen, EU Policy Unit, General Secretariat, Council of Europe Mr Frank Umbach, Research Institute of the German Council on Foreign Relations Mr Norbert von Hofmann, East Asia Desk, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Dr Klaus Julian Voll, Freie Universität, Berlin Dr Gudrun Wacker, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Mr Wolfgang Weege, Deputy Head, Department for International Policy, Social Democratic Party of Germany Professor Gert Weißkirchen, Member of Federal Parliament, Member of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the German Federal Parliament Dr Almut Wieland-Karimi, South Asia Desk, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
Asia Mr Roskan Affandi, Political Department, Indonesia Embassy Mr Puneet Agrawal, Second Secretary, Policy Department, Indian Embassy Dr Clarita Carlos, Director, National Defence College of the Philippines Mrs Chen Huaifan, Member, Chinese Association for Arms Control and Disarmament, PR China Mr Du Kening, Council Member, Chinese Association for International Understanding, PR China HE Mr Asif Ezdi, Ambassador, Islamic Republic of Pakistan Dr Gao Zugui, Expert, Research Institute for Contemporary International Relation, PR China HE Mr Hwang Won-Tak, Ambassador, Republic of Korea HE Mr Rahardjo Jamtomo, Ambassador, Republic of Indonesia HE Mr Surapong Jayanama, Ambassador, Royal Thai Embassy Mr Oscar Kerketta, Head of Chancellery, Indian Embassy Brigadier Harwant Krishan, Military Attaché, Indian Embassy General Ashok Krishna, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, India Mr George Lekahena, Second Secretary, Indonesian Embassy Dr Lee Seo-hang, Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security, Korea Mrs Lin We, Third Secretary, Sub-Division Western Europe, International Department, Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, PR China General Ashok K. Mehta, Consulting Editor, Indian Defence Review, India Mr M. Riefqi Muna, Vice Executive Director, Research Institute for Democracy and Peace, Indonesia HRH Prince Norodom Sirivudh, Supreme Privy Counsellor to H.M. The King, Member of the Senate, and Chairman of the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace Professor Paik Jin-hyun, Seoul National University, Korea 110 Programme and Participants
Mr Mark Pierce, Councillor, Australian Embassy Dr Surin Pitsuwan, Member of Parliament, former Foreign Minister, Thailand Brigadier Naeem Ahmad Salik, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs, Ministry of Defence, Pakistan Dr Tan See Seng, Assistant Professor, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore Colonel Wang Guoqiang, Research Professor, Institute for Strategic Studies, Chinese Academy for National Defence, PR China Mrs Wang Lanping, Head of Department, Sub-Division Asia, International Department, Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, PR China HE Professor Walter Woon, Ambassador, Republic of Singapore Professor Wu Xingtang, former Secretary General, Chinese Association for International Understanding, PR China Dr Chao-Tzang Yawnghwe, Member, Strategic Policy Committee of the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma Mrs Yu Xiaoxuan, Second Secretary, Embassy PR China Mrs Clara Yuwono, Director for External Affairs, Centre for Security and International Studies, Indonesia Mr Stephanus Yuwono, Councillor, Political Department, Indonesia Embassy Mr Zaw Oo, Director, Policy and Research Programs, The Burma Fund, Washington DC
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