Why and How NATO Should Adapt to a New Mediterranean Security Environment Can Kasapoğlu
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NO. 15 MARCH 2019 Introduction Why and How NATO Should Adapt to a New Mediterranean Security Environment Can Kasapoğlu NATO faces a problematic threat landscape in the Mediterranean. The Alliance has to deal with hot topics that range from Russia’s robust military posture and involve- ment in the Syrian Civil War to ISIS terrorism and the migrant crisis. To address all of these challenges, NATO should boost its engagement with partner nations, produce a new maritime security approach, and counterbalance Moscow’s strategic foothold in the eastern Mediterranean. Against the backdrop of Russia’s interven- shadowed flashpoint. Indeed, these war tions in Georgia and Ukraine, the Alliance’s game reports concluded nightmare sce- eastern flank has been the geopolitical epi- narios for capitals in the eastern flank, center of contention between NATO and but key metropoles of NATO nations have Russia while the southern flank has taken a already witnessed devastating terrorist back seat. The Armed Forces of the Russian attacks stemming from the south. The Federation enjoy clear superiority in their migrant crisis has plagued the Euro-Medi- Western Military District over the Baltic terranean area. In addition, as underlined NATO members (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithua- by the 2018 Brussels Summit Declaration, nia) and Poland. Moreover, this correlation Turkey has been hit three times in the last of forces is augmented by the strong com- four years by missiles launched from Syria. bined-arms and mobilization capabilities Finally, the Mediterranean witnessed the of the Russian military. Notably, RAND’s most dangerous chemical weapons use of Arroyo Center conducted a series of war the 21st century, which triggered US-led games in 2014 and 2015 simulating a Rus- punitive strikes against the Syrian Baath sian incursion into the Baltics. The findings, regime. In brief, NATO’s southern flank has published in a special report in 2016, high- gone through fire and water. lighted that Russian forces could reach The Alliance faces two risk categories in the outskirts of Tallinn and Riga within 60 the south. First, there is the rise of violent hours. These considerations put the eastern non-state actors, state failures, and human flank affairs at the forefront for NATO security issues. Second, NATO has to deal while the southern flank – and the Medi- with state-led challenges emanating from terranean in particular – remains an over- Russia’s rising military posture in the eastern Mediterranean. However, unlike 5,000 to 20,000 foreign fighters according the broadly accepted eastern flank narrative, to various estimates. The Syrian jihad, on the allies have yet to reach a consensus in the other hand, mobilized up to 40,000 the south. foreign fighters, with some 7,000 of those being from NATO countries. In other words, the real fallout from the Syrian jihad re- Terrorist Threats and Spillovers mains to be seen in the coming decades. Failed and fragile states have become On November 13, 2015, a series of coordi- vectors for terrorism in the Euro-Mediter- nated terrorist attacks shook Paris. Within ranean region. Syria and Libya may never five days, France’s flagship Charles de Gaulle function as “states” in a Weberian sense aircraft carrier had left its home port in again, as militancy could turn into “insti- Toulon and sailed to the eastern Mediter- tutionalized warlordism” in these countries. ranean to conduct airstrikes on ISIS. The NATO should grasp this trend in a geo- carrier then passed through the Suez Canal politically holistic way. Due to global demo- to assume the command of the US task graphic trends, intrastate conflicts increas- force in the Gulf (CTF-50) in counter-terror- ingly tend to take place in urbanized areas. ism operations. Around the same time, Coupled with the growing lethality of mod- then-French Prime Minister Manuel Valls ern firepower, overwhelming migrant in- told parliament that France could be at risk fluxes will accompany each urban warfare of a chemical or biological terrorism attack. case from now on. In fact, only one year earlier, a laptop cap- Terrorist activity across the southern tured from a Tunisian ISIS operative in Mediterranean is complex in nature. Tuni- Syria revealed the terrorist group’s plans for sia has a problematic home-grown mili- using weapons of mass destruction, includ- tancy issue, and this jihadist potential has ing efforts to weaponize bubonic plague. found a safe haven in Libya amidst the Similar patterns – namely ISIS connec- collapse of the Libyan state. Open-source tions or time spent with ISIS fighters in the intelligence suggests that training camps Middle East and North Africa – were pres- established in Libya were used to dispatch ent in the 2016 Brussels bombings, the Tunisian foreign fighters to Syria. The mili- 2016 Berlin Christmas market truck attack tancy issue in Libya also threatens Egypt’s (the Tunisian perpetrator was linked to an Western Desert area and overstretches ISIS cell in Libya), the 2016 Ataturk Airport Egyptian security forces between the Libyan attack in Istanbul, and the 2017 Istanbul frontier and Sinai. In many cases, one can- nightclub shooting, among many others. not separate smuggling, terrorism, and The one and only time that the Alliance violent extremism from each other in the invoked Article V – the collective defense southern Mediterranean. The Algerian clause of the North Atlantic Treaty – was national Mokhtar Belmokhtar, for example, in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, less is a key figure in al-Qaeda in the Islamic than 24 hours after al-Qaeda targeted NATO Maghreb as well as an infamous champion territory. Thus, NATO had acknowledged of organized crime. He is known as “Mr that the fight against terrorism was one of Marlboro” or “the King of Marlboros” due its duties. In October 2001, NATO’s Stand- to his cigarette smuggling activities. ing Naval Forces kicked off Operation Overall, NATO does not have an easy way Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean, out. Much like its close cooperation with a counter-terrorism effort conducted in eastern flank partners, for example Finland compliance with Article V. and Sweden, the Alliance needs to boost its There is little room for optimism regard- engagement in the southern flank with its ing the terrorism challenge in the south. Mediterranean Dialogue partners. In fact, Al-Qaeda was largely the product of the the Mediterranean Dialogue is a product Afghan jihad in the 1980s, which attracted of NATO’s post-Cold War efforts. Since its SWP Comment 15 March 2019 2 establishment in 1994, the regional security should be worried about the strategic environment has gained completely differ- ramifications of this trend. The Russian ent characteristics. At present, the Alliance Navy can now use its relatively small needs to initiate tailor-made assistance pro- vessels for long-range conventional strikes grams for border security, security sector and commission its submarines to attack reform, intelligence cooperation with NATO strategic targets deep in enemy territory structures, humanitarian challenges, and without passing the nuclear threshold. counter-terrorism. Finally, Moscow has turned the Hmei- Furthermore, although the establish- mim Air Base into a “promotion path.” ment of the NATO Strategic Direction South Most of the current or recent military Hub (2017) is a milestone for the Alliance, district commanders have previously the hub can only make a meaningful differ- headed the Russian Group of Forces in ence if it can ensure the Mediterranean Dia- Syria. More interestingly, General Sergei logue partners’ permanent engagements. Surovikin – another former top com- Otherwise, this important effort might not mander of the Russian contingent – now be embraced by its target audience. serves as chief of the Russian Aerospace Forces, marking the first example in this regard, as General Surovikin is not an State-led Challenge: Russia as aviator. Likewise, General Andrey Karta- NATO’s Southern Neighbor polov, now in charge of the newly estab- lished Political-Military Directorate (an in- As these risks from non-state actors persist, formation warfare command), also made NATO has a new and ambitious neighbor in his way there through promotions at the Mediterranean. Hmeimim. The intervention in Syria has fostered In brief, Moscow’s military gains in the the Russian military’s combat readiness. Syrian expedition inevitably affect the over- According to the Russian Ministry of all NATO–Russia balance. Defense, more than 63,000 military per- sonnel – including 434 generals and more than 26,000 officers – served in Syria. This NATO Needs a Stronger includes about 90 percent of the combat Mediterranean Posture pilots who have flown missions over the Syrian skies and 60 percent of the strategic As reflected in the 2016 Warsaw Summit and long-range aviation crews who have communiqué, the allied leaders have agreed taken part in operations. Furthermore, on “projecting stability” on the southern Russia has tested more than 200 weapon flank. This strategy was based on the assess- systems through its campaign. The Syrian ment that NATO members can be secure if expedition has led to fundamental improve- their neighborhoods are stable. The Alli- ments in the concept of operations. Long- ance learned this the hard way through the range precision-strike capabilities provided post-Arab Spring developments. In 2017, by Kalibr land-attack cruise missiles remain NATO officially joined the anti-ISIS coali- the most notable achievement in this tion and, in the same year, the NATO Stra- respect. In October 2015, the Russian Navy tegic Direction South Hub was inaugurated first used these high-end missiles from in Naples. warships in the Caspian Sea. The missiles Another pillar of NATO’s Mediterranean reportedly traveled some 1,800 km before engagement is Operation Sea Guardian hitting their targets in Syria. The strikes (OSG). The Alliance directly refers to the marked a significant success for Moscow.