DOCSLIB.ORG

Perfectionist Liberalism

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Perfectionist Liberalism PERFECTIONIST LIBERALISM By SEAN MCKENZIE A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 1997 TABLE OF CONTENTS page ABSTRACT ii CHAPTERS 1 INTRODUCTION 1 2 THOMAS HOBBES 18 Geometry 18 Human Nature: Three Sources of Conflict 23 Solution 31 Hobbes' Liberalism 33 Conclusion 40 3 COMMUNITARIANISM 42 The Mismatch Between Society and Liberal Language.... 47 Liberal Practice 52 Criticizing the Critics 63 A New Divide 65 Liberal Worries About Communitarian Proposals 67 Concluding Remarks 74 4 ARISTOTLE AND MILL 78 Continuum Rather Than Chasm? 78 Aristotle, Mill, and the Unity of Their Projects 80 Aristotle and the Individual's Need for the City 82 Mill, the Individual, and Society 97 Oversight, Qualifications 102 Comparison 109 Taking One's Stand Ill 5 WILL KYMLICKA 114 Kymlicka, Liberalism, and the Good Life 114 Defense of the Liberal View of the Self 117 Critique of Communitarian Practical Politics 127 Minority Rights 142 Why Not Public Culture? 148 Conclusion 154 ii 6 WILLIAM GALSTON 156 Intrinsic Virtue 160 Instrumental Virtue 175 7 RAZ AND GEORGE 216 Raz and the Human Good: Autonomy 217 The Problem of Autonomy 224 Perfectionist Liberalism 227 George and the Human Good: Morality 234 Conclusion 244 8 CONCLUSION 250 Culture: the Common Denominator 250 Race, Culture, and the Legitimation Crisis 255 Three Endangered Virtues 261 Protecting the Endangered 279 Last Word 285 REFERENCES 287 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 293 iii , Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy PERFECTIONIST LIBERALISM By Sean David McKenzie August 1997 Chairman: Alfonse Damico Major Department: Political Science Perfectionist liberalism is a theory which examines ways in which the social fabric of our nation might be rebuilt. It borrows from communitarian and liberal political theory. Communitarians lament social decay, worrying about rising crime, drug abuse. divorce and the like. They want to counteract these trends by balancing rights with responsibilities, freedom with loyalty. Liberals regret these trends as well but fear governmental infringement on personal freedoms. The liberal insight is that individuals have better lives if they are free not to get married or to work for the betterment of society. Perfectionist liberalism seeks to reconcile these two theories. They acknowledge the importance of responsibility and freedom. According to the best account of perfectionist liberalism, an individual life is more fulfilling if it includes certain responsibilities, obligations, and commitments. One may freely choose to abandon one's projects. IV or forego commitment altogether, but not without great personal cost. Rather than diminishing them, adults enhance their lives if they forfeit the freedom to sit on the couch all day, prey sexually on others, or pursue one hobby after the next without end. Recent work in political theory bears out this claim. V CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Perfectionist liberalism makes its case by acknowledging both a communitarian and a liberal insight. The former shows how in some ways society is headed in troubling directions. A quick glance at current statistics on crime, drug abuse, divorce, and poverty bears out this claim. To turn things around, the communitarian contends, we must balance rights with responsibilities, freedom with obligation. Communitarian practical politics borrows from both political parties. With Republicans, it admonishes lovers to marry and stay married, if not for each other, then for their children. From the Democrats, communitarians believe in the responsibility to help the poor, with redistributive taxation if necessary. The liberal objects to communitarian concern with the state of society. Politically, we must focus on the individual rather than the whole, and on freedom rather than responsibility. Freedom makes America great, individual freedom. The liberal insight is that individuals have better lives if they are free not to get married or to work for the betterment of society. Some may see these insights as pointing to a tragic 1 2 dilemma: stable communities and freedom are genuine but perhaps incompatible goods; we cannot always have both. Perfectionist liberals, however, do not see things in such zero-sum terms: they borrow from both sides. They acknowledge the importance of responsibility, pace communitarians. Partisans of Rawls lend perfectionist liberals their emphasis on the individual in contradistinction to society. According to the best account of perfectionist liberalism, an individual life goes better if it includes certain responsibilities, obligations, and commitments. We admire and want to be like one who remains faithful to marriage, takes care of the kids, and does some sort of community service like little league or PTA on the side. In a supposedly decadent age, we can find every-day heroes of this sort close by. These people are the bastions of communities all over America. We assume that their lives are better spent than those of couch potatoes, gangbangers, and socialites. When we ponder the life of an every-day hero, however, we realize how little freedom it has compared to less demanding lifestyles. We must not blink at this fact, but with the liberal we must remember the importance of individual's having initially chosen to get married or coach a team. We do not want to live in a place where we cannot lead our own lives; neither do we want to merely drift. 3 Freedom is important, to be sure, but an individual needs a morally demanding life. Rather than diminishing them, adults enhance their lives if they forfeit the freedom to sit on the couch all day, prey sexually on others, or pursue one hobby after the next without end. It will be the burden of this paper to defend this claim. Before defending my thesis, however, I must explain how we got to this point. Whence did the communitarian and liberal insights arise? The latter comes from the most influential political theory of the modern age. In Chapter 1, I will attempt to describe how Thomas Hobbes anticipates both liberalism's commitments and its vulnerability. Hobbes' theory is so attractive to liberals because of its egalitarian commitments. For Hobbes, the greatest mark of human eguality is vulnerability: For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger with himselfe. (1987: 183) When he defends his leviathan, he is in part writing a critique of ancient political philosophy, particularly that of Aristotle. Political philosophy of this sort champions a tutelary state; it is openly perfectionist. Aristotle's state comes into being for the sake of mere life, but exists to promote the good life. For Aristotle, however, only a few can ever attain the good life of political practice. He 4 distinguishes between natural rulers and natural slaves. Only the former can be citizens, and can develop the practical reason necessary for good living. Hobbes rejects this distinction and in so doing paves the way for a revolution in political thought. Aristotle's state tries to make better men out of a select few, endeavors to teach men to be reasonable through an education to virtue and a life of practical political experience. Hobbes takes all men as he finds them: passionate rather than reasonable, ^®^^“^^terested rather than virtuous. Some may turn out to be better than others, but this is not politically relevant; it is a matter of individual judgment. We cannot say with certainty what is better because the good strikes different individuals in different ways. Often, we cannot agree on what is good. In disputes over truth Hobbes sides, in contradistinction to Aristotle and particularly to Plato, with the many against the wise. We can know no summum bonum, regardless of what philosophers may contend. As Leo Strauss reminds us, Hobbes understands that although we may possess inferior wisdom, we know instinctively what is good for us: for even granting that the wise man is, in principle, a 5 better judge, he is much less concerned with the self- preservation of a given fool than is the fool himself" (1965: 16) . Hobbes grounds his state in the passion of the many rather than the wisdom of the few. More specifically, his state is founded on a particular passion: the fear of a violent death, the summum malum. This is a more pertinent if less noble basis for politics. It applies to us all; it is something to which we can all agree. Hobbes' theory, in its anti perfectionism, is radically egalitarian, and for this reason attractive. Hobbes reasons from a pre-political self, demonstrating the rationality of the state's existence as preserver of survival. Life without a state is no life at all. Men consent to be governed for the sake of preserving life. The good life is not a chief concern, politically. Following Hobbes, much liberalism posits a chasm between itself and political theory containing any hint of perfectionism. One who seeks the name liberal must forsake all others in the name of freedom and security. Here I stand, she must claim, I can do no other. But this stance comes at a cost. Anti-perfectionist liberalism has become so preoccupied with the individual, rights, and freedom that it tends to lose sight of other 6 important political values. For over a decade, communitarians such as Charles Taylor and Michael Sandel have demonstrated the problems inherent in the anti-perfectionist stance which begins with Hobbes. I will take up the communitarian critique in chapter 2. Sandel charges liberalism with conceiving of the individual as unencumbered. In protecting the individual from imposed notions of the good, liberals describe a Hobbesian self prior to any received ends.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Some Realism About Constitutional Liberalism Toni M
    University of Minnesota Law School Scholarship Repository Constitutional Commentary 2012 Some Realism About Constitutional Liberalism Toni M. Massaro Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Massaro, Toni M., "Some Realism About Constitutional Liberalism" (2012). Constitutional Commentary. 1099. https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/1099 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Book Review Symposium Ordered Liberty: Three Views and a Response SOME REALISM ABOUT CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERALISM] ORDERED LIBERTY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUES. James E. Fleming2 and Linda C. McClain. 3 Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 2013. Pp. 371. $49.95 (Cloth). Toni M. Massaro 4 I. INTRODUCTION Presidential elections often are good barometers of the national mood, though their fullest implications are likely best read in hindsight rather than on the eve of the primaries. Nevertheless, a fair reading of the 2012 national mood, as of this pre-election day writing, is that the American people are divided between a vision of government as ally versus government as antagonist. On the partisan poles are those who may be described as strongly and consistently pro-government in their leanings, on the one end, and those who are strongly and consistently libertarian, on the other end. Although most Americans likely lie in between these statism poles, and selectively invoke the benefits or harms of government power, broad-strokes political rhetoric today increasingly rings 1.
    [Show full text]
  • Liberalism After Communitarianism1 Charles Blattberg Professor of Political Philosophy Université De Montréal Introduction
    Liberalism after Communitarianism1 Charles Blattberg Professor of Political Philosophy Université de Montréal Introduction Since the beginning of the modern age, there have been political thinkers who complain about its over-emphasis on the individual. Others have raised concerns about the dangers associated with too much community. One version of this dispute is reflected in the ‘liberal-communitarian debate’, which arose within anglophone political philosophy during the 1980s. The liberals were led by John Rawls, along with Ronald Dworkin, Thomas Nagel, and T.M. Scanlon. And the communitarian critique of their work was advanced by, among others, Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor, and Michael Walzer. As we might expect, since the publication of the writings of both groups, some have seen fit to declare one side or other of the debate the victor. But we should assume that none of the leading participants saw their exchanges in such merely competitive terms. After all, serious thinkers know that theirs is a higher – because ultimately philosophical – calling. We can understand the debate as arising primarily around Rawls’ A Theory of Justice (1999; originally published in 1971). The book defends what he considers to be the key principles of liberalism. To Rawls, we should endorse that political order which matches what rational citizens would freely choose from ‘the original position’. This is the perspective attained by stepping behind a hypothetical ‘veil of ignorance’, which conceals individuals’ knowledge of their capacities or social position. By imagining ourselves behind such a veil, we are said to be able to deliberate in a truly representative manner, and so ‘regard the human situation not only from all social but also from all temporal points of view’ (Rawls 1999: 514).
    [Show full text]
  • A Crossroads, Not an Island: a Response to Hanoch Dagan
    Michigan Law Review Online Volume 117 Article 9 2019 A Crossroads, Not an Island: A Response to Hanoch Dagan Zoë Hitzig Harvard University E. Glen Weyl RadicalxChange Foundation Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr_online Part of the Law and Economics Commons Recommended Citation Zoë Hitzig & E. G. Weyl, A Crossroads, Not an Island: A Response to Hanoch Dagan, 117 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 117 (2019). Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr_online/vol117/iss1/9 This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review Online by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. A CROSSROADS, NOT AN ISLAND: A RESPONSE TO HANOCH DAGAN Zoë Hitzig* & E. Glen Weyl** Hanoch Dagan critiques Radical Markets for insufficient attention to the value of autonomy. While most of his concrete disagreements result from miscommunications, he appears sympathetic to a theory of autonomy that is more widespread, and deserves response. Human agency is fundamentally social, and individuality is primarily constituted by the unique set of social connections and identities one adopts. In this sense, flourishing individuals are crossroads of different communities, not self- sufficient islands. Beyond any welfarist benefits, a fundamental value of Radical Markets is that they aim to instantiate the social nature of identity and empower agency through diverse community. Obsessed, bewildered By the shipwreck Of the singular We have chosen the meaning Of being numerous.
    [Show full text]
  • UNIVERSITY of CALIFORNIA, IRVINE Romantic Liberalism
    UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE Romantic Liberalism DISSERTATION submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in English by Brent Lewis Russo Dissertation Committee: Professor Jerome Christensen, Chair Professor Andrea Henderson Associate Professor Irene Tucker 2014 Chapter 1 © 2013 Trustees of Boston University All other materials © 2014 Brent Lewis Russo TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS iii CURRICULUM VITAE iv ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION v INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER 1: Charles Lamb’s Beloved Liberalism: Eccentricity in the Familiar Essays 9 CHAPTER 2: Liberalism as Plenitude: The Symbolic Leigh Hunt 33 CHAPTER 3: Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s Illiberalism and the Early Reform Movement 58 CHAPTER 4: William Hazlitt’s Fatalism 84 ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank Charles Rzepka and the Trustees of Boston University for permission to include Chapter One of my dissertation, which was originally published in Studies in Romanticism (Fall 2013). Financial support was provided by the University of California, Irvine Department of English, School of Humanities, and Graduate Division. iii CURRICULUM VITAE Brent Lewis Russo 2005 B.A. in English Pepperdine University 2007 M.A. in English University of California, Irvine 2014 Ph.D. in English with Graduate Emphasis in Critical Theory University of California, Irvine PUBLICATIONS “Charles Lamb’s Beloved Liberalism: Eccentricity in the Familiar Essays.” Studies in Romanticism. Fall 2013. iv ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION Romantic Liberalism By Brent Lewis Russo Doctor of Philosophy in English University of California, Irvine, 2014 Professor Jerome Christensen, Chair This dissertation examines the Romantic beginnings of nineteenth-century British liberalism. It argues that Romantic authors both helped to shape and attempted to resist liberalism while its politics were still inchoate.
    [Show full text]
  • Bringing Liberalism and Communitarianism Closer
    Western Michigan University ScholarWorks at WMU Master's Theses Graduate College 4-2001 Bringing Liberalism and Communitarianism Closer Paul Frazier Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/masters_theses Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Frazier, Paul, "Bringing Liberalism and Communitarianism Closer" (2001). Master's Theses. 5022. https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/masters_theses/5022 This Masters Thesis-Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate College at ScholarWorks at WMU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at WMU. For more information, please contact [email protected]. BRINGING LIBERALISMAND COMMUNITARIANISM CLOSER by Paul Frazier A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of The Graduate College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts Department of Philosophy Western Michigan University Kalamazoo, Michigan April2001 Copyright by Paul Frazier 2001 BRINGINGLIBERALISM AND COMMUNIT ARIANISM CLOSER Paul Frazier, M.A. Western Michigan University, 2001 The question that divides liberalism and communitarianism is: should the state exist to protect individuals and individual rights or for the good of society as a whole? This thesis suggests that this is the wrong question to ask. Individuals are not isolated and different fromtheir communities, but are products of social settings. This does not mean, however, that individual freedom and individual rights are compromised. Rather, the only way for an individual to be an autonomous agent and to make free choices is within a society. Rights for individuals, then, must come from within a social setting. Therefore, the individual is intertwined with a society and we cannot view a just society as simply focusingon one or the other.
    [Show full text]
  • Beyond Political Liberalism
    Beyond Political Liberalism Toward a Post-Secular Ethics of Public Life Troy Dostert University of Notre Dame Press Notre Dame, Indiana © 2006 University of Notre Dame Press 00 dost (i-x/1-14) Final iii 9/13/06 2:20:04 PM Copyright © 2006 by University of Notre Dame Notre Dame, Indiana 46556 www.undpress.nd.edu All Rights Reserved Manufactured in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Dostert, Troy Lewis, 1968– Beyond political liberalism : toward a post-secular ethics of public life / Troy Dostert. p. cm. Based on the author’s thesis (doctoral)—Duke University. Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. isbn-13: 978-0-268-02600-4 (pbk. : alk. paper) isbn-10: 0-268-02600-9 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Political ethics. 2. Religion and politics. 3. Liberalism—Religious aspects. 4. Religious pluralism—Political aspects. I. Title. bj55.d64 2006 172—dc22 2006023895 ∞ The paper in this book meets the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity of the Council on Library Resources. © 2006 University of Notre Dame Press 00 dost (i-x/1-14) Final iv 9/13/06 2:20:05 PM Introduction One of the most pressing dilemmas in contemporary political theory con- cerns how we should conceive of political life in light of the challenges posed by moral diversity. When citizens with widely divergent ethical or religious convictions clash in public debate, how can we approach such disagreements constructively? How can we work toward a stable and legitimate basis
    [Show full text]
  • A Comparative Study Between John Stuart Mill and John Rawls
    American Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences Research (AJHSSR) 2021 American Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences Research (AJHSSR) e-ISSN :2378-703X Volume-5, Issue-5, pp-347-356 www.ajhssr.com Research Paper Open Access The Individual and the Society: A Comparative Study between John Stuart Mill and John Rawls Roger MONDOUE1, JUMBAM Gideon2 1(Department of Philosophy, Psychology, Sociology, Professor-University ofDschang, Cameroon) 2(Department of Philosophy, Psychology, Sociology, Doctorate-University ofDschang, Cameroon) ABSTRACT:This research paper seeks to examine the nature of the relationship that exists between John Stuart Mill and John Rawls‟s conceptions of the individual and the society, given that the need for comparing and contrasting their views is of major necessity in the field of philosophy of humanity and persons. Haven acknowledged the fact that both thinkers are being situated within the liberal tradition, we intend to argue that they all have incompatible and compatible conceptions to the question of the individual/society relationship. This will be in opposition to those who only perceive their views in regard to the reflection of individual and the collective from an exclusive or from an inclusive perspective. Mill accords more powers to the individual above the society while Rawls on his own path reconsidered the balance between the two. However, beyond their opposing dimensions, we shall argue that Rawls remains Millian despite his claimed to have rupture from Mill liberalism of autonomy and individuality. Finally we shall equally propose an alternative that goes beyond their liberal ambitions and that can serve as the base for overcoming the tension between the individual and the society in our present liberal and neoliberal context.
    [Show full text]
  • A Postliberal Future?
    A POSTLIBERAL FUTURE? By David Goodhart 1 INTRODUCTION Britain is a good country. One of the best places in the world to live. But it also, of course, has many failings. Some of these are deeply embedded in our history and institutions. Others are of more recent parentage and easier—or at least possible—to rectify through political action. In this essay I want to argue that this task of changing the country for the better would be made easier if a certain cluster of ideas—what is sometimes called postliberalism—held greater sway in the political nation. The word/phrase is a clunky one and there may be better alternatives: ‘one nation liberalism’ is one candidate or, more polemically, ‘liberalism for actually existing people’. But postliberalism seeks to acknowledge the achievements and ascendancy of liberalism in recent decades while also capturing a sense of moving beyond it, of maturing into something more robust that can address concerns that are neglected by, indeed sometimes exacerbated by, mainstream liberalism. Postliberalism is not a policy or political programme, it is more like an ideology or worldview—it tells a story about what Britain looks like today, where it has gone wrong and the attitudes, assumptions and principles that should guide reformers. It also has a view of human nature that aims to capture people in their messy reality rather than reduce them to a single, dominant drive such as self-interest or a desire for autonomy. People are competitive and co-operative, selfish and altruistic. They are in the main neither strivers nor shirkers and generally flourish in secure, settled lives surrounded by love and recognition and with useful, purposeful activity to occupy them.
    [Show full text]
  • What's Left of the Left: Democrats and Social Democrats in Challenging
    What’s Left of the Left What’s Left of the Left Democrats and Social Democrats in Challenging Times Edited by James Cronin, George Ross, and James Shoch Duke University Press Durham and London 2011 © 2011 Duke University Press All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America on acid- free paper ♾ Typeset in Charis by Tseng Information Systems, Inc. Library of Congress Cataloging- in- Publication Data appear on the last printed page of this book. Contents Acknowledgments vii Introduction: The New World of the Center-Left 1 James Cronin, George Ross, and James Shoch Part I: Ideas, Projects, and Electoral Realities Social Democracy’s Past and Potential Future 29 Sheri Berman Historical Decline or Change of Scale? 50 The Electoral Dynamics of European Social Democratic Parties, 1950–2009 Gerassimos Moschonas Part II: Varieties of Social Democracy and Liberalism Once Again a Model: 89 Nordic Social Democracy in a Globalized World Jonas Pontusson Embracing Markets, Bonding with America, Trying to Do Good: 116 The Ironies of New Labour James Cronin Reluctantly Center- Left? 141 The French Case Arthur Goldhammer and George Ross The Evolving Democratic Coalition: 162 Prospects and Problems Ruy Teixeira Party Politics and the American Welfare State 188 Christopher Howard Grappling with Globalization: 210 The Democratic Party’s Struggles over International Market Integration James Shoch Part III: New Risks, New Challenges, New Possibilities European Center- Left Parties and New Social Risks: 241 Facing Up to New Policy Challenges Jane Jenson Immigration and the European Left 265 Sofía A. Pérez The Central and Eastern European Left: 290 A Political Family under Construction Jean- Michel De Waele and Sorina Soare European Center- Lefts and the Mazes of European Integration 319 George Ross Conclusion: Progressive Politics in Tough Times 343 James Cronin, George Ross, and James Shoch Bibliography 363 About the Contributors 395 Index 399 Acknowledgments The editors of this book have a long and interconnected history, and the book itself has been long in the making.
    [Show full text]
  • Two Concepts of Basic Equality
    Res Publica DOI 10.1007/s11158-017-9354-5 Two Concepts of Basic Equality Nikolas Kirby1 Ó The Author(s) 2017. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com Abstract It has become somewhat a commonplace in recent political philosophy to remark that all plausible political theories must share at least one fundamental premise, ‘that all humans are one another’s equals’. One single concept of ‘basic equality’, therefore, is cast as the common touchstone of all contemporary political thought. This paper argues that this claim is false. Virtually all do indeed say that all humans are ‘equals’ in some basic sense. However, this is not the same sense. There are not one but (at least) two concepts of basic equality, and they reflect not a grand unity within political philosophy but a deep and striking division. I call these concepts ‘Equal Worth’ and ‘Equal Authority’. The former means that each indi- vidual’s good is of equal moral worth. The latter means that no individual is under the natural authority of anyone else. Whilst these two predicates are not in them- selves logically inconsistent, I demonstrate that they are inconsistent foundation stones for political theory. A theory that starts from Equal Worth will find it near impossible to justify Equal Authority. And a theory that starts from Equal Authority will find any fact about the true worth of things, including ourselves, irrelevant to justifying legitimate action. This helps us identify the origin of many of our deepest and seemingly intractable disagreements within political philosophy, and directs our attention to the need for a clear debate about the truth and/or relationship between the two concepts.
    [Show full text]
  • JS Mill's Political Thought
    P1: JZZ 0521860202pre CUFX079B/Urbinati 0 521 86020 2 cupusbw December 26, 2006 7:38 This page intentionally left blank ii P1: JZZ 0521860202pre CUFX079B/Urbinati 0 521 86020 2 cupusbw December 26, 2006 7:38 J. S. MILL’S POLITICAL THOUGHT The year 2006 marked the two hundredth anniversary of John Stuart Mill’s birth. Although his philosophical reputation has varied greatly in the interven- ing years, it is now clear that Mill ranks among the most influential modern political thinkers. Yet despite his enduring influence, and perhaps also because of it, the breadth and complexity of Mill’s political thought is often under- appreciated. Although his writings remain a touchstone for debates over liberty and liberalism, many other important dimensions of his political philosophy have until recently been mostly ignored or neglected. This volume aims, first, to correct such neglect by illustrating the breadth and depth of Mill’s political writings. It does so by drawing togetheracollection of essays whose authors explore underappreciated elements of Mill’s political philosophy, including his democratic theory, his writings on international relations and military inter- ventions, and his treatments of socialism and despotism. Second, the volume shows how Mill’s thinking remains pertinent to our own political life in three broad areas – democratic institutions and culture, liberalism, and international politics – and offers a critical reassessment of Mill’s political philosophy in light of recent political developments and transformations. Nadia Urbinati
    [Show full text]
  • Locke's Perfectionist Liberalism
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by D-Scholarship@Pitt LOCKE’S PERFECTIONIST LIBERALISM: AN ARTICULATION AND DEFENSE by Evan Patrick Riley BA, Philosophy, University of Louisville, 1995 BA, Philosophy, Politics and Economics, Oxford University, 1997 Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The College of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Pittsburgh 2008 UNIVERSITYOF PITTSBURGH COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES This dissertation was presented by Evan Patrick Riley It was defended on December 5th, 2008 and approved by Karin Boxer, Assistant Professor, Philosophy Stephen Engstrom, Professor, Philosophy Michael Goodhart, Associate Professor, Political Science Kieran Setiya, Associate Professor, Philosophy Director: Michael Thompson, Professor, Philosophy ii Copyright © by Evan Riley 2008 iii LOCKE’S PERFECTIONIST LIBERALISM: AN ARTICULATION AND DEFENSE Evan Riley, PhD University of Pittsburgh, 2008 Locke’s view in the Two Treatises not only allows for but embraces interference with individuals on recognizably perfectionist grounds. It is plainly a form of perfectionism. Yet it is also an early paradigm of deontological liberalism for Locke sharply emphasizes the importance of moral duties to respect the basic rights of the sovereign individual. It is tempting to conclude that he is confusedly appealing to two opposed forms of moral and political theory, indeed to what we have come to see as two opposed forms of moral reasoning, viz. consequentialism on the one hand and deontology on the other. This temptation should be resisted. Perfectionism and deontology are not necessarily at odds with one another; some perfectionisms may coherently and productively also be deontological liberalisms.
    [Show full text]