sign in sign up
<<
Home , Frank Hassett, John Coates (general), Jungle warfare, Ted Serong

INTERVIEW

Rethinking Warfare

Michael Evans explains the complexities of counterinsurgency to Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe

ichael Evans is the ADC counterinsurgency—at least in its purely Fellow at the Australian dimension—draws heavily on earlier Defence College in , traditions of small-unit soldiering in , where he is responsible for and Second World jungle warfare the design and delivery of techniques and tactics, in particular. Australian Mcounterinsurgency education for mid-career Army counterinsurgency as a serious and senior ADF officers. He is a institutional activity began in the early 1960s graduate of King’s College, London, and a with the work of (later General) Member of the International Institute for on anti-guerrilla doctrine in South . Dr Evans served in the East Asia. By the mid-1960s, with Australian Rhodesian and Zimbabwean armies and was troops in , the Army produced closely involved with the in one of the best doctrine manuals of any English- integrating former guerrillas into the Zimbabwe speaking Western military, the 1965 National Army. He is a former Head of the Division in Pamphlet 11, Counter- ’s Land Warfare Studies Revolutionary Warfare. It was short, well-written Centre at the Royal Military College, and mercifully free of the business school Duntroon, and the lead author of the style jargon that blights much contemporary Australian Army’s Land Warfare Doctrine 3-0-1, doctrine. Although the manual’s political Counterinsurgency (2009). context is now dated, in terms of technique it In September 2010, Dr Evans spoke was and still remains highly regarded by experts with Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe, a defence as a model of its kind. Indeed, it was being used analyst who has published widely on by Australian commanders in Somalia as late Australian, South Asian, and Indian as 1993, which is quite a shelf-life. Ocean political and security issues. Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe: From a COIN Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe: When did perspective, what was significant about the COIN (counterinsurgency) tactics and strategies Australian involvement and experience in first enter the Australian military and how was the ? it implemented? Michael Evans: The Australian military learnt Michael Evans: In the modern sense, a great deal from the 1952 British Army’s counterinsurgency began in the Australian Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya Army in the 1950s during the era of Forward pamphlet and drew deeply on the success of Defence in South-East Asia under the Menzies British Commonwealth forces under Generals government. However, as has been pointed Briggs and Templer. Pragmatism, flexibility and out by several historians, Australian the Anglo-Saxon penchant for the functional

Policy • Vol. 26 No. 4 • Summer 2010–11 41 Rethinking Counterinsurgency Warfare

over the theoretical were all products of counterinsurgency.’ I am yet to meet a Vietnam Malaya, and Australia built its approach on this veteran who does not believe that what he was empirical tradition. Of course, today, Malaya doing in South Vietnam was counterinsurgency. has enormous symbolic significance because Counterinsurgency is like pornography: it produced one of the few relatively clear- you know it when you see it. cut victories over an insurgent movement. The Australian Army that came out of Most of the methods used were codified in Sir Vietnam was in my opinion probably the finest Robert Thompson’s classic 1966 work, Defeating small unit army in the world in the early 1970s. Communist . Malaya informed It was not for nothing that General William Division in Battle Pamphlet 11. Looking Westmoreland, the US Commander in South back, what is striking about Malaya is that as East Asia, compared the Australian Army to the a campaign, it was sui generis in its success. inter-War German Reichswehr under Hans von When applied by others, most notably by Seeckt. As a former Chief of the General , the Rhodesians, these methods proved much General , has observed, less successful in the different political and the war in Vietnam professionalised the regular ethnographic circumstances. Australian Army as a modern combined-arms force—and that professionalism had at its Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe: From a COIN core the art of counter-revolutionary warfare perspective, what was significant about the (as counterinsurgency was referred to at Australian involvement and experience in the time). Vietnam? Michael Evans: That’s an interesting Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe: How would question to ponder given the revival of interest you describe the state of the Australian military in counterinsurgency over the last few years and and its preparedness for COIN in the aftermath the rise of a group of Western military of Vietnam to its deployment in East Timor? fundamentalists known popularly as the Michael Evans: We were not prepared for COINdinistas. Some COINdinistas, drawing East Timor—although people like me had on the intellectual fusion of classical been warning that the Australian Army would counterinsurgency pacification techniques with go and fight offshore in South-East Asia or the neo-classical ideas of ‘clear, hold and build’ Pacific—for several years. The period 1972– theories, claim that the Australians never really 97 was in my view the era of the Australian conducted counterinsurgency in Phuoc Tuy Army’s Babylonian Captivity. The land force province. According to this revisionist was seen as a kind of geographical abstraction argument, the Australian Task Force ‘cleared and not as an instrument of statecraft. It was and held’ but never built. We patrolled in chained like an unwanted dog to the Defence an ‘enemy-centric’ fashion and fought the of Australia (DOA) doctrine and forced to Viet Cong, but we did not take a convert itself from a military establishment ‘population-centric’ approach with all of its configured for expeditionary warfare and tropical attendant civil-military functions. Therefore, counterinsurgency into a force that would be the argument goes, Australians did not optimised for domestic, long-range desert group execute proper counterinsurgency. This strikes operations in Northern Australia. Army 21, as a classic case of presentism triumphing in as this scheme was called, was part of a strategic historical analysis. It is akin to saying that fantasy reminiscent of ’s Petainists and because the Catholic Mass is now performed their obsession with the Maginot Line. No one in plain English with the priest in full view of seems to have recalled General Sydney the congregation, the older Latin version Rowell’s wise advice to the Americans about with the priest partly obscured no longer fulfils fears of a Japanese landing in Broome in 1942: the essence of Catholicism as redefined by ‘if they land we’ll send the Salvage Corps to Vatican II. We need to be aware of ‘Vatican II pick up their bones because there is no water

42 Policy • Vol. 26 No. 4 • Summer 2010–11 Rethinking Counterinsurgency Warfare

between Broome and Alice Springs.’ Army to understand the implications of post- should have relentlessly quoted Rowell at conflict stability operations and, more broadly, those individuals in the 1980s and 1990s nation-building as a strategy. When we took who sought to impose DOA thinking on the Osama bin Laden’s wolf’s lair in the Tora Bora land force. mountains, what did we find in the caves? Australia was lucky that the Chief of Army We found copies of insurgency manuals, in 1997, Lieutenant General Frank Hickling, including Mao Zedong’s On . took the brave decision to break with DOA We have no excuse for not knowing what thinking and return the Army to its traditional was coming. roots as an expeditionary force. Not much more than a year later we were in East Timor. To field Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe: How has the a force, we had to improvise and cannibalise Australian Army managed its deployments in land force capabilities hollowed out by a quarter both Iraq and Afghanistan? What do you see are century of death by a thousand cuts. We were its successes and shortcomings or similarities saved by Hickling’s breathing space, by the and differences? quality of our soldiers, and by the long shadow Michael Evans: The beginning of wisdom of the expeditionary professionalism bequeathed is to understand that the Australian Army is by operations in Vietnam. If matters had gone first and foremost a political instrument, a tool wrong for Australia in East Timor, there would of statecraft. As Colonel Ted Serong, the leading have been a reckoning with those who designed Australian counterinsurgency theorist of the DOA for the Army. They were lucky. Cold War era, put it, Australia always uses its military force in support of a diplomatic position Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe: What impact and never the reverse. Our Army is small; did the East Timor operation have on the it lacks mass; it is an instrument of surgical Australian military and how did it influence effect, insofar as that is possible in land warfare. and prepare the Australian Army for COIN Accordingly, our offshore deployments to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan? Afghanistan and Iraq have reflected a form of Michael Evans: East Timor restored the military statecraft to support both our liberal professional confidence of the Australian Army democratic values and our alliance with the after a quarter of a century of sterile DOA . In Iraq, an unpopular thinking. It re-established our reputation as an commitment, we deployed a regiment; expeditionary land force. It is no accident that in Afghanistan, a war with broader popular this confidence and reputation was epitomised support, we entered Uruzgan with the Dutch by , the last of the great Vietnam in a reconstruction and training mission plus veterans, who provided skilled and charismatic a Special Operations Task Group. Again, it is leadership. We rediscovered small unit tropical important to note that neither the Iraq nor soldiering, we relearned the intricacies of Afghan commitments was ever described expeditionary operations and, above all, the by the Howard or Rudd governments as Army recaptured its historical soul embodied counterinsurgency missions. When it comes in the Digger who fights away so that those at to modern war, Australia’s mantra may be home can be safe. All of these factors stood described thus: ‘as military as necessary and as us in good stead post-9/11 with Afghanistan political as possible.’ Some critics call for much and Iraq. Having said this, it is important to more heavy lifting, but in a democracy what remember the political context. Australia did you can do with military force is shaped not initially participate in Afghanistan and Iraq by the political class and the will of the as counterinsurgency missions. Both began as electorate. We will do well to keep all of this conventional for regime change. The fact in mind because it is easy to get sucked into that both missions became insurgency counterinsurgency; it is much harder to situations was due to the Coalition’s failure get out.

Policy • Vol. 26 No. 4 • Summer 2010–11 43 Rethinking Counterinsurgency Warfare

Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe: What key reinforced by the reality of real limits to the use lessons and experiences do you think the of the military instrument in counterinsurgency. Australian Army has drawn from its experience Counterinsurgency is a mystery rather than in Iraq and Afghanistan? a puzzle. One can solve a puzzle but a mystery Michael Evans: Both theatres have served evades easy resolution. Afghanistan is a mystery as operational laboratories in terms of testing wrapped in the cloak of guerrilla warfare, our readiness, training, leadership and tactical a mystery that requires a political outcome. skill-levels. As with all post- II Second, Australians are relentless pragmatists deployments, the experiences have tended to who see Americans as overly prone to enthusiastic illuminate the tactical-level excellence—and the cycles of theoretical faddism. Before the operational-level inexperience—of the Army. Iraq crisis (which began in 1990) spawned We have operated as niche forces with many counterinsurgency, it gave us via Desert Storm officers embedded in the Coalition command the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)—now and control system. In the case of the Special seldom referred to but once omnipresent in the Forces, hunter killer operations have, of course, 1990s. There is, therefore, a wariness amongst been vital. For our reconstruction-training some senior Australian officers about the current units, the raising and training of an Afghan rush to counterinsurgency, especially when it National Army brigade in Uruzgan has been the is presented as ‘the future of warfare’—as some essence of the mission. In all this activity, it is COINdinistas are wont to do. The truth is, important to remember that counterinsurgency this is an age of full-spectrum operations and warfare has been the by-product rather than complex hybrids, and advanced armed forces the rationale for our military commitment. must be able to respond to a multiplicity Insurgency is what we face from performing of contingencies. reconstruction and training to improve Afghan Third, Australians have always performed local capacity. well in small-unit soldiering and civil-military Some observers have criticised Australia for affairs, which are both at the heart of modern not taking counterinsurgency more seriously counterinsurgency. There is perhaps inside our and not sufficiently preparing for it within our officer corps a military hubris of ‘been there, education-training continuum. It is certainly done that.’ There is certainly a feeling that the true that Australia has tried to avoid the overheated Americans are discovering what Australian rhetoric of the ‘COINdinista revolution’ that soldiers have always intuitively understood about has occurred in the United States and, to a lesser small-unit operations and ‘war amongst the extent, Britain. Rather, we have preferred to people.’ Finally, it is clear that much of classical quietly rewrite Army counterinsurgency doctrine counterinsurgency doctrine only partly meets and to introduce courses at the Defence College the task of today’s armed nation building or and elsewhere. Far more may need to be done, stabilisation in globalised political conditions. but the process of improving our knowledge For today’s wars, classical counterinsurgency, of contemporary counterinsurgency has well forged during the Cold War, is an analogue and truly begun in a measured way. It is worth and not a replicant. This reality has reinforced contemplating a few of the reasons why we Australia’s institutional reservation about have sought to avoid the brash new world of uncritically embracing a ‘counterinsurgency the COINdinistas. revolution’ inside the ADF. So these are the First, at the forefront is the ADF’s awareness conditions under which the development of that our missions in Iraq and Afghanistan new counterinsurgency thinking has had to are not defined by our political masters as proceed in the ADF, in general, and in the Army, counterinsurgency—even though they involve in particular. As a result, we, in the writing team the latter. In Afghanistan, the use of the ADF, at the Command and charged for better or worse, is political rather than with producing the Army’s new Land Warfare military in character; this consciousness is Doctrine 3-0-1, Counterinsurgency in 2008–09,

44 Policy • Vol. 26 No. 4 • Summer 2010–11 Rethinking Counterinsurgency Warfare

tried to distil best-practice doctrine in a cool, Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe: What impact measured and realistic manner. Our manual is do you think the Australian Army’s deployment best seen as a bridging document for the land in Iraq and Afghanistan has had on the ethos force and may serve as a guide for the ADF in of the Army as opposed to say Vietnam? its development of a Future Joint Operating What long-term implications will this have Concept (FJOC) and future joint doctrine. for the evolution of the Australian Army’s Ultimately, the ADF will require an FJOC strategic culture and strategic thinking? and joint doctrine that embraces elements of Michael Evans: The main difference counterinsurgency, but which embodies political between the Australian Army in Iraq and purpose, probes the strategic level of war, and Afghanistan and earlier in Vietnam is simple: provides linkage to the inter-agency community . In Vietnam, conscripts were in the twenty-first century battle space. the face of public controversy since young men were called up and compelled to fight. Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe: How has the Circumstances are very different in Iraq and Australian Army’s doctrine Afghanistan. We have a long-service, volunteer evolved? professional army in the field operating under Michael Evans: The Australian Army is the doctrine of ‘unlimited liability’—military very small and there are clear limits to its professionals accept that they may be killed capacity in an urban environment. All Western in performance of their duties as integral defence forces are coming to terms with the to their contract with the state. What today’s reality that by 2020, over 60% of humankind Australian soldiers cannot bear is being will inhabit cities. This will rise to 75% by 2040. patronised by being turned into lost victims This revolution in urban demography barely or alternatively being eulogised as celebrity resonates in the media or academia but is a heroes by the media. They are neither of coming global reality. As the planet urbanises, these things. They are tough, proud, serious insurgency and irregular conflict will follow suit. professionals; they are ordinary men and As Clausewitz teaches, war is a clever chameleon women doing the extraordinary; and they that adjusts to political conditions. An urban are part of a close-knit, stoic brotherhood. world will make war different from a rural world. What they demand is the highest respect In the 1960s, Fidel Castro famously called the for their calling, which is the profession of city the graveyard of the guerrilla. But by 2025, arms—no more, no less. the megacity may well be well on its way to What will be the long-term implications becoming the guerrilla fighter’s version of the of Iraq and Afghanistan for Australian Sierra Maestra mountains. The 2008 Mumbai strategic culture? I think both campaigns attack, in which 10 suicide terrorists effectively will reinforce the Army’s expeditionary ethos paralysed a huge Asian city for 60 hours, and the Australian way of war as a form of is a glimpse into what we may expect on a larger military support for a foreign policy steeped scale in future years. The difficulties we will in Western liberal democratic values. I have face in emerging ‘feral city’ operations include written elsewhere about Australia’s tyranny density of population, media saturation, and of dissonance between strategic theory and limits on using armed force among civilians, practice. The theory of Defence of Australia is compressed operations, and a multiplicity of couched in terms of insularity and geography, environmental factors. If we can avoid fighting but the practice of Defence of Australia in cities we should do so, but if we have to is always about our history and heritage, undertake urban operations (as seems likely), of going offshore to pursue vital interests to then we need to develop a metrostrategy help uphold a favourable geopolitical order. mentality in order to understand the twenty- It is a curious, paradoxical anomaly—again first century city of the developing world asa more of a deductive mystery than an inductive complex demographic battle space. puzzle.

Policy • Vol. 26 No. 4 • Summer 2010–11 45