Water Scarcity and Sustainability in the Himalayas Incentives for Securing Water in a Himalayan Town: a Case from Dhulikhel, Nepal Tikeshwari Joshi, Eszter K

Volume 6 Number 1 2020

Water Scarcity and Sustainability in the Himalayas Incentives for Securing Water in a Himalayan town: A case from Dhulikhel, Nepal Tikeshwari Joshi, Eszter K. Kovacs and Kaustuv R. Neupane

CHIEF EDITOR Dil Khatri, Southasia Institute of Advanced Studies (SIAS) SPECIAL ISSUE EDITORS Chandra Lal Pandey, School of Arts, Kathmandu University Dil Khatri Hemant Ojha, University of Canberra INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY BOARD Hemant Ojha Andrea Nightingale, University of Oslo Fraser Sugden, University of Birmingham Siri Eriksen, Norwegian University of Life Sciences Jon Ensor, University of York MANAGING EDITOR Gyanu Maskey, SIAS and Kathmandu University Design and Layout Pradip Dhakal ©Southasia Institute of Advanced Studies E-mail: [email protected] Sanjeeb Bir Bajracharya Website: www.sias-southasia.org JoshiNEW et. al.Nepal Journal of Incentives for securing water in a HimalayanPublished by townNPRN Social Science and Hosted by SIAS ANGLE Public Policy Available at www.nepalpolicynet.com 2020, Vol. 6(1), pp.66-85

INCENTIVES FOR SECURING WATER IN A HIMALAYAN TOWN: A CASE FROM DHULIKHEL, NEPAL

Tikeshwari Joshi1, Eszter K. Kovacs2 and Kaustuv R. Neupane1

Abstract

This paper explores the negotiations and the emerging socio-political relationships and alliances that were formed to reach a series of water-sharing agreements between upstream and downstream communities, in order to secure water required for continued urbanisation of the downstream town. The research focused on the socio-political actors and users of the Dhulikhel drinking water supply system of Nepal. Primary data was collected through key informant interviews, focus group discussions and stakeholder workshops to explore the development of the negotiation process and the agreement, and the role of different actors. The qualitative data was analysed through narrative and discourse analyses. During the negotiation process, political leaders from both communities were involved in the formation and acceptance of the agreement. The long- term negotiation that started during the 1980s culminated in a series of agreements, the last of which formally introduced cash incentives to the upstream community in 2011. The downstream urban community has been paying NPR one million per annum to the upstream community for their continued role in the sustainable management of the water catchment. The paper provides insights into the shifting power relations between local rural and urban socio-political actors who play a vital role in water access negotiations, and

1 Southasia Institute of Advanced Studies, Kathmandu, Nepal. Corresponding email: [email protected] 2 Department of Geography, University of Cambridge UK, and Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary.

66 JoshiNEW et. al.Nepal Journal of Incentives for securing water in a HimalayanPublished by townNPRN New Angle: Nepal Journal of Social Science and Public Policy Vol. 6(1), 2020 Social Science and Hosted by SIAS ANGLE Public Policy Available at www.nepalpolicynet.com fundamentally influence the potentials and effectiveness of incentive-based mechanisms 2020, Vol. 6(1), pp.66-85 to secure water needs. Keywords: Incentives, negotiation, actors, ecosystem services, water security

INTRODUCTION development and life needs, as captured by the Goal 6 and Goal 15 of sustainable INCENTIVES FOR SECURING WATER IN A HIMALAYAN Himalayan ecosystems provide a wide range development goals (SDG, 2015) and that TOWN: A CASE FROM DHULIKHEL, NEPAL of goods and services to people living in sustainable and sufficient water access rural and urban regions (MEA, 2005; Rasul is widely used as an indicator of the et al., 2011; IPBES, 2018). More than half developmental progress of societies (Dore 1 2 1 Tikeshwari Joshi , Eszter K. Kovacs and Kaustuv R. Neupane of humankind depends on fresh water et al., 2010). that is captured, stored, and purified in the Himalayan regions (Grêt-Regamey et Local water management gives rise to potentially novel interlinkages and Abstract al., 2012). However, the ability of these ecosystems to continue to provide the same relationships between upstream and quality and quantity of water has been downstream communities, particularly considerably degraded at local and global as water supply systems in downstream This paper explores the negotiations and the emerging socio-political relationships and levels in recent years (MEA, 2005; Wunder areas are typically significantly influenced alliances that were formed to reach a series of water-sharing agreements between et al., 2008; Irena and Meine, 2018). Many by upstream activities (Thapa and Paudel, upstream and downstream communities, in order to secure water required for continued Himalayan towns are under severe strain 2002; Martinez et al., 2013). Over the past urbanisation of the downstream town. The research focused on the socio-political actors from environmental degradation and a lack decade, there has been a growing tendency and users of the Dhulikhel drinking water supply system of Nepal. Primary data was of basic services, including water supply to use Payments for Environmental Services collected through key informant interviews, focus group discussions and stakeholder systems that are under increasing demand (PES-like) schemes as an innovative tool to workshops to explore the development of the negotiation process and the agreement, from continuous population growth and secure water to downstream areas and to and the role of different actors. The qualitative data was analysed through narrative urbanisation (Tiwari et al., 2018). Hence, incentivise ‘better’ manage local natural and discourse analyses. During the negotiation process, political leaders from both local watershed management can be critical resources in the upstream (Wunder, 2005; communities were involved in the formation and acceptance of the agreement. The long- for supplying clean water as large water Pagiola et al., 2005; Pagiola, 2008; Kosoy term negotiation that started during the 1980s culminated in a series of agreements, the supply systems are costly to develop and et al., 2007). In theory, PES approaches last of which formally introduced cash incentives to the upstream community in 2011. maintain (Rai et al., 2018). The sustainable can enhance the welfare of transacting The downstream urban community has been paying NPR one million per annum to the management of water resources is becoming communities by creating win-win situations upstream community for their continued role in the sustainable management of the water a challenge especially given a changing and for the parties involved (cash to upstream catchment. The paper provides insights into the shifting power relations between local uncertain future climate, a rapidly growing land managers, guaranteed water supply rural and urban socio-political actors who play a vital role in water access negotiations, population that is driving increased social to downstream users) as well as improving and and economic development, globalisation, natural resource management (Wunder, 2007). Other scholars have considered PES 1 Southasia Institute of Advanced Studies, Kathmandu, Nepal. and urbanisation (Cosgrove and Loucks, as an incentive for local communities to Corresponding email: [email protected] 2015). At the same time sustainable water 2 Department of Geography, University of Cambridge UK, and Corvinus University of Budapest, resource management is important to meet secure their efforts for conserving nature Hungary. through the redistribution of livelihood

66 67 New Angle: Nepal Journal of Social Science and Public Policy Vol. 6(1), 2020 Joshi et. al. Incentives for securing water in a Himalayan town fundamentally influence the potentials and effectiveness of incentive-based mechanisms resources, through financial recognition • What are the incentive types and to secure water needs. of the work behind environmental mechanisms that have been offered by management (Gutman, 2007; Kumar downstream communities, and how Keywords: Incentives, negotiation, actors, ecosystem services, water security and Managi, 2009). Chan et al. (2017) have these been received and mobilised characterised PES as a tool for enabling by the upstream community? development and life needs, as captured INTRODUCTION sustainable relationships with nature, by the Goal 6 and Goal 15 of sustainable conserving and restoring ecosystems and Himalayan ecosystems provide a wide range development goals (SDG, 2015) and that their benefits for people. Securing drinking of goods and services to people living in sustainable and sufficient water access With these research questions, we argue water through a PES- like scheme can rural and urban regions (MEA, 2005; Rasul is widely used as an indicator of the that in Himalayan countries like Nepal, be a cost-effective solution compared to et al., 2011; IPBES, 2018). More than half developmental progress of societies (Dore incentive-based water agreements are other alternatives (Rai et al., 2017) and of humankind depends on fresh water et al., 2010). mostly influenced by the bargaining powers hence, such schemes are increasingly being that is captured, stored, and purified in and relative socio-political relationships introduced and promulgated worldwide the Himalayan regions (Grêt-Regamey et Local water management gives rise between the communities underpinning (Rode et al., 2015). al., 2012). However, the ability of these to potentially novel interlinkages and PES negotiations. Further, incentives relationships between upstream and are a direct outcome of negotiations ecosystems to continue to provide the same It is recognised in the literature that the downstream communities, particularly between actors, rather than the ‘objective’ quality and quantity of water has been negotiations to establish PES-like schemes as water supply systems in downstream rationales and processes that underpin the considerably degraded at local and global are political (Hope et al., 2007; Kovacs areas are typically significantly influenced identification and qualification of ecosystem levels in recent years (MEA, 2005; Wunder et al., 2016), but there is little detailed by upstream activities (Thapa and Paudel, services and their flows, or the reflection et al., 2008; Irena and Meine, 2018). Many exploration of these dynamic politics 2002; Martinez et al., 2013). Over the past of environmental management costs and Himalayan towns are under severe strain (Corbera et al., 2009). With this backdrop, decade, there has been a growing tendency economic valuations of such services. We from environmental degradation and a lack this research aims to explore the negotiation to use Payments for Environmental Services examine the role of actors and communities of basic services, including water supply dynamics between two communities having (PES-like) schemes as an innovative tool to underpinning these processes below. systems that are under increasing demand diverse interests for reaching an incentive- secure water to downstream areas and to from continuous population growth and based water agreement. Our research has incentivise ‘better’ manage local natural In this paper, we consider the above urbanisation (Tiwari et al., 2018). Hence, explored the following questions: questions through the case study town of local watershed management can be critical resources in the upstream (Wunder, 2005; Pagiola et al., 2005; Pagiola, 2008; Kosoy Dhuilkhel, which has a well-established for supplying clean water as large water drinking water supply scheme, with a supply systems are costly to develop and et al., 2007). In theory, PES approaches can enhance the welfare of transacting • How do power relations between PES-like water agreement that was the maintain (Rai et al., 2018). The sustainable two communities influence the result of protracted negotiations among management of water resources is becoming communities by creating win-win situations for the parties involved (cash to upstream development, introduction and upstream and downstream actors. The a challenge especially given a changing and establishment of an incentive-based objective of these negotiations was to uncertain future climate, a rapidly growing land managers, guaranteed water supply to downstream users) as well as improving agreement for water? secure ever-increasing amounts of water population that is driving increased social to downstream, rapidly urbanising and natural resource management (Wunder, • Which actors were involved and economic development, globalisation, consolidating urban settlements. During 2007). Other scholars have considered PES in establishing the incentive- and urbanisation (Cosgrove and Loucks, the negotiation process, political leaders as an incentive for local communities to based agreement? What are their 2015). At the same time sustainable water from both downstream and upstream resource management is important to meet secure their efforts for conserving nature characteristics and geography? through the redistribution of livelihood communities were involved in the formation

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6 New Angle: Nepal Journal of Social Science and Public Policy Vol. 6(1), 2020 Joshi et. al. Incentives for securing water in a Himalayan town New Angle: Nepal Journal of Social Science and Public Policy Vol. 6(1), 2020 fundamentally influence the potentials and effectiveness of incentive-based mechanisms resources, through financial recognition • What are the incentive types and and acceptance of the agreement. The composed of institutions, individuals, and to secure water needs. of the work behind environmental mechanisms that have been offered by communities referred to in this paper are the community as a whole. management (Gutman, 2007; Kumar downstream communities, and how the Kalanti Bhumidanda village in upstream Keywords: Incentives, negotiation, actors, ecosystem services, water security The concept of power is central to and Managi, 2009). Chan et al. (2017) have these been received and mobilised Dhulikhel, where Dhulikhel town is the understanding the processes and structures characterised PES as a tool for enabling by the upstream community? downstream community located in the development and life needs, as captured associated with natural resource governance INTRODUCTION sustainable relationships with nature, Kavre district of Nepal. Dhulikhel town has by the Goal 6 and Goal 15 of sustainable and policy reform, including management conserving and restoring ecosystems and had formal long-term water agreements Himalayan ecosystems provide a wide range development goals (SDG, 2015) and that decentralisation, the introduction of their benefits for people. Securing drinking with Kalanti Bhumidanda since 1985 to of goods and services to people living in sustainable and sufficient water access With these research questions, we argue markets or market-like institutions and the water through a PES- like scheme can secure the towns’ water supply. The water rural and urban regions (MEA, 2005; Rasul is widely used as an indicator of the that in Himalayan countries like Nepal, redefinition of distributive mechanisms and be a cost-effective solution compared to supply scheme of the town has been et al., 2011; IPBES, 2018). More than half developmental progress of societies (Dore incentive-based water agreements are property rights (Raik et al., 2008). Scrutinising other alternatives (Rai et al., 2017) and considered one of the most successful and of humankind depends on fresh water et al., 2010). mostly influenced by the bargaining powers power dynamics with regards to PES can hence, such schemes are increasingly being well-recognised incentive-based water that is captured, stored, and purified in and relative socio-political relationships help to understand both the huge expansion introduced and promulgated worldwide supply systems in the country (Joshi et the Himalayan regions (Grêt-Regamey et Local water management gives rise between the communities underpinning of PES in the policy arena as well as the (Rode et al., 2015). al., 2014). Our socio-political analyses in al., 2012). However, the ability of these to potentially novel interlinkages and PES negotiations. Further, incentives grounded impacts of PES schemes on social relationships between upstream and are a direct outcome of negotiations this case looks at the way that local social ecosystems to continue to provide the same It is recognised in the literature that the and economic relationships of communities downstream communities, particularly between actors, rather than the ‘objective’ relations of power have shaped the water quality and quantity of water has been negotiations to establish PES-like schemes (de Francisco, 2013). Muradian et al. (2010) as water supply systems in downstream rationales and processes that underpin the agreement. In the following sections of considerably degraded at local and global are political (Hope et al., 2007; Kovacs considers PES as the outcome of complex areas are typically significantly influenced identification and qualification of ecosystem the paper, we present our conceptual levels in recent years (MEA, 2005; Wunder et al., 2016), but there is little detailed power relations, distributional issues and by upstream activities (Thapa and Paudel, services and their flows, or the reflection framework, our data collection methods and et al., 2008; Irena and Meine, 2018). Many exploration of these dynamic politics social situatedness. An uncritical embrace 2002; Martinez et al., 2013). Over the past of environmental management costs and local context, followed by empirical findings, Himalayan towns are under severe strain (Corbera et al., 2009). With this backdrop, of PES that neglects how politics, culture, decade, there has been a growing tendency economic valuations of such services. We discussion and conclusions respectively. from environmental degradation and a lack this research aims to explore the negotiation and economy govern implementation to use Payments for Environmental Services examine the role of actors and communities of basic services, including water supply dynamics between two communities having could reinforce existing power structures, (PES-like) schemes as an innovative tool to underpinning these processes below. systems that are under increasing demand diverse interests for reaching an incentive- inequalities, and vulnerabilities (Corbera secure water to downstream areas and to from continuous population growth and based water agreement. Our research has CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK et al., 2007; Pascual et al., 2014). Design of incentivise ‘better’ manage local natural In this paper, we consider the above urbanisation (Tiwari et al., 2018). Hence, explored the following questions: PES for watershed services requires questions through the case study town of Our work focuses on the importance of local watershed management can be critical resources in the upstream (Wunder, 2005; negotiation with multiple stakeholders Dhuilkhel, which has a well-established understanding and paying attention to social for supplying clean water as large water Pagiola et al., 2005; Pagiola, 2008; Kosoy —providers, beneficiaries and drinking water supply scheme, with a and political relationships between actors supply systems are costly to develop and et al., 2007). In theory, PES approaches intermediaries—who often have varied, • How do power relations between PES-like water agreement that was the within any negotiation process, to better maintain (Rai et al., 2018). The sustainable can enhance the welfare of transacting sometimes conflicting, positions (Hope two communities influence the result of protracted negotiations among account for how these relations influence, management of water resources is becoming communities by creating win-win situations et al., 2007; Corbera et al., 2009; Van development, introduction and upstream and downstream actors. The in this case, water access and development a challenge especially given a changing and for the parties involved (cash to upstream Hecken et al., 2015). Negotiations over establishment of an incentive-based objective of these negotiations was to trajectories. In the present case, the socio- uncertain future climate, a rapidly growing land managers, guaranteed water supply PES schemes to develop a shared agreement for water? secure ever-increasing amounts of water political relationship refers to the systems population that is driving increased social to downstream users) as well as improving understanding of the diverse interests, to downstream, rapidly urbanising and composed of both social and political and economic development, globalisation, natural resource management (Wunder, • Which actors were involved assets, capacities, and power of players consolidating urban settlements. During elements belonging to the upstream and and urbanisation (Cosgrove and Loucks, 2007). Other scholars have considered PES in establishing the incentive- can take significant time, as does the the negotiation process, political leaders down-stream community and interaction 2015). At the same time sustainable water as an incentive for local communities to based agreement? What are their building of trust between stakeholders from both downstream and upstream between them (Alfredson and Cungu, resource management is important to meet secure their efforts for conserving nature characteristics and geography? (Dietz et al., 2003; Meinzen-Dick, 2007; communities were involved in the formation 2008; Mollinga, 2008). These relations are through the redistribution of livelihood van Noordwijk et al., 2008). As environmental, socio-economic, and

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6 New Angle: Nepal Journal of Social Science and Public Policy Vol. 6(1), 2020 Joshi et. al. Incentives for securing water in a Himalayan town and acceptance of the agreement. The composed of institutions, individuals, and political contexts change, the signals structure is mostly heterogeneous in nature communities referred to in this paper are the community as a whole. and outcomes created by incentive- with key stratifying factors including caste, the Kalanti Bhumidanda village in upstream based mechanisms can also change ethnicity, gender, economic class by wealth The concept of power is central to Dhulikhel, where Dhulikhel town is the (Jack et al., 2008). Indeed, the (rich, middle and poor), employment understanding the processes and structures downstream community located in the process of negotiations among actors (especially within the bureaucratic and associated with natural resource governance Kavre district of Nepal. Dhulikhel town has can play a more important role than the political system), and level of education and policy reform, including management had formal long-term water agreements ‘scientific’ studies that determine and justify (Uprety, 2006). The heterogeneous nature decentralisation, the introduction of with Kalanti Bhumidanda since 1985 to Ecosystem Services (ES) and economic of Nepalese society quite makes bringing markets or market-like institutions and the secure the towns’ water supply. The water valuation approaches to the management social actors together for building consensus redefinition of distributive mechanisms and supply scheme of the town has been of water (de Groot and Hermans, 2009); around the management of natural propertyrights (Raiket al.,2008). Scrutinising considered one of the most successful and after all, the introduction of PES approaches resources complex. The growing demand power dynamics with regards to PES can well-recognised incentive-based water find receptivity (or not) in specific contexts. for resources, widespread poverty, together help to understand both the huge expansion supply systems in the country (Joshi et with inadequate incentives for natural of PES in the policy arena as well as the In PES schemes, buyers and sellers are al., 2014). Our socio-political analyses in resources management further add conflict grounded impacts of PES schemes on social heterogeneous (e.g. they have a wide array this case looks at the way that local social (Uprety, 2007). relations of power have shaped the water and economic relationships of communities of world views, histories, social status, agreement. In the following sections of (de Francisco, 2013). Muradian et al. (2010) interests, connections, types of knowledge considers PES as the outcome of complex behind their positions, terms of valuation the paper, we present our conceptual STUDY AREA AND METHODS framework, our data collection methods and power relations, distributional issues and through which they see nature, economic social situatedness. An uncritical embrace status and development opportunities) and local context, followed by empirical findings, This research explored the drinking water of PES that neglects how politics, culture, negotiations may profoundly shape and discussion and conclusions respectively. supply system in Dhulikhel, Nepal. Dhulikhel and economy govern implementation colour these. De Francisco (2013) suggests is a small municipality and the district could reinforce existing power structures, that a water-related PES scheme might headquarter of Kavrepalanchok district, inequalities, and vulnerabilities (Corbera contribute to changing historical inequities about 30 km east of Kathmandu, Nepal. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK et al., 2007; Pascual et al., 2014). Design of between the upper and lower areas of a With panoramic views of the Himalayan PES for watershed services requires catchment, increasing the bargaining power Our work focuses on the importance of peaks, it is a tourist destination, as well as an negotiation with multiple stakeholders and status of providers of environmental understanding and paying attention to social emerging centre for education and health, —providers, beneficiaries and services in upland areas. On the other hand, and political relationships between actors home to both Kathmandu University and the intermediaries—who often have varied, PES may also legitimise large-scale water within any negotiation process, to better community managed Dhulikhel Hospital. sometimes conflicting, positions (Hope consumption downstream. Therefore, a account for how these relations influence, The town has a population of about et al., 2007; Corbera et al., 2009; Van salient issue is who has the power to decide in this case, water access and development 32,162 (CBS, 2017). Situated at 1550 Hecken et al., 2015). Negotiations over on the criteria relating to distribution of trajectories. In the present case, the socio- metres, the urban area is only about 4 PES schemes to develop a shared water as ecosystem services in this case. political relationship refers to the systems understanding of the diverse interests, percent, and it is dominated by rural and composed of both social and political assets, capacities, and power of players This research sets out to explore, empirically, agricultural land (73.6 per cent) and elements belonging to the upstream and can take significant time, as does the how these theoretical forms of power occur forestland (22.4 percent; Dhulikhel down-stream community and interaction building of trust between stakeholders in relation to PES-like scheme within a Municipality, 2011). between them (Alfredson and Cungu, (Dietz et al., 2003; Meinzen-Dick, 2007; socio-political context comprising many 2008; Mollinga, 2008). These relations are van Noordwijk et al., 2008). As heterogeneous actors. The Nepalese social environmental,

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6 New Angle: Nepal Journal of Social Science and Public Policy Vol. 6(1), 2020 Joshi et. al. Incentives for securing water in a Himalayan town New Angle: Nepal Journal of Social Science and Public Policy Vol. 6(1), 2020 and acceptance of the agreement. The composed of institutions, individuals, and political contexts change, the signals structure is mostly heterogeneous in nature In Dhulikhel, the water supply conservation office, representatives communities referred to in this paper are the community as a whole. and outcomes created by incentive- with key stratifying factors including caste, system is managed by the community via from Kathmandu University (KU) the Kalanti Bhumidanda village in upstream based mechanisms can also change ethnicity, gender, economic class by wealth the Dhulikhel Drinking Water Users and Kavre Valley Integrated The concept of power is central to Dhulikhel, where Dhulikhel town is the (Jack et al., 2008). Indeed, the (rich, middle and poor), employment Committee (DDWUC), which is regarded Drinking Water Supply Project understanding the processes and structures downstream community located in the process of negotiations among actors (especially within the bureaucratic and as an exemplary community-managed (KVIDWSP). Primary foci of the KIIs were associated with natural resource governance Kavre district of Nepal. Dhulikhel town has can play a more important role than the political system), and level of education water supply system in Nepal. In on the processes of negotiations and and policy reform, including management addition, 27 public taps from nearby up and downstream relations for the had formal long-term water agreements ‘scientific’ studies that determine and justify (Uprety, 2006). The heterogeneous nature decentralisation, the introduction of sources, which pre-date the main securement of water sources to with Kalanti Bhumidanda since 1985 to Ecosystem Services (ES) and economic of Nepalese society quite makes bringing markets or market-like institutions and the pipeline, provides water for drinking and Dhulikhel, and the management and secure the towns’ water supply. The water valuation approaches to the management social actors together for building consensus redefinition of distributive mechanisms and other uses both to the few households distribution of water within Dhulikhel. supply scheme of the town has been of water (de Groot and Hermans, 2009); around the management of natural propertyrights (Raiket al.,2008). Scrutinising without piped supplies, as well as Further, 37 interviews were conducted considered one of the most successful and after all, the introduction of PES approaches resources complex. The growing demand power dynamics with regards to PES can supplementary support for those with with local community members who well-recognised incentive-based water find receptivity (or not) in specific contexts. for resources, widespread poverty, together help to understand both the huge expansion piped supply. The source of the main were beneficiaries of the water supply systems in the country (Joshi et with inadequate incentives for natural gravity pipeline’s quality drinking water is negotiations within both upstream and of PES in the policy arena as well as the In PES schemes, buyers and sellers are al., 2014). Our socio-political analyses in resources management further add conflict primarily from Saptakanya fall, from a downstream communities. Interviews grounded impacts of PES schemes on social heterogeneous (e.g. they have a wide array this case looks at the way that local social (Uprety, 2007). stream named Kharkhola located in with upstream farmers were focused and economic relationships of communities of world views, histories, social status, relations of power have shaped the water Kharkhola Mahabharat Community on the issues related to negotiation with (de Francisco, 2013). Muradian et al. (2010) agreement. In the following sections of interests, connections, types of knowledge Forest, in Kalanti Bhumidanda village, 13.5 Dhulikhel water users committee, considers PES as the outcome of complex behind their positions, terms of valuation the paper, we present our conceptual STUDY AREA AND METHODS km away (DDWSSUC, 2014; MoUD Nepal, use and management of forest framework, our data collection methods and power relations, distributional issues and through which they see nature, economic 2015). The Kharkhola source is one of the resources, and the use of incentives social situatedness. An uncritical embrace status and development opportunities) and local context, followed by empirical findings, This research explored the drinking water tributaries of the Roshi river, which is a provided by the downstream of PES that neglects how politics, culture, negotiations may profoundly shape and tributary of the Koshi, a transboundary community. Interviews with discussion and conclusions respectively. supply system in Dhulikhel, Nepal. Dhulikhel and economy govern implementation colour these. De Francisco (2013) suggests river. downstream users concerned access to is a small municipality and the district could reinforce existing power structures, that a water-related PES scheme might water and the issues related to quantity headquarter of Kavrepalanchok district, inequalities, and vulnerabilities (Corbera contribute to changing historical inequities This paper uses the narrative and and quality of water over time. about 30 km east of Kathmandu, Nepal. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK et al., 2007; Pascual et al., 2014). Design of between the upper and lower areas of a discourse analysis of qualitative data. With panoramic views of the Himalayan PES for watershed services requires catchment, increasing the bargaining power Qualitative data was collected through Three FGDs were held: one Our work focuses on the importance of peaks, it is a tourist destination, as well as an negotiation with multiple stakeholders and status of providers of environmental key informant interviews (KIIs), focus amongst downstream community understanding and paying attention to social emerging centre for education and health, —providers, beneficiaries and services in upland areas. On the other hand, group discussions (FGDs), interviews members and two in upstream and political relationships between actors home to both Kathmandu University and the intermediaries—who often have varied, PES may also legitimise large-scale water with local users and workshops with communities. The downstream FGD was within any negotiation process, to better community managed Dhulikhel Hospital. sometimes conflicting, positions (Hope consumption downstream. Therefore, a stakeholders. KIIs were conducted with with officials, executive members and account for how these relations influence, The town has a population of about 20 key informants including officials and users of Dhulikhel DWUC, and officials of et al., 2007; Corbera et al., 2009; Van salient issue is who has the power to decide in this case, water access and development 32,162 (CBS, 2017). Situated at 1550 former executive committee members the municipality. The FGDs conducted in Hecken et al., 2015). Negotiations over on the criteria relating to distribution of trajectories. In the present case, the socio- metres, the urban area is only about 4 of the Dhulikhel Drinking Water Users the upstream included key stakeholders PES schemes to develop a shared water as ecosystem services in this case. political relationship refers to the systems Committee (DDWUC), political leaders such as VDC3 officials, representatives of understanding of the diverse interests, percent, and it is dominated by rural and composed of both social and political involved in the negotiation processes with the community forest user group assets, capacities, and power of players This research sets out to explore, empirically, agricultural land (73.6 per cent) and elements belonging to the upstream and upstream communities in 1985, officials (CFUG) and local farmers. The can take significant time, as does the how these theoretical forms of power occur forestland (22.4 percent; Dhulikhel down-stream community and interaction from the Municipality and District soil FGDs with the downstream community building of trust between stakeholders in relation to PES-like scheme within a Municipality, 2011). between them (Alfredson and Cungu, (Dietz et al., 2003; Meinzen-Dick, 2007; socio-political context comprising many 2008; Mollinga, 2008). These relations are van Noordwijk et al., 2008). As heterogeneous actors. The Nepalese social 3 environmental, A Village Development Committee (VDC) in Nepal was the lowest administrative unit of the Government (1990-2017) which was dissolved according to New Constitution of Nepal 2015.

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6 New Angle: Nepal Journal of Social Science and Public Policy Vol. 6(1), 2020 Joshi et. al. Incentives for securing water in a Himalayan town

In Dhulikhel, the water supply system upstream communities in 1985, officials concerned access to water and the issues started a dialogue with upstream political is managed by the community via the from the Municipality and District soil related to quantity and quality of water leaders, mainly with those who belonged Dhulikhel Drinking Water Users Committee conservation office, representatives from over time. Similarly, FGDs with the to the Panchayat system, and those who (DDWUC), which is regarded as an exemplary Kathmandu University (KU) and Kavre Valley upstream community were focused on were in a formal position e.g. chair of Village community-managed water supply system Integrated Drinking Water Supply Project the issues related to negotiation with the Panchayat4. We recount how long-term in Nepal. DDWUC now supplies (KVIDWSP). Primary foci of the KIIs were on Dhulikhel water user’s committee, use negotiations between these socio-political around 90 percent of the population in the processes of negotiations and up and and management of forest resources, actors concluded with an agreement with its supply area, covering wards downstream relations for the securement and the use of incentives provided by the cash incentives in 2011. 2,3,4,5,7,8,9 and some parts of wards 1 of water sources to Dhulikhel, and the downstream community. Two stakeholder Dhulikhel town entered into the first formal and 6. In addition, 27 public taps from management and distribution of water workshops were held with officials from agreement with Kalanti Bhumidanda in 1985 nearby sources, which pre-date the main within Dhulikhel. Further, 37 interviews the municipality, District Development for the supply of water to its inhabitants were conducted with local community Committee, District Soil Conservation pipeline, provides water for drinking and and for the management of water source members who were beneficiaries of the Office, District Forest Office, Department other uses both to the few households at the upstream. In the 1980s, Dhulikhel water negotiations within both upstream of Environment, Dhulikhel Drinking Water without piped supplies, as well as was suffering from water scarcity and and downstream communities. Interviews Users’ Committee, Kavre Valley Drinking supplementary support for those with started looking for support to construct a with upstream farmers were focused on Water Supply project, and upstream VDCs piped supply. The source of the main water facility for its inhabitants. As a part the issues related to negotiation with officials. Interviews were conducted in gravity pipeline’s quality drinking water is of their exploration, they approached the Dhulikhel water users committee, use Nepali and recorded and transcribed into primarily from Saptakanya fall, from a then German development agency, GTZ, and management of forest resources, English. Field diaries and field reflection stream named Kharkhola located in that was working in the water sector in and the use of incentives provided by the notes were also considered within the Kharkhola Mahabharat Community Forest, Nepal, at Bhaktapur. Responding to local downstream community. Interviews with analysis and for the data validation. in Kalanti Bhumidanda village, 13.5 km away demands and needs, the GTZ accepted the downstream users concerned access to (DDWSSUC, 2014; MoUD Nepal, 2015). The request of Dhulikhel, and started working water and the issues related to quantity and Kharkhola source is one of the tributaries of with the Dhulikhel Development Board quality of water over time. the Roshi river, which is a tributary of the The development of the Water (DDB). Initially, GTZ explored different Koshi, a transboundary river. Three FGDs were held: one amongst Agreement water for Dhulikhel jointly with the DDB. This paper uses the narrative and discourse downstream community members and two The DDB approached the community of analysis of qualitative data. Qualitative In this section, we provide detail in upstream communities. The downstream Kalanti Bhumidanda, which sits alongside data was collected through key informant on the process of negotiation and the FGD was with officials, executive members the Roshi source and started a dialogue interviews (KIIs), focus group discussions involvement of socio-political actors within and users of Dhulikhel DWUC, and officials with the community about the possibility (FGDs), interviews with local users and the negotiation process for the water of the municipality. The FGDs conducted of piping water to Dhulikhel from the workshops with stakeholders. KIIs were agreement. Negotiations between the two in the upstream included key stakeholders Roshi, through their community and land. conducted with 20 key informants including communities started while the downstream such as VDC3 officials, representatives of Responding to the appeal of DDB, the then officials and former executive committee community faced acute shortages of water the community forest user group (CFUG) Bhumidanda village panchayat discussed members of the Dhulikhel Drinking Water in the 1980s. The then influential political and local farmers. The FGDs with the the issues within a wider citizen forum and Users Committee (DDWUC), political leaders leaders of the downstream community involved in the negotiation processes with 4 A Village Panchayat in Nepal was the lowest administrative unit of the country during the panchayat regime 3 A Village Development Committee (VDC) in Nepal was the lowest administrative unit of the Government (1960-1990) in the country. (1990-2017) which was dissolved according to New Constitution of Nepal 2015.

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In Dhulikhel, the water supply system upstream communities in 1985, officials concerned access to water and the issues started a dialogue with upstream political agreed to provide water to DDB, recognising The Pradhan Pancha agreed to the conditions is managed by the community via the from the Municipality and District soil related to quantity and quality of water leaders, mainly with those who belonged the water needs of Dhulikhel. The upstream we put forward, and accordingly, as per the Dhulikhel Drinking Water Users Committee conservation office, representatives from over time. Similarly, FGDs with the to the Panchayat system, and those who community placed a single condition on this decision of the Village Council, we decided (DDWUC), which is regarded as an exemplary Kathmandu University (KU) and Kavre Valley upstream community were focused on were in a formal position e.g. chair of Village request at that time: they asked Dhulikhel to allow them to take water. 4 community-managed water supply system Integrated Drinking Water Supply Project the issues related to negotiation with the Panchayat . We recount how long-term to contribute towards the construction of The struggle of Dhulikhel town for accessing in Nepal. DDWUC now supplies (KVIDWSP). Primary foci of the KIIs were on Dhulikhel water user’s committee, use negotiations between these socio-political a school building that had been damaged water did not end with the agreement made around 90 percent of the population in the processes of negotiations and up and and management of forest resources, actors concluded with an agreement with by a great flood. The condition was agreed in 1985. The shifting political paradigm in its supply area, covering wards downstream relations for the securement and the use of incentives provided by the cash incentives in 2011. by the DDB, and accordingly an agreement the country from a single party political 2,3,4,5,7,8,9 and some parts of wards 1 of water sources to Dhulikhel, and the downstream community. Two stakeholder was made on July 27, 1985. During this time Dhulikhel town entered into the first formal system contributed to local-level upheaval: and 6. In addition, 27 public taps from management and distribution of water workshops were held with officials from a single party-political system functioned agreement with Kalanti Bhumidanda in 1985 from 1990, the multi-party democratic nearby sources, which pre-date the main within Dhulikhel. Further, 37 interviews the municipality, District Development under the direct rule of the Monarch for the supply of water to its inhabitants system was introduced, only to be usurped were conducted with local community Committee, District Soil Conservation in Nepal, where the head of the village pipeline, provides water for drinking and and for the management of water source by the Maoist people’s war between members who were beneficiaries of the Office, District Forest Office, Department was led by the Pradhan Pancha (elected other uses both to the few households at the upstream. In the 1980s, Dhulikhel 1996-2006, and the establishment of water negotiations within both upstream of Environment, Dhulikhel Drinking Water Chairperson of the Village Panchayat). To without piped supplies, as well as was suffering from water scarcity and the republic with the abolishment of the and downstream communities. Interviews Users’ Committee, Kavre Valley Drinking come to this agreement, the role of the then supplementary support for those with started looking for support to construct a monarchy in 2006. The 1990 constitution with upstream farmers were focused on Water Supply project, and upstream VDCs political leaders of the communities and piped supply. The source of the main water facility for its inhabitants. As a part of Nepal provided the freedom to citizens the issues related to negotiation with officials. Interviews were conducted in the local government remained significant gravity pipeline’s quality drinking water is of their exploration, they approached the to raise their voices and concern through Dhulikhel water users committee, use Nepali and recorded and transcribed into to foster the negotiation process, and primarily from Saptakanya fall, from a then German development agency, GTZ, multiple ways and means that were locally and management of forest resources, English. Field diaries and field reflection the negotiations themselves were formal stream named Kharkhola located in that was working in the water sector in novel. As a result, local people became and the use of incentives provided by the notes were also considered within the and largely confined to these leaders, Kharkhola Mahabharat Community Forest, Nepal, at Bhaktapur. Responding to local empowered to raise their voices and downstream community. Interviews with analysis and for the data validation. although the upstream did hold village in Kalanti Bhumidanda village, 13.5 km away demands and needs, the GTZ accepted the concerns through different forums. In downstream users concerned access to meetings to discuss the proposals. The then (DDWSSUC, 2014; MoUD Nepal, 2015). The request of Dhulikhel, and started working line with these changes, the upstream water and the issues related to quantity and Pradhan Pancha of the Kalanti Bhumidanda Kharkhola source is one of the tributaries of with the Dhulikhel Development Board community at Bhumidanda demanded more quality of water over time. Village Panchayat - a signatory of the 1985 the Roshi river, which is a tributary of the The development of the Water (DDB). Initially, GTZ explored different and more from the downstream, despite agreement on behalf of the upstream Koshi, a transboundary river. Three FGDs were held: one amongst Agreement water for Dhulikhel jointly with the DDB. the fact that the downstream community This paper uses the narrative and discourse community explained how the socio- downstream community members and two The DDB approached the community of provided multiple forms of support (the analysis of qualitative data. Qualitative In this section, we provide detail political relationship was at that time: in upstream communities. The downstream Kalanti Bhumidanda, which sits alongside details of the support are recounted in the data was collected through key informant on the process of negotiation and the FGD was with officials, executive members the Roshi source and started a dialogue Pradhan Pancha from Dhulikhel Nagar section below). Regarding the increasingly interviews (KIIs), focus group discussions involvement of socio-political actors within and users of Dhulikhel DWUC, and officials with the community about the possibility Panchayat - the district head quarter (who frequent demands originating from the (FGDs), interviews with local users and the negotiation process for the water of the municipality. The FGDs conducted of piping water to Dhulikhel from the is my friend too) requested us to provide upstream community, the Dhulikhel DWUC workshops with stakeholders. KIIs were agreement. Negotiations between the two in the upstream included key stakeholders Roshi, through their community and land. water for the Dhulikhel people who were chair stated that “The demands were also conducted with 20 key informants including communities started while the downstream such as VDC3 officials, representatives of Responding to the appeal of DDB, the then suffering from water scarcity. In response, fuelled in later stages by the fact that there officials and former executive committee community faced acute shortages of water we requested them to construct our local the community forest user group (CFUG) Bhumidanda village panchayat discussed was no responsive elected government at members of the Dhulikhel Drinking Water in the 1980s. The then influential political school building as it was damaged by the 5 and local farmers. The FGDs with the the issues within a wider citizen forum and the then-VDC since 2000.” Users Committee (DDWUC), political leaders leaders of the downstream community then huge flood of the Roshi river in 1981. involved in the negotiation processes with 4 A Village Panchayat in Nepal was the lowest administrative unit of the country during the panchayat regime 5 The local-level government was established in 2017 through election as per the Constitution of Nepal (2015) but 3 there was no local-level government for close to twenty years prior to this. A Village Development Committee (VDC) in Nepal was the lowest administrative unit of the Government (1960-1990) in the country. (1990-2017) which was dissolved according to New Constitution of Nepal 2015.

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6 New Angle: Nepal Journal of Social Science and Public Policy Vol. 6(1), 2020 Joshi et. al. Incentives for securing water in a Himalayan town agreed to provide water to DDB, recognising The Pradhan Pancha agreed to the conditions Responding to demands from the upstream KU himself was involved in the negotiation the water needs of Dhulikhel. The upstream we put forward, and accordingly, as per the community as well as increasing water process. community placed a single condition on this decision of the Village Council, we decided needs of the downstream, after 25 years, the In the negotiation process the downstream request at that time: they asked Dhulikhel to allow them to take water. Dhulikhel DWUC made another agreement community was thus more powerful than to contribute towards the construction of with the then Bhumidanda VDC on May The struggle of Dhulikhel town for accessing the upstream due to its administrative a school building that had been damaged 8, 2011. This added more provisions to water did not end with the agreement made offices, representations from influential by a great flood. The condition was agreed provide economic benefits to the upstream in 1985. The shifting political paradigm in political leaders, and possessing the elected by the DDB, and accordingly an agreement communities. For the second agreement, the country from a single party political local institution, the Dhulikhel DWUC, which was made on July 27, 1985. During this time the negotiation process was started since system contributed to local-level upheaval: by the 2000s was a well-established local a single party-political system functioned 2000. Responding to the request of the from 1990, the multi-party democratic institution. During the absence of formally under the direct rule of the Monarch Dhulikhel DWUC to forge consensus on system was introduced, only to be usurped elected local representatives, such local in Nepal, where the head of the village the demand and supply of water, the then by the Maoist people’s war between institutions were de facto responsible for was led by the Pradhan Pancha (elected mayor of the Dhulikhel Municipality and 1996-2006, and the establishment of meeting the demands of the local people. In Chairperson of the Village Panchayat). To the then DDC chair started dialogue with the republic with the abolishment of the addition to this, well-established educational come to this agreement, the role of the then the then VDC chair of Kalanti Bhumidanda. monarchy in 2006. The 1990 constitution institutions like Kathmandu University and political leaders of the communities and of Nepal provided the freedom to citizens The chairperson of Dhulikhel DWUC himself Dhulikhel Hospital located at Dhulikhel the local government remained significant to raise their voices and concern through played an active role in the negotiation represent powerful stakeholder interests to foster the negotiation process, and multiple ways and means that were locally process to bring the actors into a constructive (and are significant water consumers) in the negotiations themselves were formal novel. As a result, local people became dialogue. Members of all-party mechanism their own right, where both lobbied for the and largely confined to these leaders, empowered to raise their voices and (APM)6 from upstream played a crucial increased water take sought by Dhulikhel although the upstream did hold village concerns through different forums. In role as during the negotiation process, town. meetings to discuss the proposals. The then line with these changes, the upstream facilitation of local institutions and their Pradhan Pancha of the Kalanti Bhumidanda As per the agreement, additional facilities community at Bhumidanda demanded more representation was a prominent need and Village Panchayat - a signatory of the 1985 were agreed to be financed by downstream and more from the downstream, despite had to incorporate the help (and interests) agreement on behalf of the upstream Dhulikhel. These included an NPR7 800,000 the fact that the downstream community of non-traditionally political actors. The community explained how the socio- annual payment to the upstream VDC, as provided multiple forms of support (the manager of the Dhulikhel DWUC opined, political relationship was at that time: details of the support are recounted in the well as additional support (NPR 200,000) In the negotiation process, Kathmandu for two schools (NPR 100,000 per annum Pradhan Pancha from Dhulikhel Nagar section below). Regarding the increasingly University (KU) and Dhulikhel Hospital acted for each school), a university scholarship Panchayat - the district head quarter (who frequent demands originating from the as a facilitator or mediator between the is my friend too) requested us to provide upstream community, the Dhulikhel DWUC established for upstream residents at the communities in bringing the negotiation water for the Dhulikhel people who were chair stated that “The demands were also Kathmandu University, and discounts for to a conclusive end. The Vice Chancellor of suffering from water scarcity. In response, fuelled in later stages by the fact that there poor and marginalised people in Dhulikhel we requested them to construct our local was no responsive elected government at school building as it was damaged by the the then-VDC since 2000.”5 then huge flood of the Roshi river in 1981. 6 Provision of All-Party Mechanism (APM) was formally introduced in 2009 to fill the vacuum of elected government at the local level which was later dissolved in 2012. The APM 5 The local-level government was established in 2017 through election as per the Constitution of Nepal (2015) but members comprised the representatives of the major political parties based on the vote that there was no local-level government for close to twenty years prior to this. they received in the national election. 7 NPR is the Nepalese Currency. 1 USD ~NPR 111 in April 2019.

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6 New Angle: Nepal Journal of Social Science and Public Policy Vol. 6(1), 2020 Joshi et. al. Incentives for securing water in a Himalayan town New Angle: Nepal Journal of Social Science and Public Policy Vol. 6(1), 2020 agreed to provide water to DDB, recognising The Pradhan Pancha agreed to the conditions Responding to demands from the upstream KU himself was involved in the negotiation Hospital. The agreement further provisioned Incentives to upstream the water needs of Dhulikhel. The upstream we put forward, and accordingly, as per the community as well as increasing water process. to increase the transferred sum (NPR community community placed a single condition on this decision of the Village Council, we decided needs of the downstream, after 25 years, the 800,000 agreed) by NPR 100,000 every five In the negotiation process the downstream request at that time: they asked Dhulikhel to allow them to take water. Dhulikhel DWUC made another agreement years. In addition to these, the downstream As an incentive to the upstream community community was thus more powerful than to contribute towards the construction of with the then Bhumidanda VDC on May community agreed to increase the annual for their efforts at resource management in The struggle of Dhulikhel town for accessing the upstream due to its administrative a school building that had been damaged 8, 2011. This added more provisions to payment for the guarding of the forest with the upstream, the downstream community water did not end with the agreement made offices, representations from influential by a great flood. The condition was agreed provide economic benefits to the upstream an area of about 200 hectares (Kharkhola has paid a total of NPR 9,536,000 from the in 1985. The shifting political paradigm in political leaders, and possessing the elected by the DDB, and accordingly an agreement communities. For the second agreement, Mahabharat Community Forest), where the first agreement in 1985 till 2014. While the country from a single party political local institution, the Dhulikhel DWUC, which was made on July 27, 1985. During this time the negotiation process was started since water source is located. The downstream 55% of the payment provided from the system contributed to local-level upheaval: by the 2000s was a well-established local a single party-political system functioned 2000. Responding to the request of the community also demanded an increase in downstream community was for community from 1990, the multi-party democratic institution. During the absence of formally under the direct rule of the Monarch Dhulikhel DWUC to forge consensus on the volume of water from a 6- inch (agreed infrastructure, 8% was for education, while system was introduced, only to be usurped elected local representatives, such local in Nepal, where the head of the village the demand and supply of water, the then in 1985) to a 10-inch pipe supply. 34% was granted to the VDC, only 3% was by the Maoist people’s war between institutions were de facto responsible for was led by the Pradhan Pancha (elected mayor of the Dhulikhel Municipality and allocated directly for forest management, 1996-2006, and the establishment of meeting the demands of the local people. In During the first agreement process, Chairperson of the Village Panchayat). To the then DDC chair started dialogue with which is closely linked to water source the republic with the abolishment of the addition to this, well-established educational negotiations may be regarded as relatively come to this agreement, the role of the then the then VDC chair of Kalanti Bhumidanda. conservation. There was no formally monarchy in 2006. The 1990 constitution institutions like Kathmandu University and smooth and simple, where the time required political leaders of the communities and stipulated allocation of funds for different of Nepal provided the freedom to citizens The chairperson of Dhulikhel DWUC himself Dhulikhel Hospital located at Dhulikhel to forge a consensus and an agreement the local government remained significant purposes within the 1985 agreement to raise their voices and concern through played an active role in the negotiation represent powerful stakeholder interests was short in comparison to the second to foster the negotiation process, and document. multiple ways and means that were locally process to bring the actors into a constructive (and are significant water consumers) in agreement. During the first agreement, the negotiations themselves were formal novel. As a result, local people became dialogue. Members of all-party mechanism their own right, where both lobbied for the the public participation norms of the single and largely confined to these leaders, empowered to raise their voices and (APM)6 from upstream played a crucial increased water take sought by Dhulikhel party-political system were dominant, although the upstream did hold village concerns through different forums. In role as during the negotiation process, town. where local people were minimally meetings to discuss the proposals. The then 34% line with these changes, the upstream facilitation of local institutions and their involved in formal decision-making. These Infrastructure/Development Pradhan Pancha of the Kalanti Bhumidanda As per the agreement, additional facilities community at Bhumidanda demanded more representation was a prominent need and dynamics have greatly changed since the 55% Village Panchayat - a signatory of the 1985 and more from the downstream, despite were agreed to be financed by downstream Education had to incorporate the help (and interests) 7 introduction of the multi-party democratic agreement on behalf of the upstream Dhulikhel. These included an NPR 800,000 3% the fact that the downstream community of non-traditionally political actors. The system after 1990, wherein people’s Forest Conservation community explained how the socio- annual payment to the upstream VDC, as provided multiple forms of support (the manager of the Dhulikhel DWUC opined, rights are guaranteed by law. This is likely 8% political relationship was at that time: well as additional support (NPR 200,000) VDC Grant details of the support are recounted in the one reason why the bargaining power In the negotiation process, Kathmandu for two schools (NPR 100,000 per annum Pradhan Pancha from Dhulikhel Nagar section below). Regarding the increasingly of the upstream community increased University (KU) and Dhulikhel Hospital acted for each school), a university scholarship Fig 1: Incentives provided and distribution in different Panchayat - the district head quarter (who frequent demands originating from the and several contentious meetings were as a facilitator or mediator between the established for upstream residents at the sectors (Source: Field Data, 2014). is my friend too) requested us to provide upstream community, the Dhulikhel DWUC required through nearly 11 years to come communities in bringing the negotiation Kathmandu University, and discounts for water for the Dhulikhel people who were chair stated that “The demands were also to the second agreement. Continuous to a conclusive end. The Vice Chancellor of poor and marginalised people in Dhulikhel suffering from water scarcity. In response, fuelled in later stages by the fact that there political engagement and negotiation After the second agreement, the upstream we requested them to construct our local was no responsive elected government at among upstream and downstream community started to receive NPR school building as it was damaged by the 5 the then-VDC since 2000.” communities played a vital role for a cash- 1,000,000 per annum from the DDWUC then huge flood of the Roshi river in 1981. 6 Provision of All-Party Mechanism (APM) was formally introduced in 2009 to fill the vacuum based agreement to supply water to the on behalf of the downstream of elected government at the local level which was later dissolved in 2012. The APM community. In addition to the amount 5 downstream community. The local-level government was established in 2017 through election as per the Constitution of Nepal (2015) but members comprised the representatives of the major political parties based on the vote that there was no local-level government for close to twenty years prior to this. mentioned in the agreement, the they received in the national election. upstream community 7 NPR is the Nepalese Currency. 1 USD ~NPR 111 in April 2019.

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6 New Angle: Nepal Journal of Social Science and Public Policy Vol. 6(1), 2020 Joshi et. al. Incentives for securing water in a Himalayan town

Hospital. The agreement further provisioned Incentives to upstream successfully negotiated an additional change in the country and with establishing to increase the transferred sum (NPR community NPR 36,000 per annum for the salary of the culture of payment, though Dhulikhel 800,000 agreed) by NPR 100,000 every five a forest guard. A forest guard attempts to remained more powerful. The upstream years. In addition to these, the downstream As an incentive to the upstream community prevent illegal extraction of forest products, community seemed to also be more active community agreed to increase the annual for their efforts at resource management in controls grazing and other aspects of forest in negotiations to receive more incentives, payment for the guarding of the forest with the upstream, the downstream community management. Figure 1 gives the incentive which led to the emergence of a strongly an area of about 200 hectares (Kharkhola has paid a total of NPR 9,536,000 from the provided and its distribution in different cash-based agreement in 2011. Provision Mahabharat Community Forest), where the first agreement in 1985 till 2014. While sectors of the upstream community of cash incentives of one million per annum water source is located. The downstream 55% of the payment provided from the to the upstream in the second agreement community also demanded an increase in downstream community was for community reflects that political change over time can the volume of water from a 6- inch (agreed infrastructure, 8% was for education, while change the interests of people, reflected in DISCUSSION in 1985) to a 10-inch pipe supply. 34% was granted to the VDC, only 3% was the incentive-based mechanisms (Jack et allocated directly for forest management, The review of the agreements made for al., 2008). During the first agreement process, which is closely linked to water source negotiations may be regarded as relatively the water security of Dhulikhel township Prominently, Dhulikhel, which is the conservation. There was no formally and discussions with different stakeholders smooth and simple, where the time required stipulated allocation of funds for different district headquarter of Kavre, is politically to forge a consensus and an agreement shows that several rounds of social more powerful than the upstream rural purposes within the 1985 agreement interactions between community members was short in comparison to the second document. community. This is also reflected by one agreement. During the first agreement, enabled the agreement to take shape. of our key informants from the upstream the public participation norms of the single It is important to understand the social community, who told us, party-political system were dominant, networks and linkages that reinforce the Dhulikhel is the centre of power, where where local people were minimally need for embedded social negotiation of 34% institutions linked with authority like the involved in formal decision-making. These Infrastructure/Development PES-like contracts, as in this case, rather police, administrations and other institutions dynamics have greatly changed since the 55% than the introduction of standardised Education are clustered. We must go to Dhulikhel to get introduction of the multi-party democratic templates developed elsewhere (Kolinjivadi 3% state services like citizenship, land ownership Forest Conservation et al., 2014). As elaborated in the result system after 1990, wherein people’s registration and electricity access and so on. rights are guaranteed by law. This is likely 8% section, wider socio-political changes VDC Grant If we don’t allow them water access, we have one reason why the bargaining power greatly influenced water negotiations. Being a fear of being deprived, or of experiencing a single party-political system, the consensus of the upstream community increased Fig 1: Incentives provided and distribution in different difficulties in accessing such state facilities. and several contentious meetings were process of the first agreement was smooth sectors (Source: Field Data, 2014). The centre of power was also reflected required through nearly 11 years to come and less hectic, with a single condition in the agreement dated 1985, which to the second agreement. Continuous imposed on water take by Dhulikhel: clearly mentioned that Dhulikhel – as the political engagement and negotiation After the second agreement, the upstream construction of a school building. However, district headquarter, where government among upstream and downstream community started to receive NPR the second agreement took several years offices were located – faced water scarcity. communities played a vital role for a cash- 1,000,000 per annum from the DDWUC and several rounds of negotiation meetings Communities’ relative standing and based agreement to supply water to the on behalf of the downstream to come to an agreement in the multiparty bargaining power also depended on the downstream community. community. In addition to the amount political system. Here, the bargaining mentioned in the agreement, the power of the water provider, the upstream types of available water sources, such as upstream community community, increased with socio-political river or spring sources (Joshi et al., 2018).

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Hospital. The agreement further provisioned Incentives to upstream successfully negotiated an additional change in the country and with establishing One of the key informants from Dhulikhel, for the second agreement, “There were a to increase the transferred sum (NPR community NPR 36,000 per annum for the salary of the culture of payment, though Dhulikhel who also played a crucial role in the series of interactions up to 18 times among 800,000 agreed) by NPR 100,000 every five a forest guard. A forest guard attempts to remained more powerful. The upstream negotiations said, “We had no other options the actors of both communities”. years. In addition to these, the downstream As an incentive to the upstream community prevent illegal extraction of forest products, community seemed to also be more active than to make negotiation with upstream community agreed to increase the annual for their efforts at resource management in controls grazing and other aspects of forest in negotiations to receive more incentives, community because they owned water One of limitations of the 2011 agreement payment for the guarding of the forest with the upstream, the downstream community management. Figure 1 gives the incentive which led to the emergence of a strongly sources, as the water source lies in the forest was the recognition of the Community an area of about 200 hectares (Kharkhola has paid a total of NPR 9,536,000 from the provided and its distribution in different cash-based agreement in 2011. Provision they have been managing”. Forestry User Groups (CFUGs) who were Mahabharat Community Forest), where the first agreement in 1985 till 2014. While sectors of the upstream community of cash incentives of one million per annum playing a prominent role in the protection This denotes a recognition of the water source is located. The downstream 55% of the payment provided from the to the upstream in the second agreement of the water source. Agreements must frequently unseen work behind maintaining community also demanded an increase in downstream community was for community reflects that political change over time can consider historical costs and duties for environmental resources, which in this the volume of water from a 6- inch (agreed infrastructure, 8% was for education, while change the interests of people, reflected in the management of the same resource DISCUSSION context gave rise to claims for compensation in 1985) to a 10-inch pipe supply. 34% was granted to the VDC, only 3% was the incentive-based mechanisms (Jack et (Kovacs et al., 2016). The water source area for continued support. From the perspective in the upstream community is managed allocated directly for forest management, The review of the agreements made for al., 2008). During the first agreement process, which is closely linked to water source of Dhulikhel town, increased demand of by the Kharkhola Mahabharat CFUGs negotiations may be regarded as relatively the water security of Dhulikhel township Prominently, Dhulikhel, which is the water was a critical issue in 2011 because under the Forest Act 1993 of Nepal and conservation. There was no formally and discussions with different stakeholders smooth and simple, where the time required stipulated allocation of funds for different district headquarter of Kavre, is politically of the expansion of water users in the related regulations, which empowers CFUG to forge a consensus and an agreement shows that several rounds of social more powerful than the upstream rural peri-urban area of Dhulikhel. From the members to manage their forest resources purposes within the 1985 agreement interactions between community members was short in comparison to the second document. community. This is also reflected by one perspective of the upstream community, as common-pool resources and consider agreement. During the first agreement, enabled the agreement to take shape. of our key informants from the upstream these increased demands needed to be CFUGs as independent entities. The CFUG is the public participation norms of the single It is important to understand the social community, who told us, matched with higher compensation. As a the actual manager of the upstream forest party-political system were dominant, networks and linkages that reinforce the water provider, the upstream community resource and its associated ecosystem Dhulikhel is the centre of power, where where local people were minimally need for embedded social negotiation of were continuously applying greater pressure services, but the executives of CFUG are 34% institutions linked with authority like the involved in formal decision-making. These Infrastructure/Development PES-like contracts, as in this case, rather for more benefits from the downstream not among the negotiators and decision- police, administrations and other institutions dynamics have greatly changed since the 55% than the introduction of standardised community in order to develop their makers in the agreement process. In the Education are clustered. We must go to Dhulikhel to get introduction of the multi-party democratic templates developed elsewhere (Kolinjivadi community in terms of education and whole negotiation process, the then VDC 3% state services like citizenship, land ownership Forest Conservation et al., 2014). As elaborated in the result system after 1990, wherein people’s registration and electricity access and so on. road access. As a water recipient, the authority, together with the then APM, rights are guaranteed by law. This is likely 8% section, wider socio-political changes downstream community wanted to come VDC Grant If we don’t allow them water access, we have was signatory of the agreement on behalf one reason why the bargaining power greatly influenced water negotiations. Being a fear of being deprived, or of experiencing up with a stable long-term agreement of the upstream community. Hence, CFUG a single party-political system, the consensus of the upstream community increased Fig 1: Incentives provided and distribution in different difficulties in accessing such state facilities. with their upstream community to secure was excluded as an institution and did not and several contentious meetings were process of the first agreement was smooth growing water demands of the community. receive direct funding. A similar exclusion sectors (Source: Field Data, 2014). The centre of power was also reflected required through nearly 11 years to come and less hectic, with a single condition Accordingly, through a series of meetings, was found by Khatri (2009) in the case of in the agreement dated 1985, which to the second agreement. Continuous imposed on water take by Dhulikhel: the two communities came to an agreement Kulekhani hydropower, where similarly the clearly mentioned that Dhulikhel – as the political engagement and negotiation After the second agreement, the upstream construction of a school building. However, where downstream community incentivised PES mechanism did not provide economic district headquarter, where government among upstream and downstream community started to receive NPR the second agreement took several years the upstream community with cash incentives to the CFUGs and other local offices were located – faced water scarcity. communities played a vital role for a cash- 1,000,000 per annum from the DDWUC and several rounds of negotiation meetings support worth NPR one million per-year organisations looking after watershed Communities’ relative standing and based agreement to supply water to the on behalf of the downstream to come to an agreement in the multiparty in recognition of management efforts of management activities. Other studies have bargaining power also depended on the downstream community. community. In addition to the amount political system. Here, the bargaining the water source. As claimed by one of the highlighted how even non-participant types of available water sources, such as mentioned in the agreement, the power of the water provider, the upstream officials of the Dhulikhel DWUC, to conclude households within targeted communities are upstream community community, increased with socio-political river or spring sources (Joshi et al., 2018).

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7 New Angle: Nepal Journal of Social Science and Public Policy Vol. 6(1), 2020 Joshi et. al. Incentives for securing water in a Himalayan town

One of the key informants from Dhulikhel, for the second agreement, “There were a considered potential recipients of incentives an empirical possibility. In addition, it seems who also played a crucial role in the series of interactions up to 18 times among within PES schemes (e.g. Huang et al., 2009), that the payment made by downstream negotiations said, “We had no other options the actors of both communities”. which is also evident from the case of Costa settlements are essentially compensation than to make negotiation with upstream Rica, where to get a better outcome from for water diversion, as there is (currently) One of limitations of the 2011 agreement community because they owned water the payment for watershed services, the enough water flowing from the source. was the recognition of the Community sources, as the water source lies in the forest national programme introduced a series Downstream areas are not currently Forestry User Groups (CFUGs) who were they have been managing”. of modifications to promote participation planning or concerned with future water playing a prominent role in the protection of small farmers and indigenous peoples in scarcity scenarios. This denotes a recognition of the of the water source. Agreements must order to be more inclusive of all potential frequently unseen work behind maintaining consider historical costs and duties for stakeholders (Porras et al., 2008). Similarly, the increment of NPR 100,000 environmental resources, which in this the management of the same resource payments every five years now received by context gave rise to claims for compensation (Kovacs et al., 2016). The water source area In the case of Dhulikhel, the practice of the upstream community was not clearly for continued support. From the perspective in the upstream community is managed incentives started in 1985, a product of linked to value determination, nor to how of Dhulikhel town, increased demand of by the Kharkhola Mahabharat CFUGs the first period of negotiations between long the downstream community retained water was a critical issue in 2011 because under the Forest Act 1993 of Nepal and the up and downstream. The downstream their willingness-to-pay to the upstream. of the expansion of water users in the related regulations, which empowers CFUG community paid a total of NPR 9,536,000 The question is now being reformulated peri-urban area of Dhulikhel. From the members to manage their forest resources between 1985 and 2014. However, the to how the Dhulikhel DWUC will manage perspective of the upstream community, as common-pool resources and consider mode of payment was determined without to meet the growing demands of the these increased demands needed to be CFUGs as independent entities. The CFUG is any consideration given to any measurement upstream community, and the expected matched with higher compensation. As a the actual manager of the upstream forest or evaluation of the relevant ecosystem periodic growth of the sum by NPR 100,000 water provider, the upstream community resource and its associated ecosystem services. There are well-established every 5 years. The increased amount were continuously applying greater pressure services, but the executives of CFUG are methods and approaches that have been implies an increase to downstream users’ for more benefits from the downstream not among the negotiators and decision- applied in a Himalayan context (de Groot water bills. In the long run, downstream community in order to develop their makers in the agreement process. In the and Hermans, 2009; Rasul et al., 2011). On users may question the utility of the community in terms of education and whole negotiation process, the then VDC the other hand, existing literature suggests current arrangement, and the entitlement road access. As a water recipient, the authority, together with the then APM, that environmental service buyers do not of upstream communities to demand downstream community wanted to come was signatory of the agreement on behalf always have a clear definition of what payment. From the perspective of upstream up with a stable long-term agreement of the upstream community. Hence, CFUG environmental services they are paying community, they acknowledge an ongoing with their upstream community to secure was excluded as an institution and did not for as there may be problems of high challenge to justify their incremental growing water demands of the community. receive direct funding. A similar exclusion complexity, uncertainty, and imperfect and monetary demands. One of the key Accordingly, through a series of meetings, was found by Khatri (2009) in the case of asymmetric information in the linkages informants from the upstream community the two communities came to an agreement Kulekhani hydropower, where similarly the between desired environmental services expressed his dissatisfaction towards the where downstream community incentivised PES mechanism did not provide economic and ecosystem management practices 2011 agreement as: the upstream community with cash incentives to the CFUGs and other local (Muradian et al., 2010; Muradian and Rival, The calculation of an increment of NPR support worth NPR one million per-year organisations looking after watershed 2012). Therefore, a fully developed market 100,000 every 5 years without proper in recognition of management efforts of approach, in which PES would function management activities. Other studies have valuation of water is not appropriate the water source. As claimed by one of the highlighted how even non-participant precisely according to economic theory, and cannot do justice to the upstream officials of the Dhulikhel DWUC, to conclude households within targeted communities are remains more a theoretical abstraction than community who protect upstream resources

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One of the key informants from Dhulikhel, for the second agreement, “There were a considered potential recipients of incentives an empirical possibility. In addition, it seems by providing water to the downstream. The little portion of the money is used in school who also played a crucial role in the series of interactions up to 18 times among within PES schemes (e.g. Huang et al., 2009), that the payment made by downstream downstream community are paying us only education for local children as we need to negotiations said, “We had no other options the actors of both communities”. which is also evident from the case of Costa settlements are essentially compensation because they are in acute water need. pay salary of school teacher from our own than to make negotiation with upstream Rica, where to get a better outcome from for water diversion, as there is (currently) contribution. One of limitations of the 2011 agreement Such dissatisfaction from the upstream community because they owned water the payment for watershed services, the enough water flowing from the source. was the recognition of the Community community with the process of the Incentive-based ecosystem service sources, as the water source lies in the forest national programme introduced a series Downstream areas are not currently Forestry User Groups (CFUGs) who were negotiation and the lack of grounding in management can contribute towards they have been managing”. of modifications to promote participation planning or concerned with future water playing a prominent role in the protection payments’ size relative to work or economic building consensus between communities of small farmers and indigenous peoples in scarcity scenarios. service valuation may lead to conflict in and is thereby instrumental for facilitating This denotes a recognition of the of the water source. Agreements must order to be more inclusive of all potential the near future. Bhatta et al. (2014) has downstream–upstream problem-solving frequently unseen work behind maintaining consider historical costs and duties for stakeholders (Porras et al., 2008). Similarly, the increment of NPR 100,000 environmental resources, which in this the management of the same resource payments every five years now received by suggested that a standardised method to (Kosoy et al., 2007). The analysis reveals context gave rise to claims for compensation (Kovacs et al., 2016). The water source area In the case of Dhulikhel, the practice of the upstream community was not clearly determine the flow of services and the that incentive-based mechanisms with long- for continued support. From the perspective in the upstream community is managed incentives started in 1985, a product of linked to value determination, nor to how realistic price for the use of such services term interactions among the actors play a of Dhulikhel town, increased demand of by the Kharkhola Mahabharat CFUGs the first period of negotiations between long the downstream community retained needs to be well- supported and tested crucial role for negotiation which ultimately water was a critical issue in 2011 because under the Forest Act 1993 of Nepal and the up and downstream. The downstream their willingness-to-pay to the upstream. before being adopted. Such an approach sustains water security in the downstream of the expansion of water users in the related regulations, which empowers CFUG community paid a total of NPR 9,536,000 The question is now being reformulated may not only minimise the potential for (Dore et al., 2010; Joshi et al., 2014; Bhatta peri-urban area of Dhulikhel. From the members to manage their forest resources between 1985 and 2014. However, the to how the Dhulikhel DWUC will manage disagreement and conflict but will also et al., 2014 and Joshi et al., 2018). give a scientific and standardised basis for perspective of the upstream community, as common-pool resources and consider mode of payment was determined without to meet the growing demands of the Mechanisms of incentive-based ecosystem negotiations. these increased demands needed to be CFUGs as independent entities. The CFUG is any consideration given to any measurement upstream community, and the expected services management not only require a matched with higher compensation. As a the actual manager of the upstream forest or evaluation of the relevant ecosystem periodic growth of the sum by NPR 100,000 Analysis of economic incentives to the payment culture (Wunder, 2013) but also water provider, the upstream community resource and its associated ecosystem services. There are well-established every 5 years. The increased amount upstream shows that only 3% of the total need to consider clear mechanisms for were continuously applying greater pressure services, but the executives of CFUG are methods and approaches that have been implies an increase to downstream users’ amount is allocated to forest management. benefit- sharing amongst communities for more benefits from the downstream not among the negotiators and decision- applied in a Himalayan context (de Groot water bills. In the long run, downstream This is a voluntary contribution by the (Bhatta et al., 2014). Our analyses show community in order to develop their makers in the agreement process. In the and Hermans, 2009; Rasul et al., 2011). On users may question the utility of the community for forest management as per that the annual payment made from the community in terms of education and whole negotiation process, the then VDC the other hand, existing literature suggests current arrangement, and the entitlement the community forestry approach, which downstream community was primarily road access. As a water recipient, the authority, together with the then APM, that environmental service buyers do not of upstream communities to demand has been ongoing for the last twenty years. compensation for securing access to downstream community wanted to come was signatory of the agreement on behalf always have a clear definition of what payment. From the perspective of upstream In contrast, more than 55% of the total water. As water demand increases, the up with a stable long-term agreement of the upstream community. Hence, CFUG environmental services they are paying community, they acknowledge an ongoing incentive has been invested in infrastructure downstream community’s willingness to pay with their upstream community to secure was excluded as an institution and did not for as there may be problems of high challenge to justify their incremental development. One of the key informants to the upstream service providers become growing water demands of the community. receive direct funding. A similar exclusion complexity, uncertainty, and imperfect and monetary demands. One of the key from the upstream community argued: greater to ensure a greater supply of water. Accordingly, through a series of meetings, was found by Khatri (2009) in the case of asymmetric information in the linkages informants from the upstream community the two communities came to an agreement Kulekhani hydropower, where similarly the between desired environmental services expressed his dissatisfaction towards the The development process in Bhumidanda was where downstream community incentivised PES mechanism did not provide economic and ecosystem management practices 2011 agreement as: initiated only after Dhulikhel diverted water the upstream community with cash incentives to the CFUGs and other local (Muradian et al., 2010; Muradian and Rival, for its inhabitants, and basic infrastructure CONCLUSION The calculation of an increment of NPR support worth NPR one million per-year organisations looking after watershed 2012). Therefore, a fully developed market was essential for us during those days. 100,000 every 5 years without proper This paper analysed the negotiation in recognition of management efforts of management activities. Other studies have approach, in which PES would function Nowadays, large part of the money that we valuation of water is not appropriate dynamics between two communities’ the water source. As claimed by one of the highlighted how even non-participant precisely according to economic theory, receive from the downstream has been used and cannot do justice to the upstream in development activities as our community intent on establishing a water-sharing officials of the Dhulikhel DWUC, to conclude households within targeted communities are remains more a theoretical abstraction than community who protect upstream resources is still underdeveloped. In addition to this, agreement. These agreement approaches

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7 New Angle: Nepal Journal of Social Science and Public Policy Vol. 6(1), 2020 Joshi et. al. Incentives for securing water in a Himalayan town by providing water to the downstream. The little portion of the money is used in school have a long history in the Himalayas and sustainability. New mechanisms for linking downstream community are paying us only education for local children as we need to in Nepal. We have drawn attention to the up- and downstream may also give rise because they are in acute water need. pay salary of school teacher from our own changing dynamics between actors over the to new governance considerations around contribution. past 30 years, as the involvement of local how federal institutions can upscale and Such dissatisfaction from the upstream communities become more possible and recognise existing water agreements, and community with the process of the Incentive-based ecosystem service more politicised through the past decades how future negotiation dynamics to ensure negotiation and the lack of grounding in management can contribute towards of political development in Nepal. These sustainable water supply in the years to payments’ size relative to work or economic building consensus between communities power relations, the degree of resource come will be affected. service valuation may lead to conflict in and is thereby instrumental for facilitating scarcity and urbanisation, the urgency of the near future. Bhatta et al. (2014) has downstream–upstream problem-solving demand have all played an important role suggested that a standardised method to (Kosoy et al., 2007). The analysis reveals in Dhulikhel for determining the terms determine the flow of services and the that incentive-based mechanisms with long- ACKNOWLEDGEMENT of negotiations, the sought incentives by realistic price for the use of such services term interactions among the actors play a upstream communities, and their ability needs to be well- supported and tested crucial role for negotiation which ultimately This paper is part of our work undertaken to realise an agreement, over and above before being adopted. Such an approach sustains water security in the downstream in the project ‘Political Economy of Water scientific approaches to ES. The outcome may not only minimise the potential for (Dore et al., 2010; Joshi et al., 2014; Bhatta Security, Ecosystem Services and Livelihoods of long-term negotiations between up and disagreement and conflict but will also et al., 2014 and Joshi et al., 2018). in the Western Himalaya’ funded by the downstream stakeholders have achieved give a scientific and standardised basis for UK’s Ecosystem Services for Poverty Mechanisms of incentive-based ecosystem not only a joint agreement to protect negotiations. Alleviation Program (ESPA). The authors services management not only require a and supply water resources, but at the would like to acknowledge the support of Analysis of economic incentives to the payment culture (Wunder, 2013) but also same time now provide support to the Professor Bhaskar Vira from the University upstream shows that only 3% of the total need to consider clear mechanisms for community forest user group and several of Cambridge (U.K.), Dr. Hemant Ojha amount is allocated to forest management. benefit- sharing amongst communities community development initiatives in the (University of Canberra). and Dr. Dil Khatri This is a voluntary contribution by the (Bhatta et al., 2014). Our analyses show upstream. Power relations between local (SIAS). The authors would like to thank the community for forest management as per that the annual payment made from the rural and urban socio-political actors play editors and anonymous reviewers for their the community forestry approach, which downstream community was primarily a vital role in water access negotiations, valuable comments. Last, but certainly has been ongoing for the last twenty years. compensation for securing access to and fundamentally influence the potentials not least, we would like to thank all the In contrast, more than 55% of the total water. As water demand increases, the and effectiveness of incentive-based respondents from Dhulikhel and Kalanti incentive has been invested in infrastructure downstream community’s willingness to pay mechanisms to secure water needs. Such Bhumidanda communities who made this development. One of the key informants to the upstream service providers become power relationship in negotiation can research possible. from the upstream community argued: greater to ensure a greater supply of water. be a new knowledge in PES or PES like agreement. The development process in Bhumidanda was initiated only after Dhulikhel diverted water Furthermore, Dhulikhel drinking water for its inhabitants, and basic infrastructure CONCLUSION users committee, Kathmandu University, was essential for us during those days. and Dhulikhel Hospital still need to be This paper analysed the negotiation Nowadays, large part of the money that we linked within new federal institutions such dynamics between two communities’ receive from the downstream has been used as the Municipality (Dhulikhel) and Rural in development activities as our community intent on establishing a water-sharing Municipality (Bhumidanda) for long- term is still underdeveloped. In addition to this, agreement. These agreement approaches

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7 New Angle: Nepal Journal of Social Science and Public Policy Vol. 6(1), 2020 Joshi et. al. Incentives for securing water in a Himalayan town New Angle: Nepal Journal of Social Science and Public Policy Vol. 6(1), 2020 Joshi et. al. Incentives for securing water in a Himalayan town by providing water to the downstream. The little portion of the money is used in school have a long history in the Himalayas and sustainability. New mechanisms for linking REFERENCES de Francisco, J.C.R., 2013. PES, peasants and power in Andean watersheds: power downstream community are paying us only education for local children as we need to in Nepal. We have drawn attention to the up- and downstream may also give rise relations and payment for environmental services in Colombia and Ecuador. PhD thesis, because they are in acute water need. pay salary of school teacher from our own changing dynamics between actors over the to new governance considerations around Alfredson, T. and Cungu, A., 2008. Negotiation theory and practice: a review of the literature. Wageningen University, Wageningen, NL. ISBN 978-94-6173-786-1. contribution. past 30 years, as the involvement of local how federal institutions can upscale and Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, FAO. Such dissatisfaction from the upstream Gutman, P., 2007. Ecosystem services: foundations for a new rural-urban Ccmpact. Ecol communities become more possible and recognise existing water agreements, and community with the process of the Incentive-based ecosystem service Bhatta, L.D., Helmuth van Oort, B.E., Rucevska, I. and Baral, H., 2014. Payment for ecosystem Econ, 62:383–p.387. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2007.02.027 more politicised through the past decades how future negotiation dynamics to ensure negotiation and the lack of grounding in management can contribute towards services: possible instrument for managing ecosystem services in Nepal. International of political development in Nepal. These sustainable water supply in the years to payments’ size relative to work or economic building consensus between communities Journal of Biodiversity Science, Ecosystem Services & Management, 10(4), pp.289-299. Hope, R.A., Porras, I., Borgoyar, M., Miranda, M., Agarwal, C., Tiwari, S. and Amezaga, J.M., power relations, the degree of resource come will be affected. service valuation may lead to conflict in and is thereby instrumental for facilitating 2007. Negotiating watershed services. Water Resources Markets for Environmental scarcity and urbanisation, the urgency of the near future. Bhatta et al. (2014) has downstream–upstream problem-solving CBS, 2012. National population and housing census 2011. Central Bureau of Statistics, Series, London. demand have all played an important role suggested that a standardised method to (Kosoy et al., 2007). The analysis reveals Kathmandu, Government of Nepal. in Dhulikhel for determining the terms Huang, M., Upadhyaya S.K., Jindal, R. and Kerr, J., 2009. Payments for watershed services in determine the flow of services and the that incentive-based mechanisms with long- ACKNOWLEDGEMENT of negotiations, the sought incentives by Chan, K.M.A., Anderson, E., Chapman, M., Jespersen, K. and Olmsted, P., 2017. Payments Asia: a review of current initiatives.Journal of Sustainable Forestry, 28 (2009), pp.551- realistic price for the use of such services term interactions among the actors play a upstream communities, and their ability for ecosystem services: rife with problems and potential—for transformation towards 575. needs to be well- supported and tested crucial role for negotiation which ultimately This paper is part of our work undertaken to realise an agreement, over and above sustainability. Ecological Economics, 140, pp.110–122. before being adopted. Such an approach sustains water security in the downstream in the project ‘Political Economy of Water IPBES, 2018. Intergovernmental science-policy platform on biodiversity and ecosystem scientific approaches to ES. The outcome may not only minimise the potential for (Dore et al., 2010; Joshi et al., 2014; Bhatta Security, Ecosystem Services and Livelihoods Corbera, E., Kosoy, N. and Tuna, M.M., 2007. Equity implications of marketing ecosystem services (IPBES). of long-term negotiations between up and disagreement and conflict but will also et al., 2014 and Joshi et al., 2018). in the Western Himalaya’ funded by the services in protected areas and rural communities: case studies from Meso-America. downstream stakeholders have achieved Creed, I.F. and van Noordwijk, M. eds., 2018. Forest and water on a changing planet: give a scientific and standardised basis for UK’s Ecosystem Services for Poverty Global Environmental Change, 17(3-4), pp.365-380. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j. Mechanisms of incentive-based ecosystem not only a joint agreement to protect vulnerability, adaptation and governance opportunities. A global Assessment Report, negotiations. Alleviation Program (ESPA). The authors gloenvcha.2006.12.005 services management not only require a and supply water resources, but at the would like to acknowledge the support of IUFRO World Series Vol 38. Vienna. Analysis of economic incentives to the payment culture (Wunder, 2013) but also same time now provide support to the Professor Bhaskar Vira from the University Corbera, E., Soberanis, C.G. and Brown, K., 2009. Institutional dimensions of payments Jack, B.K., Kousky, C. and Sims, K.R.E., 2008. Designing payments for ecosystem services: upstream shows that only 3% of the total need to consider clear mechanisms for community forest user group and several of Cambridge (U.K.), Dr. Hemant Ojha for ecosystem services: an analysis of Mexico’s carbon forestry programme. Ecological lessons from previous experience with incentive-based mechanisms. Proceedings of amount is allocated to forest management. benefit- sharing amongst communities community development initiatives in the (University of Canberra). and Dr. Dil Khatri Economics, 68(3), pp.743-761. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2008.06.008 the National Academy of Sciences, 105(28), pp.9465-9470. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/ This is a voluntary contribution by the (Bhatta et al., 2014). Our analyses show upstream. Power relations between local (SIAS). The authors would like to thank the Cosgrove, W.J. and Loucks, D.P., 2015. Water management: current and future challenges pnas.0705503104 community for forest management as per that the annual payment made from the rural and urban socio-political actors play editors and anonymous reviewers for their and research directions. Water Resources Research, 51(6), pp.4823-4839. the community forestry approach, which downstream community was primarily a vital role in water access negotiations, valuable comments. Last, but certainly Joshi, T., Devkota, K. and Neupane, K., 2014. Incentive based natural resources management has been ongoing for the last twenty years. compensation for securing access to and fundamentally influence the potentials not least, we would like to thank all the Dhulikhel Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Users’ Committee. 2014.Annual Report. for securing water needs in the face of climate change: a case study of Dhulikhel water In contrast, more than 55% of the total water. As water demand increases, the and effectiveness of incentive-based respondents from Dhulikhel and Kalanti users committee, Nepal. International Conference on Mountain People Adapting to Dhulikhel Municipality, 2011. Municipal profile of Dhulikhel 2011. Kavre, Nepal. incentive has been invested in infrastructure downstream community’s willingness to pay mechanisms to secure water needs. Such Bhumidanda communities who made this Change. ICIMOD, Kathmandu, Nepal. to the upstream service providers become power relationship in negotiation can development. One of the key informants research possible. de Groot, R.B.A. and Hermans L.M., 2009. Broadening the picture: negotiating payment greater to ensure a greater supply of water. be a new knowledge in PES or PES like Joshi, T., Agarwal, C. and Neupane, K., 2018. Water catchments and water users: negotiations from the upstream community argued: schemes for water-related environmental services in the Netherlands, Ecological agreement. and other mechanisms for water security in the urbanising Himalayas, Social Science Economics, 68(11), pp.2760-2767. The development process in Bhumidanda was Baha. initiated only after Dhulikhel diverted water Furthermore, Dhulikhel drinking water Dietz, T., Ostrom, E. and Stern, P.C., 2003. The struggle to govern the commons. Science, for its inhabitants, and basic infrastructure CONCLUSION users committee, Kathmandu University, Khatri, D.B., 2009. Compromising the environment in payments for environmental services? 302(5652), pp.1907-1912. http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1091015 was essential for us during those days. and Dhulikhel Hospital still need to be An institutional analysis of mechanisms for sharing hydroelectricity revenue in Kulekhani This paper analysed the negotiation Nowadays, large part of the money that we linked within new federal institutions such Dore, J., Robinson, J. and Smith, M. eds., 2010. Negotiate – reaching agreements over water. watershed, Nepal. MA Thesis. The Hague: Institute of Social Studies. dynamics between two communities’ receive from the downstream has been used as the Municipality (Dhulikhel) and Rural Gland, Switzerland: International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN). in development activities as our community intent on establishing a water-sharing Municipality (Bhumidanda) for long- term is still underdeveloped. In addition to this, agreement. These agreement approaches

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7 7 New Angle: Nepal Journal of Social Science and Public Policy Vol. 6(1), 2020 Joshi et. al. Incentives for securing water in a Himalayan town

REFERENCES de Francisco, J.C.R., 2013. PES, peasants and power in Andean watersheds: power relations and payment for environmental services in Colombia and Ecuador. PhD thesis, Alfredson, T. and Cungu, A., 2008. Negotiation theory and practice: a review of the literature. Wageningen University, Wageningen, NL. ISBN 978-94-6173-786-1. Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, FAO. Gutman, P., 2007. Ecosystem services: foundations for a new rural-urban Ccmpact. Ecol Bhatta, L.D., Helmuth van Oort, B.E., Rucevska, I. and Baral, H., 2014. Payment for ecosystem Econ, 62:383–p.387. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2007.02.027 services: possible instrument for managing ecosystem services in Nepal. International Journal of Biodiversity Science, Ecosystem Services & Management, 10(4), pp.289-299. Hope, R.A., Porras, I., Borgoyar, M., Miranda, M., Agarwal, C., Tiwari, S. and Amezaga, J.M., 2007. Negotiating watershed services. Water Resources Markets for Environmental CBS, 2012. National population and housing census 2011. Central Bureau of Statistics, Series, London. Kathmandu, Government of Nepal. Huang, M., Upadhyaya S.K., Jindal, R. and Kerr, J., 2009. Payments for watershed services in Chan, K.M.A., Anderson, E., Chapman, M., Jespersen, K. and Olmsted, P., 2017. Payments Asia: a review of current initiatives.Journal of Sustainable Forestry, 28 (2009), pp.551- for ecosystem services: rife with problems and potential—for transformation towards 575. sustainability. Ecological Economics, 140, pp.110–122. IPBES, 2018. Intergovernmental science-policy platform on biodiversity and ecosystem Corbera, E., Kosoy, N. and Tuna, M.M., 2007. Equity implications of marketing ecosystem services (IPBES). services in protected areas and rural communities: case studies from Meso-America. Global Environmental Change, 17(3-4), pp.365-380. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j. Creed, I.F. and van Noordwijk, M. eds., 2018. Forest and water on a changing planet: gloenvcha.2006.12.005 vulnerability, adaptation and governance opportunities. A global Assessment Report, IUFRO World Series Vol 38. Vienna. Corbera, E., Soberanis, C.G. and Brown, K., 2009. Institutional dimensions of payments for ecosystem services: an analysis of Mexico’s carbon forestry programme. Ecological Jack, B.K., Kousky, C. and Sims, K.R.E., 2008. Designing payments for ecosystem services: Economics, 68(3), pp.743-761. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2008.06.008 lessons from previous experience with incentive-based mechanisms. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 105(28), pp.9465-9470. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/ Cosgrove, W.J. and Loucks, D.P., 2015. Water management: current and future challenges pnas.0705503104 and research directions. Water Resources Research, 51(6), pp.4823-4839. Joshi, T., Devkota, K. and Neupane, K., 2014. Incentive based natural resources management Dhulikhel Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Users’ Committee. 2014.Annual Report. for securing water needs in the face of climate change: a case study of Dhulikhel water users committee, Nepal. International Conference on Mountain People Adapting to Dhulikhel Municipality, 2011. Municipal profile of Dhulikhel 2011. Kavre, Nepal. Change. ICIMOD, Kathmandu, Nepal. de Groot, R.B.A. and Hermans L.M., 2009. Broadening the picture: negotiating payment Joshi, T., Agarwal, C. and Neupane, K., 2018. Water catchments and water users: negotiations schemes for water-related environmental services in the Netherlands, Ecological and other mechanisms for water security in the urbanising Himalayas, Social Science Economics, 68(11), pp.2760-2767. Baha. Dietz, T., Ostrom, E. and Stern, P.C., 2003. The struggle to govern the commons. Science, Khatri, D.B., 2009. Compromising the environment in payments for environmental services? 302(5652), pp.1907-1912. http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1091015 An institutional analysis of mechanisms for sharing hydroelectricity revenue in Kulekhani Dore, J., Robinson, J. and Smith, M. eds., 2010. Negotiate – reaching agreements over water. watershed, Nepal. MA Thesis. The Hague: Institute of Social Studies. Gland, Switzerland: International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN).

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