The Impact of Anti-Western Discourse in the Romanian Public Sphere

THE IMPACT OF ANTI-WESTERN DISCOURSE IN THE ROMANIAN PUBLIC SPHERE

The Impact of Anti-Western Discourse in the Romanian Public Sphere – Propaganda, Public Communication & Civic Participation

Authors

Dan N. Sultanescu, SNSPA – [email protected] Dr. Tudor Vlad, University of Georgia - [email protected] Vlad Achimescu, The University of Mannheim - [email protected] Dana C. Sultanescu, Multimedia Foundation for Local Democracy – [email protected]

1 THE IMPACT OF ANTI-WESTERN DISCOURSE IN THE ROMANIAN PUBLIC SPHERE

Abstract:

The paper is an overview of how the public responds to various issues of interest in Romania, a country member of NATO in Eastern Europe. A special attention is devoted to issues that reflect pro- or anti-Russian attitudes, in the context of escalating tensions in the region. The analysis features data from a 2016 sociological research, as well as profile description of public segments susceptible to theses serving anti-Western propaganda in Romania. The paper also studies the connection between pro/anti Russia/NATO attitudes and public participation, based on the hypothesis that in a country geographically situated close to Russia there are special vulnerabilities within the public towards Eastern propaganda. The study examines general attitudes towards the East and the West in Romania, attitudes towards government models, current issues, as well as the perceived cultural, political and economic influence in Romania of several major geopolitical players. This data set can be used to develop methods to evaluate the impact of anti-Western propaganda in post-Communist countries.

Keywords: Propaganda, civic involvement, civic participation

2 THE IMPACT OF ANTI-WESTERN DISCOURSE IN THE ROMANIAN PUBLIC SPHERE

The Impact of Anti-Western Discourse in the Romanian Public Sphere – Propaganda, Public Communication & Civic Participation

INTRODUCTION

Our study aims to assess Romanian people’s attachment to the traditional Euro-Atlantic partnership and the impact of Russian propaganda in Romania, in the current complex European and global context. Romania has been a steadfast ally of the United States and NATO in a very unstable region: two of its neighbors are Ukraine – currently embroiled in a difficult relationship with Russia after the 2014 annexation of Crimea, and the Republic of Moldova – former member of the Soviet Union and a territory which was throughout history a part of various configurations of the Romanian state. The country’s complicated relationship with Russia, influenced by the common affiliation to the Communist space for a long period of time, contained several episodes marked by non-military, but informational disputes (documented and analyzed by Stefureac, 2015), a fact that underlines both the precedent and the vulnerabilities. Romania is a member of the European Union since 2007 and remains one of the poorer countries in the EU. Traditionally, Romanians have been among the Europeans with the highest rates of trust in the EU and the future of this organization, but this trust has started to stagnate and even decrease in the last years. This trend coincides with the difficult situation of the European Union, marked by the aftermath of the economic crisis, as well as the recent event of “Brexit” – the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the Union as a result of a national referendum. The refugee crisis has questioned the Union’s ability to put together a coherent and efficient plan, supported and implemented by all member states. Proposed solutions were met with divided reactions by various member states and the lack of solidarity has damaged people’s perception of the Union’s strength and functionality. The economic crisis has left behind not only painful effects of the austerity policies applied in several member states, but also pessimism about the future, especially among the youth (according to a EU-wide Eurobarometer survey - Standard Eurobarometer 85, Spring 2016, in 2016 44% of Europeans were pessimistic about the future of the EU, compared to 24% in 2007). Along with the economic and social issues, security and defense capabilities have recently come under scrutiny. “Over the past decade the security situation in Europe has deteriorated markedly, especially in our neighborhood: no longer can a single Member State guarantee its internal and external security alone; (…) the decline of Europe’s defense capabilities has limited its ability to project stability beyond our immediate borders; (…) this goes hand in hand with the reluctance of our US allies to intervene if Europe is not ready to take its fair share of responsibility”, underlines a draft report on the constitutional set-up of the

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European Union, recently discussed in Brussels and authored by Guy Verhofstadt, European Parliament’s rapporteur on the constitutional future of Europe (Verhofstadt, 2016). One outcome of Brexit has been the intensification of the talk about a two-tier Union, which Italian Foreign Minister Paolo Gentiloni described in the following terms: “I believe that today’s EU at 28 can contain a smaller circle [of countries] sharing the single currency, the Schengen treaty [on passport-free travel], and, above all, better defense coordination – a core of seven to twelve European countries that could have stronger levels of integration. Italy will fight for this new kind of EU.” (ANSA, 2016) The rise of populist, Eurosceptic parties and leaders has been documented in recent years in several EU countries, such as the UK, France, Italy, Austria, Germany, Netherlands, Finland – in each case these parties are either gaining ground in polls or good result in regional elections, or propose strong presidential candidates. The political landscape in the US is also an important factor in this context. A Pew Research poll published in June 2016 and reported by CNN found that only 9% of Europeans surveyed have confidence in Donald Trump to do the right thing in world affairs, and Eighty-five percent of respondents in 10 EU countries said they have no confidence in Trump (CNN, 2016). Thus, the European Union is going through a significant crisis, the US is not the same proactive actor, and on several issues their signals are no longer similar1. At the same time, analysists consistently underline the continuous and ever-stronger efforts by Russia in the field of “hybrid war”, in the aftermath of the annexation of Crimea (Sherr, as well as Giles, both in Giles et al, 2015). This situation is considered by experts a demonstration of Russia’s new approach to conflict, showcasing a wide array of tools used to obtain geopolitical influence, from propaganda to actual military invasion. Several of these tools are also used in other territories of geopolitical importance for Russia, and Romania is one such territory. “Across Europe and the Euro-Atlantic area, Russia’s intelligence offensive is being conducted with increasing determination and sophistication. This is a smart and modern war that goes well beyond the traditional intelligence requirements of “need to know” concerning the intentions of enemy countries, which in President Vladimir Putin’s mind includes any country opposed to his expansionist ambitions”, notes Romanian Ambassador to the US, George Cristian Maior, who is also the former director of the Romanian Intelligence Service (Maior, 2015). “Putin’s strategy in this regard is obvious: to undermine and destabilize the democratically elected governments of Russia’s neighbors in order to gain political, economic and strategic influence within them. By generating domestic support for Russia’s policies through political and cultural elites as well as the media, Putin hopes to rebuild a European sphere of influence and exert control over decisions of strategic importance for Russia”, adds Ambassador Maior explaining the purpose of this type of offensive. What about the means it employs? “(…) the

1 George Maior, Romania’s Ambassador to the US, underlines the issue of different approaches by the US and the EU, united through the fact that “they ask the same questions”, but separated by “finding separate answers” (Maior, in Iuga (ed), 2016). More questions about the translatlantic relationship in Maior (coord), 2010.

4 THE IMPACT OF ANTI-WESTERN DISCOURSE IN THE ROMANIAN PUBLIC SPHERE funding of political parties, the establishment of pro-Russian blogs and websites, the mass manipulation of social media and the use of agents of influence. They all serve the common goal of keeping Russia’s supposed enemies off balance by sowing division and spreading disinformation” (Maior, 2015). The use of such tools is currently under-researched, although their impact can prove to be significant. Even though, for years Romania’s elites have supported a sole project – the “Westernization” of the country - this doesn’t seem to be an irreversible process, especially in a society with a low level of civic participation.

LITERATURE REVIEW. THE RUSSIAN “HYBRID WAR” THREAT

The “hybrid war” label is the most commonly-used by experts and analysts for a series of tools used by Russia, especially after 2008, to extend and exert its influence abroad and to become a major international player. “Propaganda”, “cyber war”, “hybrid threat”, “information war”, “non-linear war” are other terms used for the same concept, which is perceived as “continuous between peace and war” (Franke, 2015). Although the term has been brought to the forefront of international public debate after the events in Crimea, “hybrid war” is not a new reality, and Russia’s efforts in this direction have been less discussed outside specialized security studies. This is not open war or military aggression, but subtle operations which can disturb peace and harmony within societies, “assorted, seemingly inconsequential actions, [which] when combined, can plunge an otherwise functioning nation into chaos. To many NATO nations living in Russia’s shadow, the implications of that threat are deeply troubling” (Canaday, 2016). The operations in Ukraine have been the most aggressive form illustrating this concept, but certainly not the only form it takes: “Since at least 2008, Kremlin military and intelligence thinkers have been talking about information not in the familiar terms of “persuasion”, “public diplomacy” or even “propaganda”, but in weaponized terms, as a tool to confuse, blackmail, demoralize, subvert and paralyze” (Pomerantsev, Weiss, 2014). The so-called “Gerasimov Doctrine” is considered by many to be the first explicit synthetic description of Russia’s brand of “hybrid war”, exposed in an article published by General Valery Gerasimov, then Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation in a military magazine, in February 2013; it concentrates around the “tendency toward blurring the lines between the states of war and peace” (Gerasimov, quoted by Galeotti, 2014). The main directions of the hybrid war doctrine are presented mostly by describing “lessons” from witnessed conflicts (Iraq 1991 and 2003, Arab Spring, Libya etc.), but the conclusion is clear: “we must not copy foreign experience and chase after leading countries, but we must outstrip them and occupy leading positions ourselves”. In his words, “the very ‘rules of war’ have changed. The role of non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown and in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force weapons in their effectiveness. (…) The focus of applied methods of conflict has altered in the direction of the broad use of political,

5 THE IMPACT OF ANTI-WESTERN DISCOURSE IN THE ROMANIAN PUBLIC SPHERE economic, informational, humanitarian, and other nonmilitary measures – applied in coordination with the protest potential of the population. All this is supplemented by military means of a concealed character, including carrying out actions of informational conflict and the actions of special-operations forces”. Analysts point out that there is a huge range of tools and operations that can be grouped under the “hybrid war” label when it comes to Russia’s behavior. Most of these can fall within one of the following three categories: 1. Propaganda and disinformation, which can either promote the Russian model or undermine the Western model, its values and its efficiency Direct propaganda is mostly being carried out through the official Kremlin media with a considerable resonance in countries with a Russian minority, since “most Russian-language media available throughout the world is broadcast or rebroadcast directly from Russia, where the Kremlin maintains a tight grip on the media” (Cotter, 2016). The objective of sowing doubt and undermining trust in Western values is equally important and carried out either by TV pieces presenting alternative explanations to certain events or by comments posted on social networks advocating scenarios (sometimes conspiracy theories) behind events: “Russia has invested hugely in adapting principles of subversion to the internet age. These new investments cover three main areas: internally and externally focused media with a substantial online presence, of which RT (formerly Russia Today) is the best known but only one example; use of social media and online discussion boards and comment pages as a force multiplier to ensure Russian narratives achieve broad reach and penetration; and language skills, in order to engage with target audiences on a wide front in their own language” (Giles, in Giles & al, 2015). 2. Stimulating controversial themes and potential conflicts in these societies, by exploiting real issues A controversial, divisive issue can become a battleground which can profit Russian interests, by flaming out sensitivities on one side or both and amplifying the perceived conflict. What begins as an isolated issue can end up – after being subjected to such stimulation – looking like large rifts dividing society in two irreconcilable groups. From ecological issues such as shale gas exploitation to legalization of gay marriage in conservative societies, any potentially controversial issue can become a tool used to widen divisions within societies, which can sometimes lead to street protests or even clashes with police. This generates a “pollution of the information framework for decision-making”, which can affect both “the opinion-forming process” and “the policy-making process itself” (Giles, 2016). 3. Amplifying the image of crises and supporting extremist groups and separatist movements in European countries. Russia “invests heavily in Europe’s division” (Sherr, 2013), since any disruption to the harmony inside the European Union or inside various member states is useful for the weakening of the respective structure – thus augmenting the visibility of various crises inside the EU or supporting the various extremist parties asking for either the dissolution of the EU or break-ups inside European states serve Russian interests: “Russia can simply amplify

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existing tensions rather than instigating and fabricating new ones (…) The UK Brexit referendum in June 2016, the expected large-scale arrival of migrants and refugees (…) and the stress this places on the Schengen and Eurozone, and increasing anti-German and anti-EU feelings in Poland or anti-Polish feelings in Lithuania all demonstrate real difficulties that can be exploited” (Herd, 2016). Alleged Russian financing of extremist parties in Europe seems to be a preferred instrument: “Now the Kremlin has adopted a different approach, creating alliances and funding groups on the left and on the right: European right-nationalists are seduced by the anti-EU message; members of the far-left are brought in by tales of fighting US hegemony” (Pomerantsev, Weiss, 2014).

Existing studies offer abundant examples of such attempts to “create and exploit rifts in the West, delegitimize NATO, weaken the European Union and divide the West” (Herd, 2016), and also indicate various other methods used for increasing Russia’s influence, some of them more obvious and thus prominent to the public debate, such as the exploitation of energy dependence for political ends (Giles, in Giles & al, 2015), cyber-attacks (mentioned even in the context of the US presidential campaign), creating “think-tanks to deliver pro-Russia positions abroad” (Pomerantsev, Weiss, 2014), even sending messages “by aggressive use of military flights” (Franke, 2015). These strategies and their potential impact have not yet been extensively analyzed.

CIVIC CULTURE The Civic Culture was used as a framework by Almond and Verba in 1963 to analyze national differences in orientations toward political institutions and the self-ascribed role of the citizen in the functioning of democracy (Almond and Verba, 1989), focusing on measures such as political knowledge, feelings, interest, communication, competence, partisanship, tolerance and most important activism (in to civic life, community and political arena). Writing more than two decades later as a follow-up, Verba makes a further distinction between types of participation, drawing dividing lines between civic, electoral and political participation, and further separating the latter into elite-directed and elite-challenging participation (replacing the outdated terms of conventional and unconventional participation), also distinguishing between actual and desired participation. Most of these measures were adapted and used in our 2012 study on Romanian Political Culture (Infopolitic, 2013a), which concluded that “our civic profile is one of non-participation, distinctive from the Western model. Romanian citizens are available for participation and information, the figures of intent are very high, but this intention does not translate to effective participation” (Teodorescu, Sultanescu, 2015a). At the eve of Romania’s entry into the European Union, a group of sociologists studying social and political values concluded that “the transition from communist comrades to democratic citizens has not finished yet” (Tufis in Voicu, 2007, p.56), as support for democracy was still overshadowed by high levels of intolerance to minorities, low trust in state institutions

7 THE IMPACT OF ANTI-WESTERN DISCOURSE IN THE ROMANIAN PUBLIC SPHERE and weak voluntary participation. Five years later, our own national and regional study of civic culture (CSCI, 2012) concluded that intolerance remains at high levels, traditional values surpass self-expression values, and participation is limited to voting for most Romanians, while voluntary work in organization, active mobilization in political campaigns and protests have much lower levels. However, the study also found that there is a high potential for both civic and political participation, stifled by a lack of opportunities. The 2012 study was replicated on a smaller scale in 2016, and the evolutions will be briefly presented in the data analysis section. For now it should be retained that for historical reasons the civic culture of Romania resembles the Eastern European model more than the Anglo-Saxon model, but there is a strong aspirational dimension that may be linked to geopolitical preferences: most people want to participate more in the future, and most people have more confidence in the EU and USA than in Russia, but are the two connected? Is the preference for the Western model also linked with a higher level of civic competence, tolerance and participation or is it only economical in nature? In our 2012 study, the idea of regional political cultures was not supported by the data, and education was found to be a much stronger predictor of differential participation than geographical areas. All studies of political culture (Verba, Marsh) find education to be a factor that reduces national differences in political factor. At high levels of education participation is high regardless of country. Generational differences in participation potential were also found. This is why we would expect admirers of the Western model to be younger and more educated and those of the Russian model to be older and less educated.

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HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY

Starting from the described context, as well as the experience of previous research, we aim to verify 6 specific hypotheses, using the data we have access to: 1. Romanians are beginning to temper their euro-optimistic and pro-atlanticist tone, as a result of the complex European and global context. 2. Most Romanians still position themselves as pro-Western. The pro-Russian public is in minority. Romanians can be divided into three clusters: one cluster that is pro-American and (partly) anti-Russia, one cluster that is pro-Russia and (partly) anti-American, and one cluster of “neutrals”, which is very important from the point of view of exposure to manipulation or propaganda. 3. There are two negatively correlated latent variables: attitude toward USA & NATO, attitude toward Russia. This means that the categories of public defined by these variables are dissimilar and divergent. 4. The solidity of the strategic – military relationship between Romania and the US is not sufficient to guarantee the strength of the entire edifice. We want to verify if the attachment towards the military relationship between Romania and the US is also to be found in other domains – our assumption being that the military and security dimension is the most important. 5. The pro-American cluster contains higher proportions of young, educated, urban people, while the pro-Russian cluster contains higher proportions of older, rural, less educated and poorer Romanians. 6. Being pro-American is associated with a participative civic culture (a higher degree of tolerance, civic and political participation), while being pro-Russian is more associated with a parochial civic culture (passivity, distrust in institutions, less civic and political participation)

We verify our hypotheses by employing statistical analyses on several survey databases we had access to, as well as a tailored research carried out in July 2016, for which we custom- built indicators. In short, we can group the analyzed data in three categories: - CSCI Survey, 2012, which was part of the project Initiative for Civil Society (Infopolitic, 2013a): 8031 completed questionnaires, fieldwork between November 2011 and March 2012, representative at national and regional level, with a margin of error of ± 1% at national level. - CSCI Survey, July 2016 (Infopolitic, 2016a): 766 questionnaires, fieldwork in July 2016, a survey representative at national level, with a margin of error of ±3,5% at national level, containing a reduced number of variables compared to the 2012 study (in order to increase the response rate). - Databases and results of polls from other sources: INSCOP (2013 – 2016), Sociopol (2013 – 2016), Eurobarometer (from open sources)

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The questionnaire in July 2016 was built to follow the same main indicators analyzed in the research report of the 2012 project Initiative for Civil Society, conducted by Multimedia Foundation for Local Democracy in partnership with SNSPA. We added several questions regarding Romanians’ opinion about the situation in the region, attitudes towards countries in the East and West, attitude towards special situations which can be influenced from outside of the country etc. We attempted to compare similarly built indicators from the two surveys, in order to verify the consistency of civic and political participation in Romania. Thus, to make the data comparable, we attempted to use identical standards as regards to sampling – both samples are representative for the Romanian population of adult age (18+), data gathering method (telephone interviews/ CATI with random dialing), weighting scheme (iterative proportional fitting)., the order and measure of the variables (opening the questionnaire with the questions about civic participation, continuing with electoral participation and political participation, and ending with sociodemographic variables; variables were measured similarly in both surveys). Moreover, for the analysis of the hypotheses regarding the characteristics of the pro- American and pro-Russian categories of public in Romania, we used further methods, as described below: - To describe the attitude of the Romanian public towards USA/NATO and Russia, 11 variables were used, all measured at ordinal level, on a 4-point scale. - In order to reduce the number of studied dimensions, a factor analysis was performed. The variables were treated as metric, even though the number of scale values is small. PFA was preferred over PCA because it is based on the common variance between the variables, and not the total variance. Oblimin rotation was chosen, to allow the factors to be correlated, as the third hypothesis assumes a negative correlation. - To classify the Romanian public by geopolitical preferences, cluster analysis was employed. Factor scores were calculated based on the described PFA. We believed that the population is divided into groups or “clusters” that have consistent in-group attitudes and conflicting between-group attitudes. This assumption can be tested by using Cluster Analysis. The 2-step Cluster Analysis method from SPSS was preferred over the traditional K-means cluster analysis, because of the possibility it offers to choose the optimal number of clusters based on maximum likelihood tests and ratio of distance measures (SPSS, 2004). Not without criticism, the method was shown to perform well when working with metric variables (Bacher et. al., 2004). - To predict political participation, logistic regression was performed . As dependent variables, past and potential political participation to any activities in the two defined types (campaigns and protests) were used – in total 4 variables.

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MAIN FINDINGS

Regarding the first hypothesis, about the tempering tendency of the pro-Western attitude in Romania, we used data from several surveys – both Romanian (INSCOP, Sociopol, CSCI) and European. Also, for comparison purposes, we identified data from other Central and Eastern-European studies (details below). Even though it may have been measured with differences in question wording and collection methods (telephone or face to face), we included all the indicators of trust in EU on the same graph. The general trend for the years 2009-2013 appears to be descendent in Eurostat measurements, with a decline of Romanian trust in the EU from 66% to less than 50% (European Commission, 2016), paralleling the period of economic crisis. After 2013, we can show more data sources, and all seem to indicate an increase in confidence until the end of 2014, as the countries recovered from the crisis and austerity measures were reversed. From 2015 onwards, Eurostat, CSCI and INSCOP data show again a slow descending trend, as voices questioning the sustainability of the European project increase in number.

Figure 1. Eurostat 2016 – Evolution of Romanian trust in EU (Eurostat, CSCI, INSCOP, SOCIOPOL) and NATO (INSCOP)

Trust in EU and NATO (% strong + %moderate)

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

NATO (INSCOP) EU (INSCOP) EU (CSCI) EU (SocioPol) EU (Eurostat)

We can also add to this picture a halt in the rise of trust in NATO and the US, without registering an explicit decrease, at least not as a tendency (as shown by INSCOP data in graph). The rising number of those trusting less the EU and NATO indicate a society which has cooled off its attachment towards Western values. This is the starting point of our analysis. Trust in the US follows a similar line to trust in NATO. In order to better understand the specificity of Eastern European countries, it is important to note that, looking at the numbers throughout the

11 THE IMPACT OF ANTI-WESTERN DISCOURSE IN THE ROMANIAN PUBLIC SPHERE years, trust in NATO has always been higher than trust in the US, which can be explained by the fact that NATO includes EU member as well as the US.

Figure 2. Sociopol Survey data

Romania does not follow the general European trend in this aspect. Pew Research data (in Annex) show a decrease in the “favorable view of the US” in several European countries, such as France, Italy, Spain or the UK, while countries like Poland maintained a favorable attitude. Romania is not on the list of countries included in the Pew Research study. In a recent study titled “Central Europe under the fire of propaganda”, GLOBSEC Policy Institute analyses the results of a poll conducted in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia on the issue of Russia’s efforts to increase its influence in this region. It is interesting to note that, when asked to choose the ideal geopolitical orientation of their respective countries, clear majorities in all 3 countries favor the “somewhere between” option (48-52%), and not the “part of the West” choice (only 23-32%). In the aftermath of the Ukraine conflict, the Eastern European region has become extremely important, Russia’s activity close to the border of the aforementioned countries increasing in intensity. There is substantial literature noting the effects of Russia’s annexation of Crimea at regional and global level (such as Gardner, 2016).

To test our hypotheses concerning the characteristics of the pro-American and pro- Russian public in Romania, we used several statistical operations. To describe the attitude of the Romanian public towards USA/NATO and Russia, 11 variables were used, all measured on a 4-point scale. To avoid acquiescence bias, positive and negative phrases were constructed, but most are formulated to express a positive relationship toward the two world powers. Four of them express pro-USA feelings, four express pro-Russia feelings, two express anti-Russia feelings and one expresses anti-USA feelings. The descriptives are in Table 1.

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It can be observed that pro-USA items have mostly positive scores (over 50% have confidence in USA, NATO and Obama) and pro-Russia items have mostly negative scores – less than 20% have confidence in Putin and Russia, however the majority of sample members indicated agreement that Romania should improve its relationship with Russia and 50% do share some appreciation for Vladimir Putin’s actions in defense of Russia. Even though Romanians have strong pro-USA sentiments, about half agree that USA corporations have also had a negative effect on the Romanian economy, by corrupting home politicians.

Table 1. Descriptive statistics for components of Factor Analysis

4 1 2 Some- 5 Some- 99 Strongly what Strongly what DK/NA St. Disagree Disagree Agree Mean Agree dev Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % ConfRUS Confidence in Russia 63% 20% 8% 3% 5% 1.61 1.08 ConfPUTIN Confidence in Vladimir 55% 23% 9% 7% 6% 1.84 1.27 Putin ProPUTIN I appreciate the actions 29% 12% 23% 28% 7% 3.09 1.69 of Vladimir Putin, because he defends Russia from foreign threats CloseRUS Romania should improve 12% 5% 31% 50% 3% 4.03 1.36 political and economic relationship with Russia ThreatPUTIN I am very concerened by 31% 19% 21% 26% 4% 2.91 1.66 the threats uttered by Vladimir Putin FearRUS I am afraid Russia will 30% 14% 21% 33% 2% 3.13 1.71 attack Romania, as it did Ukraine ConfUSA Confidence in the USA 24% 30% 25% 17% 3% 3.26 1.50 ConfOBAMA Confidence in Barrack 17% 21% 31% 24% 7% 2.81 1.50 Obama ConfNATO I believe that the NATO 15% 7% 29% 46% 3% 3.86 1.47 member states will immediately come to help if Romania is attacked by Russia USApositive USA has an overall 11% 11% 35% 32% 10% 3.73 1.39 positive contribution to the safety and wealth of Romania USAnegative Many American 25% 11% 18% 32% 14% 3.25 1.71 companies have plundered the Romanian national wealth and corrupted Romanian Politicians

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Latent variables underlining geopolitical preferences In order to reduce the number of studied dimensions, a PFA factor analysis was performed. Contrary to our hypothesis, neither the eigenvalues nor the scree plot suggests the presence of only two factors (pro-USA and pro-Russia). Instead, a 4-factor solution that explains 45% of the common variance is the optimal choice. Even with this 4-factor solution, the communalities for anti-Russia and anti-USA statements is lower than the others (between 0.2 and 0.3). Nevertheless, the variables were kept in the analysis, to reduce the influence of high correlations caused by acquiescence bias. Of the four extracted factors, the first two seem to approximate the hypothesized Pro- USA and Pro-Russia orientations. However, there are two other factors not taken into consideration. Looking at the loadings after rotation, the following names have been considered to express the factors: 1. Pro-USA factor– High loadings on all pro-USA and on the pro-NATO variables, negative loading on the anti-USA variable and a moderate loading on one of the Russian threat variables 2. Pro-Russia factor – Highest loading on the pro-Putin variable, also high loadings for pro-Russia, negative loadings on positive impact of USA and on confidence in NATO 3. Isolation factor – Anti-Russia statements have the highest loadings, however the pro-USA variables do not load on this variable, but there is a moderate loading for the anti-USA variable. Therefore, this variable represents fear toward Russia together with skepticism toward the positive USA, a preference for isolationism, for going alone. 4. Conciliation factor – The final factor loads highest on pro-NATO and positive- USA variables, but also on the desire for more cooperation with Russia and a positive appreciation of Putin’s actions for the sake of Russia (but not also confidence in USA/Obama or Russia/Putin), therefore a conciliatory attitude toward both world powers, the opposite of the third factor. In agreement with the first hypothesis, there is a small negative correlation between the first two latent variables, however it is not statistically significant (r=-0.05, p=0.15). There is however a strong positive significant correlation between the pro-USA factor and the conciliation factor (r=0.20, p<0.001), meaning that strong pro-Atlantic attitudes tend to be associated with pro-cooperation, and not pro-conflict attitudes toward Russia, without also being associated with confidence in Russia or Putin. The Pro-Russia factor is also partly correlated to the pro-conciliatory factor (r=0.116, sig<0.001). Table 2. SPSS output for Factor Analysis – more analysis in Annexes.

Structure Matrix Factor F1 Pro-USA F2 Pro-Russia F3 Isolation F4 Conciliation ConfUSA .697 .101 .010 .172

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USApositive .639 -.213 .123 .408 ConfOBAMA .634 .076 .053 .096 USAnegative -.323 .060 .312 -.067 ConfPUTIN .039 .917 -.067 .269 ConfRUS .108 .687 -.040 .102 FearRUS -.041 -.110 .644 .030 ThreatPUTIN .227 .013 .538 -.037 ConfNATO .494 -.230 -.184 .619 CloseRUS .106 .121 -.009 .498 ProPUTIN -.069 .333 .051 .404 Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.

Dividing the public into groups in terms of geopolitical preferences Factor scores were calculated based on the described PFA. The distributions of the four factor scores are in the graph below. Except for the last factor, the histograms seem to suggest bimodal distributions rather than normal or at least symmetric distributions. This seems to suggest that the population is divided into groups or “clusters” that have consistent in- group attitudes and conflicting between-group attitudes. This assumption can be tested by using Cluster Analysis Figure 3. Histograms for the four factor scores

The factor scores were fed as input variables into a 2-step Cluster Analysis. Two separate cluster analyses were performed, a reduced analysis including only the first two factor scores (the hypothesized pro-USA and pro-Russia variables), and an extended cluster analysis including all the four factor scores. The simplified cluster analysis yields three clusters as an optimal solution while the more complex cluster analysis yields five clusters as optimal solutions (see Annex for details about BIC and ratio of distance measures).

15 THE IMPACT OF ANTI-WESTERN DISCOURSE IN THE ROMANIAN PUBLIC SPHERE

Figure 4. Outputs for two cluster analyses. Size of clusters, average of factor scores for each cluster and relationship between the two sets of clusters.

The three clusters roughly represent a pro-USA orientation, a pro-Russia orientation and an orientation that can be labeled as neutral, but with certain considerations. This last cluster is more heterogenous than the others, and generally contains people with low confidence in Russian and American policies leaders, but otherwise conflicting views on the two countries: NATO and USA’s roles are positively appreciated but USA-backed corruption is also seen as high, Russia is seen as a threat but demand for conciliation is also high. The five cluster solution offers more nuances. As can be seen from the graph, the pro- USA cluster can be further split into two sub-clusters: a group (C1) where most members see Russia as a threat and another (C2) where the Russian threat is minimalized. The neutral group can be also be split in two, one of indifference or ambivalence (C3), with confidence in NATO and distrust in Russia, but not so much trust in USA and Obama, and a sub-cluster of people skeptical toward the USA as well as Russia (C4) with low values on all items, except the negative influence of USA, that gets a high score, as does fear of Russian aggression; finally, the pro-Russia cluster (C5) is almost identical to the pro-Russian cluster in the simplified solution, where pro-Russia variables close to 100% (except for confidence in Russia, which is still more than 50%), and threat of Russia lower values, but pro-USA items are also high. Graphically, the clusters can be represented with biplots. For the simplified cluster analysis two dimensions suffice for the divisions, while for the complex cluster analysis a three- dimensional analysis is required to separate between the two pro-American groups. Figure 5 shows how the pro-Russian group is clearly separated from the rest, while the difference between pro-American and neutral is less clear, as the many cases in the middle could be classified both ways. Using all four factors, the classification is more complex, the pro-USA clusters differ in regards to the isolation factor.

16 THE IMPACT OF ANTI-WESTERN DISCOURSE IN THE ROMANIAN PUBLIC SPHERE

Figure 5. Cluster membership depending on factor scores, for the simplified 3 cluster solution (left, with pro-USA and pro-Russia factors as axes) and for the 5 cluster solution (right, with Pro-USA and Isolation factors as axes)

Profile of the three clusters: pro-USA, pro-Russia, Neutrals There are not enough cases to make profiles for all 5 groups. But, based on chi-square tests and adjusted standardized residuals (in appendix) of bivariate relationships, the following highlights in the cluster profiles can be made: 1. Pro-Americans (33%) are older than other groups (with a high proportion of pensioners), they are associated with higher media consumption, political knowledge and political participation and are more right wing, but not extreme right 2. Pro-Russians (18%) are younger and use Facebook more often, are more predisposed to civic participation (more trust in people and NGOs, more volunteers and potential volunteers), consider they can influence political decisions more often and tend not to vote for PNL; also more men. 3. Neutrals (48%) are generally suffering from political and electoral apathy, they participate less often to campaigns and protests, have less confidence in institutions, are pessimistic about the country’s direction and are more attracted by the extreme right. Also, more women in this group than men. Bivariate differences in education are not significant, however in a multivariate analysis education becomes significant, with the less educated being more likely to adhere to the pro- Russian group, controlling for all other variables. Similarly, gay marriage is not a dividing factor in bivariate analysis, but being for it becomes associated with the pro-USA group when age is accounted for; however, tolerance in general is more associated with pro-Russia in a multivariate model. Age becomes insignificant when controlling for media consumption, and it seems that consumption of political media increases the odds of being in the pro-American cluster; however, the use of online social networks increases the odds of belonging in the pro-Russian cluster, as does having a more pronounced local identity and civic competence. A partial table for the logistic regression that produced these results is available in Table .

17 THE IMPACT OF ANTI-WESTERN DISCOURSE IN THE ROMANIAN PUBLIC SPHERE

Table 3. Logistic regression , with cluster membership as dependent variable (0=ProUSA, 1=ProRussia).

B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) Constant -1.417 .724 3.830 1 .050 .243 MALE .274 .293 .874 1 .350 1.315 URBAN .456 .303 2.259 1 .133 1.577 AGE 2.684 2 .261 AGE(1) – under 40 .144 .384 .140 1 .708 1.154 AGE(2) – over 65 -.588 .399 2.171 1 .141 .556 EDUCATION (ref: secondary) 3.746 2 .154 EDUCATION - primary(1) .764 .395 3.742 1 .053 2.148 EDUCATION - tertiary(2) .090 .396 .052 1 .820 1.094 FACEBOOK .622 .341 3.323 1 .068 1.863 LOCAL .539 .290 3.451 1 .063 1.714 TOLERANCE .902 .320 7.932 1 .005 2.464 IDEOLOGY3 (ref: center and NA) 8.121 2 .017 IDEOLOGY3(1) – Right-wing .385 .347 1.230 1 .267 1.470 IDEOLOGY3(2) – Left-wing -.721 .358 4.066 1 .044 .486 MEDIA CONSUMPTION -.512 .315 2.648 1 .100 .599 CIVIC COMPETENCE .672 .298 5.082 1 .024 1.957 FOR GAY MARRIAGE -.686 .336 4.166 1 .041 .504 AUTHORITARIANISM -.008 .288 .001 1 .979 .992 SHALE .357 2 .837 SHALE(1) – anti-shale .211 .398 .282 1 .595 1.236 SHALE(2) – pro-shale -.092 .522 .031 1 .861 .913 Note: Neutral category was excluded from this analysis, only pro-USA and pro-Russia are compaired, positive values of b coefficient means a higher likelihood of being pro-Russian rather than pro-USA

18 THE IMPACT OF ANTI-WESTERN DISCOURSE IN THE ROMANIAN PUBLIC SPHERE

Military relationship between Romania and the US

The uncertainty sensed by a country in Romania’s position is complex and is determined by varied elements. Their interconnectedness prevents the public from discerning among its various attachments “in black and white” (like orientation towards the European project or the Euro-Atlantic one). On the contrary, there is a multitude of nuances which we wish to detail here. The Romanian population is attached to NATO, has a positive perception of the military relation with the US and feels protected from Eastern threats. But, when we introduce elements of “soft power” 2 into the discussion, we notice that the relation does not seem as solid. Is Romania’s military relation with the US sufficient to guarantee the Western edifice in Romania? The analysis of data suggests that Romania is confronted with a significant threat of distancing itself from the Western model, on several dimensions. To analyze this, we examined both data regarding trust and responses to the several statements, some of which were used in the factor analysis described earlier (see Table 1). Frequencies for the variables that were not used for that analysis are presented in the following table. Table 4. Frequencies – statements about Romanians’ attitudes

Totally Partially Partially Completely DK/DA agree agree disagree disagree NATO is stronger than Russia 46% 23% 7% 11% 13% Even if we won’t reach energy independence soon, 61% 23% 3% 9% 4% it’s better to look for renewable energy sources, not to exploit shale gas It is essential for Romania to reach energy 54% 18% 9% 15% 4% independence, to avoid being dependent of energy imports, even is this means exploiting shale gas It is important to help the Republic of Moldova to 53% 27% 6% 10% 4% become closer to Western countries I agree that Romania should receive Syrian refugees 6% 16% 14% 62% 2% The anti-missile shield at Deveselu is a good thing 35% 25% 11% 21% 8% for Romania I am very interested in the situation in Crimea and 18% 25% 21% 31% 5% Ukraine

Polling data show that, while Romanians feel protected from a military point of view, when it comes to other types of influence, there are other elements in play, which can be more susceptible to change.

2 According to Joseph Nye, “soft power” describes a nation’s ability to attract or to be persuasive, beyond the “hard”, military component. It includes aspects pertaining to values, cultural influence, even manipulation (Nye, 2004 a). Using this concept, the author also explains the decrease of the American influence in the world during the George W. Bush administration and shows its virtues during the Cold War, when the successful doctrine of containment against the USSR not only limited the military and economic power of the Eastern bloc, but also its influence in the world (Nye, 2004b). The author also underlines that “soft power depends on credibility, and when governments are perceived as manipulative and information is seen as propaganda, then credibility is destroyed” and identifies three sources of “soft power”: culture (as long as it is attractive to others), political values (when they are admired both home and abroad) and foreign policy (when it seems supported by moral authority) (Nye, 2011)

19 THE IMPACT OF ANTI-WESTERN DISCOURSE IN THE ROMANIAN PUBLIC SPHERE

- Military: trust in partners (including NATO) is high, as is trust in the army and in the statement that a potential conflict with Russia would not lead to defeat. - Economy: the attitude is much more nuanced – the highest economical influence in Romania, as perceived by Romanians, is European and American, but Romanians also believe in economic cooperation with Russia, if possible. - Ideology: Romanians are confused because of the crisis of the European project. - Culture: the EU holds more influence in Romania than the US, which makes the Romanians more dependent on the EU in this area.

An element deriving from a component of soft power – the image of invincibility and power, projected by the use of active military resources – also influences Romanians’ perception. Thus, this image of invincibility built by the Russian leader Vladimir Putin influences this perception, generating both fear and a type of admiration.

If we try to test public opinion about more subtle elements, such as other types of influence beside the military one, we notice a few interesting, even counterintuitive facts. Respondents were asked about assessment of and preference for external influences in four areas (military, economical, cultural and civil society), with USA, the EU, Russia, the Balkans or neither of them as possible answers. - Romanians perceive the European Union as having a stronger influence over the Romanian society than the US. The US is perceived as the main influence when it comes to the Army. Regarding other aspects more present in everyday life, such as economy, culture, civil society, the main perceived influence is the European Union. - Russia’s perceived influence over Romania is small compared to the EU and US influence. Only in the military area the answers indicate a bigger influence (with no potential significance), but this can be explained by the interpretation of the question. Russia is not perceived as a country which influences Romania. The Balkan area has a stronger perception of influence when it comes to culture or economy – a normal fact explained by neighborhood. - The answers marked “neither” can be interpreted as nationalism, or internal influence over the respective issues. 15% of Romanians don’t accept any external source of influence over their own culture – which can be interpreted as trust in the prevalence of local culture.

Supplementary, we asked another question about the desired source of influence in the future in relation to the same areas. This indicator measures aspiration rather than assessment. - The EU remains the strongest influencer when it comes to desirable future influence. Romanians wish for a bigger role of the EU, including in the military area.

20 THE IMPACT OF ANTI-WESTERN DISCOURSE IN THE ROMANIAN PUBLIC SPHERE

- The only area where there is no decrease for US is the economic influence – Romanians want a stronger presence and economic influence from the US on their country, which indirectly marks a current deficit noticeable in the official statistics as well. - Beside the wish for a greater EU influence in all areas, the only area which registers a similar increase is the influence form “neither”. Between 15% and 18% of Romanians want no foreign influence over their country. - In consequence, Romania’s dependence from the US is in minority in all aspects we measured, which indicates the fact that the proportion of the consistently pro-American Romanians currently represents a minority (under 50%).

21 THE IMPACT OF ANTI-WESTERN DISCOURSE IN THE ROMANIAN PUBLIC SPHERE

Figure 6. Current influence over Romania

Which of the following holds most influence over Romania currently when it comes to...

Civil society and mass-media 25% 6% 32% 5% 10% 22%

Military 46% 10% 22% 1%7% 14%

Economy 17% 3% 54% 6% 6% 14%

Culture 17% 6% 37% 10% 15% 15%

0% 25% 50% 75% 100%

US Russia EU The Balkans None DN/NA

Figure 7. The future desirable influence over Romania…

Who would you prefer to influence Romania more in the case of...

Civil society and mass-medie 17% 3% 46% 5% 16% 13%

Military 31% 5% 36% 2% 15% 11%

Economy 19% 2% 49% 5% 15% 10%

Culture 11%1% 46% 9% 18% 15%

0% 25% 50% 75% 100%

US Russia EU The Balkans None DN/NA

22 THE IMPACT OF ANTI-WESTERN DISCOURSE IN THE ROMANIAN PUBLIC SPHERE

The influence of geopolitical positioning on participation to civic and political life

The discussion about civic participation is important – since Romania registers a very low level of such engagement, compared to the EU and the US. By lacking an authentic civil society, participatory spirit and social capital, Romania is a society that depends on the performance of its institutions and its economy. If they do not produce concrete results for the population, there is a high risk that the most Euro-optimist country in the EU becomes one of the most vulnerable in the region. Data from two similar surveys, described in the methodological section were used for this part of the analysis. When comparing data sets from 2012 and 2016, we notice a decline in civic participation, especially in its aspirational component, in the context of the decline of the values supporting participation (tolerance, solidarity) and of a polarization regarding the credibility of NGOs, towards which most Romanians manifest a passive attitude. Also, there is a reduced attachment towards the local environment, which is associated with stronger social conflicts, and a lower affiliation to religious organizations suggest a weakening of community bonds and implicitly of community participation. Voting remains the main form of public participation in Romania, at a similar level compared to 2012 (Infopolitic, 2016). The degree of information about candidates and programs is perceived as superior, although media consumption registers a lower level. Political participation is on the rise in all its forms, from more frequent political communication to the likelihood of taking part in campaigns and the challenging of political elites through protest (even unauthorized). On the other side, a rise in extreme right orientation can be noticed, as well as a reduced disposition to interact with people having different political opinions. Some of these differences can be noticed in the table below, for the rest please consult the report. Table 5. Differences between indicators of civic culture (2012 and 2016)

2012 2016 verdict min max min max Has a local rather than national or European identity 66.9% 69.5% 53.9% 61.2% decrease Has moderate or high confidence in NGOs 29.4% 32.0% 25.7% 32.3% same Does not reject 4 out of 5 minorities as neighbors 43.5% 46.3% 28.9% 35.8% decrease Member in a voluntary association 24.0% 26.4% 14.2% 19.7% decrease Read or watch political news daily 59.0% 61.7% 47.8% 55.2% decrease Interested in the next elections 56.2% 58.9% 59.2% 66.3% increase Discuss politics with friends 51.8% 54.5% 60.3% 67.4% increase Have participated or would participate to campaigns 45.8% 48.5% 58.3% 65.5% increase Have participated or would participate to protests 60.0% 62.7% 70.9% 77.3% increase Source: CSCI 2012, CSCI july 2016 Note: Confidence intervals were constructed for all measures in 2012 and 2016. When the confidence intervals do not overlap, then there is a high chance that a change has taken place.

23 THE IMPACT OF ANTI-WESTERN DISCOURSE IN THE ROMANIAN PUBLIC SPHERE

Can the preference for USA or Russia influence civic and political participation? Theoretically, liberal values from USA, higher social capital, and a more open society should be associated with all indicators of participation. Logistic regressions have been employed to test whether the odds of civic or political participation increase when pro-USA attitudes are more positive. Civic participation was measured as membership in at least one voluntary association or foundation (1=yes, 0=no). Political participation was measured in its two aspects – conventional and unconventional – having participated to at least one party-driven political campaign action (running for office, handing out flyers, gathering signatures, attending rallies, convincing others to vote) and to at least one type of protest (petition, boycott, marches, strikes, occupying buildings) in the last two years (1=yes, 0=no for both variables). Potential participation was also tested for all three (1=has participated or may participate in the future; 0 = has not participated and does not wish to do so in the future). Table 6. Logistic regression tables for participation in voluntary associations, political campaigns and protests, either in the past (first) or potential future participation (second table) 3

MEMBER NGO PART. CAMPAIGN PART. PROTESTS M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2 B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. F_ProUSA .27 .06 .16 .35 .53 .00 .34 .01 .38 .00 .34 .01 F_ProRUS .31 .01 .00 .98 .17 .06 .00 .99 .10 .26 .00 .99 F_Isolation -.23 .11 .02 .90 .05 .66 .11 .41 -.08 .45 .11 .41 F_Conciliation -.66 .00 -.46 .01 -.09 .45 -.32 .03 -.32 .01 -.32 .03

POT. VOLUNTEER POT. CAMPAIGN POT. PROTESTS M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2 B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. F_ProUSA -.21 .05 -.13 .28 .17 .10 .09 .45 -.07 .55 -.03 .83 F_ProRUS .31 .00 .29 .01 .11 .24 .05 .66 .20 .06 .10 .44 F_Isolation .17 .11 .19 .12 .20 .06 .26 .04 .18 .14 .25 .08 F_Conciliation -.17 .17 -.18 .21 .09 .45 .00 .97 -.05 .69 -.21 .21 Note: M1 doesn’t use any other controls, M2 controls for gender, age, education, residence, subjective wellbeing, voting preferences, media consumption, civic competence, tolerance, optimism. Coefficients for controls were not shown as to not take up too much space. A full regression table can be provided on request.

3 A significance level of .05 is generally used in social sciences, but because of the sample size, we also marked coefficients with a significance value of .1, not without giving a caution for over-interpreting weak relationships.

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When not controlling for other variables except the geopolitical ones, the pro USA factor is positively associated with all forms of actual participation – membership in NGOs (odds of participation increase by 30% for a one standard deviation increase in pro-USA attitudes), participation to at least one campaign activity (odds increase by 70%) and participation to at least one form of protest (odds increase by 45%) in the last 2 years. The pro-Russia factor is also associated with higher campaign and protest participation, but with lower values. The conciliation factor is associated with lower levels of participation. When other variables are controlled for, especially age, education, ideology and voting behavior, the influence of the pro-Russia factor disappears. However, the influence of the pro- American factor remains positive, even though it diminishes to an odds increase of 40% in both campaign and protests. Thus, regardless of gender, age or political preference, having more confidence in NATO, USA and its leaders increased the odds of having participated to a political activity in the past. The results for predictors of potential participation are quite different. Pro-USA factor is not significant when controlling for other variables, it is only positively associated with potential to participate in campaign before other controls are thrown in. Being pro-American means having more often participated to political life, but not necessarily wanting to participate if one hasn’t already done so. The pro-Russian factor is positively associated with potential civic participation (through NGOs), and the relationship remains when adding age, voting intention or civic competence. It is not associated with potential political participation. The isolation factor is positively associated with potential campaign and protest participation. Those who look neither to USA nor Russia tend to want to be more involved locally in campaigns or protests.

DISCUSSION

In this section, we re-evaluate the hypotheses in light of the results obtained and briefly discuss the potential implications of the findings.

H1: Romanians are beginning to temper their euro-optimistic and pro-Atlanticist tone, as a result of the complex European and global context. Partly confirmed. Several sources in the survey indicate a halt in the rising tendency of these options. Although they remain pro-Western in their majority, Romanians’ pro-West affinity growth has tempered. Moreover, the number of euro sceptics and neutrals is again rising. The Romanian public has always been known as Euro-optimistic, being one of the strongest supporters of the European project. After adhering to the EU, the global economic crisis followed, with all its effects, which included, in Romania, the implementation of some of the harshest austerity measures in Europe. Although later the austerity program was alleviated with several reparatory measures, the effects had a strong impact and the economic revival which followed later generated only partially a change of tonus in society. In the last two years, the

25 THE IMPACT OF ANTI-WESTERN DISCOURSE IN THE ROMANIAN PUBLIC SPHERE convulsions on the Continent (refugee crisis, terrorist acts, Brexit) resulted in an increasingly confused image of the European Union, which contributed to the decrease of trust in the EU as registered in the latest Eurobarometer surveys. Trust in NATO seems to hold a superior legitimacy compared to the US in the perception of the Romanian public. When we study trust in these two entities (USA and NATO) we observe that there is a significant portion of the population which trusts both, but at the same time the segment which only trusts NATO is larger than the one solely trusting the US. While generally paralleling the trust in UE, it remains more stable in the last year than the previous indicator. In the theoretical construct we wish to verify, we also introduce the observation that Eastern Europe becomes, in the current context, a special area, with a particular significance for the solidity and security of the Western project. Of all Eastern European states, on account of size (of the population, territory, economy) and geopolitical positioning, two are especially important for supporting the Western project – Poland and Romania4.

H2 a: Most Romanians still position themselves as pro-Western/American. The pro-Russian public is in minority. Mostly confirmed– indeed, pro-American Romanians outnumber the pro-Russian Romanians, but the pro-Americans do not outnumber the neutral or ambivalent public. Romania is clearly more pro-American than pro-Russian, as even the cluster deemed skeptical towards USA has higher appreciation for the country and its leader than for Russia and Putin. The cluster with consistent pro-American attitudes contains more than a third of the population, and it can be divided into two equal subgroups: pro-Americans that fear Russian hostility toward Romania and pro-Americans not concerned about Russia. The so called neutrals are not enthusiastic about USA, but they do rate it higher than Russia, though not as high as the pro- Americans. As the neutrals do not show any affinity toward the East and are characterized by higher levels of political apathy compared to the public that takes sides, it is unclear what direction they will go.

H2 b: Romanians can be divided into three clusters: one cluster that is pro-American and (partly) anti-Russia, one cluster that is pro-Russia and (partly) anti-American, and one cluster of “neutrals”, which is very important from the point of view of exposure to manipulation or propaganda.

4 We find an emphasis on the role of the larger countries on the Eastern NATO front - Poland, Romania, and Turkey – in several papers. For example, the 3 countries are analyzed together in papers by Turkish university centers: Adam Balcer shows that the Black Sea region has become a region where Russian aggression is growingly manifest and the bilateral cooperation of the three states has strengthened (Balcer, 2015). A policy paper published in 2013 by The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), insists on the need to strengthen bilateral relations in order to strengthen the position of the two countries as bastions of NATO and the EU in the region (Kulesa et al, 2013). The same reality inspired less academic, but no less publicly influential works analyzing the future perspectives of Eastern European states in a context where Russia would be displeased by the affirmation of countries such as Poland or Romania. Friedman (2012) analyses Russia’s strategy to destabilize NATO and isolate Eastern Europe.

26 THE IMPACT OF ANTI-WESTERN DISCOURSE IN THE ROMANIAN PUBLIC SPHERE

Partly confirmed. There is a possible classification of three clusters, and the first is correctly stated in the hypothesis. However, the second cluster is pro-Russia without being anti-American and the third one is a heterogeneous cluster, containing both anti-Americans (but not pro- Russians) and indifferent persons. The 3 main groups (US, Russia, neutrals) are not antagonistic. The saying “those who are not with us are against us” does not hold to the Romanian public; pro- Americans rarely give positive appreciations of Russia, but pro-Russians usually give high scores to USA/NATO, while those skeptical of USA and NATO are not pro-Russia, but rather isolationist. The pro-Russian group numbers below 20%, however it is for the most part also not overtly anti- American, but rather a conciliatory group which does not see Russia as a threat. Some of the results are unexpected. Younger than their pro-American counterparts, Putin and Russia supporters in Romania do not appear to be infused with authoritarian values, but tend to be more favorable to an open society and to civic participation. They do not seem to be more frustrated than the pro-Americans. It is the neutrals that are either apathetic or tempted by extremism. Furthermore, a more complex classification yields 5 clusters – 2 pro-American (one concerned by Russia’s aggression and one un-concerned) and 2 neutral (one of them being slightly more skeptical towards the USA).

H3: There are two negatively correlated latent variables: attitude toward USA & NATO, attitude toward Russia. This means that these categories of public are different and divergent.

Unconfirmed. There are four latent variables, the first two being the hypothesized ones. The correlation between them is not statistically significant and there are two other latent variables: isolationism (or fear of Russia without expecting help from NATO) and conciliation (acknowledging USA and NATO’s positive effect in Romania, but wishing to improve relations with Russia and a certain tolerance toward Putin’s actions). The publics are not as divergent as hypothesized. Rather, it seems that both USA and Russia affinities contrast less with each other (as they both correlate with the conciliatory factor) but with an attitude of generalized distrust toward the great powers. A potential rise in nationalism will probably be associated with this variable.

H4: The solidity of the strategic – military relationship between Romania and the US is not sufficient to guarantee the strength of this edifice. We want to verify if the attachment towards the military relationship between Romania and the US is also to be found in other domains – our hypothesis being that the military and security dimension is the most important. Confirmed. Data suggest that Romanians are convinced by the Western military support in case of need and by the strong US military influence. But, when it comes to other areas, the US influence is not perceived as strong. Romanians perceive and wish for a stronger influence from the EU, in comparison to the US – regarding culture, economy, civil society. The explanation comes from the direct connection with the European space after the 2007 integration and the

27 THE IMPACT OF ANTI-WESTERN DISCOURSE IN THE ROMANIAN PUBLIC SPHERE various connections in the economic and cultural sphere. There is a minority that does not wish for any external influence - we can assume this is the nationalist area, which is receptive towards a nationalist message, advocating the distancing from the traditional partners of Romania – the EU and the US. This potential of the nationalist message is convergent to current situations in other countries –UK, France, Italy, Germany, Turkey, as well as the US.

H5: The pro-American cluster contains higher proportions of young, educated, urban people, while the pro-Russian cluster contains higher proportions of older, rural, less educated and poorer Romanians Unconfirmed. The demographic composition of the clusters does not suggest that the American cluster contains younger and more educated people with higher SES. Actually, pro-Americans tend to be older than pro-Russians, a group that contains more social media use and higher levels of tolerance and civic competence. However, pro-Americanism is associated with more political media consumption and improved political knowledge and controlling for other variables, less people with no secondary education. Younger internet users have a more nuanced geopolitical position, and are less willing to choose sides.

H6: Being pro-American is associated with a participant civic culture (a higher degree of tolerance, civic and political participation), while being pro-Russian is more associated with a parochial civic culture (passivity, distrust in institutions, less civic and political participation) Partly Confirmed. After controlling for other factors, attachment to NATO and USA is indeed positively correlated with actual political participation, whether conventional or non- conventional and attachment to Russia and Putin is not associated with any type of actual participation. However, being pro-USA is not associated with a higher degree of tolerance (except maybe to homosexuals) and civic participation though NGOs, and is not associated with increased potential participation, while being pro-Russian is associated with an increased desire to do voluntary work. This happens against the background of the general decrease in civic participation in Romania. The intensity of all these relationships is not very strong, a fact which speaks against the theory of a congruence between admiring the USA and the adoption of American values. A greater predisposition towards political participation does not translate to a greater civic participation – on the contrary. This fact, in the context of rising intolerance and lack of trust in people and institutions, indicates a society lacking internal cohesion, still marked by parochial elements and not fully capable to affirm its new democratic virtues.

CONCLUSION

The main finding of this paper is the five-cluster division of the Romanian population, when only a three-cluster system was expected. There are two equally-sized pro-American groups that differ on the issue of perceived Russian threat, one neutral group, one isolationist

28 THE IMPACT OF ANTI-WESTERN DISCOURSE IN THE ROMANIAN PUBLIC SPHERE group and one pro-Russian group. There is an unexpected asymmetry in the nature of the partisan groups: there is little affinity for Russia or its leader among pro-Americans, but the same is not true in reverse: the pro-Russia cluster generally offers high ratings to NATO, USA and its leader, they are conciliatory rather than conflictual. The fact that the pro-Russian group is not limited to disadvantaged groups (poor, rural, low education) and also includes young politically active internet users becomes less of a concern when the above mentioned asymmetry is taken into consideration. Members of this group may wish for a more harmonious relationship with Russia, however most of them also have a positive view on NATO and USA. Although a significant portion of the neutral public is not susceptible to direct pro- Russia propaganda and, at the same time, a good portion of the public is not receptive to an explicit anti-US propaganda (due to the good image of the US in Romania), the neutral segment (almost half of the Romanian population) can be influenced more efficiently by undermining values central to the Western democratic model and elements connected to the European project. In addition, in light of the finding that affinity toward the USA is less ideologically driven than pragmatic in nature (as Romanians adhering to these groups do not exhibit a much stronger attachment to democracy or the ideals of an open society, but only higher levels of political activism), it is a matter of concern that at least the pro-American group that fears the Russian military strength may decline in numbers if perceived military support from NATO decreases, giving rise to nationalist and isolationist sentiments. The main limitations of this analysis have to do with the reduced capacity for insightful analysis, on account of a limited sample (a little under 800 cases). If other data regarding general information (such as trust level, attitudes towards the EU, US, Russia, as well as characteristics of civic participation) are already confirmed by other Romanian and European research, a thorough analysis of the characteristics of the pro-American and pro-Russian public, with all needed nuances (distribution in several clusters, such as the 5 identified above) would mean reapplying the research on bigger samples, and also varying the data collection method to include face-to-face interviews and/or self-applied internet surveys. Furthermore, the analysis regarding public opinion through surveys should be completed by other types of analysis – such as opinion mining on data extracted from the public space (in order to assess the agenda of opinion makers, as well as to evaluate comments in social media). The necessity of new research arises from the complexity of the current context in Eastern Europe – where new disputes arise outside the classic military area and focus on more subtle influences, developed by indirect attempts of undermining desirable values.