STREAMS 9 Political Sociology

The idea of bi-nationalism in Palestine

Abaher El- Sakka Abaher El- Sakka Doctorant/Ph.D Student Centre Nantais de Sociologie CENS Maison des Sciences de l'Homme Ange Guépin 21, boulevard Gaston-Doumergue B.P. 76 235 44262 Nantes Cedex 2 France E-mail:[email protected] Tél. (+33) 02 40 20 65 15; Fax. (+33) 02 40 20 65 11

Paper prepared for the 6th Congress of the European Association of Sociology, Ageing Societies, New Sociology" in Murcia – Spain (September 23-26, 2003)

The idea of bi-nationalism in Palestine Resume

Bi-nationalism in the Palestinian context expresses the idea that the land of Mandate Palestine should be transformed into a secular state - a constitutional-liberal state, with Arabs and Jews as its national citizens. This is the perception of most Palestinian political groups, who have adopted bi-nationalism as an objective, with a secular democratic state of Jews, Christians, and Muslims. In the intellectual elite thinking, bi-nationalism creates expectations and prospects of political action that are either unrealisable or counterproductive. Conceptually, the idea raises interesting issues about extra-territorial nationalism and ethnicity, but practically it is unpopular. We ask about the manner in which pre-existing elements of bi-nationalism are reconfigured and used to give shape to visions. We also ask about the impact of powerful shocks and of the extreme stress on the framing of the question of identity, and the role of contingent external factors in shaping national identity. What is an accurate reflection of public opinion regarding bi-nationalism? This approach sees national, trans-national identity or post-identity as constructed. How are they also compelled to rethink their relationship with neighbouring Arab states, particularly around cultural factors? While it now has the status of a "utopian" political proposal, talking about bi-nationalism in practical terms may force people to confront more seriously the limits of alternative approaches? Would a bi-national state agenda self-consciously incorporate Palestinian refugees, living in refugee camps outside of the territories of , as equally entitled to citizenship in the new state?. This study will be supported by field research.

1 Introduction

Fifty-five years after the creation of the state of Israel in Palestine, alnakba - for , catastrophe- the Middle East, continues to be in a state of instability and ongoing cycles of war and violence. Since the Nakba, with the occupation of their land, their exodus, and the denial of their right to the establishment of an independent sovereign state that would assure them of their rights to dignity and progress, Palestinians have searched for alternative solutions. Since 1948 Palestinians looked to find solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In its regional context, the case of Palestine/Israel raises at least six possible political frameworks: two states, in which the Palestinian entity is either a truly independent state or a dependent bantustan; a federal bi-national state; an inclusive unitary state; apartheid, or a regional confederation.

We explore the most contemplated solution in the past 30 years - the two-state solution, which the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) adopted in 1978 and is allegedly the framework of the current peace process initiated with the Oslo Accords of 1993. This solution is based on Israeli withdrawal from all Palestinian territories that it occupied in 1967 and the formation of an independent Palestinian state on those territories. Soon after the PLO came into being in the mid-sixties, it expounded the idea of a single secular, democratic state, very much in the spirit of other contemporary movements for national liberation of the time. Israel would be abolished, although the Jews could continue to live in Palestine - under Palestinian sovereignty - as citizens with equal rights. I would like to note here that this slogan or proposal is different to that of a bi-national state .The concept of a Palestinian state was raised only towards the end of the 1970s. This came after the Geneva Conference for the Negotiations Between the Arab States and Israel whose conclusions showed that Israel would supposedly be willing to make territorial compromises, especially after the war of 1973. Elements in the PLO thought that if the lands occupied in 1967 could be returned to the Arab states, then it would be equally possible for the Palestinians to receive back part of these lands [the West Bank and Gaza Strip] and establish their own state. The PLO soon altered this slogan. After the war 1973, the PLO won international recognition. In the following year the Arab states acknowledged it as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

The turning point was in the period when the PLO began promoting the idea of a transitional phase in which a Palestinian state would first arise in just the West Bank and Gaza. For the first time it seemed as though the tools might be at hand, internationally, to transform slogan into reality. Aside from these concerns, Palestinian groups that advocate a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza gain support for such a state as part of what is known as al Barnamij al Marhali (the “Stages Programme”). Emile Tuma1 raised a justified objection to the idea in the late 1970s when he suggested that for decades the Palestinian national movement had fought to establish the unity of the Palestinian people in their

1 Palestinian leader and author, and a founder of the communist party.

2 struggle for independence under the banner of secular nationalism2 This program was introduced by the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine in 1975 and then adopted by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1978. It calls for the establishment of a Palestinian state in any part of Palestine that is liberated or from which the Israelis withdraw. That program, however, which was linked to armed struggle, was summarily dismissed before it had even been debated, in order to accommodate the Arab states agenda of a diplomatic struggle. The PLO would scale down its national ambitions and accept a two-state approach, while the Arab states would provide diplomatic and material help for an independent Palestinian "mini"-state alongside Israel.

In November 1988, the PNC meeting in Algiers formally accepted the existence of two separate states, Israel and the new Palestine. In 1997, Yasser Arafat announced that the PLO would declare the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on May 4 1999. Though this never happened, he has been reiterating this position ever since. Despite the fact, the exact borders of the proposed state have not been defined, despite the hearsay form the Camp David and Taba talks in 2000-2001, the idea of such an entity beside Israel has taken become solid. As a result, the idea of two states as the preferred solution to the conflict has become so dominant. Especially in this period of second Intifada and recent third Gulf War delivered by the American-British alliance in Iraq. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the impasse, which allowed Libyan president Qadaffi to propose the creation of the state of “Israttil” – Palestine and Israel in the same state, and the integration of Israel in the Arab league! Recently, one British group attempted to provide an international protection movement in the West Bank and Gaza, which they justified by highlighting successes in resolving international conflicts such as Kosovo, Rwanda and Timor3.

Let us examine the idea of a bi-national state which has never been a serious proposal. Now it arises again, precisely when the Palestinian cause seems worse off than ever. Is there significance in the timing? We will examine the details of the current situation on the ground as well as the political situation, to show how indecision could lead to a bi-national state.

The Idea

The notion of a bi-national state was never even close to becoming reality, and surely it is no closer now. Why then are people reviving the idea at this time? A handful of Israeli leftists and Palestinian academics had revived the idea of Jewish-Arab bi-nationalism in recent years, but since the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, such ideas have been forgotten. Instead, various versions of partition have come to form the loose core of a weak and troubled consensus in the diplomatic community. A bi-national state is

2 Salim Tamari, "The Dubious Lure of Bi-nationalism," in the Journal of Palestinan Studies 117 (Autumn 2000), Salim Tamari is director of the Institute for Studies, and associate professor of sociology at Birzeit University. 3 Al-Quds Al-arabi volume 14-issue 4248 Thusuday 16 January ?2003

3 a state with two major nationalities that compete for political power. A bi-national state means that current Israel/ historical Mandate Palestine would absorb Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. A bi-national state is an option that neither side wants, but is doomed to occur if indecision persists Bi-national states are hard enough to keep together eg Canada, Switzerland Belgium, Cyprus. Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia no longer exist but there are many successful models operating in countries with distinct national groups. The distinct Jewish and Palestinian national characters may be safeguarded by way of a bi-national system of government. Palestinian residents and Israeli Jews would coexist in the common citizenship of one-state. This means that each nation would have its own institutions and elected representatives that, together, promote the interests of both nations within a central government. Now we will define a bi-national state, as defined by both partisans and opposition, and then explore the argumentations and critics for both sides of the issue.

The Bi-National State Solution

Historical background

In 1925, the Jews in Mandate Palestine were a tiny minority of the population and Zionism was not perceived as a movement capable of drawing masses of Jewry to come to settle in Palestine. At the time, it seemed that the presence of Jews in Palestine would be dependent on the good will of the Arab population, while the bi-national concept suggested by the “Brit Shalom” [Peace Alliance] movement unified the entire Jewish population against it. The Jewish intellectual, Judah Magnes, and Martin Buber, the renowned Jewish theologian , struggled to create a bi-national state in the pre-1948 period, but never had a large audience for his views. However, there was little support in Palestine itself for the bi-national idea. It was clearly rejected by Arab leaders, and on the Jewish side only the most left-wing groups supported it. There was some resonance4 in communist parties who reclaimed the democratic state slogans in 1947 in a transcript of their testimony before the Anglo-American Commission of Inquiry which, in 1946, investigated Jewish and Arab claims in Palestine and made recommendations for the future of the territory, then under British rule. In the same period, the concept of a bi-national state returns in Bosnia and Ireland. In this period, the only Slovenian ethnic party to arise as such was the Slovenian Democratic Union, which was represented by only one adviser.5 The Communist Party, left asserting bi-national (with two bodies of press, one in Italian, one in Slovenian. A particular case is that of the Communist "Titoists", whose party continued an independent existence since expulsion from the Yugoslav Communist Party of the Comintern in 1948 for defending the concept of a bi-national state.

4 Omar Hilmi Alghol, osabet al tahrir al wattani,fi falestin, national liberation community 1943-1948m ;mkhtarat , Beyrouth,p77m, see also, Bayan Neyehed Alhout, political leadership, intuitionsin Palestine, 1948-1917, Dar Alhouda, Beyrouth,1986; Maher Alsharif, Communism and Arabic nationalism in Palestine 1948-1919, researches socialist center in the Arab word, Beyrouth1986. 5 Bogdan NOVAK, Trieste 1941-1954: The ethnic, political and ideological struggle, Chicago - London, The University of Chicago Press, 1970.

4

There is, therefore, nothing new in the outrage of Israelis about raising the idea of a "bi-national" state, since it has always been perceived as the eradication of the Jewish-Zionist state6.”.Whether Palestine should be governed by majority rule or by a multi-cultural framework, was a question that was much debated by the members of “Brit Shalom”. They concluded that having a dominant people decide the terms of the dominated would lead to friction of such a magnitude that it would eventually lead to war. Instead they proposed a solution built on the principle of parity, by which they meant that the different nationalities would coexist side by side. This for them meant a bi-national state7, or at least that was the programme espoused by Magnes, the undisputed leader of the organisation. In 1942 Hashomer Hatzair joined the League for Arab-Jewish Rapprochement and Cooperation. Its goal was nothing less than an international federation of workers that "would lead the socialist revolution in Palestine when the time came8 .

Ammon Raz-Krakotzin9 explores Hannah Arendt’s views regarding Israel and Palestine, with special emphasis on her support for bi-nationalism. "The problem created by the concept of a Jewish state remains, even as part of a solution that would guarantee a Palestinian nation in the occupied territories. […] Because it implies the exclusion by Israeli Palestinians and brings out a double standard of the Israeli regime " - that is, a distinction between the State and national identity. She has continued to defend the concept of a bi-national state. UN mediator for Palestine, Count Folke Bernadotte, described the idea in 1948 as "an offence against the principles of elemental justice”. Recent new books by Michel Warschawski10 focus on figures of the Israeli left who have reclaimed this idea.

Actors and Arguments

The major proponents of the idea among the Palestinians are from the Palestinian Diaspora, for example, , who purports that the bi-national state is not just a short-term solution, but a long- term one. He believes that a bi-national state is really not a dramatic change from the status quo only some groups are for a bi-national state, but there are major forces that are motivating the establishment of a Palestinian state, inside Israel and in Palestine also. The bi-national solution was first presented and discussed by Azmi Bishara.11 Bishara’s group continues to lobby for equal rights for Palestinian Arabs and the establishment of a bi-national state within Israel. Bishara maintains that a bi-national state

6 Meron Benvenisti The Bi-national Option ,Ha'aretz, 7th November 2002

8 Cohen, A.. Israel and the Arab World. Boston, Beacon Press,1970 9 Hannah Arendt and the issue of bi-nationalism in Palestine, R.E.P. n°19 (71) Spring, 1999, see also Alain DieckhofF, Démocratie et ethnicité en Israël Sociologie et sociétés, vol. XXXI, n° 2, automne 1999 United States Institute of Peace, 1995). 10 Michel Warschawski, “Israël-Palestine, le défi bi-national”. Post-scriptum d’Elias Sanbar, ed. Textuel, fév. 2001. 11ban Arab political figures,MK Azmi Bishara, and his party, the National Democratic Assembly and leading figure in the Palestinian nationalist.

5 arrangement should be proposed only if the Palestinians fail to secure an independent Palestinian state in the territories occupied in 1967.

Others have suggested a bi-national state, though the chance of such a proposal being accepted by Israel is about equal to ending the Occupation. Alternative Visions for Peace, Palestinian-American Naseer Aruri, Lama Auoda, Samih Aufraha, present a detailed proposal for the bi-national state project12 . From the early 1990s the bi-national state solution was supported by Ghada Karmi and others. Adel Mena'a and Nadim Ruhna, have been trying to change Palestinian national strategic goals. The members of the group are convinced that instead of working to establish an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel, and to turn Israel into a state for all its citizens, the Palestinians should aspire to establish a Palestinian-Jewish bi-national state. Ashrawi13 believes that, although a “two-state solution” is still possible, Israeli policies run the risk of creating a bi-national state by default. In Ashrawi’s estimation, this eventuality would condemn Palestinians and Israelis to a situation where they are “locked into two absolutist ideologies that are mutually exclusive.”

Foundations

For, the defender this idea14, the Oslo 1993 agreement is a bad agreement. Palestinians agreed to recognize Israel, but they also agreed, without safeguards or conditions, to postpone the issues that matter most to Palestinians, namely the question of sovereignty, land and water, the Jewish settlements in their midst, Jerusalem, and the refugees. In particular, by leaving the question of Palestinian sovereignty and that of the Jewish settlements as things "to be decided," they elevated the Israeli claim to an undefined part of the West Bank, as if it were equivalent to the claim of the Palestinians. The state of Israel comprises 78% of Mandatory Palestine, leaving the Palestinians with only 22%. Even if the Occupation ends completely, the viability of any Palestinian state is still doubtful. If the occupation does not end and Israel's “Matrix of Control” remains, then the "two-state solution" becomes merely a guise for apartheid. The likelihood that Israel would cede major portions of its territory to a Palestinian state is extremely remote. The Oslo agreements never recognized Israel as an occupying power within the parameters of international law. Moreover, Oslo was grounded in the existence of Israel solely as a state for the Jews, which precludes genuine coexistence with the Palestinian people on any equal basis15. The two-state solution leaves Israel a "Jewish state", and does not address the status of the Palestinians living in Israel. Indeed, it does address the tremendous intertwining and intermingling of the two peoples, who have been

12 see on http:www.bostonreview.net 13 Professor of English Lit at Bir Zayt, On the advisory council of, & spokeswoman for, Palestinian delegation at Madrid process from Oct91, PA Minister for Higher Education (Jun96-98, spokeswomen of the Arab League on 11Jul01 14 Ghada Karmi A Secular Democratic State in Historic Palestine: An Idea Whose Time Has Come? Al-Adab (Lebanon), July 2002 (Translated from Arabic) 15 Naseer Aruri is Chancellor Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts Darmouth. “One State, One Solution,”, No. 75, 10 May 2001. and see also, Nasser Aruri Dishonest Broker : The Role of the United States in Palestine and Israel,2003 South End Press.

6 described as "intimate enemies". But there is another, more dangerous twist to the "two-state solution:" its usefulness in imposing on the Palestinians a bantustan16 along the lines of those South Africa tried to create during the apartheid era. The same "two-state solution" can cut either way, then. It can be a constructive step towards true Palestinian self-determination within a viable regional framework, or it can represent a permanent state of apartheid. The difference between the two is not only territorial. Leaving only a strategic 10-15% of the West Bank under Israeli control would spell the difference between a viable Palestinian state with the potential to develop, and a bantustan. Israel is banking on the anxiousness of the international community to remove this conflict from the agenda, and thus on its reluctance to "quibble" about a few percentages of land. This is why "viability" must be part of the equation, not merely Palestinian statehood. The major problems confronting the Palestinians cannot be addressed in the mini- state that would emerge. Even if the entire Occupation were removed, a Palestinian state on only 22% of the country has little chance of economic development, let alone addressing the refugee issue. By shifting both the issues of viability and of the refugees to the region as a whole, a greater degree of latitude is available than confining them to the particular size, resources and characteristics of the Palestinian state. “If we begin to understand and perceive the situation from the perspective of an "apartheid regime" - something that still remains to be done - and not within the limiting framework of the "1967 occupation", we will start thinking of strategies that lead to liberation of two nationalities in one state17”

For some, Oslo proved that the Palestinian nationalist objective was unattainable (Abu-Odeh18). According to the Oslo Accords in 1995 (Oslo II), there is a clear delineation of control into zones A, B, and C. In zone A (15-18% of the West Bank), Palestinians have full control of security and administration. In zone B (20% of the West Bank), Palestinians have administrative control and Israel has control over security for the region. In zone C (62-65% of the West Bank), Israel has complete control over security and administration. As one can clearly see, the PA has full control over only 15-18% of the West Bank and administrative control19l over another 20%. These issues are at the very crux of the argument. Without Oslo and the establishment of a separate Palestinian state, the notion of an independent state as the solution to the Palestinian "problem" has become an impossibility. This assertion rests on some facts20. If one is a majority and the other a minority — and given that the majority will dominate the character of the state — then the only way that minority can be compensated is in a state for all its citizens. This means granting cultural autonomy to the minority. If there are no majority-minority

16 Farsoun, Samih K. and Zacharia, Christina E. Palestine and the Palestinians. Colorado 1997, Westview Press. P 314 17 Azmi Bishara, Apartheid Consciousness and the Question of Palestine, Between the Lines, March 2001 18 Lama Abu-Odeh The Case for Bi-nationalism: Why one state - liberal and constitutionalist - may be the key to peace in the Middle East Boston Review, Volume 26, December 2001-January 2002, p. 4 19 Smith, Edward, p. 469-472. 20 As'ad Ghanem, argues that only a bi-national state can ever hope to meet the needs of the whole Palestinian people, Al-Ahram Weekly.

7 relations, then the only alternative is a bi-national state21. If the occupied territories remain with Israel, and the Palestinians there lose the option of establishing a national state in the West Bank and Gaza, then this vision need only be adapted to include them. If we have majority-minority relations, the state will be for all its citizens, enclosing the two nationalities within it. If we don’t have these relations, then it is a bi- national state. These two states would represent a federal, political, and economic union, which would encompass political representation, external security, and international relations of its citizen: the development of a multi-ethnic civic society. Our orientation should be to confront racism22 and apartheid by the way, based on citizenship in same one state for two peoples. Azmi Bishara has presented a fascinating conceptual innovation in which he wants to separate national-territorial affiliation from citizenship of a country. The idea is that within the same borders and the same territorial receptacle, two political and symbolic entities would coexist No matter by what name we refer to this phenomenon - a bi-national state, a federal system, a cantonal arrangement on the Swiss model - the common denominators would still be equal rights, equal citizenship, plurality and coexistence23. It would manifest a common humanity in which the very identity of the citizens would have to be re-examined, taking into consideration psychological and ideological, and not only ethnic, religious and nationalistic factors. Some think that there are forces woking against this idea. Edward Said says “When I got a request to write an article for The New York Times Magazine about my idea of a solution, a bi-national state for Palestinians and Israelis, that was because an editor there had read me on the Internet”. A slogan of Said’s: “Two people in one land. Or, equality for all. Or, one person one vote. Or, a common humanity asserted in a bi-national state”24. This is a very well-known statement.25

Right of Return

The right of return represents the central and most complex concern among Palestinians. The right of return refers to Palestinians and their descendents who were expelled out of their homes in the wake of the establishment of the state of Israel in Palestine in 194826. Today the refugee population exceeds 3.7 million, which represents nearly half of the current Palestinian population in the region. This population, through the shared experience of exile for over 55 years, has developed a strong sense of identity and solid commitment to return. Many of these people still hold the keys to the homes they left behind in Palestine, Consolidated by collective memory27 witch force national identity based on a major historical event. Palestinian refugees would be citizens of the Palestinian state. The Right of Return is considered by Israel

21 Graham Usher interview with Azmi Bishara Al-Ahram Weekly 30 April - 6 May 1998 Issue No. 375 22 Azmi Bishara, the site of meaning, essays from the first year of the Intifada, Muwatin, Ramallah, palestine2002 23 Naseer Aruri From Oslo to the Second Intifada and Beyond: An End and a Beginning Against the Current, Issue 93, July-August 2001 24 Edward Said The Only Alternative, Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 523, 1-7 March 2001 25 interview’s in gza 2000. 26 Morris, B ; The Birth of Palestine Refugee Problem , 1947-1949, Cambridge University Press, 1987. 27 Abaher el sakka,La mémoire collective palestinienne, Formation d’une identité plurielle fondée sur la mémoire d’événements fondateurs ,le Temps, MSH, Ange Géupin, Nantes2001 .

8 to be a fundamental threat to its existence – “as a sovereign national entity”, as well as a Jewish one. The problem is citizenship. Having their political space in the , refugees could find substantive individual justice by living in any part of Palestine they choose, including parts within Israel. Since 1948 the Palestinians have become a people of diaspora and exile. In 1949, negotiations took place with the Jewish State with a view ensure the return from approximately 100.000 Arab refugees. The negotiations undertaken at the time never led to a result. In the meantime, many Jews originating in Europe, then Arab countries arrived in Israel. With the arrival of the latter, the argument of an exchange of populations between the Arab States and the State of Israel was developed. The argument determining to refuse any return of the refugees of Arab extraction of the war of 1948 in the State of Israel was thus: the return of these Arab populations is likely to transform the young person State of Israel into a "bi-national" state.

The concept of Haq alwada or the “Right of Return” for Palestinians could finally be recognized through the proclamation of Israel’s law of welcoming Jews abroad as citizens which must also be applied to the Palestinian Diaspora in all justice28 By the same token, Israeli Jews wishing to live in the settlements could continue to do so under Palestinian sovereignty (which would permit the settlements to be integrated, of course), but would lose their role as extensions of Israeli control by remaining Israeli citizens. The return to Palestine means that Palestinian Arabs in Israel would become national group. “I raised the demand for cultural autonomy precisely to create this controversy. I wanted the Arabs in Israel to think about their future not as local communities, but as a national group”29. I believe cultural autonomy flows from the recognition of the Arabs in Israel as a national minority.

One of the conditions for the establishment of a Palestinian state set by Israel is that the Palestinian Authority will not open its doors to Palestinian refugees, as this would result in a “rapid change” in the Israeli-Palestinian demographic balance. They are subject to continuing discrimination wherever they are in the Arab world, in particular in Lebanon, and from one month in Iraq, which explains why, over the last few years, large numbers of these young refugees have emigrated to the West, especially to Europe. For in such a state, the right of return that has been exercised by millions of Jews since 194830, would have to be extended to the hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees who would thus be able to return to their villages, or at least to areas close to them. A bi-national state would necessitate a reconfiguration of the shared space of Palestine-Israel .A bi-national state is one inhabited by two national groups and run on the basis of equality and parity both between the individuals as citizens and between groups31, which have collective rather than individual aspirations. Inherent in such an arrangement is the condition that the groups living there are enabled to coexist and to develop on the following fundamental bases. The major issues facing the Palestinians, Israel and the rest of region -

28 Abu-Odeh, p. 11. 29 Azmi Bishara, Al-Ahram Weekly Online30 April - 6 May 1998 Issue No. 375 Issue No. 375 30 As’ad ghanam, 31 Nasser Abufarha's plan for a bi-national state, www.ap-agenda.org

9 refugees, the Palestinian population in Israel, security, economic development and water, to name but a few - are regional in scope, and cannot be adequately addressed within the limited framework of Israel/Palestine. Even though many of these homes no longer exist, the Palestinian refugees see their lives and future in the context of their return.

This solution permits Palestinians from the West Bank to participate in the Israeli democratic process flies in the face of institutionalised Zionism32. Abu Odeh said that the adoption of a bi-national state that is secular-constitutional and liberal would bode well for the Palestinians. The Palestinians would have to change their political agenda from a right to national self-determination to one supporting constitutional liberalism33. What if the two-state solution, clutched so fiercely by Israeli liberals, is no longer feasible, unless we accept a truncated bantustan on pieces of the West Bank as a legitimate Palestinian "state?" Secondly, establishing a bi-national state will not necessarily mean that Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will have to ask for Israeli identity, as some would have us believe On the other hand there are those who claim they support a secular Palestinian state, and who go on to argue that a bi-national state does not reckon either with the intense national feeling of the Palestinians or with their power. Thus, even without territorial division, the two nations could each belong to its own exclusive country, to vote and be elected within it and to be subject to its government, and take pride in its national symbols This paper provides only a short analysis of one the possible solutions to the ongoing Arab- Israeli conflict: the bi-national state

Perceptions in Palestinians society

There is a lot of difficulty on the ideological-emotional plane. There is an enormous collective difficulty on both sides in conceding essential parts of the homeland, sanctified both religiously and secularly. And on the practical level physical and political, the ex-Yugoslavia example is not encouraging, with some similarities34 and has opened the way for substantial criticism of this model. The position of Azmi Bishara is heard by many Palestinian intellectuals in the West Bank and Gaza, who would call for the bi-national state option only if they are unable to achieve an independent state in the West Bank and Gaza. Some other Palestinian intellectual, by the same token, consider that only when the Palestinians decide to and reconstruct their democratic secular state framework, then they can decide on the future type of state35. As a political and economic entity Israel is much stronger than the Palestinian polity. Palestinians and Israeli Jews constitute national entities, which will complicate the conflict between the

32 Abu-Odeh , p.2 33 Abu-Odeh, p. 5. 34 Michel Drouet, citoyenneté dans un Etat pluri-national : le cas de l’ex-yoygsalvie, in La citoyeneneté aujourdi’hui, extension ou régression ?presse universitaire de Renne, 1995 P41 35 Interview with Haydar ‘Abd al-Shafi- Gaza 2000 ,1st chairman of legislative council of Gaza (1962-4); was member of 1st PLO-EC (1964-5) founder & director of Palestinian Red Crescent soc from 1972, providing free medical care & a forum for cultural activities. Former Palestinian delegation leader to the Madrid Peace conference

10 two nationalisms, by the fact that the fundamental ideologies and histories are absolutely opposed. Evidently, if a two-state solution, based firmly on international resolutions and law, is not implemented soon, then this is the only other alternative, apart from the horrific ones of perpetual apartheid, transfer, or genocide. Some Palestinians36 wonder how Israel is able to refuse solutions which are laid down in international law. For example, Israeli settlements in the occupied territories contravened the Fourth Geneva Convention- hence the slogan, "land for peace"; UN Resolutions 242 and 338; UN General Assembly Resolution 194. Instead of discussing how the right of refugees to return to their homes would be implemented, the Oslo process pushed the refugee issue of to the side. Also recently, the wall which Israel constructed beyond the greens line borders of 1967. For the bi-national state solution is based on the realization that the two state solution is not a viable option for resolution of the conflict and recognition of the fact that Palestinians and Israelis are integral components of a shared space.

Even though some of his points seem inaccessible, the points raised demonstrate the clear conflict that must be surmounted by those who do not believe a bi-national state is credible and who refuse to regard the idea carefully. The idea of a bi-national state for Israelis and Palestinians seems to be acquiring a certain attractiveness37. For other Palestinians38, the nationalist struggle and their Arab ties are what define them as Arab Palestinians, and here this distinction between qawmi Arab and Palestinian identity, well be in conflict with this idea. A bi-national state asks the Palestinians to change who they are. Thus, the rebuilding process for Palestinians will be long and very costly. However, it would be only a matter of time before the Palestinians became the majority and assumed the leadership role of the country’s economy and infrastructure. Based on past experience with PA bad management of economics, and “the bureaucracy of the bourgeois state,” this would be a bleak future. Nonetheless, Palestinians will strongly protest against a bi-national state due to cultural issues. For Palestinians, a bi-national state means giving up these identities, which is highly unlikely. For a Palestinian, the nationalist struggle and their Arab ties are what define them. They would be required to rethink the pan-Arab component of their own culture. This is particularly significant in the arenas of cultural affinities and political identity. Some of those opposed to a bi-national state claim that the concept will abort the Palestinian national project, there are those who support the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip on the grounds that this state is the Palestinian national project. This approach is different from these adopted by others (Salim Tamari39). A public opinion poll published at the end of 1999 suggested that close to 20 percent of the respondents from the West Bank and Gaza and about 15 percent of the Jewish respondents from Israel (17 percent of the Israeli Arab respondents) favoured a bi-national solution if the attempts at establishing two states fail. Opinion has often been the source of division as well, manipulating tensions and mistrust between the consolidation of a united popular opposition. Establishing a bi-national state will

36 interview with students in univesirtys a gaza. 37 Salim Tamari, The Dubious Lure of Bi-nationalism," in the Journal of Palestinan Studies 117 38 Serie interviews, in gaza strip an dwest bank, in 1998and 2000. 39 Salim Tamari , idem,

11 not necessarily mean that Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will have to ask for Israeli identity, as some would have us believe. On the other hand there are those who claim they support a secular Palestinian state, and who go on to argue that a bi-national state does not reckon either with the intense national feeling of the Palestinians or with their power.

This view is misleading and has to be corrected. A secular-democratic state is not a national or an ethnic state; it is a state of citizens and not of nationalities. As such, it represents the inevitable termination of the Palestinian national project. Yet some of those who promote a secular state mean a Palestinian national state and not a state for all citizens, irrespective of their national or religious affiliation. But the debate on bi-nationalism (and Lama Abu-Odeh's argument for the idea) requires further explanation. Conceptually, the idea raises interesting issues about extraterritorial nationalism and ethnicity, but practically the bi-nationalist concept could be counterproductive and escapist. We also need to factor in the changing political and social structures in Palestinian society40. […No serious discussion has been put forward here about the repercussions of creating a juridical, social, and political regime from two antagonistic national groups in one single constitutional body..[ At the level of resolving the immediate tasks of dismantling Israeli colonial rule in the occupied territories, bi-nationalism creates expectations and prospects of political action that are either unrealisable or counterproductive. In the main, it would act to defuse and mystify the struggle for independence.41].

CONCLUSION

The notion of a bi-national state was never even close to realisation, and surely it is no closer now. Why then are people reviving the idea at this time? The idea of a bi-national state remains marginal today .This is why there is no Palestinian party that today advocates quitting the project for a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza in favour of a bi-national state. A large number of Palestinians are engaged today in exploring possible ways out of the crisis in which they are embroiled. Edward Said values the future steps to convince Israeli society by cultural argument. “It is better to have cultural confrontation with a bi-national state as the only solution for the conflict, than the actual violent confrontation”42. Probably more then any other factor, its reference to the rights of the person has changed the political culture of the country and contributed to the construction of a new identity, at the heart of which lies the emphasis on individuals rather than collectivises. Palestinians are afraid of the fragmentation of future citizenship. Three such challenges can be clearly distinguished: The redefinition of collective identity is occurring and mostly the first preoccupation. The construction and promotion of the national identity have become an important function of the new Palestinian identity, - an imagined community, (Anderson 1983) is now the end of this situation on injustice and oppression. A large number

40 Salim Tamari, Return to the forum on Bi-nationalism, with Lama Abu-Odeh and respondents 41 Salim Tmarai, idm, 42 Edward Said, Alquds Newspaper, interview with, 25/05/2001

12 of Palestinians are engaged today in exploring possible ways out of the crisis in which they are embroiled. From September 2000 – the second Intifada - this fragmentation was becoming social, economic, physical and of course regional, despite Oslo's call for a contiguous Palestinian entity and also nothing at all. The debate is still new on the Palestinian side, beyond a very small number of people. It would aim to create an equitable pluralist society on the “Western democratic model”, and is opposed to an arrangement of separate communities, mostly Palestinian. Recently in letter open to Israelis, Palestinian intellectuals addressed a letter “ the message that there are two solutions: either two states, or a bi-national state.43 A bi-national state will not be consciously chosen “So although a bi-national state now seems like a totally long shot and completely utopian. The costs associated are too high to endure even for those benefiting the most. However, the current political drift indicates that a bi-national state could arise as an unplanned consequence. Given the ideologies of the Israelis and the Palestinians, it seems highly unlikely that either culture would have the capacity to overcome their ideology in order to coexist. Some claim that a bi- national state is a theoretical concept which could never be implemented. But how can it be less possible than the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip? Indeed, the whole reality of Palestine is one of bi-nationality. This reality has to be developed, so that it becomes the basic structure upon which equality among Israelis and Palestinians can be built. Since statehood is foremost the protectorate of identity, total separation of these societies would undermine the demographic reality of a shared space. The two struggles are not contradictory. Palestinians still believe the primary struggle is the national struggle against Israel, especially over settlements, but also over Jerusalem, the prisoners, land and water, that is: the national issues. But aspirations are what give a people its identity and the idea of sovereignty. So it became vital for them to have own aspirations. The Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza has been under Israeli military rule since 1967 under which Palestinians have experienced continuous brutal harassment, including policies of expulsion, imprisonment without charge, collective punishment, land confiscation, restrictions on movement, trade, development, growth, and use of natural resources such as water. That debate has been going on in Palestine. However, in the new configuration of Palestinian society, in which worthwhile projects usually begin small and originate in the periphery (since the centre tends to be accepted), we know that Palestine’s nationalism was created by the territorisation of nationalism and was formed in the diaspora. That critique needs to be broadened in order to include the mainstream and penetrate the collective consciousness.

43 Palestiniens Declaration for Israeli society,2001.

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14 Salim Tamari, The Dubious Lure of Bi-nationalism," in the Journal of Palestinan Studies 117 Salim Tamari, Return to the forum on Bi-nationalism, with Lama Abu-Odeh and respondents Smith, Edward D. (2001). Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict – A History with Documents. 4th ed. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s. United States Institute of Peace, 1995).

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