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Home , Bachtiar Nasir, Populism, Wahdah Islamiyah

Journal of Critical Reviews ISSN- 2394-5125 Vol 7, Issue 5, 2020

Review Article

EXPLAINING ISLAMIC POPULISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: AN INDONESIAN MUSLIM INTELLECTUALS PERSPECTIVE

M. Khusna Amal

State Islamic Institute of Jember, Email: [email protected]

Received: 16.01.2020 Revised: 08.02.2020 Accepted: 10.03.2020

Abstract Why do religious populism can strengthen in contemporary Southeast Asia? The recent rise of mass mobilization that uses religious identities in Southeast Asia has driven scholarly debate about what caused the unprecedented religious populism. This article seeks to explain an Indonesian Muslim intellectual on the rise of Islamic populism, and it’s causes through a close examination of the case of Islamist-populist mobilization in in late 2016. As already well known, there has been no singular explanation of Muslim intellectuals, in this case, are moderate and progressive groups, in response to the Islamist mobilization. Some scholars have argued that increasing among the Muslim population is an important factor, while others have disputed such a view, arguing that the crisis of democratic representation is the main factor. Borrowing Faucoult’s perspective, the article argues that the plurality and even contradictions of thoughts among moderate-progressive Muslim intellectuals are not only due to differences in their perspectives but also their position in the power/knowledge constellation.

Key Words: Indonesia, , populism, intellectual perspective, and .

© 2019 by Advance Scientific Research. This is an open-access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.31838/jcr.07.05.121

INTRODUCTION Muslim majority country (Stepan, 2014, Hefner, 2019; Liddle & The growing prominence of the mass mobilizations that utilize Mujani, 2013; Pepinsky, Liddle & Mujani, 2018). religious identities and, at the same time, position, the confront them with the ruling elites marks what is called the This article seeks to explain the Indonesian Muslim Islamic populism. Vedi R. Hadiz, for example, expressly intellectuals' on the rising Islamic populism, and it’s positions the 212 movement as an Indonesia’s typical variant causes in electoral and democratic consolidation. of Islamic populism. In this term, Islamic populism is not only a Although these intellectuals are both from moderate Muslim marginal low-class movement but also led by professionals and even liberal and progressive groups, their views on these and educated individuals who demand reorganization of issues will certainly not be the same. This article argues that power to favor the community more (Hadiz, 2018; Mietzner, the plurality of their discourses is closely related to not only 2016 & 2018). As a representation of Islamic populism, the differences in their perspectives, but also the diversity of their 212 movement positions itself as a bloc on behalf of ordinary positions in the power/knowledge constellation. From the people and the regime in power, which is labeled as corrupt in standpoint of critical discourse analysis, however, a discourse antagonistic positions. Also, the 212 movement carries produced by an intellectual is never neutral from ideological- populist narrations to be confronted with the status quo. The political interests. proponents of the 212 movement generally view the mass mobilization they initiate not only as a political strategy to gain Indonesia’s Islamic Populism power, but also the expression of the community and people’s This article argues that the mobilization of Indonesian general desire (Laclau, 1977; Weyland, 2001; Kenny, 2019; Islamists in late 2016 can be classified as a case of populism. It Norris & Inglehart, 2018). constitutes mass demonstrations that were unprecedented in size and scope, involving Muslims from various regions in Rising mobilization of Indonesian Islamist concerning the Indonesia (Fealy, 2016). The picture of the drone shows a sea democratization caused a heated debate especially between of people with people sitting on a prayer rug in the rain. It is scholars of Indonesian Islam and politics. Generally, they estimated that the masses who are members of the 212 assume that increasingly stronger Islamic populism movement reached around 500,000-750,000 people (Mietzner contributes negatively to the declining quality of , and Muhtadi, 2018). This number has doubled compared to particularly from the perspective of ’s the 411 movement (4 November 2016), which was followed perspectives. In their accounts, Islamic populism is not liberal by around 50,000 people and the movement before with a power, and its presence positively contributes to number of participants around 150,000-250,000 people strengthening (Canovan, 1999; Mudde, (Osman and Waikar, 2018; Franciska, 2016). 2009; Power, 2018; Menchik, 2019). Nevertheless, some disputed such notion, arguing that the populism launched by However, the 212 movement which succeeded in mobilizing the Islamist groups do not change much the decline of the masses in large numbers, did not just appear. It is true that democracy. For example, the electoral processes of the this movement emerged as a response or rather the reaction of president and people’s representatives (DPR), from central to the people to Ahok's controversial statement regarding the a regional level, are still conducted directly. Democracy Qur’an Surah Al-Maidah. The appearance of this movement institutions such as the General Elections Commission (KPU), cannot be separated from the previous movements, carried the General Election Supervisory Agency (BAWASLU), political out by Islamist groups targeting , parties, and others still exist. Besides, the populism does not better known as Ahok, the governor of DKI , a Chinese successfully struggle for its political agenda, particularly in and Christian, whose memorandum they hated. Indeed, the controlling the state or changing its political system to be an hatred of the Islamists, especially the Islamic state. However, some scholars belive that Indonesia (Fron Pembela Islam, FPI), was not only related to Ahok's today –in comparation to other Muslim-majority Chinese and Christian status but also in his capacity as such as Egypt, Turkey, Senegal, Pakistan and Nigeria-- still governor. As known, Ahok is an effective governor, focused on offers clear evidence of a successful democratic transition in a governance, anti-corruption, and has a high commitment to

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pluralism. This kind of condition which has been dispelled has Munarman (FPI) as Field Commander. The GNPF-MUI played made many parties, especially economic brokers and an essential role in mobilizing the masses and organized a politicians, and Islamist groups dislike Ahok (Qurtuby, 2018; series of demonstrations to demand that Ahok be jailed Mietzner, Muhtadi & Halida, 2018). because he was considered to have defamed Islam. In the name of the to Defend Islam, GNPF-MUI succeeded in It is important to note that the resistance of Islamist groups in mobilizing a sizable mass of around 50,000-100,000 people on their alliance with political-economic brokers, against Ahok, October 14, 2016. Next, on November 4, 2016, the Defend had been going on for quite a long time, not only when Ahok Islam Action was followed by no less than 350,000 people was governor of DKI Jakarta, but also during the 2012 Jakarta (Ichwan, 2016; IPAC , 2018). Election which was won by Jokowi-Ahok. Their protection was not only expressed through political actions such as being The climax, on 2 December 2016 (212), the Islamist group involved in the elections but also street politics such as which had consolidated itself into the GNPF-MUI, succeeded in demonstrations and various other ways. The inauguration of a mobilizing a massive mass to carry out the Action to Defend rival governor by FPI, for example, can be understood as a Islam III. As mentioned above, there are no less than 700,000 form of resistance by Islamist groups in their efforts to people involved in the Action to Defend Islam. Many experts delegitimize the governor in power. It is just that the actions of believe that a mass of this size, driven not to the extent of resistance they did, did not get broad public support. Habib members of Islamist organizations, which are the leading Rizieq's propaganda, which carries religious (Christian), ethnic proponents of the Action to Defend Islam. However, members (Chinese), ideological (communist) sentiments, was not of MUI, FPI, FUI, MIUMI, Wahdah Islamiyah, HTI, and the sufficiently successful in massively provoking the masses to Action to Defend Islam organs, are certainly not many in delegitimize Ahok. In fact, this action also received support number compared to members of mainstream Islamic from groups in parliament and political parties who organizations such as NU and (Interview with did not respect the governor in power (Interview with Abdil Moch Nur Ichwan, July 24, 2019). Mughis Mudhoffir, Sept 6, 2019). M. Amin Abdullah also stated the same thing. According to him, The Islamist resistance movement really found its strategic it is impossible for such a large mass, only coming from the momentum when Ahok experienced a tongue sprain in his membership of FPI, HTI, PKS, and the organization that drives speech in the Thousand Islands on September 27, 2016. In his Islamist mobilization. There is no doubt that many members of speech, Ahok told residents in the Thousand Islands not to be the two mainstream Islamic organizations (Muhammadiyah easily fooled by people who used the verse Al- (Surah and NU), especially those who are conservative or sympathetic Al-Maidah: 51) for political purposes. The situation became to the agenda of the Action to Defend Islam struggle, more problematic when posting Ahok's speech video with the participated in the movement. In fact, in Muhammadiyah itself, heading "Defamation on Religion?" Which was slightly figures such as Bachtiar Nashir were also involved in processed was spread by Buni Yani through her Facebook organizing mass mobilization. Outside of all these account on October 6, 2016. This video posting later triggered organizations, there may also be new Muslims who have been a strong reaction from Muslims who demanded that Ahok be stricken by religious violence or religious euphoria, tried immediately and imprisoned. Even more than a dozen participating in the Action to Defend Islam (Interview with M. Islamic organizations then reported governor Ahok to the Amin Abdullah, July27, 2019). Borrowing Nur Ichwan’s term, police over the blasphemy case (Interview with Burhanuddin the floating ummah is many who are involved in praxis to do Muhtadi, Sept 7, 2019). what is known as jihad to defend their religion (Moch. Nur Ichwan, 2016). On October 11, 2016, a number of non-mainstream Islamic figures such as Bachtiar Nasir (The Indonesian Council of Not limited to the success of mobilizing the masses in large Young Intellectuals and /Majlis Intelektual dan Ulama numbers, a series of the Action to Defend Islam also succeeded Muda Indonesia, MIUMI chairman), K.H. Fakhrurrozi Ishaq in forcing the to pay serious attention to the (Chair of the Jakarta Community Movement), K.H. Ahmad power of Islamist groups. In the Action to Defend Islam III, for Shabri Lubis (FPI Chairperson), Tgk Abdullah Ibrahim example, President Jokowi even had to be willing to meet with (Chairperson of the Majlis Dhikr SBY Nurus Salam), and others, a mass of protesters led by FPI's high priest (Rizieq Shihab) to came to the central The Indonesian Ulama Council (Majlis give a speech even if only for a short time. The court's decision Ulama Indonesia, MUI). In their hospitality, they asked MUI to that sentenced Ahok to 2 years in prison on blasphemy issue a statement or fatwa related to the Ahok case. On that charges on May 9, 2017, was cited as a prestigious same day, the MUI then held a meeting and later issued an achievement of the Action to Defend Islam. Meanwhile, Anis "opinion and attitude of reluctance," which, in essence, that Baswedan's victory in the second round of the Jakarta Ahok's statement was categorized as insulting the Qur'an and Regional Election (April 19, 2017), with 58 percent of votes / or insulting scholars who had legal consequences. The MUI's compared to 42 percent for Ahok, also cannot be separated religious opinion and attitude in its recommendations also from the influence of the Action to Defend Islam (Qurtuby, oblige the government and law enforcers to, among other 2018). This fact further affirms the authority and legitimacy of things, "prevent any desecration and defamation of the Koran Islamic political groups, as represented in the Action to Defend and the Islamic religion by not paying any attention to these Islam, in the constellation of power in Indonesia (Mietzner acts" and "cracking down on those who commit the blasphemy and Muhtadi, 2018; Mietzner, Muhtadi & Halida, 2018; IPAC, and defamation al-Qur'an and Islamic teachings and insults to 2018). scholars and Muslims in accordance with applicable legislation "and" proactively enforce law enforcement in a strict, fast, The Causes of Islamic Populism proportionate and professional manner with due regard to the The rise of Indonesia’s Islamic populism has been a long debate sense of justice of the community so that people have among Muslim intellectuals from various perspectives. In confidence in the enforcement of law (Ichwan, 2016; Burhani, general, they refer to Islamic populism on several prominent 2016). events, the most important of which is the 212 movement or Not long after the MUI issued its religious attitude, a popular popularly called the Action to Defend Islam. Not a few of them alliance called the National Movement to Defend MUI’s Fatwa are of the view that the main trigger of mass mobilization in (Gerakan Nasional Pembela Fatwa/GNPF-MUI) was various regions in Indonesia, is none other than Ahok's immediately formed with Rizieq Shihab (FPI High Priest) remarks related to Al-Maidah verse 51 which was then framed occupying the position of Trustees and Bachtiar Nasir by Islamist elites as blasphemy religion (Fealy, 2016). In (MIUMI/Muhammadiyah/MUI) as its chairman. Misbahul framing theory, what the Islamists do is a way to convince Anam (FPI) was appointed as Deputy Chairman I, Zaitun diverse and broad target groups so that they are motivated to Rasmin (Wahdah Islamiyah/MUI) as Deputy Chair II, engage in mass mobilization in pressing demands against Muhammad al-Khaththath (The Islamic Community Ahok's trial (Tarrow, 1998; Situmorang, 2013). Forum/Forum Umat Islam/FUI) as Secretary-General, and

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According to media reports, the central meeting point that Lutfi Assyaukani also expressed his views on the crucial role of unites Islamist groups to consolidate themselves, organize the conservativism in encouraging the rise of Islamic populism in masses, and carry out demonstrations is nothing but the issue Indonesia. According to him, the protest movement labeled of defamation of religion addressed to Ahok. If there were no Islam is the tip of the iceberg of Islamic conservativism that Ahok controversial remarks which were later justified as emerged since 15 years ago. Referring to the influx of Middle blasphemy, it was not secure enough for anyone to be able to Eastern values as a consequence of the opening of democracy mobilize the masses on a large scale (Qurtuby, 2018). The after 1998, he believes that the large number of Indonesian economic crisis that took place in the decade 2008-2009 also Muslims who are trying to adopt the Saudi Arabian lifestyle is did not lead to mass demonstrations like the 212 movement. the fruit of the Wahabi campaign's success. However, This fact confirms that religious issues proved to be Assyaukanie’s approach is in line with the views of scholars enormously used by Islamic political elites to ignite the who explain Islamist mobilization as a phenomenon driven emotions of religious people. Islamist shrewdness in using primarily by Islamic convictions of believers (Mietzner and religion as an ideological weapon is actually more an effort to Muhtadi, 2018; Mietzner, Muhtadi and Halida, 2018). stir up emotions and public understanding both dogmatically and psychologically regarding worldly and endlessness affairs However, the view that argues that the emergence of Islamic (Kahin, 1970; Jati, 2017). populism is a logical consequence of the strengthening of conservativism is quite relevant if related to the results of a Some scholars argue that the Ahok problem is actually purely number of survey institutes. Almost all survey institutions political and not a religious issue. Ahok's remarks about Al- reported that the trend of conservativism and radicalism in Maidah in front of the citizens of the Thousand Islands region, Indonesia tended to increase in the post- period. it might not be possible to contemplate the controversy and at Setara Institute for Democracy and Peace noted an increase in the same time the emotions of Muslims when he conveyed it violence with 144 cases in 2011 and 264 in 2012 (Kaptein, not in the context of the elections. Because it was spoken by 2016). The latest picture was delivered by the National Human Ahok, who was a non-Muslim memorandum, came from ethnic Rights Commission, which reported 74 cases in 2014 and Chinese, and at the same time held the status of a governor and experienced a surge of 78 cases in 2015, and reached almost incumbent governor who was involved in power contestation, 100 cases in 2016 (Kompas.com, 05/01/2017). The Wahid it was not surprising if his words became controversial Foundation in 2016, showed that 11 million of the 150 million (Interview with M. Amin Abdullah, July 26, 2019; Moch. Nur Muslim population in Indonesia were ready to take radical Ichwan, July 24, 2019; Muhammad A.S. Hikam, Sept 31, 2019). action. Of that amount, 0.4 percent have committed radical The justification of blasphemy that was pinned by the religious action. This number reaches 7.7 percent of the total Muslim elites to Ahok was actually not an official legal product. population in Indonesia Likewise, the terminology of the Action to Defend Islam used (http://wahidfoundation.org/index.php/publication/index/re by Ahok protesters who are members of the GNPF-MUI ranks is port). also purely a political movement because it is oriented towards political interests and not religious movements. In this case, Even though the trend of conservativism continues to increase religion is limited to being used as a tool for Islamists groups in in Indonesia after the New Order, the position of Islamist their struggle for power (Interview with Sahiron Syamsudin, groups remains a minority when compared to mainstream October 22, 2017). Islamic groups. However, they are relatively successful in raising alternative Islamic discourse into the public Islamic In today's media era, Ahok's words alone will not have a religious discourse. The that led to efforts to build this significant social impact without involving the role of the Islamic order -including establishing an Islamic State, applying media. As it is understood that Ahok's controversial remarks Islamic law (shari'a) and certain religious moral standards for have received public attention from Muslims in various regions Muslim communities- succeeded in spreading and attracting and even around the world, after a person named Buni Yani, the attention of the broader community through various media who memorized a colleague and at the same time supported and ways such as books, magazines, pamphlet, internet, Anis Baswedan in the Jakarta election, edited and uploaded the religious studies on campus, school, , and training video on the page You Tube and Facebook. Cash, the results of (Lindsey, 2016; Jones, 2016; Assyaukanie, 2017; Varagur, this Buni Yani upload became viral, successfully influencing 2017). and shaping Muslim public opinion that Ahok indeed blasphemed religion. Habib Rizieq Shihab, for example, is one Meanwhile, some scholars argue that the rise of Islamic of the key actors who is directly involved in creating populism is not merely understood as a phenomenon of propaganda through and mobilizing the masses to strengthening conservativism among Indonesian Muslims. One carry out demonstrations on behalf of defending Islam of the reasons that made them doubt the effect of (Burhani, 2016). According to Ichwan, Rizieq is a trigger media conservativism in encouraging the emergence of the Islamic who have expertise in utilizing social media for the sake of populism was related to their academic tradition in seeing the propaganda. With the help of his cyber army and its buzzers, election results as a benchmark in understanding the rise of Rizieq was quite successful at reproducing and simultaneously Islamist sentiment. Hamayotsu (2018), for example, argues that spreading his political narratives in the framework of when Islamic parties were not sufficiently successful in getting influencing public opinion to get involved in the mass enough convincing votes in the 2009 elections, he concluded demonstrations (Interview, July 21, 2019). that the fate of political Islam was over. A similar view was expressed by Saiful Mujani, who saw the results of the 2009 Other scholars argue that the strengthening of conservatism, Election as evidence that Muslim voters had turned away from which is rooted in the new Islamic variant, is what contributed Islamic law as their political priority. However, when Islamic to the important whip of Islamic populism in Indonesia. M. political parties succeeded in increasing their votes in the 2014 Amin Abdullah, for example, believes that the Islamist elections, an international network anxiously asked mobilization in late 2016 is the culmination of the conservative whether political Islam had risen in Indonesia (Mietzner and turn that has occurred in Indonesia, especially in the last ten Muhtadi, 2018; Lindsey, 2016; Jones, 2016; Assyaukanie, 2017; decades. He stressed that Indonesia is currently surrounded by Varagur, 2017). an extraordinary number of trans-nationalist Islamic schools, ranging from HTI, Jema’at Islamiyah, Taliban, Al-Qaeda, ISIS, Muhtadi asserted that the emergence of Islamic populism was and others. In the 212 movement, the variants of conservative- more closely correlated with the exclusion of Islamist groups radical were considered to have an essential role in such as FPI from the realm of power rather than the supporting the Action to Defend Islam (Interview, July 26, strengthening of conservativism in the lives of Muslims. In the 2019). Without the basis of conservativism, which in reality is era of President SBY, his political policies tended to be developing rapidly in Indonesia, the actors of the 212 accommodating towards Islamist groups. For example, SBY movement, will find it challenging to be able to mobilize the tends to be tolerant in responding to attacks by FPI and other masses in such large numbers (Hamayotsu, 2018; Hadiz, 2017). militant groups against sects and religious minorities such as the Ahmadiyya and Shi'a. When SBY condemned such incidents

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of religious violence, he also described the violence as a conditions is exposed and used by challengers to take the fight horizontal conflict between two antagonistic social groups, (Eisinger, 1973). Some scholars consider the openness of the rather than an on the law by an Islamist against a democratic era as an important political opportunity factor for minority (Interview with Burhanuddin Muhtadi, September 8, the emergence of Islamic populism. On the contrary, populism 2019; Suryana, 2017). will be difficult to surface in an authoritarian political system. Indonesia's experience shows that during the 32 years of The results of research conducted by survey institutions such authoritarian New Order, it proved not to provide space for the as LSI, also showed that conservative and radical sentiments in emergence of socio-political activism that was contradictory to the Indonesian Muslim community, in general, showed a the government, such as the current Islamic populism (Azra, declining trend between 2010 and 2016. For example, the 2019). number of Muslims who objected to non-Muslim religious events in neighboring life decreased from 51.6 percent in 2010 Besides, the emergence of Islamic populism is not merely to 49.6 percent in 2011 and 39.6 percent in 2016. Likewise, the facilitated by openness and freedom as a consequence of percentage of Indonesian Muslims who objected to the democracy. In general, right-sided populism emerged as a establishment of places of worship in their neighborhoods response to the crisis of liberal democracy. Vedi R. Hadiz decreased from 63.8 percent in 2010 to 60.6 percent in 2011 explicitly revealed that the growing Islamic populism could not and 52 percent in 2016. Similarly, respondents who said that be separated from the people's disappointment in democracy. those who had made donations to organizations committed to Different from conventional populism, which aims at curative implementing Islamic law reached 37.4 percent in 2010, 25 and constructive democratic processes to be sensitive to the percent in 2011, and 13.7 percent in 2016. Attacks on non- demands and aspirations of the wider community, Islamic Muslim places of worship were at the position of 1.3 percent in populism actually takes a somewhat different path. First, the 2010, 1.8 percent in 2011, d an 0.4 percent in 2016 (Mietzner word ummah is used as a proxy for demos who exclusively fight and Muhtadi, 2018). for the interests of Muslims. Secondly, instead of supporting democracy as the main way to form a government, Islamic The 212 movement, has made the issue of the economic populism tends to support a system of democratic interfaith marginality of the ummah due to the influx of foreign workers, governance such as the khilafah or shari'ah-based government. especially from , as one of the narratives that contributed Third, Islamic populism emphasizes the aspect of significantly to mobilizing the masses in large numbers. In this strengthening identity-based on the symbol of religiosity case, Vedi R. Hadiz said that the systematic narrative about the (Hadiz, 2016). marginalization of the people became one of the main variables that contributed to the promotion of anti-Ahok and anti-Jokowi Another view says that the strengthening of Islamic populism is mass mobilization. This narrative has long been prominent in a logical consequence of the absence of progressive political the trajectory of modern Indonesian with the movements. Not limited to Indonesia, the weakness of perception that ethnic Chinese minorities are social groups that progressive politics also occurs in various countries, especially have benefited from economic development since the era of Europe (Mudoffir et al., 2017). The weakening of this (Hadiz, 2017). progressive force coincides with the consolidation of forces in a fairly long period of history. In Europe, this According to Hadiz, the strengthening of Islamic populism condition was born as a consequence of the hegemony of cannot be separated from the response of Islamists to the and the bankruptcy of the welfare state, whereas paradox of neo-liberal modernization and . Almost in post-colonial countries such as Indonesia, communist parties the same as the actions carried out by Islamism groups in were generally repressed by vicious authoritarian regimes various forms, this act of populism also interspersed with their during the Cold War era. The mass slaughter of PKI (Indonesian ideological and political zeal in criticizing and suing the social, Communist Party) sympathizers in 1965-1966 and the banning economic, and political system of the modern world which is of these political parties during the New Order era, was a dominated by the principles of secularism and . Such momentum that marked the end of leftist political traditions a political system creates not only a crisis of morality but also while providing a way for the consolidation of New Order State the deterioration of the people and social injustice in various capitalism. In practice, the slaughter of the PKI was not only fields of life, especially . For this reason, these circles carried out by the military but also civilians who used Islamic always wage a counter against the system of secularism- and nationalist-secular identities. Propaganda, which placed capitalism and offer a format of political and economic systems as a threat to the state ideology (Pancasila) and at based on Islam (Hadiz, 2016 & 2017). the same time a threat to religion, also contributed to Other experts see the rise of Islamic populism in relation to the mobilizing civilian groups in carrying out massacres of paradox of democracy. On the one hand, democracy is hundreds of people suspected of being PKI sympathizers increasingly developing as characterized by freedom of the (Hadiz, 2006 & 2019). press, freedom of expression and expression of opinions, and the holding of elections, which takes place relatively free. CONCLUSION Nevertheless, on the other hand, more citizens are trying to This article has shown that Indonesian Muslim intellectuals' openly declare their religious identities, make a difference, and discourses on Islamist mobilization in late 2016 were very open new public spaces that are in accordance with religious diverse. Generally, they understand Indonesia’s Islamist demands and Islamic lifestyles by consuming religious symbols mobilization of 2016 as a case of Islamic populism. The that coincide with increased intolerance and radicalism. In this argumentation is that the popular movements involve ideology completely open situation, it is also possible for political elites and political narrations, which places the people and elite in a to play all kinds of ways to gain constituent support and contradictory position. This scholar's perspective confirms dominate political power by manipulating religious identities populism experts’ opinions like Cas Mudded and Margaret (Hasan, 2019; Burhan, 2019; Mietzner, 2015; Aspinall, 2015). Cannovan, who define populism as an ideology or, more The 212 Islamist mobilizations can be understood as part of the precisely, a thin ideology. Like ideational perspective in process and even the consequences of democratization, where general, populist ideas (which positions the people vis a vis the public space is very open to various groups (Muhammad power structure and dominant value) take a prominent Wildan, July 26, 2019; Wildan, 2016). position in constructing reality and simultaneously encourage social practice to realize their political agenda. Because of its also considered that Islamic populism could thin character, it cannot stand alone as a political-practical only blossom, grow, and develop if the socio-political situation ideology. In essence, it cannot promote any extensive and is supportive. In other words, Islamic populism can emerge to coherent program for a solution to important political resistance against the ruling regime because of the availability questions. of political opportunities. Citing the opinion of Peter Eisinger, Some Muslim intellectuals deem that the Islamist mobilization one of the pioneers of the theory of political opportunity, promoted by the conservative-radical Islamist groups protest actions arise when a political system under certain represent identity politics more. The mass mobilization does

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EXPLAINING ISLAMIC POPULISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: AN INDONESIAN MUSLIM INTELLECTUALS PERSPECTIVE

not carry or struggle for populous agenda, which is directly for these groups to draw the attention of and negotiate with related to their life improvement in the social, economic, the ruler for accommodation. educational, and political aspects at all. The agenda carried by the Islamist groups are pragmatic (struggle for power Fourth, the view that the emergence of Islamic populism is the resources), and some are undeniably ideological (enforcement consequence of democracy. Generally, right populism emerges of Islamic principles in public space). The Islamic populism in response to the liberal democracy crisis. Vedi R. Hadiz agencies capitalize on religious and populous symbols as their explicitly states that the development of Islamic populism political strategy to gather mass support. The driving actors cannot be separated from the people’s disappointment at the and the masses who participate in the mass mobilization are democracy. Differently, from conventional populism with a mostly of Muslim middle classes, in which they desire curative and constructive purpose for the democratic process improvement of public space pursuant to religious norms. to be more sensitive to people’s demands and aspirations, Therefore, these groups are concerned more about secularized Islamic populism takes a different path. People’s words are public spaces than the poverty issue, which burdens the used as proxy demos to struggle for Muslims ’ interests people and Muslims. exclusively. Instead of supporting democracy as the main path to shape governance, Islamic populism tends to support other Meanwhile, some other Muslim intellectuals see the Islamist than a democratic governmental system like khilafah or mobilization, which uses religious and popular issues as a -based government. representation of Islamic identity political populism in Indonesia. The populism dimension may be viewed in the Acknowledgments narrations which perceive or place the people, including I would like to thank my research supervisor, Dr. Greg Fealy, Muslims, in an antagonistic position against the regime, which and my advisors, Prof. Dr. Arsekal Salim, M.A, for their is imaged as corrupt, authoritarian, and pro-blasphemer. valuable feedback and enduring support during the process of Besides, the narration of adversity experienced by Islamist my research and writing. Many thanks also go to anonymous groups, especially in the economic-political aspect, as caused reviewers and editor of Journal of Critical Review for their by the domination of foreign also marks populism driven by constructive feedback. All errors, if any, are my own. poverty issues. In this perspective, some intellectuals view Islamic populism as a mixture of identity and social class Disclosure statement issues; the latter is typically an economic-political perspective. No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

With regard to factors which play an important role in driving Funding the rise of Islamic populism in Indonesia, Muslim intellectuals The research funding for this article was supported by also have different perspectives. There are at least four Directorate of Islamic Higher Education, Ministry of Religious perspectives. First, Islamic populism rises in the context of Affairs, Republic of Indonesia political elites’ confrontation, particularly oligarchy, in the struggle for and preservation of power. In the context of RERERENCES Presidential Elections 2014 and 2019, the power contestation 1. Aspinall, Edward. (2015). Oligarchic populism: Prabowo is full of confrontation between two groups of oligarchic Subianto’s challenge to Indonesian democracy. political elites, which carry ultra-nationalist populism figure, Indonesia 99 (1), 1–28. Prabowo Subianto, against moderate populism, Joko Widodo. The confrontation among the oligarchic political elites later 2. Assyaukanie, Lutfi. (2017). unholy alliance: ultra- drags civil groups into the fight for power. Many views that the conservatism and political pragmatism in Indonesia. mass mobilization launched by the Islamist groups as political Thinking ASEAN, 19, January. elites means in their struggle for and/or preservation of 3. Azra, Azyumardi. (2019). Populisme, Politik Identitas, power. dan Demokrasi Indonesia, Pengantar Ahli, dalam Burhanuddin Muhtadi, Populisme Politik Identitas & Second, the view that the rise of Islamic populism emerges in Dinamika Elektoral, xiii-xviii. line with strengthening religious resurgence with its 4. Burhani, Ahmad Najib. (2016). Aksi Bela Islam: conservative characters. In Martin van Bruinessen’s Konservativisme dan Fragmentasi Otoritas Keagamaan. terminology, the Indonesian era after the New Order is in the Maarif Institute for Culture and Humanity, 11 (2), 15-29. religious conservative turn. The strengthening conservatism 5. Canovan, Margaret. (1999). Trust the People! Populism marked with many intolerant and violent attitudes with and the Two Face of Democracy. Political Studies, XLVII, religious labels by both political elites and religious elites 2-16. drives Islamist groups to rise and perform mass mobilization 6. Dijk, Kees van and Nico J.G. Kaptein (ed.). (2016). Islam, to struggle for their political agenda. At the same time, Politics and Change, the Indonesian Experience after the strengthening conservatism also intersect with the absence of Fall of Suharto. Leiden University Press. progressive powers in public space. Besides fragmentation 7. Eisinger, Peter. (1973). The Conditions of Protest resulting from the difference in the organization and political Behavior in American Cites, American Political Review agenda, the weakening progressive forces in Indonesia cannot 67, 11-28. be separated from the New Order regime’s legacy, which 8. Franciska, Cristine. (2016). Tujuh Juta atau 500.000? significantly contributes to destroying these groups. Ketika media sosial berdebat soal jumlah peserta aksi Third, the view that the rise of Islamic populism is caused 212 di Monas dalam more by the exclusion of Islamist groups from the power https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/trensosial-38204802 domain. All this time, the Islamist groups, like FPI, get privilege 9. Fealy, Greg. (2016). Bigger than Ahok: Explaining the 2 from the regime in power ever since the early in December Mass Rally. Indonesia At Melbourne, 1998. As commonly known, the emergence of Islamic December 12. paramilitary organizations like FPI is facilitated and utilized by 10. Hadiz, Vedi R. (2006). The Left and Indonesia’s 1960s: certain political elites. Therefore, it is not surprising that when The Politics of Remembering and Forgetting, Inter-Asia the patron holds power, these paramilitary organizations also Cultural Studies, Vol. 7 (4), 554-569 get free access to power. Until 11. Hadiz, Vedi R. (2016). Islamic Populism in Indonesia (SBY) government, the Islamist groups receive promising and the Middle East. Cambridge: Cambridge University space and access to power. The condition changes during the Press. change in power after SBY. Instead of accommodation in 12. Hadiz, Vedi R. (2017). Behind Indonesia’s Illiberal Turn. power, the Islamist groups are even alienated and This an adapted version of the author’s paper presented marginalized. The exclusion of Islamist groups in the Jokowi at the Indonesia Update Conference at the Australian era drives them to rise and show their strength by mobilizing National University, 1-11. the masses. The Ahok case is deemed only to be an access door 13. Hadiz, Vedi R. (2017). Indonesian Politics in 2017. Year of Democratic Setbacks: Towards a

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EXPLAINING ISLAMIC POPULISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: AN INDONESIAN MUSLIM INTELLECTUALS PERSPECTIVE

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