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Explaining Islamic Populism in Southeast Asia: an Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Perspective

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Explaining Islamic Populism in Southeast Asia: an Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Perspective Journal of Critical Reviews ISSN- 2394-5125 Vol 7, Issue 5, 2020 Review Article EXPLAINING ISLAMIC POPULISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: AN INDONESIAN MUSLIM INTELLECTUALS PERSPECTIVE M. Khusna Amal State Islamic Institute of Jember, East Java Email: [email protected] Received: 16.01.2020 Revised: 08.02.2020 Accepted: 10.03.2020 Abstract Why do religious populism can strengthen in contemporary Southeast Asia? The recent rise of mass mobilization that uses religious identities in Southeast Asia has driven scholarly debate about what caused the unprecedented religious populism. This article seeks to explain an Indonesian Muslim intellectual discourse on the rise of Islamic populism, and it’s causes through a close examination of the case of Islamist-populist mobilization in Indonesia in late 2016. As already well known, there has been no singular explanation of Muslim intellectuals, in this case, are moderate and progressive groups, in response to the Islamist mobilization. Some scholars have argued that increasing conservatism among the Muslim population is an important factor, while others have disputed such a view, arguing that the crisis of democratic representation is the main factor. Borrowing Faucoult’s perspective, the article argues that the plurality and even contradictions of thoughts among moderate-progressive Muslim intellectuals are not only due to differences in their perspectives but also their position in the power/knowledge constellation. Key Words: Indonesia, Islam, populism, intellectual perspective, and democratization. © 2019 by Advance Scientific Research. This is an open-access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.31838/jcr.07.05.121 INTRODUCTION Muslim majority country (Stepan, 2014, Hefner, 2019; Liddle & The growing prominence of the mass mobilizations that utilize Mujani, 2013; Pepinsky, Liddle & Mujani, 2018). religious identities and, at the same time, position, the people confront them with the ruling elites marks what is called the This article seeks to explain the Indonesian Muslim Islamic populism. Vedi R. Hadiz, for example, expressly intellectuals' discourses on the rising Islamic populism, and it’s positions the 212 movement as an Indonesia’s typical variant causes in electoral politics and democratic consolidation. of Islamic populism. In this term, Islamic populism is not only a Although these intellectuals are both from moderate Muslim marginal low-class movement but also led by professionals and even liberal and progressive groups, their views on these and educated individuals who demand reorganization of issues will certainly not be the same. This article argues that power to favor the community more (Hadiz, 2018; Mietzner, the plurality of their discourses is closely related to not only 2016 & 2018). As a representation of Islamic populism, the differences in their perspectives, but also the diversity of their 212 movement positions itself as a bloc on behalf of ordinary positions in the power/knowledge constellation. From the people and the regime in power, which is labeled as corrupt in standpoint of critical discourse analysis, however, a discourse antagonistic positions. Also, the 212 movement carries produced by an intellectual is never neutral from ideological- populist narrations to be confronted with the status quo. The political interests. proponents of the 212 movement generally view the mass mobilization they initiate not only as a political strategy to gain Indonesia’s Islamic Populism power, but also the expression of the community and people’s This article argues that the mobilization of Indonesian general desire (Laclau, 1977; Weyland, 2001; Kenny, 2019; Islamists in late 2016 can be classified as a case of populism. It Norris & Inglehart, 2018). constitutes mass demonstrations that were unprecedented in size and scope, involving Muslims from various regions in Rising mobilization of Indonesian Islamist concerning the Indonesia (Fealy, 2016). The picture of the drone shows a sea democratization caused a heated debate especially between of people with people sitting on a prayer rug in the rain. It is scholars of Indonesian Islam and politics. Generally, they estimated that the masses who are members of the 212 assume that increasingly stronger Islamic populism movement reached around 500,000-750,000 people (Mietzner contributes negatively to the declining quality of democracy, and Muhtadi, 2018). This number has doubled compared to particularly from the perspective of liberal democracy’s the 411 movement (4 November 2016), which was followed perspectives. In their accounts, Islamic populism is not liberal by around 50,000 people and the movement before with a power, and its presence positively contributes to number of participants around 150,000-250,000 people strengthening illiberal democracy (Canovan, 1999; Mudde, (Osman and Waikar, 2018; Franciska, 2016). 2009; Power, 2018; Menchik, 2019). Nevertheless, some disputed such notion, arguing that the populism launched by However, the 212 movement which succeeded in mobilizing the Islamist groups do not change much the decline of the masses in large numbers, did not just appear. It is true that democracy. For example, the electoral processes of the this movement emerged as a response or rather the reaction of president and people’s representatives (DPR), from central to the people to Ahok's controversial statement regarding the a regional level, are still conducted directly. Democracy Qur’an Surah Al-Maidah. The appearance of this movement institutions such as the General Elections Commission (KPU), cannot be separated from the previous movements, carried the General Election Supervisory Agency (BAWASLU), political out by Islamist groups targeting Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, parties, and others still exist. Besides, the populism does not better known as Ahok, the governor of DKI Jakarta, a Chinese successfully struggle for its political agenda, particularly in and Christian, whose memorandum they hated. Indeed, the controlling the state or changing its political system to be an hatred of the Islamists, especially the Islamic Defenders Front Islamic state. However, some scholars belive that Indonesia (Fron Pembela Islam, FPI), was not only related to Ahok's today –in comparation to other Muslim-majority democracies Chinese and Christian status but also in his capacity as such as Egypt, Turkey, Senegal, Pakistan and Nigeria-- still governor. As known, Ahok is an effective governor, focused on offers clear evidence of a successful democratic transition in a governance, anti-corruption, and has a high commitment to Journal of critical reviews 583 EXPLAINING ISLAMIC POPULISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: AN INDONESIAN MUSLIM INTELLECTUALS PERSPECTIVE pluralism. This kind of condition which has been dispelled has Munarman (FPI) as Field Commander. The GNPF-MUI played made many parties, especially economic brokers and an essential role in mobilizing the masses and organized a politicians, and Islamist groups dislike Ahok (Qurtuby, 2018; series of demonstrations to demand that Ahok be jailed Mietzner, Muhtadi & Halida, 2018). because he was considered to have defamed Islam. In the name of the Action to Defend Islam, GNPF-MUI succeeded in It is important to note that the resistance of Islamist groups in mobilizing a sizable mass of around 50,000-100,000 people on their alliance with political-economic brokers, against Ahok, October 14, 2016. Next, on November 4, 2016, the Defend had been going on for quite a long time, not only when Ahok Islam Action was followed by no less than 350,000 people was governor of DKI Jakarta, but also during the 2012 Jakarta (Ichwan, 2016; IPAC , 2018). Election which was won by Jokowi-Ahok. Their protection was not only expressed through political actions such as being The climax, on 2 December 2016 (212), the Islamist group involved in the elections but also street politics such as which had consolidated itself into the GNPF-MUI, succeeded in demonstrations and various other ways. The inauguration of a mobilizing a massive mass to carry out the Action to Defend rival governor by FPI, for example, can be understood as a Islam III. As mentioned above, there are no less than 700,000 form of resistance by Islamist groups in their efforts to people involved in the Action to Defend Islam. Many experts delegitimize the governor in power. It is just that the actions of believe that a mass of this size, driven not to the extent of resistance they did, did not get broad public support. Habib members of Islamist organizations, which are the leading Rizieq's propaganda, which carries religious (Christian), ethnic proponents of the Action to Defend Islam. However, members (Chinese), ideological (communist) sentiments, was not of MUI, FPI, FUI, MIUMI, Wahdah Islamiyah, HTI, and the sufficiently successful in massively provoking the masses to Action to Defend Islam organs, are certainly not many in delegitimize Ahok. In fact, this action also received support number compared to members of mainstream Islamic from opposition groups in parliament and political parties who organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah (Interview with did not respect the governor in power (Interview with Abdil Moch Nur Ichwan, July 24, 2019). Mughis Mudhoffir, Sept 6, 2019). M. Amin Abdullah also stated the same thing. According to him, The Islamist resistance movement really found its strategic it is impossible for such a large mass, only coming from the momentum when Ahok experienced a tongue
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