The Role of Non-State
AActorslexander C. Chandra in ASEAN
ince its establishment in 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has shown little interest in facilitating the par- ticipation of non-state actors in its decision-making processes. SASEAN is well-known for its elitist tendencies and for how few of its policies correspond to the needs of Southeast Asian people. At the same time, it could also be argued that ASEAN has become this way due to the lack of pressure from non-state actors on the Association. However, during its infancy, most ASEAN member countries were gov- erned by authoritarian regimes which made it difficult for social pres- sure to emerge, both at the national and regional levels.
REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 71 In recent years, non-state actors have substantial changes in its modus operan- gained importance in the regionalization di. Unless such attempts are made, the process in Southeast Asia. The business Association will lose its significance to community, the academic community, and the people of the region. non-government organizations (NGOs) get increasing recognition as critical par- The relevance of ticipants in the creation of a regional civil society engagement community and identity. However, their with ASEAN participation in ASEAN has been limited to conferences, symposia, and seminars The idea that people should partici- focusing on various regional issues. It pate in ASEAN decision-making pro- was only after the financial crisis of 1997 cesses had already emerged in the 1980s that the involvement of a wider range of among prominent figures within the elite non-state actors in the association inten- ASEAN circle. Former Indonesian For- sified, partly due to the process of rela- eign Minister and one of the founding fa- tive democratization in the region. thers of ASEAN Adam Malik once stated that “the shaping of a future of peace, In time for ASEAN’s plan to intro- friendship and cooperation is far too duce an ASEAN Charter and to establish important to be left to government and an ASEAN Community, the Association government officials… [as such, there is has begun to realize that there is wide- a need for] ever-expanding involvement spread criticism of ASEAN’s closed and and participation of the people”. Ma- exclusive nature. There are now sev- lik’s idea, however, only became an issue eral forums through which civil society of discussion between those involved in groups can find a voice in ASEAN, from Track 1 and Track 2 diplomacies. It was the ASEAN People’s Assembly (APA), the ASEAN Institutes for Strategic and which was convened in Batam, Indone- International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS), es- sia in 2000, all the way up to the ASEAN tablished in 1988, that submitted an idea Civil Society Conference, which was first to have “an assembly of the people of held in Shah Alam, Malaysia in December ASEAN” in 1995 which subsequently re- 2005. Civil society groups have also been sulted in the launching of the first ASEAN invited to provide input to the members People’s Assembly (APA) in 2000. It was of the Eminent Persons Group (EPG), only then that the participation of the which was tasked to prepare recommen- people was finally recognized by ASEAN dations to the ASEAN Charter by the and its member governments. 12th ASEAN Summit in Cebu City in De- cember 2006. These developments not Concrete interaction between civil only suggest that ASEAN should address society groups and ASEAN predates its democracy deficit, but also that civil
society groups are now ready to engage As cited in Ali Alatas, ASEAN: An Association in Search with ASEAN and its activities. ASEAN of People or the People’s Search for an Association, Report of is indeed under pressure from the citi- the First ASEAN People’s Assembly, (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2001). zens of its member countries to make Track 1 refers to the practice of diplomacy amongst government officials. Track 2 diplomacy can be consid- Noda Makito, ‘The Role of Nonstate Actors in Build- ered as the practice of bringing public intellectuals, aca- ing an ASEAN Community’, in Road to ASEAN 10: demics, government, business, media and other relevant Japanese Perspectives on Economic Integration, eds. S. Sueo sectors in their private capacity to discuss economic, and N. Makito (Tokyo: Japan Center for International political, and security issues at both the domestic, Exchange, 1999), 167-94. regional, global levels. For detailed definitions of Track Desmond Ball, ‘CSCAP: The Evolution of ‘Second 1 and Track 2 diplomacy, see, for example, Carolina Track’ Process in Regional Security Co-operation’, in G. Hernandez, ‘Track Two and Regional Policy: The Security Co-operation in the Asia-Pacific Region, eds. D. Ball, ASEAN ISIS in ASEAN Decision Making’, in Twenty R. Grant, and J. Wanandi (Washington, DC: Centre Two Years of ASEAN ISIS: Origin, Evolution and Challenges for Strategic and International Studies, 1993); C. G. of Track Two Diplomacy, eds. H. Soesastro et al., (Jakarta: Hernandez, A People’s Assembly: A Novel Mechanism for Centre for Strategic and International Studies and the Bridging the North-South Divide in ASEAN, (unpublished ASEAN Institute for Strategic and International Stud- manuscript, 1995). ies, 2006).
72 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM APA. An example of such interaction is ness sector is known to provide substan- the involvement of the business sector tial input to regional economic integra- in many of ASEAN’s economic integra- tion initiatives. tion initiatives, which resulted in the es- The academic community has also tablishment of the ASEAN Chambers of been playing a key role in ASEAN. It has Commerce and Industry (ASEAN-CCI) been known to articulate its own vision in 1972. ASEAN-CCI became an impor- for an integrated ASEAN. The ASEAN- tant vehicle through which the business ISIS and the Institute for Southeast community channels inputs and concerns Asian Studies (ISEAS), for example, have on regional economic issues to ASEAN. provided much-needed input to ASEAN. It also played a key role in the creation Members of ASEAN-ISIS, which include of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). the Brunei Minister of Foreign Affairs, Following the surge of trade liberalization the Cambodian Institute for Co-opera- in the mid-1980s, the ASEAN business tion and Peace (CICP), the Indonesian community began to realize the increas- Centre for Strategic and International ing production diversity and complemen- Studies (CSIS), the Laos Institute for tary nature of ASEAN economies, result- Foreign Affairs, the Malaysian Institute ing from the process of industrialization for Strategic and International Studies, and the operations of transnational cor- the Philippines’ Institute for Strategic porations (TNCs) in the region . These and Development Studies (ISDS), the factors, among others, justified ASEAN’s Singapore Institute of International Af- introduction of AFTA in the early 1990s. fairs (SIIA), Thailand’s Institute for Se- During the 1980s and 1990s, a re- curity and International Studies (ISIS), gional production network, ethnic busi- and Vietnam’s Institute for International ness network, and sub-regional economic Relations (IIR), are influential not only at zones have emerged, all of which have the national level, but also at the regional helped initiate an informal bottom- level. This influence allows ASEAN-ISIS up regionalization process throughout to play a bridging role between ASEAN East Asia. In Southeast Asia, this pro- and wider civil society through its steer- cess played a crucial role in influencing ing of the APA initiative. This bridging ASEAN to look towards many other re- role reflects a close relationship between gional economic integration initiatives. ASEAN and national and regional think- Although political co-operation may have tanks. been at the forefront of ASEAN’s overall agenda, economic integration has been Unfortunately, civil society involve- at the heart of many of the Association’s ment with ASEAN has been limited to regional integration initiatives. Within the academic circle and the business the ASEAN Secretariat, for example, community. Indeed, it was only after funding has been concentrated mainly the economic crisis of 1997 that more on economic integration initiatives. Al- civil society groups became involved in though the Secretariat has well-trained economists and trade experts, the busi- Although both ASEAN-ISIS and ISEAS have similar research programs (i.e. economics, politics and strategic studies, social and cultural studies, etc.), the Paul Bowles, ‘ASEAN, AFTA, and the “New Regional- two institutions differ in that the former is comprised ism”’, s, Vol. 70, No. 2 (1997), 219-33. Pacific Affair of think-tanks with regional interests at the national J. L. Tongzon, The Economies of Southeast Asia, 2nd level while the latter is simply a regional think-tank. edition (Cheltenham and Northampton, MA: Edward ISEAS attended the formation of ASEAN-ISIS in Bali, Elgar Publishing Ltd., Inc, 2002), 182. Indonesia in 1984. However, since ISEAS considers Dajin Peng, “Invisible Linkages: A Regional Perspec- itself a regional think-tank, the Singapore Institute of tive of East Asian Political Economy”, International International Affairs (SIIA) joined in the ASEAN-ISIS Studies Quarterly, Vol. 46, No. 4 (2002), 423-47. instead to represent Singapore (an informal discussion, An informal discussion was conducted with a staff on September 7, 2006, with a researcher in one of the member whose name will remain anonymous through- academic think-tanks that is part of the ASEAN-ISIS. out this paper at the ASEAN Secretariat on August The name of this individual will remain anonymous 2006.. throughout the paper)..
REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 73 ASEAN and its activities, also largely as a munity by 2020, as enshrined in the Bali result of the process of democratization Concord II (2000). This agreement pro- in the Southeast Asian region.10 ASEAN motes political, economic, and socio-cul- became of interest to non-governmental tural co-operation through the ASEAN organizations (NGOs). The participation Security Community (ASC), the ASEAN of NGOs and other civil society organi- Economic Community (AEC), and the zations (CSOs) is occasioned partly by ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community their work at the grassroots and reflects (ASCC) respectively. During the 38th an immediate response to public need.11 ASEAN Economic Ministerial Meeting CSOs in general are also “naturally issue- (AEM) held in Kuala Lumpur in August oriented or even issue specific”,12 which 2006, ASEAN announced the accelera- makes them ideal advisers to regional and tion of the creation of AEC to 2015, five international organizations. years earlier than originally planned13. Many regard the ASEAN Community as Meanwhile, Southeast Asian ASEAN’s most ambitious plan, one that CSOs themselves have been questioning has forced CSOs to take ASEAN more the need to engage with ASEAN at all. seriously. Prior to the economic crisis (1997-98 pe- riod), most Southeast Asian CSOs, apart Secondly, Southeast Asian CSOs are from the academic community, were in- increasingly of the opinion that ASEAN different to the Association. Many CSOs is a platform from which to influence saw ASEAN as an elitist club for the policy at the regional level. Although member countries’ foreign ministers, -- a the prevailing view is that regional policy club that made many regional integration is determined by domestic politics, re- initiatives without any firm commitment gional organizations influence policies at to implement them. Although NGOs the national level. In trade related issues, and grassroots organizations in South- for example, the ASEAN Secretariat has east Asia have been involved in various been keen to promote bilateral free trade regional networks, most of their activi- agreements (BFTAs), an initiative that ties have focused on campaign and advo- draws both support and concern from cacy on multilateral bodies and their ar- government officials and CSOs in the re- rangements. They paid more attention to gion. Some are concerned that BFTAs the threats posed by international orga- might damage multilateral trade negotia- 14 nizations such as the International Mon- tions under the auspices of the WTO, etary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and while others are concerned about the the World Trade Organization (WTO). potential damage that this form of trade ASEAN, on the other hand, was regarded liberalization may have on ASEAN’s 15 as a weak organization with little power own integration process. Apart from to impact on the well-being of Southeast the trade-diversion effect, pursuing dif- Asian people. ferent trade commitments can also be confusing. Headed by a staunch neo-lib- There are numerous reasons why eral, Ong Keng Yong, ASEAN believes civil society is now keen on engaging that bilateral deals are ways to iron out ASEAN. First and foremost is ASEAN’s intention to establish an ASEAN Com- 13 Global Justice Update, “ASEAN Sepakat untuk Per- cepat Integrasi Ekonomi Hingga Lima Tahun (ASEAN Agrees to Accelerate Economic Integration Until Five 10 Alexander C. Chandra, “Indonesia’s Non-State Actors Years”, Global Justice Update, Vol. IV, No. 69-70, (1-31 in ASEAN: A New Regionalism Agenda for Southeast August 2006). Asia?”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2004), 14 See, for example, Martin Khor, “Bilateral/Regional 155-74. Free Trade Agreements: An Outline of Elements, 11 Leo Gordenker and T. G. Weiss, “Pluralizing Global Nature and Development Implications”, Third World Governance: Analytical Approaches and Dimensions’,” Resurgence, Issue No. 182-183 (2005), 11-15. in NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance, eds. T. G. Weiss and L. Gordenker (London: Lynne Riener Publishers 15 See, for example, Alexander C. Chandra, ‘Indonesia 1996), 17-47. and Bilateral Trade Agreements (BTAs)’, The Pacific 12 Makito, op. cit. p. 177. Review, Vol. 18, No. 4 (2005), 541-88.
74 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM thorny issues between two trading part- civil society can engage ASEAN and ners before they stymie larger negotia- ASEAN issues. However, civil society tions.16 While ASEAN has been actively groups have yet to consolidate among involved in this type of trade liberaliza- themselves regarding how and to what tion, Southeast Asian CSOs have been extent their engagement should be, nervously watching out for the potential thereby limiting their engagement with impacts of faster and more comprehen- ASEAN. Currently, there are two for- sive trade liberalization under BFTAs. mal forums for civil socie-ty engagement Yet, few civil society groups in the region with ASEAN, namely the ASEAN Peo- showed any interest in the BFTA nego- ple’s Assembly (APA) and the ASEAN tiations between ASEAN and China. As Civil Society Conference (ACSC). Of the a result, the ASEAN-China Free Trade two, APA is the one more recognised by Agreement was implemented in 2004 ASEAN; it is incorporated in the Vien- with little response from civil society tiane Action Program (VAP) signed dur- groups. In fact, in some countries such ing the 10th ASEAN Summit in Laos on as Indonesia, the deal went into the im- November 29, 2004. A formal network plementation phase without even parlia- represents the academic community (the mentary ratification17. ASEAN-ISIS) while some groups that at- tended the first ACSC in Kuala Lumpur Thirdly, while increasingly aware of in December 2005 started the Solidarity the potential harm ASEAN policies may for Asian People’s Advocacy (SAPA) to have on policies of member countries, promote broader civil society engage- ASEAN CSOs also acknowledge the po- ment with ASEAN.18 In essence, both tential benefits that ASEAN might gen- ACSC and SAPA are considered an alter- erate for its member countries. In spite native forum and network for engaging of the 1997-98 economic crisis, ASEAN ASEAN. The new way many civil society is still in existence, proving that member groups want to engage ASEAN produced countries still believe the Association can the ACSC and subsequently SAPA. be useful. ASEAN is regarded as one of the most successful regional groupings ASEAN-ISIS and SAPA: in the world by many regional integra- Networking the Region tion observers for, inter alia, its ability to maintain stability and sustained econom- As mentioned earlier, the Southeast ic development. Member countries have Asian business community was one of enjoyed peace, and have thus been able to the few civil society groups that carried concentrate on their own economic de- out some networking within the region velopment. In other words, ASEAN can through the ASEAN-CCI. However, it be seen as a useful tool, a buffer to pre- was the academic community that has ac- vent the conflicts that plagued its mem- tive influence on many ASEAN policies. ber countries before the Association was The ASEAN-ISIS can be considered as established in 1967. the most established academic network working on ASEAN. While some might Networks and forums for engagement with ASEAN 18 There are other formal and informal networks among Southeast Asian civil society groups working on specific Over the years, forums were opened so issues. The Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism (WGAHRM) is one of the most no- 16 D. Arnold, Attracting FDI Through the Spread of table networks of individuals and groups that work with Free Trade Agreements: Unraveling the Rationale and governments and NGOs on the issue of human rights. Impact on Labour Conditions in ASEAN (Hong Kong, Another network of specific groups that has strong SAR: Asia Monitor Resource Centre, 2004); available advocacy is the Asia and Pacific Regional Organization from
REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 75 describe ASEAN-ISIS as a loose asso- is its attempts to act as a bridge between ciation of think-tanks, a policy-network, ASEAN policy-makers (Track 1) and the or a policy-community, those within the rest of civil society, particularly NGOs ASEAN-ISIS circle or those who have (or Track 3).22 In its Report of the Eighth been in contact with the network would Southeast Asian Forum, which was sub- see it as Track 2 diplomacy.19 The idea mitted to the ASEAN SOM in July 1998, of forming an ASEAN-ISIS emerged ASEAN-ISIS urged ASEAN to allow the from a discussion between Juruf Wanan- participation of civil society groups in its di of CSIS and an American scholar on decision making processes23. This and ASEAN Donald Emerson, in the early similar efforts facilitated the launching 1980s.20 A number of subsequent meet- of the APA. ings among like-minded Southeast Asian SAPA is another important net- institutes finally resulted in the creation work. It is a new network of South and of an ASEAN-ISIS as a formal network East Asian civil society groups, particu- of international and strategic institutes in larly NGOs, with a specific working key Southeast Asian countries. It was at group on ASEAN and the ASEAN Char- the fourth meeting of these institutes in ter. The network itself was a result of the Singapore in June 1988 that the ASEAN- Strategic Action Planning for Advocacy 21 ISIS was formally launched. meeting that was organised by several re- ASEAN-ISIS has become the key gional NGOs in Bangkok on February 3- actor in developing the concept of Track 4, 2006. The Bangkok meeting was held 2 diplomacy, or the policy dialogue be- as a result of informal consultations be- tween government officials, think-tanks, tween the regional CSOs that attended and policy analysts. According to Caroli- the Kuala Lumpur ACSC in December na Hernandez, one of the leading figures of the previous year. The participants in the ASEAN-ISIS, the relative success at that informal meeting felt the need to of the ASEAN-ISIS in penetrating the come up with a new mechanism, either a foreign and security policy-making pro- forum or a platform, where information cesses at the regional level can be seen in and resources could be shared in order “(1) the institutionalization of meetings to enhance the effectiveness of civil so- between ASEAN-ISIS and the ASEAN ciety engagement with the various inter- Senior Official Meeting (SOM); (2) the governmental processes that have rap- 24 acknowledgement of the role of ASEAN idly risen in the region in recent years . ISIS in the Joint Communiques of the Shortly after, five regional and interna- AMM since 1991; [and] (3) the solicita- tional NGOs, including Forum Asia, the tion by ASEAN SOM of the views of Southeast Asian Committee for Advoca- ASEAN ISIS on issues they wish to be cy (SEACA), the Third World Network studied further prior to making official (TWN), and the Asian Partnership for policy.” Another important role of ISIS the Development of Human Resources in Rural Asia (AsiaDHRRA), agreed to ini- 19 Hadi Soesastro, Clara Joewono, and Carolina Hernan- tiate and facilitate the creation of SAPA. dez, ‘Introduction’, in Twenty Two Years of ASEAN ISIS: During the Bangkok meeting, working Origin, Evolution and Challenges of Track Two Diplomacy, eds. H. Soesastro et al., (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic groups were established to discuss spe- and International Studies and ASEAN Institutes for cific issues, such as the WG on Human Strategic and International Studies 2006), 1- 15. Rights Education, the WG on the Asian 20 Soesastro et al., op. cit., p. 5. People’s Charter and World Social Forum 21 The signatories of the Statutes of ASEAN-ISIS were Jusuf Wanandi (Indonesian Centre for Strategic and In- 22 ternational Studies – CSIS), Noordin Sopiee (Malaysian See, for example, Hernandez, op. cit., p. 20. 23 Institute of Strategic and International Studies – ISIS), ASEAN-ISIS, Report of the Eighth Southeast Asian Carolina Hernandez (Center for Integrative and De- Forum (Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Strategic and Inter- velopment Studies – CIDS), Lau Teik Soon (Singapore national Studies, 1998). Institute of International Studies - SIIA), and Kusuma 24 Solidarity for Asian People’s Advocacy, SAPA: Snitwongse (the Thai Institute of Security and Interna- Background and Context, (Bangkok, Unpublished SAPA tional Studies – ISIS). documentation, 2006).
76 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM (WSF), and the WG on ASEAN and the civic organizations; it provided little op- ASEAN Charter. To date, however, it portunity to directly influence the agen- is only the WG on ASEAN that is fully da-setting of the Association. Another functional. reason for the emergence of alternative During its Consultation Meeting in forums for CSOs is the differences of Singapore on September 19, 2006, SAPA opinion between academics, such as the members agreed that the network should ASEAN-ISIS and ISEAS, and the rest of serve as an open platform for consulta- civil society, about the way ASEAN inte- tion, co-operation, and co-ordination gration should be pursued. With regard among Asian social movements and civil to economic integration, for example, society organizations, including NGOs, ASEAN-ISIS supports an open economy people’s organizations, and trade unions for ASEAN and favors trade liberaliza- who are engaged in action, advocacy, and tion26. National and regional NGOs, on lobbying at inter-governmental processes the other hand, are more cautious, fear- and organizations.25 The network also ing the possible adverse effects of trade aims to enhance co-operation among its liberalization and open economies. members and partners to increase the impact and effectiveness of their- en ASEAN-recogniZed civil gagement with inter-governmental bod- society forums ies. The main areas of engagement for SAPA include issues of democracy and APA is “a general meeting of civil soci- human rights, peace and human security, ety organizations, non-government orga- sustainable development and environ- nizations, and civic organizations from ment, as well as globalization and trade, the ten member-states of ASEAN.” ... finance and labour. Apart from ASEAN, [It] aims to serve as a vessel for articu- therefore, SAPA’s main targets include lating and conveying the people’s view the South Asian Association for Regional and interests outside of the formal po- Co-operation (SAARC), the Asian De- litical channels’”27. It was convened on velopment Bank (ADB), the Asia-Europe the rationale that the process of commu- Meeting (ASEM), the United Nations nity-building in ASEAN must include all (UN), etc. layers of society to make the Association more relevant to the ordinary citizens.28 Unlike the ASEAN-ISIS and its Prior to the launching of APA, ASEAN- APA, both ACSC and SAPA are not men- ISIS—the core of this initiative—already tioned in any existing formal ASEAN argued that interaction between Track 1 documents. The initiative to set up and Southeast Asian NGOs (or Track 3) both ACSC and SAPA was due partly should be enhanced.29 When the Thai to increasing dissatisfaction with APA’s slow progress. In fact, many CSOs that 26 See, for example, Hadi Soesastro, “ASEAN Economic participated in APA later attended the Community: Concept, Costs, and Benefits”, in ACSC and subsequently joined SAPA. Roadmap to an ASEAN Economic Community, ed D. Hew (Singapore: ISEAS 2005), 13-30; Dennis Hew, R. Sen, L. APA was, indeed, successful in building P. Onn, M. Sellakumaran, S. Mentreevat, and N. K. Jin, a bridge between ASEAN bureaucracy ‘ISEAS Concept Paper on the ASEAN Economic Com- and the region’s CSOs, two worlds that munity’, in Roadmap to an ASEAN Economic Community, ed. D. Hew (Singapore: ISEAS, 2005), 293-310. had been apart for far too long. But in spite of APA, little actual engagement 27 C. G. Hernandez, “Introduction and Summary: has taken place between ASEAN and re- ASEAN People’s Assembly 2003”, in Towards an ASEAN Community of Caring Societies, ASEAN Institute of gional CSOs. After all, APA is only a gen- Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) and eral meeting place for CSOs, NGOs, and Institute for Strategic and Development Studies (ISDS) (Manila: ISDS, 2003), 1-9. 28 E. T. C. Cheow, “Socioeconomic Challenges for the 25 Solidarity for Asian People’s Advocacy, Agreement and ASEAN People’s Assembly’”, The Jakarta Post, (24 July Decisions: 2nd SAPA Consultation Meeting, Singapore, 2004); available from
REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 77 Foreign Minister called for the establish- that NGOs also played a role in the for- ment of the congress of ASEAN people mation of ACSC. The ACSC, which was during the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting attended by more than 120 participants (AMM) in Brunei in 1995, ASEAN-ISIS from CSOs throughout Southeast Asia, responded by introducing the idea of produced a statement to be presented to an assembly of the peoples of ASEAN, the ASEAN heads of state. This was the which transcended the idea of ASEAN first time that ASEAN Leaders had invit- officials at the time to set up a regional ed to hear representatives from civil soci- inter-parliamentary union. ASEAN-ISIS ety groups in the region on their views on wanted a more broadly representative the process of ASEAN community-build- people’s assembly that would include ing. Initially, ACSC was meant to be a representatives from various elements of one-off event, with no follow-up events civil society. planned for the subsequent ASEAN Sum- After confronting various setbacks, mit. However, during meetings between such as lack of funding and the reserva- ASEAN leaders and representatives of tion of ASEAN officials towards the civil society groups at the 11th ASEAN idea,30 the first APA was finally launched Summit, ASEAN leaders recognised the in Batam, Indonesia on November 24-25, ACSC and supported its annual conven- 2000. Currently, APA and the ASEAN- ing. ISIS are seen in the VAP as initiatives to bring the people of the region closer to The ASEAN Charter, the Association, along with the ASEAN Eminent Persons’ Group, Business Advisory Council (ABAC), the and Civil Society ASEAN Parliamentary Organization (AIPO), and the ASEAN University Net- At the 11th ASEAN Summit, with the work. There had been three additional theme “One Vision, One Identity”, APA meetings after the first one in Ba- ASEAN Leaders announced the drafting tam. The second APA was held in Bali, In- of an ASEAN Charter which would serve donesia in 2002, and the third and fourth as the legal and institutional framework in Manila, Philippines in 2004 and 2005 for ASEAN. The Charter would codify respectively. The fifth APA will again be all ASEAN norms, rules, and values, as held in Manila in December 2006. well as reaffirm many other agreements that ASEAN signed prior to the ASEAN The First ACSC, on the other hand, Charter.31 An Eminent Persons Group, was the initiative of the Malaysian govern- composed of highly distinguished and ment, which commissioned the ASEAN well respected citizens from ASEAN Study Center of the Universiti Teknologi member countries, was set up to exam- MARA (UiTM) to hold the event paral- ine and provide practical recommenda- lel to the 11th ASEAN Summit in Kuala tions in the making of an ASEAN Char- Lumpur, Malaysia in December 2005. ter.32 Recommendations from the EPG The event was supported by the ASEAN Secretariat, as well as another Malaysian 31 For the Declaration on the Establishment of the NGO, the Third World Network (TWN). ASEAN Charter, see ASEAN Secretariat Kuala Lumpur Although UiTM, an academic organiza- Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Charter (2005); available online:
78 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM will be taken into consideration during eration. The meeting was also attended the next ASEAN Summit and forwarded by representatives of the ASEAN Inter- to a High Level Task Force responsible Parliamentary Organization (AIPO) and for drafting the ASEAN Charter. Since the Working Group for an ASEAN Hu- December 2005, the EPG has met seven man Rights Mechanism. Prior to that times: the first time in Kuala Lumpur meeting, on the same day, members of after the 11th ASEAN Summit; the sec- the EPG held another special consulta- ond time in Bangkok on February 14-15, tion with representatives of ASEAN- 2006; the third in Ubud, Bali, on April ISIS. CSO representatives, under the 17-19, 2006; the fourth in Singapore on auspices of SAPA, submitted a joint in- June 27-29, 2006; the fifth in Kuala Lum- put on ASEAN political and security co- pur on August 22-24, 2006; the sixth in operation. On its first submission to the Siem Reap on September 24-26, 2006; members of EPG on the ASEAN Char- and, finally, the seventh in Brunei Darus- ter, members of SAPA expressed great salam, on November 28-29, 2006. EPG enthusiasm for an ASEAN Charter and members and civil society representa- the opportunity to engage with ASEAN tives met during the aforementioned Bali during the Charter’s creation.35 and Singapore meeting, concentrating on The second meeting between civil issues pertaining to political and security society groups and EPG members took cooperation and economic cooperation place in Singapore on June 28, 2006, respectively. Subsequently, Southeast and concentrated on economic issues in Asian civil society groups also met with the ASEAN Community. The meeting, the Special Adviser to the Philippines’ hosted by the Singaporean based think- EPG member, Fidel Ramos, to make tank, the Institute for Southeast Asian their submission on the socio-cultural Studies (ISEAS), was attended by NGO pillar and institutional mechanism issues representatives, members of the regional on November 10, 2006 in Quezon City, and national academic community based Philippines.33 Representatives of civil in Singapore, and the business commu- society groups also submitted a letter to nity (with a special meeting between the members of EPG on November 24, the EPG and an international consult- 2006, reiterating the main elements of ing firm, McKinsey and Co., conducted their three submissions34. later). SAPA reaffirmed its commitment to engage in the formation of an ASEAN Civil society submissions Charter and committed to carrying on to the EPG on the ASEAN the process after the EPG’s task would Charter have been completed. As mentioned above, the first meeting The last submission of SAPA, on took place in Ubud, Bali and concentrat- the socio-cultural pillar and ASEAN in- ed on the first main pillar of the ASEAN stitutional mechanism, was submitted in Community: political and security co-op- Quezon City, on November 10, 2006. For some practical reasons, the meeting was sri (Thailand), Nguyen Manh Cam (Vietnam). For de- tails regarding the list of members of EPG, see ASEAN mainly attended by representatives of Secretariat 2005, List of Members of the Eminent civil society groups from the Philippines. Person’s Group (EPG) on the ASEAN Charter; available From the EPG side, Ambassador Rosario from
REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 79 (Editor’s note: the complete set of submissions Philippines also participated actively of the SAPA WG on ASEAN is included in in the discussion.39 Others, particularly this volume.) those representing the less democratic countries of Southeast Asia, were rela- Responses and reactions tively silent and appeared cautious about of the Eminent Persons confronting the civil society groups. It Group to civil society in- would, of course, have been more inter- puts esting if more EPG members, particu- larly those from Cambodia, Laos, Myan- Participation in all ASEAN decision- mar, and Vietnam (CLMV countries), making processes is a key concern for not to mention those from Singapore, civil society. CSOs are demanding a dem- showed more clearly their reactions to ocratic and inclusive process with clear the process of civil-society engagement mechanisms for participation in national with ASEAN. and regional consultations. In general, At the second meeting, the EPG the EPG concurred with the idea that Chairman again expressed his satisfac- ASEAN and the decision-making pro- tion with the contribution of civil society cess of the ASEAN Charter should be groups. There was also an interesting ex- open to civil society participation. At change on the issue of people-to-people the first meeting between the EPG and engagement. In relation to the specific civil society, members of the EPG appre- terminology used by SAPA, for example, ciated civil society’s contributions to the Fidel Ramos felt that the term people ASEAN Charter.37 In fact, SAPA was empowerment, rather than pro-people, the only group present at the meeting would be more appropriate in a Char- that had prepared a written submission. ter, as the term pro-people connotes Others, including the representatives of a top-down elitist approach that civil the Working Group on Human Rights society would rather put aside . Some Mechanism and AIPO made only oral EPG members, however, expressed their statements during the meeting. Dur- views in more subtle ways by throwing ing the meeting, Ali Alatas of Indonesia back the question on how CSOs propose stressed that the dilemma for the EPG to implement a “pro-people” policy in was whether to decide on basic princi- ASEAN . ples that provide norms, guidelines, and a framework for ASEAN cooperation It is clear that civil society groups and policy implementation; or, simply are starting to show keen interest in the to draft a recommendation that incorpo- ASEAN regional project. However, it rates all important issues that emerge in the region. He did, however, hint that has a very active civil society. He tried to assure the audience by saying that the EPG would certainly listen the EPG favored the former over the not only to the views of civil society groups, but also latter option38. Fidel V. Ramos of the parliaments and academic think tanks. For further details of Alatas’ views on the ASEAN Charter and the EPG’s engagement with representatives of civil society stitutional Mechanisms to the Eminent Persons Group groups, see, for example, The Leaders, “Interview with on the ASEAN Charter (Quezon City: Unpublished Ali Alatas”, The Leader (N/A) available online:
80 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM remains to be seen how the recommen- ASEAN and its activities is therefore tre- dations from the EPG to the High Lev- mendous. Without such popularization, el Task Force (HLTF) will be taken up. ASEAN will remain elitist. It is impera- Some CSO demands may be seen as too tive to build on the recent relative suc- radical by some ASEAN member govern- cess in widening the door for civil society ments. The participation of civil society engagement with ASEAN. Civil society groups in decision-making processes in participation must be expanded at the countries such as Burma is still limited national and local level, before this new while freedom of expression in some CSO engagement develops its own elitist of the older ASEAN members, such as tendencies. n Singapore, is still constrained. Yet, the EPG-civil society consultation process is an important step in guaranteeing an ASEAN Charter that reflects the needs and interests of all Southeast Asians.
Is There a Future for ASEAN-CS Engagement?
The long-term future of civil society en- gagement with ASEAN depends entirely on the ability of regional CSOs to come up with a united stance vis-à-vis ASEAN. Currently, civil society groups in South- east Asia are very much fragmented. As mentioned previously, members of the academic community and many NGO representatives hold divergent views on the way in which the ASEAN integra- tion process should be pursued. Given ASEAN’s limited experience in allow- ing civil society groups to participate in the agenda-setting, it might be difficult for the Association to deal directly with the numerous civil society groups in the region. Another key challenge to civil society engagement with ASEAN is the Association’s lack of openness to civil society participation. Less democratic member- countries are still unsure about civil society engagement in the ASEAN process. Countries such as Burma, and even Singapore, would wish to stop civil society groups from participating in the Association’s decision-making processes.
ASEAN and its existing CSO network still need to familiarise local and national CSOs with the Association and its ac- tivities. Currently, only national and regional CSOs with regional and / or in- ternational interests are actively engaged with ASEAN. The task of popularising
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