ATC RADAR VECTOR MAPS

The Case for Including MVA Charts in the Electronic Flight Bag Descent to the MVA

How many of you have accepted a clearance and descended to the Minimum Vectoring Altitude (MVA)? (Below the MSA altitude listed on your Jeppesen chart.) How many of you would descend to the MVA if there was a possibility that an obstacle penetrated that MVA? How many of you have accepted radar vectors towards higher terrain at an airport with mountains close by? The Las Vegas Case

Because Sectional charts are used to draw up MVA charts, the opportunity exists for the local ATC designer to make errors. Because local ATC designers have no formal TERPs training, MVA charts reflect local interpretations and “spin.” MVA charts are supposed to have a minimum of 3 miles lateral from higher terrain, and 2,000 feet of vertical clearance at airports with mountains except when a lower altitude is necessary to blend with the descent requirements of approach procedures. An Overview of the Southwest Area of the Las Vegas MVA Chart: This is a closer view of the previous slide. The red dashed line is a vector to the airport from the southwest at 5,000 feet. Because of errors the ATC designer made in reading the fuzzy terrain contours on the Sectional, the passes within a mile (instead of the required 3-mile minimum) of terrain higher than 5,000 and is pointed directly at terrain only 600 feet lower than the aircraft. The Phoenix Case

The local designers failed to provide mountainous-area 2,000 feet of terrain clearance over a steep peak The distance of this peak from the airport does not justify or require a reduction in obstacle clearance for orderly transition to an approach procedure. During storm conditions, significant altimeter errors and up-and-down drafts can occur over such a mountain peak. Overview of PHX MVA Chart Note “X” Marks the Spot

3-D view over Humboldt Peak Note steep gradients of terrain, which is favorable to altimeter errors and up-and-down drafts during storm conditions. The Los Angeles Case

Los Angeles area MVA charts have complex design, to the extent that in some areas sectors are compressed against steeply rising terrain. When LAX is in an east configuration, terrain to the northeast can pose a significant CFIT risk. The GABRE DP Example The red dashed line is the GABRE runway heading track to intercept the SLI radial track to fly north to, and over, the San Gabriel Mountains. Aircraft are often leveled-off at 3,000 while flying runway heading to the northeast. If climb resumption is delayed until aircraft intercepts SLI radial and turns north, then a series of tightly squeezed MVA sectors are encountered, and a climb gradient of as high as 865 feet per mile is faced, all without any indication of the situation on the flight deck. Are there similar problems elsewhere in our national airspace system? The Reno MVA vs. MSA Example

A vector towards the airport from the northwest. Just as the aircraft enters the 11,100’ MSA sector, the flight is cleared to descend to 8,200. Where is the check-and-balance? What if the controller or crew erred and caused a descent to some altitude lower than 8,200? The Asheville MVA vs. MSA Case The Asheville Primary Area Terrain Violations These terrain points likely contain trees. The ridgeline was missed because only the 4,260’ terrain point is on the Sectional Chart for the area. Absent verification, 200 feet of assumed adverse obstacle (AAO) additive should be applied to all these points. The Asheville Blanket Disregard of DMA 2,000’ Required Obstacle Clearance The obstacle points shown are beyond the distance required for orderly transition onto instrument approach procedures, thus they all should have 2,000 feet of DMA vertical ROC. (The ZTL MIAC for this area also has blanket reductions of required DMA vertical ROC.) The Roanoke Buffer Violations (The Asheville MVAC has numerous similar buffer violations, some of which have been forwarded to AAT-200 at their request.) The Roanoke Buffer Violations, Closer View

Like the Asheville case, these terrain points likely have trees and, without verification, should have 200 feet of AAO additive. The “Missing” SFO/SJC Radio Antenna

Towers on SNA/LGB’s Highest Mountain Because these towers are less than 200 feet in height (they are about 150’ high), the FAA had no knowledge of their existence until ALPA sent them the following photos: The Case Against Using Sectional Charts to Design MVA Charts is Compelling

Sectionals are designed as an aid to VFR navigation.

Sectionals are at a scale of 1:500,000, and lack the accuracy or resolution to be used to design terminal IFR altitudes and sectors.

Computer-aided design programs exist today that make it easy to design MVA charts with U.S. Geological 1:24,000 topographical charts, all corrected to WGS84. Selected Text Info Contained on All Sectional Charts The Salt Lake City Errant Vector Towards Higher Terrain Hypothetical

FAA MVA charts are more complex than most nations’ charts, especially in designated mountainous areas (“DMAs”).

Does this make them too complex for use on the modern flight deck? The “big picture” view is misleading because the typical TRACON (approach control) controls airspace far smaller than its MVA chart suggests:

The red box approximates Salt Lake City TRACON’s airspace. Clipping the chart to the airspace used by the TRACON scales in to show just the entire airspace of concern: Scaling in closer still to the working area of interest (for example, being vectored to the ILS final) makes the chart very readable: ALPA’s Objective for MVA (and MIA) Charts: Present MVA/MIA charts MVA/MIA altitudes need are internal ATC ad hoc to become regulatory IFR charts. altitudes, like all other IFR altitudes.

Present MVA/MIA charts MVA/MIA charts must be are hand-drawn on VFR designed to appropriate Sectional Charts with RNP values, using best inconsistency and are available terrain/obstacle prone to errors. data, and designed using computer-aided design software. CONCLUSIONS The CHIPs Program needs the Operations Committee’s support to move this effort forward.

This project will succeed only if it is pursued across FAA services at the associate administrator level.

Modernization of MVA/MIA charts is a fundamental element of moving the national airspace to the concept of RNP.

Causing MVA/MIA charts to become public IFR altitudes will provide the process to make them available to industry electronic chart vendors and all other interested parties. A Flight Safety Foundation Task Force Recommended Electronic MVA Charts on the Flight Deck Almost Four Years Ago

Excerpt From the Flight Safety Foundation’s “Flight Safety Digest,” Page 117, November 1998-February 1999:

Discussion

“Currently there is a hazardous disconnect between the vectoring charts used by the air traffic controller and those available in the cockpit. The pilot has minimum-sector-altitude (MSA) charts that provide the lowest usable altitude in a sector surrounding an airport. The air traffic controller has MVA charts designed and maintained by . These charts are centered around radar-antenna sites, which in most cases are different from the center point of the MSA charts. As the MSA and MVA charts are based on different criteria, a pilot can become confused when vectored at an altitude that is below the MSA charted altitude. The pilot is not sure whether he is being vectored at an approved MVA altitude or whether a mistake has been made concerning the MSA. This is especially critical in high-density traffic areas where radio congestion may preclude further and immediate clarification with ATC. This is a classic "latent situation" or "enabling factor" in the potential error chain.”

Conclusion

“With the implementation of the global positioning system (GPS) and flight management system (FMS), it is now possible to display MVA information in an electronic form on the flight deck. The one missing action is for ATC to make this information available to pilots who want or need it.”

Recommendation

“The ATC/AFWG strongly recommends that MVA information be made available for use.” Addendum – NASA ASRS Reports

The follow pages summarize our analysis of NASA ASRS reports over an approximate 10-year period, which pertain to safety-of-flight incidents involving radar vectors. Our Search of NASA ASRS Database

We searched the NASA Reporting System Database for a 10 year period, ending in mid-2000, the latest period for which they have reports compiled.

We found 90 incidents, which we considered to be pertinent to the issue of MVA/MIA charts. This represents over 8 reported incidents per year, all of which have moderate to serious safety implications.

It is reasonable to infer that the reported incidents represent no more than 50% of such occurrences. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that 15-20 such incidents occur each year in U.S. airspace.

Most of the reporters are Part 121 flight crews. The Reports Fall Into the Following Major Categories

Vectors towards higher terrain.

Vectors below the MVA during terminal-arrival operations.

Misunderstood clearance resulting in either descent below the MVA or flight into an area of higher MVA.

GPWS warning because of likely inadequate mountainous-area terrain clearance. Synopsis : GPWS WARNING (DESCENT BELOW THE MVA) -- FINAL APCH VECTOR

DURING THE APCH PHASE, WE EXPERIENCED A 'TERRAIN WARNING' JUST AFTER LEVELING OFF AT ATC ASSIGNED ALT (2800 FT MSL). THE ACFT WAS APPROX 14.5 DME ON THE SAN 110.9 LOC. (JUST OUTSIDE OF 'SWAFT' INTXN.) AFTER HEARING THE AUDIO PORTION OF THE TERRAIN WARNING 'PULL UP' 'PULL UP' WE CLBED THE ACFT IMMEDIATELY TO APPROX 5300 FT PLUS OR MINUS 100 FT AND ADVISED ATC OF THE DEV. WE WERE IMC AT THE TIME OF THE WARNING IN RAIN. ATC ADVISED US TO TRY AND LEVEL 5000 FT AND WE COMPLIED. AT THAT POINT WE WERE GIVEN THE OPTION TO INTERCEPT THE LOC (RWY 27) AND CONTINUE THE APCH. WE ACCEPTED THE CLRNC AND CONTINUED AND LANDED ON RWY 27 IN SAN DIEGO WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. NOTE: THERE IS AN OBSTACLE NEAR THE POINT OF OUR TERRAIN WARNING AT (2791 FT) ON APCH CHART (11-2) LOC RWY 27. ALSO THERE IS TERRAIN IN THAT VICINITY CONTAINED AT 4000 FT (1000 FT OBSTRUCTION CLRNC).

Ed Note: MVA in area of this incident is 3,800’ Synopsis : MAINTENANCE TECHNICIAN INADVERTENTLY FLIPPED RADIO SWITCH AND APCH CTLR COULDN'T TALK TO SMT ON VECTOR TOWARDS HIGHER TERRAIN. PORTABLE RADIO USED TO MAKE CONTACT WITH SMT.

WHILE WORKING THE W ARR RADAR SECTOR I OBSERVED AN FDEP TECHNICIAN FIDDLING WITH THE STRIP PRINTER, FLIPPING SWITCHES WHICH ACTIVATED THE BACK UP FDEP PRINTER THEN ENTERING TEST MESSAGES. JUST PRIOR TO LEAVING THE TRACON THE TECHNICIAN ACCIDENTALLY FLIPPED A SWITCH (DIRECTLY ABOVE THE PRINTER SELECTOR SWITCH) WHICH INACTIVATED THE MAIN AND STANDBY RADIO XMITTERS FOR THE E SIDE (DEP) CTLR, AND THE CTLR WAS UNABLE TO COMMUNICATE UNTIL A MAINT SUPVR IDENTED THE PROB (12 MINS LATER). AN SMT WAS ON A NBOUND VECTOR TOWARDS MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN (MVA 5000') AT 4000' WHEN OUR RADIOS WERE LOST AND A BACK UP PORTABLE RADIO WAS FINALLY ABLE TO MAKE CONTACT WITH THE ACFT JUST BEFORE HE ENTERED THE HIGHER MVA. THE TECHNICIAN WAS INFORMED OF THE NEAR DISASTER. THE FOLLOWING DAY THE BACK UP RADIO (PORTABLE) ALSO FAILED. (emphasis ours) Synopsis : FLC OF AN LGT LOST COM WITH APCH DURING A VECTOR TO FINAL RESULTING IN ATC INSTRUCTED IMMEDIATE CLB WHEN COM REESTABLISHED WITH THE TWR CTLR.

ACFT WAS BEING VECTORED FOR AN ILS APCH TO RWY 21 AT GEG. ALT ASSIGNED WAS 4000 FT AND HEADING WAS APPROX 90 DEGS TO THE INBOUND COURSE HEADING: ACFT LOCATION WAS NW TO N OF GEG, CREW OBSERVED THE ACFT GOING THROUGH THE LOC COURSE. CAPT TOLD FO TO CALL APCH CTL. FO WAS UNABLE TO CONTACT AND SWITCHED TO TWR FREQ. CTLR ISSUED CLRNC, 'CLB IMMEDIATELY TO 5500 FT AND TURN R TO 270 DEGS.' CREW IMMEDIATELY COMPLIED AND COMPLETED THE ILS TO RWY 21. AFTER BLOCKING IN, CREW REVIEWED SEQUENCE OF EVENTS AND REALIZED THAT COMS HAD BEEN LOST WITH APCH CTL (123.75) DUE TO THE FREQ TRANSFER SWITCH BEING ACTIVATED BACK TO 126.1 (CTR). CREW SUSPECTS THAT SWITCH MAY HAVE BEEN MOVED BY TURB AS FO HAD NO RECOLLECTION OF MOVING SWITCH. BETTER SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND RADIO DISCIPLINE MIGHT HAVE AVERTED SIT. NO GPWS ACTIVATION OCCURRED. Synopsis : FLC OF A B737-300 RESPONDED TO ANOTHER ACFT CALL SIGN DUE TO SIMILAR SOUNDING CALL SIGN AND FLC ACKNOWLEDGMENT BLOCK TO ATC

THE FLT WAS ENRTE FROM SLC TO SJC AND HAD BEEN NAVING VIA THE JAWWS ONE ARR PROC. AFTER PASSING PAPEE INTXN, THE FLT WAS ISSUED A VECTOR HEADING TO INTERCEPT THE ARR NE OF JAWWS INTXN. BAY APCH THEN ISSUED A VECTOR HEADING, TAKING THE FLT OFF OF THE ARR, AND ISSUED CLRNC TO DSND TO 6000 FT. WHILE ON VECTORS AND STILL DSNDING TO 6000 FT BOTH PLTS HEARD AND UNDERSTOOD THAT THE FLT WAS FURTHER CLRED TO DSND TO 4000 FT AND TO CHANGE TO ANOTHER FREQ. THE CAPT RESET THE ALT WINDOW ON THE MCP AND THE FO VERIFIED THE SETTING. THE FO CONFIRMED THE ALT ASSIGNMENT AND FREQ CHANGE. NO REPLY FROM BAY APCH WAS RECEIVED AND THE FO SWITCHED TO THE NEWLY ASSIGNED FREQ AND CONTACTED BAY APCH. THE CTLR ACKNOWLEDGED THE FLT'S CALL AND NO FURTHER COM WAS IMMEDIATELY MADE. THE CTLR DID NOT QUESTION THE ALT ASSIGNMENT FOLLOWING THE FREQ CHANGE. THE FLT CONTINUED A SLOW DSCNT BELOW 6000 FT AND THE CAPT REMARKED THAT THE ASSIGNED ALT WAS BELOW THE MSA DEPICTED ON THE ILS RWY 12R APCH PLATE, BUT ACCEPTED THE ALT AS A MINIMUM VECTOR ALT ISSUED BY BAY APCH. THE FO WAS ABLE TO SEE THE GND AND REMARKED THAT IT APPEARED TO BE COMFORTABLY BELOW THE ACFT. THE FLT WAS OPERATING IN IMC WITH BREAKS IN THE CLOUDS ALLOWING INTERMITTENT VERTICAL VISIBILITY. FLT CONDITIONS INCLUDED RAIN AND CONTINUOUS LIGHT AND OCCASIONAL MODERATE TURB. AS THE SLOW DSCNT (1000 FPM) CONTINUED, BAY APCH ISSUED A VECTOR WHICH CHANGED THE HEADING BY APPROX 20 DEGS TO THE R AND REMARKED THAT THE VECTOR WAS TO AVOID TERRAIN. FURTHER VECTORS WERE ISSUED AND NO XMISSIONS WERE RECEIVED REGARDING THE FLT'S ALT. THE FLT ACQUIRED THE ARPT VISUALLY AND WAS CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 12R. THE FLT LANDED UNEVENTFULLY AND AS IT WAS TAXIING TO THE GATE, SAN JOSE GND CTL ASKED THE CREW TO CONTACT BAY APCH BY TELEPHONE. THE CAPT CONTACTED BAY APCH BY TELEPHONE AND WAS TOLD THAT THE FLT HAD ACCEPTED A CLRNC FOR ANOTHER FLT ACR Y. THE SUPVR OFFERED THAT HE HAD REVIEWED THE AUDIO TAPE AND HAD HEARD A SOUND CONSISTENT WITH 2 ACFT XMITTING SIMULTANEOUSLY FOLLOWING THE ISSUANCE OF THE CLRNC TO DSND TO 4000 FT AND CHANGE FREQS. HE SAID THAT IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO IDENT WHICH ACFT HAD BEEN XMITTING SIMULTANEOUSLY. THE GPWS DID NOT ACTIVATE DURING THE FLT. AT NO TIME WAS THE FLT INFORMED BY RADIO THAT IT HAD ACCEPTED AN INCORRECT CLRNC. NOR WAS ANY XMISSION RECEIVED AMENDING THE ALT CLRNC OR INSTRUCTING THE FLT TO STOP DSCNT OR CLB.