20 The German Times – Life April 2019

The great historical gray area

A new biography of , the man who tried to kill Hitler, has reignited a long-running historical debate. It says a lot about the German state of mind

PICTURE ALLIANCE/AKG-IMAGES most of Europe was all but over. had participated in could be won; Stauffenberg was primarily influ- called, that after taking it upon him- “Categories like morals and con- BY LUTZ LICHTENBERGER The regime did not end until ten they were mostly of aristocratic enced in his youth by the char- self to detonate the bomb at Wolf’s science cannot be located on this months later, when the Allies cap- origin, their values not in line ismatic spell of the poet and – as Lair, he flew back to where side or that side of political party t midnight on July 20, tured Berlin and Hitler killed him- with democratic norms. And, in he would be deemed today – cult he was needed to coordinate the lines,” she wrote, “but only within 1944, four men are self in his bunker there. The debate the leftists’ view, had to leader Stefan George. George, plan of arresting the most impor- a person. It should therefore actu- Aescorted to the inner in Germany about the legacy of the be totally defeated by the Allies born in 1868, had gathered around tant Nazi figures such as Heinrich ally be called an uprising of those yard of the Bendlerblock, the men involved in the July 20 plot to ensure that they would not be him a group of young men dedi- Himmler and Joseph Goebbels. who followed their conscience.” headquarters of German Army has been raging on ever since. spared from facing up to all the cated to poetry and male compan- It is a very distinct point Karlauf Jens Jessen, also a grandchild of in Berlin. The glaring headlights A controversial new biography crimes and atrocities they com- ionship imbued with at least a hint is making. Stauffenberg was not a July 20 conspirator, delivered a of military vehicles cast the scene about the coup’s leader, Stauffen- mitted (most of all the attempted of homoeroticism. No less radical the idealist hero his proponents very critical and extensive review in a ghostly atmosphere. The berg. Porträt eines Attentäters extermination of the Jews). than Karl Marx, who urged phi- to make him out to be today. His in Die Zeit, but drew some inter- firing squad consists of 10 petty (Stauffenberg. Portrait of an Beginning in the 1970s, however, losophers not only to interpret the aristocratic upbringing did not esting conclusions relevant to the officers. They proceed to execute assassin; Blessing Verlag, 2019) a new appreciation emerged. The world but to be willing to change imbue him with immunity against ongoing debate. No earlier biog- four conspirators, chief among by Thomas Karlaufhas caused , looking for moral it, George, albeit with a different the Nazi mob. He did not try to kill raphy had brought us so close to them a high-ranking officer tempers to flare and reignited the legitimization, officially adopted world view, spoke of poetry as a Hitler because of Auschwitz, or all Stauffenberg while allowing him named Claus Schenk Graf von long-running debate. the legacy of July 20 as part of its revolutionary force with the poten- the other camps, or the rampant to remain the distant figure that Stauffenberg. In the 1950s, the conspirator’s identity – service men should be tial to overthrow existing orders. corruption, or the establishment he was, Jessen writes. The journal- Earlier that day, Stauffenberg reputation was discredited among Staatsbürger in Uniform, citizens “George from the beginning con- of a police state. He did it because ist and descendent reads Karlauf’s had detonated a bomb at the large groups of the population. in uniform, not slavish adherents sidered himself to be a poet of ‘the Hitler was losing the war. biography as an attempt to delegit- Wolf’s Lair, ’s Eastern This occurred among the remain- to an authoritarian state. The act,’” Karlauf writes. “Conspiracy Instead, Karlauf credits Stauffen- imize Stauffenberg’s heroics while Front military headquarters – a ing proponents of Nazi ideology, German army traditionally swears and overthrow were central ele- berg with epitomizing Max identifying a common tendency two-hour flight from Berlin. The but more disturbingly also among in new recruits every year in a big ments of his world view; ‘the act’ Weber’s concept of Verantwor- among Germans, the will to allo- dictator had survived the assas- former functionaries and passive ceremony on July 20. became the decisive metaphor of tungsethik (ethic of responsibility). cate blame equally: “There shall sination attempt thanks to a series adherents who wanted to discredit Now Karlauf has written an his poetry.” After Stalingrad, the gruesome not have been heroes.” of flukes, but primarily because the initiative to end the regime, erudite and elegant biography, a Karlauf traces Stauffenberg’s defeat of the Sixth Army in Russia What Jessen fails to grasp is that hot temperatures that day caused in part because they felt it was an reexamination of Stauffenberg’s slowly evolving thinking from during the winter of 1942–1943, great historical gray area in which the venue for the tactical session indictment on their complacency life and the formative influences romanticizing about a new Ger- Stauffenberg came to the conclu- all seemingly larger-than-life yet to be moved from the bunker, between 1933 and 1945. Authori- on his thinking while managing many in the 1920s, welcoming the sion that the war could not be won flawed figures exist. What Karlauf where the bomb would have ties denied pensions to many to land squarely in the middle Nazi regime in 1933 and approving and that Hitler did not have the makes patently clear in his copi- caused considerably more damage, of the descendants of the men between both of today’s camps. of the war until realizing that Hitler right to take the entire German ous portrait is that Stauffenberg to a lightly built shack nearby. involved in the plot. There was Those who declare the men of July would amount to nothing but Ger- people down with him. The man is part of Germany’s history, of In the ensuing hours, the con- also no official acknowledgement 20 transcendent heroes as well as many’s ruin. had to go. “This kind of reasoned both its highs and its lows, and the spirators nonetheless went for- of the group of July 20. the left-leaning critics can read into Like many of his co-conspirators, military and political assessment,” critical figure in a corresponding ward with their elaborate plan to Critics from the left have their Karlauf’s book precisely want they once Stauffenberg reached this Karlauf writes, “does not jibe with debate that cannot and should not overthrow the regime in Berlin, own list of admonishments, want to hear. conclusion, he advanced the plan- our view of July 20 as a beacon of be constrained by the affixing of but after the Führer himself called including the following: the con- The author set out to write about ning of the assassination and urged moral outrage.” ahistorical slogans. several loyal generals and officers, spirators were mostly officers Stauffenberg using only sources his overly cautious and scrupu- Case in point, Sophie von Stauffenberg and his men were who had adhered to Nazi ideol- – documents, letters, memoirs – lous fellow officers and civilians to Bechtoldsheim, granddaughter captured and killed. With their ogy; they did not begin to oppose from before 1945, that is, before the follow suit. By the summer of 1944, of Stauffenberg, responded with Lutz Lichtenberger is senior deaths, the plot to end the Nazi Hitler until it became increasingly mythmaking began in earnest by he had become so indispensable to an impassioned critique of Kar- editor of The German Times. stranglehold over Germany and inconceivable that the war they both friends and detractors. , as the plot was lauf’s book in a speech in March.

THE NEGOTIATOR BACKWARDS THEORY AND PRACTICE

here is a whiff of Cold War nostalgia permeating Horst olfgang Schivelbusch is the great other among German New Yorker cartoon shows a man is sitting in bed at night with TTeltschik’s book on the geopolitical state of play. But its Whistorians. The 77-year-old has been living in New York and Ahis computer. His wife wakes up and asks what he’s doing, profound historical underpinnings form the sturdy foundation Berlin for decades; he was never associated with a university, and typing so late? “Someone’s wrong on the internet,” he says. of Russisches Roulette. Vom Kalten Krieg zum Kalten Frieden (Rus- certainly does not write like a typical college professor. In 2001, he Werner Plumpe, a professor of economic history at the Univer- sian Roulette. From Cold War to Cold Peace). published Die Kultur der Niederlage (The Culture of Defeat: The sity of Frankfurt, has written a major work, the product of decades Teltschik spent his formative political years in the 1980s serv- American South 1865, France 1871, Germany 1918) – a military his- of diligent and insightful scholarship that can only be admired. And ing as then-Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s senior foreign policy tory mixed with an elaboration on the mentalities that dictated how yet it reads like an 800-page answer to every not-so-smart opinion advisor. In the 2000s, Teltschik was head of the Munich Secu- societies learned to cope with military defeat – which has become a ever uttered about capitalism. Das kalte Herz. Kapitalismus: Die rity Conference – and his experience in politics, diplomacy and minor classic. Geschichte einer andauernden Revolution (The cold heart. Capital- international punditry serves him well in limning the contours Now Schivelbusch has written a prequel of sorts. In his new short ism: the history of an ongoing revolution) strives to distill how an of the current lines of conflict between the West and Russia. book Rückzug. Geschichten eines Tabus (Retreat. Histories of a taboo), economic system was able to take off after its humble beginnings It has often been said that the personal relationships between he examines how a military retreat, whether tactical or forced, can in 17th-century Holland and England. political leaders play an important role in high-stakes negotia- strain armies, generals and, most of all, the public. “The experience of Plumpe’s book is very German in its undoubtedly sincere attempt tions. Teltschik, as one might expect, would seem natural, thinks withdrawal sets in once an offensive movement – political, religious, to understand capitalism as an idea or concept, not a plea for TINA highly of Kohl; he convincingly recounts how the chancellor economic, technical, cultural or military – encounters a dominant (Margaret Thatcher’s mantra “There is no alternative”). No reform quietly put together a string of 27 treaties and accords between opponent,” he writes. To persevere would be to risk defeat, but the would be possible, he says, without comprehending the founda- the Soviet Union and Germany in 1989 and 1990 alone. Kohl movement could be mistaken for the extreme version of withdrawal tions of the market economy. understood the Russians’ political and psychological needs for – taking flight. Plumpe ticks off one theory after the next for the creation and security assurances, the sum of which proved “in the end to be Schivelbusch looks at Napoleon in Russia, France and the Battle of sustainability of capitalism – technological logic, intrinsic moti- the key to German reunification.” the Frontiers in 1914 as well as Great Britain at Dunkirk in 1940. His vation of individuals, the use of force, geography, climate or soil Teltschik does not spare criticism of today’s Russia and its most interesting and consequential chapter, however, deals with the conditions – and refutes all of them with mountains of historical misdeeds and at times nefarious behavior, but his impetus is United States and Vietnam. The author recounts how the domino evidence. for the West and NATO to understand how to more effectively theory became the “theoretical and strategic basis for the Vietnam The very short version of Plumpe’s very long answer to how deal with Moscow. John F. Kennedy’s strategy for peace was War” and equates it with the modern version of retreat-phobia. It is capitalism came to succeed: A variety of conditions were met, i.e. based on first “understanding the interests of one’s opponents, an oddity of history, he writes, “retreat-phobia afflicts Goliath, but private property enabled market activity, and subsequently through regardless of what one thought of them. Is there anyone who only seldom David.” The weak are superior to the strong because variation and selection, created a model for material reproduction truly believes Russia will just give in without getting anything they can move in any direction and have less to lose. They fight only spanning the entire globe. in return?” for themselves, not for the bigger audience – the general public. Plumpe is no Randian apologist; he is well aware of all the prob- Some of Teltschik’s policy recommendations – dialogue, bal- Today, in the West, withdrawal has a new name, so as not to hurt lems commonly associated with capitalism, like inequality, exploita- ancing of interests, building foundations of trust – might come national pride. “The term ‘exit strategy’ suggests that everything – tion and the plundering of resources. If only real-world capitalism across as diplomatic boiler plate, but his story has compelling including possible failure – had been under control from the very would comply more often with his ever-so-profound theoretical historic evidence on its side. beginning.” rationale for open and free markets.

HORST TELTSCHIK WOLFGANG SCHIVELBUSCH WERNER PLUMPE Russisches Roulette. Vom Kalten Krieg zum Kalten Frieden, Rückzug. Geschichten eines Tabus, Carl Hanser Verlag, Das Kalte Herz. Kapitalismus: Die Geschichte einer an- C.H. Beck, Munich, 2019 Munich, 2019 dauernden Revolution, Rowohlt Berlin Verlag, Berlin, 2019