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THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE American Power: For What? Ideas, Unipolarity and America’s Search for Purpose between the ‘Wars’, 1991-2001 Nicholas Kitchen A thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of the London School of Economics and Political Science for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, September 2009 DECLARATION I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without the prior written consent of the author. I warrant that this authorization does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. Signature: Date: Declaration of word length I declare that my thesis consists of 88,818 words. Signature: Date: i ABSTRACT This thesis studies the debates surrounding the grand strategy of United States in the decade after the Cold War. ‗Bookended‘ by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001, it assesses the strategic ideas that were advanced to conceptualise American foreign policy, grouping these thematically under the headings of primacy, neoisolationism and liberal multilateralism. To this end the thesis introduces a neoclassical realist model of grand strategy formation, in which ideas are considered in conjunction with considerations of power in the international system. The thesis makes the case that the ideas of each strategic school-of-thought reflect both a distinctive theoretical understanding of international relations and a particular tradition in United States foreign policy. Furthermore, it makes the more general structural claim that under conditions of limited threat such as the apparent unipolarity of the post-Cold War years, great power strategies are less determined by the imperatives of international structure and more by the ideas at the domestic level influencing the foreign policy executive. As a result, grand strategy formation becomes highly ideologically contested, and the geopolitical science of strategic assessment and response becomes unpredictable. The thesis argues that after the Cold War the strategic debate is best understood in conjunction with the contemporaneous idea that the United States held a functionally imperial position in the international system. In the absence of agreed threats, competition between strategic ideas resulted in the United States pursuing a foreign policy that selectively incorporated elements of each strategic alternative. Although this ‗uni-multilateralism‘ had as its aim the management of the international system, its diverse sources of ideas and support meant that in security matters in particular American foreign policy was inconsistent and unpredictable. It was therefore not until the events of 9-11 provided a unified threat around which to coordinate strategy that America adopted a more coherent imperial grand strategy. ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS A doctoral thesis is simply the written output from a far broader process of intellectual and personal development which it has been a privilege to have been able to undertake. The opportunity would not have been possible without the financial support of the ESRC, as well as the various employments within the London School of Economics that have sustained me throughout. Less instrumental support has come first and foremost from my supervisor, Michael Cox. Apart from his contributions at various stages to the content of the thesis itself, his advice, example and insight have been a consistent source of reassurance and encouragement whilst navigating the world of academia more generally. Working with him (and for him) has been a pleasure both academically and personally. Thanks are also due to the colleagues who have been a resource of criticism and support, ideas and enlightenment during my time at LSE, more often than not in those shared creative hours in the George. I thank especially, in alphabetical order, Kirsten Ainley, Lisa Aronsson, Dayna Barnes, Cristina Barrios, Felix Berenskoetter, Emma De Angelis, Maalfid Braut-Hegghammer, Christopher Coker, Kim Hutchings, Artemy Kalinovsky, Roberty Kelley, Emilia Knight, Scott Kofmehl, George Lawson, Adam Quinn, Svetozar Rajak, and Arne Westad. Finally, behind every doctorate are long-suffering loved-ones, and this particular PhD is no exception to that rule. Without the love and support of Kate this thesis would not exist: for her tolerance of my often chaotic writing methods, I thank her; for my inability to simultaneously read and listen, I apologise. I hope it will prove worth it. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 5 Overview and Structure of the Argument ............................................................. 12 CHAPTER 1: A NEOCLASSICAL REALIST MODEL OF GRAND STRATEGY FORMATION ........................................................................................................... 16 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 16 Neoclassical Realism – A Theory Of Foreign Policy ........................................... 16 What Is ‗Grand Strategy‘? .................................................................................... 22 Theorising Strategic Ideas ..................................................................................... 28 Realism and Ideas ............................................................................................. 29 The False Promise of Constructivism ............................................................... 41 A Positivist Conception Of Ideas .......................................................................... 46 The Intervening Variable: Ideas Within Nations .............................................. 51 A Neoclassical Realist Model Of Grand Strategy Formation ............................... 56 The Strategic Assessment – Detecting National Security Threats .................... 57 The Means of Strategy – Power and Appropriateness ...................................... 59 Auxiliary Goals – Strategy Beyond the National Interest ................................. 62 Accounting For Grand Strategic Change .............................................................. 63 Conclusion: The Implications Of A Neoclassical Realist Approach To Grand Strategy Formation ................................................................................................ 67 1 CHAPTER 2: IDEAS IN THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE ................................. 73 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 73 Inventing America ................................................................................................. 74 The National Interests Of Universal Liberty ......................................................... 80 American Separation, American Expansion ......................................................... 83 A New Consciousness Of Strength: The United States As A Great Power ......... 87 A Distinctly American Tension: Liberal Universalism, Exceptional Isolationism ... ............................................................................................................................... 90 Rise To Globalism: American Ideas Of World Order .......................................... 95 Conclusion: After Containment –Victory, Loss and Uncertainty ...................... 101 CHAPTER 3: ‗COME HOME, AMERICA‘ – NEOISOLATIONISTS, REALISTS AND THE RETREAT FROM GLOBALISM ........................................................ 104 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 104 Discarding The Cold War Mindset ..................................................................... 105 The ‗I‘-Word ....................................................................................................... 108 The Internationalist Assumption ......................................................................... 114 America‘s Strategic Immunity ............................................................................ 117 ‗It‘s The Economy, Stupid‘ – Domestic Post-Cold War Priorities ..................... 122 Ending the Cold War at Home ........................................................................ 124 Immigration and the Multicultural Society ..................................................... 128 The Economy .................................................................................................. 132 A Normal Country In A Normal Time – Retrenching The American Empire ... 138 America‘s Redundant Alliances ...................................................................... 141 Conclusion: Neoisolationism As Defensive Realism ........................................ 148 2 CHAPTER 4: ‗INSTITUTIONALISING AMERICA‘ – LIBERAL MULTILATERALISM ........................................................................................... 153 Introduction ........................................................................................................