4 0 UNSW Law Journal Volume 40(2)
2
FLE IBILITY IN DECISION MA ING: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE AUSTRALIAN TA EOVERS ANEL
EMMA ARMSON
I INTRODUCTION
The Australian Takeovers Panel (‘the Panel’) became the primary forum for resolving takeover disputes in the context of corporate law on 13 March 2000. This resulted from the implementation of the reforms in the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Act 1999 (Cth) (‘CLERP reforms’).1 In replacing the previous role of the courts with the Panel, the CLERP reforms sought to inject legal and commercial specialist expertise into takeover dispute resolution, provide ‘speed, informality and uniformity’ in decision-making, minimise ‘tactical litigation’ and free up court resources.2 The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers in the United Kingdom (‘UK Panel’) was the key overseas body cited in support of the CLERP reforms based on its ‘reputation of resolving takeover disputes promptly and effectively’.3 Notwithstanding the differences in the way in which the two Panels operate, it has been concluded that the criteria of speed, flexibility and certainty can be applied to the Australian Panel in determining whether the CLERP reform aims have been achieved.4 As a result of the CLERP reforms, parties are required to apply to the Australian Panel instead of the courts in relation to takeover disputes during the bid period.5 The Panel can then exercise its power to make a declaration of unacceptable circumstances under section 657A(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (‘Corporations Act’) on three alternative grounds. These grounds are where