UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

"In an equitable and sympathetic manner": Alberta's Workmen's Compensation

and the United Mine Workers of America, District 18's Welfare Fund

by

Jason Corey Devine

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

CALGARY, ALBERTA

DECEMBER, 2011

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This thesis is a study of the role of the United Mine Workers of America, District 18 in the development of Workmen's Compensation legislation in Alberta. It also an investigation into the creation of District 18's Welfare Fund in the post-war period and the fund's relationship to workers' compensation legislation. The miners initiated the movement for workers' compensation in Alberta and the first law in this regard was passed in 1908. After that year, District 18 continued to be prominent in working to improve the content and administration of the legislation as it affected miners and the Alberta working class. As a result of the insufficiency of workers' compensation, District 18 created a

Welfare Fund. It was not designed to replace state-provided welfare, but to provide help to members where the law fell short. The fund, as such, was an exercise in working-class agency and mutual aid.

ii Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I want to give thanks to my Supervisor, Dr. Nancy Janovicek, for her guidance and friendship. Her judicious approach always gave recognition of achievement and error, and underlined the need to strive for better. If not for her, not only would the present thesis not have been written, but I would never have taken up the formal study of history in the first place. For that, and more, I am eternally grateful.

I have had the pleasure of not only taking a course with Dr. Elizabeth Jameson, but also of being instructed by her in many conversations. For her support and friendship, and for serving on the committee, I give my appreciation.

To the other members of the History Department with whom I have had courses,

I give thanks for their insight and encouragement. And to the staff of the History

Department, above all Brenda Oslawsky, I give thanks for all the help and putting up with my myriad questions.

I also want to express my gratitude to Dr. John R. Graham for sitting on the examining committee.

In the course of my research the help of one University of Calgary librarian in particular, Dani Pahulje, was irreplaceable. She helped me understand the state of government archiving in Alberta and was crucial in helping to locate the reports of various commissions. I am very thankful for her aid.

Besides the hours spent reading legislation and newspapers on microfilm, the bulk of my research took place in the Glenbow Museum Archives. I heartily thank the staff for all their assistance.

Last, but not least, I want to thank my mother for all her loving support.

iii I dedicate this study to my best friend and wife, Bonnie Devine, and to our children: Connor, William, Matthew, and Jayden. Their love, support, and patience has

been a constant source of strength.

>

iv TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ii

Acknowledgements iii

Dedication iv

Table of Contents v

Epigraph vi

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER 2: THE ROOTS OF MILITANCY 14

CHAPTER 3: THE MINERS AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION 33

CHAPTER 4: CREATING THE WELFARE FUND 68

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 90

BIBLIOGRAPHY 97

v Miners have always had difficulty in comprehending the simplest of propositions as to the market-regulation of wages, and have clung tenaciously to unscientific notions such as 'justice' and 'fair play'.

E.P. Thompson, "A Special Case"

vi 1

Chapter 1: Introduction

This thesis is a study of the development of the United Mine Workers of America

(UMWA), District 18's Welfare Fund and its relationship to the Workmen's Compensation in Alberta. The UMWA-D18's Welfare Fund was established in 1946-47 through an agreement between the union and various coal operators. The explicit reason for setting up the welfare fund for injured workers was to address the weaknesses in the contemporary

Workmen's Compensation legislation; the union did not aim to replace benefits with the fund. In the words of the union, it was not the intention of the Welfare Fund to "substitute or take the place of any Federal or Provincial Government agency."11 argue that

Workmen's Compensation was an element in the development of the capitalist state through its developing regime of industrial legality, and hence a tool utilised to regulate the labour-capital relationship basic to capitalist societies. This limited the impact of the legislation on the Alberta working class in general and the UMWA-D18 more specifically.

Regardless of the legislation's structural function, miners still faced some of the most dangerous working conditions in Alberta. Thus the union consistently led the fight to improve the content of workers' compensation legislation and to ensure that it would "be administered in an equitable and sympathetic manner."2 Indeed, they initiated the movement in Alberta that culminated with the passing of the first workers' compensation act in 1908. Due to the legislation's nature as a class-compromise and District 18's limited successes, it still fell short of the demands and needs of working people. This thesis argues then, that District 18's Welfare Fund represented an exercise in agency and mutual aid on the part of the miners, as well as a response to political and economic conditions of post­

1 Glenbow Museum Archives, United Mine Workers of America, District 18 [hereinafter GMA, UMWA- D18] fonds, M-5889-3089, "Payment of Benefits From Welfare Fund of District 18, United Mine Workers of America, 7 October 1947," 6. 2 GMA, UMWA-D18 fonds, M-6000-495, "Memorandum submitted to the Special Committee appointed by the Alberta Legislature for the purpose of receiving representations and recommendations as to the operations of the Workmen's Compensation (Accident Fund) Act," 1-2. 2 war capitalism.

In developing an understanding of working-class agency, this thesis builds on the scholarship of historian Alan Derickson. As he has noted in the American context, "miners were not merely victims of hazardous technology," nor were they "merely the passive beneficiaries or victims of policy."3 Rather, miners engaged in a spectrum of conflicts: broad struggles to influence public health policy for all workers, to more specific fights to improve the conditions in the mines.4 This view thus avoids the conspiratorial view of the state which, while critiquing the capitalist state, ends up over-estimating its power and emphasising structure at the expense of agency.5 While the state certainly shaped the lives of working people, such power was conditional and limited; workers could and did contest the power of the state in the pursuit of their own interests. As E. P. Thompson succinctly put it in his discussion of the origin of the English working class, "The working class made itself as much as it was made."6

Other aspects of working-class agency are the traditions of self-help and mutualism.

These traditions have developed in response to the exigencies and conditions of capital accumulation within class-divided capitalist societies. In Derickson's words "workers' initiatives for health reform were inextricably embedded in a larger matrix of conflicts between labor and capital."7 Labour and capital are the two basic classes of capitalism. In economic historian David Leadbeater's lucid definition "the capitalist class are the owners of capital, who exist by virtue of their private appropriation of surplus value (or profits)."8

3 Alan Derickson, Workers Health', Workers' Democracy: The Western Miners' Struggle, 1891-1925 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), xi; Alan Derickson, "Down Solid: The Origins and Development of the Black Lung Insurgency," Journal of Public Health Policy 4,1 (Mar., 1983): 25. 4 Ibid., 25; Alan Derickson, "Industrial Refugees: The Migration of Silicotics from the Mines of North America and South Africa in the Early 20th Century," Labor History 29 (1988): 82-83, 86. 5 Alvin Finkel, Social Policy and Practice in Canada: A History (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2006): 4-5. 6 E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class 2nd ed. (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1974), 213. 7 Derickson, Workers Health', Workers' Democracy, xii. 3

The working class, classically defined by Marx and Engels, is that group of people who do not own the means of production, and who must consequently hire themselves out for wages.9 To increase profits, mine owners periodically cut wages, enforced work speed ups, and reduced workers' control at the point of production. This frequently led to strikes. To successfully challenge owners' unfair demands, solidarity among workers was essential; this solidarity provided a basic core for working-class mutualism among organised workers. As a consequence of the imperative to increase profits, employers did not adequately invest in safety and health programs, thus increasing the chances of accident and death. However, other employers did create contributory health schemes for their employees to offset the possibility of strikes or of being taken to court by an injured worker.

Mutualism among unionised workers began early in North America. According to

Derickson, the railroad brotherhoods were among the earliest to provide death, disability, and sickness pensions. By the middle of the nineteenth century, most other craft unions did so too.10 One of the bases for this was the "strong craft heritage of independence on the job" which Cornish miners had brought with them to the USA and then passed on to their co-workers. In Canada mining was also an inherited craft, with its main roots in Britain and the United States. The British and American miners in Canada did not merely bring their skills and forms of organisation, but also their politics and were an important ideological source of radicalism.11 Constructing their own health and welfare services meant that the members of the Western Federation of Miners did not need to rely on their employers for

8 David Leadbeater, 'The Development of Capitalism in the Area Currently Called Alberta," (M.A. Thesis, University of Alberta, 1980), 591. 9 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 5, 9. 10 Derickson, Workers HealthWorkers' Democracy, xi. 11 David J. Bercuson, Fools and Wise Men: The Rise and Fall of the One Big Union (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1978), 32-33; Desmond Morton and Terry Copp, Working People: An Illustrated History of the Canadian Labour Movement, 2nd rev. ed. (Ottawa: Deneau Publishers, 1984), 50; Derickson, Workers' Health, Workers' Democracy, 5. 4 such provision or on public charity. Not only was their independence vis-a-vis their employers guarded, but company medical plans frequently relied on compulsory deductions to pay for the company doctor, to the consternation of miners. Yet, as Derickson argues,

"Hardrock miners throughout North America opposed the arrogant principles underlying this system." Further, most miners had little confidence in the alleged "professional skill" of the physicians whom their employers hired.12 Similarly, the facilities provided by the company tended to be inadequate, while "company doctors often testified against injured workers in liability suits" and, much to workers' dismay, frequently found the "employer blameless in occupational accident cases."13 The UMWA-D18 adhered to this tradition of working-class independence.

A core reason for working-class self-help strategies on the part of miners was the hazardous and life-threatening conditions they faced in the mines. Mining has historically had one of highest rates of workplace accidents and death; depending on the severity, this could mean a partial or complete loss of livelihood, or a slow death from illness.14

According to Arthur Mclvor and Ronnie Johnston, the dangerous nature of working underground was well recognised by the ancients: "In Roman times Galen reported on his visits to copper sulphate mines in Cyprus where miners had to toil naked because sulphurous fumes destroyed any clothing."15 While they are quick to point out that they

"are not suggesting a line of continuity from slave labour in the ancient mines to the experience of working underground in the modern period," Mclvor and Johnston argue that by the time of British industrialisation, it was openly recognised that mining was an

12 Derickson, Workers Health', Workers' Democracy, 63. 13 Elizabeth Jameson, All That Glitters: Class, Conflict, and Community in Cripple Creek (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1998), 73; Derickson, Workers Health', Workers' Democracy, 104-105. 14 Bercuson, Fools and Wise Men, 1-8; Nancy M. Forestell, "And I Feel Like I'm Dying from Mining for Gold": Disability, Gender, and the Mining Community, 1920-1950 "Labor: Studies in Working-Class History of the Americas, 3, 3 (2006): 81-83, 85; Bryan D. Palmer, Working-Class Experience: Rethinking the History of Canadian Labour, 1800-1991 (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1992), 221. 15 Arthur Mclvor and Ronnie Johnston, "Voices from the Pits: Health and Safety in Scottish Coal Mining since 1945," Scottish Economic and Social History 22 (2002): 112. 5 especially dangerous form of work.16 In the case of Alberta, Bryan Palmer has stated that between 1905 and 1945, "over 1000 miners died on the job."17 The ever-present danger of accident or death thus provided another impetus to some level of mutualism regardless of any cultural transmission.

Similar to the insufficiency and nature of company-provided services, was the lack of health and welfare services provided by the state. In the period that Derickson covers, public healthcare did not exist. This meant that in many communities in North America, the first hospitals were founded by unions.18 In the period this thesis covers however, the

Canadian welfare state was already under construction, albeit in an uneven and contradictory manner. With various actors providing input on policy, sharing provision, and covering disparate spheres of social life, the welfare state was not a monolithic, finished, and singular apparatus. Rather, in the words of historians Raymond B. Blake and

Jeffery A. Keshen, it was a "patchwork quilt."19 This was true of Workmen's

Compensation. Legislation was passed not merely at different periods, but the groups involved also varied. For example, as this thesis will show, Alberta's Workmen's

Compensation was initiated by the labour movement, specifically the miners, and they achieved success in 1908, earlier than most other provinces. In Ontario however, as

Michael Piva has shown, Workmen's Compensation was not brought in until 1914, and in this instance it was unionists, employers, and the government who sought to end the old employer liability laws. And British Columbia actually passed Canada's earliest legislation in 1902 at the initiative of two Socialist Party of British Columbia MLAs.20 However, there

16 Ibid., 112-113. 17 Bryan D. Palmer, Working-Class Experience, 221. 18 Derickson, Workers Health', Workers' Democracy, 109, 119-120. 19 Raymond B. Blake and Jeffery A. Keshen, "Introduction" in Social Fabric or Patchwork Quilt: The Development of Social Policy in Canada, eds. Raymond B. Blake and Jeffery A. Keshen (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2006), 9. 6 is still a dearth of work on the origins of Workmen's Compensation across the different provinces. New research and analysis will undoubtedly alter the timeline set forth in Piva's foundational article. This thesis aims to contribute to that process.

Other social actors who influenced the development of social welfare in Canada included the poor, the working class, capitalists, and social reformers. This thesis follows

Alvin Finkel's assertion that "the welfare state as, at least in part, the product of workers' efforts to win concessions from employers and the state. Marxists suggest that the state legislates social policies for two associated reasons: to promote the accumulation of capital and to promote the legitimation of the social system."21 In this perspective then, the state is not merely a tool of capitalists, but is open to influence from subaltern groups, hence altering the form and pace of its development. If workers do not merely influence their own lives, but that of the capitalist state, then compromise and agreement between popular and elite interests in the realm of public policy is possible.22

The section of the welfare state that directly bears on this study is Workers'

Compensation, specifically in Alberta.23 Historical studies on the development of workers' compensation legislation in Canada is sparse in comparison with the American historiography, and in the case of Alberta, they are non-existent.24 Michael J. Piva's

20 Michael J. Piva, "The Workmen's Compensation Movement in Ontario," Ontario History 67 (1975): 48-50; Anjan Chaklader, "History of Workers' Compensation in BC, May 1998," accessed 14 September 2011, http://www.qp.gov.bc.ca/rcwc/research/chaklader.pdf. 21 Alvin Finkel, Social Policy and Practice, 5. 22 Ibid., 4. 23 While the UMWA-D18 had members in Alberta and BC, the majority of its members were based in the former; thus, for reasons of space, the slightly different BC experience will not be dealt with. Some historical works on Workmen's Compensation have been produced, but not published. See Anjan Chaklader, "History of Workers' Compensation in BC," accessed 14 September 2011, http://www.qp.gov.bc.ca/rcwc/research/ch aklader.pdf; Ian Coneybeer, "The Origins of Workmen's Compensation in British Columbia: State Theory and Law," (M.A. Thesis, Simon Fraser University, 1990); G. Geddes, "Agreement and Agitation: The Movement for Comprehensive Workmen's Compensation Legislation in British Columbia, 1891-1917," (Honours Thesis, University of British Columbia, 1986). 24 Robert H. Babcock, "Blood on the Factory Floor: The Workers' Compensation Movement in Canada and the United States," in Social Fabric or Patchwork Quilt: The Development of Social Policy in Canada, eds. Raymond B. Blake and Jeffery A. Keshen (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2006), 48; Piva, "The Workmen's Compensation Movement," 39. 7 important article on the genesis of compensatory legislation in Ontario examined the main groups in the fight for Workmen's Compensation in Ontario and found that while the organised labour movement argued for some form of compensation legislation for industrial accidents, the province's business community was divided. However, as accidents increased with industrialisation, under the old common-law legislation, workers' only recourse for compensation was to take their employer to court. Piva argues that, increasingly, workers won in the courts and to off-set such costs, capitalists increasingly looked for a cheaper form of liability. This pressure on the capital accumulation process, combined with the pressure exerted by the trade union movement, led to the passage of workers' compensation legislation in Ontario in 1914.25

Robert H. Babcock built on Piva's analysis by comparing the Canadian and

American experiences. Babcock first noted that the earliest initiatives for employer liability were in Germany, England, and New Zealand in the late 1800s; this was in response to the growth of industrial accidents as the second industrial revolution developed. These three countries provided the initial models for Canada and the United States. He found that

Canadian provinces and American states both adopted some form of employer liability legislation. Specifically, "The trend in both countries was toward the establishment of no- fault, government-run workers' compensation commissions rather than the perpetuation of fault-finding by the courts." Despite such commonality, Babcock found that there was a basic difference between the two national experiences. In Canada, the provincial governments assumed liability, but state legislatures did not; thus if an employer went into insolvency, injured employees lost their benefits. Babcock concluded that the basic and more specific difference between the two nations was due to "the controlling influence of historical contingencies rather than underlying national values."27 These contingencies refer

25 Ibid., 43-44,47,48-50,52. 26 Babcock, "Blood on the Factory Floor," 46-48, 55. 8 to the differing strengths, perspectives, and relationships between different social forces, including corporations, trade unions, and social-reform movements.28 This points to the necessity of focusing on the historical specificity of class differences, but also going beyond class to consider the influence of cross-class formations such as social reform movements.

As an historical aspect of the welfare state, workers' compensation represents an element and stage in the development of the liberal-capitalist state. In their important work

Labour Before the Law, Judy Fudge and Eric Tucker study the historical development of the liberal-capitalist state from the perspective of the organised working-class movement.

The concept they employ to encapsulate this relationship is industrial legality, which they define as "the legal regulation of workers' collective action" by the state; more specifically

"a detailed set of legal rules and procedures that define which groups of workers may bargain collectively and when they can collectively withdraw their labour power."29 Their understanding of industrial legality was an expansion, however, over the previously developed usage. The earlier definition referred to "a specific set of institutional and legal arrangements that emerged at the end of World War II, which are characterized by legally binding contracts between bureaucratic trade unions, certified by the state to represent administratively defined bargaining units."30 This was part of labour and capital's post-war compromise. Fudge and Tucker argue for the usefulness of expanding the concept based on the basic premise that as a result of the internal contradiction between workers and capitalists, the state is forced to create some medium for institutionalising this conflict.

Certainly, they argue it is one of the principal means for the regulation of those

27 Ibid., 56. 28 Ibid., 56. 29 Judy Fudge and Eric Tucker, Labour Before the Law: The Regulation of Workers' Collective Action in Canada, 1900-1948 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2001), vii. 30 Ibid., 9. 9 contradictions produced by capitalism's production relations. Because the liberal-capitalist state needs to legitimise, and hence justify, its activity, the regime of industrial legality is not merely "moral and economic," but works essentially through legal "institutions and discourses."31

Fudge and Tucker note though that the regime of industrial legality is not absolute, but rather variable and contested. Hence they posit three different regimes of industrial legality in Canada: "liberal voluntarism (1850-1900); industrial voluntarism (1900-48); and industrial pluralism (1948-present)."32 Chronologically, this thesis' subject matter falls within the industrial voluntarism stage. This is a period marked by the increasing intervention of state institutions in the regulation of industrial conflicts in Canada.33 While the state had intervened before 1900, the qualitative difference was the increasing tendency on the part of employers to turn to the courts, and on the part of the state to intervene via legislation and legal structures, rather than leave relations between workers and capitalists strictly to the whims of the market.34

While Fudge and Tucker's usage of industrial legality focuses exclusively on questions of unionisation and withdrawal of labour power, their chronological and theoretical expansion of the concept opens the door to further developments.35 Indeed, as they point out "the modalities of legal intervention vary, as to its importance in relation to other ways of containing and regulating" class conflict.36 In providing a brief list of some of the omissions from their study, Fudge and Tucker include workers' compensation as one of the "legal devices that directly shaped the rights, duties, privileges, and freedoms of the

31 Palmer, Working-Class Experience, 259, 278-284; Fudge and Tucker, Labour Before the Law, 4, 10. 32 Ibid., 14. 33 Ibid., 3. 34 Ibid., 2. 35 For an interesting application of Fudge and Tucker's analysis in regards to strike activity by District 18 see, Tom Langford, "Coal Miners' Resistance to Industrial Legality in Western Canada, 1940-1950," Prairie Forum 31,2 (Fall, 2006): 233-243. 36 Ibid., 6. 10 employment relationship."37 It is precisely here where this thesis builds on Fudge and

Tucker's pioneering work. Workers' compensation as legislation and an institution is seen as part of the development of the liberal-capitalist state and hence of its differing regimes of industrial legality. It was one of those "legal devices" that helped to regulate class conflicts between workers and capitalists, especially those arising from industrial accidents and diseases resulting from dangerous work conditions.

Finally, although this history does not deal directly with illness and disability among the miners, it is informed by the history of disability and the questions is raises:

What is disability? Who defines disability? How does the definition of disability change?

From the outset it should be understood that such questions were answered by, in the first place, the Workmen's Compensation Board and the legislation it interpreted, and secondly, the union and its members. The definitions given, as will be clear in this thesis, are representative of what is contemporarily termed the medical model of understanding disability.

Much of the initial work in disability studies has been devoted to examining competing definitions of disability. Theresa Meade and David Serlin argue that the medical model "codes the 'normal' body according to a fixed and narrow standard of economic and social productivity. Medical models of disability, focused on bodily impairment, created the disabled person and his or her disabled body as something distinct from the able-bodied person."38 Thus, the "problem" is the individual body that requires fixing. This model ignores the socio-economic factors that limit a person's ability to participate in society.

However, the alternative, social model, in the words of Douglas Baynton "locates the problems disabled people face in defective social structures rather than impaired bodies."39

37 Ibid., 15. 38 Teresa Meade and David Serlin, "Editors' Introduction," Radical History Review 94 (Winter, 2006): 3. 39 Douglas Baynton, "Disability History: No Longer Hidden," Reviews in American History 32 (2004): 284. 11

More specifically, as stated by historian Paul K. Longmore, "for most people with most kinds of disabilities, most of the time the greatest limitations are not somatic but social: prejudice and discrimination, inaccessibility and lack of accommodations."40 The distinction here is thus between a very real, material physical impairment and the very real, moral and material obstacles to people's engagement in society. In conflating disability and impairment, the individual body is pathologised and the social roots of disability missed.

This thesis has been informed by disability studies in order to show the critical distance between our understanding of disability and that of our subjects in the past, and, hence, to prevent an uncritical reproduction of such a pathologising discourse.

This thesis has grown out my general interests in both Marxism and working-class politics, and, more specifically, my Honours thesis. That work studied the role of the

United Mine Workers of America, District 18 in the formation of the One Big Union

(OBU) between 1919 and 1920.41 The prominent part that the miners of District 18 played in the OBU, and their consistent militancy, inspired me to investigate their role in later class struggles in Alberta and to ask such questions as: Did their radicalism persist? Did they remain the leading combative sector of the Alberta working class?

Building on my previous work this thesis is based primarily on the United Mine

Workers of America, District 18 fonds, Workmen's Compensation legislation in Alberta, and the newspaper articles which constitute the Alberta Scrapbook Hansard. In studying

Workmen's Compensation in Alberta, I focused on the acts themselves in order to track the development of the legislation as it impacted labour and capital, and augmented the state's power. Unfortunately, the law is limited in revealing what those social actors' thought

40 Paul K. Longmore, Why I Burned My Book and Other Essays on Disability (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2003), 2. 41 Jason Devine, "You understand we are radical": The United Mine Workers of America, District 18 and the One Big Union, 1919-1920," (Honours Thesis, University of Calgary, 2009), accessed 10 August 2011, http://www.socialisthistory.ca/Docs/History/Devine-UMWA-OBU.pdf. 12 about the legislation. One of the best sources for such information are the proceedings of the Royal Commissions and Commissions of Inquiry that the Alberta government regularly formed before presenting new laws. However, many reports of those commissions are missing, and with them the submissions made by employees and employers alike.42 As a substitute for this gap in Alberta's archives, I have turned to the Alberta Scrapbook

Hansard. For most of Alberta's history there has been no proper Hansard. Instead there was the Scrapbook which contains newspaper articles dealing with matters in the legislature.43 Its obvious strength is in providing some view of what the government, and the opposition's view of this or that act was. The articles also at times report the views of the miners of District 18, different employers, and their respective delegations to the government. However, their greatest weakness is their varying quality. Reports of speeches are certainly not always verbatim, and the articles often reflect the biases of the reporters.

The various extant agreements signed by the union and the coal operators were the most useful sources to investigate the nature, scope, and development of UMWA-D-18's

Welfare Fund. The importance of the agreements is in their detailing of the different aspects of the fund over time, which allows us to understand the basic goals of the union in setting up the fund. However, they are limited in that it was the members of District 18's leadership that negotiated with their numerous employers; thus rank and file voices are expressed in a partial form. To find the voice of the rank and file, I have also looked at the proceedings of the union's conventions between 1946 and 1948, to analyse what the membership thought of their new Welfare Fund.

The second chapter of this thesis provides a politico-economic overview of the post­ war situation from the global, national, and provincial perspectives, including the state of

42 For a list of some of the missing reports see, Christine E. Backhaus, Royal Commissions and Commissions of Inquiry in Alberta, 1905-1976 (Edmonton: Legislature Library, 1977). 4 The official Alberta Hansard only began in 1972. 13 the coal industry in Alberta. It also gives a brief history of District 18. This will provide the essential context for the general relations between labour and capital, and more specifically, between the miners and their employers. Chapter three develops a history of

Workmen's Compensation in Alberta. It is this development which will help us understand the reasons and nature of the UMWA-D18's founding their Welfare Fund, and the development of the capitalist state in Alberta. The fourth chapter examines the history of the Welfare Fund and the scope of its functioning. Facing dangerous working conditions and insufficient social welfare the UMWA-D18 fought to improve workers' compensation in Alberta. However, both the miners and employers enjoyed limited success in influencing the development of the law. As a result of deficiencies in compensation, District 18 eventually formed a Welfare Fund. It was not intended to replace state-provided benefits, but to improve the lives of miners where the legislation could not. This act of mutual aid underlines the agency of the miners of District 18. 14

Chapter 2: The Roots of Militancy

In the early years of Alberta's history, the coal miners were the most radical and militant section of working class. They were at the forefront of the various struggles to improve both their own and other workers' lives. Thus, the UMWA, District 18's roots in the province stretched back to the earliest efforts at organising workers. However, this role at the vanguard of the movement did not last forever. The end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War led to a reconfiguration of the trade union movement and the capitalist state in North America. More specifically, a new post-war accord between labour and capital was forged based on union recognition, anti-communism, and increased social welfare legislation via the growth of the welfare state. This situation, however, did not erase or negate the class struggle between labour and capital. What it did do was to alter some of the terms and forms of that struggle.44 In spite of the new class peace, the imperative of capital accumulation remained. With social welfare legislation still limited in scope, the necessity for working-class mutualism was not removed. Hence, the miners sought to form a Welfare Fund. However, this was the precursor to the end of the coal miners as the base of radicalism in Alberta, the long decline of the province's coal industry, and the demise of the union itself.

The organisational and radical origins of the UMWA-D18 begin in the 1880s. It was during this period that the Knights of Labor became the first union to organise miners in Western Canada. Because of the discrimination of employers, and the small size of the

Knights, they were largely unsuccessful and only brought together a minority of miners in

Alberta and British Columbia.45 By the 1890s, the Knights were in terminal decline in

44 Gregory S. Kealey, "The Structure of Canadian Working-Class History," in Lectures in Canadian Labour and Working-Class History, ed. W.J.C. Cherwinski and Gregory S. Kealey (St. John's: Committee on Canadian Labour History, 1985), 32. 15

Canada, but many of them would go on to join the Western Federation of Miners (WFM) and different socialist organisations.46 In fact, the WFM was the next organisation to unionise miners in both Alberta and British Columbia. Their first local in Canada was created in Rossland in 1895, and two years later they formed their first Albertan local in

Lethbridge. As the 1890s came to an end the WFM was involved in a violent fight with the

Idaho government and the mine owners. This in turn led to increasing conflicts between the union and the American Federation of Labor (AF of L). However, the WFM had already left the AF of L after the 1896 Leadville strike and was rapidly radicalising. In 1902, the union endorsed the Socialist Party of America and shortly after their Canadian counterparts did the same, endorsing the Socialist Party of British Columbia. With increasing repression in the United States and new legislation aimed at restricting organising in Canada, the

WFM collapsed in Alberta by 1903. Focussing solely on metal mining in British Columbia, the union invited the United Mine Workers to take over in Alberta. On 9 November 1903, under the leadership of Frank Sherman, Crow's Nest Valley District 7 left the WFM and became District 18 of the United Mine Workers of America.47

The United Mine Workers of America, like the Knights of Labor and the Western

Federation of Miners, was an American creation, which then extended into Canada. The

UMWA was actually created in January 1890 by the unification of Knights of Labor

National Trade Assembly 135 and the National Progressive Miners Union 48 The UMWA

45 Allen Seager, "A Proletariat in Wild Rose Country: the Alberta Coal Miners, 1905-1945," (Ph.D. Thesis, York University, 1981), 202; Bruce Ramsay, The Noble Cause: The Story of the United Miner Workers of America in Western Canada (Calgary: District 18, United Mine Workers of America, 1990), 10. 46 Gregory S. Kealey and Bryan D. Palmer, Dreaming of What Might Be: The Knights of Labor in Ontario, 1880-1900 (Toronto: New Hogtown Press, 1987), 168,210. 47 Jeremy Mouat, Roaring Days: Rossland's Mines and the History of British Columbia (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1995), 71-72; Jeremy Mouat, "The Genesis of Western Exceptionalism: British Columbia's Hard-Rock Miners, 1895-1903," Canadian Historical Review 71, No. 3 (1990): 319; Melvyn Dubofsky, We shall be all: a history of the Industrial Workers of the World (Champaign, 111., University of Illinois Press, 2000), 34-37; Seager, "A Proletariat in Wild Rose Country," 202-203; Ramsay, The Noble Cause, 17-19,27. 16 was far more moderate than the WFM, which, under the leadership of Charles Moyer and

"Big Bill" Haywood, had been the leading force in the founding of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) in 1905.49 However, the miners of District 18 had longstanding radical traditions that they would continue. Under their leader, Frank Sherman, the miners' commitment to socialism remained strong. For example, Sherman ran as a Socialist Party of Canada (SPC) candidate in Calgary during the 1908 federal election.50 Then, in

Alberta's 1909 election, SPC member Charles M. O'Brien won the Rocky Mountain riding with 555 votes or 37.83 percent of the total vote. Rocky Mountain was a miners' district, and District 18 considered O'Brien its representative in the legislature because he effectively worked to improve the conditions of the miners and promoted the anti-reformist socialism of the SPC.51

The UMWA-D18's adherence to socialism continued and exploded in the cross-

Canada labour revolt in the wake of the 1917 Russian Revolution.52 Following a split with the Trades and Labor Congress of Canada (TLC), revolutionary trade-unionists developed the One Big Union in mid-March 1919 at the Western Labor Conference.53 Miners were at the forefront in the creation of the OBU. Thus, in late March the executive board of District

18 endorsed the new union, and then in April a referendum on affiliation was held among

48 John H. M. Laslett, The United Mine Workers of America: A Model of Industrial Solidarity? (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), 1; Priscilla Long, Where The Sun Never Shines: A History of America's Bloody Coal Industry (New York: Paragon House, 1989), 148-151. 49 Joyce L. Kornbluh, "One Big Union: The Philosophy of Industrial Unionism," in Rebel Voices: An IWW Anthology, ed. Joyce L. Kornbluh (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr Publishing Company, 1998), 1-3. 50 Seager, "A Proletariat in Wild Rose Country," 231. 51 O'Brien later moved to the United States during WWI and became one of the founding members of the Communist Party of America. See Ian Angus, Canadian Bolsheviks: The Early Years of the Communist Party of Canada (Montreal: Vanguard Publications, 1981), 72-73; Peter Newell, The Impossibilists: A Brief Profile of the Socialist Party of Canada (London: Athena Press, 2008), 371; A. Ross McCormack, Reformers, Rebels, and Revolutionaries: The Western Canadian Radical Movement, 1899-1919 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), 62, 64. 52 For more information on the labour revolt in Canada see the excellent collection, Craig Heron, ed., The Workers' Revolt in Canada, 1917-1925 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998). 53 Larry Peterson, "The One Big Union in International Perspective: Revolutionary Industrial Unionism 1900- 1925," Labour/Le Travailleur, 7 (Spring, 1981): 63. 17 the locals. An overwhelming majority voted to join the OBU, with less than 1 percent voting against.54 On 28 July 1919, international president John L. Lewis suspended District

18's charter and three days later, the miners reorganised themselves as One Big Union,

District No. 1, Mining Department. Boasting a membership of 8000, the miners were the largest section in the new union. This had all taken place under the leadership of District

18's newly elected president, P.M. Christophers, who was a member of the SPC.55

The One Big Union officially ended its existence in 1956, but it had lost its influence in working class politics much sooner in the late 1920s. The miners, for their part, left the OBU in 1920. Under the combined pressure of the operators, the leadership of the international union, the government, and the local media, District No. 1 ceased to exist.

Many members were beaten and chased out of Alberta, others were blacklisted, and many more returned to lower wages and worsened conditions. Hungry and demoralised the miners returned to the United Mine Workers of America. In June 1921, District 18 was reconstituted under the direction of Lewis. A new reformist, anti-OBU leadership loyal to

Lewis was elected and the OBU itself denounced. After this election, membership in the

OBU was incompatible with membership in the UMWA.56

However, the radical sentiments of the miners were not destroyed. During a strike in

1922 in District 18, revolutionaries gained influence in the union and mines again. Earlier in the year the Workers Party of Canada (WP) had been founded as the public face of the Communist Party of Canada (CPC). Under the influence of Bolshevik theory many workers abandoned the OBU and the idea of dual unionism. Instead they joined the WP and sought to reunite with mainstream labour with the goal of ousting conservative leaderships

54 Warren Caragata, Alberta Labour: A Heritage Untold (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, 1979), 77; Allen Seager, "Socialists and Workers: The Western Canadian Coal Miners, 1900-21," Labour/Le Travail, 16 (Fall, 1985): 27. 55 Caragata, Alberta Labour, 78,79; Ramsay, The Noble Cause, 123; Angus, Canadian Bolsheviks, 51. 56 Caragata, Alberta Labour, 78-81; Seager, "A Proletariat in Wild Rose Country," 382-383. 18 and radicalising rank and file union members. Thus, those who re-joined District 18 claimed loyalty to the union, worked hard to build the organisation, and consequently were rewarded with a share of leadership.57 Many miners who had left or been expelled as OBU members, now returned as Communists.

Shortly after though, the UMWA-D18 declined in membership. At the end of the war both coal production and the price of coal began to drop. Like other employers, the coal operators fought the negative effects these had on their profits by cutting wages. The miners fought back by engaging in strikes, but, as the WP's press pointed out, the union's officials showed a lack leadership and failed to support the strikes. This was also compounded by the fact that the strike relief provided by the international union was considered insufficient by the miners. The situation came to a head when, in March 1925, operators began to lockout miners across District 18. When the struggle was lost in

Hillcrest, the membership began to leave the union in droves. To stop the tide the leadership negotiated new contracts in the Drumheller region. However, these contracts resulted in lower wages and that only led to a continued exodus. The miners who left were then compelled to organise into new company associations and autonomous, local "home unions" and they settled for worsened work conditions and much lower wages. The

UMWA-D18's only remaining stronghold was a section of the Drumheller area. In half a year the membership of District 18 had been reduced from 8000 to 1500. The union's autonomy was severely reduced when it was placed under the control of the international union, and Robert Livett, a leading OBU opponent, was appointed head of the union. He

fa would rule the severely reduced District 18 for the next eleven years without election.

This situation changed with the intervention of the CPC.59 As militants who had

57 Angus, Canadian Bolsheviks, 97, 109-113; Seager, "A Proletariat in Wild Rose Country," 369-370. 58 Caragata, Alberta Labour, 71, 89-92; Seager, "A Proletariat in Wild Rose Country," 387, 391-394; Angus, Canadian Bolsheviks, 141. 19 fought in Alberta's coal fields from the early days of the SPC, and who continued to struggle for better working conditions and wages in spite of District 18's conservative leadership, this situation was intolerable. The Communists thus took the initiative to rebuild the movement and create a new miners' union. In June 1925, the Mine Workers Union of

Canada (MWUC) was founded and in September of the same year it held its "first province-wide convention" at the Calgary Labor Temple.60 The following year MWUC's membership had reached almost 4000, between fifteen mining camps. Though the

Communists had taken the lead in forming the MWUC, they were aided by labour moderates and did not have absolute control of the leadership. A symbol of this was the fact that in 1926 Frank Wheatley, the only member of District 18's executive board to oppose the union's joining the OBU in 1919, became the MWUC's vice-president. In the same year the union joined Aaron Mosher's All-Canadian Congress of Labour (ACCL).61

Though the radicals in MWUC tried to improve the miners' conditions, the results were generally disappointing. According to Caragata, one of the major reasons for this was that "Frank Wheatley and the moderate leadership of MWUC were intent on keeping things quiet" and relied on lobbying the government.62 In 1928, the federal government brought coal miners from Britain ostensibly to perform harvest work. However, they were utilised in breaking a strike by MWUC in the Wayne area. In response, the union's leadership focused on lobbying to prevent the British miners from being brought in, but to no avail. For this they were sharply criticised in the CPC press. These factors laid the basis for an eventual upheaval in the union. By 1929, the Communists had achieved the

59 In 1924 the CPC ended its underground existence, dropped the name Workers Party and came out openly as the Communist Party of Canada. See, William Rodney, Soldiers of the International: A History of the Communist Party of Canada, 1919-1929 (Great Britain: University of Toronto Press, 1968), 55. 60 Seager, "A Proletariat in Wild Rose Country," 394-395,400,402; Angus, Canadian Bolsheviks, 141; Caragata, Alberta Labour, 92. 61 Ibid., 78,92; Seager, "A Proletariat in Wild Rose Country," 405-407. 62 Caragata, Alberta Labour, 93. 20 dominant position in MWUC and, in 1930, Frank Wheatley and the moderates had been removed from leadership. The MWUC then withdrew from the ACCL to join the newly created Workers Unity League (WUL), becoming its "largest affiliate".63

In late 1929, the CPC had received instructions from the Red International of

Labour Unions (RILU) in Moscow, which had reversed the established policy against dual unionism.64 The CPC was ordered not to work to attain leadership in the mainstream of the

Canadian trade-union movement, but to withdraw from it. They organized rival

Communist-led unions, and established the WUL in early 1930 in Toronto. Though it never became as influential as craft-based unions, the WUL had over 40,000 members by

1932. It also achieved important successes in organising unorganised workers whom both the ACCL and TLC had ignored, and was a forerunner of industrial unionism in Canada.

The WUL joined the TLC in 1935 when the CI reversed its position on dual unionism again. This meant that the various unions affiliated to the WUL had to join the related unions of the TLC. Hence, a referendum was held in June 1936 in Alberta, among MWUC locals. A majority decided to unite with UMWA-D18.65

In the 1930s, District 18 entered a period of consolidation and growth, eventually regaining its former level of membership before the formation of the OBU. Its existence in the TLC was brief though.66 Shortly after the 1935 AF of L convention, a group of unions under the leadership of John L. Lewis and the UMWA formed the Committee for Industrial

Organization (CIO). Intending to by-pass the conservative leadership of the AF of L, the

63 Ibid., 93,111-112; Palmer, Working-Class Experience, 252. 64 The RILU had been founded in Moscow on 3 July 1921 under the direction of the Communist International (CI). Its purpose was to unify revolutionary trade-unionists and oppose the social-democratic International Federation of Trade Unions. See, E.H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923: Volume 3 (Harmondsworth: Pelican Books, 1983), 207-208,395-397; Angus, Canadian Bolsheviks, 277-278. 65 Ibid., 278-279, 281; Palmer, Working-Class Experience, 254, 290-291; Caragata, Alberta Labour, 93; Irving Martin Abella, Nationalism, Communism, and Canadian Labour: The CIO, the Communist party, and the Canadian Congress of Labour 1935-1956 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), 3; Seager, "A Proletariat in Wild Rose Country," 462-464. 66 Ibid., 465. 21

CIO set out to promote industrial unionism and organise the unorganised. Thus, "vast organizing campaigns were launched in the mass-production industries and within months several million unorganized and largely unskilled workers" joined the AF of L.67 By 1937, the new CIO unions had been expelled from the AF of L and its leadership pressured the

TLC to do the same. Two years later, the TLC expelled the CIO unions in Canada at a standing vote of 231 to 98. In 1940, the expelled unions united with the ACCL and formed the Canadian Congress of Labour (CCL).68

Even as late as 1947, District 18 remained the "main base" of the CPC in Alberta.

However, membership in the Communist Party was prohibited by the constitution of the

UMWA. Hence miners who were members of the CPC were restricted in their ability to organise politically inside the union and to influence the leadership. Regardless, Robert

Livett, the old opponent of the OBU, was still president of District 18 and he kept tight control of the union. For example, on 14 October 1943, the federal government banned coal strikes for the remainder of the war. In response, around 10,000 miners of UMWA-

D18 struck on 1 November. They struck for a two dollar raise and "two weeks paid vacation" as well as other demands. The government appointed a royal commission that had the powers of a "war labour board." Livett ordered the miners back to work, but many refused. He was soon denounced by the Edmonton sub-district and more than 5,500 continued to strike days after their president's orders. While those who continued to strike called on their fellow miners to re-join the picket line, the strike was successfully undermined by Livett and other District 18 officials.69

The Communists' limited influence ended after WWII with the beginning of Cold

War anti-communism. Bryan Palmer has been quick to warn against "posing any

67 Abella, Nationalism, Communism, and Canadian Labour, 4; Morton and Copp, Working People, 153; Charles Lipton, The Trade Union Movement of Canada, 1827-1959 (Toronto: NC Press, 1973), 259. 68 Morton and Copp, Working People, 167-169; Caragata, Alberta Labour, 126. 69 Ibid., 132,139. 22 conspiratorial intrigue" between union leaders and the capitalist state; however, as he states,

"it is appropriate to suggest that industrial legality and the suppression of the Communist

presence in trade unions were necessary complements to one another, both having as their

end the governance of labour and the institutionalization and assurance of industrial

discipline."70 In the growing Second Red Scare, the Co-operative Commonwealth

Federation (CCF) leadership and anti-communist CCF rank and file members sought and succeeded in removing CPC leaders and members from various unions such as the

International Woodworkers of America (IWA), the United Automobile Workers (UAW), and the UMWA-D18. Other unions such as the United Electrical, Radio and Machine

Workers of America (UE) and the International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers

(Mine-Mill) survived, but faced purges from the Canadian Congress of Labour (CCL), numerous raids, legal attacks, and existed at times on the margins of the union movement.71

Cold War anti-communism in the trade union movement was one of the pillars of the post-war accord between labour and capital in North America. As a result of the purges and attacks, union membership dropped, the vast sums of union funds spent on factional campaigns reduced the unions' resources, and the overall movement weakened. This was in spite of the fact that Communist Party militants had been in the forefront of the industrial unionism movement with the WUL and had been some of the earliest organisers and founders of CIO unions. In the end, Communist Party influence in the union movement, and in the broader working class, was severely reduced and CCF hegemony firmly in place.7 *y Driving Communist Party militants out of the union movement thus supplemented the war against the influence of the Soviet Bloc via social reforms such as social welfare programs.

70 Palmer, Working-Class Experience, 290. 71 Ibid., 290-294; Caragata, Alberta Labour, 139-140. 72 Palmer, Working-Class Experience, 290-298; Abella, Nationalism, Communism, and Canadian Labour, 139-140,162-167. 23

Yet, the radicalism of Alberta's miners was never wholly based on their political affiliations. Another reason for their radicalisation was the very conditions of their lives: dangerous working conditions, lack of social welfare, and the clash between their interests and those of their employers. These material forces, though, did not automatically translate into the revolutionary sentiments of the coal miners. Political education and organisation shaped miners' agency. Their revolutionary tradition had helped to form a culture of resistance and combativeness. However, purging Communists ended the militant tradition.

This is one of the major reasons for the end of the leading radical role played by the miners of District 18. The other reason was structural and was the result of post-war socio­ economic trends, in particular the decline of the coal industry.73

The post-WWII period was not a uniform, homogenous experience across different countries; nor was it in Canada, as both legal and economic conditions varied widely in different provinces. There were common social, political, and economic features in North

America and Western Europe. Beginning with the war-related rapid industrial development, which definitively picked up pace after the war, these regions saw a new regime of capital accumulation. In the words of James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer, there was the "adoption of a Fordist regime of accumulation and mode of regulation" which "resulted in a system of mass production and the scientific management of labour at the point of production."74 This new stage of accumulation formed the basis for the new long wave of capitalist prosperity and the restructuring of the working class.75

In Canada, except for a slight drop between 1945 and 1946 due to the transition

73 For more information on this process in ensuing years see, Tom Langford and Chris Frazer, 'The Cold War and Working-Class Politics in the Coal Mining Communities of the Crowsnest Pass, 1945-1958," Labour/Le Travail, 49 (Spring, 2002): 43-81. 74 James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer, Globalization Unmasked: Imperialism in the 21" Century (Halifax: Femwood Publishing, 2001), 13. 75 Ernest Mandel, Long Waves of Capitalist Development: A Marxist Interpretation, 2nd Revised ed. (London: Verso, 1995), 16, 18; Palmer, Working-Class Experience, 268. 24 away from the war economy, the GNP "would increase consistently through the post-war years."76 One of the factors shaping this economic growth was a continuation of the industrialisation that began during the war. Indeed, WWII brought in what has been termed the "age of heavy manufacturing in Canada."77 In the post-war period, the number of workers in manufacturing doubled, while those in mining and farming decreased.78 The labour force also expanded with post-war immigration as "1.5 million new Canadians arrived between 1948 and 1957."79 In addition, increasing birthrates fuelled population growth; between 1945 and 1980, the national population "almost doubl[ed] to approximately 24 million."80 These strides in economic development and the increasing population were the material premises for the progressive redistribution of wealth in post­ war Canada.

The main vehicle through which wealth was socially redistributed to the working class was through the expansion of the welfare state, which historian Gregory Kealey has termed the "major symbol" of this period.81 While the "unprecedented post-World War

Two prosperity" provided the basis for this process, it was neither predetermined, nor automatic. Rather, it was a response to the competitive pressure of the Soviet Bloc and the growing influence of trade unions and left-wing parties, especially the CIO in the United

States and the CCF in Canada.82 This was at the core of the labour-capital compromise which included a "share of labour in productivity gains, the social redistribution of market- generated income, and the legitimacy of a capitalist state based on the provision of social programs."83 While such changes materially improved the lives of workers with better

76 Kenneth Nonie, Douglas Owram, and J.C. Herbert Emery, A History of the Canadian Economy, 4th ed. (Toronto: Thomson, 2008), 358. 77 Ibid., 352. 78 Ibid., 353. 79 Palmer, Working-Class Experience, 271. 80 Ibid., 271. 81 Kealey, 'The Structure of Canadian Working-Class History," 31. 82 Palmer, Working-Class Experience, 268-269; Petras and Veltmeyer, Globalization Unmasked, 13-14; Jill Quadagno, 'Theories of the Welfare State," Annual Review of Sociology 13 (1987): 121. 25 working conditions and increased consuming power, it was not enjoyed uniformly across the working class. These differentiations, coupled with changes at the point of production, marked this period as one of segmentation between different sectors of the working class.84

The international long wave of prosperity had its effects in Alberta also. While the previous development of capitalism in Alberta had started the transition away from an agricultural basis, it was the "crucial years" of the decade following WWII that marked the basic change in economic structure. In the words of economic historian David Leadbeater:

With the 1940s and the beginning of the long period of growth heavily dependent on oil and gas development, Alberta entered an era of rapid and relatively mature capitalist development. Although still a subordinate economy with highly uneven development, the class structure, the degree of urbanization, the level of concentration of capital, and the diffusion of technology and techniques increasingly took on the proportions of a highly developed capitalist economy.85

Reflecting the increasing centralisation and concentration of agricultural capital, the number of farms decreased, while their economic value and geographic size expanded.

Also, "Quantitatively, between 1945 and 1950, the value of agricultural production dropped to less than half of total production," with oil and gas surpassing agricultural production in the following decade.86 This process was in turn reflected in population distribution. In

1948,48 percent of Alberta's population lived on farms; however, by 1961, only 21 percent did. Conversely, the total Alberta population almost doubled from 760,000 to 1,332,000 between 1941 and 1961. According to Alvin Finkel "In the period from 1951 to 1956, 75 percent of the population increase for Alberta was accounted for by" Calgary and

Edmonton, while the "seven smaller cities in the province accounted for much of the rest."87

83 Petras and Veltmeyer, Globalization Unmasked, 14. 84 Kealey, 'The Structure of Canadian Working-Class History," 33. 85 David Leadbeater, "An Outline of Capitalist Development in Alberta," in Essays on the Political Economy of Alberta, ed. David Leadbeater (Toronto: New Hogtown Press, 1984), 64-65. 86 Ibid., 30-31. 26

The key to the post-war growth of capitalism in Alberta was its dependence on the development of oil and gas. This was because "Only the discovery of large oil fields in

Alberta in 1947 and 1948 prevented the Prairies as a whole from returning to long-term

go relative decline in terms of value of production, population, and personal wealth." This development was a reflection of the reduction in the economic importance of coal as a result of the growing prominence of oil and gas. Indeed, from the late 1800s until the post­ war years, "coal was King" and was one of the primary elements in the historical development of capitalism in Alberta and in Canada itself.89 To give one example, Alberta only produced 43,220 tons of coal in 1886. However, it produced 4 million tons of coal, which made up 26.7 percent of total Canadian production, in 1913.90 After WWII this picture changed radically, and in light of the coal industry's importance, not least for the livelihood of the members of the UMWA-D18, it is useful to briefly discuss its historical rise and fall.

The fate of coal mining was directly dependent upon the expansion and evolution of railways. From the beginning, the coal industry suffered from a number of interrelated

"chronic problems," the most significant being a limited market. The existence of tariffs prevented the development of an American market for coal, and high freight rates prevented the Alberta coal industry from competing with "other suppliers east of Winnipeg or west of the Rockies."91 Thus, the coal industry's market was confined to the Prairies, specifically to the incoming settlers and the rail traffic that brought them there. Over time, the railways would come to be the only market for Alberta coal thus forming an uneven

87 Alvin Finkel, The Social Credit Phenomenon in Alberta (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), 100- 101. 88 Leadbeater, "An Outline of Capitalist Development," 64; Norrie, Owram, and Emery, A History of the Canadian Economy, 353. 89 Leadbeater, "An Outline of Capitalist Development," 13-14. 90 Ibid., 14. 91 A. A. den Otter, "Railways and Alberta's Coal Problem, 1880-1960," in Western Canada Past and Present, ed. A.W. Rasporich (Calgary: McClelland and Stewart West Limited, 1975), 84,86. 27 symbiotic relationship: "while the railways counted on these mines to supply the inexpensive coal, the collieries depended entirely upon the railways as consumers and carriers of their product; without the mines, the railways would only have to pay higher fuel

costs, but without the railways the coal industry would have been small indeed." Demand

for Alberta coal was never stable, and hence "Measured in terms of its potential, Alberta's coal industry never achieved full production."93

During the Great Depression Alberta's coal industry was in less demand, but, like

many other sectors of the economy in Alberta and Canada, the industry was resuscitated by

war preparations. The war created ever-growing demands for both industrial and

agricultural goods, which in turn, meant increased railway traffic. Demand was so high that

Alberta collieries could not meet it because of the lack of available labour power.

According to den Otter, "After 1944 no miner could join the armed forces, and for the first

time in the nation's history, women eighteen years or older were permitted to hold surface

jobs in coal mines."94 This was, however, the final resurgence in production before the

Alberta coal industry's near-terminal decline.

In 1948, the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) announced and began a policy known

as "dieselization," and soon after the Canadian National Railway (CNR) followed suit.95

Palmer has found that, "Between 1950 and 1957 the proportion of diesel locomotives used

on the railways rose from 25 to 80 percent."96 The reason for the transition from coal to

diesel was to achieve "lower overall operating and maintenance costs," and in fact this was

achieved as many trains no longer stopped at certain terminals for maintenance and crew changes.97 As den Otter argues, "Eight years later neither the CNR nor the CPR burned

92 Ibid., 90. 93 Ibid., 84. 94 Ibid., 94-95. 95 Ibid., 96. 96 Palmer, Working-Class Experience, 273. Canadian coal. A 13,000,000-ton market had disappeared."98 With the loss of its main consumer, Alberta coal production dropped and hence employment opportunities in the industry decreased drastically. Mines began to shut down and the number of miners fell from 8500 in 1946 to 7000 in 1952, to 3443 in 1956, and even lower to 1146 in

1966." According to Palmer, "Whole communities were decimated in the process."100

The decrease of the number of miners, historically the most radically militant section of the Albertan working class, was not mourned by the ruling Social Credit Party and its leader, Premier Ernest C. Manning. During the years of growing prosperity under

Manning, the Social Credit party became more conservative, dropping its former social reformist orientation. One expression of this was the Manning government's embrace of the

Cold War anti-communist hysteria, which targeted the moderate and radical political left and the trade union movement. Manning claimed that the CCF was communist, and when the Alberta Farmers Union carried out a strike in 1946, Manning again blamed

Communists. Finally, in 1951, Municipal Affairs Minister C.F. Gerhart claimed that there were "five to six hundred Communist spies planted among Alberta's working people," though the details were "studiedly vague."101 Leaders of the mainstream trade union movement acceded to this part of the post-war labour-capital accord, with the Industrial

Federations of Labour of Alberta (IFLA), the provincial central for CCL unions, earnestly claiming that they had done their best to remove from their organisation any "subversive" radicals.102

In the context of Alberta's dominant political climate, the growth of the welfare state was muted in comparison to other provinces. The Manning government extolled the

97 den Otter, "Railways and Alberta's Coal Problem," 96; Palmer, Working-Class Experience, 273. 98 den Otter, "Railways and Alberta's Coal Problem," 96-97. 99 Finkel, The Social Credit, 101, 112. 100 Palmer, Working-Class Experience, 273. 101 Finkel, The Social Credit, xi-xii, 12, 109, 113, 139-140. 102 Ibid., 113. 29

principles of free enterprise, free markets, and rugged individualism. This was in spite of its

political and financial support for select monopolies, such as its creation of the Alberta Gas

Trunk Line Ltd., "a major state-enforced private monopoly on gas transmission in Alberta," control of which the government handed over to "a small group of corporate interests."103

Still, with $123 million spent in operating costs in 1955-1956, "education absorbed $37.8 million, public welfare and health $48.2 million, and highways and bridges $15.7 million."104 Old-age pensioners, blind persons, and those who received mothers' allowance received "free hospital and medical treatment," and the government introduced a provincial pension for those over sixty-five years old, and who could meet a means test.105 Yet, the

Manning government refused to institute rent controls, a government housing construction program, or even free hospital and other medical care. Unsurprisingly, it was also a severe opponent of Medicare and of the federal government's construction of the welfare state.106

The Social Credit government's labour policy and legislation reflected its anti- communism and limited welfare state development. In 1948, the government revised the

1947 Alberta Labour Act with the goal of undermining unions. The amended legislation both defined unions as corporate entities and their leaders as, "individuals responsible for the actions of their members, imposing steep fines against violators of the act."107 Further, it was now illegal to carry on unionisation campaigns on an employer's property without

the employer's permission. Even more ominously for the existence of the organised labour movement, any strike which was considered illegal under the law meant the pre-existing contract between a union and their employer became automatically "void."108 The Manning

103 Ibid., xii, 136-138; Leadbeater, "An Outline of Capitalist Development," 48. 104 Finkel, The Social Credit, 122. 105 Ibid., 122-123. 106 Ibid., 139,148-152; Howard Palmer and Tamara Palmer, Alberta: A New History (Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers, 1990), 316. 107 Finkel, The Social Credit, 111. 108 Ibid., 108; Caragata, Alberta Labour, 140. 30 government also displayed its pro-capital outlook via the Board of Industrial Relations.

This agency, which was appointed by the government, regularly ignored or acted antagonistically to complaints by trade unions, while at the same time showing favouritism to company unions in the matter of certification and support. Such a lack of impartiality on the part of Alberta's Social Credit government was not lost on Alberta capital. While

Albertan entrepreneurs had in earlier years attacked Social Credit as "socialist," in the post­ war years they, in the words of Alvin Finkel, "gave it a clean bill of health" for its anti- labour, pro-capital policies.109

The history of the United Mine Workers of America, District 18's militancy and radicalism is one that stretches back to the period before the province of Alberta was created. It was among the earliest proponents of industrial unionism and was the backbone of the OBU in western Canada. Through its various organisational changes, the miners of

Alberta were one of the strongest bases of support for both the early socialist movement and later Communist movement. With such a radical tradition the miners were in the forefront of the struggle to improve working-class life. With radicals in the UMWA, it was a union that sought reforms to improve the material conditions of working-class people.

One example, which I will examine in the next chapter, was their continual work to improve workers' compensation in Alberta. Even during the Cold War Communist purging of the union movement, they remained influential among miners. Yet, with the decrease in the UMWA membership, as a consequence of the loss of coal's importance in the Alberta economy, District 18's ability to pressure the government through strikes, or the threat of strikes, was severely reduced.

Beginning during World War II and intensifying after the war, the international capitalist system began the greatest economic expansion in its history.110 With changes at

109 Finkel, The Social Credit, 113-115. 31 the point of production and a resultant booming prosperity, coupled with the growth of working-class power, the basis was laid for the post-war accord between capital and labour.

This accord was a compromise on the part of capital and the state.111 These new conditions did not fundamentally alter the state's basic function in capitalist society, but rather modified it. This compromise represented, in a limited manner, the interests of both the working class and capitalists; hence its effects on the former were contradictory. In Canada, in response to trade union militancy and the growth of the political left, certain concessions were made on the part of capital. These included novel labour legislation, such as union recognition, and the expansion of social welfare policy in the form of various universal programs like family allowances. While these represented real material and legal advances for the workers of Canada, they also furthered capital's ability to contain labour militancy and maintain the capital accumulation process.

It is important to note that the social safety net still included many gaps, and unions were still suspect in the eyes of both capital and its state. Thus the necessity for workers to agitate for reforms and to organise unions, in order to improve their lives materially, was still present. The context had changed, but the fundamental reasons for working-class self- help had not. This was even truer for the province of Alberta. In addition to structural gaps, the specific dominant political situation shaipened those pro-capital aspects of the post-war accord. The Social Credit government's construction of the welfare state was limited compared to other provinces, and where it did equal or excel other provinces, it was due to higher prosperity. Labour legislation tended to weaken the power of the trade union movement rather than mediate conflicts with employers; hence the government only grudgingly recognised unions. Finally, the Red Scare was a regular tool for Premier

Manning and his government to garner support, weaken the union movement, and protect

110 Chris Harman, A People's History of the World (New York: Verso, 2008), 548. 111 Ernest Mandel, Long Waves of Capitalist Development, 77-78 32 the interests of capital. Most importantly, these modest developments only began in 1948.

It was those conditions of the immediate post-war period, 1946-1947, that necessitated the

United Mine Workers of America, District 18's formation of their Welfare Fund. 33

Chapter 3: The Miners and Workers' Compensation

This chapter comprises a brief history of workers' compensation legislation in

Alberta between the years 1900 and 1948, and sets forth three distinct, yet connected arguments. First, contrary to the official history of the Workers' Compensation Board, ii "y workers' compensation in Alberta actually started in 1908, not 1918. Second, the miners of the UMWA-D18 were consistently the leading section of the Alberta working class in the fight to improve both workers' compensation legislation and its administration. Third, the development of workers' compensation at times directly benefitted labour and at other times capital. However, at all times the development of the legislation represented the growth of state power in Alberta over both capital and labour as a whole, insofar as it represented the legal regulation of the conflict between the two. These factors reduced the effectiveness of workers' compensation legislation. As will be discussed in the next chapter, it was because of the legislation's limitations in Alberta that the UMWA-D18 set up its Welfare Fund.

A lack of evidence precludes a complete history of workers' compensation in

Alberta. Many of the reports of Royal Commissions and Commissions of Inquiry, including the different submissions on the part of miners and others, have not been preserved in archives. This puts real obstacles in the way of the researcher who attempts to recover the working-class voices from the past. Thus, this chapter focuses on three years in the development of Workmen's Compensation Acts in Alberta. The first is 1908, the true beginning of workers' compensation in Alberta. The second is 1918, the year the

Workmen's Compensation Board (WCB) was first created and workers' compensation formed as an institution. The final year discussed is 1948, when the amendments to the legislation provided the context in which UMWA-D18's new Welfare Fund operated.

112 "Workers' Compensation Timeline," Association of Workers' Compensation Boards of Canada, accessed July 18,2011, http://www.awcbc.org/en/workerscompensationtimeline.asp. 34

The first legislation to deal with workers' compensation in Alberta predated the creation of Alberta itself. In 1900, An Ordinance to Secure Compensation to Workmen was passed in the North-West Territories. This was not a contributory workers' compensation plan, but rather an amendment to the employers' liability legislation. Similar to Ontario's

1886 Legislation with Respect to Workmen's Compensation in Canada, injured employees

"could sue for damages when the accident was caused by," among other factors, negligence on the part of the employer.113 The difficulty of this for employees was that, as Michael

Piva has pointed out, "The law did not restrict the traditional defenses in cases of liability.

In order to bring a successful suit against an employer, a workman had to prove negligence.

Such efforts were hamstrung by the common law principles of assumed risk, contributory negligence and common employment."114

Under the principle of common employment, "an employee assumed risk of negligence of fellow employees."115 The Ordinance of 1900 removed the principle of common employment from employers' liability litigation in the North-West Territories.

Under the new legislation, the "Negligence of [a]fellow workman [was] no defence in action against employer."116 That an employer could no longer use the negligence of an injured worker's fellow employee as a defence, represented a real advance from the perspective of the worker launching a suit because it became it easier to prove an employer's negligence. Still, as Piva has argued in the Ontario context, "Under employers' liability law justice was irregular and sporadic."117 Juries and judges could be sympathetic or not to an injured worker. Moreover, one needed to have funds to be able to launch an action. Compensation for injured workers at this time, then, was sporadic and inconsistent.

113 An Ordinance to Secure Compensation to Workmen, O.N.W.T., ch. 13, (1900); Piva, "The Workmen's Compensation Movement," 42. 114 Ibid., 42. 115 Ibid., 43. 116 An Ordinance to Secure Compensation, ch. 13, s. 2, (1900). 117 Piva, "The Workmen's Compensation Movement," 43. 35

Alberta's Workers' Compensation Board officially dates the origins of workers' compensation in Alberta in 1918, but the first real piece of legislation establishing workers' compensation came a decade earlier.118 In 1908, the Legislative Assembly of Alberta

passed An Act with respect to Compensation to Workmen for Injuries Suffered in the

Course of their Employment. This act was a transitional piece of legislation which began a

fundamental change in compensation. On the one hand, the legislation formalised employers' individual, not collective liability, for injured workers:

If in any employment to which this Act applies personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment is caused to a workman, his employer shall, subject as hereinafter mentioned, be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the first schedule to this Act.119

On the other hand, it gave workers a choice between gaining compensation under the act or in the courts:

When the injury was caused by the personal negligence or wilful act of the employer or of some person for whose act or default the employer is responsible nothing in this Act shall affect any civil liability of the employer, but in that case the workman may, at his option, either claim compensation under this Act or take proceedings independently of this Act.120

This distinction is important. Taking an employer to court was only possible if the injured worker so chose and if the injury was as a result of the employer's negligence, or that of one for whom the employer was responsible, such as another employee. However, the guaranteed compensation went beyond the common law principle of negligence in tying injury to accidents.

This was recognised by the Alberta Liberal government itself when it presented the bill. It pointed out that the proposed legislation was "to a large extent similar" to the

118 "Workers' Compensation Timeline," Association ofWorkers' Compensation Boards of Canada, accessed 18 July 2011, http://www.awcbc.org/en/workerscompensationtimeline.asp. 119 Act with respect to Compensation to Workmen for Injuries Suffered in the Course of their Employment, S.A., ch. 12, (1908). 120 Ibid. 36 legislation passed in "Great Britain, adapted, however to the conditions of this province."121 Liberal MLA and Attorney-General, C.W. Cross stated, in moving the second reading, that "The English Workmen's Compensation act of 1897 wrought a sweeping change in English law by introducing the Bismarckian principle of compensation which entirely eliminates negligence as an essential ingredient in the liability of an employer for accidents to his servants."122 Cross went on to admit that "under these employers' liability acts, or under the extension of them, such as we have in the Ordinances of the North-West

Territories, a workingman still could only recover damages as a result of an action at law with the consequent delays, expenditures and uncertainty of which in the vast majority of cases he was in no position to bear."123 Cross also recognised that the "actual application of this common law doctrine to modern conditions" put the onus on the injured worker to prove the employer's negligence, and that in light of "modern conditions.. .one of an army of vast workingmen working under a complex system it is frequently impossible to trace responsibility."124

However, this new legislation was likely not the result of wholly altruistic concerns.

For example, the Leader of the Opposition, Conservative MLA Albert Robertson attacked the proposed legislation. He argued that "the bulk of the legislation in all countries favored the capitalist more than it did the laboring classed" and that, in this instance, it was no different.125 For example, in the legislation as it passed, the workers who laboured "in or about any building which exceeds thirty feet in height, and is either being constructed or repaired by means of a scaffolding, or being demolished," were covered, but in the act as

121 "Edmonton Bulletin, 15 February 1908," in Alberta Scrapbook Hansard, First Legislature - 15 March, 1906 to 25 February, 1909. 122 Ibid. 123 Ibid. 124 Ibid. 125 "Edmonton Journal, 17 February 1908," in Alberta Scrapbook Hansard, First Legislature - 15 March, 1906 to 25 February, 1909. 37

1 originally presented, the building had to exceed forty feet. Robertson questioned why

"there had been a change from thirty feet as in the English Act to forty feet" in deciding 107 who was excluded from the act. He also criticised the removal of the industrial diseases clause "as they have lead mines which maybe operated in Alberta one day."128 Robertson's final judgement was that the government were "mere copyists and it was significant that when changes were made they were made in behalf of the capitalist and to the detriment of labor." Thus, in his view, it was a concession, a "mere sham piece of legislation" designed to attract the votes of workers.129

Despite Robertson's interest in playing to the gallery, he was not off the mark in arguing that the legislation primarily aimed to serve the interests of capital. For example, an employer was not liable "in respect of any injury which does not disable the workman for a period of at least two weeks from earning full wages at the work at which he was employed."130 If a family had only one or two breadwinners, this meant certain privation for the family, and even worse for the worker who had no family to rely upon. Another clause which also revealed a pro-capital bias dealt with the guidelines for the medical examination of an injured worker:

Where a workman has given notice of an accident he shall, if so required by the employer, submit himself for examination by a duly qualified medical practitioner provided and paid by the employer, and, if he refuses to submit himself to such examination, or in any way obstructs the same, his right to compensation, and to take or prosecute any proceedings under this Act in relation to compensation, shall be suspended until such examination has taken place.131

This clause was expanded in paragraph 11 to include workers receiving "weekly payments;" as in the case cited above, if they refused to see the employer's medical

126 Act with respect to Compensation to Workmen, S.A., ch. 12, s. 2 (1908). 127 Ibid. 128 "Edmonton Journal, 17 February 1908." 129 Ibid. 130 Act with respect to Compensation to Workmen, S.A., ch. 12, (1908). 131 Ibid. 38 practitioner, their "right to such weekly payments shall be suspended until such examination has taken place."132 The requirement for a medical examination to certify the existence of an injury was not inherently biased against workers. But the fact that the doctor was both selected and hired by the employer created the possibility the he would be beholden to the employer. Derickson has shown in the American experience that doctors provided by the company rarely found employers at fault in accidents occurring on the job.133

Some of the government's comments on other aspects of legislation show that supporting employers was its primary concern. The new act did not apply to workers employed in the agricultural sector of the economy, thus setting a standard in Alberta of excluding the agricultural proletariat from progressive state regulations.134 The government's justification was that "agriculture was and will continue to be the predominating industry of the province," and hence the exclusion was designed "to protect the farmer."135 Lieutenant-Governor George H. V. Bulyea stated that the legislation also aimed at "protecting employers against vexatious litigation."136 This echoes Piva's findings in Ontario. The main reason there why employers eventually supported the legislation was to reduce the increasing costs of going to court, which included lawyers' fees and the growing success of workers in suing their employers.137

However, unlike Ontario, the main reason why employers and the government supported the legislation was not to reduce costs. Rather it was designed to assure class

132 Ibid. 133 Derickson, Workers Health', Workers' Democracy, 104-105. 134 This practise continues; agricultural workers are still not eligible for workers' compensation. See, Act with respect to Compensation to Workmen, S.A., ch. 12, s. 10 (1908) and Bob Bametson, 'The Regulatory Exclusion of Agricultural Workers in Alberta," Just Labour: A Canadian Journal of Work and Society 14 (Autumn, 2009): 50, 53-54. 135 "Edmonton Bulletin, 25 February 1908," in Alberta Scrapbook Hansard, First Legislature-15 March, 1906 to 25 February, 1909. 136 "Edmonton Bulletin, 6 March 1908," in Alberta Scrapbook Hansard, First Legislature - 15 March, 1906 to 25 February, 1909. 137 Piva, "The Workmen's Compensation Movement," 43-44,46-47, 56. 39 peace between labour and capital, especially from Alberta's most combative section of workers, the miners. In light of the coal industry's importance for the development of capitalism in Alberta, this is understandable. In 1906 "railway bottlenecks helped precipitate a fuel crisis on the prairies" and a "nine-month strike in the Lethbridge district and in the Crowsnest Pass," by the UMWA-D18 exacerbated the situation.138 This caused a

"coal famine" that instigated demands that the federal government intervene. The federal government dispatched Mackenzie King, Deputy Minister of Labour, to mediate the strike.

King introduced the Industrial Disputes Investigation Act (IDIA), which enforced compulsory conciliation, and was part of King's strategy to "mediate class antagonism by bringing both labour and capital under the jurisdiction of established authority."139 Though the miners did not win most of their demands, they did achieve a wage increase.140

The miners struck again in 1907, and this strike extended throughout all of District

18. They demanded various improvements, including a reduction of the hours of work from ten to eight hours. This strike, coupled with that of 1906, compelled the government of

Premier Rutherford to appoint a Royal Commission to investigate the conditions of coal mines in Alberta, in 1907.141 According to Bulyea, in his closing address to the Third

Session of the First Legislature:

The labors of the Royal Commission to inquire into the conditions of coal mining have resulted in the Miners' Eight Hours Act, which has settled by legal enactment in a manner which will, I believe, be conducive to the interests of both sides, a question which might, if left to the play of opposing industrial forces, have been a cause of friction.142

The commission of inquiry and the subsequent act reducing hours of labour for miners

138 Palmer and Palmer, Alberta: A New History, 160; Morton and Copp, Working People, 88. 139 Palmer, Working-Class Experience, 162-163, 175-176; Fudge and Tucker, Labour Before the Law, 53-54; Palmer and Palmer, Alberta: A New History, 160. 140 Ibid., 160 141 Douglas R. Babcock, Alexander Cameron Rutherford: A Gentleman of Strathcona (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1989), 39. 142 "Edmonton Bulletin, 6 March 1908." 40 were clearly aimed at attaining class peace on the coalfields as a result of militant actions by the miners.

Miners' militancy and the provincial Government's goal to attain harmonious relations between labour and capital, also extended to the workers' compensation legislation. The Workmen's Compensation Act of 1908 passed in the same session as the

Eight Hours Act, after the strikes by the UMWA-D18. In his Speech from the Throne, opening the Third Session of the First Legislature, Lieutenant-Governor Bulyea pointed out that:

A Bill will be submitted for your consideration providing for the regulation of the conditions of labour as regards compensation to workmen in case of accidents. I believe that by thus providing on an assured basis for the future the relations between capital and labour in this province will be rendered more cordial from the outset.143

As the only major strikes in Alberta during this period were those of the miners, it is clear that Bulyea had the mining industry in mind.144

The miners took the lead role in fighting for workers' compensation. During the final debate on the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1908, Robertson argued that "any representatives of the trades and labor council present who wished to speak before the

House" on the topic of the proposed Act be allowed to do so.145 Interestingly, no labour representative chose to sit with Robertson. However, Frank Sherman, president of the

UMWA-D18, with the consent of the assembly, sat beside Liberal MLA W.C. Simmons.146

The Edmonton Bulletin pointed out that "Mr. Sherman's presence there recalled the fact that it was he who three years ago was practically the first in Alberta to start the movement for the Compensation act."147 Sherman was a radical socialist, so his apparent support of

143 Alberta, Legislative Assembly, Journals of the Legislative Assembly, l9 Leg, 3rd Sess, vol 3 (1908) at 8. (G.H.V. Bulyea). 144 Palmer and Palmer, Alberta: A New History, 159-160. 145 "Edmonton Bulletin, 25 Februaryl908." 146 Ibid. 41

Simmons and the legislation was obviously pragmatic and aimed at getting the legislation passed.

Thus, the first workers' compensation legislation in Alberta was passed for multiple, though not equal, reasons. These included the goal of lowering and regularising costs for employers of injured workman, and improving the access of injured employees

(for some, not all, sectors of the working class) to compensation. However, in line with the government's goal to decrease labour-capital conflict, such as the miners' strikes, this legislation promoted a class compromise. This over-riding desire for class peace, the leading role of the miners in arguing for improvements, and a pro-capital bias informed later amendments to workers' compensation legislation.

On 22 August 1917, an Order in Council established a commission to "make inquiry into and concerning compensation for injuries received by workmen in Alberta, and to embody in their report thereon any amendments to the existing law regarding workmen's compensation."148 The commissioners visited nineteen different cities and towns including

Calgary, Edmonton, and Medicine Hat, but spent most of their time in mining towns, such as Blairmore, Evansburg, Mountain Park, and Taber. Thus, while politicians met with employers, managers, and organised and unorganised workers, the majority of persons providing testimony were mine managers, and even more so, miners and UMWA-D18 representatives.149 It is clear that the mining industry was a major concern of the Alberta government and exerted one of the major influences on the final report and suggested amendments.

147 Ibid. 148 Commission, OC 1057/17, (1917) A Gaz 1,521. 149 Unfortunately, the 1918 report is missing except for the Order in Council, a draft of the new act, and a list of the witnesses and towns. Without the proceedings any definite statement as to why the government chose in 1917 to amend the legislation is impossible. See, Alberta, Legislative Assembly, "Report of Investigation regarding Workmen's Compensation, 1918" by John T. Stirling, Walter F. McNeill, and James A. Kinney in Sessional Papers, No 34 (1918) at lx-lxvi. 42

A delegation from the Edmonton branch of the Western Canada Manufacturers'

Association met with Premier Stewart in late March 1918, to inquire about the assessments for industries under the new proposed legislation. Specifically, they wanted to know if the new assessments on employers were to be determined by a "flat rate or a rate according to a hazard," and they also stated that they did not want any extra "burdens" on "the struggling industries."150 In his reply Stewart assured the manufacturers that "it was far from the intention of the government to impose any additional burden on the industries."151

He went on to state that it was the goal of his government "to prevent practically all litigation."152 This was later reflected in the actual Act, in section 38, subsection 2:

The provisions of this Act shall be in lieu of all rights and rights of action, statutory or otherwise, to which a workman or his dependants are or may be entitled against the employer of such workman for or by reason of any accident happening to him while in the employment of such employer and no action in respect thereof shall lie.153

With this clause, injured workers could no longer take their employer to court and the final link to the old common law system of compensation was removed. Employer liability would now be collective and state-run, and the "burdens" shared between employers in specific industries.

Premier Stewart's final point in his reply to the manufacturers was that it was not the intention of the government "to bring the act into force until the beginning of 1919," although it would come into effect in the coal mines before that time.154 The reason for applying the new legislation to the coal mines before any other section of the Alberta economy was connected with the state of the industry at this time. The miners of UMWA-

150 "Edmonton Bulletin, 27 March 1918," in Alberta Scrapbook Hansard, Fourth Legislature - 7 February, 1918 to 19 April, 1921,41. 151 Ibid., 41. 152 Ibid., 41. 153 The Workmen's Compensation Act, 1918, S.A., ch. 5, s. 38 (1918). 154 "Edmonton Bulletin, 27 March 1918," 41. 43

D18, like much of the Canadian working class, were radicalising under the pressures of inflation caused by WWI. In 1917, miners across District 18 struck for increased wages, in defiance of the official union leadership. Because of coal's importance to the national war effort, the Borden government intervened and appointed W.H. Armstrong as "director of coal operations for Western Canada with the power to determine wages, working conditions and coal and coke prices."155 With workers radicalising and striking in the most crucial sector of the Alberta economy, applying the new legislation was an attempt by the provincial government to improve the working conditions and prevent the outbreak of more strikes.

Representatives of industrial capital were not the only ones to send a delegation to the government. A delegation from District 18 also discussed the proposed legislation with the Premier, raising demands which affected not only themselves but all of the Alberta working class.156 A delegation of three members of the UMWA-D18, Ed Brown, the secretary of the organization, Frank Wheatley from Bankhead, and Hugh McDonald from

Brule, met with Stewart over a period of three days.157 The miners raised a wide range of demands. First, they "asked that the rates of compensation all along the line be raised," as they contended that with the "high cost of living" the rates were not high enough to

"provide a living while the wage earner is laid off."158 The miners requested that "instead of the flat rate of $10 per week" which an injured worker received, that they "get 66 2/3 per cent" of their salary.159 The Premier disagreed, arguing that with the flat rate workers would receive more, since workers with low wages would get less on a percentage basis. The

155 Bercuson, Fools and Wise Men, 67,196. 156 It should be noted that besides the miners, Alberta Scrapbook Hansard mentions no other groups of workers who met with the Premier, or any other member of the Alberta government, to discuss the proposed legislation. 15 "Edmonton Journal, 27 March 1918," in Alberta Scrapbook Hansard, Fourth Legislature - 7 February, 1918 to 19 April, 1921, 63. 158 "Edmonton Bulletin, 29 March 1918," in Alberta Scrapbook Hansard, Fourth Legislature - 7 February, 1918 to 19 April, 1921,44. 159 Ibid., 44. 44 miners further asked that the suggested "$100 limit to medical aid," which the proposed

WCB would be "authorized to render, be removed and no limit set."160 They also requested that provisions for old age be included in the new law.161

The members of UMWA-D18 also made demands that more specifically affected miners. In the proposed legislation a worker could claim compensation for certain 1 fS) industrial diseases. While this was a certain improvement for miners and others over the original 1908 Act, the length-of-employment qualification meant that some workers would not qualify. The industrial diseases enumerated were to be treated as an "accident arising out of and in the course of' the injured worker's employment and entirely "due to the nature" of the employment. The diseases, however, were assumed to have arisen in the previous twelve months of employment. Any workers who hid the fact that they had suffered from the disease previously would lose their rights to compensation.163 This provides a good example of how the medical model of understanding disability affected those who were impaired. It was not that that Premier was merely focussing on the sickness of individual miners and ignoring structural limitations. Rather, his government's discrimination against ill miners became itself a social factor, preventing them from engaging in the Alberta mining industry.

The delegation told the Premier that such regulations were discriminatory and asked that they be removed. Again rebuffing their demands, Stewart argued that such regulations were to prevent the province from being flooded by sick miners from the United States and other provinces. The Alberta government did not want to take financial responsibility for

160 Ibid., 44. 161 "Edmonton Journal, 27 March 1918," 63. 162 Seven in total were listed: Anthrax, Lead poisoning or its sequelae, Mercury poisoning or its sequelae, Miners' phthisis, Phosphorus poisoning or its sequelae, Arsenic poisoning or its sequelae, and Ankylostomiasis. See, Alberta, Legislative Assembly, "Report of Investigation regarding Workmen's Compensation, 1918" by John T. Stirling, Walter F. McNeill, and James A. Kinney in Sessional Papers, No 34 (1918) at liii. 163 Alberta, Legislative Assembly, "Report of Investigation regarding Workmen's Compensation, 1918" xlii- xliii. 45 workers injured outside of the province. The regulations would not be altered. He concluded, ominously, that, "it was definitely decided that a census would be undertaken by the government to ascertain the exact number of miners in the province of alien enemy birth."164 The government's rationale for this was, according to the Premier, that "there was a strong feeling that men of the Anglo-Saxon race should be give consideration first," and he further argued that there were too many "enemy aliens" employed and he made reference to recent labour troubles.165

The new Workmen's Compensation Act, received assent on 13 April 1918 and came into effect for mining, under Schedule 1, on 1 August 1918. For other types of employment that were included under Schedule 2, the legislation came into effect on 1

January 1919.166 The government did not include most of the miners' demands. Their demand for the rates to be increased "all along the line" was met in general, but not in the manner they had specifically requested. First, unlike the 1908 legislation, an injured worker received compensation from the day of the accident after ten days or more of

"disablement," and if the worker was "disabled for a period of less than ten days" he was to be "paid for and from the fourth day after the accident."167 This was a definite monetary improvement over the 1908 legislation for injured workers, through which payment only began "during incapacity after the second week" of being off of work.168 The maximum compensation a worker received also increased. In 1908 an injured worker could receive from $1000 to a maximum of $1800 in compensation. Under the 1918 legislation, a worker could receive a maximum of $2500 in compensation.169 However, the government rejected

164 "Edmonton Bulletin, 29 March 1918," 44; "Edmonton Journal, 28 March 1918," in Alberta Scrapbook Hansard, Fourth Legislature - 7 February, 1918 to 19 April, 1921, 67. 165 "Edmonton Journal, 27 March 1918," in Alberta Scrapbook Hansard, Fourth Legislature - 7 February, 1918 to 19 April, 1921,64• 166 The Workmen's Compensation Act, 1918, S.A., ch. 5, s. 67. 167 Ibid., s. 43. 168 Act with respect to Compensation to Workmen, S.A., ch. 12, s. 3 (1908). 46 the miners' demand that the flat rate be replaced with a percentage of the workers' wage.

Also, there were no provisions for old age and the restrictions on workers previously suffering from an industrial disease remained in place.170

Despite these restrictions, the inclusion of industrial diseases nevertheless represented a real advance over the 1908 act, especially for the miners. Of the seven industrial diseases listed in the draft legislation, all were found in the new act including

"Miners' Phthisis."171 Miner's phthisis was an archaic term for silicosis, a debilitating respiratory affliction that generally meant an early death under the medical conditions of the time.172 Because of the missing report of the 1917 Royal Commission, it is impossible to say with certainty whether or not miner's phthisis was included as a result of the testimony of miners or their union representatives. It is clear, however, that the miners were leaders in fighting for improvements to workers' compensation legislation in Alberta, and were a significant influence on its final form in 1918.

A novel aspect to the Workmen's Compensation Act (1918), and one with important implications for both capital and labour, was the creation of the Workmen's

Compensation Board as the official arbiter of all compensation case. This institution was a new stage in the development of the liberal-capitalist state in Alberta. Under the 1908 legislation, all workers' compensation cases were referred to an ad hoc committee that included representatives of both the employer and the injured worker; if such a committee

169 This discussion refers to the categories of Death, Permanent Total Disability, and Temporary Total Disability. Compensation for Permanent Partial Disability was determined by a list of injuries, such as loss of eyesight, loss of arm, leg, or hand etc., and for which a fixed sum for each injury was set. Injuries coming under Temporary Partial Disability received compensation based on a totally different rate of compensation compared to the other categories. The 1908 act only recognised the categories of Death, Total Incapacity, and Partial Incapacity. Thus, the scope and complexity of injury recognised, and the determination of compensation, braodened between 1908 and 1918. See The Woikmen's Compensation Act, 1918, S.A., ch. 5, s. 48,51-54, and the Act with respect to Compensation to Workmen, S.A., ch. 12, First Schedule (1908). 170 Ibid., s. 59. 171 Ibid., Form. 172 Jabez H. Elliot, "Silicosis in Ontario Gold Miners," Transactions of the American Clinical and Climatological Association, 39 (1923): 24-27; Derickson, "Industrial Refugees," 67-69. 47 was not in existence, or not agreed to by both parties, the issue was then referred to the courts.173 However, in 1918, arbitration was formalised and systematically delineated.

Indeed, the board enjoyed this role as the "commission for the administration" of the new act.174 For example, the board now had the power to appoint a "medical referee" to carry out the medical examinations of injured workers. As in 1908, an injured worker was still required to submit to an examination, but the legislation no longer stipulated that the medical examiner be employed by, and thus beholden to, the employer.175 Formally, at least, this meant the process was more independent from the influence of the employer, and thus less open to abuse by the latter. Legally, then, this was an important gain for the working class.

The powers, and hence formal independence, of the Workmen's Compensation

Board extended beyond simply controlling medical examination. In the words of the 1918 act: "The board shall have like powers as the Supreme Court for compelling the attendance of witnesses and of examining them under oath, and compelling the production of books, papers, documents and things."176 The WCB was also given:

exclusive jurisdiction to examine into, hear and determine all matters and questions arising under this Act, and the action or decisions of the board thereon shall be final and conclusive and shall not be open to question or review in any court, and no proceedings by or before the court shall be restrained by injunction, prohibition or other process or proceedings in any court or be removable by certiorari or otherwise into any court.177

Relatedly, the board was also empowered to make regulations for the purpose of administering the act.178 The new Workmen's Compensation Act thus developed a whole section of the liberal-capitalist state wholly independent from the courts, in the sense that

173 Act with respect to Compensation to Workmen, S.A., ch. 12, Second Schedule (1908). 174 The Workmen's Compensation Act, 1918, S.A., ch. 5, s. 3. 175 Ibid., s. 2,43-44. 176 Ibid., s. 11. 177 Ibid., s. 13. 178 Ibid., s. 15. 48 the state regulation of workers' compensation was now the province of one court, the

WCB.

In order for the new state machinery to function and carry out its prescribed duties, two different funds, which were administered by the board, were established by the legislation. Insofar as these funds represented encroachments on the property rights of employers, they show the increased, though limited, independence of the state from capital.

The first fund was a system of assessments, to be collected from employers coming under the different schedules of the act, created "to cover the administration" of compensation.179

The board was to determine both when to make assessments and their total amount, but the period of collection was to be "at least quarterly" and the "amount assessed" was not to be "less than $5."180 The basis for determining the assessment was to be either "a percentage of the payroll of the employer or a specific sum" to be determined by the board.181 The WCB was thus given the authority to compel employers to "prepare and transmit to the board a statement of the total amount of wages earned by all his workmen during each of the twelve calendar months then last past" and to do so regularly afterwards.

In furtherance of the same goal, the board was given the "right to examine the books and accounts of the employer and to make such other inquiry as the board may deem necessary for the purpose of ascertaining the amounts of payroll of any employer," and to inspect the workplace.182 If an employer failed to comply, the WCB could determine assessments to be levied and the employer would be required to pay the difference.183

The legislation also created the Accident Fund, which covered compensation for accidents and concomitant administration costs. Payment to this fund was also made by

179 Ibid., s. 20. 180 Ibid., s. 20. 181 Ibid., s. 20. 182 Ibid., s. 27-29. 183 Ibid., s. 27-28. 49 those employers included under the act. Significantly, separate accounts were to be kept of the funds collected from each employer, but in paying out compensation the fund was treated as "one and indivisible."184 Thus while each individual employer covered under the law was responsible for paying into the Accident Fund, employer liability was collective for compensation payments. But if workers at a particular worksite had an above-average number of accidents, the WCB could add an extra charge on the employer as a percentage of his contribution to the fund.185 The question of the manufacturers' delegation was thus answered: all employers covered under the legislation were obliged to pay, but no flat rate was specifically mentioned. Further, payment according to the amount of accidents was determined to be additional, but optional as per the board's discretion.186 The liberal- capitalist state in Alberta thus had an increased level of power, via the new workers' 187 compensation legislation, over a section of capital in Alberta.

Of final import was the actual structure of the Workmen's Compensation Board.

This was actually the most crucial change under the new law, for who sat on the board, and how that was to be decided, would determine how the new legislation would be interpreted and applied. This would determine whether the independence of the liberal-capitalist state from both labour and capital, in the shape of workers' compensation, was truly substantive, or merely formal. The WCB was to "consist of not more than three members to be appointed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council" and was "a body corporate."188 Of the three commissioners, one was to be "be appointed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council to be chairman of the board" and the chairman was to remain so as long as he continued to

184 Ibid., s. 33. 185 Ibid., s. 33. 186 For the year 1949, employers included under Class 1, "Employment in or about underground Coal Mines" had to pay an assessment of $9.50, the highest rate levied by die WCB among industries included under the 1948 Act. See Notice (The Workmen's Compensation Act), (1948) A Gaz I, 1297. 187 Ibid., Schedule 1-2. 188 Ibid., s. 3. 50 be a member of the board.189 Being appointed by the Lieutenant Governor, the commissioners could also "be removed at any time for cause" and the government also set their salaries. A vacancy of one seat would not impair the work of the board, as only two members were "necessary to constitute a quorum for the board."190

There are no recorded instructions or criteria outlining the selection process for the members of the WCB. Thus it was up to the discretion of the Lieutenant Governor, though likely with input from the provincial government, to select the commissioners. However,

Alvin Finkel has noted that the United Farmers of Alberta government, which held power

from 1921 to 1935, had the "practice of naming a labour representative" to the WCB and this continued under the Social Credit government of William Aberhart only in the final years of his administration.191 This practice, then, was not legally binding and was wholly dependent on the good will, with regards to the working class, of the Alberta government.

Those who were to be commissioners were thus selected and paid by the government, and, hence, they were completely dependent upon the latter for their appointment and salaries. So while a "labour representative" might be placed on the board, it was not obligatory, and more importantly any "labour representative" selected was

chosen and paid by the government, meaning his independence would be limited. Alberta

workers thus faced a board that was formally, but not substantively, independent of both

labour and capital.

This is not to argue that the trade unions and unorganised workers of Alberta would

not have wanted a representative on the WCB, nor that co-optation would be automatic.

Certainly it would have been beneficial to have the workers' point of view in such a crucial

institution. But the fact remains that one labour representative on a board with two pro-

189 Ibid., s. 4. 190 Ibid., s. 6-8,10. 191 Finkel, The Social Credit, 78; Leadbeater, "An Outline of Capitalist Development," 38. 51 employer representatives was unequal. Equally important was that Alberta's workers had no say in choosing who was to represent their interests on the WCB. As we will see later on, this was a fear and criticism later raised by unions in Alberta, and above all by the miners.

After 1918, there were a number of amendments to the legislation that increased the scope of the powers of the WCB. They also, at times, favoured both employers and injured employees, though unequally. In 1919, an amendment to the act removed legal precedent

from the board's decisions.192 This increased the powers of the board over labour because

an injured worker could no longer turn to the courts to get compensation, nor turn to the courts to review decisions by the WCB. If an injured worker was not satisfied with a

decision by the WCB, then he had no independent recourse for appeal. The 1920

amendment gave the board the authority to enter places of employment to inspect and

determine whether proper measure had been taken for prevention of accident, for

maintaining sanitation, and for the prevention of diseases. Despite the improved protection

for workers, employers could also petition the WCB to have their employees included

under the act. Employees, however, would have to wait for an amendment the following

year for the same right.193

In 1922, the Statues of Alberta were revised and all amendments to workers'

compensation legislation were consolidated as The Workmen's Compensation Act

(Accident Fund).194 The 1924 amendment was very positive for the workers of Alberta in a

number of areas. First, while the board had the power "to supervise and provide medical

aid in every case where the Board is of the opinion that the exercise of such power is

192 An Act to amend The Workmen's Compensation Act, 1918, S.A., ch. 36, s. 2 (1919). 193 An Act to amend The Workmen's Compensation Act, 1918, S.A., ch. 39, s. 1,5 (1920); An Act to amend The Workmen's Compensation Act, 1918, S.A. ch. 38, s. 2 (1921). 194 An Act to Provide Compensation to Injured Workmen by Means of an Accident Fund, R.S.A. III, ch. 177, s. 1 (1922). 52 expedient, the Board may permit the injured workman to select the doctor."195 Under previous legislation the doctor was beholden to the employer, and then later appointed by the board itself. Workers for the first time had the choice of selecting their own doctor.

Employers were also required to provide workers with transportation to the hospital, if immediately necessary. Employers were also obligated to post notices from the WCB conspicuously as the board "may require from time to time." These further inroads on the property rights of capital were beneficial to injured workers because they would not have to pay their own way to the hospital; they would also have easier access to important information from the WCB than they had before.

In 1928, the powers to the WCB were augmented yet again, this time limiting the rights of injured workers. First, a new clause added to section 13 stated that no "action be maintained or brought against the board or any commissioner in respect of any act or decision done or made in the honest belief that the same was within the jurisdiction of the board."196 The freedom of movement of an injured worker was reduced by an alteration to section 39. An injured worker receiving compensation could no longer collect benefits if he left the province without the permission of the WCB. Importantly though, the 1928 revisions included updating the industrial diseases schedule. The older reference to

"Miner's Phthisis" was changed to "Pneumoconiosis" and was deemed to comprise

"Silicosis. Siderosis. Lithosis."197 This was the first time the modem terms for the respiratory ailments suffered by miners were used in workers' compensation legislation in

Alberta.

As was regular practise for the government of Alberta when overhauling workers' compensation legislation, another commission of inquiry was appointed by the Social

195 An Act to amend The Workmen's Compensation Act (Accident Fund), S.A. ch. 33, s. 19, 21 (1924). 196 An Act to amend The Workmen's Compensation Act (Accident Fund), S.A. ch. 38, s. 4 (1928). 197 Ibid., 26. 53

Credit government on 10 March 1942. The report was received by the Alberta Legislature on 19 February 1943. IQO However, this report, along with the accompanying evidence and suggestions provided by various individuals and organisation, is missing. The only source for investigating this report is the Alberta Scrapbook Hansard. Once again, those in the forefront of the effort to improve the content and administration of the legislation in the interests of Alberta's working class were the miners of District 18. Only this time, besides submissions to the commission, the miners did not send any delegations to the Premier as they already had a representative in the Legislative Assembly, Angus J. Morrison.

According to Finkel, Morrison was the president of UMWA-D18 and was elected as a

Labour candidate in the mining town of Edson, in 1940. However, he was an independent

Labour candidate as he was not a candidate for the Canadian Labour Party and was opposed by a CCF candidate. Morrison argued on behalf of his union and labour in general, besides supporting at times the "socialist resolutions" of CCF leader, Elmer Roper.199

The CCF failed to win any seats in the 1940 election, thus Morrison was the only representative of Alberta workers in the legislature. However, he was not appointed to the 1942 commission. Instead the "six members of the Legislature" who were "named by

Premier Aberhart" included only two Independents and four members of Social Credit.

Despite his exclusion, Morrison sought to have wider input on the commission by raising a proposal in the legislature to have both "employee and employer representation" on the six member committee. This amendment was defeated by a majority vote. One of the reasons for increasing labour's voice was detailed in a "further clause in the amendment" that

198 Legislative Assembly, Journals of the Legislative Assembly ofProvince ofAlberta, 9th Leg, 3rd Sess, vol 44 (1943) at 40. 199 Alvin Finkel, The Rise and Fall of the Labour Party in Alberta, 1917-42," Labour/Le Travail 16 (Fall, 1985): 93. 200 Finkel, The Social Credit, 69. 201 "Edmonton Journal, 11 March 1942," in Alberta Scrapbook Hansard, Ninth Legislature - 20 February, 1941 to 24 March, 1944, 86. 54

"asked this larger committee to investigate 'if the chairman of the Workmen's

Compensation board, Dr. Victor W. Wright, has fairly and justly administered the

Workmen's Compensation act,' and further if he has violated provisions of sub-section two, section 63, of the Workmen's Compensation act."202 The noting of section 63 was actually a misprint. The section actually referred to was 6, subsection 2: "The Chairman of the Board shall not engage in any other business or employment for remuneration."203

Angus J. Morrison further argued that "it was 'his conviction and also backed by legal Opinion' that Dr. Wright had violated" the section under question, and he went onto refer to the "evidence produced at the last session by opposition members which alleged that Dr. Wright was a member of a syndicate interesting itself in a refunding scheme for

Alberta's debt and out of which huge profits were claimed likely."204 Besides his charge that Dr. Wright was in violation of the act, Morrison stated that "among Alberta workers" there was "wide dissatisfaction" with the manner in which the act was being administered.

Specifically "many workers felt" that the chairman, Dr. Wright, should be removed.

D.M. Duggan, an Independent from Edmonton, agreed with the need to investigate the present chairman. However, he argued that if the allegations were in fact proven true then

"the investigating committee could not deal properly with the situation merely by reporting at the next session," but rather it was matter for immediate "judicial inquiry."206 Morrison replied that "a wider committee would be the only one to satisfactorily investigate the board" and that the "railway organization, the Alberta Federation of Labor and the United

Mine Workers of America organization.. .have urged a probe by a body made up of "JCYl legislative members, workers and employers."

203 An Act to provide Compensation to Injured Workmen, R.S.A. III, ch. 284, s. 6 (1942). 204 "Edmonton Journal, 11 March 1942," 86. 205 Ibid., 86. 206 Ibid., 86. 55

Aside from attempting to expand the membership of the commission of inquiry,

Morrison also made suggestions aimed at improving the legislation. He echoed previous demands by miners to improve compensation rates for injured workers by moving an amendment to the commission's report, requesting "that basic percentage rates of compensation be increased from 66 2/3 per cent to at least 75 per cent of earnings."208

Morrison argued, "The time has arrived, surely, when this province must take the lead and show the rest of the Canadian provinces that increased rates of compensation should be paid to injured workmen."209 It was the miners' view that the legislation should both provide for "adequate compensation for injured workmen and their dependants" and "be administered in an equitably sympathetic manner."210 Once again, he made a complaint against the administration of workers' compensation. Morrison stated that the union he represented had "lost confidence" in the chairman of the WCB and that their

"organization.. .is definitely on record, Mr. Speaker, and they have not changed their minds, that this man, Dr. Victor W. Wright should be removed."211 Morrison's amendment was seconded by Roper, who had gained a seat for the CCF in a 1942 by-election in

Edmonton. However, the amendment was defeated and the commission's report was adopted by a voice vote.212 Clearly, the miners' suggestions for improving workers' compensation in Alberta included both the content of the legislation, and, at this stage, especially the administration of the legislation itself.

A few days prior to the debate, Fred Anderson, Social Credit member for Calgary and member of the commission of inquiry, had made a statement which was both

207 Ibid., 86. 208 "Edmonton Bulletin, 9 March 1943," in Alberta Scrapbook Hansard, Ninth Legislature - 20 February, 1941 to 24 March, 1944,57. 209 Ibid., 57. 210 Ibid., 57. 211 Ibid., 57 212 Ibid., 86; Finkel, The Social Credit, 79. 56

representative of the leading role of the miners of District 18 in critiquing the WCB and of

•y « -j the Social Credit government's view of the miners. He stated that it was his

"understanding" that the archangel Gabriel was the "Speaker of the house of angels" and

that if Gabriel was the chairman of the WCB and the other angels were members of the

board also, "in two years the United Mine Workers of America would be raising a

howl!"214 This comment revealed the disdain of the government towards the miners'

concerns about compensation. The government excluded Morrison from the committee,

and then refused to include representatives of employees and employers on the latter, and

did not increase the rates of compensation to 75 percent. Moreover, Dr. Wright, was not

removed from chairmanship and his annual report was accepted by the legislature. This

was in spite of the fact that Dr. Wright and others were actually engaged in a scheme with

the Alberta government for the "refunding of the Public Debt of the Province" in 1941}16

As Morrison had charged, Dr. Wright, as chairman of the WCB, had violated the terms set

down in the 1938 Act: "The Chairman of the Board shall not engage in any other business

or employment for remuneration."217

The new Workmen's Compensation Act became legislation on 30 March 1943. If

the workers of Alberta, like the miners, were hoping to see great improvements, they were

sorely disappointed. The only major change directly benefitting workers were alterations

made to section 44, subsection 5. Specifically, new clauses were added which further

augmented the powers of the WCB. The first enabled the board:

213 No other union was reported in the Scrapbook Hansard to have sent a delegation, nor is any other union reported to have also received a gibe from the government regarding the WCB. 21 "Edmonton Bulletin, 6 March 1943," in Alberta Scrapbook Hansard, Ninth Legislature - 20 February, 1941 to 24 March, 1944,51. 215 "Edmonton Bulletin, 19 February 1943," in Alberta Scrapbook Hansard, Ninth Legislature - 20 February, 1941 to 24 March, 1944,4. 216 Legislative Assembly, Journals of the Legislative Assembly of Province of Alberta, 9th Leg, l9 Sess, vol 42 (1941) at 102. 217 An Act to Amend and Consolidate The Workmen's Compensation Act (Accident Fund), S.A. ch. 23, s. 6 (1938). 57

to construct, equip, maintain and conduct, one or more hospitals at one or more points in the Province as may in the opinion of the Board be necessary or advisable, for the purposes adequately providing the medical aid authorized by section 43 of this Act; and the second enabled it "to establish, equip, maintain and conduct, therapeutic clinics for the treatment and rehabilitation of injured workmen."218 By giving the WCB the ability to create new hospitals and clinics, the new legislation created the potential for improved medical care facilities in underserviced regions and towns. This was an important step forward at a time when there was little medical infrastructure in Canada. However, like so many other aspects of workers' compensation legislation in Alberta, it was up to the discretion of the board. Given that the administration's priority was to keep costs for services low, workers were perhaps not optimistic that the government would construct many new hospitals and clinics.

Indeed, the WCB under the chairmanship of Dr. Wright consistently upset injured

Alberta workers in general and the UMWA-D18 in particular. In Finkel's words, the

"government received dozens of complaints about the parsimony of the Workmen's

Compensation Board" and yet it remained "unresponsive" to them.219 Dr. Wright was an ongoing problem for the miners and they continued to call for his removal. On 3 and 4

November 1944, a delegation of miners selected by the sub-districts of UMWA-D18, met with the new Social Credit Premier, Ernest Manning, and his cabinet in Calgary to place before them a resolution that the delegates to a UMWA-D18 had adopted at a conference held in August 1943.220 The miners argued that they had made repeated presentations to the government about the administration of the act, but had "received no redress," and characterised the current situation as both "deplorable" and "fast becoming unbearable."

218 An Act respecting Workmen's Compensation, S.A. ch. 4, s. 44 (1943). 219 Finkel, The Social Credit, 79. 220 GMA, UMWA-D18 fonds, M-6000-497, "Representations to Premier and Cabinet on Workmen's Compensation Board, 1944." 58

Dr. Wright's offending actions included poor treatment and "humiliation and abuses" of injured miners seeking compensation. More importantly, though, the delegation charged that their members were "being ordered back to work entirely crippled and unable to perform even the most menial tasks by this bureaucratic administration."222 They complained that their:

union had been forced to expend huge sums of money to obtain independent medical reports on some of our members to prove to these misfits the injustices they are carrying on.223

Many miners had been misdiagnosed by the WCB, had benefits reduced, and in numerous cases were sent back to work too early in the recovery period. Many of these men had been temporarily disabled and after being sent back to work became totally or partially disabled permanently.224 These miners' lives were made worse not because of a conflation of disability and impairment in the WCB's evaluation, but rather because the board ignored their actual impairments. Thus, the complaints against Wright and the WCB were not aimed at their understanding of disability, but at their parsimony.

The union's criticisms were not reserved solely for Dr. Wright. They also demanded

"that Mr. Alfred Farmilo, who is alleged to represent Labour on the Board, be removed and replaced by a Trade Unionist who will enjoy the confidence of the working men and women of this Province."225 Aberhart had appointed Farmilo, the former secretary-treasurer of the Alberta Federation of Labour (AFL), as the labour representative to the WCB in

1941. The miners' specific complaint against Farmilo was that he had "made no effort to

221 Ibid., 1. 222 Ibid., 2. 223 Ibid., 2. 224 Ibid. 225 Ibid., 1. 226 Alf Farmilo, as he was commonly called, had early in his life been a socialist and stonemason in Edmonton. Later he became an aggressive opponent of the One Big Union, becoming the revolutionary- socialist union's "chief opponent as a paid organizer of the American Federation of Labour." Thus he embraced the conservative business unionism of Gompers and was a part of the "right-wing leadership" of the 59 improve or benefit the lot of injured workmen," but rather was "merely a rubber stamp for

Dr. Wright in carrying out unjust and inhumane practices that have caused misery and in some cases privation to injured workmen and their families."

Because the WCB did not provide security to injured workers, the miners did "not feel safe at times to follow their occupation" and "had it not been for the war emergency and the counsel and advice" of union officials, "the miners would have taken matters into their own hands long before this date and would have refused to work in the mines."

Despite their grievances, Dr. Wright and Farmilo were not removed; moreover, Wright served his full term until he resigned in 1945. On the occasion the Alberta legislature passed a motion which stated that "in the opinion of this Assembly, Dr. Wright has done outstanding work" and that it desired "to go on record as appreciating the untiring and unselfish work done by Dr. Wright as Chairman of the Compensation Board."229

On 24 March 1947, the Alberta legislature passed a motion presented by Premier

Manning that a special legislative committee be appointed to investigate the workers' compensation legislation; seven men were appointed as members of the commission.230

Prior to this, the UMWA-D18 had given the government a "Supplementary Brief' dealing with the state of coal mining in Alberta. The brief also set forth a crucial demand of the miners and, more substantially, their criticisms of the administration of the WCB. The miners repeated their demand for the rate of compensation to be raised to 75 percent, and pointed out that provinces other than Alberta had already made this change. The brief also stated that there were "two matters of particular importance to labor" which did not directly

Alberta Federation of Labour (AFL) by the time of his appointment to the WCB. See, Caragata, Alberta Labour, 58,72, 141 and Finkel, The Social Credit, 78. 227 GMA, UMWA-D18 fonds, M-6000-497, "Representations to Premier and Cabinet on Workmen's Compensation Board, 1944." 1. 228 Ibid., 2. 229 Legislative Assembly, Journals of the Legislative Assembly of Province of Alberta, 10th Leg, 1st Sess, vol 46 (1945) at 84. 230 Legislative Assembly, Journals of the Legislative Assembly ofProvince of Alberta, 10th Leg, 4th Sess, vol 49 (1947) at 85. 60 impinge on the legislation itself and they concerned "the administration."231

When Dr. Wright retired, Carl Cook replaced him as "temporary Chairman" of the

WCB and Walter Souster Rose took over Cook's former role.232 By 1947, Cook was still chair, much to chagrin of the miners of District 18. They wanted him removed, and while quick to point out that their demand was due to "neither political nor personal prejudice," they argued they were "merely asking the government to carry out their commitment that

Mr. C.C. Cook was only a temporary appointment."233 According to the UMWA-D18 it had "protested immediately" at the appointment of Cook because of his "past environment, and further, as he had already been selected as the employers' representative on the Board, he could not be accepted by labour as an impartial third man, the most important factor of the Board."234 They also pointed out that after their first protest, the Premier had assured the union that the appointment was indeed only temporary. Thus, after more than a year, the miners were still arguing for a more neutral chair.235

The government finally met the miners' demand in early 1947. Charles Malcolm

Macleod became the new chair and Cook returned to his previous role as a commissioner on the board.236 But the board did not replace Farmilo. The miners' brief again attacked his credentials as a representative of labour and posited that he had "never justified his position" on the WCB. Yet, the miners of District 18 were not merely "dissatisfied with his ability to act as an administrator," but, they emphasised, "Mr. Farmilo is not the man who would be chosen from the ranks of labor, if the choice of labor were listened to."237 The

231 GMA, UMWA-D18 fonds, M-6000-502, "Supplementary Brief on behalf of District 18 United Mine Workers of America," 3. 232 Chairman and also a Commissioner of the Workmen's Compensation Board, Appointed, OC 878-45, (1945) AGaz,549. 233 GMA, UMWA-D18 fonds, M-6000-502, "Supplementary Brief on behalf of District 18 United Mine Workers of America," 3. 234 Ibid., 3. 235 Ibid., 3-4. 236 Members of Board, Appointed, OC 54-47, (1947) A Gaz, 105. 61 brief asserted that if the Social Credit government was truly "sincere about giving the voice of labor just consideration on its chosen representative," Farmilo would be immediately removed and labour allowed to "submit their chosen representative to fill his position."238

Farmilo, however, would continue to sit on the WCB until 1955.239 For the UMWA-D18, the labour member sitting on the WCB was a representative in name only because there had been no input from the majority of Alberta's workers. And with the chairmen of the WCB being, in fact, representative of capital, the miners did not believe in the impartiality of the

WCB.

On 30 May 1947, the Alberta section of the Canadian Congress of Labour (CCL) submitted a memorandum to the new Special Committee investigating workers' compensation.240 It set out at the beginning two basic principles as the bases for it demands: "(1) That the provisions of the legislation should insure [sic] adequate compensation for injured workmen and their dependants," and "(2) That the legislation should be administered in an equitable and sympathetic manner."241 Under the first principle, it proposed a number of amendments to the act which aimed at raising compensation and improving materially injured workers. First, it asked that compensation payments begin "from the first day of the accident" whereas under existing legislation payment only began from the first day if a worker was injured for longer than fourteen days.242 It also requested that the Widow's Pension be increased from $40 to $50 per month, and that the "maximum earnings of a workman upon which compensation shall be

237 GMA, UMWA-D18 fonds, M-6000-502, "Supplementary Brief on behalf of District 18 United Mine Workers of America," 4. 238 Ibid., 4. 239 "PR0608, Alfred Farmilo fonds," Provincial Archives of Alberta, accessed 5 August 2011, https://hermis.alberta.ca/paa/Search.aspx?DeptID= 1 &CollectionH)= 1 &st=farmiIo. 240 The UMWA-D18 was affiliated with the CCL and was thus an opponent of the conservative AFL. See Finkel, The Social Credit, 94. 241 GMA, UMWA-D18 fonds, M-6000-495, "Memorandum submitted to the Special Committee appointed by the Alberta Legislature for the purpose of receiving representations and recommendations as to the operations of the Workmen's Compensation (Accident Fund) Act," 1-2. 242 Ibid., 2; An Act respecting Workmen's Compensation, S.A. ch. 4, s. 19 (1943). 62 paid" be increased to $2500. It further insisted that "compensation cover all accidental injuries and industrial ailments, including osteo arthritis and anthracosis in the course of employment."243

Under the second principle dealing with the administration of the legislation, the

CCL eloquently defended workers' compensation legislation as a right rather than charity.

Arguing that the "manner in which workmen's compensation legislation is administered" was "as important as the provisions of the legislation itself," the CCL warned that if the

"fundamental purpose of the legislation is not kept uppermost in mind by those in charge of administration," then the legislation would be administered contrary to the spirit of its provisions.244 In the view of the CCL, "The compensation paid to an injured workman should not in any sense be considered as a donation. It is a right which is recognized and provided by the law through the Workmen's Compensation Act."245 The memorandum went on to applaud the removal Cook, but repeated UMWA-D18's criticisms of Alf

Farmilo and stated that confidence in the WCB would not be restored until Farmilo was replaced.246 Thus, in its opinion, the understanding that workers' compensation was not charity, but a legal right, should be extended to the administration of the act itself. It demanded an equal voice in the administration of the act, so that injured workers would be treated with respect.

Two coal operators' associations made submissions that countered union demands.

They strongly resisted the union movement's characterisation of workers' compensation as a right. Under one section entitled "Representations by Organized Labor," the coal operators offered their critical opinions on the demands of the trade union movement in

Alberta. According to the brief, labour's "list of suggestions for the widening of the scope

243 GMA, UMWA-D18 fonds, M-6000-495, "Memorandum submitted to the Special Committee," 3-5. 244 Ibid., 6. 245 Ibid., 6. 246 Ibid., 6-7. 63 of the Act grows longer year by year," but, in their opinion, the "original concept of the Act appears to have been that it was a form of insurance which was to provide for the basic necessities of life while the injured workmen was incapacitated."247 Yet it now appeared to the operators that the legislation had "moved far beyond that phase and some of the requests being made for the widening of the Act more properly belong to Social Security measures."248 The operators then pointed out that the legislation did "not apply to the community as a whole," and gave the example of farming, which the law did not cover, and which they characterised as "one of the most hazardous of occupations."249 Therefore, in their opinion, until everyone both shared the costs and were covered by the legislation,

"further benefits should be provided not by industry alone," for "one section of community at the expense of the rest."250

The coal operators were essentially repeating the concerns of the manufacturers made in 1918: specifically, extra financial "burdens" on the owners of capital. The basic struggle between labour and capital over the division of society's wealth, which at the point of production concerned wages, benefits, and hours, continued then, in the arena of the state. If injured workers received increased compensation, profits would be reduced as it was employers who paid into the accident fund. As compensation was a legal right, workers and employers struggled over the definition and scope of that right. A narrowing of injured worker's right to compensation would mean less compensation, and thus higher profits for employers. This is one of the reasons why they fought to improve the administration of the legislation was so crucial to the miners and others. They believed that

247 GMA, UMWA-D18 fonds, M-6000-495, "Brief Part II for Information of The Legislative Committee With Respect To The Workmen's Compensation Act Submitted on behalf of: The Western Canada Bituminous Coal Operators' Association and Domestic Coal Operators' Association of Western Canada October 27th, 1947," 7. 248 Ibid., 7. 249 Ibid., 7. 250 Ibid., 7. 64 a biased WCB could very well limit the legal rights of injured workers in practice without formally violating the act, as it had the sole power to interpret the law.

At the end of the deliberations, the special committee produced both a majority and minority report.251 In the debate over the two reports, the concerns of capital, as expressed by the coal operators, were repeated by members of the Social Credit government. N.A.

Willmore, Social Credit MLA for Edson and a member of the special committee, urged

"close scrutiny to relieve industry as far as practicable of heavy assessments."252 More specifically he hoped that the "heavy assessment for compensation levied against the mining industry might be lessened by further attention to accident prevention and thorough rehabilitation of workmen."253 Another member of the committee, A.E. Fee, also a Social

Credit MLA, made the claim that "labor representations made to the committee indicated groups were seeking social security rather than compensation," and he argued that the "act was not intended to cover so wide a sphere."254

A. J. E. Liesemer, CCF MLA for Calgary, presented a minority report that included many amendments that both UMWA-D18 and the CCL had raised during the hearings. It recommended that compensation "be paid from the date of disability when the disability is more than three day's duration."255 It also suggested that Widow's Pensions be increased from forty to fifty dollars a month. Finally, while the majority report suggested no increase above the existing "Wage ceiling of $2000," the maximum was increased to $2500.256 However, the new legislation did not increase basic rates of compensation up

231 Unfortunately, as in other instances, the majority report and the bulk of the evidence submitted are missing. The minority report, however, is in existence 252 "Edmonton Journal, 3 March 1948," in Alberta Scrapbook Hansard, Tenth Legislature - 22, February 1945 to 31, March 1948,32; Legislative Assembly, Journals of the Legislative Assembly of Province of Alberta, 10th Leg, 4th Sess, vol 49 (1947) at 85. 253 "Edmonton Bulletin, 3 March 1948," 24. 254 "Edmonton Bulletin, 5 March 1948," in Alberta Scrapbook Hansard, Tenth Legislature - 22, February 1945 to 31, March 1948, 32; Legislative Assembly, Journals of the Legislative Assembly ofProvince of Alberta, 10th Leg, 4th Sess, vol 49 (1947) at 85. 255 Alberta, Legislative Assembly, "MINORITY REPORT In connection with the Report of the Special Committee on Workmen's Compensation" by A.J.E. Liesemer in Sessional Papers, No 52 (1948) at 2. 65 to 75 percent of wages. This clause of Liesemer's report was rejected because, according to

A.E. Fee, it "would put a greater burden on employers."257 In presenting the minority report

Liesemer had argued "the amendments suggested.. .for these major items do not involve too great a step in advance of other provinces."258 Rather, he went on:

they merely bring us, generally, up to a neighbouring province, and, in particular items, up to several other provinces, so that this step is less difficult for us to take here in Alberta than it would be if this province were actually the first to advance.

This was similar to Angus Morrison's argument made in 1943 that Alberta should finally take the lead among Canadian provinces in the sphere of workers' compensation legislation. Only this time the hope of the reformer was not to take the lead, but merely to catch up to other jurisdictions.

During the final debate, the Minister of Education, Ivan Casey, also a member of the committee, had attacked Liesemer's minority report. And the chairman of the committee, Social Credit Minister of Labour J.L. Robinson, "implied that the filing of the minority report had been a political move."260 Surprisingly, in the face of such hostility from the government and the majority of the committee, the minority report was accepted into the legislature.261 Despite the shortcomings of the legislation, the condition of injured workers' lives improved, and the miners had been central players in lobbying for these changes. In the copy of the minority report housed at the Glenbow Museum Archives, there is a letter written and signed by Liesemer and addressed to "Mr. Angus Morrison,

Secretary, United Miner Workers of America, District 18, Calgary, Alta."262 In this letter

256 Ibid., 2-4. 257 "Edmonton Journal, 16 March 1948," in Alberta Scrapbook Hansard, Tenth Legislature - 22, February 1945 to 31, March 1948, 67. 258 Alberta, Legislative Assembly, "MINORITY REPORT," 2. 259 Ibid., 2. 260 The newspaper article does not give more details as to what Robinson meant, but presumably he was characterising Liesemer's action as designed to criticise the government and gain votes for the CCF. See, "Edmonton Bulletin, 5 March 1948," 32; Caragata, Alberta Labour, 140. 261 "Edmonton Bulletin, 5 March 1948," 32; 66

Liesemer expressed his "great appreciation of the valuable and speedy work done by yourself and your organization in support of the request the tabling" of the minority report, after permission had originally been denied.

The early legislation dealing with compensation for injured workers, in the territory that became Alberta dealt with employers' liability. This legislation was based upon the concepts of British common law that dictated the framework for civil actions by injured workers. Workers who were injured on the job could only gain compensation by taking their employer to court. In 1908, the government passed the first proper workers' compensation law in Alberta's history. It did this by establishing compulsory, individual liability on the part of the employer, removing the connection between the common law principle of negligence and accident on the job, and by reducing recourse to the courts, on the part of the worker, as a mere option. This was a qualitative step in the state regulation of worker-employer struggles over compensation.

The full formalisation and state institutionalisation of workers' compensation occurred in 1918 with the expansion of the legislation and the creation of the Workmen's

Compensation Board. The right to sue an employer was removed and workers covered by the legislation no longer had this option. Employer liability was made collective and levies made on those employers were included in the legislation to cover both compensation and the expenses of the new state agency. The legislation introduced penalties against non- compliant employers, and certain WCB powers represented limited encroachments on the private property rights of capital in Alberta, such as the right to inspect an employer's premises.

From the mid-1900s to 1948, the UMWA-D18 played the leading role in fighting to improve both the content and administration of workers' compensation legislation in

262 A.J. E. Liesemer to Angus Morrison, 27 February 1948. 263 Ibid. 67

Alberta. It initiated the movement for workers' compensation. Militant strikes posed a threat to the capital accumulation process in Alberta, which in turn motivated the government to take measures to ensure class peace in the province; instituting workers' compensation was one of these measures. The miners of District 18 sent delegations to the government to lobby for improvement, and they constituted a significant portion of those who met with the Royal Commissions that investigated workers' compensation.

The miners of District 18 fought not only to improve their specific situation in the mining industry, but also raised demands that sought to improve the material condition of the working class of Alberta. They repeatedly demanded increases in the rates of compensation for all injured workers. These efforts were never wholly successful. Yet the miners, along with other workers, viewed workers' compensation as a legal right; one which they sought to expand, and one which capital in Alberta sought to narrow. In spite of their achievements, workers' compensation was still insufficient in the view of UMWA-

D18. For this reason, the miners decided to create a Welfare Fund to supplement the meagre payments allowable under the legislation. 68

Chapter 4: Creating the Welfare Fund

This chapter investigates the UMWA-D18's Welfare Fund. The fund was developed for two inter-related reasons. First, mining was dangerous work in comparison to other sectors of the labour force and miners were especially prone to accident, disease, and death. Second, the miners of UMWA-D18 considered the provisions provided by workers' compensation legislation in Alberta to be inadequate. Consequently, when they set up the fund, the miners had two distinct goals. The union did not want to replace workers' compensation or other forms of state-provided welfare, but rather wanted to reinforce them. By providing support when the system failed, the miners were essentially creating patches to cover the gaps in the developing social safety net. Another goal was to keep the fund solvent. The fund was not intended to replace current legislation and for this reason its coverage was limited. The union's executive also established regulations to prevent the possibility of abuse by union members. The Welfare Fund is an important example of working-class agency and mutualism. It also demonstrates that they viewed certain state-provided benefits, above all workers' compensation, as a right. Beginning with a brief discussion of the historical reasons for working-class self-help, this chapter then explores immediate impetus for the creation of the Welfare Fun, including developments in the United States. The details and development of the program itself will then be examined.

Historically, the provision of mutual benefits to cover death and health care to union members developed out of the nature of capitalist society itself. In the unequal struggle between labour and capital, workers have frequently had recourse to forming unions. Marx characterised unions as "centers of resistance against the encroachments of capital" that limited "themselves to a guerilla war against the effects of the existing system."264 Thus, unions have been generally "defensive organizations" the design of which aimed at

264 Karl Marx, Wages, Price and Profit (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1975), 78. 69 protecting and improving the conditions of its membership.265 In the late-nineteenth century, the Toronto typographers' union moved beyond merely fighting for more control over workplace conditions and improving wages, to including coverage for sickness, unemployment, and death. These benefits improved the lives of the membership, but were also a "powerful organizing tool" because such benefits were useful in attracting new members.266 Mutual aid was crucial for coal miners. Mining has historically had one of highest rates of workplace accidents and death, and David Bercuson argued that the coal ^)f\7 mines of Alberta and British Columbia "were among the most dangerous in the world."

Thus, as Elizabeth Jameson has pointed out, one of the "first tasks" of miners' unions "was to provide for sickness and death."268 Such provisions helped reinforce solidarity and helped to "affirm a simple sense of decency and human dignity."269 Unions initially provided mutual aid to provide services that the state did not provide. Yet even with the development of social welfare, these benefits continued to be necessary.

Before District 18 established its Welfare Fund, the creation of such a program was left to the discretion of the different bodies that made up the union. According to article

XXI, section 9, of the 1944 constitution of the international union, "Sick, accident and death benefit funds may be established by Districts, Sub-District or Local Unions if desired by two-thirds of the members of the respective bodies."270 However, by 1948, that clause had been removed.271 Further, under the constitution's second article which outlined the

265 Morden Lazarus, Years of Hard Labour: An account of the Canadian workingman, his organizations and tribulations over a period of more than a hundred years (Ontario: Co-operative Press Associates, 1975), 7; Bercuson, Fools and Wise Men, 28. 266 Morton and Copp, Working People, 15. 267 According to Palmer, "in Alberta, over 1000 miners died on the job in the years 1905-45." See, Palmer, Working-Class Experience, 221 and Bercuson, Fools and Wise Men, 2; 268 Jameson, All That Glitters, 91. 269 Ibid., 93. 270 GMA, UMWA-D18 fonds, M-6000-2, "Constitution of the International Union United Mine Workers of America, Washington D.C. Adopted at Cincinnati, Ohio September 19, 1944," 82. 271 GMA, UMWA-D18 fonds, M-6000-2, "Constitution of die International Union United Mine Workers of America, Washington D.C. Adopted at Cincinnati, Ohio October 11,1948," 81-83. 70 goals of the international union, the sixth point had been expanded beyond the 1944 wording. According to the 1944 text, the union aimed "To secure equitable statutory old- age pensions, workmen's compensation and unemployment insurance laws."272 In 1948, the union added as a new goal the provision of "security against old age and disability of members and their dependants."273 These changes to the international constitution did not initiate the welfare fund; rather they acknowledged changes that had occurred in the international union between 1944 and 1948.

In 1946, the United Mine Workers of America created a Welfare and Retirement

Fund. In the United States, as WWII drew to a close, workers made attempts to recover and advance the socio-economic reform movements set in motion by the New Deal. As a part of these efforts, the CIO lobbied for a national health insurance bill. This campaign failed though and, according to Richard P. Mulcahy, the CIO "began opting for a privatized and divided system of fringe benefits which varied from union to union and from employer to employer."274 For his part, UMWA president John L. Lewis hoped to create a comprehensive welfare fund for miners that would include health, educational, death benefits, and retirement pensions. Lewis' aim was not to have different funds for each district and local, but rather one Welfare Fund, which would be effective for the entire industry.275

In early 1946, the National Bituminous Wage Conference opened and Lewis' entire opening speech focused on the need for the welfare fund and criticised the existing health care given to miners. The coal operators, however, rejected the union's proposal for a

"royalty of 10 cents per ton of coal" that the owners would pay into a welfare fund. In

272 GMA, UMWA-D18 fonds, M-6000-2, "Constitution of the International Union, 1944,"4. 273 GMA, UMWA-D18 fonds, M-6000-2, "Constitution of the International Union, 1948," 4. 274 Richard P. Mulcahy, A Social Contract for the Coal Fields: The Rise and Fall of the United Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2000), xii. Leslie A. Falk, "Coal Miners' Prepaid Medical Care in the United States-and Some British Relationships, 1792-1964," Medical Care 4,1 (Jan. - Mar., 1966): 40; Mulcahy, A Social Contract for the Coal Fields, xii. 71 response, the miners went on strike across the United States on 1 April 1946. The Truman government intervened, calling both Lewis and the operators to the White House to negotiate. While a welfare fund was agreed to in principle, the operators did not implement it and the strike continued. Fearing that the strike could harm post-war reconstruction, the government "seized control of the bituminous coal mines, under the War Labor Disputes

Act," putting Secretary of the Interior, Julius Krug in charge.277 Krug ordered the miners back to work, but they refused to go. The strike, and negotiations, continued until the signing of the "National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement," also known as the "Krug-

Lewis Agreement," on 29 May 1946.278

The royalty agreed to was only five cents and further, as a result of "legal conflicts" the fund "did not go into operation for almost a year, and pensions were not paid until

September 1948."279 One of the legal conflicts concerned the administration of the fund. A board of three trustees was put in charge with one representative from the union and from the government; the third trustee was to be neutral. There were disagreements about who would be final trustee and the final choice, a New York businessman, upset Lewis. The trustees finally held their first meeting on 9 April 1947. The agreement also stipulated a that a medical survey had to be carried out in the bituminous industry in order to determine if a medical program was in fact necessary before the fund could pay benefits. Joel T.

Boone, Real Admiral of the US Navy, headed up the survey and delivered a report on 19

March 1947, which came to be known as the "Boone Report."280 The report found that

276 "A Brief History of UMWA Health and Retirement Funds," United Mine Workers of America, accessed 16 August 2011, http://www.umwa.org/? q=content/brief-history-umwa-health-and-retirement-ftinds-0; Falk, "Coal Miners' Prepaid Medical Care," 40. 277 Robert J. Myers, "Experience of the UMWA Welfare and Retirement Fund," Industrial and Labor Relations Review 10, 1 (Oct., 1956): 93; Mulcahy, A Social Contract for the Coal Fields, 8. 278 Ibid., 8; Falk, "Coal Miners' Prepaid Medical Care," 40. 279 Myers, "Experience of the UMWA Welfare and Retirement Fund," 93. 280 Mulcahy, A Social Contract for the Coal Fields, 8-9; Allen N. Koplin, "Government and Health-The Significance of the Coal Strike and Contract in Retrospect," American Journal of Public Health 69,2 (February, 1979): 154. 72 many of the doctors provided to miners by pre-payment plans were selected according to unprofessional criteria, for example holding an anti-union bias. It also found that many of 981 the hospitals and doctors' offices were substandard and unsanitary.

Later on, the royalty on the coal was "increased to 10 cents a ton for pensions,

welfare benefits, and medical benefits" in a 1947 agreement, and later up to twenty cents in

1948.282 In regard to pensions, the UMWA had sought a retirement age of sixty, while the

mine operators had suggested sixty-five. When pensions began to be paid in September

1948, a compromise was reached by establishing the retirement age at sixty-two.

Ultimately, the trustees of the Welfare and Retirement Fund reduced the retirement age to

the miners' original demand of sixty in April 1949.283 It was this program that was later,

according to Lorin E. Kerr, "widely acclaimed for providing high-quality personal health

services at a reasonable cost."284 This also became the model for District 18's Welfare

Fund.

The idea for UMWA-D18's Welfare Fund was initially proposed on 8 August 1946

at a special convention held in Calgary. Among the numerous resolutions passed was a

mandate for the formation of the fund. According to the resolution's preamble "Many mine

workers in District 18 are incapacitated from earning a livelihood, through sickness

(temporary disability), permanent disability, old age and occupational diseases which are

not covered by compensation."285 The inadequacies of state-run workers' compensation

were the main motivators for the miners in setting up a welfare program of their own. Even

though the legislation's coverage was not wide enough for the miners, it remained a useful

281 Falk, "Coal Miners' Prepaid Medical Care," 40. 282 Myers, "Experience of the UMWA Welfare and Retirement Fund," 94. 283 Ibid., 94. 284 Lorin E. Kerr, "Occupational Health: A Classic Example of Class Conflict," Journal of Public Health Policy 11,1 (Spring, 1990), 44. 285 GMA, UMWA-D18 fonds, M-2239-37, "Proceedings of Special District Convention of District 18, United Mine Workers of America August 5-10, 1946," 19. 73

example for them. The union's resolution adopted language similar to the legislation, in

particular the categories for "disability" and injury. The resolution proposed that "a

Welfare Fund be established by a royalty of five cents (50) per ton on all coal produced for

use or sale in the territory of District 18."286 Thus the coal operators would pay for the program. The purpose of such a fund was "for making payment to mine workers and their dependents and survivors, with respect to wage loss resulting from sickness, permanent disability, death or retirement."287 Finally, the administration of District 18's fund would follow that "set up by our International Organization."288

Similar to the American experience, the UMWA-D18's Welfare Fund did not pay

benefits immediately and its terms developed through successive agreements with mine

operators. The fund was formally created by an interim agreement with various coal

operators on 1 October 1946. The financial basis of the fund was to "be established by the

payment of three (3) cents per ton on all coal sold or used by the Coal Operators who are

members of the Associations signing this Agreement or other independent Operators."289

The three cents levy was to begin as soon as the agreement was signed and held in trust

until a "Joint Committee" of the union and the operators brought "in a recommendation as

to the character and purpose of the fund" along with an elaboration of "the rules governing

its administration." The committee's mandate was to investigate these matters and then

appoint trustees for the fund. As was the case in the United States, the committee would

286 Ibid., 19. 287 Ibid., 19. 288 Ibid., 19. 289 GMA, UMWA-D18 fonds, M-5889-3089, "Memorandum of Agreement made this 5th day of December, A.D. 1946 between United Mine Workers of America, District 18, Of the First Part - and - The Western Canada Bituminous Coal Operators Association, Domestic Coal Operators Association of Western Canada, Canadian Collieries (Dunsmuir) Limited, Minute Coal Company, Aetna Coal Company, Ideal Coal Company Limited, Sovereign Coal Company Limited, Castle Coal Company Limited, Inland Coal Company Limited (Three Hills Collieries), Samis Collieries, Bryan Hard Coal Company Limited, and Tulameen Collieries Limited, Of the Second Part, - and - Robert Livett and Clement Stubbs, both of Calgary, in the Province of Alberta, Of the Third Part," 2. 290 Ibid., 2. 74 consist of three board members: one selected by District 18 and a second by the coal operators; these trustees would select the third delegate.291 By early December 1946, the

Joint Committee still had not been formed even though payments into the trust had already commenced with the amounts owed "to be paid into the Welfare Fund on the 25th day of the month for the previous month's production." As a result, the union wanted to go appoint

trustees and develop the administration for the growing trust fund. A new agreement was signed between the UMWA-D18 and the various mine operators on 5 December 1946. The

new agreement reaffirmed the "3 cents per ton" payment and the need to "nominate and appoint" trustees for the Welfare Fund. According to the fourth point of the agreement the

trustees were instructed to "open an account in the Main Branch of the Royal Bank of

Canada, at Calgary, Alberta" to hold the payments made by the operators.293 The trustees

were also expected to "from time to time, and as expeditiously as may be reasonable under

the circumstances, invest.. .in bonds of the Dominion of Canada."294

However, this was only an interim agreement and underlining this was the fact that

the trustees would only be temporary. When the three "Permanent Trustees" had finally

"been appointed and a proper deed of trusteeship created," the two former trustees were to

cash all the bonds invested and turn over the proceeds to the new trustees.295 Yet, the agreement also made provisions in case the permanent trustees were not appointed in the foreseeable future. If after one year they still were not in place, the two temporary trustees were empowered to "administer the Welfare Fund for the benefit of the members of the

United Mine Workers of America, District 18."296 The rest of the agreement set out procedures for replacing an interim trustee, the process for a trustee to retire, and reminded

291 Ibid., 2. 292 Ibid., 2. 293 Ibid., 3-4. 294 Ibid., 4. 295 Ibid., 5-6. 296 Ibid., 6. 75 the parties to the agreement that it was "an interim agreement only and is intended to remain in force and effect only until such time as permanent provisions" were made for administering the fund in accordance with the guidelines of the October agreement.

By the middle of 1947, the three permanent trustees still had not been appointed and with the deadline for commencing the fund and paying out benefits approaching, the leadership of District 18 moved to outline the rules for the administration of the Welfare

Fund. The Executive Board decided to "set up a committee of three to draft rules for this

Fund, as provided by the terms of our joint agreement." The committee consisted of

District 18 President Robert Livett, Secretary-Treasurer A.J. Morrison and District 18

Representative Edward Boyd.299 On 7 October 1947, Boyd presented the draft rules for the fund, which provided insight into the goals and concerns of the leadership of the District

18.

The draft submitted by Boyd is important because it gives a clear indication of the

UMWA-D18's understanding of the nature of the fund. Boyd noted that the fund should be

"made operative at an early date by the payment therefrom of benefits to members of

District 18, U.M.W. of A. for purposes which can be considered as legitimate coming within the scope of the Welfare fund."300 The union was concerned about abuse of the fund. Boyd stated that, "it was not the intent to allow the Fund to be abused by any individual member or section of members."301 Their key concern was the solvency of the fund. Indeed at this early stage, because funds were limited, many injured workers could not receive benefits. As Boyd argued, "complete coverage cannot be extended to our

Al/tli., V I. 298 GMA, UMWA-D18 fonds, M-6000-17, "Minutes District Executive Board Meeting Calgary, Alberta June ll4, 1947," 5. 299 Ibid., 5. 300 GMA, UMWA-D18 fonds, M-5889-3089, "Payment of Benefits From Welfare Fund of District 18, United Mine Workers of America, October, 7th, 1947," 1. 301 Ibid., 1. 76 membership, or in other words 'all considered welfare purposes' cannot be covered on the basis of the 30 per ton assessment."302 Since the American union's fund was also new, there was no current fund in operation from which a "pattern (example)" could be adapted. Therefore, in administering the fund, "a period of 'trial and error' is to be expected, and that in order that the errors which may or will develop from experience be kept down to a minimum, it is suggested that all benefits paid to members be kept down to an absolute minimum for the time being."303 Boyd believed that this prudent course of action would ensure that "the fund can be kept or retained in a solvent financial position."304 It was assumed, then, that as experience and statistics were accumulated "it would be a simple matter to make amendments which would extend to members of the

Fund increased benefits and coverage."305

The goal of limiting the fund to "legitimate" purposes was also connected to the union's basic aim: that of supplementing rather than replacing the state-run workers' compensation program. Spelling out clearly where the miners stood, the report asserted that:

It is certainly not the intention of the Fund to substitute or take the place of any Federal Government or Provincial Government agency or to relieve such agencies of their responsibilities in the payment to members of the United Mine Workers of America any monies coming to them and to some extent guaranteed to them by existing social legislation such as Workmen's Compensation, Old Age Pension or Unemployment Insurance.306

The various components of the developing welfare state were thus viewed by the miners as

Hard-won rights, but they also recognised that need to provide extra coverage for themselves.

302 Ibid., 2. 303 Ibid., 2. 304 Ibid., 2. 305 Ibid., 3. 306 Ibid., 2. 77

Many of the suggested guidelines for benefits actually paralleled the provisions of the province's workers' compensation legislation. In light of "calculations based on insurance stats" that established an average of 130 deaths per year, the union leadership informed members that death benefits would be limited to a one-time payment of $200 "to the widow, family or heirs" to prevent a drain on the fund.307 In regard to sickness, the report argued that benefits should only be paid after the employee had lost thirty days of work and that if this criterion was "adhered to it would eliminate any tendency of abuse of the Fund."308 For those members of the union whose illnesses extended beyond thirty days,

"benefits would be paid to applicant upon receipt of legitimate medical certificate and after thorough investigation" and the amount paid to the employee would be decided by the

"administrators or trustees of the Fund."309 In addition to the concern for assuring solvency and guarding against abuse, it is also clear that the Alberta workers' compensation legislation and the American fund were models for District 18.310

Boyd's report also dealt with the question of old age. It argued that members "who are 'burnt out' in the coal mining industry at an age long before Old Age Pension" would be eligible for benefits.311 Like sickness benefits, eligibility would depend on "medical examination" and "thorough investigation," with the added criteria of "the length of time spent in the coal mines;" similarly, the payout of benefits would be up to the discretion of the fund's administrators.312 For those members of District 18 who were able to collect old age pensions, the fund's benefits were suggested as a supplement to existing government payments. Depending on the province in which an individual resided, he was "entitled to

307 Ibid., 3-4. 308 Ibid., 4. 309 Ibid., 5. 310 Other examples that District 18 studied included the Marsh Report (1943), the Heagerty Report (1943), a summary of the Dominion Coal Workers' Relief Association Glace Bay, Cape Breton Island, N.S. (1947), and an overview of the Imperial Oil Company Welfare Program (n.d.). See GMA, UMWA-D18 fonds, M- 5889-2918, Welfare Fund General Correspondence, 1946-1948. 311 Ibid., 5. 312 Ibid., 5. 78

$30.00 or $35.00 monthly," but they were also "allowed to earn $125.00 annually and still retain their full pension."313 Thus, in Boyd's opinion, "a member of the Welfare Fund could receive $10.00 per month as a benefit therefrom without interfering in any way with the pension payable by the Government under the Act."314

The union's fund also requested examinations by medical specialists. It pointed out that there were "very few instances where local unions operate a specialist fund, but in a great majority of areas no such service is afforded local union members."315 In view of the shortage of medical services for workers, the report suggested that "this service.. .should be extended to our members and should be the responsibility of the Welfare Fund."316 The report stipulated, however, that the fund should not cover hospital care. Boyd asserted that

"in the vicinity of 90% of the members of District 18 are already covered by some type of hospital plan which is contributory."317 Since the members had coverage and the Welfare

Fund was still at a preliminary stage, only later could the question of payment for hospital services be revisited.318 The union, then, was trying to balance the goal of improving its members' access to health services with responsible fiscal management of the nascent fund.

Members of District 18 who were injured on the job would apply first for compensation from the WCB; the fund was supplementary to these payments. Boyd argued that "[i]n numerous instances injured members receive small paltry pensions from the

Workmen's Compensation Boards while the member is still not in any physical condition to return to his employment."319 Still, Boyd recognised that making up for the shortcomings of workers' compensation could distract them from gaining benefits to which

313 Ibid., 6. 314 Ibid., 6. 315 Ibid., 5-6 316 Ibid., 6. 317 Ibid., 5. 318 Unfortunately it is not specified in the report whether such plans were private or union-based. See, ibid., 5. 319 Ibid., 7. 79 the miners were legally entitled. Thus, he felt that "some form of assistance should be granted to such legitimate cases from the Welfare Fund," but that it be "of a temporary nature and should be effective only while his (the member's) claim is being thoroughly investigated."320 Most of all, the union should make a "representation" to the specific WCB in question, and that all "possible efforts should be made and continued to have the respective Compensation Boards accept complete responsibility for the injured

1 workman." It was also suggested that any benefits paid here only be considered at a later 'X'yy date when the fund became "operational" and more data had been collected.

Finally, the report dealt with the administrative and financial details of the emerging Welfare Fund. It asserted that there would be two operational stages in its development, but that they had not even entered stage one. During the first stage it would be "necessary to give consideration to the setting up of a complete organization separate from but closely associated to the District Organization" and "whose specific duty would be to receive claims from the members of the Fund." Those early claims would only cover death, sickness, and specialist examinations, while other costs would include the "the office work involved and possible investigations," along with the data collection and studies.324 According to Boyd, assessments had been collected from 1 October 1946 to 30

September 1947, and adding to that "interests on bonds and cash," the fund total was estimated at "approximately $250,000"325 In Boyd's opinion, the fund was "now in a position financially to stand on its own feet."326

Rank and file members of UMWA-D18 commented on the evolving fund at their

320 Ibid., 7. 321 Ibid., 7. 322 Ibid., 7. 323 Ibid., 7-8. 324 Ibid., 8. 325 Ibid., 8. 326 Ibid., 8. 80 next special convention, but unfortunately, unlike earlier conventions, speeches and comments made from the floor were not transcribed. Instead, the report was summarised and it included only the decisions and resolutions passed by delegates. Two resolutions, though, were passed by the convention which dealt with the Welfare Fund. The first was a substitute resolution that replaced eighteen other resolutions which had been submitted by various locals of District 18. It stated: "RESOLVED That we demand an increase in the

Welfare Fund to 100 per ton," and it further called on the "District Officers to give a progress report on the Welfare Fund to the Convention"327 Local Union No. 2633,

Coleman had proposed the resolution. The reason for raising the assessment was not merely to increase the finances of the fund, but also, according to the Coleman local, to bring the union "in line with our brothers in the U.S.A."328 The other resolution was passed two days later on the 19th and it asked that "every effort be made to commence payments from the

Welfare Fund as at January 1st, 1948."329

However, the substitute resolution left out a demand raised by two other locals.

Local 4685, Aerial and local 7331, East Coulee both insisted on a raise in the coal levy, but also wanted the fund's "administration to be solely in the hands of the Union - operators to have nothing to do with it."330 That two locals raised this request shows that some members of the union were wary of their employers having any influence over the provision of medical benefits, and thus over their health. Certainly, the union-established health benefits were not intended merely to improve the membership's material condition, but also to establish greater autonomy over their lives. However, the influence of the employer over

327 GMA, UMWA-D18 fonds, M-2239-38, "Proceedings of Special District Convention of District 18, United Mine Workers of America October 14th, 15th, 16th, n"1, and 18th 1947," 11. 328 GMA, UMWA-D18 fonds, M-2239-38, "Resolutions Proposed by Local Unions For Submission to the Special Wage Scale Convention of District 18 United Mine Workers of America Convening at Calgary, Alberta October 14, 1947," 30. 81 the miners' conditions of existence was not decreased by the shared administration of the

Welfare Fund. Still, the fact that only an insignificant minority raised the demand shows that most members had no illusions that this was an attainable goal. To expect the coal operators to give the miners thousands of dollars and have no say in how the funds were spent would be to ignore the reality of the labour-capital accord which the Welfare Fund, as a business agreement between the union and employers, represented.

The payment of benefits from the Welfare Fund did not begin on 1 January 1948, but the negotiations about the development of the fund continued. On 14 February 1948,

District 18 and the mine operators signed a tentative agreement. This new deal raised the coal assessment to five cents per ton instead of the union's demand for ten cents.

Importantly, 1 May 1948 was set as the date when the fund "should become operative."

However, the union agreed that "at the present time the operation of the Fund will be confined only to the payment of death benefits," and finally that for a special two-month period, the "trustees and staff will devote their time mainly to gathering data and statistics on which to base the other benefits" of the Welfare Fund.333

At a meeting of the District's Executive Board, held on 24 April 1948, Morrison and Boyd gave a report of recent meetings with operators regarding the fund. It was moved that the report be accepted and that a permanent trustee be chosen. The motion carried. A second motion was then made that the president of UMWA-D18, Robert Livett, "be appointed permanent Trustee for the Welfare Fund with an Alternate to be appointed."334

The motion was carried with Livett as the Trustee representing the miners and with Boyd

331 According to Tom Langford, the coal assessment was raised to twenty-seven cents per ton by 1958. See, Tom Langford, "An Alternate Vision of Community: Crowsnest Miners and their Local Unions during the 1940s and 1950s," in A World Apart: The Crowsnest Communities of Alberta and British Columbia, eds. Wayne Norton and Tom Langford (Kamloops: Plateau Press, 2002), 152. 332 GMA, UMWA-D18 fonds, M-5889-2918, "Notes - Welfare Fund, April 27'h, 1948," 1-2. 333 Ibid., 2. 334 GMA, UMWA-D18 fonds, M-6000-17, "Minutes District Executive Board Meeting Calgary, Alberta April 22nd, 1948," 3. 82 selected as an alternative.335 A new agreement was then signed on 1 May 1948 which formalised both the appointments and previously established aspects of the fund's administration. The new agreement noted that District 18 had appointed Livett and that the mine operators appointed William C. Whittaker, but that a third permanent trustee still had to be appointed by them. Most importantly the recent agreement refined the main aim of the Welfare Fund by adding a new distinction: "It is hereby declared and agreed that the said fund shall not be used as to substitute for or to take the place of any Federal or

Provincial Statutory provisions relating to social benefits, nor shall it be used to amplify such statutory provisions."336 Thus, the fund would not be used to "amplify" pre-existing state-provided benefits. This meant that the suggestion in Boyd's report to supplement old age pensions would not be instituted. The union would neither replace nor supplement the social welfare obligations of the state.

Initially the fund only paid death benefits to families. The trustees investigated all claims and, if they were valid, they could provide benefits. For those members of the

UMWA-D18 "in good standing who shall die on or after the 1st day of May A.D. 1948, the sum of $250.00" would be forthcoming.337 Death benefits also had a limited retroactivity.

Payment would be paid to members in good standing who died between 1 January 1948 and 30 April 301948, but in this case the amount was reduced to $200.338 These different sums of money were to be paid to the immediate relatives, "but only to such one or more

335 This provides an interesting example of the state of democracy in the UMWA, because the president of the international union, John L. Lewis, was also the miners' trustee of the American fund. However, he was not elected to the position, but rather had already appointed himself in June 1946. This was a time when Lewis still practised an autocratic rule by not allowing districts to elect their own officers and appointing his supporters instead. See Mulcahy, A Social Contract for the Coal Fields, 8 and Melvyn Dubofsky and Warren Van Tine, John L. Lewis: A Biography (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986), 114-120, 122; GMA, UMWA-D18 fonds, M-6000-17, "Minutes District Executive Board Meeting Calgary, Alberta April 22nd, 1948," 3. 336 GMA, UMWA-D18 fonds, M-5889-2918, "Memorandum of Agreement made this first day of May, A.D. 1948," 2,4,5. 337 Ibid., 8. 338 Ibid., 8. 83 persons as may have been living with the deceased immediately preceding his death."339

The Welfare Fund followed the Alberta Workmen's Compensation legislation's definition of family. The agreement noted that if claims were made by a "common-law wife, or by an illegitimate child, or children, the practice and formula of the Workmen's Compensation

Board is to be followed by the Trustees, and claims may be allowed accordingly."340 Under the contemporary legislation, no distinction was made between a married wife and a common-law wife, nor between a child of married parents and an illegitimate child.341

An expansion of the benefits provided by the fund was declared in early December

1948. In a letter to J. Elchyson, Secretary of local 7606, Bienfait, Livett and Whittaker were "pleased to announce that the scope of the Fund had now been extended to cover

'Total Disability' and 'Partial Disability' Pensions."342 It was their "hope that this extension of benefits will assist in coping with an important one of the members' problems."343 The agreement, which had established the new categories, was signed on 1

October 1948. The first sections of the agreement set out the financial basis of the new benefits. With the goal of solvency ever in mind the union executive decided that:

the total amount of all benefits paid under this agreement shall not exceed in the year commencing October 1st, 1948 and ending September 30th, 1949 the sum of $175,000 and in any years thereafter shall not exceed fifty percent of the total monies which remained in the fund on September 30th of the immediately preceding year. 344

Further, the initial payment was to be made "in each case for the month in which the application is received," but, unlike death benefits, disability benefits were not retroactive.

lyIU,5 U • 341 An Act Respecting Workmen's Compensation, S.A. ch. 5, s. 2 (1948). 342 GMA, UMWA-D18 fonds, M-5889-2918, Letter to Mr. J. Elchyson, December 7, 1948, 1. 343 Ibid., 1. 344 Unfortunately, like the proceedings of District 18's conventions, transcripts of the actual negotiations between the representatives of the union and the operators were not recorded by the union, only the agreements themselves. See, GMA, UMWA-D18 fonds, M-5889-2918, "Agreement Regarding Total Disability And Partial Disability Pensions, October l", 1948," 1. 84

Thus, the fund had firmly entered into the first operational stage.

To receive the new total disability benefit, a miner had to have been "considered by decision of the Trustees to be mentally or physically disabled as a result of long service in the coal mining, to such an extent as to be unemployable as a workman in any occupation whether in or outside the coal mining industry."345 More specifically, a member had to have already completed "twenty years' service in the coal mining industry as a mine worker or checkweighman," in the provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, and/or

Saskatchewan, and the last five years had to have been in "one or more mines" of those operators who had signed the agreement.346 If these three conditions were met, a member would then receive monthly payments "in an amount not exceeding Sixty Dollars

($60.00)."347 Importantly though, and reflecting the aim of not replacing state provided benefits, the actual amount was to "result after deducting from the maximum of Sixty

Dollars.. .the sum total of any and all other benefits and/or pensions of whatsoever kind received by said member."348 Considering the union's long-term desire to improve workers' compensation, this was clearly intended to be a stop-gap measure.

The same regulations applied to partial disability pensions. Once again miners who claimed benefits had to have twenty years' service in mining. The trustees defined partially disability as "not sufficiently disabled or incapacitated to prevent him from undertaking casual work in and around a coal mine or employment in some other suitable occupation."349 If eligible, a member would also receive a monthly payment, but only:

in an amount which shall be determined and decided upon by the Trustees, and which shall result after deducting from Sixty Dollars.. .the amount the Trustees

345 Ibid., 2. 346 Ibid., 2. 347 Ibid., 2. 348 Ibid., 2. 349 Ibid., 3. 85

consider said member's physical or mental condition would ordinarily enable him to earn at casual employment.350

This amount would be further determined as was the case with total disability, by deducting "the sum total of any and all other benefits and/or pensions received by said member."351 The partial disability pension offered, aimed to provide a measure of help to the miners of District 18, but not to create permanent wards of the fund.

The fund's expansion of benefits improved miners' live materially, but also reinforced the contemporary, medical view of disability. It first did this by following the categories employed by the WCB, thereby legitimising the government's discourse.

Second, it also pathologised an individual's body in determining qualification. To be eligible a miner had to unemployable. But, according to the fund, the source of a miner's inability to be employed was the body itself and not the conditions of work, such as the level of technology or the organisation of the labour process. Thus, the miners did not focus on reintegrating injured miners back into the industry, but on preventing injuries in the first place. This impact on the miner was not an intentional decision on the part of the Welfare

Fund's administrators. Since the WCB was their model, and the fund aimed at solvency, it is hard to see how the union could have employed a discourse of disability radically different from that of the board.

The union's goal to maintain the financial solvency of the fund was also revealed in the other qualifications listed in the rest of agreement. These qualifications essentially introduced a distinction between the "deserving" and "undeserving." For example, clause five underlined the fact that eligibility was to be determined by a means test: "Advanced age and length of service shall not in themselves or in combination be deemed to entitle a member to benefits hereunder but must be accompanied by the circumstance of incapacity

350 Ibid., 3. 86 or disability resulting from long service."352 The fund likewise had an element of moral control. Many unions have historically used their benefits to enforce moral discipline on its membership by penalising members who got ill "from drunkenness or debauchery."353

Thus, clause six stated that "Benefits under this Agreement shall not be payable in cases where the alleged disability has in the consideration of the Trustees, resulted from alcoholism or venereal disease."354 Monthly payments would be terminated when the member receiving them died.355 While this may say something about the union's conception of working-class masculinity or about the influence of the coal operators, it seems clear from the context that such clauses were in part designed to ensure solvency.

Other conditions determining whether or not a member of the fund would receive a pension underline the importance of the fund's relationship to workers' compensation. For example, an applicant had to submit to a "medical examination by a duly qualified medical practitioner approved by the Trustees" and a report from that examination had to be submitted with the application. If it was necessary, a member would also have to submit to further examinations by one or more "medical practitioners," again as determined by the trustees.356 As was the case for Workmen's Compensation regulations, a member of

District 18 who refused to submit to a medical examination would "at the discretion of the

Trustees" either have his application refused or have his benefits cancelled, if he were already receiving payments.357 If any member who was receiving or applying for the pensions was shown to have "knowingly and willingly" falsified records, or made untrue statements "in order to secure benefits," he would be "barred" form getting anything from

352 Ibid., 4. 353 Morton and Copp, Working People, 15. 354 GMA, UMWA-D18 fonds, M-5889-2918, "Agreement Regarding Total Disability And Partial Disability Pensions," 4. 355 Ibid., 4. 356 Ibid., 4. 357 Ibid., 5. 87 the Welfare Fund.358

The decisions taken by the trustees, like those made by the WCB, were also to be based "upon the real merits and justice of each case and no decision of the Trustees shall be binding upon the Trustees as a precedent for any other decision or ruling."359 The rulings of the trustees were, similarly, not to "be questioned in any Court or otherwise; nor shall any action lie for the recovery of benefits against the Trustees or against any employer."360 This clause was not merely a copy of the legislation, but was also obviously included in the agreement in regards to the possibility of union members to abuse the Welfare Fund, and the necessity to protect it and its officers from disgruntled members. Finally, if any member receiving payments left Alberta, British Columbia, or Saskatchewan they had to inform the trustees or face the loss of benefits. Trustees also had the power to create any regulations they "deemed necessary" to administering the fund.361

A view of what the rank and file members of District 18 thought about the newly operational fund is afforded by their next Special Convention, held in mid-November 1948.

Only one resolution dealing with the Welfare Fund passed at the convention. It was again a substitute resolution from the resolution committee, which this time replaced twenty-four other resolutions submitted by local unions. It was resolved "That the contribution to the

Welfare Fund be increased to 200 per ton."362 However, like the previous year, the resolutions that locals sent in demanded more. Many, like local 228, Luscar wanted the assessment on coal raised to fifteen cents in order "to allow payments in line with the

American miners' benefits."363 Other locals, also called for a higher levy, demanding a

358 Ibid., 6. 359 Ibid., 5. 360 Ibid., 5. 361 Ibid., 6. 362 GMA, UMWA-D18 fonds, M-2239-39, "Proceedings of Special District Convention of District 18, United Mine Workers of America 15-19 November, 1948," 10. 88 twenty-five cents rate.364 Local 7331, East Coulee again raised the demand that the fund should "be administered by District Officers without Coal Operators."365 That this was the only local to raise the issue of control shows that it was not a major concern for most members of District 18. Only one local submitted a resolution about conditions determining the eligibility of members for obtaining payments. Michel local 7292, Natal demanded that "the Welfare Fund will carry No Means Test" and that "this ftmd will apply benefits to all union members who get too old or become incapable of following their employment through sickness or injury, regardless of age."366

With only one local criticising the inclusion of a means test it is clear that, as in the case of the employer's influence on the fund, it was not an issue that most miners in

District 18 were concerned about. Only a few miners wanted no limitations on their mutualism, and hence no narrowing of the scope of solidarity. But, as in the case of the

East Coulee local, their resolution ignored the pre-existing limitations of the aims and nature of the Welfare Fund. By not trying to displace the developing social safety net, and needing to keep financially solvent, coverage would have had to be selective in its application. Further, because of the influence of the mine operators, it was unlikely that they would agree to a universal Welfare Fund with minimal criteria for determining eligibility.

In conclusion, UMWA-D18's Welfare Fund was established in order to provide different benefits to the members of the union, thus improving their lives materially.

Because of the dangerous nature of mining this was crucial. The fund's creation took place in the context of the emerging welfare state in Canada. Miners considered Unemployment

363 GMA, UMWA-D18 fonds, M-2239-39, "Resolutions Proposed by Local Unions For Submission to the Special Wage Scale Convention of District 18 United Mine Workers of America Convening at Calgary, Alberta November 15-19, 1948," 19. 364 Ibid., 6, 35. 365 Ibid., 28. 366 Ibid., 35. 89

Insurance, Old Age Pensions, and above all, Workmen's Compensation to be rights. In their view, the state was legally obligated to provide these benefits and, in the case of workers compensation, they had spent decades in fighting to improve the scope, content, and administration of the legislation. Yet they also felt that the aid provided by the state was frequently insufficient and fell short of the needs of miners. The main aim of the fund, then, was to provide benefits in those areas where the state programs were inadequate.

A secondary goal of the fund was financial solvency. By not seeking to replace state-provided welfare, the scope of the fund would, by nature, be limited in its coverage.

Thus, the benefits provided only covered death, total disability, partial disability, and medical examinations by specialists. Also, the finances of the fund would always be limited by the size of the coal operators' assessment, especially in the early stages of its development. Following their brothers in the United States, UMWA, D-18 tried to increase the assessments, but with limited successes. With these fiscal limitations to District 18's mutualism, regulations introduced guards to prevent the abuse of the fund by the union's membership. For example, criteria were elaborated to determine a member's eligibility to receiving help from the fund. These conditions serve to highlight the importance of

Workmen's Compensation in the thinking of the miners of District 18. The Welfare Fund was both an example of the miners' conception of social welfare as a legal right and of traditional working-class mutualism. 90

Chapter 5: Conclusion

District 18's Welfare Fund continued until March 1989. The influence of the union continued to decrease even though the coal industry in Alberta started to resuscitate in the late 1960s. For example, in the early part of that decade only 1000 miners were employed by mines that numbered less than 100.367 And although coal mining continues today, District 18 no longer exists.368 With severely reduced numbers and the end of their historical tradition of militancy and radicalism, the coal miners of Alberta are no longer at the forefront of working-class struggles. Nevertheless, when they were leaders in the labour movement, they successfully achieved significant improvements in their lives that affected the rest of the working class.

The miners of UMWA-D18 initiated the Alberta movement for Workmen's

Compensation. Their militancy influenced the passage of the first workers' compensation legislation in Alberta in 1908. District 18 was consistently the leading voice lobbying for improvements in both the content and administration. However, the evolution of the legislation was not uniform in its effects, nor did it follow a progressive trajectory. The development of workers' compensation at times directly benefitted labour and at other times capital. Many of their victories were partial. The inclusion of industrial diseases materially benefitted those workers who were vulnerable to exposure. The same was true for the increased rates of payments, though the increase regularly fell short of the miners' suggestions. Their demands for improvements in the administration of the various acts, such as the removal of certain members of WCB, were never successful.

Second, employers' influence on workers' compensation reduced the impact it

367 Palmer and Palmer, Alberta: A New History, 287; "United Mine Workers of America, District 18 fonds," Glenbow Museum, accessed 19 September 2011, http://www.glenb0w.0rg/c0llecti0ns/search/findingAids/a rchhtm/umwa.cfm#series20; 368 "UMWA Offices," United Mine Workers of America, accessed 21 September 2011, http://www.umwa.o rg/?q=content/umwa-offices. 91 could have on workers. For example, despite the complaints of one sector of capital, agricultural labourers were always excluded from workers' compensation legislation. Also, employers no longer faced expensive litigation on the part of their employees. A regularised system of compensation additionally helped achieve a measure of class peace.

In this matter, the interests of capital and the state coincided. Yet, the development of the legislation also represented the growth of state power in Alberta over both capital and labour as a whole, insofar as it represented the legal regulation of the conflict between the two. These different factors, then, limited the positive effects of the legislation on the

Alberta working class in general, and the UMWA-D18 more specifically.

This development of workers' compensation in Alberta amends Fudge and Tucker's chronology of the development of industrial legality. The Ordinance of 1900 falls within their first phase of industrial legality, liberal voluntarism (1850-1900). In this period, "the law, especially the common-law doctrines of property and contract, established a broad framework within which productive relations were organized."369 Still, legislation dealing with relations between capital and labour was undeveloped, legal institutions specifically designed for industrial relations were non-existent, and, finally, the courts were irregularly utilised. Though intervention by the liberal-capitalist state had a character similar to compensation for injured workers, and relations between workers and capitalists were largely left up to the spontaneity of the market, the Ordinance of 1900 shows that injured workers were already increasingly going to court. This in turn resulted in greater regulation and intervention by the state. While it can be postulated that the basis of this form of "industrial legality was the individual contract of employment operating within a system that left most terms and conditions to be determined according to the labour market," the 1900 legislation marks this phase of workers' compensation as a transitional

369 Fudge and Tucker, Labour Before the Law, 2. 92

one that was already beginning to develop beyond liberal voluntarism.370

The next significant legislation in Alberta, the 1908 Act, falls within the second

phase of industrial legality, industrial voluntarism (1900-48). Fudge and Tucker's concept

remains valid, but the chronology they posit does not correspond to workers'

compensation as it developed in specific geographical contexts. In their schematic, state

interference in the regulation of industrial warfare grew qualitatively and courts were

increasingly utilised by labour and capital. However, with the 1908 Act, this phase was

already in the process of being transcended. While workers had the option of going to

court, they also had the choice of getting compensation under the act, with negligence as a core principle excluded. Courts were no longer the focal point of relations between labour and capital in the struggle over compensation in Alberta. Rather regulation by the liberal- capitalist state, in regards to workers' compensation, lost its irregular and undeveloped character, and became far more systematic and formalised. The Workmen's Compensation

Act of 1908 was transitional and shared characteristics attributed to either industrial

voluntarism or the third and final phase of industrial legality, industrial pluralism.

Although the Workmen's Compensation Act (1918) as a step in the development of

workers' compensation in Alberta does not follow the chronology presented by Fudge and

Tucker, their concept still retains its validity. Under this regime, the role of the courts was

reduced to a minimum, and the institutionalisation of state intervention increased in

comparison to previous phases. In Fudge and Tucker's original theorisation, their reference

point was to unionisation and strike activity. There was a trade-off for organised workers in so far as trade unions had an officially recognised existence, but such legal recognition

"was, however, conditional upon their willingness to control unruly members."371 A similar

trade-off was made with the 1918 Workman's Compensation Act. The right of workers to

370 Ibid., 2. 371 Fudge and Tucker, Labour Before the Law, 3. 93 receive compensation for specific injuries, arising as a result of accidents on the job, was recognised, but their right to sue their employer was removed.372 This was in the context of the weakened role of courts and increased institutionalisation of state regulation of workers' compensation.

It is important to note that Fudge and Tucker's third phase, with regards to unionisation and strike activity, began in the post-WWII period, while I am postulating here that the third phase was entered, with regards to workers' compensation, as WWI was ending. Fudge and Tucker noted that their expanded concept of industrial legality could be applied to various facets of the liberal-capitalist state that layer and mediate the different aspects of the labour-capital relationship.373 The case of workers' compensation shows that the chronology of development can differ among the different aspects of the state. Hence, the chronological and theoretical expansion of the concept of industrial legality not only implies the existence of various "modalities of legal intervention" in the class conflict, but also multiple timelines of their development. Different regional and local contexts would complicate this even further. These facts require further historical research and theorisation into the developments of the different "modalities," if we are to better understand the historical role of the state in capitalism.

The definition of disability employed by both WCB and the union was what we currently term the medical model. This understanding ignores socio-economic constraints on peoples' participation in society, pathologises the individual body, and conflates impairment and disability. Yet this view was not limited to medical professionals, but also informed the popular opinion. Workers' compensation legislation has historically

372 Except, of course, in the case of agricultural workers who had to turn to the courts for compensation for work-related accident. Since most workers would have found it expensive to turn to the courts, such a compromise was merely formal. However, for the minority of workers who did not find it expensive and did pursue litigation, this compromise would have been quite substantive. 73 Fudge and Tucker, Labour Before the Law, 15. 94 reinforced the medical model by its language. In a similar manner, District 18's Welfare

Fund buttressed the law's discourse on disability. New historical research into the workers' compensation in Canada will have to take into account the historical specificity of both the understanding and experience of disability. Review of WCB case files may provide details on how the medical model shaped impaired workers' lives.

The miner's created their own Welfare Fund as a result of the deficiencies of social welfare legislation in Alberta, especially workers' compensation, and because of the conditions of life in capitalist society. Importantly, the basic goal of the fund was not to replace legislation, but rather to serve as an adjunct. The Welfare Fund represented an exercise in working-class mutualism in the context of an expanding welfare state. For example, when a member of District 18 died, regardless of whether on or off the job, that member's immediate relatives would receive a sum of money. However, because of its basic aim to supplement existing services rather than to replace them, the fund's coverage was inherently limited. Thus, as Unemployment Insurance already existed, there was no basis for extending the fund to include benefits for those with no work during slack periods.

Workmen's Compensation and other state-provided benefits were viewed, then, as rights that the miners had a claim to.

It should kept in mind though, that District 18 was not limited to Alberta, but also encompassed miners residing in both British Columbia and Saskatchewan. As noted at the beginning of this thesis, the experience of miners in these different provinces were left out for reasons of space and time. However, as this study has shown, the experience of the

UMWA in the United States also influenced the formation of District 18's Welfare Fund.

Any future work on the development of the Fund will have to look at the possible influences of the British Columbia and Saskatchewan miners. The reason for this is that even though the leadership and decisions affecting the Fund were made in Alberta, the role 95 of locals inside other provinces should not be assumed to be non-existent. The same approach will also have to be applied to later studies on the development of Workmen's

Compensation in these three provinces. One reason for this is because of the different history of Workmen's Compensation between the provinces. The miners thus faced similar but different state bodies, with different personnel, who provided compensation. Taking this into consideration should enable us to discover if miners had different roles and motivations, beyond conditions of work, in the development of Workmen's Compensation.

This could add to our understanding of the historical relationship of the working class to the capitalist state in general, and more specifically, the role of the miners in the development of the welfare state in western Canada.

The Welfare Fund's secondary goal was to remain financially solvent. This too implied that the provision of benefits would not be comprehensive, but selective and that regulations would be instituted to prevent abuse by the membership. Indeed, if the fund ran out of money, benefits would not be available to anyone. Thus, a means test was included to determine eligibility. Other criteria were brought in that defined the boundaries of legitimate illnesses and which introduced an element of moral control. For example, sicknesses which resulted from the consumption of alcohol or sexual activity were considered illegitimate. Unfortunately, the scope of this thesis prevents any definite statement on the extent to which this may have been an expression of the miners' understanding of masculinity and respectability. Further investigation is required to make any substantial judgement. In the first place, a comparison would have to be made between the regulations of the Welfare Fund and the previous similar funds set up by the different locals. It would also be necessary to inquire into correspondence between the fund's administrators and the locals themselves to discover if any miner had ever been refused benefits on these grounds. 96

It should also be borne in mind that that the fund was an agreement between the union and the coal operators. This meant that employers had an important influence on the expenditure of the fund's money, and that they too would seek to place limitations on the scope of the Welfare Fund. However, only the successive fund agreements exist in the

UMWA-D18's fonds, but not the transcripts of the meetings themselves. To determine

whether or not employers were the source of the moral control clauses, or for that matter

their actual views and importance in the administration, more research into the extant fonds

of the various operators will be necessary.

Underlining the importance of District 18's relationship to workers' compensation

was the fact that the contemporary legislation, and the miners' experience with it, was the other major influence which affected the shape of the fund. Thus, the categories of injury and illness utilised by the fund, such as partial and total disability were taken directly from

the language of the legislation, as were the regulations for its administration.

Correspondence and case files from WCB will have to be reviewed in connection with

those from the Welfare Fund itself and the different locals in order to understand and

analyse the impact of the fund on workers' and their families' lives. This would also help

us gain a clearer picture of the views of rank and file miners on the fund's operation.

Though the miners of District 18 wanted and supported the creation of the fund, some

sections of the union did have criticisms. Further investigation should add their voices to

the historical record and help us better understand the nature, scope, and functioning of this

example of working-class mutual aid. 97

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