7KH+D]DUDVRI$IJKDQLVWDQDQGWKHLU6KL૶D2ULHQWDWLRQ $Q$QDO\WLFDO+LVWRULFDO6XUYH\

Yahia Baiza

Journal of Shi'a Islamic Studies, Volume 7, Number 2, Spring 2014, pp. 151-171 (Article)

3XEOLVKHGE\,&$63UHVV DOI: 10.1353/isl.2014.0013

For additional information about this article http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/isl/summary/v007/7.2.baiza.html

Access provided by of Edinburgh (5 Aug 2014 11:14 GMT) Journal of Shi‘a Islamic Studies Spring 2014 ∙ Vol. VII ∙ No. 2

The of and their Shi‘a Orientation: An Analytical Historical Survey

Y a h i a B a i z a The Institute of Ismaili Studies, London, UK [email protected]

Abstract: This paper presents an analytical historical survey of the emergence of Shi‘ism among the Hazaras of modern-day Afghanistan. It argues that the Hazaras’ Shi‘a orientation is surrounded with much speculation, many prejudices, and arbitrary interpretations. A critical analysis of these prejudices and interpretations reveals that nineteenth and twentieth century orientalists and scholars from Afghanistan have not systematically and thoroughly studied the Hazaras’ Shi‘a orientation. Instead, they often sought to underpin their hypotheses and theories without examining their validity. Their accounts also reveal that they tend to interpret Shi‘a Islam primarily as that of the Shi‘as, while neglecting the Shi‘a Isma‘ili tradition. Therefore, the field needs a fresh review of the existing accounts, and a systematic study and interpretation of the available and relevant data.1

Keywords: Afghanistan; Shi‘ism; Hazara; Ghurids; Shi‘a Isma‘ili da‘wat.

Introduction

This paper focuses on the emergence of Shi‘ism among Hazaras in Afghanistan. It presents an analytical account of when and how the Shi‘a orientation of Islam developed in the Hazaras’ embrace more than in that of any other ethnic group in the country. These questions are addressed through a critical review of the existing theories and hypotheses, a systematic analysis and interpretation of the available data relevant to the focus of this paper, and the inclusion of marginalized voices in the

151 The Hazaras of Afghanistan Yahia Baiza emerging interpretation. In critiquing the existing hypotheses, prejudices and interpretations, this paper also posits that prejudices and hypotheses are the vehicles of every piece of research. In his theory of hermeneutics and historicity, Hans-Georg Gadamer emphasizes that prejudice is the beginning of all understandings and interpretations of the matter of historical investigation. While recognizing the importance of prejudice, he does not agree with the attitude that prejudice does not need correction and ought to be allowed to lead to unhistorical conclusions, i.e., allowing everyone to bring one’s own bias and truth. From Gadamer’s hermeneutic perspective, uncorrected prejudice leads to dogma and ends every interpretation, instead of leading a person to acquire authentic understanding of and insight into the object of investigation.2 Following Gadamer’s theory, this critique is not primarily related to the prejudices and hypotheses dealing with the why and wherefore of the Hazaras’ conversion to Shi‘ism. Rather this critique is concerned with the authorial attitude that attempts to interpret historical events and information in such a manner as to support their arguments and prejudices, instead of allowing historical material to speak out and reveal itself. However, this paper does not argue that the concerned authors’ statements and conclusions are necessarily wrong. Rather it argues that what they say is not the full picture because their focus is too narrow, and excludes other historical and social realities. Therefore, those authors’ interpretations and conclusions remain arbitrary and unhistorical. In order to develop a holistic and comprehensive picture of the Hazaras’ Shi‘a orientation, this paper argues that any valid interpretation must include marginalized and peripheral voices. This paper actualizes this argument within an analytical framework that is based on an open and pluralist epistemology,3 which includes all voices relevant to the matter of this study. This approach encourages researchers to seek and give weight to the marginalized and minority voices and include them in their interpretations. This paper terms this epistemological approach a minority-inclusive epistemology,4 which forms this paper’s analytical framework. It (a) considers and understands the historicity of the Hazaras’ Shi‘a orientation as part of a long historical evolution rather than a single historical event; and (b) in its analyses, transcends the historical material and time, so that other historical realities, specifically,

152 Journal of Shi‘a Islamic Studies Spring 2014 ∙ Vol. VII ∙ No. 2 the thus-far marginalized voices and interpretations, can be incorporated into the emerging interpretation. This paper begins with a critique of the existing hypotheses and interpretations. Then it continues with an analysis of the early Ghurids and the Isma‘ili da‘wat (summons), and their influences on the Hazaras’ adoption of Shi‘a Islam. These are two specific examples, which have made major contributions to the growth of Shi‘a Islam in Afghanistan in general and among the Hazaras in particular, but their voices have remained on the margin and periphery of the mainstream interpretation.

The Hazaras’ Shi‘a orientation: A critique of the existing interpretations

The Hazaras of Afghanistan are one group of the native inhabitants of modern-day Afghanistan.5 Their current geographical location, primarily restricted to the central regions of Afghanistan, is a consequence and legacy of the colonial era. The nineteenth-century Anglo-Russian colonial rivalry and race to colonise the independent states and khanates in South and Central Asia dramatically changed the country’s geopolitical boundaries, national demography and name from Khurasan to Afghanistan. Following the colonial policy, amir ‘Abd al-Rahman Khan (r. 1880-1901), and subsequent amirs, kings, and presidents also transformed the modern state into an institution of structural violence. The state actively imposed, at least until the 1930s and early 1940s, a policy of forced displacement and confiscation of the Hazaras’ and non- Hazaras’ lands and distributed them to Pashtun settlers and nomads from the southern part of the country.6 Under ‘Abd al-Rahman’s rule, the state also forced the Hazaras to convert to , to take shelter in the central mountainous , and to migrate to modern-day Pakistan and . Politically, socially and economically they began to live a marginalized life. Administratively, the state also divided the Hazaras across several administrative divisions, where, with the exception of the , they began to live as an ethnic minority surrounded by majority Pashtun and Tajik populations. The Hazaras’ current geographical location in central Afghanistan is the result of political-historical processes rather than a mirror and unchanged image of the historical past, leading researchers

153 The Hazaras of Afghanistan Yahia Baiza

(anthropologists, ethnographers, and historians) to develop hypotheses about when, how, and why the Hazaras embraced Shi‘a Islam more than that of any other ethnic group in the country. The following analyses reveal that the Hazaras’ adoption of Shi‘a Islam is surrounded with many speculations, prejudices, and arbitrary interpretations. To begin with, Lutfi Temirkhanov refers to a nineteenth-century Russian orientalist, Nikolai Alexandrovich Aristov, who appears to be one of the first orientalists to assume that the Hazaras adopted Islam from the original inhabitants of the area who were Shi‘a .7 Termirkhanov questions Aristov’s assumption and challenges him on two grounds. First, Aristov did not provide acceptable evidence to support his view. Secondly, Tajiks, except for the Wakhan (and many districts from Kuran wa Munjan in the south to Darwaz in the north) region of Badakhshan, are primarily Sunnis and not Shi‘as. Even though some Tajiks who reside in the Hazara-populated area of Day Kundi (and Bamyan) are Shi‘a Muslims, it is not enough to assert that the Hazaras adopted Islam and its Shi‘a interpretation from the Tajiks. In contrast, Temirkhanov asserts that it is the Tajiks who lived in mixed areas with the Hazaras who could have adopted Shi‘a belief from the Hazaras.8 However, the second part of Temirkhanov’s own comment on the Hazaras’ influence on their Tajik countrymen cannot be considered more than mere speculation, since he himself does not support this view with historical evidence. Temirkhanov’s own account of the Hazaras’ religion is equally ambiguous. He comments that the majority of the Hazaras belong to the Shi‘a branch of Islam, except for the Day Zinyat clan, residing in the northern part of the Hindu Kush Mountains, and some clans in Shaykh ‘Ali, who are Sunni Muslims. He further declares the Payinda Khan clan (being subdivided into Dad Khan, Suhbat Khan and Muhammad Khan sub-clans or big families, all belonging to the larger Day Chupan family), of being Isma‘ilis of Shaykh ‘Ali. Furthermore, he describes the Shaykh ‘Ali Isma‘ili Hazaras as a group of Isma‘ili communities whose headquarter is located in a village called Mushrib near the city of Qum in Iran.9 There appear to be two major problems with this account. First, the names of the Isma‘ili clans in Shaykh ‘Ali are not accurate and such clans with Isma‘ili affiliation are not known to the present-day Isma‘ilis from Shaykh ‘Ali. In Shaykh ‘Ali, there are four major clans, namely Day Kalu (literally, Day Kalan), Karam ‘Ali, Nayman (colloquially, Naymu) and Qallugh or Qarlugh (also known as Karlug

154 Journal of Shi‘a Islamic Studies Spring 2014 ∙ Vol. VII ∙ No. 2 and Karlugh). The first three clans have Isma‘ili membership, whereas the last is a completely non-Isma‘ili village. Secondly, when this author asked the Isma‘ili elders of Bihsud, Shaykh ‘Ali and several districts of Bamyan, including Shibar, whether the Shaykh ‘Ali Isma‘ilis or their communities have ever had, or were connected with, a headquarter in the village of Mushrib near Qum in Iran, they all rejected such a proposition. They stated that if it was true they would definitely have heard something about it from their forefathers. On the contrary, they stated that it was for the first time that they had heard such a statement.10 Therefore, Temirkhanov’s account of the Shaykh ‘Ali Isma‘ilis also appears erroneous. His account suggests that he probably did not know much about the Shaykh ‘Ali Hazaras, but built his argument on the basis of other sources, which he apparently did not investigate thoroughly. Temirkhanov could possibly have been referring to a Sufi order, which Alexander Burnes described as the ‘Ali Allahi movement. Burnes narrates of his visit to the Hazaras of north of , somewhere in Bihsud in 1832, that one of the leaders of the ‘Ali Allahi movement, which had followers in Iran and Turkey, started propagating his movement among the mountain people of Hazarajat, north of Ghazni, in the region of Kuh-i (lit. ‘the Father Mountain’). The new doctrine proclaimed by the movement is believed to have described ‘Ali to be the Deity and as such greater than the Prophet Muhammad himself. One of the Hazara chieftains, shocked at the blasphemy of the new doctrine, declared a full scale religious war that resulted in the complete annihilation of ‘Ali Allahi activities in the region.11 Temirkhanov may have mistakenly understood ‘Ali Allahis to be Isma‘ilis, since, according to Burnes’ account, ‘Ali Allahi leaders enjoyed some followers in Iran and Turkey as well as in Bihsud and the region of Kuh-i Baba, south of Shaykh ‘Ali, where the ‘Ali Allahis’ activities and consequent war took place. Apparently, Burnes’ account itself was also influenced by anti- Shi‘a polemic sources, including Muhammad Haydar Dughlat’s Tarikh-i Rashidi, in which Dughlat wrongly attributes certain immoral practices to the Shi‘a Isma‘ilis of Badakhshan.12 However, Burnes’ account of the presence of an ‘Ali Allahi sect in Bihsud itself is dubious. Sayed Askar Mousavi comments that ‘Ali Allahis enjoyed hardly any support and had few followers in Afghanistan;13 therefore, the presence of an ‘Ali Allahi group in the 1830s in Bihsud remains open to further investigation.

155 The Hazaras of Afghanistan Yahia Baiza

Another assumption about the Hazaras’ conversion to Shi‘a Islam is related to a short-lived dynasty with a Sufi inclination, which also acted as a forerunner for the Safawid kings. The Sufi tariqah and the dynasty in question are respectively the Sufis from Sabzawar (Sabzwar) and the Sarbadarids (Sarbadars) (lit., ‘head on the gallows’).14 They ascended to power in 736/1335, when their leader, ‘Abd al-Razzaq Bashtini, killed a local tax collector in Bayhaq. In order to escape the consequent punishment, he organised a rebellion,15 attacked and killed the local officials in the town of Bashtin in the Sabzawar district.16 He managed to hold control of the town, which then became the stronghold of the emerging Sarbadarid state that ruled for nearly half a century (737- 788/1337-1386) over part of western Khurasan.17 About their religious creed, Ibn Batutah states that they were Shi‘as and aspired to root out the Sunni Muslims in Khurasan and convert them to the rafidi (i.e. Shi‘a) cause.18 Ibn Batutah’s information of the Sarbadarids is not a firsthand account, but is rather based on hearsay. However, it is also interesting to note that in expressing his dislike of the Sarbadarids, Ibn Batutah associates the term rafidi, literally ‘rejectionist’, with heretics and with the Shi‘a belief of the Sarbadarids. However, for the purpose of this study, Ibn Batutah’s statement at least indicates that the Sarbadarids were known to be Shi‘a Muslims. Their initial inclination to Shi‘a mysticism supported the growth of in Sabzawar, and it is these Sufis from Sabzawar who are believed to have had an influence on the Hazaras’ Shi‘a orientation in Afghanistan. The Sabzwari Sufis’ influence on the Hazaras’ Shi‘a orientation is not well documented in the literature. One instance where it is seen is in the work of Husayn ‘Ali Haj Kazim (1989), a contemporary historian from Afghanistan, who associates the Hazaras’ Shi‘a belief with the Sabzwari Sufis. Haj Kazim states that the Sarbadarid amirs played an important role in the growth and spread of Shi‘a thought in Iran and Afghanistan. After the fall of the Sarbadarid dynasty in 788/1386, life became difficult for the Sabzawari Sufis, some of whom left Sabzawar during the rule of Shahrukh Timuri (807-50/1405-47), and settled in different parts of the Hazara areas, such as Qandahar, Bihsud, Ghazni, and Bamiyan.19 Haj Kazim does not provide any historical evidence and details about the life and activities of these Sabzwari Sufis. His conclusion is unsubstantiated by facts, and to some extent is based on oral traditions among the Twelver Shi‘a Hazaras. Haj Kazim’s account is interesting and merits

156 Journal of Shi‘a Islamic Studies Spring 2014 ∙ Vol. VII ∙ No. 2 further investigation. However, due to a dearth of data, it is difficult to claim that the Hazaras’ Shi‘a orientation began with Sabzwarid Sufis. Another interpretation suggests the Hazaras converted to Shi‘ism during the reign of the Safawid monarch Shah ‘Abbas (r. 1587-1629). Although the Safawid period (1501–1736 ce) is of great significance, particularly in the institutionalization of Shi‘a Islam in Persia, their influence on the Hazaras is debatable. While the Safawids’ own adoption of the Shi‘a doctrine remains obscure, Temirkhanov rejects the idea of the Safawids’ direct influence in converting the Hazaras to Islam and to Shi‘ism. According to Temirkhanov, the idea of the Hazaras’ conversion to Shi‘ism at the time of Shah ‘Abbas was first introduced by Vámbéry in the 1860s. A century later, the same perception was then confirmed by American researcher Schurmann (1962), who was apparently not aware of Vámbéry’s view.20 Schurmann could have reached his conclusion about the Hazaras’ conversion into the Shi‘a faith under Shah ‘Abbas based on his view that Safawid Persia was the only Shi‘a state in the Muslim world. The role of the Safawid dynasty in converting Persia into a Shi‘a state and its influence on the Hazaras’ Shi‘a belief requires further clarification. Shah Isma‘il made Shi‘a Islam the state religion of Persia21 soon after occupying Tabriz in 907/1501 and declaring any opposition to their religious policy punishable by death.22 However, believing that a mass conversion to Shi‘a Islam was brought about at the point of sword alone23 is not a commonly shared view. Abisaab’s study of the conversion of Persia into a Shi‘a state under Safawid rule demonstrates that the Shi‘a mujtahids and scholars took on the intellectual challenge of converting the people of Persia and part of Khurasan to Shi‘a Islam.24 These mujtahids, mainly Arab ‘Amili clerics from Jabal ‘Amil in Lebanon,25 considered the conversion of Sunni Muslims to the Shi‘a path a noble mission as well as an intellectual challenge.26 However, there is no record of these clerics’ activities in the Hazara areas. Schurmann further suggested that the Safawid rulers converted the Hazaras from idol worshipping to Shi‘a Islam.27 The Safawids’ religious policy in Persia appears to be the key point of departure for Schurmann’s assumption in stating that Shi‘a Islam was introduced among the Hazaras sometime after the rise of the Safawids, i.e., during or after the sixteenth century.28 Temirkhanov rejects Schurmann’s view that the Hazaras, particularly prior to and during the rise of the Safawid dynasty, were idol worshippers. Temirkhanov refers to a book whose title he gives in

157 The Hazaras of Afghanistan Yahia Baiza translation as The History of the ‘Abbasid Amirs, written by Iskandar Beg Turkman in the Safawid period, and states that in no part of the book were the Hazaras described as idolaters during the pre-Safawid period. Equally, the book is silent about Shah ‘Abbas’s role in converting the Hazaras to the Shi‘a faith. On the contrary, the book refers to the Hazaras as Shi‘a Muslims.29 Supporting Temirkhanov’s argument, it is also worth noting that had such a mass conversion occurred under Safawid rule, or an order been issued, it would have been recorded in history. Temirkhanov proposes that the Hazaras were converted to Islam and Shi‘ism after Chingiz Khan’s conquest of Khurasan and Persia, specifically after the conversion of Ghazan Khan (683-92/1295-1304) to Islam. According to Rashid al-Din Fadl Allah’s account, Ghazan Khan, Hulagu Khan’s great grandson and the seventh Ilkhani ruler of Persia, was interested in Islam from his youth, but he did not have a systematic about Islam. Rather his knowledge of Islam was based on his personal inquisitiveness. Fadl Allah states that Shaykh Sadr al-Din Ibrahim ibn Qutb al-Awliya’ Shaykh Sa‘ad al-Din Hamawi had the greatest influence on his awareness of Islam. He further reports that at the beginning of the month of Sha‘ban 694/1306, Ghazan Khan and other Mongol princes accepted Islam.30 Although there were pockets of resistance from their Mongol followers, the army leaders managed to suppress resistance, destroy temples and other spaces of non-Islamic practices, and to convert their people to Islam.31 Ghazan Khan showed an inclination towards Shi‘a Islam from the very beginning of his conversion to Islam, as he often undertook pilgrimages to the tombs of ‘Ali and his sons, and he respected sayyids and Shi‘as, providing them with regular stipends.32 Upon his death, Öldjeytü (703-16/1304-16) followed the Shi‘a inclination of his brother, Ghazan Khan, and proceeded to take severe measures against the Sunnis, who were the majority. Apparently, Ghazan Khan’s and his brother Öldjeytü’s Shi‘a inclination led Temirkhanov to believe that the Mongols imposed the Shi‘a doctrine upon the Hazaras. This could also indicate Temirkhanov’s perception of a possible Mongol origin of the Hazaras who were converted to the Shi‘a path by Ghazan Khan. However, upon Öldjeytü’s death in 716/1316, his son Abu Sa‘id (the first Mongol ruler with an Islamic name) ascended to the throne at a time when the country was threatened by civil war. The young Abu Sa‘id converted to Sunni Islam, and was surrounded by various factions. Thus the Shi‘a inclination of Ghazan Khan and his brother provided

158 Journal of Shi‘a Islamic Studies Spring 2014 ∙ Vol. VII ∙ No. 2 an important momentum for the growth of Shi‘a thought in Persia and Khurasan, but it does not seem to have been the beginning of the Hazaras’ Shi‘a orientation. Temirkhanov’s interpretation, in style and method, is very much similar to Schurmann’s view. Schurman’s assumption was based on the Safawid imposition of Shi‘a Islam in Persia, while Temirkhanov’s assumption is based on the Mongol prince’s adoption of Shi‘a Islam and the imposition of their chosen belief upon their subjects, and that the Hazaras must have been converted to Shi‘a Islam during this time. Sayed Askar Mousavi consolidates Schurmann’s and Temirkhanov’s theories in an attempt to develop a more acceptable picture of the matter under investigation. Mousavi states that both authors could be correct: the process of the Hazaras’ conversion into Shi‘a Islam was begun by Ghazan Khan and his successor Abu Sa‘id and completed by Shah ‘Abbas. There appear to be two primary reasons that led Mousavi to this view. First, he refers to the belief of his research respondents, mainly Twelver Shi‘a Hazaras, whom he describes as respected Hazara scholars, who believe the Hazaras were converted to the Shi‘a path during the rule of Shah ‘Abbas. Secondly, Mousavi refers to Iskandar Beg Turkman’s Tarikh-i ‘Alam Ara-yi ‘Abbasi (The History of the ‘Abbasid Amirs), written during the Safawid period. Mousavi describes the book as the most reliable historical text and says:

The Hazaras were already Shi‘a at the time of Shah Abbas; two to three thousand Hazara soldiers, under the command of Din Muhammad Khan Uzbak, fought against Shah Abbas’ army.33

It is worth noting that, in Tarikh-i ‘Alam Ara-yi ‘Abbasi, Iskandar Beg Turkman gives a different account from the above. He does not refer to the Hazaras’ religious affiliation; instead, he states that:

Din Muhammad Khan in a way desired the kingdom of Khurasan and was not ready to give it up easily, and now twelve thousand warlike and two to three thousand [soldiers] from the Hazarajat are gathered around him.34

Mousavi’s sources as well as those of Turkman, Schurmann, and Temirkhanov, do not provide sufficient evidence to support the view

159 The Hazaras of Afghanistan Yahia Baiza that the Hazaras’ Shi‘a orientation began under Ghazan Khan and Abu Sa‘id and was completed during the era of Shah ‘Abbas. However, such assumptions remain questionable, because Abu Sa‘id, as has already been stated, is believed to have changed his religious affiliation from Shi‘a to Sunni Islam. In addition, as has already been discussed, Turkman’s account does not make any reference to the Hazaras’ Shi‘a faith in the era of Shah ‘Abbas. Mousavi offers another view, which contradicts his earlier assumption, stating that the descendants of ‘Ali (the Prophet Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law and the fourth caliph of Islam), known as the sadat-i ‘Alawi, were the original Shi‘as in Iran and Afghanistan. Mousavi posits the killing of the eighth Shi‘a imam, Imam Rida by the ‘Abbasid caliph al-Ma’mun as the main cause of the migration of the sadat to Afghanistan and further east to China.35 Although the hostile policies of the Umayyads and the ‘Abbasids towards the Shi‘a of both Isma‘ili and Ithna ‘Ashari lineages and their followers are well recorded in history, one would need further evidence and historical proof to claim that the descendents of ‘Ali were the original Shi‘as in Afghanistan and that their migration to Khurasan and further east also influenced the Hazaras’ Shi‘a belief. To sum up, the presented analyses and discussions demonstrate the complexity involved in the study of the Hazaras’ Shi‘a orientation in Afghanistan. The above authors do not explicitly examine the validity and legitimacy of their claims and conclusions. As a result, their conclusions at best may be regarded as statements that point out specific aspects rather than the full picture itself. It is true that the era of Ghazan Khan and his brother Öldjeytü Khan, as well as the eras of the Sarbadarids and Safawids, are relevant in the overall development of Shi‘a Islam in Persia and Khurasan, but they are only parts of the picture. In order to create a holistic picture, other historical realities, which have been kept in the margin thus far, must be included. The following sections study and present an interpretation of the role and influence of the early Ghurid chieftains and the Isma‘ili da‘wat and da‘is (summoners) on the Hazaras’ conversion to Shi‘a Islam.

160 Journal of Shi‘a Islamic Studies Spring 2014 ∙ Vol. VII ∙ No. 2

The Ghurids: the early partisans of ‘Ali

If, in the early beginning of Islam, particularly after the Prophet’s death, Shi‘ism meant or was associated with loyalty to ‘Ali, then the Ghurid chieftains and their subjects belong to the first partisans (shi‘at) of ‘Ali in Khurasan. In the current map of Afghanistan, Ghur is located in the central-western part of Afghanistan. Historically, Ghur and its adjacent areas have served as an important Hazara region. The Ghurid rulers attracted historians’ attention when the fast- marching Arab armies invaded Persia and overthrew the Sasanid dynasty. In 22/643, the Arab armies defeated the last Sasanid king Yazdigird III (633-51), who fled to Khurasan along with a group of Sasanid nobles. According to the historical records, Mahawi Suri from the Shansabanian family, one of Yazdigird’s governors in Marw, ordered the killing of Yazdigird III. Minhaj Siraj Juzjani states that Mahawi Dihqan killed Yazdigird III in a mill.36 Petrushevskii views Mahawi’s desire to be the new Sasanid khusraw (emperor) as a key reason for his order to kill Yazdigird. Petrushevskii further adds that Mahawi incited the Turks from the region against Yazdgird III, who, after losing his last army, escaped to Marw, where at Mahawi’s order Yazdigird was refused entry to the city. He was then forced to take refuge in a mill outside the city, where he was killed by a miller, and probably at Mahawi’s order.37 Meanwhile, Khurasan lacked a centralized political administration and a united army. Local resistance against the Arab armies began in 32/653, almost a decade after the killing of Yazdigird III. Resistance began with an offensive under the command of a local leader, Qaran Hirati (Herati, also known as Qaran Khurasani), who attacked the Arab armies in and defeated the Arab commander of the region, Rabi‘ ibn Ziyad, and expelled him from Sistan. The reorganized themselves and recaptured Nishapur, where Qaran Hirati was killed.38 Resistance, attacks, and counter-attacks continued for several decades between the Arab and the Khurasanian armies. The Arabs’ invasion of Khurasan and the Ghurids’ political ambitions led to the emergence of the nucleus of what later came to be termed the Shi‘a interpretation of Islam in this region. In order to reach a peace deal with the Arab commanders in Marw, and to protect his local independence, Mahawi Suri took a group of Ghurid nobilities on a journey to Kufah to gain first-hand knowledge of the religion of the Arab

161 The Hazaras of Afghanistan Yahia Baiza armies from their caliph and commander-in-chief ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib (r. 35-40/656-61). Mahawi Suri and his companions met the caliph, paid their allegiance to him and converted to Islam. Tabari presents two accounts that describe the date and the content of this event. First, he narrates this event on the authority of Abu Ja‘far who states that ‘in this year [during the Siffin War in 657 ad], Mahuyah [Mahawi Suri], came to ‘Ali and confirmed the peace he reached with Ibn Amirah [an Arab commander in Khurasan]’. Secondly, Tabari reports from Ishaq, who states that Mahuyah, the governor of Marw, came to ‘Ali after the war of Jamal and ‘Ali wrote to the dihaqin (sing. dihqan), elites and commanders of Marw:

In the name of God, the most Merciful, the most Benevolent. Peace be to everyone who is a follower of guidance,

Governor Mahuyah has come to me, and I am happy with him. Written in the year 36 [657].39

The above account reveals that much of the contents of the meeting and ‘Ali’s letter had been lost by the time the news of the event reached Tabari. However, the few sentences that are narrated by Tabari explain a number of important points. First, his report confirms that the Ghurid chieftains met with the caliph. Secondly, ‘Ali was pleased with the fact that the Ghurid chieftains undertook a journey of a considerable distance, from Ghur and Marw in Khurasan to Kufah, the capital of the caliphate. ‘Ali’s satisfaction with the intention of the Ghurid chieftains is expressed in the letter. Thirdly, ‘Ali refers to Mahawi Suri as a governor, which is a political as well as an administrative position. This meant that the Ghurid chiefs managed to retain their independence and could rule as local governors in their area of influence. Fourthly, Tabari’s narration indicates that the letter was addressed to the dihaqin, elites and the commanders of Marw. This demonstrates that the authority ‘Ali bestowed upon Mahawi and his companions would have been recognized by the local Khurasanian and the Arab authorities and military commanders. Fifthly, it may be assumed that the meeting between the Ghurid nobles and ‘Ali only have been arranged with the agreement and support of ‘Ali’s chief commanders and governors of Khurasan, Ibn Amirah and Ja‘dah ibn Hubayrah al-Makhzumi. Unless an agreement of peace and mutual consent had been reached between the two parties in Khurasan, Ghurid

162 Journal of Shi‘a Islamic Studies Spring 2014 ∙ Vol. VII ∙ No. 2 chieftains could hardly have visited the caliph. Therefore, the meeting could have been a bonus for the Ghurid chieftains, who would have been equally keen to visit the caliph and to gather first-hand knowledge about the leadership and religious belief of the Arab armies. Thus the peace agreement and cordial relationship between the Arab chief commander in Khurasan and the meeting with the caliph not only secured the Ghurid local independence, but also marked the first milestone in the emergence of ‘Ali’s supporters (Shi‘as) in Khurasan. Historians of later generations confirmed and further elaborated the Ghurids’ visit to Kufah and loyalty to ‘Ali. Juzjani – the prominent Ghurid historian – in his Tabaqat-i Nasiri (603/1205) states that the Ghurid leader from the Shansabanian family converted to Islam, and received a mandate and standard from the Caliph ‘Ali. He further adds that every ruler from that family who ascended to the throne would receive the covenant, which the Commander of the Faithful (amir al-mu’minin), ‘Ali, had written, and he would agree to abide by it, after which he would legally become king.40 At this stage, the Ghurids’ Shi‘a orientation and the term Shi‘a itself did not mean a distinct theological or jurisprudential school of thought. Rather, as Ja‘fari states, in its early emergence, the term Shi‘a meant and could be understood in its literal meaning as a party, followers, group, associates, or a more broader connotation of ‘supporters’ of Ali.41 Thus one can safely argue that the Ghurid chiefs and their followers were the first supporters of ‘Ali, thereby making the Hazara, Tajik, and Turkoman-populated regions in Khurasan a friendly land for the later development of Shi‘a path. The Ghurid rulers developed a distinct ‘Alid and the early Shi‘a (pro- ‘Ali) identity. They demonstrated their ‘Alid/Shi‘a identity by resisting the Umayyads for ninety-two years from Khurasan. Ghurid rulers, after the death of ‘Ali in 40/661, refused to obey the Umayyad governors who demanded the denunciation of ‘Ali from the pulpits of mosques and persecuted his partisans, known as the shi‘at ‘Ali. Throughout the ninety-two years of the (40-132/661-753), the Ghurids maintained their allegiance to ‘Ali and the Prophet’s household as their distinct identity that distinguished them from their fellow subverted Khurasanian and Persian neighbours as well as from the Arab occupiers. The Umayyads lost their power and authority in Khurasan and the governance of the Muslim world soon after the rise of Abu Muslim Khurasani (d. c. 755). The Ghurids’ ninety-two years of resistance proved

163 The Hazaras of Afghanistan Yahia Baiza that the local people in Khurasan were capable of facing the Arab empire and could even defeat them. The Ghurids joined Abu Muslim Khurasani from the Balkh region, between Qataghan and Badakhshan of modern- day Afghanistan. Abu Muslim organized a strong army and consolidated his power in the Balkh-Marw region in Khurasan in 129/750, and launched a revolution against Umayyad rule. He ended the political crisis and the tribal kingdoms in Khurasan, overthrew the Umayyad dynasty, and installed the ‘Abbasids on the throne of the Muslim caliphate.42 Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabataba’i describes Abu Muslim’s movement as a Shi‘a rebellion. He even goes on to state that Abu Muslim offered the caliphate to Imam Ja‘far al-Sadiq (d. 765), but the Imam refused Abu Muslim’s proposal.43 However, others like Husayn Isma‘ili give a Sunni interpretation of Abu Muslim’s revolution, since his movement was connected with Ibrahim, the grandson of ‘Abbas, the Prophet’s uncle,44 and the ‘Abbasid caliphs ultimately became a Sunni dynasty. While Abu Muslim’s story continues to have both Sunni and Shi‘a interpretations, his revolution and victory over the Umayyads eased pressure on the Ghurid chiefs who took part in Abu Muslim’s movement. Later, the Ghurids defeated the Ghaznawids (997-1186) with the support of the Isma‘ili da‘is and communities of Afghanistan, established their independent dynasty and sultanate (1009-1215), and ruled beyond the mountains of Ghur. Although the Ghurid sultans’ religious identity oscillated between Shi‘a Isma‘ili, Karrami, Shafi‘i and Hanafi45 over the course of their sultanate in Khurasan and India, the early Ghurid chieftains and Abu Muslim’s revolution played an important role in creating fertile ground for the emergence and growth of Shi‘a supporters in Khurasan in general and in the Hazara, Tajik, and Turkic-populated regions of Herat, Ghur, Gharjistan, and Marw in particular.

The Isma‘ili da‘wat and the Hazaras’ Shi‘a orientation in Afghanistan

The Isma‘ili da‘wat system and da‘is, with an active da‘wat mission from the ninth to the seventeenth century, were major contributors to the flourishing of Shi‘a thought in Afghanistan. The literature, however, flatly ignores the contribution and the voice of the Isma‘ili da‘wat in the evolution of Shi‘a history in this region. The Isma‘ili da‘wat represented

164 Journal of Shi‘a Islamic Studies Spring 2014 ∙ Vol. VII ∙ No. 2 the most organized and highly disciplined Shi‘a school, which led to the systematic propagation and spread of Shi‘a belief, in its Isma‘ili interpretation, across Afghanistan, particularly in the Hazara areas.46 The very first Isma‘ili da‘wat mission in Afghanistan began in an area that is a traditional homeland of the Hazara people. It started ad hoc, when an Isma‘ili da‘i, named Ghiyath, fled from Persia to Khurasan at the end of the 3rd/9th century. When a certain Sunni cleric, al-Zafarani, incited public opinion against him, Ghiyath left his chief deputy, the famous theologian-philosopher, Abu Hatim Ahmad b. Hamdan al- Razi, in charge of Rayy, and he himself fled to Marw around the end of the 3rd/9th century.47 He started his da‘wat mission in Marw al-Rudh, present-day Bala Murghab, in the north-western province of Badghis in Afghanistan. Thereafter, the Isma‘ili da‘wat found a firm foothold in Afghanistan. Ghiyath managed to convert Amir al-Husayn ibn ‘Ali al- Marwazi (Marwarudi) to the Isma‘ili faith. Al-Marwazi held great power over the areas of Maymanah, Taliqan, Ghur, Gharjistan, and Herat.48 It is also believed that he succeeded in converting people under his rule to the Isma‘ili faith.49 This would mean that the Tajiks and the Turks, alongside the Hazaras, were also among the first Isma‘ili converts. The next generations of Isma‘ili da‘is included the prominent da‘i-philosopher Muhammad ibn Ahmad Nasafi, his son Hasan Mas‘udi (nicknamed Dihqan), Abu Ya‘qub Sijistani,50 and . The latter occupies a special place in the history of the Isma‘ili da‘wat in Khurasan. Despite facing constant challenges, persecution, and harassment at the hands of the dominant Sunni clerics and rulers, Nasir Khusraw transformed the Isma‘ili da‘wat into an organized system, the legacy of which has lasted until today. In addition, he was the first prominent Fatimid da‘i to write his poetry and prose in Persian, and he made a significant contribution to the renaissance and development of Persian literature and language, known as Persian- (Farsi-Dari) in Afghanistan.51 After the death of the Fatimid Caliph-Imam Mustansir bi-Allah (bi’llah) in Cairo in 487/1094, the issue of succession to the caliphate- imamate divided the Isma‘ilis into two branches known as the Musta‘lawi and the Nizari. While Musta‘li continued to rule the Fatimid state in Cairo, the Nizari Isma‘ilis founded a new state in Alamut, Persia (1090- 1256). However, after the fall of Alamut in 1256, life became difficult for Isma‘ilis in Persia and Khurasan. Although many Isma‘ili communities across Persia and Khurasan had to convert to either Sunni or Shi‘a

165 The Hazaras of Afghanistan Yahia Baiza

Ithna ‘Ashari creeds, a significant number of Isma‘ilis maintained their resilience and loyalty to their Isma‘ili faith. Four hundred years after the death of Nasir Khusraw, Sayyid Suhrab Wali Badakhshani, an Isma‘ili writer, revised Nasir Khusraw’s teachings and wrote a concise treatise on the principles of Isma‘ili theosophy (hikmat). According to Ivanow, the treatise, called Si wa Shash Sahifah (Thirty-Six Epistles), was probably written in 856-7/1452-3, and is largely based on Nasir Khusraw’s works but contains less originality.52 During the same period of time, the Isma‘ili Imam Mustansir bi-Allah (bi’llah) II (868-881/1464-1476) and his followers gained considerable temporal power and prestige during the rule of Shah Isma‘il Safawi, who honoured the Isma‘ili scholars by sending them khalats (robes of honour). The Isma‘ili imams appear to have built upon this momentum by intensifying their efforts to reorganize the life of the community and revive the Alamut doctrine of qiyamat (spiritual resurrection). The Nizari Isma‘ili Qasim-Shahi imam, Nur al-Din ‘Ali (922-957/1516-1550), appointed Khwajah Sultan Husayn Ghuriyani Hirati as a da‘i for Herat and the adjacent region of Afghanistan,53 which apparently included the Hazaras’ traditional homeland, including Ghuriyan of Herat, Ghur, Gharjistan, and Badghis. Around the same time, Abu Ishaq Quhistani (d. after 904/1498) and Khwajah Muhammad Rida, who is better known as Khayr-khwah Hirati (d. after 960/1553), revived the Alamut doctrine of qiyamat, dealing with the Isma‘ili esoteric interpretation of the shari‘ah and religious rituals. Khayr-khwah was an Isma‘ili da‘i, poet and a prolific writer. After succeeding his father, Khwajah Sultan Husayn Ghuriyani Hirati, and by becoming a new da‘i, he revised Abu Ishaq Quhistani’s Haft Bab (Seven Chapters), which is now presented as one of Nasir Khusraw’s works, -i (The Words of the Spiritual Master), and is revered as a sacred text among the Badakhshani54 and the Hazara Isma‘ilis in Afghanistan. The Isma‘ilis continued their religious activities under their hereditary local pirs, who were appointed by the Isma‘ili imams of the time. The Hazara Ithna ‘Ashari and Isma‘ili populations of Afghanistan also experienced extreme suppression and marginalization at the hands of Pashtun and Sunni amirs in modern times. Amir ‘Abd al-Rahman Khan (1880-1901) and the Taliban brutally massacred the Hazara Shi‘a populations of Afghanistan and forced them to convert to Sunni Islam or emigrate.55 Despite these periodic challenges and this structural violence, the Hazaras maintained their Shi‘a orientation and presence

166 Journal of Shi‘a Islamic Studies Spring 2014 ∙ Vol. VII ∙ No. 2 in Afghanistan, and continued their Shi‘a (Ithna ‘Ashari and Isma‘ili) religious practices. Since the fall of the Taliban in November 2001, the political and social climate has changed in favour of ethnic and religious minorities and this has benefitted the development of the Hazara and Shi‘a as well as other marginalized communities in Afghanistan. In 2002, the 49th hereditary Isma‘ili imam of the time, Shah Karim al-Husayni Aga Khan IV, introduced modern Isma‘ili institutions to Afghanistan, such as the Aga Khan Development Network, the Isma‘ili National Council, and the Isma‘ili Tariqa and Board. Like the da‘wat system of the old time, these modern Isma‘ili institutions also represent an organized system that is guided by the Isma‘ili imam. At the same time, the Hazara Ithna ‘Asharis continue the development of their religious rituals, practices, and other social activities under their local religious and political leaders, scholars, and through public and private general and madrasah educational systems.

Conclusion

This paper concludes that the Hazaras’ Shi‘a orientation is far from being a historical event. It demonstrates that one particular event in history cannot explain, at least adequately, how and when the Hazaras adopted Shi‘a Islam. Although the individual interpretations analysed in this paper make their contributions to the debate, they fail to incorporate other historical realities. This paper highlights the fact that these authors often adopt an attitude of interpreting historical materials in such a manner as to support their prejudices, arguments, and hypotheses instead of allowing the historical information to reveal itself. Therefore, their interpretation is not a full picture or a complete understanding of the matter. Hermeneutically speaking, the critiques in this paper do share a common point of interest with the reviewed literature concerning the Hazaras’ conversion to Shi‘a Islam. This common interest is defined by the shared ‘meaning and understanding’ of the matter itself. However, this paper differs from the reviewed works in that it approaches the subject matter from a different and a fresh theoretical and epistemological perspective, particularly by developing a case for minority-inclusive epistemology. This perspective becomes the means for giving importance

167 The Hazaras of Afghanistan Yahia Baiza to and including the voice of the early Ghurids and the Isma‘ili da‘wat, which have been excluded and marginalized from the ‘mainstream’ interpretation. Certainly, there are other unheard voices that could be included in this debate. Therefore, this paper encourages other researchers to make their contributions to this and similar debates by applying the minority-inclusive epistemology. As a final thought, the question is whether the evolution of the Hazars’ Shi‘a orientation has reached its end or not. To address this question, this paper demonstrates that the Hazaras’ Shi‘a orientation evolved through a long historical process, in which competing local-global political-cultural elements, and peoples’ loyalty to, and participation in, the Shi‘a religious rituals and practices, played crucial roles. The current Shi‘a communities in Afghanistan are the product of over a millennium long historical evolution, during which the Hazaras either freely adopted the Shi‘a interpretation of Islam, or in certain periods, were forced to convert to Sunni Islam. It is only within the context of this evolving historical process that the idea of Shi‘a Islam as an evolving and living tradition can be made meaningful and relevant to the life of people who subscribe to the notion of Shi‘a interpretation of Islam in one form or another. Therefore, as long as these two factors (local-global political- cultural developments and the people’s participation in Shi‘a practices) remain active, the Shi‘a interpretation of Islam too will remain subject to further evolution.

Notes

1 I would like to thank my friends Jamil Kassam, doctoral candidate at the University of Chicago, and Russell Harris, researcher and editor at The Institute of Ismaili Studies, for proof-reading and commenting on the first and second drafts of this paper, respectively. 2 H-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2nd ed. (London: Continuum, 2004), 271-85. 3 This approach is based on Mohammed Arkoun’s open pluralistic epistemology to which he refers as the Emerging Reason, and calls for the inclusion of marginal and peripheral voices in interpretation. See M. Arkoun, To Reform or to Subvert? (London: Saqi Essentials, 2006), 10-11, 37, 42-3. 4 This epistemological approach has been discussed in full detail in this author’s forthcoming book, Y. Baiza, The Hazara Ismailis of Afghanistan: Their History, Religious

168 Journal of Shi‘a Islamic Studies Spring 2014 ∙ Vol. VII ∙ No. 2

Rituals and Practices (2015). 5 For a full analysis of the Hazaras’ ethnic origin, see S. A. Mousavi, The Hazaras of Afghanistan: An Historical, Cultural, Economic and Political Study (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 1998) and Baiza, The Hazara Ismailis of Afghanistan. 6 For further details, see Y. Baiza, Education in Afghanistan: Developments, Influences and Legacies (London: Routledge, 2013), 14-31. 7 Temirkhanov, L., Tarikh-i Milli-yi Hazarah [The National History of the Hazara] (Qum: Mu’allif, 1993), 44. 8 Ibid., 44. 9 Ibid., 43. 10 Personal interview with elders of various Shi‘a Isma‘ili Hazara communities in , Afghanistan, June 2010. 11 A. Burnes, Travels into Bokhara II (London: John Murray, 1835), 154. 12 Burnes accuses the ‘Ali Allahis of having sexual orgies in the dark, for which they were named ‘chiragh-kush’, or ‘lamp-killers’. Ibid. Obviously, he did not observe such a ceremony, but rather wrote his account of the ‘Ali Allahis on the basis of gossip and perhaps influenced by the account of Dughlat and others who wrote polemic accounts about other smaller Shi‘a sects. For further discussion on this subject, see M. H. Dughlat, Tarikh-i Rashidi, trans. and annotation W. M. Thackston (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1996), 146. 13 Mousavi, The Hazaras of Afghanistan, 78. 14 There are two cities by the name of Sabzawar, one in Herat, Afghanistan, and one in the north-eastern Iran. The Sabzawar (Sabzwar) of Herat derives its name from its geographical location, lying along the Harut River in Herat. The name Sabzwar means Greenland. In the late 1950s, under Prime Minister Muhammad Daoud’s Pashtunization policy, the name of the place was changed from Sabzwar to Shin Dand, which is composed of two Pashto words: shin (green) and dand (lake), i.e., Green Lake, or a green area lying along and around a lake. Although both Sabzwar cities (in Afghanistan and Iran) may have had a common history in the past, the Sabzwar Sufi circles were primarily located in the present north-eastern Iran, from where they are then believed to have moved to Afghanistan and settled among the Hazaras. 15 C. P. Melville, ‘SarbadÁrids’, in Encyclopaedia of Islam (new edition) IX, ed. C. E. Bosworth et al. (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 47-49. 16 J. M. Smith, Jr., The History of the Sarbadar Dynasty, 1336-1381 A.D., and its Sources (The Hague: Mouton, 1970), 103. 17 A. A. Dehkuda, ‘Sarbadar’, in Lughat Namih-yi Dihkhuda XXI (Tehran: Chapkhanih- yi Majlis, 1973), 418. 18 A. A. M. Ibn Batutah, The Travels of Ibn BaÔÙÔa, A.D. 1325-1354 (New York: The

169 The Hazaras of Afghanistan Yahia Baiza

Syndics of the Cambridge University Press, 1971), 575. 19 H. A. Haj-Kazim, Pizhuhishi dar Tarikh-i Hazara-ha [An Investigation into the Hazaras’ History] (Iran: Chapkhanih-yi Mahtab, 1989), 47-48. 20 Temirkhanov, Tarikh-i Milli-yi Hazarah, 45. 21 H. F. Schurmann, The Mongols of Afghanistan: An ethnography of the Moghôls and related peoples of Afghanistan (The Hague: Mouton, 1962), 120. 22 D. Morgan, Medieval Persia, 1040-1797 (London: Longman, 1988), 121. 23 Ibid. 24 R. J. Abisaab, Converting Persia: Religion and Power in the Safawid Empire (New York: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd, 2004), 39-40. 25 Morgan, Medieval Persia, 122; Abisaab, Converting Persia, 39-40. 26 Abisaab, Converting Persia, 39-40. 27 Schurmann, The Mongols of Afghanistan, 120. 28 Ibid. 29 Temirkhanov, Tarikh-i Milli-yi Hazarah, 46-47. 30 R. Fadl Allah, Tarikh-i Mubarak-i Ghazani: Dastan-i Ghazan Khan [Ghazani’s Holy History: the History of Ghazan Khan], ed. K. Jahn (London: Messrs. Luzac & Co, 1940). 80-81; R. Fadl Allah, ‘ al-Tawarikh [Compendium of Chronicles] II, ed. B. Karimi (Tehran: Shirkat-i Nasbi Muhammad Husayn Iqbal va Shuraka, 1959), 903. 31 Temirkhanov, Tarikh-i Milli-yi Hazarah, 49. 32 Fadl Allah, Jami‘ al-Tawarikh, 984-5, 997. 33 Mousavi, The Hazaras of Afghanistan, 74. 34 I. B. Turkman, Tarikh-i ‘Alam Ara-yi ‘Abbasi I (Tehran: Chapkhanih-yi Gulshan, 1971), 569. 35 Ibid., 75. 36 M. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri I & II, ed. A. H. Habibi (Kabul: Anjuman-i Tarikh-i Afghanistan, 1963), 173. 37 I. P. Petrushevskii, Islam dar Iran az Hijrat ta Payan-i Qarn-i Nuhum-i Hijri, trans. K. Kishavarz (Tehran: Intisharat-i Payam, 1972), 42-43. 38 Encyclopedia of Aryana, ‘Afghanistan: Awda‘-i Afghanistan Maqarin-i Zuhur-i Islam’ [Afghanistan: Afghanistan’s Condition in the Eve of the Rise of Islam], in Encyclopaedia of Aryana III (Kabul: Matbu‘ah-yi Umumi, c. 1956), 301; A. H. Habibi, Tarkikh-i Afghanistan ba‘d az Islam [A after Islam] I (Kabul: Anjuman-i Tarikh-i Afghanistan, 1966), 153. 39 Tabari, Tarikh-i Tabari IV, 263; VI, 2494. 40 Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri I, trans. Major H. G. Raverty (New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, 1970), 302, 319-320. 41 S. H. Ja‘fari, The Origins and Early Development of Shi‘a Islam (London:

170 Journal of Shi‘a Islamic Studies Spring 2014 ∙ Vol. VII ∙ No. 2

Longman, 1979), 2. 42 S. Moscati, ‘AbÙ Muslim,’ in Encyclopaedia of Islam (new edition) I, ed. H. A. R. Gibb et al. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1986). 43 S. M. H. Tabatabai, Shi‘Ðte Islam, trans. and ed. S. H. Nasr (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1975), 62. 44 H. Ismaili, ‘Foreword,’ in A. T. Tartusi, Abu Muslim Namah I, (Tehran: Nuqrih, 2001), 102. 45 F. B. Flood, ‘Ghurid Monuments and Muslim Identities: Epigraphy and Exegesis in Twelfth-century Afghanistan’, in The Indian Economic and Social History Review XLII, no. 3 (2005), 263-294, 281-84. 46 For a detailed and systematic study of the Ismaili da‘wat in Afghanistan, see Baiza, The Hazara Ismailis of Afghanistan. 47 F. Daftary, A Short History of the Ismailis: Traditions of a Muslim Community (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998), 43. 48 Stern, S. M., ‘The Early IsmÁ‘ÐlÐ Missionaries in North-West Persia and in KhurÁsÁn and Transoxania’, in Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, XXIII, no. 1 (1960), 56-90. 49 F. Daftary, The Isma‘ilis: Their History and Doctrine, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 111. 50 See Nasir Khusraw, Khwan al-Ikhwan, ed. Y. Al-Khashab (Cairo: Institut Français d’Archeologie Orientale, 1940). 51 For more detail on the Ismaili daw‘at and Ismaili da‘is, see Baiza, The Hazara Ismailis of Afghanistan. 52 W. Ivanow, ‘Foreword’, in in H. Ujaqi (ed.), Si wa Shash Sahifah [Thirty-Six Epistles] (Tehran: Kayhan, 1961), 9-11. 53 F. Daftary, The Isma‘ilis, 434. 54 W. Ivanow, ‘Foreword’, in Tasnifat-i Khayr-khwah-i Hirati. ed. W. Ivanow (Tehran: The Ismaili Society of India in association with Kayhan Press, 1961), 11. 55 See Baiza, Education in Afghanistan, 25-31, 168-71,

171