A Summary of the Information Provided to the FAA on Thai-based Aviation In our efforts for a proper investigation and accountability into the crash of Orient Thai’s One-Two–Go OG269, we have received documents, photographs, and crew allegations demonstrating improper behavior of various Thai airlines and of Thailand’s civil aviation authority, the DCA. The evidence and allegations make it clear that prior to, during, and after the crash of OG269, the Thai DCA knew or should have known that Thai airlines were continually compromising safety. While much of the evidence suggests outright corruption and incompetence, even taken in the best possible light, DCA oversight of Thai aviation is inexcusably lax. Information we received came from pilots and personnel working for Orient Thai Airlines, One-Two-Go Airlines, SkyStar Airways and Phuket Air. The vast majority of this information was known or could have been easily discovered by the DCA, including: 1. Airlines regularly falsify check rides. In one case, XXX informed DCA Deputy Director- General Vitichai [sometimes spelled Wittichai] of 4 fraudulent check rides taking place in December 2007. No action was taken by the DCA upon XXX’s notification. Nor was any action taken after we made the material public. The DCA finally took some action just prior to the FAA’s recent visit. No management was every censored. 2. We have very credible testimony from pilots who learn of passing sim checks they have never taken. 3. We have very credible testimony of pilots who are not qualified for the aircraft they fly. 4. The airlines regularly require their pilots to fly in excess of the maximum legal limits (110 hours a month in Thailand) and ICAO (100 hours a month) with full knowledge of the DCA. In an effort to show oversight in hindsight, the DCA recently ordered the pilots to produce historic flight summaries for the FAA. Out of fear of being the scapegoats for the excessive hours, some of the pilots refused to provide such paperwork. 5. The airlines regularly conduct maintenance malpractice. A. Severe problems that have been “squawked” (made known by the pilots to maintenance personnel) are often reported by maintenance personnel to have cleared up or been remedied, only to reappear for the flight crew. B. Inspections are frequently done on paper only. C. Heavily documented cases where improper maintenance and illegal flights nearly lead to catastrophes include: • At Orient Thai, a serious issue with a left engine thrust reverser on a 747 was ignored. One western-trained pilot resigned due to the airline’s refusal to stop flying the aircraft. The thrust reverser sleeve eventually separated from the aircraft – in mid air. The aircraft could have lost a wing but fortunately did not. • Phuket Air needed to ferry an aircraft from Saudi Arabia to Jakarta for an engine change. In order to legally fly the aircraft, the engine that required replacement needed to be deemed serviceable. Papers were signed and it was suddenly “serviceable”. Unfortunately, the engine came apart during take-off, dumping engine parts including the entire turbine for miles. The DCA had just 4 days previously audited Phuket Air’s maintenance department. [There are publicly available pictures of the separated turbine resting in the parking lot of a Saudi hotel.] • Three weeks after the first attempt to fly the Phuket Air 747, Phuket Air violated numerous crew, maintenance and civil regulations and the terms of their insurance why the flew the 3 engine 747 to Jakarta. Both flight events were highly public and the sequence of events could not reasonably have been unknown to the DCA. 6. At the time of the crash of OG269, Orient Thai had no training manuals, no safety manual and no safety program all of which must be monitored by the DCA. 7. The airlines regularly operate in violation of the Minimum Equipment List (MEL). For some airlines, the MEL is only a copy of the Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL). Both are gross violations of ICAO standards and very unsafe. 8. At least one airline regularly flies overweight because of an inability of the staff to properly track and convert weights between metric and English systems. 9. A lack of clear boundaries between the airlines and the DCA both creates opportunities for corruption and makes it clear that the DCA is aware of Thai airline violations of safe procedures: A. The DCA runs a program in which a DCA agent works in the DCA office for 5 days a week and then flies 2 days a week with their assigned airline. The airline pays the DCA agent’s salary for the days spent at the airline. Besides conflict of interest based on the payment and responsibilities of the DCA agent, these DCA agents are themselves exceeding duty time by working 7 days a week. [A few days before the FAA’s recent trip to Thailand, the DCA altered the program to 1 flying day per week for agents.] • DCA agent Praphon is assigned to Orient Thai’s One-Two-Go fleet. As a working pilot there, Agent Praphon is aware of and complicit in the airline’s violations of ICAO and legal standards, including fraudulent and frequently non-existent training and re-currency programs, lack of required manuals and training program, and excessive flight and duty hours and maintenance fraud. 1. Proof of these frauds by Orient Thai are publicly available and have been given to the FAA. 2. Several pilots allege Agent Phraphon regularly extorts Thai First Officers to pay for prostitutes on the Chaing Mai route. B. DCA Deputy Director-General Vitichai and Orient Thai and One-Two-Go CEO Udom Tantiprasongchai are “golf buddies”. Their relationship and its particulars have led to credible allegations that the DCA overlooks Orient Thai and One-Two- Go infractions and that DCA Deputy Director-General Vitichai protects Mr. Tantiprasongchai’s interests. There are credible allegations of bribery, including allegations from witnesses to such bribery. • In one well-known incident, a scheduled 747 flight was delayed by the Flight Engineer because the landing pilot had overheated the brakes. Rather than tolerate the delay, the pilot physically removed the flight engineer’s bags from the aircraft and departed – with passengers – but without the Flight Engineer. The incident was widely known and was documented by the Flight Engineer. The DCA took no action. • DCA Deputy Director-General Vitichai admitted on camera that Orient Thai’s One-Two-Go pilots were vastly over hours in the crash of OG269. He further acknowledged that Orient Thai Airlines had provided crash investigators, including the NTSB, with fraudulent flight hour information. However, he never notified the NTSB of the fraud, even though lead investigator Jill Andrews of the NTSB ghost wrote the crash investigation report for the DCA. [In February 2008, we informed Ms. Andrews of the fraud. In May, we provided her with the true rosters. In June, Ms. Andrews completed the crash report. The DCA has not released that report.] • In February 2008, long after he had the OG269 black box information and proof of excessive flight hours, knowledge of an improper training program and lack of a safety program at Orient Thai and One-Two-Go, DCA Deputy Director-General Vitichai told the press, “No punishment will be imposed on any agency or personnel after completion of the investigation [into the crash of OG269] because the accident was beyond control.” [The immediate cause of the crash was flight crew error during a bad weather landing. One pilot appears to have been incapacitated and the other to have panicked. The root causes of the crash are shown here.] A Category 1/Acceptable rating would require the FAA to conclude that the DCA licenses and oversees air carriers in accordance with ICAO aviation safety standards. It seems reasonable to expect Thailand could only achieve a Category 1/Acceptable rating after: The DCA decertifies every airline that provided it with fraudulent information. The DCA dismisses every manager and agent who accepted such obviously fraudulent information. A newly reconstituted DCA shows an ability and willingness to competently oversee Thai civil aviation. If the FAA does not find Thailand in compliance with the ICAO standards, then the FAA must demote Thailand’s ranking to Category 2/Conditional or to Delisted/Unacceptable. It is difficult to understand how the FAA itself could be performing appropriate oversight and have provisionally concluded that the DCA performs oversight in accordance with ICAO standards. .