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Moving Toward a Better Understanding of the Code of Silence: Exploring Potential Moderators of the Relationship between Offense Seriousness and Willingness to Report

A thesis presented By

Katherine Pelton

to The Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science

In the field of

Criminology and Criminal Justice

Northeastern University Boston, Massachusetts August 2020

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Table of Contents

List of Tables and Figures...... 4 Abstract ...... 6 Introduction ...... 7 Statement of the Problem ...... 7 Purpose of the Study ...... 15 Literature Review...... 17 Police Culture ...... 18 traditional view...... 18 variations in police culture...... 19 the socialization process...... 23 Police Corruption ...... 27 causes of police corruption...... 28 issues with studying corruption...... 37 Police Integrity ...... 40 theory of police integrity...... 43 past research...... 44 Code of Silence ...... 51 code of silence and seriousness...... 54 code of silence and disciplinary fairness...... 57 code of silence and supervisory status...... 63 code of silence and length of service...... 67 Methods...... 70 Measures...... 71 independent variable...... 71 dependent variable...... 72 moderating variables...... 72 control variables...... 78 Data, Participants, and Sampling ...... 80 Analytic Strategy ...... 86 missing data...... 87 3

Analysis...... 90 Descriptive Statistics ...... 90 Offense Seriousness ...... 93 Discipline Fairness ...... 98 Supervisory Status ...... 103 Length of Service ...... 107 Rank ...... 112 Assignment ...... 113 Agency ...... 116

Discussion ...... 119 Revisit Research Questions and Hypotheses ...... 119 Discussion of Results and its Implications ...... 120 Limitations ...... 135 Future Research Suggestions ...... 140 References ...... 144

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List of Tables and Figures

Figure 1: Conceptual Model of Proposed Relationship ...... 71

Table 1 Correlation Between Appropriate Discipline and Expected Discipline ...... 75

Table 2: Demographic Characteristics of Sample ...... 82

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Variables in the Analysis (N = 3,107) ...... 92

Table 4: Odds Ratios (OR) and p-values of the Models containing only the Main Effects (N =

3,107) ...... 95

Table 5: Odds Ratio (OR) and p-values for the Models containing Discipline Fairness as a

Moderator (N = 3,107) ...... 101

Table 6: Odds Ratio (OR) and p-values for the Models containing Supervisor Status as a

Moderator (N = 3,107) ...... 105

Table 7: Odds Ratios and p-values for the Models containing Length of Service as a Moderator

(N = 3,107) ...... 109

Table 8: Research Questions and Hypotheses ...... 120

Table 9: Odds Ratios (OR), Standard Errors (SE), and Confidence Intervals (CI) for Potential

Moderators of Relationship between Offense Seriousness and Willingness to Report for Case 1:

Off-Duty Security Business (N = 3,107) ...... 156

Table 10: Odds Ratios (OR), Standard Errors (SE), and Confidence Intervals (CI) for Potential

Moderators of Relationship between Offense Seriousness and Willingness to Report for Case 2:

Police DUI Accident and Cover-up (N = 3,107) ...... 159

Table 11: Odds Ratios (OR), Standard Errors (SE), and Confidence Intervals (CI) for Potential

Moderators of Relationship between Offense Seriousness and Willingness to Report for Case 3:

Excessive Force on Car Thief (N = 3,107) ...... 162 5

Table 12: Odds Ratios (OR), Standard Errors (SE), and Confidence Intervals (CI) for Potential

Moderators of Relationship between Offense Seriousness and Willingness to Report for Case 4:

Holiday for Tune-up (Supervisor) (N = 3,107) ...... 165

Table 13: Odds Ratios (OR), Standard Errors (SE), and Confidence Intervals (CI) for Potential

Moderators of Relationship between Offense Seriousness and Willingness to Report for Case 5:

Speeding Motorist Bribe (N = 3,107) ...... 168

Table 14: Odds Ratios (OR), Standard Errors (SE), and Confidence Intervals (CI) for Potential

Moderators of Relationship between Offense Seriousness and Willingness to Report for Case 6:

Theft at a Burglary Crime Scene (N = 3,107) ...... 171

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Abstract

The code of silence, defined as a set of informal rules prohibiting the reporting of others’ wrongdoings, is consistently one of the most significant hurdles that police agencies encounter in their efforts to control corruption (Christopher, 1991; Kutnjak Ivković, Haberfeld, & Peacock,

2018; Mollen, 1994). This study endeavored to explore the code of silence further by testing potential moderators for the association between an officer’s perceptions of seriousness and willingness to report more exhaustively through the introduction of potential moderators. This study hypothesized that discipline fairness, supervisory status, and length of service would each have a significant impact on the association between offense seriousness and willingness to report. In order to test these hypotheses, a series of ordinal logistic regressions were conducted using the dataset from Klockars (1999). This dataset consisted of a sample of 3,232 officers collected from thirty police agencies in the United States that were asked to answer a series of questions about multiple hypothetical scenarios. The results of this study revealed strong support for discipline fairness, and partial support for supervisory status and length of service, as moderators of the relationship between offense seriousness and willingness to report. This study is an important contribution to the field of police research because it is one of the first studies to explore the association between offense seriousness and reporting intentions, thus providing a deeper understanding of the police code of silence.

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Introduction

Statement of the Problem

Throughout history, there have been multiple incidents of police officers engaging in acts of corruption afforded to them by virtue of their position. The Wickersham Commission Report

(1931), the Knapp Commission Report (1972), and the Mollen Commission Report (1994) were all created in response to landmark cases of police corruption.

Established by President Herbert Hoover, the Wickersham Commission carried out the first nation-wide study of crime and law enforcement in the United States in response to the rapid growth of organized crime courtesy of the Prohibition (Calder, 2013). One particular aspect the commission looked into was the abuses of force carried out by police officers in the pursuit of obtaining information about a crime, described as the “third degree” (Wickersham et al., 1931).

The use of third degree practices was said to be difficult to measure for several reasons. First, police officers will either keep mum about their use of these methods, or they will go one-step further and deny that such methods exist. Second, the people subjected to third degree practices may choose to keep quiet about the abuses. The fear of retaliation from the police usually motivates people to make this decision. Third, people may instead elect to embellish their personal experience with police abuses of power or just lie about experiencing this type of abuse

(Wickersham et al., 1931).

The investigation carried out by the Knapp Commission in response to allegations of corruption made by a police officer named Frank Serpico revealed that corruption was widespread throughout the New York Police Department. This corruption took the form of police officers accepting payments from individuals, businesses, and/or illegitimate organizations in exchange for non-enforcement of the law, preferential treatment, or protection 8 from police activity (Knapp, 1972). Serpico’s allegations of police corruption were not investigated in a timely manner because the commanding officers who initially received these allegations did not take any further action to investigate or report these incidents of corruption

(1972).

According to the Mollen Commission Report, multiple attempts to investigate the involvement of police officer Michael Dowd’s acts of corruption were continuously blocked by the commanding officers of the NYPD’s Internal Affairs Division in order to prevent information regarding corruption within the 75th precinct (Officer Dowd’s precinct at the time) from becoming publicized and ruining the precinct’s reputation (1994). Investigations into police officer Allan Brown and the extent of corruption in the 9th precinct were also thwarted, this time by the premature arrest of Officer Brown, in order to prevent a corruption scandal spanning the whole precinct from becoming public knowledge (Mollen, 1994).

The above incidents are examples of police agencies making concerted efforts to cover- up allegations of corruption and police brutality in order to protect another officer or to protect the image of the department (Armacost, 2004; Mollen, 1994).

The trial of Jason Van Dyke, the Chicago police officer who shot Laquan McDonald, provides a more contemporary illustration of police officers protecting one another (Hinkel, St.

Clair, & Gorner, 2018). According to his official statement, Van Dyke fired upon McDonald out of self-defense on October 20, 2014 because the suspect threatened him with a knife, and other police officers gave reports corroborating Van Dyke’s recollection of the incident. Hinkel, St.

Clair, and Gorner reported that video footage from a dashboard security camera, whose release

Mayor Emanuel’s administration had blocked, disproved the statements given by Van Dyke and the other police officers. The video in question revealed that McDonald was heading away from 9 the police officers on scene when Van Dyke shot him and was lying on the ground as Van Dyke fired more rounds into him (2018).

The investigation led by the Oakland Police Department into allegations of police sexual misconduct involving a woman when she was a minor was found to be altogether lacking by an independent report (Swanson & Barron, 2017). In their review of the Oakland Police

Department’s investigation, Swanson and Barron highlight that, prior to the appointment of a court-ordered monitor, the department had failed in its investigation in multiple ways. First, the

Criminal Investigation Division closed their investigation after one week and did not pursue any of the leads they gained from their interview with the young woman involved. Second, the investigation by the Internal Affairs Division was also severely deficient as only one officer was carrying it out and he/she failed to pursue leads. Third, the Oakland Police failed to notify the

District Attorney’s office about the allegations and the investigation, thus preventing criticism of their investigation process (2017, p. 2). This failure to investigate these acts of police misconduct properly could be suggestive of the idea that the parties involved in the investigation did not want to unveil the true scope of the misconduct and thus ruin the department’s image.

This sense of duty to protect their own that police officers feel for one another is rooted in the “us vs them” mentality that officers learn to internalize through socialization and field training (Crank, 2004; Van Maanen, 1972, 1975; Westley, 1951). A defining aspect of policing is that their work is characterized by the dangers they face and the authority they wield (Skolnick

& Fyfe, 1993). As a result, police officers have come to adopt a unique perspective in which they consider themselves to be a bastion of morality and defenders of society against the evils of crime and lawlessness (Manning, 1977; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). The “us vs them” mentality that the police feel toward those outside of policing is further fueled by the encouraged social 10 isolation of the police (Barker, 1977), the perceptions of public hostility toward the police

(O’Neill, 2018; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993; Westley, 1951), and a perceived aggressive approach to combatting corruption (Christopher, 1991). These facets of policing interconnect and work together in ways which can instill a sense of dependency and kinship shared among police officers (Van Maanen, 1972, 1975).

Thanks in large part to the emphasized importance of the bonds shared between police officers and the lack of trust felt for the general public and the media as a result of their perceived antagonism towards the police, one of the first tenets police recruits are taught is the code of silence (Van Maanen, 1972). Barker argues that police officers will choose to not reveal the identity and conduct of a corrupt officer within their department to their supervisors or to the news media because of a powerful sense of loyalty and a fear of being known as someone who breaks one of the arguably most sacred tenets of the police (2011). Police officers who are known to have reported the misconduct of another officer are at risk of being ostracized, being denied back-up in emergencies, and facing hostility from the other officers in the department

(Bjørkelo & Macko, 2012; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993).

In an interview, former Baltimore police officer Michael Wood recalls how he did not attempt to report the multiple incidents of misconduct he witnessed for years because he feared he would receive the same retaliation as another whistleblower in the department (Balko, 2015).

When Serpico originally reported the acceptance of dirty money by other cops in his precinct in an off-the-record conversation, he asked to remain anonymous because he feared becoming a social pariah. During this same conversation, Serpico was also warned that if he brought this misconduct to the attention of the Commissioner of Investigation, the resulting consequences could lead to him “winding up in the East River” (Knapp, 1972, p. 197). While Barker contends 11 that the retaliation against whistle-blowers among the police is more often than not imagined

(2011), the fact that police officers have faced backlash in the past lends some credence to the power that this fear holds over potential whistle-blowers.

The aftermath of Frank Serpico blowing the whistle on the widespread corruption in the

NYPD is one of the more famous examples of whistle-blower backlash. In an interview, the former detective recounted how his fellow officers’ ostracism of him eventually came to a head when he was shot during a narcotics raid and his partners never called in the shooting (Burke,

2017). Furthermore, Serpico would learn years later that the two police officers who took him to the hospital after responding to a 911 call made by a witness would have left him there to die had they known it was he who they were rescuing (2017).

Former Detective Angelo Dahlia of the Burbank Police Department is another law enforcement officer who reported officer misconduct and was punished for it (Dahlia v.

Rodriguez, 2013). Dahlia assisted a Lieutenant Jon Murphy in the investigation of an armed robbery at Porto’s Bakery & Café. On the first day of the interviews of the detained suspects,

Dahlia witnessed Lieutenant Omar Rodriguez and Sergeant Edgar Penaranda abusing and threatening bodily harm against a suspect during questioning on two separate incidents (Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 2013). During interviews, police officers continued to attack the suspects physically in the Porto’s armed robbery investigation while other officers stood guard to keep others out of the area. Dahlia attempted to voice his concerns over the conduct of the officers helping with the investigation to Murphy multiple times, but each time his concerns were dismissed by the supervising officer (Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 2013). Internal Affairs soon launched an inquiry in the Porto’s investigation due to allegations of police brutality and other misconduct, and Rodriguez and Penaranda threaten Dahlia to keep quiet about what he saw. 12

Over the course of the investigation by Internal Affairs, Dahlia was repeatedly subjected to harassment and intimidation tactics by Rodriguez and Penaranda on a daily basis (Dahlia v.

Rodriguez, 2013). In an interview with the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, Dahlia disclosed the instances of police abuse he witnessed during the robbery investigation as well as the constant barrage of threats and mistreatment from Rodriguez and Penaranda; soon afterwards, Dahlia’s superiors place him on administrative leave. In response to all of the abuses he suffered, Dahlia filed a whistleblowing lawsuit (Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 2013).

A different example of whistleblower backlash is found in the case of Chicago police officers Shannon Spalding and Daniel Echeverria (Spalding v. City of Chicago, 2016). Spalding and Echeverria worked undercover with the Federal Bureau of Investigation to help take down a group of corrupt officers headed by one Sergeant Ronald Watts. These officers of the law extorted drugs and money from narcotics dealers from the Ida B. Wells housing project in exchange for not being arrested, and planted false evidence on those who did not comply with this arrangement (Byrne, 2016; Spalding v. City of Chicago, 2016).

When Spalding and Echeverria’s involvement in the investigation into Watts leaked, some of the supervising and commanding officers of the narcotics (Spalding and Echeverria’s assignment), fugitive apprehension, and organized crime divisions turned on the two whistleblowers and blacklisted them. Over the next few years, the two whistleblowers faced repeated threats from their supervisors that they would receive no assistance in an emergency, were assigned the worst cases and shifts, and could not enter a CPD building. All of this backlash led to the two officers suing the City of Chicago and the police officers specifically involved in the retaliation that Spalding and Echeverria faced (Spalding v. City of Chicago,

2016). When news of the lawsuit reached the media, Spalding’s supervisor Sergeant Mills 13 fabricated charges against Spalding in order to strong-arm her into dropping her lawsuit against the Chicago Police Department. As a result of all of this retaliation and intimidation, Spalding developed Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, and Evcheverria had to take medical leave for months due to his own emotional distress (Byrne, 2016; Spalding v. City of Chicago, 2016).

Former Detective Joseph Crystal of the Baltimore Police Department is one more example of a police officer who faced retaliation from his fellow officers after he reported an incident of police corruption (Schapiro, 2015). While on patrol one night, Crystal witnessed an off-duty officer assault a suspect arrested for drug-related charges with the help of a sergeant who was on-duty at the time. Wanting to do the right thing, Crystal filed a report detailing the incident and later helped to convict the officer and the sergeant with his trial testimony

(Schapiro, 2015).

The other members of the force eventually learned of Crystal’s role in the indictment of the police officer and the sergeant, thus beginning the harassment of Detective Crystal. The other police officers called Crystal a rat and a snitch, and the members of his unit refused to work with him (Schapiro, 2015). Crystal was also denied backup while on-duty several times, demoted to patrol officer, passed off from patrol to patrol because no one wanted to deal with the whistleblower, and found a dead rat on his car’s windshield in front of his house one day

(Schapiro, 2015). The repeated abuse and ostracism eventually got to Crystal and he resigned from the Baltimore Police. Later on, he filed a lawsuit against department for its failure to protect him from the retaliation he was forced to endure (Schapiro, 2015)

As is evidenced by the above examples of police corruption and retaliation against whistleblowers, the code of silence is a significant issue in the world of policing due to the ramifications it brings about. According to the reports given by the Christopher Commission 14

(1991) and the Mollen Commission (1994), the code of silence is the one of the most significant impediments in the face of administrative efforts to combat police corruption and other forms of lawlessness or misbehavior. The inability of police administrators to effectively control the presence of corruption is particularly concerning because it allows for corruption to continue unchecked among the officers in their departments (R. A. Johnson, 2005; Umphress & Bingham,

2011). This unimpeded spread of corrupt values and behaviors has been found to severely dishearten the morale of police officers because they bear witness to acts of corruption going unpunished (Manning, 1977; Weitzer, 2002). In addition, oftentimes when issues of corruption go unaddressed it culminates in an agency-wide scandal that receives public scrutiny. As a result, public trust in the police takes a significant loss and civilians become more cynical in their views of the police. This distrust of the police causes the citizens of the community to be averse to going to the police with information regarding criminal activity, thus diminishing the capability of the police to do their jobs effectively (Manning, 1977; Punch, 2000).

The code of silence is also disquieting because it encourages officers to lash out against those who forsake the bonds of loyalty that the code upholds. Johnson (2005) reports that this retaliation against those who violate the unspoken rule of never reporting a fellow officer for his/her misconduct is costly. One way that attacks against whistle-blowers are harmful to a police department is that it robs the police of a veritable source of information regarding police corruption. Police corruption is very difficult to accurately measure because the majority of policing happens out of sight. Furthermore, police officers frequently interact with deviant individuals who tend not to report police corruption as doing so would reveal their own indiscretions or have other adverse consequences for them (Newburn, 1999; Skogan & Meares,

2004). As a result, law enforcement officers are generally the only witness to an act of 15 corruption by a fellow officer; however, if it is an established precedent that the department punishes whistleblowers, the officers who witness their peers engaging in corrupt and criminal behavior will be too afraid to report. Without the information that whistleblowers can provide, police administrations have only a partial picture of the corruption, misconduct, and other abuses of power in their department and are therefore unable to develop effective strategies to combat it

(R. A. Johnson, 2005). Backlash against whistleblowers is also harmful from a financial standpoint. In the event that an individual files a whistleblower lawsuit and wins, it is the taxpayers who usually shoulder the burden of providing payment (R. A. Johnson, 2005).

Drawing upon the ramifications of the code of silence discussed here, it is evident that the code is a prevalent issue within the policing institution whose complexity requires in-depth analyses.

Purpose of the Study

Previous literature on the code of silence among police officers has found that a number of variables have statistically significant effects on an officer’s willingness to report the misconduct of a colleague. These variables include the perceived seriousness of the behavior, knowledge of official policy, supervisory status, and discipline fairness, to name a few (Ivković,

Peacock, & Haberfeld, 2016; Kutnjak Ivković et al., 2018; Kutnjak Ivkovich & Khechumyan,

2013; Porter, Prenzler, & Hine, 2015; Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007a, 2007b). The purpose of this study is to explore the effect of one of these variables, specifically offense seriousness, on an officer’s willingness to report misconduct in more depth by determining how several of the other predictors interact with offense seriousness and affect its relationship with willingness to blow the whistle. This study uses offense seriousness as the independent variable for this research because there are multiple studies demonstrating its ability to determine a police officer’s inclination towards reporting the corrupt activities of other officers. Previous researchers have 16 described offense seriousness as one of the strongest predictors of willingness to report misconduct (Hickman, Powell, Piquero, & Greene, 2016; Huberts, Lamboo, & Punch, 2003;

Ivković, Haberfeld, & Peacock, 2016; Kutnjak Ivković et al., 2018; Porter & Prenzler, 2016).

For example, Kutnjak Ivkovic and Sauerman (2012) surveyed 771 police officers in

South Africa using a modified version of a questionnaire designed by Klockars (1999) in order to study potential correlates of willingness to report misconduct . With the exception of the “bribe from a red light violator” scenario, the remaining thirteen scenarios demonstrated that an officer’s perception of seriousness was a significant positive predictor of his/her willingness to report. Lobnikar and Meško’s surveyed 550 police officers from Slovenia using Klockars et al.’s

(2007) instrument. Perceptions of seriousness had a significant positive correlation with willingness to report in all 11 scenarios. The authors then ran a hierarchical regression model using aggregate measures and found that an officer’s perception of the seriousness of misconduct was the strongest determinant of that officer’s willingness to report misconduct (Lobnikar &

Meško, 2015). Using survey data Porter and her colleagues (2015) collected from a sample of

845 Australian police officers Porter and Prenzler examined the differences between reporters and non-reporters (2016). Focusing on the scenarios where a significant portion of the sample reported an unwillingness to report despite knowing the behaviors described violated official policy (scenarios 1, 5, 6, 7, and 8), Porter and Prenzler (2016) found that non-reporters tended to evaluate the seriousness of those scenarios as less serious than reporters. In another study, with a sample of 604 officers from 11 police agencies in the United States, the focus was on which factors contribute to a police officer’s willingness to report misconduct (Kutnjak Ivković et al.,

2018). Using the integrity survey created by Klockars et al. (2007), the authors’ analyses unveiled offense seriousness as a strong predictor of willingness to report misconduct in all eight 17 of the scenarios in which it is included as a covariate (Kutnjak Ivković et al., 2018). Overall, these findings suggest that a police officer who rated an act of misconduct as being more serious is consequently more likely to report that act of misconduct.

Literature Review

Offense seriousness is considered to be one of the strongest predictors of a police officer’s propensity towards whistle-blowing (Ivković, Haberfeld, et al., 2016; Kutnjak Ivkovic

& Sauerman, 2012; Long, Cross, Shelley, & Kutnjak Ivković, 2013; Porter & Prenzler, 2016).

However, with the exception of the research carried out by Long et al. (2013), there is currently a significant gap in the literature concerning which factors, if any, have an effect on the relationship between offense seriousness and willingness to report such behavior among police officers. It is vital that such a gap is addressed as police officers have been found to be unwilling to report an incident of police misconduct despite seeing said behavior as very serious (Huberts et al., 2003). The fact that such a discrepancy between perceptions of seriousness and willingness to report exists for some police officers suggests the presence of a strong code of silence. This discrepancy also brings forth the question “are there any factors which could lessen the impact of the code of silence on police officers who choose to not report incidents of misconduct they believe to be very serious?”.

This study will attempt to fill in this gap by examining whether there are any factors that could shape the relationship between offense seriousness and inclination towards whistle blowing. It is the hope that by exploring the effect of other factors on the relationship between offense seriousness and propensity towards reporting said offenses, this thesis will provide a more thorough understanding of the relationship between seriousness judgments and willingness to report misconduct. In addition, it is also a hope that this thesis will provide a better 18 understanding of how the different characteristics and attitudes of police officers interact and affect the desire of officers to whistle-blow.

Police Culture

traditional view. The traditional view of the occupational culture of police asserts that there is a singular culture which governs the norms, values, attitudes, and behaviors of all law enforcement officers

(Loftus, 2010; Manning, 1977; Paoline III, 2003; Skolnick, 2011; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993; Van

Maanen, 1975; Westley, 1951). William Westley’s sociological study of a Midwestern police department in the 1950s was among the first to examine the social culture of the police. The extensive interviews and observations carried out led Westley to the conclusion that the police officers carried themselves and acted in accordance to three fundamental norms: “the maintenance of secrecy about police affairs, the maintenance of respect for the police and the apprehension of the felon,” (1951, p. 294).

Another forerunner in the study of the police, Jerome Skolnick coined the term “working personality” (i.e.: the way in which an individual’s occupation shapes how he/she perceives and responds to his/her environment) to describe how a person’s work shapes his/her personality

(2011). Danger and authority help foster the development of the police “personality” by working together to isolate the police and encourage a strong sense of solidarity among police officers (Skolnick, 2011). Manning (1977) argues that the mythical “old copper” is the standard to which all police officers are held .

Paoline III created a model in order to explain the different factors which function collectively to create what researchers consider to be the occupational culture (2003). The first part of the model focuses on how perceptions of danger and use of authority affect an officer’s relationship with civilians (Paoline III, 2003). The first part also considers how the relationship 19 between an officer and his/her supervisor is affected by punitive oversight and uncertainties in both the work expected of the officer and the role of the supervisor in the officer’s work (2003).

The second part of Paoline III’s model details the coping mechanism used by police officers to deal with the stresses of their work (2003). Officers will treat everyone they meet with suspicion in order to stay ahead in potentially dangerous encounters, and they will focus solely on crime control while keeping a low profile within their department (Paoline III, 2003). The final part of the model details how police officers become a socially isolated group with strong bonds of loyalty thanks to the strategies used to deal with the stressful and dangerous nature of their work

(Paoline III, 2003).

While the above-mentioned research demonstrates that there was a monolithic police culture at one point in time, the changes made to the institution of policing have seen a breakdown of that culture (Manning, 1977; Paoline III, 2003; Reuss-Ianni, 1983). According to

Reuss-Ianni and Paoline III, the increased efforts to hire recruits that do not share the demographic characteristics of the typical police officer (i.e.: white, male, high school educated, working class) have played a role in diversifying the police subculture (2003; 1983).

Furthermore, the increased focus on the accountability and productivity of officers in response to the growing competition for resources among agencies have also helped to facilitate the development of separate policing subcultures (Reuss-Ianni, 1983).

variations in police culture.

The policing culture has been found to vary in a number of ways (Farkas & Manning,

1997; Manning, 1977; Reuss-Ianni, 1983; Wilson, 1973; Worden, 1995). One of the ways in which it varies is by an officer’s rank. Both Reuss-Ianni and Manning observed differences between patrol officers/constables and senior officers in regards to perceptions, values, and 20 behaviors through ethnographic studies of New York and British police, respectively (1977;

1983). These differences have resulted in the formation of two distinct cultures, which Reuss-

Ianni has designated as the street cop and management cop cultures. A critical difference between these two cultures is that street cops place a significantly more value on loyalty to the group than management cops because the values and expectations of the external community have a greater impact on management cops (Manning, 1977; Reuss-Ianni, 1983). Another difference between the two cultures is that management cop culture believes supervisors should focus on enforcing department rules to be effective while street cop culture believes a supervisor’s efficacy highly depends on his/her relationship with subordinates (1983). Farkas and Manning created their own categorization of police culture based on these conflicting expectations for supervisors: “lower participants”, “middle management”, and “top command”

(Farkas & Manning, 1997). While the cultures of “lower participants” and “top command” are identical to street cop culture and management cop culture, respectively, “middle management” embodies a unique culture that focuses on bridging the gap between the rank-and-file and top command (Farkas & Manning, 1997).

Another way that police culture varies is by working style. Drawing upon the findings of previous research, Worden (1995) developed a typology consisting of five distinct approaches to policing that officers utilize. The first working style, “professionals”, describes officers who believe that crime control is the main goal of policing but do acknowledge the importance of order-maintenance and service. The label “tough cops” describes officers who employ the second style of policing, and they display attitudes that are highly similar to those associated with traditional police culture (Worden, 1995). The third style of policing that Worden describes are the “clean-beat crime-fighters”. These officers believe in enforcing all laws as opposed to 21 only those concerning serious crimes. Officers who employ the fourth policing style, referred to as “problem-solvers”, tend to focus their efforts on the order-maintenance and service aspects of policing (Worden, 1995). The term “avoiders” classifies the final style of policing. Officers who fall under this category feel no attachment to their role as a police officer, preferring to only do the bare minimum so as to not draw the attention of supervisors (Worden, 1995).

Research has also categorized the police occupational culture based on the organizational characteristics of police departments. Wilson’s (1973) analysis of the police force in eight cities led to the conceptualization of three policing styles that police departments will adopt: the

“watchman” style, the “legalistic” style, and the “service” style. Police departments that use the watchman style concentrate more on the order-maintenance aspect of policing instead of crime- control, and officers from these departments will use distributive justice to guide their decisions while on duty (Wilson, 1973). Police departments that practice a legalistic approach encourage their officers to focus primarily on law enforcement and be proactive. This aggressive approach to crime control tends to result in increased hostility between police officers and the populations

(e.g.: minorities, juveniles, and others) with whom they interact more (Wilson, 1973). Police departments that utilize a service style of policing focus on both law-enforcement and order- maintenance, and officers from these departments are more inclined to use informal approaches to address a situation (Wilson, 1973). Service departments customize their approach to policing to meet the expectations of the communities they serve. This is possible because the citizens living in these communities tend to have the same expectations of the police due to their racial homogeneity and shared middle-class status (Wilson, 1973)

In any discussion regarding the occupational culture of policing, a key point of contention is the debate over which factor(s) should be considered as having the most influence on the 22 manifestation of police attitudes, values, and behavior (Abrahamsen, 2006; Balch, 1972; R. R.

Bennett, 1984; Van Maanen, 1972). One side of this debate argues that individuals who chose to become police officers already have certain personality traits in common which separates them from those who chose not to become police officers. Van Maanen (1972) describes this explanation for police attitudes and behaviors as a “bad-man theory”. The other side of this debate maintains that the individuals who choose to become police officers are comparably similar to those who choose not to become police officers; it is through exposure to the police working environment that officers develop attitudes and values which are distinct from non- police.

While the psychological paradigm does have some support in the police literature

(Hanewicz, 1978; Hogan & Kurtines, 1975; Rokeach, Miller, & Snyder, 1971), there is far more support for the sociological paradigm (Balch, 1972; R. R. Bennett, 1984; Evans, Coman, &

Stanley, 1992; Galliher, 1971; Stradling, Crowe, & Tuohy, 1993; Van Maanen, 1972, 1975;

Westley, 1951). In addition, several studies have yielded results that contradict the psychological paradigm. Bennet (1975) found that students majoring in police science had values which aligned more closely with non-police officers than with police officers. In addition, college-oriented police officers were found to be significantly less authoritarian than both non college-oriented police officers and non-police college freshmen (A. B. Smith, Locke,

& Walker, 1967, 1968). Furthermore, police officers who graduated with a baccalaureate degree were less authoritarian than officers who never attended college (A. B. Smith, Locke, & Fenster,

1970). 23

the socialization process.

A number of researchers have observed and analyzed the police in order to garner an understanding of how an individual becomes a member of the police subculture (R. R. Bennett,

1984; Bittner, 1970; Sterling, 1972; Van Maanen, 1972, 1975; Westley, 1951; Workman-Stark,

2017). Based upon these studies, one can conclude that there are several steps marking the transition from civilian to full-fledged officer of the law.

The first stage of the socialization process focuses on the factors that influence an individual’s decision to become a police officer (Van Maanen, 1972, 1975). According to Van

Maanen’s (1972) longitudinal study of recruits in the Union City Police Department, the primary reasons why the respondents chose this career path are the adventurous and “out of doors” qualities of the career. The respondents also chose this career because the rigorous selection process gave the impression that policing is a worthwhile profession, and most had a friend or family member who worked as a law enforcement officer (Van Maanen, 1972, 1975)

The next stage in the socialization of the police recruit is the training academy. This is a crucial step in the socialization process as it signifies the beginning of the recruits’ assimilation into the police subculture (Van Maanen, 1972, 1975). During this stage, the training academy employs a variety of methods designed to bolster solidarity among the recruits and foster an “us vs them” mentality against those who are not fitting the police mold (Van Maanen, 1972;

Workman-Stark, 2017). One feature of the training academy that encourages adoption of the police culture is the punitive-orientation of the staff. The strict emphasis placed on discipline and uniformity teaches the recruit that any attention from his/her superiors is most likely negative (Workman-Stark, 2017). Due to the academy’s punitiveness, the first cultural tenet of the police culture that recruits learn is the “no rat rule”. It is imperative for the recruits to learn 24 this rule and show solidarity with one another as the training academy teaches the recruits that the only support they will receive is from other recruits, who they must support in return (Van

Maanen, 1972). Another feature of the training academy is that veteran police officers will regale the recruits with stories about the department and the job. Van Maanen (1972, pp. 263–

264) considers these stories to be the most crucial part in the early stages of a police officer’s career because they teach the new officer about the emotional reality of police work.

With the conclusion of the training academy, the next phase in the socialization process commences. During this stage the new police recruit is assigned to a senior officer, sometimes known as a Field Training Officer (FTO) (Van Maanen, 1972, 1975; Westley, 1951). The senior officer teaches the recruit the tricks of the trade unique to the department and is arguably the greatest influence on the recruit as a consequence of all the time spent together (Westley, 1951).

Van Maanen’s study of the Union City Police Department revealed that the main concern of FTOs was the “hot call” and how the recruit handles it. The “hot call” is a situation that the

FTO knows is most likely to end in violence based on experience. This is a crucial moment in the recruit’s early career because it will prove to the FTO whether or not the recruit has the strength of character needed to be a police officer (Van Maanen, 1972). The Union City study also revealed that during this stage of the socialization process, the police recruit’s attitude is most predisposed toward morphing into one that is more reflective of the attitudes held by his/her FTO and the older, more experienced officers in the department. According to

Workman-Stark, exposing the recruit to senior officers who possess questionable qualities or who are highly cynical brings about the introduction of the negative aspects of police culture, which in turn overpowers any positive influences that the training academy may have had

(Workman-Stark, 2017, p. 30). 25

As previously mentioned, during this stage of the socialization process senior officers expose the recruit to the notion that the public is not a friend to the police, and that the life of a police officer is a hard road to travel. However, it is not until the recruit has his/her own personal experiences that the truth of these lessons is realized in a moment known as “reality shock” (Westley, 1951).

According to Bittner (1970) and Bayley and Bittner (1984), police recruits become

significantly more cynical within their first year as a police officer when they are confronted with the fact that the training academy left them woefully unprepared for the real demands of the job. In his study, Bennett(1984) surveyed police recruits from three, medium sized, metropolitan police departments on the first day of classes, the last day of classes, and three months into their assigned precinct. In the survey he asked the recruits to rank a list of terminal values (i.e.: a designated personal/social goal) and a list of instrumental values (i.e.: general behaviors which are used to achieve terminal value goals) in order of importance. Bennett then compared the responses of the recruits to a random sample of experienced officers from the same force (1984).

The results revealed that while the similarities between the recruits’ and the experienced officers’ rankings of the terminal and instrumental values increased between the first and second surveys, there was a marked decrease in the similarity between the two groups by the third survey, possibly because of a “reality shock” moment (1984). Over time, this difference becomes negligible as recruits start to become more similar to senior officers in terms of attitudes and behaviors. Van Maanen (1972, 1975) posits that this transformation is the final step in the socialization process because the recruit realizes that adopting these behaviors and internalizing these attitudes is the best way to guarantee that the department, his/her supervisor, and, most importantly, his/her fellow police officers welcome him/her into the group with open arms. 26

According to the literature, the organizational culture of a police agency holds significant sway over the behaviors and attitudes of its officers (Armacost, 2004; Baer Jr. & Armao, 1995;

Chavis Simmons, 2010; Christopher, 1991; Kutnjak Ivkovic, 2005; Stoddard, 1968). In her analysis of the causes of police corruption, Ivković proposes that highly corrupt departments may teach recruits to accept and internalize pro-corruption attitudes during their socialization; this socialization increases the likelihood that the recruit will become a corrupt officer in the future

(2005). Stoddard’s research consisted of reviewing the existing deviancy literature and conducting a series of interviews with a police informant. The results of his case study provided evidence that the new recruits were socialized to accept a set of informal norms and values which encouraged illicit behavior by the senior officers—recruits who resisted adopting this “code” were refused acceptance into the group (Stoddard, 1968).

Armacost argued that several aspects of the police culture that can lead an officer to abuse his/her power. The first aspect is the perception that the officer is all that stands between societal order and chaos. This self-perception invites in the risk of a police officer abusing the authoritative power of his/her position when faced with a potentially volatile situation (2004).

The second aspect is the belief that any citizen who behaves rudely or aggressively towards an officer is a threat to both the officer and to society. Police officers who view citizens as hostile are more likely to manhandle suspects during their interactions. The third aspect of police culture which encourages abuse of power is the belief that the officer has been put into the impossible position of protecting the community while the legal mandates of the community severely hinders his/her ability to do so (2004).

Chavis Simmons (2010) proposed that there are three facets of police culture which are instrumental in cultivating an environment that fosters corrupt behavior among police officers. 27

The first facet is the code of silence, which has been documented throughout a number of police agencies both in the United States and around the world (Baer Jr. & Armao, 1995; Christopher,

1991; Huberts et al., 2003; Ivković & Haberfeld, 2015b; Kutnjak Ivkovich & Klockars, 1995;

Porter & Prenzler, 2016; Westley, 1951). The second facet proposed by Chavis Simmons (2010) is that officers who engage in corrupt behavior often continue such behavior due to a lack of effective identification and disciplinary techniques. The third facet is that it is a widely-held belief among police officers that violence or brutality is an effective tool at an officer’s disposal which needs to be used if said officer wants to be an effective officer of the law (Chavis

Simmons, 2010).

Police Corruption

Throughout the years of research, scholars have never fully settled on a universal conceptualization of police corruption—some definitions can be too broad in scope while others can be considered too narrow (Goldstein, 1975; Punch, 2000; Roebuck & Barker, 1973; Sayed &

Bruce, 1998). Based on the definitions given by scholars, it is safe to assume that there are three facets to consider when determining whether a behavior is corruption: the motivation for the behavior, the nature of the behavior, and the presence of an external corrupter.

With respect to the first facet, a behavior is deemed corrupt if the officer in question is motivated by personal gain—the reward in question can be either actual or potential, and it can be for the individual, the group, or the organization (Goldstein, 1975; Klockars, 1999; Kutnjak

Ivkovic, 2005; Punch, 1985, 2000; Roebuck & Barker, 1973; Sayed & Bruce, 1998). In regard to the second facet, a police officer is considered to be engaging in corruption if he/she is abusing the authority granted to him/her by virtues of his/her position as a police officer

(Goldstein, 1975; Klockars, 1999; Kutnjak Ivkovic, 2005; Roebuck & Barker, 1973). The police 28 officer in question can be carrying out a legitimate duty of his/hers or abstaining from an action that violates those duties (Kutnjak Ivkovic, 2005; Punch, 1985; Sayed & Bruce, 1998). In these instances, it is imperative that the officer’s decision to engage in legitimate activities or avoid illegitimate activities is motivated by personal gain, otherwise there is no corruption (Kutnjak

Ivkovic, 2005).

Corruption is also considered to occur when a police officer engages in illegal behaviors

(Kutnjak Ivkovic, 2005; Punch, 1985; Roebuck & Barker, 1973; Sayed & Bruce, 1998), although

Goldstein (1975) only considers an officer’s deviant behavior to be corrupt if it is motivated by personal gain. For the third facet, corruption is considered to take place if the police officer’s behavior is the result of an agreement between that officer and a corrupter (Kutnjak Ivkovic,

2005; Punch, 2000). Kutnjak Ivkovic also argues that corruption can occur without an agreement between the officer and the corrupter if the officer in question uses force or the threat of force, or if he/she uses illegitimate methods such as theft or burglary to procure the reward he/she desires from the corrupter (2005).

causes of police corruption.

Over the years, researchers have proposed a number of causal factors to explain the presence and prevalence of corruption among police officers (Delattre, 2011; Kutnjak Ivkovic,

2005; McCormack, 1986; Pfaff, 2010; Punch, 2003). These factors can be categorized into one of three theories: the rotten apple theory, the rotten barrel theory, and the rotten orchard theory

(Pfaff, 2010).

Rotten apple theory argues that police corruption comes about because deviant individuals are able to bypass the psychological screening measures put in place to keep such individuals out of the policing profession (Arrigo & Claussen, 2003; Delattre, 2011; Griffin & 29

Ruiz, 1999). Researchers have attributed the cause of police corruption to a number of individual factors. One such factor is the individual officer’s propensity toward crime, which asserts that individuals who have a history of law-violating behavior are more likely to engage in similar behavior as police officers than individuals without a history of deviant behavior

(Kutnjak Ivkovic, 2005; Mollen, 1994).

Another factor suggested by Kutnjak Ivkovic (2005) is risk-propensity level, which is defined as “the perceived probability of receiving the rewards associated with success of a proposed situation” (Brockhaus Sr., 1980, p. 513). Similar to the central premise of classical deterrence theory (Beccaria, 1767), Kutnjak Ivkovic states that people will engage in a cost- benefit analysis of each potential behavior in order to choose the one that will result in the greatest pleasure and least amount of pain (2005). An individual’s risk-propensity will have a significant effect on his/her decision-making as he/she might inaccurately judge the risk-benefit proportion of a proposed action. Police officers with high risk-propensity levels are more apt to overestimate the benefits of deviant behavior, whereas officers with low risk-propensity levels are more inclined to overestimate the punishments of deviant behavior (Kutnjak Ivkovic, 2005).

An additional factor to which police misconduct has been accredited is the personality or psychological traits of the offending officer (L. Miller, 2004). Police officers who display character traits such as lack of empathy, impulsivity, difficulty following orders, and emotional instability may run the risk of engaging in acts of misconduct (L. Miller, 2004; Scrivner, 1994).

Researchers have also attributed police corruption to demographic characteristics such as race, education, gender, and age (Greene, Piquero, Hickman, & Lawton, 2004; Kane & White, 2009).

For instance, a survey of 1,935 recently graduated police officers found that at the time of entering the police service an officer’s age, prior contact with the criminal justice system, race, 30 prior military service, and homeowner status are significant predictors of an officer’s likelihood of engaging in misconduct (Greene et al., 2004).

The next approach to explaining the prevalence and manifestation of corruption among police officers is to look at organizational factors. Known as the rotten barrel theory(Barker,

1977; Knapp, 1972), it hypothesizes that the manifestation and prevalence of corruption within police departments can be attributed to the formal and informal organizational factors which characterize the police. Looking first at the formal structure of police organizations, there are a number of elements, which help to bring about the presence of corruption within an agency. One of these formal factors is the performance culture that characterizes police agencies. These agencies focus primarily on crime control as a way to gauge their officers’ performance because they consider it to be “real police work” (Punch, 2000), and use results as a measure of success

(J. Miller, 2003; Porter, 2011). Police officers from these agencies are likely to violate use of force rules as they try to meet the crime control demands of their departments (Christopher,

1991).

The next organizational factor which helps to incite the presence of corruption is poor supervision and inadequate corruption control methods (McCormack, 1986; Punch, 2000).

Concerning supervision, several authors have pointed out that a lack of supervision is a key feature of police work, which allows police officers opportunities to engage in acts of corruption

(Christopher, 1991; Newburn, 1999; Porter, 2011). Additionally, subordinate officers may learn to assimilate to deviant values and norms by observing either their superiors’ outright acceptance of such values and conduct (Porter, 2011) or by observing a lack of action on their superiors’ part to properly investigate and punish such behavior (J. Miller, 2003). With respect to corruption control methods, several factors impede efforts made to eliminate or reduce the prevalence of 31 corruption within a department. These obstacles include an informal culture that condones corruption, a strong bond of loyalty between officers, and a lack of support for such methods;

(Mollen, 1994; Newburn, 1999; Punch, 2000).

Another formal element of the police organization, which can incite corruption, is the discretionary powers of the police. Considered a fundamental trait of police work, the discretionary powers of patrol officers grant them significant freedom to decide whether to carry out the enforcement of a law; this authorized latitude can lead to officers bending, or even breaking, the rules for several reasons (Newburn, 1999). In departments that focus on results, police may engage in rule bending and rule breaking in order to be considered successful (Porter,

2011). Police officers will also sometimes elect to bend or break the official mandates of their department because doing so is seen as the only way to ensure justice (McCormack, 1986;

Punch, 2000).

Another characteristic of the police organization, which can contribute to corruption, is goal ambivalence. Officers are given conflicting messages not only about the objectives of the department (McCormack, 1986). In addition, police officers are often expected by their peers, their supervisors, and the general public to conduct themselves in a manner that clashes with the official policies of the department while on duty (Newburn, 1999).

The second set of police organizational factors that can facilitate the manifestation of corruption within a department, are the informal, or cultural, aspects of the organization.

Previous research discussed in this thesis has established that there is an overarching subculture shared among all officers (eg., Manning, 1977; Paoline III, 2003; Skolnick, 2011; Westley,

1951), as well as subcultures that are more varied among the different agencies of the police (eg.,

Reuss-Ianni, 1983; Wilson, 1973; Worden, 1995). Respecting the role that culture plays in the 32 prevalence of corruption among the police, Ashforth and Anand note that if corrupt acts are allowed to become entrenched in the day-to-day procedures of an agency, the agency will form a subculture that normalizes that corruption (2003).

One of the informal factors which characterize police is cynicism (Goldstein, 1975;

McCormack, 1986; Newburn, 1999; Punch, 2000). As police come into contact with the worst of society time and time again, they come to develop the perception that the whole of society is filled with corrupt individuals (McCormack, 1986; Punch, 2000). In addition, seeing individuals benefit from corruption often causes law enforcement officers to think of corruption as a game of self-seeking behavior (Goldstein, 1975).

Police officers will also learn to become cynical about the general morality of those around them. Newburn notes that patrol officers will observe otherwise upstanding citizens and their own superiors engaging in dishonesty and corruption; as a result, these officers will question why they alone are held to high ethical standards (1999). Furthermore, police officers may come to see the criminal courts as ineffective when it comes to controlling crime and will thus sometimes choose to not arrest someone or to drop a charge (Goldstein, 1975; Punch, 2000).

Another informal factor of the police organization that engenders corruption is the sense of alienation that officers feel with respect to the communities they serve. From the first day of the police academy, recruits are inundated with the message that police officers are a special group and that it is an honor to be one of them (McCormack, 1986; Van Maanen, 1975). Police officers tend to socialize with each other to the point of isolation from the public due to shared, unique experiences (Mollen, 1994). When this social isolation is combined with the perception that the general public is saturated in corruption, which police work can impart on patrol officers, it can instill within officers the belief that they need to protect one another from backlash of the 33 public (Barker, 1977; Newburn, 1999; Porter, 2011; Punch, 2000). The belief that the public is the enemy, known as the “Us vs Them” mentality, is of particular importance as the Mollen

Commission (1994) maintained was one of the strongest obstacles in the fight for corruption control.

Socialization and solidarity are both key informal factors of the police organization that can incite corruption among officers. As previously mentioned, police officers are encouraged during both academy training and field training to spend time with their colleagues and forge bonds with them (Barker, 1977; Mollen, 1994). Overtime the emphasis that the police place on the solidarity between officers can facilitate and encourage corruption due to the fact that police officers are repeatedly taught that it is far more important to protect and support one another than it is to hold one another accountable for their actions (Armacost, 2004; Newburn, 1999). With regards to the role that socialization plays in the facilitation of corruption among police officers, recruits are taught during their field training to internalize the norms and values of the police department as their own (McCormack, 1986). In the case where corruption has become normalized in a department, each successive generation of police recruits is taught by the more senior members of the department that corruption is an accepted part of the job and should be treated as such (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Barker, 1977; Ermann & Lundman, 1978).

For other police departments, corruption occurs on a smaller scale where a subpopulation of officers within a department embody a culture that is conducive to attitudes and behaviors that are corrupt in nature (Porter, 2011). Recruits who interact with these pro-corruption groups are encouraged, and sometimes even compelled, to conform to the norms of these groups so as to be accepted by the group (Barker, 1977; McCormack, 1986; Porter, 2011; Punch, 2000; Stoddard,

1968). In addition, socialization can be used by organizations like the police to instill a sense of 34 duty toward the organization that is mandatory (Armacost, 2004). This sense of duty results in police officers tending to conduct themselves in a manner that is reflective of the expectations to which their department holds them. Armacost maintains that that this emphasis on role- obligation can lead to police officers engaging in corrupt acts if said acts are conducive to achieving the goals of the organization (2004).

The code of silence is another informal organizational factor that contributes to the manifestation of corruption among police. According to the reports given by both the

Christopher Commission and the Mollen Commission, this unspoken tenet that police officers are to refrain from reporting the misconduct of their peers is one of the strongest obstacles that efforts to control and prevent corruption face (1991; 1994). The Mollen Commission also went on to state that the code of silence enables the presence of corruption in two manners. The first manner in which the code of silence strengthens corruption is that it sets a precedent that loyalty to one’s fellow officers is paramount to being a police officer (Mollen, 1994). Law enforcement officers are taught that it is wrong to report a fellow officer for misconduct and that it is imperative to protect one another (J. Miller, 2003; Porter, 2011). Consequently, police officers are likely to be reticent to report the corrupt activities of their peers even if they do not engage in corrupt activities themselves (Newburn, 1999).

The second manner in which the code of silence facilitates corruption is that it severely hinders any efforts made to accurately discern the extent of corruption in an agency as well as any efforts made to implement strategies to control corruption in said agency (Mollen, 1994).

Police officers are compelled to forego reporting incidents of misconduct, and officers who work in or cooperate with internal affairs are viewed negatively (Porter, 2011). The pressure to keep 35 silent about others’ wrongdoings is sustained by the loyalty police officers are encouraged to hold for one another (Crank, 2004; Kleinig, 2001).

The corruption literature has also taken to looking at ecological factors to explain the prevalence of police corruption. This theory, known as the rotten orchard theory (Punch, 2003), hypothesizes that police misconduct and corruption can be attributed to characteristics of the society at large that police agencies serve, such as the neighborhoods to which they are assigned

(Delattre, 2011; Kutnjak Ivkovic, 2005; Punch, 2003).

In his analysis of three well-known police scandals from Belgium, the Netherlands, and

Great Britain, Punch highlights several factors which contributed to these scandals (2003). In the case of Belgium, the author attributes the scandal to a lack of action from the actors within the criminal justice system and to the failure of the criminal justice system as a whole (2003). The scandals from Great Britain and the Netherlands came about as a result of noble-cause corruption—both police forces felt tremendous pressure from external forces such as the general public to produce results, thus causing some police officers to employ illegal methods to achieve these results (2003). Based on these analyses, Punch asserts that corruption can become systemic when it is used as a framework for formal social control (2003, p. 194).

One of the ecological factors, which researchers argue contributes to the emergence of police corruption, is the nature of the neighborhood that the police department serves. A study exploring the discrepancies in police behavior across 60 neighborhoods in three large U.S. cities discovered that police officers act differently in different areas (Smith, 1986). Morabito revealed that community disorganization positively predicted decisions to arrest mentally ill individuals

(2007). Klinger’s research provided a working theory to explain how police behavior is affected by the levels of crime and other forms of social deviancy in the neighborhoods that the police 36 serve (1997). Known as the “ecology of patrol” model, this theory postulates that ecological factors cause officers in areas with high rates of deviancy to take on a less active approach in their policing: normal crime, victim deservedness, officer cynicism, and workload (1997).

One researcher attributes the manifestation of police corruption to several ecological factors (Kutnjak Ivkovic, 2005). One such factor is the opportunities for corruption that police officers interact with while on duty. Like most other individuals, police officers aspire to achieve financial stability and upward social mobility; however, the legitimate means by which these goals can be achieved are constrained by the barriers the police organization places on career promotions and salary increases (Kutnjak Ivkovic, 2005). As a result, a police officer may take advantage of an opportunity to gain a financial reward through illegal means. According to

Newburn (1999), there are a wide variety of situations in which a police officer can be presented with an opportunity to engage in corruption. These opportunities can differ in availability and magnitude depending upon the officer’s work assignment and his/her position within the department(Barker, 1977; Porter, 2011).

An additional feature of police work which invites in corruption are police interactions with criminal individuals and organizations. Criminal organization will make a concerted effort to target police officers with offers of payments in exchange for protection of their illicit activities (J. Miller, 2003; Newburn, 1999; Punch, 2000). Police officers who interact with criminal informants, or who work undercover, will either come to internalize the deviant views of their criminal associates (Newburn, 1999; Porter, 2011; Punch, 2000), or these interactions will increase the officers’ feelings of hostility towards their criminal associates and increase the likelihood that the officers will engage in noble cause corruption (Porter, 2011; Punch, 2000). 37

An additional ecological factor of police corruption is the public opinion regarding corruption. Kutnjak Ivkovic writes that police corruption may come about as a result of public demand (2005). In particular, a police officer may elect to forego the enforcement of a law if that law is proscribing a behavior that a significant portion of the public does not disapprove, or if an individual wants the officer to make an exception for them in exchange for a bribe.

Delattre’s society-at-large hypothesis corroborates this factor as it also argues that police corruption can emerge as a consequence of citizens wanting special favors, followed by illegal ones (2011). In addition, the public’s reaction to scandals involving the police play a significant role in efforts to curtail corruption; police are inclined to see a corrupt behavior as accepted if the public is seen to be either accepting of, or at least tolerant of, the behavior in question (Kutnjak

Ivkovic, 2005).

The general society and the criminal justice system also have an ecological impact on the police. Police officers socialized in societies with high levels of corruption are likely to be influenced by the goals and values of those societies (Kutnjak Ivkovic, 2005). With regard to the effect that corruption in the criminal justice system has on the presence of corruption in the police, there is a documented connection between political corruption and policing(Kutnjak

Ivkovic, 2005). Politicians have been known to use their clout to influence the priorities and tasks chosen by the police, and police officers have been hired on the basis of political connections and bribes rather than merit (Goldstein, 1975; Kutnjak Ivkovic, 2005).

issues with studying corruption.

According to the corruption literature, the analysis of the extent and nature of corruption is a highly problematic endeavor for several reasons (Klockars, Kutnjak Ivkovich, Harver, &

Haberfeld, 2000; Kutnjak Ivković, 2003; J. Miller, 2003; Skogan & Meares, 2004). Arguably 38 one of the most prolific obstacles in the face of corruption research is that it is almost impossible to gain access to the desired information (Ivković, Haberfeld, et al., 2016; Klockars et al., 2000;

Kutnjak Ivković, 2003; J. Miller, 2003; Punch, 1989; Skogan & Meares, 2004). This is due to the fact that there are multiple parties—the offending officer, the citizen(s) involved in the corruption, his/her fellow officers, his/her supervisors, the chief of police, and the police union— who all want to keep the offending officer’s misconduct secret for a variety of reasons (Kutnjak

Ivković, 2003). For example, the Bureau of Justice Statistics attempted to study the perceptions and attitudes of police officers regarding police ethics and behaviors by collecting data from

Illinois, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania ended up withdrawing from the study at the behest of the Fraternal Order of Police, and the Chicago Police Department also abstained from participating due to objections raised by their chapter of the Fraternal Order of Police (Martin,

Bensinger, & Baker, 1994, pp. 1–2).

An additional significant setback in the study of police corruption is its low visibility

(McCormack, 1986). Police officers tend to interact with the deviants of the community and frequently work outside the view of both supervisors and the general public (Skogan & Meares,

2004). As a result, most incidents of corrupt behavior tend to go unreported, meaning that the incidents which end up being reported do not provide an accurate depiction of the issue

(Klockars et al., 2000).

Nevertheless, researchers have attempted to measure the prevalence of police corruption through a variety of methods (e.g.: surveys, court records, citizen complaints, prosecutor records, and interviews), but these tools of assessment are not without their limits(Kutnjak Ivković,

2003). One of the methods that scholars have used is to survey police officers and ask about their own involvement, or the involvement of their peers, in corrupt behavior (Kutnjak Ivković, 39

2003; Skogan & Meares, 2004). A glaring disadvantage of this method is its questionable validity—police officers are unwilling to truthfully report on the corrupt acts of themselves and of others, even if the researcher takes steps to ensure that officers feel comfortable providing this information because of the code of silence (Klockars et al., 2000; Kutnjak Ivković, 2003).

Consequently, such measures of self-report are likely to only provide insight into the least serious forms of corruption (Skogan & Meares, 2004).

Sometimes scholars will survey citizens about their own involvement in police corruption in order to get a better understanding of its prevalence. Unfortunately for researchers, citizens involved in police corruption tend to be unwilling to report it because they either do not want their own participation to come to light, or there is a fear of retaliation from the officer involved if the corruption is reported (Kutnjak Ivković, 2003). Studies have also used court cases to assess the nature of police corruption, but a weakness of this method is that it is only a viable option for research looking into individual-level correlates of police corruption as they focus on the wrongdoings of individual officers(Gottschalk, Dean, & Glomseth, 2012; Kutnjak Ivković,

2003).

Another method used by academics to study police corruption is the field study, which entails a researcher focusing solely on one, or sometimes a few, police agencies. Kutnjak

Ivković points out that while the practice of applying a combination of tools to measure the variables of interest increases the internal validity of field studies, it does reduce the generalizability of the field study’s results. This is because the breadth of the information being gathered signifies that the researcher will need to limit the number of police agencies included in the study in order to make it manageable (2003). 40

In his essay, Punch revisits the issues that emerged during his attempt to conduct field research using the Amsterdam Police as his sample (1989). He identifies the following three elements of field work which make conducting research in this manner difficult: 1) the strain experienced in a demanding field setting; 2) the limitations of research in penetrating sensitive areas of institutional life; and 3) the ethical dilemmas encountered in the field (1989, p. 177).

Police commissions are an additional method used to study the extent and nature of corruption within an agency (Skogan & Meares, 2004). A drawback of this method is that a police commission’s effectiveness in terms of properly investigating police corruption is dependent upon the political ties of the commission and the strength of those bonds, the level of support from the police administrator and the community itself, and the actual scope of the investigation. In addition, the ability of a commission to issue subpoenas, grant immunity, and use former police officers in the course of their investigation does not guarantee that the information collected using these approaches will be accurate because of the unwillingness of police officers to betray one another (Kutnjak Ivković, 2003). In order to circumvent the issues associated with attempts to measure corruption, researchers have recently turned to indirect methods. The most innovative of these methods is the measurement of police integrity.

Developed by Klockars and his colleagues, this method of studying police integrity is considered to be a better alternative to measuring corruption because researchers are less likely to encounter officers who are unwilling to answer questions about police integrity (Ivković, Haberfeld, et al.,

2016; Klockars, Kutnjak Ivkovich, & Haberfeld, 2005; Klockars et al., 2000).

Police Integrity

Police integrity has been defined as “the normative inclination among police to resist temptations to abuse the rights and privileges of their occupation” in order to allow an 41 organizational approach to it (Klockars et al., 2005, p. 2, 2000). This definition of police integrity is comprised of six elements which are indispensable: normative, inclination to resist, police, temptations, abuse, and rights and privileges of their occupation(Klockars et al., 2007).

The first component of this definition of police integrity is the normative facet, which suggests that integrity is the resulting combination of an individual’s belief in the cultural and occupational moral values of his/her society, and the propensity of that individual to align his/her actions in accordance to that belief (Klockars et al., 2007). The “inclination to resist” aspect of the definition focuses on the dissonance between an individual’s attitudes and behavior.

Interested in explaining why a person of high integrity will sometimes act in a manner which conflicts with their moral attitudes, Klockars and his colleagues examine three dimensions of the relationship between police integrity and police misconduct (2007). The first dimension is that an officer’s integrity is not the only reason why he/she would choose to not engage in misconduct—he/she may be influenced by other factors such as a lack of opportunity, fear of the consequences should his/her misconduct be discovered, or an unfavorable risk/reward balance

(Klockars et al., 2007).

The second dimension is that an officer’s attitudes of integrity are only a part of the driving force behind that officer’s decision to resist temptation, hence why integrity is only considered to be the inclination to resist as opposed to the actual resistance.(Klockars et al.,

2007) The third and final dimension of the relation between attitudes of integrity and misconduct among police officers is that while attitudes of integrity have been found to cause behaviors of integrity, the reverse of this causal relationship has also been shown to exist. As such, an officer may learn to internalize attitudes of integrity if he/she is mandated to behave in accordance to the standards of integrity (Klockars et al., 2007). 42

In the “police” part of Klockars and his colleagues’ definition of police integrity, an emphasis is placed on the fact that integrity can be a feature of an individual officer, a group of officers, an entire police agency, or multiple police agencies(2007). Therefore, it is important to remember that any discussion on the underlying forces and significant correlates of police integrity will be markedly different depending on the level of analysis that the integrity is being studied. The “temptations” facet of this definition of police integrity focuses on how the reason(s) an officer engages in misconduct vary markedly across the different types of misconduct, from officer to officer, and from agency to agency; therefore, each instance of police misconduct will require a uniquely tailored method in order to effectively control it

(Klockars et al., 2007). The “abuse” facet of the definition of police integrity refers to the ways in which an officer can exert his/her authority (Klockars et al., 2007). As mentioned before, there are noticeable differences between police agencies over what behaviors are considered abuses of authority. There are two arguments employed by police which contribute to the confusion surrounding the discussion of what is considered an abuse of office(Klockars et al.,

2007). The first argument emphatically denies that the behavior in question is an abuse of power. The second argument maintains that it is wrong to expect police officers to not have their emotions guide their behavior when placed in situations where they are witnessing and being subjected to the worst of society (Klockars et al., 2007). The final component of this definition is “the rights and privileges of their occupation”. This component highlights the fact that it is difficult to get an accurate read on the true extent of corruption within a police agency. This difficulty stems from the fact that police work rife with opportunities to engage in corruption away from the eyes of supervisors and the general public. Furthermore, those same acts of corruption are also protected by the unwillingness of the offending officers’ peers, 43 administrators, and the other parties involved in the corruption to shine a light on those activities

(Klockars et al., 2007).

theory of police integrity.

Drawing upon their definition of police integrity and Goldstein’s (1975) organizational approach to studying corruption, Klockars and his colleagues developed a model to describe police integrity at the organizational level (Ivković, Haberfeld, et al., 2016; Klockars et al., 2007,

2005, 2000). Similarly to Goldstein’s model, the police integrity theoretical model can also be deconstructed into four key dimensions. Under the first dimension an emphasis is placed on the rules of an organization which unequivocally state what behaviors are prohibited(Ivković,

Haberfeld, et al., 2016; Klockars et al., 2007, 2000). Examples include federal, state, and municipal legal rules of the jurisdiction a police agency operates under, as well as the agency’s own policies and procedures. There is also an emphasis placed on the methods employed by police agencies to effectively communicate and enforce these rules (Ivković, Haberfeld, et al.,

2016; Klockars et al., 2007). The second dimension of Klockars et al.’s (2000) theory is primarily concerned with the tools and methods utilized by a police agency in order to detect, investigate, and discipline any and all instances of corrupt behavior and other rule violations.

While police agencies primarily use reactive methods of control, such as the investigation and discipline of corrupt officers and behaviors, to foster a culture of integrity among its officers, proactive methods like integrity testing, early warning systems, and education in ethics have been put into use recently (Ivković, Haberfeld, et al., 2016; Klockars et al., 2007, 2005).

The third dimension of the theory of police integrity focuses on the code of silence and the steps that police agencies take to control its presence among their officers. Klockars et al.

(2007) highlight two aspects of the code of silence which are of particular importance. The first 44 aspect is that the behaviors the code of silence protects can be significantly different between police agencies—in one agency the protection granted by The Code may only extend to minor corruptions of authority whereas in others that protection might apply to the most egregious forms of law-breaking (Klockars et al., 2007, 2000). The second aspect of the code of silence is that it can also vary significantly between police agencies on the basis of which individuals get to benefit from its protection—there are agencies where a police officer will only extend the protection granted by the code of silence to his/her partner (Klockars et al., 2007, 2000). The fourth and final dimension of Klockars et al.’s (2000) theory stresses the significance of the influence that public expectations have on police officers and police agencies. The conduct of an agency’s officers is directly impacted not only by how the citizens under the agency’s jurisdictions view the officers, but also by the agency’s own history of integrity. As a result, it is evident that police supervisors and administrators need to adopt strategies that are conducive to preventing a self-fulfilling prophecy from occurring (Ivković, Haberfeld, et al., 2016; Klockars et al., 2007, 2005).

past research.

Klockars et al. (2000) conducted a survey of 3,235 officers from a convenience sample of

30 police agencies. In the questionnaire the survey participants were asked a number of questions in regards to the following scenarios: case 1: off-duty security system business; case 2: free meals, discounts on beat; case 3: bribe from speeding motorist; case 4: holiday gifts from merchants; case 5: crime scene theft of watch; case 6: auto repair shop 5% kickback; case 7: supervisor-holiday for tune-up; case 8: cover-up of police dui accident; case 9: drinks to ignore late bar closing; case 10: excessive force on car thief; and case 11: theft from found wallet

(Klockars et al., 2000, p. 7). Overall the respondents indicated unwillingness to report (i.e.: the 45 mean scores of “willingness to report” were less than 3) four of the eleven scenarios (case 1, case

2, case 8, and case 4) (Klockars et al., 2000).

A study carried out by Huberts Lamboo and Punch compared the results of Klockars et al. (2000) survey with the results of surveys collected from 795 police officers from three regional Dutch police forces (2003). In comparison to the officers from the USA, the officers from the Netherlands demonstrated they would be unwilling to report only one of the eleven scenarios, specifically the off-duty security business scenario (Huberts et al., 2003). A study exploring police integrity in the Philadelphia Police department using 499 police officers in the analysis found that these officers were unwilling to report three of the six scenarios the authors chose to look at (case 2, case 4, and case 8) (Greene et al., 2004). For their research, Schafer and

Martinelli surveyed 478 supervisors from a single police department and found that the supervisors in the sample were not inclined to report the off-duty security business scenario or the free meals and discounts while on patrol scenario (2008).

Another study examining a sample of 208 supervisors, comprised of 109 sergeants and 99 middle managers (officers ranked lieutenant and above), attending an Administrative Officer’s

Course of the Southern Police Institute at the University of Louisville revealed that the two populations had some differences in the percentage unwilling to report a scenario (Vito, Wolfe,

Higgins, & Walsh, 2011). While a majority of the scenarios depicted a within five percent variation between middle managers and sergeants who were unwilling to report, the remaining three scenarios showed a significant difference between the two populations. For cases 2, 4, and

8, the differences between the two populations were 10.4 percent, 10.4 percent, and 11.8 percent, respectively, with more sergeants indicating that they would not report the behaviors described in the three scenarios (Vito et al., 2011). 46

For his research, Gamarra resurveyed two of the agencies from Klockars et al (2000) study, and also included respondents from a police training facility in the new study (2011). The data from the original survey was collected from 117 respondents, and the data from the current survey was collected from 116 respondents. The original data from the first agency revealed that the respondents were not willing to report seven of the eleven scenarios (case 1, case 2, case 4, case 7, case 8, case 9, and case 10). In comparison, the current data from the first agency revealed that the agency’s officers were no longer unwilling to report case 7, highlighting that the officers of this agency had become less accepting of the supervisor’s behavior in the “holiday for tune-up” scenario (Gamarra, 2011). The original data collected from the second agency demonstrated the respondents’ reluctance to report eight of the eleven scenarios (case 1, case 2, case 4, case 6, case 7, case 8, case 9, and case 10). The current survey of the second agency illuminated a drastic change in the agency’s culture of integrity as the respondents were now only willing to keep quiet about four of the eleven scenarios (case 1, case 2, case 4, case 8)

(Gamarra, 2011). The data collected from the respondents at the training facility illustrated that the off-duty security business scenario was the only scenario which the respondents would not be willing to report (Gamarra, 2011).

468 officers from two police agencies in Armenia—Yerevan and Lori—were surveyed using Klockars et al (2000) instrument to measure the different elements of police corruption

(Kutnjak Ivkovich & Khechumyan, 2013). The two researchers found that the code of silence was quite strong among the officers in the sample as the only scenario the respondents were willing to report was the theft of a watch at a crime scene scenario (Kutnjak Ivkovich &

Khechumyan, 2013). Ivkovich and Sauerman surveyed a convenience sample of 379 police officers from eight provinces in South Africa (2013). The results of the survey indicated that the 47 scenarios the respondents were least likely to report were case 1, case 2, case 4, case 8, and case

10. The respondents were most likely to report the theft of watch from a crime scene scenario and the bribe from a red light violator scenario (modified version of case 3) (Ivkovich &

Sauerman, 2013). While the studies carried out with Klockars et al.’s (2000) survey did provide insight into the culture of integrity of multiple police agencies around the world, there was a noticeable limitation of the survey; namely that with one exception it measured only one form of police corruption, gain (Klockars et al., 2007, p. 137).

In order to correct this issue, Klockars, Kutnjak Ivkovich, and Haberfeld designed a new survey that included a wider variety of different types of police corruption in order to gain a better understanding of a police agency’s culture of integrity (2007). The new survey kept five of the scenarios from the original survey (case 1: free meals and gifts from merchants on beat, case 3: theft of knife at a crime scene, case 5: supervisor offers holiday for errands, case 8: cover up of police DUI accident, and case 9: auto body shop 5% kickback). The authors then included six new scenarios in the new survey (case 2: fail to arrest friend with warrant, case 4: unjustified use of deadly force, case 6: hit prisoner who hurt partner, case 7: verbal abuse of motorist, case

10: false report of drug possession, and case 11: sergeant allows beating of abuser) (Klockars et al., 2007, p. 139).

Khechumyan and Ivković administered this new survey to 969 police officers from ten provincial departments in Armenia (2015). The officers in the sample reported a mean score less than 3 for “willingness to report misconduct” for four of the eleven scenarios (case 1, case 6, case 8, and case 11), indicating that for these scenarios the respondents were more inclined to not report the behaviors (2015). A study of 106 police officers from two regions in Russia—the

Southern District-Rostov region and the North-Caucasus-Karachaevo Cherkessia region— 48 highlighted a significantly strong code of silence as the respondents reported an unwillingness to report for all ten scenarios (case 6 was not included in the analysis) (Cheloukhine, Ivković, Haq,

& Haberfeld, 2015). Vallmüür explored the contours of police integrity in Estonia through a survey of 109 officers sampled from the north, south, east, and west prefectures and found the respondents were willing to report all eleven scenarios (2015).

A survey was conducted using a sample of 329 officers attending classes at the Korean

National Police University and the Police Comprehensive Academy to look at police integrity in

South Korea (Kang & Ivković, 2015). For seven of the eleven scenarios the respondents indicated reluctance to report (case 1, case 2, case 5, case 6, case 7, case 8, and case 11 (2015).

Ivković (2015), using a representative stratified sample of 966 officers to explore integrity among Croatian police, found that the respondents were unwilling to report four of the eleven scenarios (case 1, case 6, case 7, and case 8).

Phetthong and Ivković surveyed 280 officers from seven police stations and the Police

Education Bureau in Thailand and found the respondents practiced the code of silence for six of the scenarios (case 1, case 5, case 6, case 7, case 8, and case 9) (2015). Kutnjak Ivkovic and

Sauerman (2012) surveyed 771 officers from eight provinces within South Africa using a modified version of Klockars et al.’s (2007) survey which included three additional scenarios

(case 12: protecting hate crime, case 13: bribe from red light violator, case 14: not reacting to graffiti). The results of the survey revealed that respondents were least likely to report case 7, case 8, case 1, case 14, case 9, and case 6 (Kutnjak Ivkovic & Sauerman, 2012). In 2015,

Kutnjak Ivkovic and Sauerman administered a second survey to 100 officers and combined the results with those from the 771 officers from the previous study. None of the mean scores for 49

“willingness to report” were below the midpoint (i.e.: M < 3), indicating that the officers of

South Africa were more inclined to report the scenarios on average (Sauerman & Ivković, 2015).

A sample of 856 police officers from two major police departments in Australia were administered police integrity questionnaires, and the resulting analysis highlighted a particularly weak code of silence (Porter et al., 2015). The only scenario where the respondents demonstrated an inclination towards not reporting was the verbal abuse of a motorist scenario, but the fact that the mean score for this particular scenario was very close to the midpoint showed the code of silence was not significantly strong (2015).

For their research into police integrity among police officers in Slovenia, Lobnikar and

Meško (2015) surveyed a sample of 583 officers using a modified version of Klockars et al.’s

(2007) survey similar to the one used by Kutnjak Ivkovic (2012), except case 13 involved accepting a bribe from a speeding motorist instead of a red light violator. There were three scenarios that the respondents indicated they would be reluctant to report: the cover-up of a police DUI accident scenario, the verbal abuse of a motorist scenario, and the free meals and gifts from merchants scenario (Lobnikar & Meško, 2015).

Research into the culture of integrity among police officers in the United States was conducted using a sample of 664 officers gathered from a convenience sample of eleven police agencies (Ivković, Haberfeld, & Peacock, 2015). The respondents indicated that they were unwilling to report two of the eleven scenarios described in Klockars et al.’s (2007) survey: the free meals and gifts from merchants scenario, and the verbal abuse of a motorist scenario (2015).

The results of these studies highlight the complex nature of the code of silence among police officers in terms of the strength of the code as well as its parameters regarding who and what the code protects. For example, the integrity surveys from Russia, South Africa, and 50

Estonia illustrated significant discrepancies in the willingness to report between the police of the these nations. The Russian police sample were not willing to report any of the scenarios

(Cheloukhine et al., 2015) described in Klockars et al.’s (2007) survey, while both the South

African police and the Estonian police were willing to report all eleven of the scenarios described in the survey (Vallmüür, 2015).

In regards to the variations between the codes of silence held by different police departments, there are several instances of police departments demonstrating significantly different levels of willingness to report certain behaviors. For example, the officers in Armenia showed an unwillingness to report the speeding motorist bribe scenario (Kutnjak Ivkovich &

Khechumyan, 2013), while police officers from the United States and the Netherlands were much more willing to report an officer for that specific misconduct (e.g., Gamarra, 2011; Huberts et al., 2003; Klockars et al., 2000).

Another example is that while police in Australia (Porter et al., 2015) and the United

States (Ivković et al., 2015) were very willing to report the “unjustified use of deadly force scenario”, police from South Korea, Thailand, and Russia were unwilling to report this scenario(Cheloukhine et al., 2015; Kang & Ivković, 2015; Phetthong & Ivković, 2015). Previous research has also shown that police officers around the world have differing opinions about whether an officer accepting free meals and gifts from merchants. Police officers from the

Netherlands, Australia, and South Africa demonstrated a willingness to report this behavior (e.g.,

Huberts et al., 2003; Porter et al., 2015; Sauerman & Ivković, 2015; Vallmüür, 2015). In comparison, officers from Russia and the United States showed a reluctance to report said behavior (e.g., Cheloukhine et al., 2015; Gamarra, 2011; Phetthong & Ivković, 2015), while studies of Croatian and Armenian police officers and American police supervisors revealed these 51 officers to be ambivalent about reporting the free meals scenario (e.g., Ivković, 2015a;

Khechumyan & Ivković, 2015; Vito et al., 2011). From the discussion on integrity, it is clear that the cultural code of silence within the police, shapes much police attitude and behavior.

Code of Silence

Silence is a phenomenon that affects not only in police agencies, but other organizations as well such as healthcare facilities, educational institutions, and the military, to name a few

(Knoll & van Dick, 2013). A number of researchers have put forth efforts to conceptualize silence within an organization and the different forms it can take (Adamska, 2016; Fivush, 2010;

Pinder & Harlos, 2001; Van Dyne, Ang, & Botero, 2003). An important distinction made in the literature that is the difference between “being silenced” and “being silent”.

Coined by Fivush (2010), the term “being silenced” refers to an individual’s participation in silence as a result of socialization. The individual’s social group, be it his/her friends, the workplace, or society in general, has rules regarding which topics can be discussed and which topics are not to be brought up in conversation. Overtime an individual will internalize these rules and will forego discussing prohibited topics automatically (Adamska, 2016; Fivush, 2010).

The other type of silence coined by Fivush (2010), “being silent”, refers to an individual’s participation in silence as a result of conscious decision. The individual in question weighs the potential advantages and disadvantages of speaking out and comes to the decision independently to not speak (Adamska, 2016; Fivush, 2010). Morrison and Milliken theorized that organizational silence can be attributed to two characteristics displayed by top-level managers: 1) fear of negative feedback; and 2) implicit beliefs (2000).

With regard to the first characteristic, managers are thought to be less open to hearing information pertaining to wrongdoing within their organization as such information connotes a 52 failure on the part of the manager. Furthermore, managers at the highest level within an organization are inclined to dismiss the negative feedback from an employee as an attempt to threaten the manager’s authority and integrity and not see these grievances as legitimate concerns for the conduct within the organization (Morrison & Milliken, 2000). Concerning the second characteristic, top-level managers hold several beliefs subconsciously, which affects the presence of organizational silence. The first belief is that their employees are egoistic and incapable of being trusted, which causes these managers to conduct themselves in ways that dishearten subordinates who wish to report something to said managers (Morrison & Milliken,

2000). The second belief top-level managers are thought to hold is that they are of the opinion that they are the most knowledgeable regarding issues of organizational importance. This opinion stems from the perception that the manager’s employees are self-interested and lazy, thus causing the manager to believe that his/her employees are not well-versed in and do not care for the organization’s interests (Morrison & Milliken, 2000). The third belief of an organization’s most senior managers is that employees who exhibit a harmonious relationship with their organization are indicative of a good organization. Opinions and information that conflicts with this harmony should be avoided as they signify that the manager’s organization is flawed (Morrison & Milliken, 2000).

With regards to silence within the police organization, Kleinig offers several insights of his own into the nature of the police code of silence (Kleinig, 2001). First, the code of silence is not limited solely to line officers. Police administrators have been known to make concerted efforts to keep incidents of corruption within their departments from becoming public knowledge

(Kleinig, 2001). These efforts are a quality example of unethical prosocial silence as suggested 53 by Knoll and Van Dick (2013) and Umphress and Bingham (2011) because the administrator’s actions are inspired by his/her desire to protect the image of his/her department (Kleinig, 2001).

Kleinig goes on to purport that a number of factors supports the code of silence. One of these factors is the bonds of loyalty that police officers are socialized to have (2001; Skolnick,

2002). As previously mentioned research noted (e.g., Mollen, 1994; Newburn, 1999; Porter,

2011), loyalty is a prominent feature of the police institution. When loyalty is combined with police perceptions of hostility from the media, the public, and their supervisors (e.g., Crank,

2004; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993; Westley, 1951), it motivates police officers to keep quiet about the misconduct of their peers out of a sense of duty to one another and a desire to protect their own

(Manning, 1977).

Another factor which sustains the code of silence among police officers is the fear of backlash one could potentially face for breaking the code (Kleinig, 2001). Johnson (2005) notes that police officers have kept silent about corruption in the past because they were afraid of the retaliation that the other officers in the department would take upon them for reporting the corruption. In a survey of police officers conducted by the National Institute of Ethics, 532 respondents reported that they had witnessed police misconduct and did not report it (Trautman,

2001). When asked about the perceived consequences of reporting the misconduct they saw, most of the respondents believed they would be ostracized while others thought they would have been subjected to disciplinary action or even fired. Ostracism is an especially powerful deterrent against whistle-blowing as policing is built on a foundation of social bonds and the support of fellow officers, without which a police officer will drown (Bjørkelo & Macko, 2012; Knapp,

1972; Mollen, 1994; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). An additional factor that supports the presence of the code of silence among police is the mutually beneficial nature of it. If a police officer keeps 54 information about another officer’s misconduct from getting out, then that officer will be likely to return the favor (Kleinig, 2001). The final factor that fosters the code of silence is the belief held by the officer observing the misconduct that he/she has no right to report said misconduct because he/she is not the epitome of morality and integrity. This idea that a whistle-blower must be completely honorable in both his/her conduct and intentions is demonstrated by the fact that whistle-blowing cases are faced with concentrated efforts to show that the whistle-blower is not without fault or had immoral motives for reporting the misconduct (Kleinig, 2001).

As previously mentioned throughout this study, the code of silence is an aspect of the institution of policing that serves as a serious obstacle against efforts to improve corruption control and public perceptions of the police (R. A. Johnson, 2005; Mollen, 1994; Newburn,

1999; Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007a, 2007b). While multiple studies have determined that willingness to report is associated with a number of factors (e.g., Ivković, Haberfeld, et al., 2016;

Kutnjak Ivkovic & Sauerman, 2012; Long et al., 2013; Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007a; Wang &

Hsieh, 2013), there has been very little research delving into the relationship between an officer’s

(un)willingness to report and one of its previously established predictors. In particular, the main endeavor of the research presented here is to choose a particular predictor and analyze the relationship between said predictor and an officer’s (un)willingness to report by determining if said relationship is moderated by the presence of one of the other established predictors. In the following sections, I will discuss the main relationship as well as the moderators chosen for this analysis.

code of silence and seriousness.

The determinant whose effect on a police officer’s propensity to be willing to report wrongdoing is being further examined is offense seriousness. First and foremost, seriousness has 55 been shown to be a consistently strong predictor of willingness to report misconduct (Hickman et al., 2016; Huberts et al., 2003; Kutnjak Ivković et al., 2018; Long et al., 2013). A possible explanation for the strong relationship between the perceived seriousness of the misconduct and the willingness to report said misconduct is deviant peer association. Wolfe and Piquero’s study of 499 Philadelphia police officers found a significant positive relationship between an association with peers who support minor forms of deviancy and increased code-of-silence attitudes (2011). As a result of spending time with colleagues who are more accepting of minor deviancy, a police officer will be more inclined to see those forms of deviancy as acceptable and will therefore be less inclined to report another officer for that behavior, as it is no longer seen as being serious enough to warrant reporting. The “grass-eaters” described in the Knapp

Commission Report support this notion as they are described as being the “heart of the

[corruption] problem” because their presence serves to legitimize corruption in an unofficial capacity and thus enables the presence of the code of silence within the police department (1972, p. 4).

A logistic regression analysis of data collected from 771 South African police revealed that the respondent’s own perception of seriousness was a significant predictor of willingness to report in 13 of the 14 scenarios included in the survey. The “bribe from a red light violator” scenario was the only scenario that did not have seriousness as a significant predictor of willingness to report (Kutnjak Ivkovic & Sauerman, 2012). Using the data Klockars (1999) gathered from 3,235 police officers employed in 30 police agencies in the United States, Long and his colleagues conducted a series of ordinal logistic regressions on four scenarios taken from

Klockars et al.’s (2000) study (scenario 1: “free meals”, scenario 2: “punch for fleeing”, scenario

3: “auto body kickback”, and scenario 4: “opportunistic theft”) (2013). In all four scenarios, 56 higher ranked perceptions of seriousness were associated with higher odds of being willing to report. A survey of Australian police found that perceptions of seriousness were positively related to willingness to report when averaged across all 11 scenarios in the survey (Porter et al.,

2015). In addition, a stepwise linear regression revealed that perceptions of seriousness was the strongest predictor of an officer’s willingness to report as it accounted for approximately 65 percent of the variation in the model (Porter et al., 2015).

In their work, Hickman and his colleagues (2016) analyzed the survey responses of 499

Philadelphia police officers to six of the scenarios from Klockars et al.’s (2000) survey and found strong zero-order correlations between evaluations of seriousness and willingness to report for four of the scenarios. The DUI cover-up scenario had the strongest correlation, followed by the free meals, the free holiday gifts, and the physical abuse scenarios (Hickman et al., 2016). A series of stepwise linear regressions comparing the ability of seriousness perceptions and attitudes towards ethical behaviors to predict willingness to report found that seriousness perceptions was the better predictor for the free meals, the free holiday gifts, the DUI cover-up, and the physical abuse scenarios (Hickman et al., 2016).

A sample of 664 police officers collected from 11 police agencies located primarily in the

Midwest and East Coast regions of the United States were given surveys and had their responses subjected to logistic regression (Kutnjak Ivković et al., 2018). The logistic regressions revealed that a respondent’s own perceptions of seriousness had a significant positive association with higher odds of being willing to report misconduct in all eight of the scenarios in which it was included. The effect that perceptions of seriousness had on police officers’ willingness to report varied greatly between the scenarios (Kutnjak Ivković et al., 2018). Seriousness had the smallest 57 effect on willingness to report in Scenario 1 while in Scenario 4 seriousness had the greatest on willingness to report (Kutnjak Ivković et al., 2018).

code of silence and disciplinary fairness.

Research has shown disciplinary fairness to have an effect on intentions to report misconduct. According to Miceli and Near, whistle-blowers are more likely to perceive the organization as just (1996). With regards to the relationship between discipline fairness and

willingness to report, three models were conceptualized to explain the different effects that discipline fairness can have on intentions to report (Kutnjak Ivkovich & Klockars, 1996).

The first model is the simple deterrence model, which argues that the more severe a punishment for a behavior appears to be, the more likely that an officer will report the behavior.

In addition, the simplified deterrence model presumes that failure to report misconduct will result in punishment with similar severity as the punishment meted for the original misconduct

(Kutnjak Ivkovich & Klockars, 1996). The second model conceptualized by Kutnjak Ivkovich and Klockars is the punishment-indifferent model, which holds that the perceived fairness of the expected discipline for corrupt behavior has no effect on an officer’s willingness to report corrupt behavior. This lack of a relationship could be because the officer in question does not expect to get punished for not reporting the misconduct, or, for some forms of misconduct, the anticipated punishment for breaking the code of silence is more severe than the expected punishment for failing to report the misconduct (1996). The third model is the simple justice model, which theorizes that officers are more likely to report misconduct if the expected punishment is seen as fair—the more severe the punishment, the less likely that the behavior will be reported. The authors do note an uncertainty regarding the relationship between fairness and willingness to report when an officer views the expected punishment as being lenient. 58

Punishment that is seen as too lenient could discourage officers from reporting misconduct, or it could have no additional effect on an officer’s willingness to report (Kutnjak Ivkovich &

Klockars, 1996).

Multiple studies have examined the relationship between discipline fairness and willingness to report misconduct. One study analyzed the survey responses of 451 police officers employed at four police stations in the Sarajevo canton in Bosnia and Herzegovina

(Kutnjak Ivković & O’Connor Shelley, 2005). The authors found that three of the ten scenarios taken from Klockars et al.’s (2000) had significant differences between fairness perceptions and willingness to report. In comparison to respondents who viewed the expected punishments for the three scenarios as either fair or too lenient, the respondents who believed the punishments to be too harsh also had the highest percentage of respondents who were not willing to report those behaviors (Kutnjak Ivković & O’Connor Shelley, 2005). In addition, the respondents evaluated the three scenarios as being the least serious and only requiring mild discipline to be appropriately punished. The code of silence is also very strong among police officers for these scenarios as they were some of the behaviors the respondents indicated they would be most likely to not report (Kutnjak Ivković & O’Connor Shelley, 2005). The low ratings of seriousness combined with the high percentage of respondents who viewed the expected punishment as too harsh and were unwilling to report for the three scenarios suggest potential support for the simple justice model.

Kutnjak Ivković and O’Connor Shelley surveyed a sample of 150 supervisors and 450 line officers from police agencies in the East Bohemia region of the Czech Republic in order to compare their views regarding the code of silence and disciplinary fairness (2010). Using the integrity instrument designed by Klockars et al.(2000), the researchers found that, with the 59 exception of non-supervisors for Scenario 3 (bribe from a speeding motorist), the results showed that respondents who viewed the expected discipline as fair were more willing to report than the respondents who viewed the expected discipline as too harsh. These results provided support for Kutnjack Ivkovich and Klockars’(1996) simple justice model (Kutnjak Ivković & O’Connor

Shelley, 2010). In three of the 10 scenarios (bribe from speeding motorist, auto body kickback, drinks to ignore late bar closing) line officers who believed the punishments for these behaviors were too lenient were more unwilling to report than line officers who thought the punishments would be fair or too harsh. These findings empirically support the simple deterrence model of discipline fairness (Kutnjak Ivković & O’Connor Shelley, 2010). The results for the supervisors found that in two of the scenarios (scenario 4: holiday gifts from merchants, and scenario 7: holiday for tune-up) supervisors who viewed the anticipated discipline as too lenient were more likely to report, supporting the simple justice model. In addition, support for Kutnjak Ivkovich and Klockars’ (1996) simple deterrence model was given by the finding that supervisors who thought the expected discipline for the “off-duty security business” scenario was too lenient were less willing to report (Kutnjak Ivković & O’Connor Shelley, 2010).

Ivkovich and Sauerman’s research into police integrity among police supervisors in

South Africa revealed a significant relationship between perceptions of fairness and willingness to report in four of the 11 scenarios (scenario 3: bribe from red light violator, scenario 5: crime scene theft of watch, scenario 6: auto body kickback, and scenario 11: theft from wallet) (2013).

All four scenarios found that the respondents who viewed the expected discipline as too harsh were less willing to report, indicating support for the simple justice model; the other seven scenarios were indicative of no relationship between discipline fairness and willingness to report, supporting the punishment-indifferent model (Ivkovich & Sauerman, 2013). 60

Long and his colleagues (2013) decided to test the predictive capabilities of perceived fairness, seriousness, and legitimacy with regards to willingness to report using the data collected during Klockars (1999) research. In the “free meals” scenario perceptions of fairness was not a significant predictor of willingness to report. Perceptions of fairness was found to be a significant positive predictor of willingness to report for the “punch for fleeing” scenario, indicating that officers who perceived the expected punishment to be fair were more likely to be willing to report that misconduct (Long et al., 2013). For the “auto body kickback” scenario, discipline fairness was found to be negatively related with willingness to report misconduct, indicating that willingness to report misconduct was lower for officers who viewed the expected discipline as fair than for those who viewed it as unfair. Similarly, perceived fairness was also found to have a significant negative association with willingness to report for the “opportunistic thief” scenario (Long et al., 2013).

A study by Ivković, Peacock, and Haberfeld (2016) analyzed the data from their (2015) work in order to explore the differences in the relationship between discipline fairness and the code of silence for supervisors and non-supervisors. The authors decided that if the difference in the percentage of respondents who rated the punishment as fair and the percentage of respondents who saw the punishment as either too harsh or too lenient was greater than 10 percent, that would indicate a relationship between discipline fairness and willingness to report

(Ivković, Peacock, et al., 2016). In 10 of the 11 scenarios supervisors who rated the expected discipline as too harsh were less likely to report than supervisors who rated the expected discipline as fair. Similarly, non-supervisors who believed discipline was too harsh were less willing to report than non-supervisors who saw the discipline as fair for nine of the eleven scenarios. These results indicate a clear support for the simple justice model (Ivković, Peacock, 61 et al., 2016). With regards to the differences in willingness to report between respondents who saw discipline as too lenient and those who saw discipline as fair, supervisors and non- supervisors each had one case where significant differences between the two fairness perceptions were reported. For the supervisors, respondents who saw the expected discipline of the “police

DUI cover-up” scenario as too lenient were more willing to report than those who saw the discipline as fair, signifying support for the simple justice model. For non-supervisors, respondents who saw the expected discipline of the “officer strikes prisoner” scenario as too lenient were less willing to report than those who saw the expected discipline as fair, which supports the simple deterrence model (Ivković, Peacock, et al., 2016).

Using the data collected in Ivković et al.’s (2015) study, an analysis of the potential predictors of the code of silence conducted by Kutnjak Ivković and her colleagues found that discipline fairness to be a significant predictor of adherence to the code of silence in all eleven scenarios (2018). In particular, respondents who reported the discipline to be too harsh were much less willing to report than respondents who thought the discipline was fair in nine of the eleven scenarios, giving credence to the simple justice model. Conversely, eight of the eleven scenarios indicated that respondents who evaluated the expected discipline as too lenient were more likely to report those behaviors than the respondents who believed the discipline to be fair

(Kutnjak Ivković et al., 2018).

In their research, Huberts and his colleagues (2003) created a model which could potentially explain the relationship between an officer’s perception of seriousness and his/her willingness to report. Within this model, the authors theorized that the discipline fairness could affect this relationship. The idea that disciplinary fairness may alter the relationship between seriousness and willingness to report could be based on the differences found between Dutch and 62

American police officers (2003). When compared, more police officers from the United States sample, which was the same sample as the one from Klockars et al.’s (2000) study, considered the expected punishments too be too harsh than police officers in the Dutch sample. The authors theorized this could be a partial explanation for why the American police had a lower willingness to report than the Dutch police did. For example, the “free meals” scenario was rated as serious by the Dutch police and as not very serious by the American police (2003). In addition, the

Dutch officers were willing to report this behavior while their American counterparts were not willing. A larger percentage of American officers perceived the expected punishment of the

“free meals” scenario as too harsh in comparison to Dutch officers. It is possible that the significant differences found between the two police samples in terms of perceptions of seriousness and perceptions of disciplinary fairness could work together to explain why the

American sample was much less willing to report the “free meals” scenario than the Dutch sample (2003).

In their examination of offense seriousness, legitimacy, and fairness as potential determinants of intention to report misconduct, Long et al. decided to also explore the interaction effects between these three potential predictors in order to gain a more complete understanding of how a police officer becomes willing to report the wrongdoings of another officer (2013). The interaction between seriousness and fairness was non-significant for the

“free meals” scenario. In the “punch for fleeing” scenario, when all main effects and interactions were included in the ordinal regression model, the interaction between seriousness and fairness was found to be a significant negative predictor. Respondents who viewed the behavior as serious and the expected discipline as fair had much lower odds of being willing to report another officer for this misconduct than those who viewed the behavior as serious but the 63 expected discipline as unfair (Long et al., 2013). In the “auto body kickback scenario”, the interaction between seriousness and fairness was a significant positive predictor. For the “auto body kickback” scenario, Officers who saw the behavior as serious were more likely to report if they also saw the expected discipline as fair than if they saw the expected discipline as unfair.

The interaction between seriousness and fairness was not significant when all main and interaction effects were included in the ordinal regression model for the “auto body kickback” scenario (Long et al., 2013). When the seriousness and fairness interaction term was added to the ordinal regression model for the “opportunistic theft” scenario, the interaction was found to be significant positive predictor. Respondents who had higher perceptions of seriousness and saw the expected discipline as fair were more willing to report than the respondents who also had higher perceptions of seriousness but viewed the expected discipline as unfair. The interaction between seriousness and fairness was found to be not significant when all main effects and interaction effects were taken into consideration for the “opportunistic theft” scenario (Long et al., 2013).

code of silence and supervisory status.

Past research empirically supports the assertion that an officer’s supervisory status is connected to his/her willingness to report misconduct (Kutnjak Ivković et al., 2018; Long et al.,

2013; Miceli, Near, & Schwenk, 1991; Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007a, 2007b). According to

Miceli and Near, whistleblowers are more likely to hold supervisory positions than those who choose not report misconduct (1996). Whistle blowing is also more effective when the initial report comes from someone with high status in the organization, implying that reports of wrongdoing from supervisors are more likely to be taken seriously (Near & Miceli, 1995). The results of Miceli, Near, and Schwenk’s survey of 590 internal auditors found that whistle- 64 blowers were more likely to have higher salaries and be more committed to their organizations

(1991). The positive association between higher salaries and higher levels of organizational commitment work in tandem to imply that supervisors are more likely to blow the whistle because 1) supervisors hold higher positions within their departments and 2) supervisors are well-versed in agency policies and place their focus on enforcing departmental rules and regulations (Manning, 1977; Reuss-Ianni, 1983; Rothwell & Baldwin, 2006).

Weisburd et al. (2001) surveyed 925 police officers in the United States and found that supervisors and non-supervisors differed in opinions substantially on several matters. Regarding opinions about whistle blowing, more non-supervisors believed that it was not worth the effort than supervisors. Code of silence opinions were such that a larger percentage of non- supervisors, in comparison to supervisors, believed that adhering to the Code is integral to fostering the mutual trust needed between officers to promote effective policing (Weisburd et al.,

2001).

Rothwell and Baldwin conducted several studies on the whistle-blowing behaviors and intentions of police officers and civilian public employees in Georgia (2006, 2007a, 2007b). In their 2006 study, which had a sample of 184 civilians and 198 police officers, the authors ran multiple regression analyses and learned that supervisory status was a significant positive predictor of willingness to all forms of misconduct asked about in the survey except felonies.

With regards to frequency of whistle-blowing, multiple regression analyses showed that supervisory status was a significant predictor of reporting minor violations (Rothwell &

Baldwin, 2006). 65

Using the same sample, Rothwell and Baldwin (2007a) regression analyses revealed that supervisory status was a significant positive predictor of a respondent’s willingness to report minor violations, major violations, and the violations in the scenarios from Klockar’s (1999) police integrity survey. An overall regression analysis indicated that supervisory status was significantly associated with willingness to report wrongdoing. Supervisory status was found to be a significant positive predictor of a respondent’s frequency of reporting minor violations

(Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007a).

The next study by Rothwell and Baldwin examined the responses from 168 civilians and

197 police officers from Georgia (2007b) and learned through regression analysis that supervisory status was a significant positive predictor of willingness to report for all forms of misconduct except felonies. A respondent’s status as a supervisor was also significantly associated with his/her frequency of reporting minor violations (2007b).

Through a study of police officers in the Czech Republic, Kutnjak Ivković and O’Connor

Shelley(2010) found that non-supervisors were significantly more likely than supervisors to adhere to the code of silence for three of the scenarios from Klockars (1999) survey: scenario 1: off-duty security business; scenario 2: free meals; and scenario 4: holiday gifts from merchants.

According to Gamarra’s research, supervisors were found to be significantly associated with willingness to report for the “excessive force” scenario, the “theft of a watch” scenario, and the

“speeding motorist bribe” scenario (2011).

Using the data from Klockars(1999), research by Long and his colleagues revealed that supervisory status was significantly associated with a higher likelihood of being willing to report for all four of the scenarios included in analysis (scenario 1: “free meals”, scenario 2: “punch for 66 fleeing”, scenario 3: “auto body kickback”, and scenario 4: “opportunistic theft”) (2013). An integrity survey of Australian police found that supervisors tended to be significantly more willing to report misconduct than their non-supervisor counterparts (Porter et al., 2015).

Porter and Prenzler conducted another study using the same data from Porter et al.’s

(2015) study and found there were five scenarios (scenario 1: gratuities, scenario 5: leave/errands, scenario 6: force-punch, scenario 7: rudeness, and scenario 8: omits-DUI) which a

significant amount of respondents were unwilling to report despite knowing those scenarios depicted behaviors that violated official policy. Using these five scenarios to study the differences between reporters and non-reporters, a series of chi square tests demonstrated that supervisors were significantly more likely to be willing to report scenarios 1, 5, 6, and 8.

However, logistic regressions did not find supervisory status to be a significant predictor of willingness to report in any of the five scenarios (Porter & Prenzler, 2016).

Ivković and her colleagues (2016) carried out multiple chi square tests on 604 police officers from the United States and found significant differences between supervisors and non- supervisors in regards to non-reporting for 10 of the 11 scenarios tested using Klockars et al.’s

(2007) survey (no significant differences between the two groups for scenario 4: unjustified deadly force).

Supervisors were shown to be less willing to adhere to the code of silence than non- supervisors for all 11 scenarios (Ivković, Peacock, et al., 2016). Using the same data, Kutnjak

Ivković and colleagues conducted a series of logistic regressions that revealed supervisory status was significantly associated with higher odds of being willing to report for eight of the 11 67 scenarios (scenario 1, scenario 2, scenario 3, scenario 5, scenario 6, scenario 7, scenario 9, and scenario 10) (2018).

Supervisory status has also been shown to be significantly associated with perceptions of seriousness (Gamarra, 2011; Kutnjak Ivković, 2005; Porter et al., 2015). Kutnjak Ivković examined differences in perceptions of seriousness across different countries and across supervisory status through a survey of 1,649 Croatian officers, 378 Finnish officers, and 3,235

American officers using Klockars’s (1999) police integrity questionnaire (2005). T-tests revealed that supervisors in Croatia were significantly more likely to give a higher rating of seriousness than line officers did in all 11 scenarios. The supervisors from the U.S. sample had significantly higher ratings of seriousness than the line officers for 10 of the 11 scenarios, with scenario 5: crime scene theft of watch having no significant differences (Kutnjak Ivković, 2005).

There were not as many differences in seriousness evaluations in the Finnish sample as Finnish supervisors were found to have significantly higher perceptions of seriousness for seven of the

11 scenarios than their line officer counterparts (scenario 2, scenario 4, scenario 6, scenario 8, scenario 9, scenario 10, and scenario 11) (2005). Porter et al.’s survey of Australian police found significant differences between evaluations of seriousness given by supervisors and non- supervisors (2015). Gamarra’s research provides weak support for the notion that supervisory status is associated with higher ratings of seriousness as supervisors were found to only have significantly higher ratings than line officers in the “excessive force” scenario (2011).

code of silence and length of service.

The code of silence and whistle blowing literature has had mixed results concerning the relationship between years as a police officer and willingness to report misconduct. Miceli and

Near (1992) provide an argument as to why such inconsistencies in the literature exist. The two 68 scholars draw attention to the fact that individuals with longer histories of employment with their organizations may be more likely to blow the whistle, but only on the behaviors that their organization considers wrong. On the other hand, newcomers may be more likely to blow the whistle on behaviors that are considered to be forms of misconduct by other standards, but are considered acceptable by the standards of their new organization (Miceli & Near, 1992). Loyalty is a key underlying factor as to why years of service are both positively and negatively associated with whistleblowing. Employees become more committed to their organizations and vice versa the longer they are a part of that organization; a senior employee is more likely to engage in whistleblowing if doing so is seen as beneficial to the organization and will not cause the senior employee to lose his/her employment perks (Miceli & Near, 1992).

In regards to positive associations between length of service and adherence to the code of silence, a few studies empirically support the existence of such a relationship. Rothschild and

Miethe’s survey of 761 respondents who worked in a variety of organizations revealed that whistleblower who utilized external channels to report wrongdoing had shorter histories of employment with their respective companies (1999). Rothwell and Baldwin’s analysis of police and public civilian employees in Georgia found that length of service was positively associated with adherence to the code of silence for misdemeanors and felonies (2007b). The existence of a negative relationship between length of service and the code of silence has found more support over the years.

A study of 4,897 respondents employed at 22 federal government departments and agencies found that individuals who reported wrongdoing were more likely to have worked at their respective organizations longer than inactive observers (Miceli & Near, 1988). Mesmer-

Magnus and Viswesvaran’s meta-analysis of whistleblowing research yielded the conclusion that 69 length of service is related to the actual act of whistleblowing, but not to the intention of it

(2005). Gamarra revealed a significant association between length of service and willingness to report for six of the 11 scenarios taken from Klockars’ (1999) police integrity survey (case 3, case 4, case 5, case 6, case 10, and case 11) (2011). A study of South African supervisors found that supervisors with at least 10 years of service were significantly associated with a greater willingness to report in six of the 11 scenarios than supervisors with two years or less of experience are associated with. These scenarios were the “red light violator bribe”, the “crime scene theft of watch”, the “auto body kickback”, the “holiday for tune-up”, the “drinks to ignore late bar close”, and the “theft from found wallet” scenarios (Ivkovich & Sauerman, 2013). Long and his colleagues’ analysis of Klockars’ (1999) survey data similarly revealed a positive association between length of service and willingness to report for the auto-body kickback scenario and the crime scene theft of watch scenario (2013). A survey of police officers in

Australia revealed that length of service was also found, on average, to have a moderately significant positive relationship with willingness to report (Porter et al., 2015).

In contrast, there are also a number of studies which have failed to find any significant relationship between length of service and willingness to report or incidents of reporting

(Barnett, Cochran, & Taylor, 1993; Kutnjak Ivković et al., 2018; Rothwell & Baldwin, 2006,

2007a; Sims & Keenan, 1998; Singer, Mitchell, & Turner, 1998). Other studies, like Kutnjak

Ivković and Sauerman’s second survey of police officers across South Africa, yielded results suggesting a significant association between length of service and willingness to report misconduct that is weak and almost non-existent (2012).

The lack of an association between length of service and whistle-blowing intentions and behaviors does support Miceli and Near’s (1992) assertion that both new employees and senior 70 employees can be driven to report wrongdoing. Rothwell and Baldwin (2007a), drawing upon

Crank’s (2004) study of the police, theorized that their failure to find a relationship between length of service and willingness to report could be indicative of a rivalry between the informal norms which discourage the report of peer misconduct and the official rules and regulations which are meant to encourage reporting. In regards to the connection between length of service and perceptions of seriousness, Gamarra found weak support for a relationship as the police officers in the sample who had been in service longer were more likely to view the “free meals” scenario and the “excessive force” scenario as being more serious than their less experienced counterparts (2011).

Porter et al. also found a similarly weak, but significant positive relationship between years of service and perceptions of seriousness (2015). In addition, while no tests were conducted specifically to determine the relationship between length of service and perceptions of seriousness, Ivkovich and Sauerman (2013) did indicate that the six scenarios which revealed a significant association between length of service and adherence to the code of silence were also the scenarios that the respondents had rated as the most serious.

Methods

This paper considers the dynamics of the demographic, positional, and perceptual differences within groups of police officers as they relate to reporting on various police behavior considered inappropriate or corrupt. Figure 1 outlines this conceptual framework. The variables of interest below follow the dynamics of this model as well.

71

Figure 1: Conceptual Model of Proposed Relationship

Independent Variable Dependent

Offense Willingness to Report Seriousness Misconduct

Moderator Control Discipline Fairness Rank Supervisory Status Current Assignment Length of Service Agency Type

Measures

independent variable.

The independent variable chosen for this study is offense seriousness. Offense seriousness is defined as the extent to which police officers view a particular misconduct as grave and deserving of a thought-out response designed to curtail any future repeats of that behavior. According to research carried out in the past, the perceived seriousness of a behavior is a strong predictor for whether an officer will report the behavior (Hickman et al., 2016;

Kutnjak Ivković et al., 2018; Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007b). This concept is measured using the question “how serious do you consider this behavior to be” for each of the scenarios that will be looked at for this study (Klockars, 1997). This question in each scenario was measured with a 5 point Likert item, ranging from 1 = not at all serious to 5 = very serious. 72

dependent variable.

For this study, my dependent variable is the willingness to report misconduct. It is measured with the question “do you think you would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behavior” (Klockars, 1997). This question is measured with a 5 point Likert item, ranging from 1 = definitely not to 5 = definitely yes. This variable and measure is a sufficient way to measure the code of silence and the degree to which police officers practice it.

moderating variables.

The empirical support found for Kutnjak Ivkovich and Klockars’ (1996) simple justice and simple deterrence models, and the results of Long et al.’s (2013) research has led to the decision to include disciplinary fairness as one of the moderators being tested in this study. This decision is also based on the proposed model Huberts, Lamboo, and Punch (2003) gives to potentially explain the relationship between offense seriousness and willingness to report. The significant interactions between seriousness and fairness that Long and his colleagues (2013) found could be explained by the theoretical models of disciplinary fairness proposed by Kutnjak

Ivkovich and Klockars (1996). As previously mentioned, the “auto body kickback” and

“opportunistic theft” scenarios each depict a significant interaction between offense seriousness and fairness. When perceptions of seriousness are kept constant, police officers who viewed the expected discipline as fair were more likely to be willing to report than police officers who have an unfair perception of the expected discipline (Long et al., 2013). This interaction effect may be explained by the simple justice model which argues that police officers are more likely to report officer misconduct if the expected discipline is seen as fair (Kutnjak Ivkovich & Klockars,

1996); as a result, the relationship between offense seriousness and willingness to report misconduct is strengthened if the expected discipline is seen as fair. 73

Based on the previous research examining the relationship between perceptions of discipline fairness, offense seriousness, and willingness to report, discipline fairness will have either a positive or a negative effect on the relationship between offense seriousness and willingness to report. In particular, it is hypothesized that if perceptions of harsh or lenient discipline both result in the relationship between offense seriousness and willingness to report being weakened, such a result would be because of the simple justice model (Kutnjak Ivkovich

& Klockars, 1996). This hypothesis is based on Long et al.’s (2013) work, which found that a fair perception of discipline strengthened the relationship between offense seriousness and willingness to report for the “auto-body kickback” and the “opportunistic theft” scenarios.

Perceptions of unfair discipline are also likely to have a negative effect on the relationship between offense seriousness and willingness to report because whistle-blowers tend rate their organization as more fair than their counterparts do (Near & Miceli, 1996). If either perceptions of a harsh discipline or lenient discipline strengthens the relationship between offense seriousness and willingness to report, it is hypothesized that the simple deterrence model can explain the positive effect of harsh discipline on this relationship (Kutnjak Ivkovich & Klockars,

1996).

Discipline fairness is defined as whether a police officer believes that the punishment a fellow officer would receive for engaging in an act of corruption or misconduct is appropriate for that particular act. Taking note from past researchers, this variable is measured by calculating the difference between two questions. The first question is “If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was discovered doing so, what if any discipline do you think SHOULD follow?” , and the second question is “If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was discovered doing so, what if any discipline do you think WOULD follow?” Both of these 74 questions were measured using a 6-point Likert item (1 = none, 2 = verbal reprimand, 3 = written reprimand, 4 = period of suspension, 5 = demotion in rank, and 6 = dismissal) (Klockars, 1999).

Drawing on previous research (Ivković, Peacock, et al., 2016; Kutnjak Ivkovich & Klockars,

1996; Long et al., 2013), an intermediate variable (DISC) was created to indicate the level of discrepancy between appropriate discipline and expected discipline, where DISC = (should— would) with a score range of -5 to 5. From there I transformed the scores into three categories:

“too harsh”, “fair”, and “too lenient” by coding all negative nonzero values to 1 (“too harsh”), all zero values to 2 (“fair”), and all positive nonzero values to 3 (“too lenient”).

A Spearman’s correlation tested the relationship between the appropriate discipline and the expected discipline for each of the six scenarios included in the analysis. For the off-duty business scenario, there is a strong, positive correlation between appropriate discipline and expected discipline that is statistically significant, rs = 0.7290, p ≤ 0.0001. Regarding the scenario wherein a speeding motorist bribes an officer in exchange for no citation, a statistically significant relationship is found between the measures of appropriate discipline and expected discipline that is both strong and positive, rs = 0.7210, p ≤ 0.0001. A strong, positive relationship that is statistically significant is found between the measures of appropriate discipline and expected discipline for the theft at a burglary crime scene scenario, rs = 0.6909, p

≤ 0.0001. There is a strong, positive relationship between appropriate discipline and expected discipline for the officer DUI accident and cover-up scenario which is statistically significant, rs

= 0.7019, p ≤ 0.0001. The measures for the appropriate discipline and the expected discipline for the holiday for tune-up of supervisor’s car scenario demonstrated a strong, positive correlation that is statistically significant, rs = 0.7532, p ≤ 0.0001. For the excessive force on car thief 75 scenario, there is a strong, positive correlation between appropriate discipline and expected discipline which is statistically significant, rs = 0.7376, p ≤ 0.0001.

Table 1 Correlation Between Appropriate Discipline and Expected Discipline

Scenarios rs p(t)

Off-Duty Business 0.7290 p ≤ 0.0001

Speeding Motorist Bribe 0.7210 p ≤ 0.0001

Theft at a Burglary Crime Scene 0.6909 p ≤ 0.0001

Officer DUI Accident and Cover-up 0.7019 p ≤ 0.0001

Holiday for Tune-up (Supervisor) 0.7532 p ≤ 0.0001

Excessive Force on Car Thief 0.7376 p ≤ 0.0001

The empirical support showing that supervisors are more willing to report misconduct and tend to view that misconduct as more serious than their line officers do has led to the decision to include supervisory status as a moderator to be tested in this study. This decision is also grounded in previous research which found that significantly more supervisors were more likely to give minor forms of misconduct higher ratings of seriousness than line officers and were similarly more willing to support those same violations (Ivković, Peacock, et al., 2016;

Kutnjak Ivković, 2005; Kutnjak Ivković & O’Connor Shelley, 2010; Westmarland & Rowe,

2018). These findings suggest that supervisory status may have an effect on the relationship between offense seriousness and willingness to report misconduct, especially minor forms of misconduct, because supervisors are given a considerable amount of training in ethics and integrity (e.g., Lim & Sloan, 2016; Vito et al., 2011) and are highly knowledgeable about departmental rules and regulations. Furthermore, supervisors tend to operate on the premise that it is their responsibility to report misdemeanors and other forms of misconduct which are 76 committed by other officers within their agencies (Reuss-Ianni, 1983; Rothwell & Baldwin,

2006; Weisburd et al., 2001; Westmarland & Rowe, 2018).

Based on the findings of previous researchers regarding the relationships between offense seriousness, willingness to report, and supervisory status, the conclusion drawn is that supervisory status will most likely have a positive effect on the relationship between offense seriousness and willingness to report, especially for offenses that are minor forms of corruption.

If supervisory status does strengthen the relationship between offense seriousness and willingness to report, such a positive effect will be because of the extensive training that supervisors receive in ethics and integrity (Lim & Sloan, 2016; Vito et al., 2011). In addition, the effect of supervisory status on the relationship between offense seriousness and willingness to report will be more evident for minor forms of corruption. This is because supervisors tend to rate minor corruption more serious than non-supervisors do, and they similarly express more of a willingness to report minor corruption than their non-supervisor counterparts do (Kutnjak

Ivković & O’Connor Shelley, 2010; Westmarland & Rowe, 2018).

Supervisory status is defined as whether a police officer is in a supervisory position such as a captain, sheriff, major, or other such position (Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007b). Due to the requirements of their jobs, officers in supervisory positions are more likely to report the misconduct of other officers, especially their subordinates as their behavior will reflect poorly on the supervisors (Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007b, pp. 4–5). In order to measure this concept the question “are you a supervisor or a non-supervisor?” will be used. Originally this item was coded so that 1 = “non-supervisor” and 2 = “supervisor”, but it was recoded to 0 = “non- supervisor” and 1 = “supervisor”. There were 614 respondents (19.76%) who indicated that they were a supervisor. 77

While the previous research does not consistently indicate a relationship between length of service and willingness to report (e.g., Ivkovich & Sauerman, 2013; Mesmer-Magnus &

Viswesvaran, 2005; Rothschild & Miethe, 1999; Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007a) length of service is included in this study as one of the moderators being tested due in part to this very inconsistency. Previous research (Rothwell & Baldwin, 2006, 2007a, 2007b) has included length of service in their analyses of willingness to report misconduct as a way to measure socialization.

Scholars argue that police officers who are part of a group with deviant norms and values such as the code of silence will learn to internalize and act in accordance to the group’s norms and values through socialization and coercion(Barker, 1977; Crank, 2004; Newburn, 1999;

Porter, 2011; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). The decision to include length of service as a moderator is also based on the presence of a significant relationship between the number of years a police officer has served and his/her evaluations of seriousness (Gamarra, 2011; Porter et al., 2015).

Gamarra’s informal interviews with some of the surveyed officers revealed that their opinions regarding which behaviors were violations of agency policy changed over the years. These changes in seriousness perceptions are due to senior officers having more experiences where they learn firsthand which behaviors their police agency will not tolerate(Gamarra, 2011).

Based on the previous research examining the relationship between length of service and willingness to report, and the relationship between length of service and offense seriousness, length of service will have an effect on the relationship between offense seriousness and willingness to report. If length of service has a positive effect on the relationship between offense seriousness and willingness to report, it is hypothesized that such an effect will be because senior officers tend to be more knowledgeable of departmental policies and are less tolerant of violations of those policies (Gamarra, 2011). In addition, length of service could have 78 a positive effect on the relationship between offense seriousness and willingness to report because officers in supervisory positions usually have more years of experience as a police officer. On the other hand, if length of service has a negative effect on the relationship between offense seriousness and willingness to report, it is hypothesized that socialization into a subculture that stresses the importance of the code could explain such an effect (Crank, 2004;

Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993)

Length of service is defined as the overall number of years that the respondent has served as a police officer. Police officers who have served more years at their current agency are more likely to report misconduct because they demonstrate significant levels of organization commitment, and they have more familiarity with the procedures of their agency that pertain to reporting misconduct (Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007a, 2007b). The measure being used for this variable is the question “how many years have you been employed at your current police agency?”. This question is measured with a 7 point Likert item (1 = less than 1 year, 2 = 1-2 years, 3 = 3-5 years, 4 = 6-10 years, 5 = 11-15 years, 6 = 16-20 years, and 7 = Over 20 years)

(Klockars, 1999).

control variables.

Several factors are thought to be an influence on the relationship between the independent and dependent variables, and so they will be controlled for in the analyses. One such variable is rank, which is conceptualized as the position of the respondent in the para- militaristic hierarchy of the police force. Due to its similarity to the moderator variable supervisory status, rank has been chosen as a control variable. A Chi-square test of independence found that there is an association between the two variables (X2(10, N = 3,070) =

2,700, p ≤ 0.0001). This factor is measured with the question “what is your rank?” (1 = recruit, 2 79

= corporal, 3 = lieutenant, 4 = colonel, 5 = officer, 6 = detective, 7 = captain, 8 = chief/sheriff, 9

= deputy, 10 = sergeant, and 11 = major) (Klockars, 1999). For ease of interpretation, this variable was collapsed into four categories. Recruits, officers, deputies, and detectives were placed in one group (1 = line officers), corporals and sergeant were placed in another group (2 = first-line supervisors), lieutenants and captains were placed in their own group (3 = middle managers), and majors, colonels, and chiefs/sheriffs were placed in the final category (4 = top administrators).

An additional control variable is the current assignment of the respondent, which is defined as the type of work that the respondent is currently doing. There have been mixed results with respect to the association between work assignment and willingness to report misconduct. Rothwell and Baldwin (2007b) found that in comparison to officers assigned to patrol units, both officers assigned to investigative units and officers assigned to professional standards units are significantly more likely to report misconduct. Additionally, Long et al. revealed that officers assigned to communications and administrative positions are more inclined to report misconduct than officers assigned to patrol units and detective/special operation units

(2013). On the other hand, a study examining police in Croatia found no difference in intention to report misconduct among police officers assigned to patrol, investigation, and community- policing units (Ivković, Morgan, Mraović, & Borovec, 2018). This concept is measured with the question “which of the following best describes your current assignment?” (1 = patrol, 2 = on- call or control, 3 = detective/investigative, 4 = traffic, 5 = administrative, and 6 = other)

(Klockars, 1999).

A third control variable is the agency, which is described as being the type of agency that the respondent is working in at the time of the survey. There are conflicting theories regarding 80 the association between organization size and unwillingness to report peer misconduct. Miceli and Near (1992, p. 156) postulate that members of large organizations are less likely to report misconduct internally for a few reasons. One such reason is that the information may never reach the intended party/parties due to the number of channels it would have to go through. An additional reason is that individuals may not be aware that there are official channels for this type of information. Conversely, it has also been theorized that individuals in large organizations are more likely to report misconduct externally because there is a greater tendency for these organizations to have measures in place to protect potential whistle-blowers and treat them fairly

(Miceli & Near, 1985, 1992).

Previous research looking at the relationship between agency size and the code of silence has had some mixed results (Krinsky, 2016). While some studies have found a statistically significant association between agency size and adherence to the code (Barnett, 1992; Miceli &

Near, 1985, 1992; Near & Miceli, 1996), others have report failing to find such a relationship in their research (Ivković, Mraović, & Borovec, 2016; Lim & Sloan, 2016; Rothwell & Baldwin,

2007a, 2007b). This factor is measured with the question “Which of the following best describes your police agency?” [1 = very large municipal police (more than 500 sworn officers), 2 = large municipal police (201-500 sworn officers), 3 = medium-sized municipal police (75-200 sworn officers), 4 = small municipal police (25-75 sworn officers), 5 = very small municipal police

(less than 25 sworn officers), 6 = state police, 7 = sheriff, and 8 = county police] (Klockars,

1999).

Data, Participants, and Sampling

The dataset being used for this study was collected by Carl Klockars in his survey on police corruption (Klockars, 1999). He writes that the purpose of his survey was to evaluate the 81 perceptions of corruption that police officers have, as well as their tolerance for corruption. In contrast to the popular opinion that police corruption can be explained by individual characteristics such as a lack of morals, this study looks at corruption from an organizational standpoint (Klockars, 1999, p. 1). Through this research, Klockars intended to answer several questions concerning factors such as knowledge of official rules concerning prohibited behaviors, the expected punishments of the prohibited behaviors, and the strength of the occupational culture’s condemnation of the prohibited behaviors, to name a few (1999). In his survey, Klockars asked questions about hypothetical scenarios as opposed to asking officers about their own activities or the activities of their fellow officers because it would provide a more realistic report of officers’ views on corruption (Klockars, 1999, p. 3).

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Table 2: Demographic Characteristics of Sample

Demographic N % Characteristics

Agency Type Sheriff 60 1.86 County 387 11.97 Very Small Municipal 93 2.88 (<25) Small Municipal (25- 215 6.65 75)

Medium Municipal 292 9.03 (76-200) Large Municipal (201- 251 7.77 500) Very Large Municipal 1,934 59.84 (500+) Assignment Patrol 2,004 62.0 On-call/Control 475 14.70 Traffic 10 0.31 Administrative 192 5.94 Other 160 4.95 Supervisory Position Supervisor 633 19.59 Non-Supervisor 2,557 79.12 Years as a Police Officer Less than 1 year 132 4.08 1-2 years 248 7.67 3-5 years 495 15.32 6-10 years 777 24.04 11-15 years 522 16.15 16-20 years 448 13.86 More than 20 years 563 17.42 83

Table 2 details the characteristics of the officers that make up the sample. An overwhelming majority (59.84%) of the respondents worked in municipal agencies with more than 500 officers. Sheriff agencies had the least number of respondents (1.86%). With the exception of County agencies, which 11.97% of the respondents are from, the rest of the agencies had less than 10 percent each of the respondents. The results of Table 2 shows that the respondents were most likely to be in a patrol assignment (62.0%), followed by on-call/control, administrative, other, and traffic assignments. Only 19.59% of the respondents reported being a supervisor. Table 2 also shows that a majority of the respondents (24.04%) have six to ten years of experience as an officer. Officers who have served three to five years, 11-15 years, 16-20 years, and more than 20 years each comprise between 10 and 20 percent of the sample population. Those who have either less than a year as an officer or one to two years as an officer contain less than 10 percent of the sample population each.

Data was collected one time through a survey, which was made up of several Likert-type scales (Klockars, 1999, p. 5). The survey consisted of asking respondents to look at 11 hypothetical scenarios involving a police officer engaging in some type of misconduct and answering questions about each scenario. The questions in the survey concentrated on the seriousness of the behavior in the scenario, the expected and fitting discipline for the behavior, and the willingness of officers to report the behavior (Klockars, 1999, p. 5). Some of the scenarios in the survey included issues such as officers accepting free meals and gifts, officers accepting bribes, officers having an off-duty security business, officers using excessive force, officers taking money or other valuable items from a crime scene, and officers drinking while on duty (Klockars, 1999, p. 5). For this study, I will be examining six of the eleven scenarios from the questionnaire, and they are as follows: 84

Case 1: A police officer runs his own private business in which he sells and installs security devices, such as alarms, special locks, etc. He does this work during his off-duty hours.

Case 2: At 2 A.M. a police officer, who is on duty, is driving his patrol car on a deserted road. He sees a vehicle that has been driven off the road and is stuck in a ditch. He approaches the vehicle and observes that the driver is not hurt but is obviously intoxicated. He also finds that the driver is a police officer. Instead of reporting this accident and offense he transports the driver to his home.

Case 3: Two police officers on foot patrol surprise a man who is attempting to break into an automobile. The man flees. They chase him for about two blocks before apprehending him by tackling him and wrestling him to the ground. After he is under control, both officers punch him a couple of times in the stomach as punishment for fleeing and resisting. (Klockars, 1999, p. 29)

Case 4: A police officer, who happens to be a very good auto mechanic, is scheduled to work during coming holidays. A supervisor offers to give him these days off, if he agrees to tune-up his supervisor’s personal car. Evaluate the

SUPERVISOR’S behavior.

Case 5: A police officer stops a motorist for speeding. The officer agrees to accept a personal gift of half the amount of the fine in exchange for not issuing a citation.

Case 6: A police officer discovers a burglary of a jewelry shop. The display cases are smashed and it is obvious that many items have been taken. While searching 85

the shop, he takes a watch, worth about two days’ pay for that officer. He reports

that the watch had been stolen during the burglary.

The above scenarios are listed in order of seriousness. I chose to include these scenarios in particular because they vary in terms of how serious respondents perceived them to be.

According to Klockars and his colleagues (2000), the police officers who filled out the survey rated Case 1 (off-duty business) as being the least serious. Cases 7 (holiday for tune-up), 8

(police DUI accident and cover-up), and 10 (excessive force on car thief) were given intermediate seriousness ratings, and Cases 3 (speeding motorist bribe) and 5 (crime scene theft of watch) were rated as the most serious. This variety in seriousness ratings will allow me to examine the effects of the potential moderators across different levels of perceived seriousness.

In addition, I also chose to these scenarios because they presented a variety of different types of corrupt behaviors, thus allowing me to see how the potential effects of the chosen moderators vary across an additional dimension.

Westmarland categorized the scenarios from Klockars’(1999) survey into one of three categories for his research. The first category is administrative corruption, which entails petty rule breaking. The second category is noble cause corruption, which is a more serious form of corruption but does not result in direct financial gain for the offending officer. The third and final category is acquisitive corruption, which entails behaviors that are considered very serious and result in monetary gain or other tangible reward for the officer involved (2005, pp. 149–

152). The off-duty business and the holiday for tune-up scenarios were placed under administrative corruption, the police DUI accident and cover-up and excessive force on car thief scenarios were placed under noble cause corruption, and the speeding motorist bribe and crime scene theft of watch scenarios were placed under acquisitive corruption (Westmarland, 2005). 86

Analytic Strategy

STATA 15.1 was used to analyze the data. First, respondents who did not answer “yes” to the survey question “Did you give your honest opinion in filling out this questionnaire” were dropped, leaving a final sample size of 3,107. A check for multicollinearity introduced by Ender

(2010) was used, which determined that the data do not suffer from multicollinearity. Multiple imputation by chained equations (MICE) was carried out using a STATA command (StataCorp,

2017). Four separate ordinal regressions were ran for each scenario because the dependent variable has ordered categories.

A check for the proportional odds assumption introduced by Wolfe and Gould (1998) found that most of the models failed to meet the proportional odds assumption. Generalized ordered logit models were estimated using William’s (2006, 2016) work and then compared with proportional odds ordinal regression models. A check for multi-model inference using information criteria introduced by Luchman (2014) found equal Akaike’s Information (AIC) and

Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) scores between the proportional odds ordinal regression models and their respective generalized ordered logit models, signifying neither model is the superior one. The results of the proportional odds ordinal regression models are reported in this thesis. The variables “offense seriousness” and “length of service in general” were treated as continuous for ease of interpretation. This decision was based on the findings of previous research (D. R. Johnson & Creech, 1983; Norman, 2010; Rhemtulla, Brosseau-Liard, & Savalei,

2012).

The first regression model measures the effect of the independent variable and the control variables on the dependent variable. The second, third, and fourth regression models each added one moderator variable (second model—Discipline Fairness; third model—Supervisory Status; 87 fourth model—Length of Service) to the first regression model in order to determine the effect of the tested moderator variable on the relationship between the independent variable and dependent variable. A post-estimation command introduced by STATA (2017) was used to run a joint test of coefficients (aka Wald test) on each of the models containing a moderator variable to determine if the interaction between the independent and moderator variables was significantly associated with the dependent variable.

missing data.

Once the data is limited only to people who answered “yes” to, “did you give your honest opinion in filling out this questionnaire”, there are 3,107 people in the sample. Of the ones who did not answer “yes”, 69 respondents (2.13%) answered that they were not honest when filling out the questionnaire, and 56 of the respondents (1.7%) did not answer the question. Overall,

8.88% (n = 276) of the people in this sample are missing data on at least one variable. In order to test the assumption that the data is missing completely at random (MCAR) a number of chi square tests were conducted to see if there is a significant difference between the respondents and non-respondents of one variable based on their responses to at least one other variable in the dataset. A chi-square test showed significant differences between the missing and non-missing cases in the following variables pertaining to the off-duty security business scenario: offense seriousness, p ≤ 0.0001; willingness to report misconduct, p ≤ 0.0001; and appropriate discipline, p ≤ 0.0001. For the variables pertaining to the speeding motorist bribe scenario, a chi-square test showed significant differences between missing and non-missing cases for the following variables: willingness to report misconduct, p ≤ 0.0001; offense seriousness, p ≤ 0.0001; appropriate discipline, p ≤ 0.0001; and expected discipline, p ≤ 0.01. The following variables were found to have a significant difference between missing and non-missing cases for the theft 88 at a burglary crime scene scenario: willingness to report misconduct, p ≤ 0.0001; offense seriousness, p ≤ 0.0001; appropriate discipline, p ≤ 0.01; and expected discipline, p ≤ 0.0001.

Chi-square tests revealed a significant difference between the missing and non-missing cases for the following variables in the holiday for tune-up scenario: offense seriousness, p ≤

0.05; appropriate discipline, p ≤ 0.001; and expected discipline, p ≤ 0.05. The following variables concerning to the police DUI accident and cover-up scenario showed significant differences between missing and non-missing cases: willingness to report misconduct, p ≤ 0.01; offense seriousness, p ≤ 0.05; appropriate discipline, p ≤ 0.0001; and expected discipline, p ≤

0.01. Significant differences were found between the missing and non-missing cases of the following variables in the excessive force on a car thief scenario: willingness to report misconduct, p ≤ 0.05; offense seriousness, p ≤ 0.05; appropriate discipline, p ≤ 0.05; and expected discipline, p ≤ 0.05.

For the variable concerning whether the respondent is a supervisor or not, a chi-square test revealed that there was a significant difference between the missing and non-missing cases at the p ≤ 0.05 level. A chi-square test indicated that there was a significant difference between the missing and non-missing cases for the general length of service variable at the p ≤ 0.0001 level.

There was a significant difference between missing and non-missing cases for the rank variable at the p ≤ 0.0001 level. A chi-square test indicated a significant difference between missing and non-missing cases for the assignment variable at the p ≤ 0.05 level. Overall, the results of these chi-square tests indicated that the data in this study is either missing at random (MAR) or missing not at random (MNAR). The significant differences between the respondents and non- respondents indicate that the issue of the missing data will need to be addressed using one of the established methods. 89

A search of the missing data literature was conducted to determine which method will be used to treat the missing data in this study. In comparison to traditional approaches such as listwise deletion, pairwise deletion, and single-value imputation, model-based approaches such as multiple imputation (MI), maximum-likelihood (ML) methods, and expectation-maximization

(EM) have been found to be the better tools for handling missing data (Graham, 2012; Howell,

2007; J. L. Schafer & Graham, 2002). This superiority is based on the fact that, unlike traditional methods, model-based methods do not produce biased parameter estimates for MCAR and MAR data thanks to their ability to include auxiliary variables in their models (Allison,

2012; Enders, 2010; Graham, 2009; Howell, 2007). Researchers have also evaluated the advantages and disadvantages of MI, ML, and EM in comparison to one another to ascertain which method is to be recommended (Allison, 2012; Dong & Joanne Peng, 2013; Graham, 2009;

Graham, Olchowski, & Gilreath, 2007; Little, Jorgensen, Lang, & Moore, 2014; Peng & Zhu,

2008; Sinharay, Stern, & Russell, 2001; Wu, Jia, & Enders, 2015).

Out of the three model-based approaches, a decision to use multiple imputation to address the issue of missing data in this data set because multiple researchers lauded the advantages of

MI over the other model-based methods. One researcher found that MI was better suited to dealing with missing data in categorical variables than EM (Peng & Zhu, 2008). Sinharay and his colleagues (2001) discussed several advantages of MI in their review. One significant advantage of MI is that if the data is modeled correctly and the covariates used have a strong correlation with one another, one can obtain good results regardless of the missing data mechanism (Sinharay et al., 2001, p. 328). Another advantage that the flexible and generalizable nature of MI allows it to be applicable to a wider variety of problems than ML (2001). Multiple imputation is also considered to be computationally simple when compared to maximum- 90 likelihood because one can equip multiple models to a data set with imputed missing values without having to impute said data set multiple times to make it compatible with each model

(Dong & Joanne Peng, 2013; Sinharay et al., 2001). MI is also considered to be better suited for

Likert scale items because it allows for missing data to be imputed at the item-level, whereas ML methods would have to regard any Likert scales that have at least one missing value as incomplete (Gottschall, West, & Enders, 2012; Wu et al., 2015).

Analysis

Descriptive Statistics

The analysis begins in Table 3 by presenting details about the means, standard deviations, modes, and percentages respondents’ answers to the questions of interest in Klockar’s (1999) survey. As shown in Table 3, officers in the current sample are least likely to report corruption portrayed in the off-duty security business scenario (M = 1.37, SD = 0.93), with 82% of the respondents reporting they would definitely not report the behavior. For the police DUI accident and cover-up scenario the mode for willingness to report was “definitely not”, with approximately 43% of the officers in the sample giving this answer, and the average score is 2.34

(SD = 1.45). The mean willingness to report score for the excessive force on a car thief scenario is 3.39 (SD = 1.51), and 35% of the respondents say they would definitely report the misconduct.

Table 3 also shows that the speeding motorist bribe scenario was reported as being the second most likely of the six scenarios that the surveyed officers would report (M = 4.19, SD =

1.26), and a mode of “definitely yes” is given. The scenario that the respondents are most willing to report was the theft at a burglary crime scene scenario (M = 4.54, SD = 1.06), with

79% of the respondents saying that they would definitely report the behavior. 91

Regarding offense seriousness, the scenario perceived as being the most serious is the theft at a burglary crime scene scenario (M = 4.96, SD = 0.31), with 97% of the respondents stating that they found the behavior to be very serious. Table 3 shows the scenario perceived as being the second most serious is the speeding motorist bribe scenario (M = 4.92, SD = 037), with a mode of “very serious”. Next in the serious rankings is the holiday for tune-up scenario, wherein the average score is 4.18 (SD = 1.040 and the mode is “very serious”. The respondents perceive the excessive force on a car thief scenario as being fourth in the serious rankings (M =

4.05, SD = 1.23), with a mode of “very serious”. The second least serious scenario according to the respondents is the police DUI accident and cover-up scenario: the mean score is 3.02 (SD =

1.39), and the mode score is 3. The off-duty security business scenario is considered to be the least serious of the six scenarios (M = 1.45, SD = 0.94), with around 75% of the respondents reporting that the behavior is not at all serious.

For the moderator variable discipline fairness, all six scenarios have a reported mode of

“fair”. Depicted in Table 3, the mean discipline fairness scores for the scenarios ranged from

1.79 to 2.09, indicating that the average respondent tends to view the expected disciplinary actions for each of the scenarios as relatively fair. The mode for supervisor status is “non- supervisor”. For the moderator variable length of service, the mode is “6 to 10 years”, with about 24% of the respondents reporting that they have been a police officer within that range of time.

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Variables in the Analysis (N = 3,107)

Case 1: Off-Duty Case 2: Police Case 3: Excessive Case 4: Holiday Case 5: Speeding Case 6: Theft at a Security Business DUI Accident and Force on Car for Tune-up Motorist Bribe Burglary Crime Variables Cover-up Thief (Supervisor) Scene M Mode M Mode M Mode M Mode M Mode M Mode (SD) (%) (SD) (%) (SD) (%) (SD) (%) (SD) (%) (SD) (%) Dependent Variable Willingness to Report 1.37 Definitely 2.34 Definitely 3.39 Definitely 3.45 Definitely 4.19 Definitely 4.54 Definitely (0.93) Not (1.45) Not (1.51) Yes (1.45) Yes (1.26) Yes (1.06) Yes (82.18) (42.95) (35.11) (34.50) (63.40) (79.04) Independent Variable Offense Seriousness 1.45 Not at all 3.02 3 (23.59) 4.05 Very 4.18 Very 4.92 Very 4.96 Very (0.94) Serious (1.39) (1.23) Serious (1.04) Serious (0.37) Serious (0.31) Serious (75.48) (52.17) (51.09) (94.69) (97.35) Moderator Variables Discipline Fairness 1.91 Fair 1.79 Fair 1.87 Fair 2.09 Fair 2.03 Fair 2.06 Fair (0.41) (82.65) (0.58) (61.89) (0.52) (70.87) (0.54) (70.26) (0.47) (77.86) (0.35) (87.64) Supervisor Status a n/a Non-Supervisor (80.13) Length of Service a 4.54 6 to 10 (1.69) years (24.37) Control Variables a Rank n/a Line Officers (79.11) Current Assignment a n/a Patrol (63.12) Size of Police n/a Very Large Municipal Police (More than 500 sworn officers) Agency a (59.41) a: The descriptive statistics for the indicated moderator variables and the control variables are the same for all six scenarios

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Regarding the control variable of rank, 79% of the respondents indicated they are line officers. The results in Table 3 demonstrate that for the variable current assignment, most of the respondents (63%) report that they work in patrol. The third control variable, the agency, shows that 59% of the respondents worked in very large municipal police departments, which have more than 500 sworn officers.

Offense Seriousness

As previously indicated the scenarios tested here are grouped into one of three categories pertaining to their perceived ethical severity. The “off-duty security business” scenario poses a low-level ethical problem. The “police DUI and cover-up”, the “excessive force on a car thief”, and the “holiday for tune-up” scenarios pose intermediate-level ethical problems. Finally, the

“speeding motorist bribe” and the “theft at a burglary scene” scenarios pose high-level ethical problems. While Tables 4, 5, 6, and 7 present a more summarized view of the regression models, more detailed tables (Tables 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14) are also provided.

Respondents who reported viewing the behaviors in the six scenarios as more serious are significantly associated with higher odds of willingness to report at the p < 0.001 level in almost all of the regression models. The one exception is found in the length of service model for the

“speeding motorist bribe” scenario, which reports a positive association between offense seriousness and willingness to report that is also significant. In addition, Table 5 shows that offense seriousness has the largest odds ratios in the models that include discipline fairness as a moderator. The models that included offense seriousness and the control variables reported the next highest odds ratios for offense seriousness (Table 4). The third highest odds ratios for offense seriousness are in the models that included supervisor status as a moderator (Table 6), and the models that included length of service as a moderator report the fourth highest odds 94 ratios for offense seriousness (Table 7). The supervisor model and length of service models for the “excessive force on a car thief” scenario are the exceptions to this order as the model in Table

7 reports a higher odds ratio for offense seriousness than the model in Table 6 does.

Overall, for the models that included the independent variable and the control variables, offense seriousness is found to be the strongest predictor of “theft at a burglary crime scene”, followed by “excessive force on a car thief”, “off-duty security business”, “Police DUI accident

and cover-up”, “holiday for tune-up”, and “speeding motorist bribe” (Table 4). These results are interesting because, while the “theft at a burglary crime scene” scenario showed the highest odds ratios (OR = 4.734) out of these six models, the “off-duty security business” scenario reports the second highest odds ratios (OR = 4.590). The “speeding motorist bribe” scenario reports the lowest odds ratio (OR = 3.357) for offense seriousness despite being ranked as the second most serious scenario. These findings suggest that other factors besides respondent’s perceptions of event seriousness influence a greater likelihood of reporting.

For the models that include discipline fairness as a potential moderator, offense seriousness achieves the highest odds ratio in “theft at a burglary scene”, followed by “off-duty security business”, “excessive force on a car thief”, “police DUI accident and cover-up”,

“holiday for tune-up”, and “speeding motorist bribe”. The inclusion of discipline fairness as a moderator variable in the models also resulted in reported odds ratios for offense seriousness that do not reflect respondent’s perceptions of event seriousness. Table 5 shows that while “theft at a burglary crime scene” scenario reports the highest odds ratio (OR = 5.069) for offense seriousness, the second highest association between offense seriousness and willingness to report

(OR = 4.958) is found in the “off-duty security business” scenario.

Table 4: Odds Ratios (OR) and p-values of the Models containing only the Main Effects (N = 3,107) 95 Case 1: Off-Duty Case 8: Police Case 10: Case 7: Holiday Case 3: Speeding Case 5: Theft at a Predictors of Security DUI Accident and Excessive Force for Tune-up Motorist Bribe Burglary Crime Willingness to Report Business Cover-up on Car Thief (Supervisor) Scene OR P > | t | OR P > | t | OR P > | t | OR P > | t | OR P > | t | OR P > | t | Independent Variable Offense Seriousness 4.590*** 0.000 4.214*** 0.000 4.551*** 0.000 3.586*** 0.000 3.357*** 0.000 4.734*** 0.000

Control Variables Rank a First-Line Supervisors 1.650** 0.002 2.037*** 0.000 2.269*** 0.000 2.637*** 0.000 5.960*** 0.000 7.478*** 0.000

Middle Managers 2.281*** 0.000 2.975*** 0.000 3.205*** 0.000 3.173*** 0.000 6.003*** 0.000 6.942*** 0.000

Top Administrators 3.058*** 0.001 2.507*** 0.001 3.677*** 0.000 4.001*** 0.000 5.102*** 0.000 11.84*** 0.000

Current Assignment b On-Call or control 0.697* 0.038 0.994 0.955 1.188 0.094 1.460*** 0.000 1.785*** 0.000 2.199*** 0.000

Detective/Investigative 0.679 0.061 0.962 0.756 1.026 0.828 1.187 0.129 1.460** 0.004 1.396* 0.038

Traffic 4.622 0.051 2.430 0.146 1.389 0.632 1.597 0.507 0.816 0.769 1.285 0.794

Administrative 1.318 0.210 1.132 0.459 0.998 0.990 1.500* 0.018 2.130** 0.001 1.012 0.964

Other 0.648 0.096 1.011 0.946 1.037 0.818 1.333 0.067 1.445* 0.040 2.124** 0.003

Agency Type c Large 201-500 0.901 0.624 1.146 0.320 0.919 0.536 0.863 0.273 0.610*** 0.001 0.523*** 0.000 *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p <0.001 Notes: a Comparison group is “Line Officers”. b Comparison group is “Patrol”. c Comparison group is “Very Large/over 500”

Table 4 (cont.) 96 Case 1: Off- Case 8: Police Case 10: Case 7: Holiday Case 3: Speeding Case 5: Theft at a Predictors of Duty Security DUI Accident and Excessive Force for Tune-up Motorist Bribe Burglary Crime Willingness to Report Business Cover-up on Car Thief (Supervisor) Scene OR P > | t | OR P > | t | OR P > | t | OR P > | t | OR P > | t | OR P > | t | Medium 76-200 1.133 0.481 0.851 0.211 0.857 0.222 0.842 0.159 0.747* 0.033 0.547*** 0.000

Small 25-75 0.253*** 0.000 0.325*** 0.000 0.282*** 0.000 0.630** 0.002 0.337*** 0.000 0.368*** 0.000

Very Small/less than 25 0.519 0.114 0.476** 0.003 0.373*** 0.000 0.828 0.375 0.464*** 0.000 0.385*** 0.000

Sheriff 1.733 0.108 0.805 0.423 1.016 0.950 1.827* 0.016 1.822 0.055 3.120* 0.022

County police 0.577** 0.008 0.896 0.337 1.704*** 0.000 1.251* 0.036 1.616*** 0.000 1.684** 0.003 *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p <0.001 Notes: a Comparison group is “Line Officers”. b Comparison group is “Patrol”. c Comparison group is “Very Large/over 500”

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The discipline fairness models also reveal that offense seriousness has the weakest association with willingness to report in the “holiday for tune-up” scenario (OR = 3.732), which is evaluated as having an intermediate ethical severity.

When supervisory status is included in the regression model, offense seriousness reports the highest odds ratio for “theft at a burglary scene”, followed by “excessive force on a car thief”, “police DUI accident and cover-up”, “off-duty security business”, “holiday for tune-up”, and “speeding motorist bribe”. The “theft at a burglary scene” is once again associated with the highest positive association (OR = 4.651) between perceptions of seriousness and likelihood of reporting (Table 6). The remaining models do not find that this association affected by the perceived severity of the corruption. The results show once more that respondents who have higher perceptions of seriousness are the least likely to report in the case of the “speeding motorist bribe” scenario (OR = 3.315), the second most severe scenario out of the six scenarios discussed here (Table 6). The strength of the association between offense seriousness and willingness to report in the supervisor model for the “off-duty security business” scenario falls somewhere in the middle (OR = 4.058) even though this act of corruption is considered the most minor in terms of its perceived seriousness (Table 6).

The inclusion of length of service in the model results in offense seriousness having the highest reported odds ratio in “excessive force on a car thief”, followed by “police DUI accident and cover-up”, “holiday for tune-up”, “theft from a burglary scene”, “off-duty security business”, and “speeding motorist bribe”. This ranking of the association between offense seriousness and willingness to report is interesting because, unlike the previous models, here the relationship between perceptions of seriousness and willingness to report is shown to be the greatest (OR = 4.492) for the “excessive force on a car thief” scenario, which the respondents 98 perceive to be of intermediate seriousness (Table 7). Similar to the other three models, the length of service models show that higher perceptions of seriousness is least likely to be associated with a greater likelihood of reporting for the “speeding motorist bribe” scenario (OR =

1.663) in comparison to the other scenarios. “Theft at a burglary scene”, despite having the highest ethical severity, falls in the midrange of this rank ordering of odds ratios for offense seriousness (OR = 2.953) among the models with length of service as a moderator (Table 7).

Discipline Fairness

For the “off-duty security business” scenario, which the respondents rated as having the lowest ethical severity, respondents who rated the expected discipline as too harsh (OR = 5.572) or too lenient (OR = 8.316) were both more likely to report this behavior than those who viewed the expected discipline as fair. Table 5 shows that these associations were both significant at the p < 0.001 level.

When looking at the effect of discipline fairness on the relationship between offense seriousness and willingness to report, the results show that the interactions between discipline fairness and offense seriousness are significant at the p < 0.01 level. However, respondents who view corruption in “off-duty security business” as serious and the discipline as either too harsh

(OR = 0.693) or too lenient (OR = 0.612), are both less likely to report than respondents who viewed the behavior as serious and the discipline as fair (Table 5). This finding is counterintuitive because the association between the main effect of discipline fairness and willingness to report is positive. The results of the Wald test find that discipline fairness is a significant moderator of the relationship between offense seriousness and willingness to report,

F(2, 550.0) = 8.02, p < 0.001. 99

According to Table 5, officers who saw the expected punishment for the “police DUI accident and cover-up” scenario, which is considered an intermediate ethical problem, as too harsh (OR = 1.329) or too lenient (OR = 1.913) were more likely to report than those who saw the expected discipline as fair. These results are not statistically significant, however. The likelihood that the more serious the behavior in “police DUI accident and cover-up” is perceived the more likely that it will be reported is weakened if the expected discipline is viewed as too harsh (OR = 0.708, p < 0.001) or if it is viewed as too lenient (OR = 0.779, p > 0.05) (Table 5).

This finding is counterintuitive because the main effects of discipline fairness on willingness to report are positive. The results of the Wald test reveal that discipline fairness is a significant moderator of the relationship between offense seriousness and willingness to report, F(2, 4400.4)

= 10.14, p < 0.001.

The next scenario considered to be of intermediate ethical severity is the “excessive force on a car thief” scenario. Similar to the results for “police DUI accident and cover-up”, the results for “excessive force on a car thief” show a non-significant positive association between discipline fairness and willingness to report (Table 5). The odds ratio is 1.615 for those who saw the expected discipline as too harsh and 2.751 for those who saw it as too lenient. Despite having a positive association with willingness to report on its own, when discipline fairness interacts with seriousness, the results show a negative interaction.

According to Table 5, police officers who view the expected discipline for “excessive force on a car thief” as too harsh are less likely to be willing to report the more serious they evaluate the behavior to be (OR = 0.778, p < 0.01) than those who view the punishment as fair.

Similarly, the relationship between offense seriousness and willingness to report is also weakened if the expected discipline is seen as too lenient (OR = 0.805, p > 0.05). A Wald test 100 finds that discipline fairness is a significant moderator of the relationship between perceptions of seriousness and willingness to report, F(2, 3975.5) = 5.32, p < 0.01.

Table 5 reports the results of the ordinal regressions for another scenario that depicts intermediate corruption, the “holiday for tune-up” scenario. The odds ratio is 0.900 for too harsh discipline and 2.420 for too lenient discipline; both of these reported relationships are non- significant. Table 5 shows the following interactions between discipline fairness and offense seriousness for the “holiday for tune-up” scenario. As perceptions of seriousness for “holiday for tune-up” increase, respondents who also view the expected discipline as too harsh (OR =

0.931, p > 0.05) or too lenient (OR = 0.784, p < 0.05) were both less likely to report than respondents who viewed the punishment as fair. The joint test of coefficients revealed that discipline fairness is not a significant moderator of the relationship between offense seriousness and willingness to report for the “holiday for tune-up” scenario, F(2, 8811.3) = 2.59, p > 0.05).

For the “speeding motorist bribe” scenario, which is rated high on the ethical severity scale, the respondents who viewed the expected discipline as too lenient are more likely to report

(OR = 23.70, p < 0.01) than those who saw the punishment as fair. Respondents who believed the expected discipline was too harsh are also more likely to report the behavior in “speeding motorist bribe” (OR = 2.359, p > 0.05). According to Table 5, the relationship between offense seriousness and willingness to report is weakened when the expected discipline is viewed as either too lenient (OR = 0.530, p < 0.01) or too harsh (OR = 0.743, p > 0.05). This finding is counterintuitive due to the positive association found between the main effects of discipline fairness and inclination to report. The moderating effect of discipline fairness was found significant through a Wald test, F(2, 692450.8) = 3.48, p < 0.05.

Table 5: Odds Ratio (OR) and p-values for the Models containing Discipline Fairness as a Moderator (N = 3,107) 101 Case 1: Off- Case 8: Police Case 10: Case 7: Holiday Case 3: Speeding Case 5: Theft at a Predictors of Willingness Duty Security DUI Accident Excessive Force for Tune-up Motorist Bribe Burglary Crime to Report Business and Cover-up on Car Thief (Supervisor) Scene OR P > | t | OR P > | t | OR P > | t | OR P > | t | OR P > | t | OR P > | t | Independent Variable Offense Seriousness (OS) 4.958*** 0.000 4.507*** 0.000 4.763*** 0.000 3.732*** 0.000 3.912*** 0.000 5.069*** 0.000

Moderator and Interaction Discipline Fairness (DF) a Too Harsh 5.572*** 0.000 1.329 0.253 1.615 0.112 0.900 0.806 2.359 0.469 4.994 0.314

Too Lenient 8.316*** 0.000 1.913 0.179 2.751 0.115 2.420 0.073 23.70** 0.009 9.614 0.188

OS x DF Seriousness x Too Harsh 0.693** 0.002 0.708*** 0.000 0.778** 0.001 0.931 0.513 0.743 0.223 0.559 0.080

OS x Too Lenient 0.612** 0.002 0.779 0.052 0.805 0.130 0.784* 0.028 0.530** 0.010 0.605 0.149

Control Variables Rank b First-Line Supervisors 1.860*** 0.000 1.970*** 0.000 2.202*** 0.000 2.575*** 0.000 5.800*** 0.000 7.434*** 0.000

Middle Managers 2.595*** 0.000 2.780*** 0.000 2.983*** 0.000 3.099*** 0.000 5.505*** 0.000 6.844*** 0.000

Top Administrators 3.666*** 0.000 2.258** 0.002 3.465*** 0.000 4.023*** 0.000 4.426*** 0.000 12.22*** 0.000

Current Assignment c On-Call or control 0.751 0.107 1.014 0.896 1.201 0.075 1.453*** 0.000 1.782*** 0.000 2.164*** 0.000

Detective/Investigative 0.727 0.127 0.959 0.743 1.015 0.902 1.186 0.131 1.483** 0.003 1.425* 0.029 *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p <0.001 Notes: a Comparison group is “Fair”. b Comparison group is “Line Officers”. c Comparison group is “Patrol”. d Comparison group is “Very Large/over 500”

Table 5 (cont.) 102 Case 1: Off-Duty Case 8: Police Case 10: Case 7: Holiday Case 3: Speeding Case 5: Theft at a Predictors of Security DUI Accident and Excessive Force for Tune-up Motorist Bribe Burglary Crime Willingness to Report Business Cover-up on Car Thief (Supervisor) Scene OR P > | t | OR P > | t | OR P > | t | OR P > | t | OR P > | t | OR P > | t | Traffic 4.603 0.066 2.048 0.242 1.326 0.685 1.596 0.512 0.636 0.524 1.205 0.844

Administrative 1.358 0.174 1.112 0.527 0.972 0.868 1.510* 0.016 2.101** 0.002 0.974 0.920

Other 0.661 0.120 1.009 0.955 1.055 0.738 1.350 0.056 1.485* 0.028 2.180** 0.002

Agency Type d Large 201-500 0.909 0.655 1.234 0.127 0.922 0.551 0.865 0.284 0.637** 0.002 0.498*** 0.000

Medium 76-200 1.135 0.483 0.836 0.167 0.842 0.175 0.843 0.165 0.750* 0.036 0.548*** 0.000

Small 25-75 0.278*** 0.000 0.315*** 0.000 0.270*** 0.000 0.634** 0.002 0.343*** 0.000 0.364*** 0.000

Very Small/less than 0.585 0.206 0.428*** 0.001 0.380*** 0.000 0.812 0.329 0.437*** 0.000 0.373*** 0.000 25

Sheriff 1.694 0.126 0.825 0.474 1.013 0.960 1.856* 0.013 1.788 0.063 3.064* 0.025

County police 0.643* 0.038 0.859 0.184 1.693*** 0.000 1.265* 0.028 1.604*** 0.000 1.646** 0.005 *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p <0.001 Notes: a Comparison group is “Fair”. b Comparison group is “Line Officers”. c Comparison group is “Patrol”. d Comparison group is “Very Large/over 500”

103

The scenario that the respondents rated as the most serious was the “theft at a burglary crime scene” scenario. Table 5 reported that both respondents who viewed the discipline for this behavior as too lenient (OR = 9.614) or too harsh (OR = 4.994) were both more likely to report than those who saw it as fair, although neither of the odds ratios were significant. Similar to the interactions between offense seriousness and discipline fairness depicted in the other models, the discipline fairness model for the “theft at a burglary scene” scenario reported negative interactions between offense seriousness and discipline fairness. According to Table 5, respondents who viewed the behavior in “theft at a burglary scene” as serious and the expected discipline as too lenient (OR = 0.605, p > 0.05) were less likely to report than those who also saw the behavior as serious but the expected discipline as fair. Respondents were also less likely to report if they saw this behavior as serious and the expected discipline as too harsh (OR =

0.559, p < 0.05) than someone with a similar seriousness perception but a “fair” perception of the expected discipline. A joint test of coefficients revealed that discipline fairness was not a significant moderator of the relationship between offense seriousness and willingness to report,

F(2, 123241.6) = 2.08, p > 0.05.

Supervisory Status

The effect of supervisory status on willingness to report is interesting for the “off-duty security business” scenario as Table 6 shows that supervisors are less likely to report this behavior than non-supervisors are (OR = 0.401, p < 0.05). This finding is counterintuitive because supervisors tend to be more likely to report than non-supervisors are. The interaction between supervisory status and offense seriousness is such that respondents who viewed the behavior in “off-duty security business” as serious were more likely to report if they were also 104 supervisors (OR = 1.904, p < 0.001). A joint test of coefficients found that supervisor status was a significant moderator, F(1, 79345.6) = 25.43, p < 0.001.

According to Table 6, supervisors are associated with higher odds of reporting the

“Police DUI accident and cover-up” scenario that are non-significant (OR = 1.457, p > 0.05). In addition, the interaction between supervisor status and offense seriousness is similarly found to have a positive, but insignificant effect on an officer’s willingness to report (OR = 1.105, p >

0.05). The Wald test further supported the results shown in Table 6 that supervisor status was not a significant moderator of the relationship between offense seriousness and willingness to report for the intermediately ranked “police DUI accident and cover-up”, F(1, 5930.1) = 1.53, p

> 0.05.

The “excessive force on a car thief” scenario, which is rated as an intermediate ethical problem, similarly found that the positive association between supervisor status and willingness to report was insignificant (OR = 1.157, p > 0.05). Table 6 reports an odds ratio for the interaction between offense seriousness and supervisor status that was not significant (OR =

1.111, p > 0.05). The joint test of coefficients similarly reports that the moderating effect of supervisor status was not significant, F(1, 44021.6) = 1.26, p > 0.05.

Table 6 reports that supervisors were less likely to report “holiday for tune-up” than non- supervisors were (OR = 0.964), which while unexpected, was not significant. Like the results for

“off-duty security business”, the interaction between supervisor status and offense seriousness suggested that supervisors were more likely to report the supervisor’s behavior in the “holiday for tune-up” scenario (OR = 1.177, p > 0.05).

Table 6: Odds Ratio (OR) and p-values for the Models containing Supervisor Status as a Moderator (N = 3,107) Case 1: Off- Case 8: Police Case 10: Case 7: Holiday Case 3: Speeding Case 5: Theft at a Predictors of Duty Security DUI Accident Excessive Force for Tune-up Motorist Bribe Burglary Crime Willingness to Report Business and Cover-up on Car Thief (Supervisor) Scene OR P > | t | OR P > | t | OR P > | t | OR P > | t | OR P > | t | OR P > | t | Independent Variable Offense Seriousness (OS) 4.058*** 0.000 4.119*** 0.000 4.471*** 0.000 3.499*** 0.000 3.315*** 0.000 4.651*** 0.000

Moderator and Interaction Supervisor Status a 0.401* 0.037 1.457 0.291 1.157 0.750 0.964 0.944 2.597 0.476 1.919 0.673

OS x Supervisor 1.904*** 0.000 1.105 0.216 1.111 0.262 1.177 0.145 1.131 0.652 1.122 0.710

Control Variables Rank b First-Line Supervisors 1.162 0.665 1.081 0.733 1.356 0.174 1.478 0.068 1.690* 0.042 2.781** 0.005

Middle Managers 1.657 0.210 1.546 0.102 1.888* 0.020 1.721* 0.038 1.481 0.277 2.319 0.080

Top Administrators 1.801 0.195 1.446 0.248 2.403* 0.013 2.500** 0.008 1.883 0.181 4.783* 0.047

Current Assignment c On-Call or control 0.688* 0.033 0.998 0.987 1.195 0.083 1.473*** 0.000 1.802*** 0.000 2.197*** 0.000

Detective/Investigative 0.702 0.087 0.958 0.734 1.025 0.838 1.184 0.136 1.458** 0.005 1.387* 0.042

Traffic 4.855* 0.045 2.782 0.093 1.581 0.510 1.762 0.427 1.136 0.864 1.506 0.689

Administrative 1.323 0.226 1.093 0.598 0.973 0.875 1.466* 0.027 2.020** 0.003 0.989 0.967 *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p <0.001 Notes: a Comparison group is “Fair”. b Comparison group is “Line Officers”. c Comparison group is “Patrol”. d Comparison group is “Very Large/over 500”

105

Table 6 (cont.) Case 1: Off- Case 8: Police Case 10: Case 7: Holiday Case 3: Speeding Case 5: Theft at a Predictors of Duty Security DUI Accident and Excessive Force for Tune-up Motorist Bribe Burglary Crime Willingness to Report Business Cover-up on Car Thief (Supervisor) Scene OR P > | t | OR P > | t | OR P > | t | OR P > | t | OR P > | t | OR P > | t |) Other 0.709 0.181 0.992 0.963 1.025 0.838 1.320 0.078 1.407 0.059 2.098** 0.004

Agency Type d Large 201-500 0.956 0.836 1.148 0.319 0.927 0.580 0.853 0.239 0.598*** 0.001 0.515*** 0.000

Medium 76-200 1.162 0.405 0.849 0.207 0.859 0.229 0.839 0.153 0.755* 0.040 0.543*** 0.000

Small 25-75 0.238** 0.000 0.321*** 0.000 0.279*** 0.000 0.616*** 0.001 0.318*** 0.000 0.355*** 0.000 *

Very Small/less than 25 0.568 0.173 0.467** 0.002 0.368*** 0.000 0.796 0.285 0.442*** 0.000 0.372*** 0.000

Sheriff 1.814 0.082 0.804 0.418 1.021 0.935 1.833* 0.015 1.815 0.056 3.101* 0.022

County police 0.601* 0.014 0.892 0.318 1.713*** 0.000 1.251* 0.037 1.614*** 0.000 1.684** 0.003 *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p <0.001 Notes: a Comparison group is “Fair”. b Comparison group is “Line Officers”. c Comparison group is “Patrol”. d Comparison group is “Very Large/over 500”

106 107

A Wald test revealed that supervisor status was not a significant moderator for the relationship between perceptions of seriousness and willingness to report, F(1, 26325.3) = 2.13, p > 0.05.

According to the ordinal regression for the “speeding motorist bribe” scenario, in which the respondents described being high on the ethical severity scale, supervisors were more likely to report (OR = 2.597, p > 0.05). Table 6 reports that supervisory status had a positive, albeit insignificant effect, on the relationship between offense seriousness and willingness to report

(OR = 1.131, p > 0.05). The results of the Wald test for this model showed that supervisor status was not a significant moderator, F(1, 33586.6) = 0.20, p > 0.05

Table 6 depicts the regression models for the scenario rated as the most severe and finds that supervisors were more likely to report someone for stealing from a crime scene than non- supervisors were (OR = 1.919, p > 0.05). The interaction between supervisor status and offense seriousness found that supervisors were more willing as compared with non-supervisors to report the behavior in “theft at a burglary scene” as their perceptions of seriousness increased (OR =

1.122, p > 0.05). Like the results of the regression model, the results of the subsequent Wald test found that supervisory status does not have a significant effect on the relationship between offense seriousness and willingness to report, F(1, 126416.0) = 0.14, p > 0.05

Length of Service

Officers with more years of experience were found to be less willing to report the corruption depicted in “off-duty security business” (OR = 0.683, p < 0.001). According to Table

7, the interaction between length of service and offense seriousness found that the relationship between offense seriousness and willingness to report becomes stronger as the number of years a respondent had been a police officer increased (OR = 1.156, p < 0.001). This finding is 108 counterintuitive due to the negative association reported between the main effect of length of service and willingness to report. The results of the Wald test for the “off-duty security business” scenario showed that length of service is a significant moderator, F(1, 46041.2) =

30.05, p < 0.001.

For the “police DUI accident and cover-up” scenario, the results of Table 7 find that length of service has a non-significant positive association with likelihood of reporting (OR =

1.005, p > 0.05). The interaction between length of service and willingness to report is similarly found to be positive but insignificant (OR = 1.024, p > 0.05). The joint test of coefficients reaffirmed the finding that length of service is not a significant moderator for the relationship between offense seriousness and willingness to report for the intermediate ethical problem depicted in “police DUI accident and cover-up”, F(1, 19901.2) = 1.53, p > 0.05.

Table 7 shows that the number of years in the police service is associated with a higher likelihood of reporting someone for utilizing excessive force against a car thief (OR = 1.064, p >

0.05). Regarding the interaction between length of service and offense seriousness, officers who view the behavior as serious are a little more likely to report the more years of experience they have (OR = 1.004, p > 0.05). The inclusion of length of service as a moderator is revealed by a

Wald test to be a non-significant addition to the model, F(1, 16522.4) = 0.03, p > 0.05).

Table 7: Odds Ratios and p-values for the Models containing Length of Service as a Moderator (N = 3,107) Case 1: Off- Case 8: Police Case 10: Case 7: Holiday Case 3: Speeding Case 5: Theft at a Predictors of Duty Security DUI Accident Excessive Force for Tune-up Motorist Bribe Burglary Crime Willingness to Report Business and Cover-up on Car Thief (Supervisor) Scene OR P > | t | OR P > | t | OR P > | t | OR P > | t | OR P > | t | OR P > | t |) Independent Variable Offense Seriousness (OS) 2.439*** 0.000 3.833*** 0.000 4.492*** 0.000 3.089*** 0.000 1.663* 0.027 2.953*** 0.000

Moderator and Interaction Length of Service 0.683*** 0.000 1.005 0.938 1.064 0.495 0.947 0.565 0.491** 0.006 0.640 0.161

OS x Length of Service 1.156*** 0.000 1.024 0.216 1.004 0.854 1.035 0.126 1.186** 0.001 1.115 0.090

Control Variables Rank a First-Line Supervisors 1.903*** 0.000 1.787*** 0.000 2.016*** 0.000 2.297*** 0.000 4.918*** 0.000 6.563*** 0.000

Middle Managers 2.863*** 0.000 2.497*** 0.000 2.746*** 0.000 2.632*** 0.000 4.493*** 0.000 5.759*** 0.000

Top Administrators 3.157** 0.001 2.158** 0.004 3.237*** 0.000 3.477*** 0.000 4.216** 0.001 11.47*** 0.001

Current Assignment b On-Call or control 0.753 0.127 0.899 0.335 1.088 0.428 1.322** 0.007 1.524*** 0.001 1.960*** 0.000

Detective/Investigative 0.708 0.104 0.903 0.424 0.974 0.829 1.116 0.337 1.341* 0.030 1.308 0.098

Traffic 5.066* 0.038 2.295 0.173 1.365 0.655 1.535 0.550 0.695 0.601 1.091 0.927

Administrative 1.421 0.132 1.032 0.855 0.920 0.631 1.368 0.071 1.877** 0.009 0.899 0.691

Other 0.699 0.166 0.973 0.868 1.005 0.977 1.292 0.103 1.368 0.083 2.076** 0.004 *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p <0.001 Notes: a Comparison group is “Line Officers”. b Comparison group is “Patrol”. c Comparison group is “Very Large/over 500”

109

Table 7 (cont.) Case 1: Off- Case 8: Police Case 10: Case 7: Holiday Case 3: Speeding Case 5: Theft at a Predictors of Duty Security DUI Accident and Excessive Force for Tune-up Motorist Bribe Burglary Crime Willingness to Report Business Cover-up on Car Thief (Supervisor) Scene OR P > | t | OR P > | t | OR P > | t | OR P > | t | OR P > | t | OR P > | t |) Agency Type c Large 201-500 0.912 0.662 1.191 0.205 0.952 0.718 0.893 0.401 0.635** 0.002 0.539*** 0.000

Medium 76-200 1.148 0.444 0.846 0.194 0.858 0.228 0.839 0.153 0.753* 0.038 0.546*** 0.000

Small 25-75 0.242** 0.000 0.327*** 0.000 0.283*** 0.000 0.628** 0.001 0.332*** 0.000 0.364*** 0.000 *

Very Small/less than 25 0.563 0.158 0.484** 0.003 0.378*** 0.000 0.833 0.391 0.464*** 0.000 0.385*** 0.000 (0.158) (0.003) (0.000) (0.391) (0.000) (0.000) 0.099 0.443 0.928 0.013 0.043 0.022 Sheriff 1.755 0.813 1.024 1.854* 1.884* 3.114* 0.026 0.208 0.000 0.082 0.001 0.005 County police 0.626* 0.662 0.865 0.205 1.653*** 0.718 1.205 0.401 1.554*** 0.002 1.636** 0.000 *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p <0.001 Notes: a Comparison group is “Line Officers”. b Comparison group is “Patrol”. c Comparison group is “Very Large/over 500”

110 111

Another scenario rated as intermediate in terms of ethical severity, “holiday for tune-up”, finds that an officer’s willingness to report has a negative, but insignificant, association with reporting intentions (OR = 0.947, p > 0.05). When length of service is applied to the relationship between offense seriousness and willingness to report, the resulting interaction finds that officers who viewed the behavior of the supervisor in the “holiday for tune-up” scenario as serious are more likely to report if they also have more years of policing experience (OR = 1.035, p > 0.05).

The resulting Wald test to determine the viability of length of service as a moderator of the association between perceptions of seriousness and reporting intentions fails to return significant results, F(1, 16970.5) = 2.35, p > 0.05.

According to the results in Table 7, police officers who have served more years in the field are less likely to report an officer for “accepting a bribe in lieu of issuing a speeding ticket” than less experienced officers (OR = 0.491, p < 0.01). However, length of service is found to increase the association between perceptions of seriousness and likelihood of reporting (OR =

1.186, p < 0.001). This finding is counterintuitive because of the negative association found between the main effect of length of service and willingness to report. In addition, the joint test of coefficients for the length of service model similarly find length of service to be a significant moderator of the relationship between offense seriousness and reporting intentions for “speeding motorist bribe”, F(1, 748548.0) = 10.38, p < 0.01.

For the highest rated scenario in terms of seriousness, “theft at a burglary scene”, officers with more years of experience reported being less likely to report (OR = 0.640, p > 0.05).

Regarding the interaction between years as a police officer and perceptions of seriousness, police officers who view theft from a crime scene as serious are more likely to report the behavior if 112 they also have more years’ experience (OR = 1.115, p > 0.05). The Wald test for this model fails to show that length of service is a significant moderator, F(1, 419056.7) = 2.87, p> 0.05.

Rank

Table 4 reports positive associations between first-line supervisors and willingness to report for all six main effects models. This association was significant at the p < 0.01 level for

“off-duty security business”, and it was significant at the p < 0.001 level for the remaining five scenarios. Table 5 shows a positive association at the p < 0.001 level between first-line supervisors and intentions to report for all of the scenarios. The supervisor status models were only significant for the “speeding motorist bribe” scenario (p < 0.05), and the “theft at a burglary scene” scenario (p < 0.01). The other scenarios reported non-significant results, most likely due to the correlation between rank and supervisor status. For the length of service models, all six scenarios found the association between first-line supervisors and willingness to report was significant at the p < 0.001 level.

Middle managers reported they were more likely to report at the p < 0.001 level for all scenarios in the main effects models (Table 4). Similarly, the discipline fairness models and the length of service models also reported positive associations at the p < 0.001 level between middle managers and reporting intentions for the six scenarios. Table 6 reports a significant positive relationship at the p < 0.05 level between middle managers and willingness to report for

“excessive force on a car thief” and “holiday for tune-up” when supervisor status is added as a moderator. The other four scenarios reported non-significant associations in the supervisor status models. Similar to first-line supervisors, the reduction in significant associations between middle managers and willingness to report is due to the correlation between rank and supervisor status. 113

Table 4 shows that respondents with the rank of top administrator were more likely to report at the p < 0.001 level for all scenarios. The inclusion of discipline fairness also saw positive associations between top administrators and willingness to report. Table 5 reports that this association was significant at the p < 0.01 level for “police DUI accident and cover-up” while the remaining five scenarios reported positive associations that were significant at the p <

0.001 level. This finding is interesting for the “police DUI accident and cover-up” scenario because the introduction of discipline fairness into the model altered the significance of the relationship between top administrators and willingness to report. Table 6 reports significant positive odds ratios at the p < 0.05 level for “excessive force on a car thief” and “theft at a burglary scene”, and a positive odds ratio at the p < 0.01 level for “holiday for tune-up”. The remaining three scenarios did not find a significant association between top administrators and reporting intentions in the supervisor status models. The length of service models revealed a positive relationship between top administrators and willingness to report for all six scenarios.

This association was significant at the p < 0.01 level for the “off-duty security business”, “police

DUI accident and cover-up”, and “speeding motorist bribe” scenarios, and at the p < 0.001 level for the “excessive force on a car thief”, “holiday for tune-up”, and “theft at a burglary scene” scenarios. These findings are interesting for “off-duty security business”, “police DUI accident and cover-up”, and “speeding motorist bribe” as the addition of length of service as a moderator affected the significance of the relationship between top administrators and willingness to report for these scenarios.

Assignment

Respondents assigned to an on-call/control position reported they were less likely to report the “off-duty security business” and the “police DUI accident and cover-up” scenarios 114 across all regression models; however, none of the reported associations was significant. The association between an on-call/control assignment and reporting intentions was positive but insignificant across all models for the “excessive force on a car thief” scenario. According to

Tables, 4 and 5, assignment to an on-call/control position had a positive association with willingness to report that was significant at the p < 0.05 level for the “off-duty security business” and “police DUI accident and cover-up” scenarios. Table 7 also found that the “off-duty security business” scenario reported a significant positive association between on-call/control assignment and willingness to report at the p < 0.05 level. The supervisor status models for the “holiday for tune-up”, “speeding motorist bribe”, and “theft from a burglary scene” scenarios reported a positive association between on-call/control and reporting intentions that was significant at the p

< 0.01 level (Table 6). For the “theft at a burglary scene” scenario, the main effect model (Table

4), the discipline fairness model (Table 5), and the length of service model (table 7) reported a positive association that was significant at the p < 0.01 level.

For the “off-duty security business” and “police DUI accident and cover-up” scenarios, respondents working in detective/investigative assignments reported they were less likely to report these scenarios across all models; however, none of the reported associations was significant (Tables 4, 5, 6, and 7). In contrast, the association between detective/investigations and willingness to report was positive but insignificant across all models for the “excessive force on a car thief” and “holiday for tune-up” scenarios. A significant positive association between a detective/investigative assignment and willingness to report was found for the main effects, discipline fairness, and length of service models at the p < 0.05 level for the “speeding motorist bribe” scenario. For the “theft at a burglary crime scene” scenario, respondents working in 115 detective/investigation were more likely to report in all four models, and this association was significant at the p < 0.05 level for the discipline fairness model (Table 5).

Officers who work in traffic assignments were more likely to report the “off-duty security business”, “police DUI accident and cover-up”, “excessive force on a car thief”, “holiday for tune-up”, and “theft at a burglary scene” scenarios across all models (Tables 4, 5, 6, and 7). The supervisor status and length of service models showed that the increased likelihood of an officer in traffic reporting someone for the “off-duty security business” scenario was significant at the p

< 0.05 level. Tables 4, 5, and 7 show insignificant negative associations between a traffic assignment and willingness to report an officer for “speeding motorist bribe”, and Table 6 reports a non-significant, positive association.

In four of the scenarios (“off-duty security business”, “police DUI accident and cover- up”, “excessive force on car thief”, and “theft from a burglary scene”) the reported associations between an administrative assignment and willingness to report were insignificant across all models (Tables 4, 5, 6, and 7). The association between working in an administrative assignment and likelihood of reporting was significantly positive at the p < 0.05 level for the all of the “holiday for tune-up” models except for the length of service model. For the “speeding motorist bribe” scenario, respondents working an administrative assignment reported an increased likelihood of reporting in all four models. For “speeding motorist bribe”, the main effects, discipline fairness, and supervisor status models reported the association was significant at the p < 0.01 level, and the length of service model reported the association was significant at the p < 0.05 level. 116

Officers who work in an assignment other than the ones previously mentioned reported a nonsignificant association with willingness to report across all regression models for “off-duty security business, “police DUI accident and cover-up”, “excessive force on a car thief”, and

“holiday for tune-up” scenarios. A positive association that was significant at the p < 0.05 level was found for the “speeding motorist bribe” scenario in the main effects and discipline fairness models (Tables 4 and 5). “Theft at a burglary scene” reported a positive association in all four of its regression models at the p < 0.01 level.

Agency

For the “off-duty security business”, “excessive force on car thief”, and “holiday for tune-up” scenarios, respondents employed in large municipal agencies reported being less likely to report these behaviors across all models; however, none of the reported odds ratios were significant. In contrast, a non-significant positive association between large municipal agency and willingness to report was found in all four regression models of the “police DUI accident and cover-up” scenario. Officers who work in large municipal agencies were less likely to report the

“speeding motorist bribe” scenario and the “theft at a burglary scene” scenario. Table 5 reports a p < 0.05 significance for “speeding motorist bribe. Tables 4 and 7 report associations between large municipal agencies and willingness to report for “speeding motorist bribe” that were significant at the p < 0.01 level, and Table 6 reports a p < 0.001 significance. The association between large municipal agency and reporting intentions was significant at the p < 0.001 level across all models for the “theft at a burglary scene” scenario.

Medium size municipal agencies were non-significantly more likely to report the “off duty security business” scenario across all models. A non-significant negative relationship between employment in a medium-sized municipal agency and willingness to report was found 117 in all the models reported for the scenarios rated as intermediate ethical problems (“police DUI accident and cover-up”, “excessive force on a car thief”, and “holiday for tune-up”). For the

“speeding motorist bribe” scenario, a negative association between medium size municipal agency and willingness to report was significant at the p < 0.05 level for all four models (Tables

4, 5, 6, and 7). Respondents reported they were less likely to report someone for stealing from a crime scene if they worked at a medium size municipal agency; this association was significant at the p < 0.001 level for the four models tested.

Small municipal agencies significantly related to willingness to report in all six scenarios across all models. In particular, officers working in small municipal agencies had a negative association with willingness to report that was significant at the p < 0.001 level for “off-duty security business”, “police DUI accident and cover-up”, “excessive force on a car thief”,

“speeding motorist bribe”, and “theft at a burglary scene” (Tables 4, 5, 6, and 7). The “holiday for tune-up” scenario reported a negative association between small municipal agencies and likelihood to report that was significant at the p < 0.01 level in all four models.

For “off-duty security business” and “holiday for tune-up”, respondents who worked in very small municipal agencies reported a non-significant unwillingness to report in each of the scenario’s four regression models. In comparison, the regression models for “police DUI accident and cover-up” show a negative association between working at a very small municipal agency and willingness to report at the p < 0.01 level (Tables 4, 5, 6, and 7). The remaining three scenarios, “excessive force on a car thief”, “speeding motorist bribe”, and “theft from a burglary scene” reported negative associations between very small municipal agencies and reporting intentions for all regression models that were significant at the p < 0.001 level. 118

Police officers who work in sheriff agencies had a non-significant positive association with willingness to report for the “off-duty security business” and “excessive force on a car thief” scenarios across all models (Tables 4, 5, 6, and 7). In contrast, a negative non-significant association between sheriff agency and willingness to report surfaced in all models for the

“police DUI accident and cover up” scenario. Police officers in sheriff agencies were more likely to report the “holiday for tune-up” and the “theft at a burglary scene” scenarios across all models that were significant at the p < 0.05 level. For “speeding motorist bribe”, Table 7 reported a positive association at the p < 0.05 level; the remaining three models for the “speeding motorist bribe” scenario reported non-significant associations.

Police officers who work in county agencies were less likely to report the “off-duty security business” and “police DUI accident and cover-up” scenarios across all models. Table 4 reports that this association was significant at the p < 0.01 level for “off-duty security business”.

The relationship between county agency and willingness to report was significant at the p < 0.05 level for the discipline fairness, supervisor status, and length of service models for “off-duty security business”. None of the models for “police DUI accident and cover-up” reported that the negative association between employment at a county agency and willingness to report was significant. Respondents working in county agencies reported positive associations with reporting intentions that were significant at the p < 0.001 level across all models for “excessive force on a car thief” and “speeding motorist bribe” (Tables 4, 5, 6, and 7). For the “holiday for tune-up” scenario, the main effects, discipline fairness, and supervisor status models reported a positive association between county agency and willingness to report that was significant at the p

< 0.05 level. County agency was not a significantly associated with willingness to report the

“holiday for tune-up” scenario when length of service was included as a moderator (Table 7). 119

Respondents who work in a county agency reported they were more willing to report the “theft at a burglary scene” scenario, and all four of the regression models reported that this association was significant at the p < 0.01 level.

Discussion

The leading objective of this thesis was to expand upon current understanding of the association between offense seriousness and willingness to report misconduct by analyzing the moderating effect of discipline fairness, supervisory status, and number of years served as a police officer on the relationship between these two variables. This analysis is justified by the fact that seriousness is one of the strongest predictors of whether an officer will blow the whistle on a fellow officer. It therefore makes sense that gaining a better appreciation of what can affect the relationship between offense seriousness and willingness to report misconduct should be a focus in both academic and professional communities, as this will allow for a more thorough understanding of the code of silence.

Revisit Research Questions and Hypotheses

The primary objective of this research was to answer three questions which previous studies had not attempted to answer. Providing answers to these questions will be beneficial to the criminal justice field because future researchers and policy makers will have a more in-depth understanding of whether and to what extent the known causal factors of the code of silence interact with one another and affect the unwillingness of police officers to report the misconduct of their peers:

120

Table 8: Research Questions and Hypotheses

Research Question Null Hypotheses

Does discipline fairness moderate the relationship H01: Discipline fairness will have no effect on the between offense seriousness and willingness to report? association between offense seriousness and willingness

to report misconduct.

Does supervisory status moderate the relationship H02: Supervisory status will have no effect on the between offense seriousness and willingness to report? association between offense seriousness and willingness

to report misconduct.

Does length of service moderate the relationship H03: Length of service will have no effect on the between offense seriousness and willingness to report? association between offense seriousness and willingness

to report misconduct.

Discussion of Results and its Implications

This study looked at the potential moderating effects of discipline fairness, supervisory status, and length of service on the relationship between offense seriousness and willingness to report for six scenarios of varying ethical severity. Overall, the results showed strong support for discipline fairness as a moderator in four of the scenarios. Supervisor status was a significant moderator in one of the scenarios, and length of service was a significant moderator in two of the scenarios.

Discipline fairness was a significant moderator in the “off-duty business scenario”,

“police DUI accident and cover-up”, “excessive force on a car thief”, and “speeding motorist bribe” scenarios. In the “off-security business scenario”, which is ranked low in terms of ethical severity (Klockars et al., 2000), the relationship between offense seriousness and willingness to report was weakened if an officer viewed the punishment as either too lenient or too harsh. In the “police DUI accident and cover-up” scenario, the perception that the expected discipline was 121 too harsh or too lenient also weakened the association between offense seriousness and willingness to report.

This scenario is considered to be of intermediate ethical severity (Klockars et al., 2000).

Discipline fairness was found to negatively affect the relationship between offense seriousness and willingness to report for the “excessive force on a car thief scenario” when the expected discipline was viewed as too harsh. Viewing the expected discipline as too lenient had a non- significant negative effect on the association between perceptions of seriousness and likelihood to report. The “excessive force on a car thief” scenario is also rated as an intermediate ethical problem (Klockars et al., 2000).

The final scenario that showed a significant interaction between discipline fairness and offense seriousness, the “speeding motorist bribe” scenario, is considered to be of high ethical severity (Klockars et al., 2000). Of the officers who shared the same perception of seriousness for this behavior, those who also saw the expected discipline as too lenient were significantly less likely to report than those who evaluated the expected discipline as fair. A “too harsh” perception of the expected discipline had an insignificant negative affect on the relationship between offense seriousness and willingness to blow the whistle.

The findings of these analyses lends support to Hubert et al.’s (2003) model, which theorized that discipline fairness could impact the relationship between offense seriousness and willingness to report. These results also partially supported the findings of Long et al. (2013). In particular, their analysis of the interaction between seriousness and fairness in the “excessive force on a car thief” scenario (referred to as “punch for fleeing” in their study), revealed that the perception that the expected discipline for this misconduct was fair had a negative influence on the relationship between offense seriousness and willingness to report. 122

As previously stated, the results of this analysis revealed that the association between perceptions of seriousness and reporting intentions was significantly weakened if the expected discipline was perceived as too harsh. This contradiction between my findings and Long et al.’s

(2013) findings may be because in this study discipline fairness was categorized into three groupings (too lenient, fair, and too harsh), while Long and his colleagues categorized discipline fairness into two categories (fair and unfair).

However, the results of this analysis for the interaction between offense seriousness and discipline fairness for the “theft at a burglary scene” partially agree with Long et al’s findings

(2013). While the ordinal regression reported a significant, negative interaction between offense seriousness and a “too harsh” perception of discipline fairness, the post-estimation Wald test did not find discipline fairness to be a significant moderator. Long and his colleagues make no note of any post estimation tests being conducted to test the interaction, so it is unclear if their results for this scenario would have led to the same conclusion (2013).

The results for the “off-duty security business”, “police DUI accident and cover-up”, the

“excessive force on a car thief”, and the “speeding motorist bribe” scenarios suggest that the simple justice model could be used to explain why perceptions of a fair punishment increases an officer’s willingness to report corruption as perceptions of seriousness increase (Kutnjak

Ivkovich & Klockars, 1996). As stated before, the simple justice model argues that officers are less likely to report misconduct if the expected discipline is too harsh, due to a desire to see punishments doled out fairly (Kutnjak Ivković & O’Connor Shelley, 2010; Kutnjak Ivkovich &

Klockars, 1995, 1996). While the main effects for discipline fairness for these four scenarios found that unfair discipline (i.e.: too harsh or too lenient) resulted in officers having greater intentions to report, the interaction between offense seriousness and discipline fairness reported a 123 negative association with willingness to report. This interaction suggests that the desire to see misconduct punished in a fair manner becomes stronger as the perceived seriousness of the misconduct increases. These four scenarios, which depict acts of corruption that vary significantly in ethical severity, highlight that the perception of fair discipline is very influential in regards to an officer’s decision to report corruption.

According to previous research (S. E. Wolfe & Piquero, 2011), police officers are less likely to adhere to code-of-silence attitudes if they perceive their agencies to be organizationally just. With this in mind, the interaction between offense seriousness and discipline fairness evident regarding reporting intentions implies that assigning discipline to acts of corruption and misconduct is complex. In order to encourage fully their officers to report misconduct, police administrators should consider the opinions of their officers regarding the seriousness of the behavior and the discipline deemed appropriate when designing and implementing departmental rules and regulations.

The next variable hypothesized to be a significant moderator of the relationship between offense seriousness and willingness to report was supervisory status. The “off-duty security business” scenario was the only scenario in which supervisor status had a significant impact on the association between perceptions of seriousness and likelihood of reporting. The results of this analysis found that supervisors were more likely to report this behavior than non-supervisors were when holding the same opinion regarding the seriousness of the misconduct. For the other five scenarios that depicted acts of corruption that ranged from intermediate-level to high-level ethical severity (Klockars et al., 2000), supervisory status did not have a significant impact on the relationship between offense seriousness and willingness to report. 124

Overall, there was weak support for the hypothesis that supervisory status would significantly impact the relationship between seriousness perceptions and reporting intentions.

On the other hand, the results do support the conjecture that supervisor status would most likely impact the connection between offense seriousness and likelihood of reporting in regards to minor forms of corruption. The lack of strong support for this hypothesis could be because corporals and sergeants (aka “first-line supervisors) have the most contact with line officers in comparison to the other supervisory positions in a department (Vito et al., 2011; Walker, 1999).

As a result, first-line supervisors have been shown to be more likely to hold similar views with line officers than officers in higher supervisory positions because they are still a part of the subculture into which they were socialized (Kutnjak Ivković, Haberfeld, & Peacock, 2019;

Kutnjak Ivković & O’Connor Shelley, 2010). First-line supervisors may also engage in the code of silence as a way to ensure their subordinates’ loyalty and good will (Bittner, 1970).

These results coincide with previous research which found significant differences in willingness to report and perceptions of seriousness between supervisors and non-supervisors for minor forms of corruption (Ivković, Peacock, et al., 2016; Kutnjak Ivković, 2005; Kutnjak

Ivković & O’Connor Shelley, 2010; Westmarland & Rowe, 2018). The significant effect that supervisor status had on the association between offense seriousness and willingness to report the “off-duty security business” scenario could be due to the occupational requirements of a supervisory position. Supervisors tend to be more knowledgeable about the rules of their respective agencies (Kutnjak Ivković, 2005; Rothwell & Baldwin, 2006). Furthermore, police officers in supervisory positions are expected to enforce their agency’s rules and regulations and often feel it is their duty to report any violations (Kutnjak Ivković, 2005; Westmarland & Rowe,

2018). These efforts to control officer misconduct would be undermined if a supervisor 125 participated in the code of silence, so supervisors forgo such participation (Kutnjak Ivković &

O’Connor Shelley, 2010).

In regards to the other scenarios tested, the fact that supervisory status did not have a significant moderating effect could be due to the perceived severity of the described acts of corruption. As stated before, the other five scenarios tested in this study depicted acts of corruption that were considered to be either of intermediate seriousness (“police DUI accident and cover up”, “excessive force on a car thief”, and “holiday for tune-up”) or high seriousness

(“speeding motorist bribe” and “theft from a burglary scene”).

In addition, supervisory status having no significant influence on the association between offense seriousness and willingness to report in these scenarios may suggest that supervisors and non-supervisors share similar opinions regarding perceptions of seriousness and reporting intentions for these scenarios. As mentioned earlier, sergeants and corporals are positions of leadership that are still significantly connected with the rank-and-file (Vito et al., 2011; Walker,

1999). This connection can result in supervisors of these two ranks practicing the code of silence out of either a sense of loyalty or a desire to stay in the good graces of their subordinates

(Bittner, 1970; Ivković, Peacock, et al., 2016; Kutnjak Ivković & O’Connor Shelley, 2010).

A few studies examining differences in perceptions of seriousness between supervisors and non-supervisors offer partial support for this notion. One such study compared supervisors and line officers in the Czech republic and found no significant differences in willingness to report for the “police DUI accident and cover-up”, “holiday for tune-up”, “speeding motorist bribe”, and “theft from a burglary scene” scenarios (Kutnjak Ivković & O’Connor Shelley,

2010). Another study by Kutnjak Ivković also found no significant differences in perceptions of seriousness among Finnish supervisors and line officers for the “speeding motorist bribe”, 126

“crime scene theft of watch”, and “holiday for tune-up” scenarios (2005). On the other hand, the same study revealed significant differences in perceptions of seriousness in all scenarios for its

Croatian sample, and significant differences in all scenarios except “crime scene theft of watch”

(i.e.: “theft at a burglary scene”) for the U.S. sample. The results of these past studies, and of this current one, suggest that the differences in perceptions of seriousness between supervisors and non-supervisors become smaller as the severity of the misconduct in question increases

(Ivković, Peacock, et al., 2016).

Overall, the results of this thesis’s analyses indicated that an officer’s supervisory status is only impactful on the relationship between offense seriousness and willingness to report for the least serious of offenses. For the remaining other scenarios, the association between offense seriousness and intention to report was not affected by a respondent’s supervisory status. The implication that these findings hold for police administrators is dependent on whether the agency prohibits or encourages secondary employment (Ayling & Shearing, 2008). If a police administrator holds the opinion that outside employment is something that is either tolerated or encouraged (Sharp, 1999), then it is likely that moonlighting is not an issue that needs to be addressed immediately with changes to departmental policy.

One the other hand, if a police administrator’s department prohibits moonlighting, then he/she will want to address the moderating effect of supervisory status. According to Sharp

(1999), off-duty employment is of concern because it may have a detrimental effect to either the agency’s image or to the officer’s ability to perform their duties sufficiently. It is possible that the respondents who viewed the “off duty security business” scenario as serious did so because of these concerns. These concerns help to explain why supervisors and non-supervisors with the same perception of seriousness exhibit different levels of willingness to report. Officers in 127 senior positions are responsible for answering to external forces such as the public or the media

(Farkas & Manning, 1997). As such, the concerns associated with moonlighting are especially troubling for senior-level officers because they will have to answer for any negative consequences resulting from this secondary employment. With this in mind, police administrators will have to ensure that their agencies’ policies concerning outside employment are designed to specifically discourage officers who are proponents of this behavior from engaging in it (Jenks, 2009).

Length of service was the third potential moderator of the relationship between offense seriousness and willingness to report that this study tested. Two of the scenarios tested showed support for the hypothesis that length of service affects the association between perceptions of seriousness and likelihood of reporting. Both the “off-duty business” and the “speeding motorist bribe” scenarios found that officers who view these behaviors as more serious and have more years of policing experience have a greater inclination to report these behaviors than their less experienced counterparts do. The significant interaction between offense seriousness and willingness to report for the “off-duty security business” scenario could be a reflection of senior- level officers’ attitudes because officers in supervisory positions tend to have more years of service (Ivković, Peacock, et al., 2016; Kutnjak Ivković & O’Connor Shelley, 2010;

Westmarland & Rowe, 2018). In contrast, the main effect for length of service was negatively associated with willingness to report, suggesting that police officers with more years of experience are less likely to report this scenario, perhaps because of socialization (Crank, 2004;

Newburn, 1999; Porter, 2011).

Length of service has a significant positive effect on the association between offense seriousness and willingness to report for the “speeding motorist bribe” scenario. This result 128 supports Kutnjak Ivković and Sauerman’s findings that police officers with more years of experience were more likely to view the acceptance of a bribe from a traffic violator as serious and be more willing to report it as well (2015). Length of service was also found to be a strong predictor of an officer’s perceptions of seriousness for the acceptance of a traffic violator’s bribe

(Kutnjak Ivković & Sauerman, 2015). The moderating effect of length of service could be the result of police officers becoming less tolerant of bribery acceptance from traffic violators as they gain more years of experience and gain a better understanding of the ramifications for this specific act of corruption (Gamarra, 2011). Similar to the “off-duty security business” scenario, the “speeding motorist bribe” scenario reported a negative association between offense seriousness and willingness to report, indicating that police officers with more experience are less likely to report someone for this behavior as a result of socialization (Crank, 2004;

Newburn, 1999; Porter, 2011). In particular, senior officers may have learned to rationalize bribes from traffic violators as being acceptable (Roebuck & Barker, 1973).

The other four scenarios, “police DUI accident and cover-up”, “excessive force on a car thief”, “holiday for tune-up”, and “theft at a burglary scene”, showed no significant moderating effect for length of service. The lack of a significant interaction between “police DUI accident and cover-up” and “excessive force on car thief” could be because both scenarios involve protecting another officer. This implies that officers of varying years of experience will choose to not report these acts of corruption because of socialization and peer pressure (Barker, 1977;

Crank, 2004; Newburn, 1999; Porter, 2011; Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007a). The non-significant interaction for the “theft at a burglary scene” could be explained by the fact that the high severity of this particular act means that police officers are likely to be willing to report this behavior, regardless of their experience. In the case of the “holiday for tune-up” scenario, it is possible 129 that there is an absence of a significant interaction between length of service and perceptions of seriousness because the severity of the behavior is seen as roughly the same by officers of all years of experience because supervisors are expected to uphold department rules and regulations

(Reuss-Ianni, 1983). In addition, lack of significant interaction between length of service and perceptions of seriousness could also be owed to police officers not wanting a fellow officer to exploit them for a favor (Roebuck & Barker, 1973).

These results are interesting because “off-duty security business” is a minor form of corruption, while “speeding motorist bribe” is a major form of corruption (Klockars et al., 2000).

This suggests that the moderating effect of length of service on the relationship between offense seriousness and willingness to report may not dependent on the magnitude of the severity of the corruption. Instead, the presence and magnitude of a moderating effect from length of service is likely dependent upon the subculture found in the police officer’s agency. Police officers employed at agencies with cultures that promote integrity are likely to learn to accept those values, while officers employed at agencies with deviant subcultures are likely to learn to accept deviant values (Klockars et al., 2000; Lee, Lim, Moore, & Kim, 2013; Lim & Sloan, 2016). The significant findings for the “off-duty business” and “speeding motorist bribe” scenarios suggests support for Miceli and Near’s (1992) arguments as well as the findings from Porter et al.’s research (2015). Miceli and Near argued that the relationship between length of service and willingness to report is inconsistent for several reasons. On the one hand, senior employees were more likely to blow the whistle because they are invested in the organization and blowing the whistle is less likely to result in rejection for them as it would for a newcomer (1992). On the other hand, newcomers may be more inclined to blow the whistle because they do not have as much to lose as their senior counterparts (Miceli & Near, 1992). In addition, senior officers will 130 be more willing to report behaviors that their organization considers deviant, whereas newcomers are more liable to report behaviors that are considered acceptable by the new organization but deviant outside the organization (Miceli & Near, 1992). The results of Porter et al (2015) revealed a weak but significant relationship between length of service and offense seriousness and significant relationship between length of service and willingness to report that was moderate. Years of service was also revealed as a significant predictor of willingness to report, although it only accounts for a small portion of the variation (Porter et al., 2015).

These results are also consistent with Gamarra’s interviews with police officers.

According to those interviews, police officers with more years of experience tended to be less tolerant of misconduct because they had more knowledge regarding which violations would not be tolerated by the department (2011).

In contrast, the lack of a significant moderating effect in the remaining four scenarios coincides with the research that did not find a connection between length of service and willingness to support (Barnett et al., 1993; Kutnjak Ivkovic & Sauerman, 2012; Rothwell &

Baldwin, 2007a; Sims & Keenan, 1998; Singer et al., 1998). A possible explanation for the lack of a significant moderating effect from length of service on the association between perceptions of seriousness and willingness to report for the majority of the tested scenarios could be that the social pressure to adhere to code-of-silence attitudes offsets the willingness to blow the whistle.

Senior officers are more likely to be invested in the agency and to have developed strong bonds with other officers, causing senior officers to practice the code of silence in order to protect the police agency and its members (Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007a; Umphress & Bingham, 2011). The absence of a significant moderating effect from length of service could also be attributed to the fact that newer officers have sometimes been known to blow the whistles themselves because 131 they do not share the same attachment to the police agency as the senior officers do (Rothschild

& Miethe, 1999; Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007a). Based on these findings, and the information gleaned from Gamarra’s (2011) work, police administrators will want to focus their efforts on creating policies and procedures that combat deviant subcultures and promote cultures of integrity so that eventually new officers will be introduced to senior officers that uphold the values of integrity.

The analyses reported here also examined the role of offense seriousness, rank, type of assignment, and agency type in predicting reporting intentions. Offense seriousness was consistently a strong predictor of willingness to report across all models for the six scenarios tested, supporting previous research (Hickman et al., 2016; Ivković, Haberfeld, et al., 2016;

Kutnjak Ivković et al., 2018; Kutnjak Ivkovic & Sauerman, 2012; Long et al., 2013; Porter &

Prenzler, 2016; Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007b).

In regards to the control variable of rank, it was included because of its association with the moderating variable supervisory status. First-line supervisors, middle managers, and top administrators reported significant positive associations with willingness to report in the main effects, discipline fairness, and length of service models for all six scenarios. For the supervisor status models, first-line supervisors had significant associations for the “speeding motorist bribe” and “theft at a burglary scene” scenarios and middle managers reported significant associations for “excessive force on a car thief” and “holiday for tune-up”. Top administrators were significantly associated with willingness to report in the supervisor status models for “excessive force on a car thief”, “holiday for tune-up”, and “theft at a burglary scene”. The differences in associations with willingness to report and levels of significances between the three supervisory groups support the argument that it is better to differentiate between the different levels of 132 supervisors as they do not share homogeneous views (Kutnjak Ivković et al., 2019). The results of this study also support the findings of Vito and his colleagues which revealed that first-line supervisors were more likely to be unwilling to report an act of misconduct than middle managers (2011). The increased likelihood of reporting associated with each of the supervisory groups could be explained by the fact that first-line supervisors, middle managers, and top administrators are all expected to devote their attention to enforcing the policies of their respective police departments (Reuss-Ianni, 1983).

Current assignment was included as a control variable as previous research found mixed results regarding its association with willingness to report (Ivković et al., 2018; Long et al.,

2013; Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007b). The results of the ordinal regressions for this study showed some support for the claim that an officer’s assignment was significantly related to his/her willingness to report. Officers who worked in traffic were significantly associated with willingness to report for the “off-duty security business” scenario. Police officers assigned to administrative, detective/investigative, on-call/control, or “other”, all reported significant associations with willingness to report for the “speeding motorist bribe” and “theft at a burglary scene” scenarios. Officers who work in on-call/or control also reported a significant association with likelihood of reporting for the “holiday for tune-up” scenario. The results of these analyses provide partial support for previous researchers who also found a significant association between current assignment and reporting intentions (Long et al., 2013; Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007b).

Long et al found that communications officers and administrative officers were more likely to report misconduct that officers assigned to patrol and detective/special operations units (2013).

Rothwell and Baldwin reported that police officers assigned to investigative units and 133 professional standard units were more willing to report peer misconduct than officers in patrol units (2007b).

Police officers assigned to traffic units are responsible for enforcing laws against dangerous driving (e.g.: speeding, driving under the influence), conducting patrols of highways and main roads for the purpose of preventing motor-vehicle accidents, and directing traffic

(Bayley, 1994; Standards for Law Enforcement Agencies: The Standards manual of the Law

Enforcement Agency Accreditation Program, 1989). Officers working in detective/investigative units are responsible for conducting investigations of criminal acts. Detectives and criminal investigators in small departments tend to be generalists, while the larger departments will assign them to specialized units such as robbery, homicide, or narcotics (Bayley, 1994; Standards for

Law Enforcement Agencies: The Standards manual of the Law Enforcement Agency

Accreditation Program, 1989). Administrative officers take care of recruitment, training, public relations, budgets, and supervising (1994). Police officers assigned to on-call/control units tend to work in specialized units, such as SWAT, which are inactive until the need for these units arises (Bayley, 1994). The wide variety of duties demonstrated by the different assignments could help to explain why officers in one unit may be more likely to report a specific scenario.

The association between current assignment and willingness to report sometimes became significant or insignificant when one of the moderators was included in the model. For example, when length of service was included as a moderator in the “speeding motorist bribe” scenario, the assignments of “other”, detective/investigative, and on-call/control became non-significant.

In addition, having a traffic assignment was only significantly associated with reporting intentions for the “off-duty security business” scenario when supervisor and length of service was included as a moderator. Police officers with an administrative assignment were no longer 134 significantly associated with willingness to report the “holiday for tune-up” scenario when length of service was added to the model as a moderator.

Agency type was included as a control variable based on Miceli and Near’s (1985, 1992) reasonings for why large organizations were both helpful and harmful to whistle-blowing behavior. For the “speeding motorist bribe” and “theft at a burglary scene”, both describing high ethical problems, officers employed in large, medium, small, and very small-sized municipal agencies were significantly less likely to report an officer for these behaviors. In contrast, police officers working in county police agencies were more likely to report these behaviors. Police officers from county agencies were also more likely to report the “holiday for tune-up” scenario, but they were less likely to report the “off-duty security business” scenario.

Small and very small municipal police agencies, the analyses showed that officers from a small municipal agency were less likely to report the remaining four scenarios, while those from a very small municipal agency were also less likely to report the “police DUI accident and cover- up” and the “excessive force on a car thief” scenarios. Sheriff agencies were less likely to report an officer for the “police DUI accident and cover-up scenario”.

Overall, these results fall in line with the previous research that found a significant association between type of agency and willingness to report (Barnett, 1992; Miceli & Near,

1985, 1992; Near & Miceli, 1996). Furthermore, the results of these analyses found that among municipal police agencies, police officers in smaller organizations are less willing to report in another officer for engaging in any major forms of corruption. According to previous research, police officers employed in larger police agencies were more willing to report misconduct than officers employed in smaller agencies because larger organizations are more inclined to have measures put in place to safeguard potential whistle-blowers from retaliation (Miceli & Near, 135

1985, 1992). Furthermore, officers in larger agencies may be more willing to report peer misconduct because the high number of employees means that there is less of a chance for an officer to form bonds with his/her colleagues that would prevent any desire to report (Rothwell

& Baldwin, 2006).

In contrast, police officers employed at a sheriff’s agency reported a greater willingness to report for the “holiday for tune-up” and “theft at a burglary crime scene” scenarios, and officers employed at a county agency were more likely to report all of the scenarios except for

“off-duty security business”. The negative association between organization size and willingness to report evidenced here may owe its existence to the fact that reporting wrongdoings through internal measures is very difficult in larger organizations. Not only is there a chance the report may never reach the intended recipient due to the channels it would have to go through, there is a chance the organization’s employees have no knowledge that such channels exist (Miceli &

Near, 1992).

Like rank and current assignment, agency type also demonstrated a change in significance with the inclusion of the moderator variables. For example, the association between employment at a county agency and willingness to report for the “holiday for tune-up” scenario became insignificant when length of service was included as a moderator. Another example of this change in significance is evidenced by the fact that working in a sheriff’s agency was only significantly associated with reporting intentions for the “police DUI accident and cover-up” scenario when discipline fairness was introduced into the analysis.

Limitations

While the dataset used for this research does allow for the examination of police attitudes and behaviors concerning willingness to report as they relate to various forms of police 136 misconduct, there are several limitations. One such limitation is referenced in Klockars et al.’s

(2000) study of the same dataset. The generalizability of the results gleaned from the analyses conducted for this paper’s research is limited in several aspects.

The first limitation is that the original researcher collected the data from a convenience sample that oversampled municipal police agencies as well as police agencies in the Northeast

(Klockars, 1999). The second limitation of the data set is it did not include any agencies from the West, Northwest, and Midwest Regions of America in the sample. The third limitation is that the majority of the sample was comprised of patrol officers. As a result, any insights gained through analysis of this data set are unlikely to be evocative of the general police officer population in America.

It has been noted by previous researchers that the use of convenience samples is often the only viable approach to studying American police for two reasons (Ivković et al., 2015; Ivković,

Peacock, et al., 2016). First, it is impossible to collect data from all police officers in the United

States as there are 17,398 police agencies and 750,340 sworn officers working full time (Banks,

Hendrix, Hickman, & Kyckelhahn, 2016). Second, attempts to collect a sample of officers that is actually representative of the American police would similarly be impossible due to the highly decentralized and fragmented nature of United States law enforcement and the fact that there is a lack of general consensus regarding who should be defined as a sworn police officer (2016).

Another constraint of this study is that the results were collected using a self-report survey. Data collected in this manner are most likely be affected by a social desirability bias

(Randall & Fernandes, 1991; Zerbe & Paulhus, 1987) and/or an intention-behavior bias

(Sheeran, 2002). Social desirability bias refers to an individual’s inclination toward presenting his or her self in a favorable light by claiming internalization of attitudes and engagement in 137 behaviors that are deemed desirable by society and claiming rejection of those which are not accepted by society (Zerbe & Paulhus, 1987). Two components make up social desirability: self- deception and impression management. Individuals who exhibit social desirability bias because of self-deception tend to exaggerate unintentionally their exhibition of socially desirable traits due to a self-perception, which paints them in a positive light. On the other hand, social desirability bias as a result of impression management constitutes individuals purposefully presenting themselves in a way which suggests the possession of socially desirable traits while in reality there is no such possession (Zerbe & Paulhus, 1987).

Social desirability bias may likely have affected the responses given by the police officers in this data set, particularly in regards to willingness to report misconduct, because police officers view themselves as moral protectors of society and are thus likely to believe that they would report witnessed misconduct. Conversely, the police officers may have also exhibited social desirability bias in their responses because of a desire to meet the stringent ethical demands placed upon them by the public. It is worth mentioning that the anonymous nature of the surveys may have mitigated the impact of social desirability bias on the findings from this research.

An additional way in which responses in self-report measures may not be an accurate reflection of behavior is through the intention-behavior gap (Sheeran, 2002). Drawing upon previous research (Mcbroom & Reed, 1992), Sheeran introduces four types of individuals which are categorized based on the nature of the intention-behavior relationship they exhibit (2002).

While two of the groups, inclined actor and disinclined abstainer, are consistent in their intentions and behaviors, the other two groups, inclined abstainers and disinclined actors, are inconsistent in their intention and behavior. Inclined abstainers display a desire to engage in a 138 behavior but take no action to do so, and disinclined actors carry out a behavior despite expressing an aversion towards that behavior (Sheeran, 2002). According to previous research, inclined abstainers should be credited with a larger percentage of the incidents of discrepancies between an individual’s intentions and his/her behavior (Sheeran, 2002). The responses given by the police officers in this data set may not be an accurate representation of what would truthfully happen if they were to witness a fellow officer engage in an act of corruption as the survey asked the respondents questions regarding willingness to report misconduct rather than actual reporting behavior.

The measurement of a police officer’s willingness to report has the potential to introduce biased results because of an intention-behavior gap for the following reasons. As previously stated, it is possible that an officer reported a higher willingness to report hypothetical misconduct because such behavior is seen as socially desirable among police (Skolnick & Fyfe,

1993); as such, this overstatement could contribute to a discrepancy between the intentions and behaviors of the respondents. Another reason for the existence of an intention-behavior gap among the respondents in the sample is that police officers have refrained from reporting misconduct in the past out of fear of being subjected to retaliation from the other members of the department (Trautman, 2001). Therefore, while a respondent may indicate a willingness to report an act of corruption in the hypothetical sense, in a real-life situation he/she may very well keep quiet about that same act of corruption (Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007b).

The design of this study is also prone to its own weaknesses. One such weakness is that this study measures reporting intentions rather than actual reporting behavior. Several studies have found that whistle-blowing intentions and actual whistle-blowing are sometimes predicted by different factors (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005; Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007b; 139

Victor, Klebe Trevino, & Shapiro, 1993). These differences in contributing factors signify that the findings gleaned from studies examining inclinations to report cannot be assumed to apply to actual reporting behaviors as well.

The Hickman et al study (2016) highlights an additional obstacle faced by this study.

According to Hickman et al, a weakness of the Klockars et al (1999) scale is that the offense seriousness variable does not fully explain why a police officer would be more willing to report his/her colleague’s misconduct (2016). This lack of explanatory capability is due to the offense seriousness question from the Klockars et al (1999) instrument only having the ability to indicate whether the respondent views the behavior in question as immoral. . In addition, this question tends to lend itself to a narrow range of responses from respondents, as noted by previous research (Hickman et al., 2016; Kutnjak Ivkovich & Khechumyan, 2013). The data used for this study exhibits a lack of deviation among the responses given by respondents about offense seriousness for several of the scenarios examined.

A further constraint in the design of the survey used is the scenarios described within. As stated previously, Klockars et al (2000)’s instrument primarily focused on acts of police deviancy motivated by gain (Klockars et al., 2007). This narrow focus on what motivates a police officer to engage in wrongdoing similarly narrows the understanding of police integrity, specifically in regards to willingness to report. The Klockars et al(2000) instrument only lends itself to measuring police integrity as it pertains to resisting wrongdoing for gain (Klockars et al.,

2007, p. 137) In addition, the majority of the scenarios depicted acts of corruption rather than other types of police misbehavior (Gottschalk, 2010; Klockars et al., 2007). Focusing primarily on corruption also results in an incomplete examination of police integrity because the Klockars et al (2000)survey does not look into the role of police integrity plays in controlling other acts of 140 police wrongdoing such as excessive force, sexual misconduct, evidence tampering, sleeping while on duty, and disrespecting citizens (Gottschalk, 2010; Klockars et al., 2007; Punch, 2000)

Another limitation of this study is that it could have measured the impact the length of service on the relationship between offense seriousness and willingness to report more effectively. As stated before, some researchers have either found an association between length of service and adherence to the code of silence (Ivkovich & Sauerman, 2013; Miceli & Near,

1988; Porter et al., 2015; Rothschild & Miethe, 1999; Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007b), or no such relationship (Barnett et al., 1993; Rothwell & Baldwin, 2006, 2007a; Sims & Keenan, 1998;

Singer et al., 1998). In addition, the police agencies that make up this dataset reported varying levels of integrity (Klockars et al., 2000).

With this in mind, measuring the moderating effect of length of service at the aggregate level rather than at the agency level could have led to a weakened understanding of the role that length of service plays. It is possible that length of service could have a differing effect on the relationship between offense seriousness and willingness to report misconduct, depending upon the levels of integrity found within a police agency.

Future Research Suggestions

Including Long et al.’s (2013) research, this study is one of the first in the police literature to test the relationship between offense seriousness and willingness to report for potential moderators. Due to this fact, there are a number of suggestions to be made to future researchers. Some of the limitations of this study inspire several of these suggestions. One such recommendation is that upcoming academics should test the impact of the moderators tested in this study on the relationship between perceptions of seriousness and whistle-blowing behaviors.

As the determinants of reporting intentions and reporting behaviors tend to differ from one 141 another (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005; Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007b; Victor et al.,

1993), focusing on the actual whistle-blowing behaviors of police officers will likely provide for a better understanding of the police code of silence.

Another suggestion is that future research should endeavor to test further the analyses in this study to ascertain their generalizability across different police populations. As indicated earlier, one of the limitations of this study is that the sample is not an accurate reflection of the police population at large; most of the sample is comprised of officers employed at agencies in the Northeast and/or at municipal agencies with more than 500 sworn officers. Therefore, future research should survey other police populations in the United States not adequately represented in this study to test the generalizability of these findings. In addition, it would also be interesting to test these hypotheses on an international scale as police agencies outside of the USA have reported different cultures of integrity (Cheloukhine et al., 2015; Huberts et al., 2003; Ivković &

Haberfeld, 2015a; Kang & Ivković, 2015; Kutnjak Ivkovich & Khechumyan, 2013; Phetthong &

Ivković, 2015; Porter et al., 2015).

Another recommendation for future research would be to explore the effects of the moderators tested in this study on the association between a police officer’s moral and ethical attitudes and his/her willingness to report. According to Hickman et al (2016), the scale developed by Hyams (1990) to measure attitudes towards ethical behaviors is a better predictor of willingness to report than offense seriousness as the seriousness of a hypothetical behavior increases. Therefore, it makes sense that exploring the relationship between ethical attitudes and willingness to report in more depth by testing potential moderators and mediators may provide a more accurate picture of why a police officer would choose to report peer misconduct. 142

While this study and other researchers in the past have included length of service as way to measure socialization (Rothwell & Baldwin, 2006, 2007a, 2007b), there are likely better ways to test the impact of socialization on the relationship between offense seriousness and willingness to report. In particular, future researchers should also include items that measure the extent to which a police officer socializes with his/her peers. When combined with questions regarding length of service at the current agency and the attitudes of the officer’s peers, future scholars are likely to have a more in depth understanding of the role that socialization plays in officer attitudes.

I would also recommend that the relationship between offense seriousness and willingness to report be explored further in other ways, such as determining if other factors either moderate or mediate the relationship. For example, knowledge of official policy could mediate the relationship between offense seriousness and willingness to report because police officers may view an act of corruption as serious if they know it is against the rules. Additionally future researchers could also test the impact of the willingness of other officers to report or their perceptions of seriousness on an individual police officer’s own intentions to report wrongdoing

(Huberts et al., 2003).

As previous research has found other factors besides perceptions of seriousness to be significantly associated with willingness to report (e.g., Kutnjak Ivković & O’Connor Shelley,

2010; Long et al., 2013; Porter & Prenzler, 2016; Rothwell & Baldwin, 2006), it would benefit the academic community and the world of policing to do in-depth analyses of these relationships as well. Some of these other predictors include the perceived willingness of other officers to report misconduct, supervisory status, discipline fairness, and others’ perceptions of seriousness.

Analyzing the association between these factors and willingness to report in a more exhaustive 143 manner through the introduction of potential moderators and mediators will be beneficial. As more is learned about the different factors associated with willingness to report, and how they interact with one another, the more knowledgeable we will be about the code of silence in police agencies. In turn, this increased understanding regarding the dimensions of the code of silence will allow police administrators to implement policies that are more effective in addressing the code of silence issue among their officers and thus mitigate its negative effects.

144

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Table 9: Odds Ratios (OR), Standard Errors (SE), and Confidence Intervals (CI) for Potential Moderators of Relationship between Offense Seriousness and Willingness to Report for Case 1: Off-Duty Security Business (N = 3,107)

Predictors of Willingness to Model 8A Model 8B Model 8C Model 8D Report OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) Independent Variable Offense Seriousness(OS) 4.590*** [4.131,5.101] 4.958*** [4.379,5.613] 4.058*** [3.627,4.541] 2.439*** [1.918,3.100] (0.247) (0.314) (0.233) (0.298)

Moderators and Interactions Discipline Fairness (DF) a Too harsh 5.572*** [3.209,9.675] (1.569)

Too lenient 8.316*** [3.419,20.22] (3.762)

OS x DF Seriousness x Too harsh 0.693** [0.549,0.875] (0.083)

OS x Too lenient 0.612** [0.449,0.833] (0.097)

Supervisor b 0.401* [0.170,0.946] (0.175)

OS x Supervisor 1.904*** [1.483,2.446] (0.243)

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 a b c d e Notes: Comparison group is “Fair”. Comparison group is “Non-Supervisor”. Comparison group is “Line Officers”. Comparison group is “Patrol”. 156 Comparison group is “Very Large/over 500”

Table 9 (cont.) Predictors of Willingness to Model 8A Model 8B Model 8C Model 8D Report OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) Length of Service 0.683*** [0.594,0.785] (0.049)

OS x Length of Service 1.156*** [1.098,1.217] (0.031)

Control Variables Rank c First-Line Supervisors 1.650** [1.211,2.248] 1.860*** [1.353,2.556] 1.162 [0.590,2.286] 1.903*** [1.345,2.693] (0.260) (0.302) (0.401) (0.337)

Middle Managers 2.281*** [1.454,3.579] 2.595*** [1.630,4.132] 1.657 [0.752,3.654] 2.863*** [1.717,4.774] (0.524) (0.616) (0.668) (0.747)

Top Administrators 3.058*** [1.155,3.532] 3.666*** [1.915,7.020] 1.801 [0.740,4.387] 3.157** [1.578,6.315] (1.000) (1.215) (0.818) (1.117)

Current Assignment d On-call or control 0.697* [0.496,0.891] 0.751 [0.531,1.064] 0.688* [0.488,970] 0.753 [0.523,1.085] (0.121) (0.133) (0.121) (0.140)

Detective/investigative 0.679 [0.453,1.018] 0.727 [0.483,1.095] 0.702 [0.468,1.053] 0.708 [0.466,1.074] (0.140) (0.152) (0.145) (0.151)

Traffic 4.622 [0.993,21.51] 4.603 [0.907,23.37] 4.855* [1.039,22.68] 5.066* [1.097,23.40] (3.625) (3.815) (3.817) (3.953)

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Notes: a Comparison group is “Fair”. b Comparison group is “Non-Supervisor”. c Comparison group is “Line Officers”. d Comparison group is “Patrol”. e 157 Comparison group is “Very Large/over 500”

Table 9 (cont.) Predictors of Willingness to Model 8A Model 8B Model 8C Model 8D Report OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) Administrative 1.318 [0.856,2.029] 1.358 [0.873,2.113] 1.323 [0.841,2.082] 1.421 [0.899,2.244] (0.290) (0.306) (0.306) (0.331)

Other 0.648 [0.389,1.079] 0.661 [0.392,1.114] 0.709 [0.429,1.173] 0.699 [0.421,1.161] (0.169) (0.176) (0.182) (0.181)

Agency Type e Large 201-500 0.901 [0.594,1.367] 0.909 [0.598,1.382] 0.956 [0.626,1.461] 0.912 [0.604,1.378] (0.192) (0.194) (0.207) (0.192)

Medium 76-200 1.133 [0.800,1.605] 1.135 [0.797,1.616] 1.162 [0.816,1.657] 1.148 [0.807,1.633] (0.201) (0.205) (0.210) (0.207)

Small 25-75 0.253*** [0.137,0.465] 0.278*** [0.149,0.517] 0.238*** [0.126,0.449] 0.242*** [0.130,0.450] (0.079) (0.088) (0.077) (0.077)

Very small/less than 25 0.519 [0.230,1.170] 0.585 [0.255,1.343] 0.568 [0.251,1.282] 0.563 [0.253,1.251] (0.215) (0.248) (0.236) (0.229)

Sheriff 1.733 [0.887,3.387] 1.694 [0.862,3.329] 1.814 [0.928,3.545] 1.755 [0.899,3.426] (0.593) (0.584) (0.620) (0.599)

County police 0.577** [0.384,0.869] 0.643* [0.424,0.976] 0.601* [0.400,0.903] 0.626* [0.414,0.945] (0.120) (0.137) (0.125) (0.132)

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Notes: a Comparison group is “Fair”. b Comparison group is “Non-Supervisor”. c Comparison group is “Line Officers”. d Comparison group is “Patrol”. e Comparison group is “Very Large/over 500”

158

Table 10: Odds Ratios (OR), Standard Errors (SE), and Confidence Intervals (CI) for Potential Moderators of Relationship between Offense Seriousness and Willingness to Report for Case 2: Police DUI Accident and Cover-up (N = 3,107)

Predictors of Willingness to Model 9A Model 9B Model 9C Model 9D Report OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) Independent Variable Offense Seriousness (OS) 4.214*** [3.906,4.546] 4.507*** [4.120,4.931] 4.119*** [3.798,4.468] 3.833*** [3.191,4.604] (0.163) (0.207) (0.171) (0.358)

Moderators and Interactions Discipline Fairness (DF) a Too harsh 1.329 [0.816,2.164] (0.331)

Too lenient 1.913 [0.741,4.936] (0.923)

OS x DF OS x Too harsh 0.708*** [0.609,0.823] (0.054)

OS x Too lenient 0.779 [0.606,1.002] (0.010)

Supervisor b 1.457 [0.724,2.933] (0.520)

OS x Supervisor 1.105 [0.943,1.295] (0.089)

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 a b c d e Notes: Comparison group is “Fair”. Comparison group is “Non-Supervisor”. Comparison group is “Line Officers”. Comparison group is “Patrol”. 159 Comparison group is “Very Large/over 500”

Table 10 (cont.) Predictors of Willingness to Model 9A Model 9B Model 9C Model 9D Report OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) Length of Service 1.005 [0.878,1.151] (0.069)

OS x Length of Service 1.024 [0.987,1.062] (0.019)

Control Variables Rank c First-Line Supervisors 2.037*** [1.654,2.509] 1.970*** [1.597,2.431] 1.081 [0.690,1.694] 1.787*** [1.429,2.235] (0.216) (0.211) (0.248) (0.204)

Middle Managers 2.975*** [2.143,4.130] 2.780*** [1.998,3.869] 1.546 [0.918,2.605] 2.497*** [1.768,3.527] (0.498) (0.469) (0.411) (0.440)

Top Administrators 2.507*** [1.493,4.209] 2.258** [1.337,3.813] 1.446 [0.774,2.702] 2.158** [1.272,3.659] (0.663) (0.604) (0.461) (0.582)

Current Assignment d On-call or control 0.994 [0.808,1.223] 1.014 [0.824,1.248] 0.998 [0.812,1.228] 0.899 [0.724,1.116] (0.105) (0.107) (0.105) (0.099)

Detective/investigative 0.962 [0.752,1.230] 0.959 [0.749,1.228] 0.958 [0.749,1.226] 0.903 [0.704,1.159] (0.121) (0.121) (0.120) (0.115)

Traffic 2.430 [0.734,8.046] 2.048 [0.617,6.803] 2.782 [0.844,9.174] 2.295 [0.694,7.585] (1.484) (1.254) (1.694) (1.400)

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Notes: a Comparison group is “Fair”. b Comparison group is “Non-Supervisor”. c Comparison group is “Line Officers”. d Comparison group is “Patrol”. e 160 Comparison group is “Very Large/over 500”

Table 10 (cont.) Predictors of Willingness to Model 9A Model 9B Model 9C Model 9D Report OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) Administrative 1.132 [0.815,1.572] 1.112 [0.800,1.548] 1.093 [0.785,1.524] 1.032 [0.739,1.440] (0.190) (0.187) (0.185) (0.176)

Other 1.011 [0.732,1.397] 1.009 [0.729,1.397] 0.992 [0.718,1.372] 0.973 [0.703,1.347] (0.167) (0.168) (0.164) (0.161)

Agency Type e Large 201-500 1.146 [0.876,1.501] 1.234 [0.942,1.616] 1.148 [0.875,1.504] 1.191 [0.909,1.561] (0.158) (0.170) (0.159) (0.164)

Medium 76-200 0.851 [0.661,1.096] 0.836 [0.649,1.078] 0.849 [0.659,1.095] 0.846 [0.657,1.089] (0.110) (0.108) (0.110) (0.109)

Small 25-75 0.325*** [0.230,0.460] 0.315*** [0.222,0.447] 0.321*** [0.227,0.455] 0.327*** [0.231,0.463] (0.058) (0.056) (0.057) (0.058)

Very small/less than 25 0.476** [0.293,0.774] 0.428*** [0.261,0.700] 0.467** [0.287,0.762] 0.484** [0.297,0.787] (0.118) (0.108) (0.117) (0.120)

Sheriff 0.805 [0.474,1.368] 0.825 [0.488,1.395] 0.804 [0.473,1.365] 0.813 [0.479,1.379] (0.218) (0.221) (0.217) (0.219)

County police 0.896 [0.717,1.121] 0.859 [0.686,1.075] 0.892 [0.714,1.116] 0.865 [0.691,1.084] (0.102) (0.097) (0.102) (0.010)

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Notes: a Comparison group is “Fair”. b Comparison group is “Non-Supervisor”. c Comparison group is “Line Officers”. d Comparison group is “Patrol”. e Comparison group is “Very Large/over 500”

161

Table 11: Odds Ratios (OR), Standard Errors (SE), and Confidence Intervals (CI) for Potential Moderators of Relationship between Offense Seriousness and Willingness to Report for Case 3: Excessive Force on Car Thief (N = 3,107)

Predictors of Willingness to Model 10A Model 10B Model 10C Model 10D Report OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) Independent Variable Offense Seriousness (OS) 4.551*** [4.191,4.942] 4.763*** [4.310,5.264] 4.471*** [4.097,4.879] 4.492*** [3.669,5.501] (0.191) (0.243) (0.199) (0.464)

Moderators and Interactions Discipline Fairness (DF) a Too harsh 1.615 [0.894,2.918] (0.488)

Too lenient 2.751 [0.782,9.680] (1.763)

OS x DF OS x Too harsh 0.778** [0.669,0.905] (0.060)

OS x Too lenient 0.805 [0.608,1.066] (0.115)

Supervisor b 1.157 [0.472,2.840] (0.530)

OS x Supervisor 1.111 [0.924,1.336] (0.105)

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 a b c d e Notes: Comparison group is “Fair”. Comparison group is “Non-Supervisor”. Comparison group is “Line Officers”. Comparison group is “Patrol”. 162 Comparison group is “Very Large/over 500”

Table 11 (cont.) Predictors of Willingness to Model 10A Model 10B Model 10C Model 10D Report OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) Length of Service 1.064 [0.890,1.272] (0.097)

OS x Length of Service 1.004 [0.963,1.046] (0.021)

Control Variables Rank c First-Line Supervisors 2.269*** [1.829,2.815] 2.202*** [1.774,2.732] 1.356 [0.874,2.102] 2.016*** [1.605,2.532] (0.250) (0.242) (0.303) (0.234)

Middle Managers 3.205*** [2.245,4.576] 2.983*** [2.087,4.263] 1.888* [1.105,3.226] 2.746*** [1.898,3.973] (0.582) (0.543) (0.516) (0.517)

Top Administrators 3.677*** [2.001,6.756] 3.465*** [1.877,6.394] 2.403* [1.201,4.810] 3.237*** [1.751,5.984] (1.141) (1.083) (0.851) (1.015)

Current Assignment d On-call or control 1.188 [0.971,1.452] 1.201 [0.982,1.470] 1.195 [0.977,1.461] 1.088 [0.883,1.339] (0.122) (0.124) (0.123) (0.115)

Detective/investigative 1.026 [0.813,1.296] 1.015 [0.803,1.282] 1.025 [0.811,1.295] 0.974 [0.769,1.234] (0.122) (0.121) (0.122) (0.117)

Traffic 1.389 [0.363,5.316] 1.326 [0.340,5.175] 1.581 [0.404,6.182] 1.365 [0.349,5.340] (0.951) (0.921) (1.100) (0.950)

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Notes: a Comparison group is “Fair”. b Comparison group is “Non-Supervisor”. c Comparison group is “Line Officers”. d Comparison group is “Patrol”. e 163 Comparison group is “Very Large/over 500”

Table 11 (cont.) Predictors of Willingness to Model 10A Model 10B Model 10C Model 10D Report OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) Administrative 0.998 [0.714,1.394] 0.972 [0.694,1.361] 0.973 [0.695,1.364] 0.920 [0.656,1.291] (0.170) (0.167) (0.167) (0.159)

Other 1.037 [0.758,1.419] 1.055 [0.770,1.445] 1.025 [0.749,1.404] 1.005 [0.734,1.375] (0.166) (0.169) (0.164) (0.161)

Agency Type e Large 201-500 0.919 [0.705,1.199] 0.922 [0.706,1.204] 0.927 [0.710,1.211] 0.952 [0.729,1.243] (0.125) (0.125) (0.126) (0.130)

Medium 76-200 0.857 [0.668,1.098] 0.842 [0.656,1.080] 0.859 [0.670,1.100] 0.858 [0.670,1.100] (0.108) (0.107) (0.109) (0.109)

Small 25-75 0.282*** [0.207,0.383] 0.270*** [0.198,0.369] 0.279*** [0.205,0.380] 0.283*** [0.208,0.385] (0.044) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044)

Very small/less than 25 0.373*** [0.244,0.571] 0.380*** [0.248,0.582] 0.368*** [0.240,0.565] 0.378*** [0.247,0.579] (0.081) (0.083) (0.080) (0.082)

Sheriff 1.016 [0.612,1.686] 1.013 [0.611,1.678] 1.021 [0.616,1.695] 1.024 [0.617,1.698] (0.263) (0.261) (0.264) (0.264)

County police 1.704*** [1.351,2.149] 1.693*** [1.341,2.137] 1.713*** [1.357,2.161] 1.653*** [1.309,2.086] (0.202) (0.201) (0.203) (0.196)

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Notes: a Comparison group is “Fair”. b Comparison group is “Non-Supervisor”. c Comparison group is “Line Officers”. d Comparison group is “Patrol”. e Comparison group is “Very Large/over 500”

164

Table 12: Odds Ratios (OR), Standard Errors (SE), and Confidence Intervals (CI) for Potential Moderators of Relationship between Offense Seriousness and Willingness to Report for Case 4: Holiday for Tune-up (Supervisor) (N = 3,107)

Predictors of Willingness to Model 11A Model 11B Model 11C Model 11D Report OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) Independent Variable Offense Seriousness OS 3.586*** [3.304,3.891] 3.732*** [3.395,4.101] 3.499*** [3.211,3.813] 3.089*** [2.512,3.798] (0.150) (0.180) (0.154) (0.326)

Moderators and Interactions Discipline Fairness (DF) a Too harsh 0.900 [0.387,2.093] (0.387)

Too lenient 2.420 [0.920,6.364] (1.193)

OS x DF OS x Too harsh 0.931 [0.750,1.155] (0.102)

OS x Too lenient 0.784* [0.631,0.974] (0.087)

Supervisor b 0.964 [0.344,2.698] (0.506)

OS x Supervisor 1.177 [0.946,1.464] (0.131)

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 a b c d e Notes: Comparison group is “Fair”. Comparison group is “Non-Supervisor”. Comparison group is “Line Officers”. Comparison group is “Patrol”. 165 Comparison group is “Very Large/over 500”

Table 12 (cont.) Predictors of Willingness to Model 11A Model 11B Model 11C Model 11D Report OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) Length of Service 0.947 [0.786,1.140] (0.090)

OS x Length of Service 1.035 [0.991,1.081] (0.023)

Control Variables Rank c First-Line Supervisors 2.637*** [2.141,3.249] 2.575*** [2.090,3.174] 1.478 [0.971,2.250] 2.297*** [1.841,2.866] (0.281) (0.274) (0.317) (0.259)

Middle Managers 3.173*** [2.245,4.483] 3.099*** [2.191,4.384] 1.721* [1.030,2.875] 2.632*** [1.836,3.772] (0.560) (0.549) (0.450) (0.483)

Top Administrators 4.001*** [2.176,7.355] 4.023*** [2.181,7.421] 2.500** [1.275,4.901] 3.477*** [1.878,6.439] (1.243) (1.257) (0.859) (1.093)

Current Assignment d On-call or control 1.460*** [1.202,1.772] 1.453*** [1.196,1.764] 1.473*** [1.212,1.789] 1.322** [1.080,1.619] (0.145) (0.144) (0.146) (0.136)

Detective/investigative 1.187 [0.951,1.480] 1.186 [0.951,1.480] 1.184 [0.948,1.477] 1.116 [0.892,1.395] (0.134) (0.134) (0.134) (0.127)

Traffic 1.597 [0.401,6.356] 1.596 [0.394,6.455] 1.762 [0.436,7.113] 1.535 [0.376,6.263] (1.125) (1.138) (1.254) (1.101) * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Notes: a Comparison group is “Fair”. b Comparison group is “Non-Supervisor”. c Comparison group is “Line Officers”. d Comparison group is “Patrol”. e 166 Comparison group is “Very Large/over 500”

Table 12 (cont.) Predictors of Willingness to Model 11A Model 11B Model 11C Model 11D Report OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) Administrative 1.500* [1.073,2.098] 1.510* [1.078,2.115] 1.466* [1.045,2.056] 1.368 [0.974,1.921] (0.257) (0.260) (0.253) (0.237)

Other 1.333 [0.980,1.813] 1.350 [0.992,1.836] 1.320 [0.969,1.796] 1.292 [0.950,1.758] (0.209) (0.212) (0.208) (0.203)

Agency Type e Large 201-500 0.863 [0.664,1.122] 0.865 [0.664,1.127] 0.853 [0.655,1.111] 0.893 [0.687,1.162] (0.116) (0.117) (0.115) (0.120)

Medium 76-200 0.842 [0.663,1.070] 0.843 [0.663,1.073] 0.839 [0.660,1.067] 0.839 [0.660,1.067] (0.103) (0.104) (0.103) (0.103)

Small 25-75 0.630** [0.473,0.838] 0.634** [0.476,0.845] 0.616*** [0.463,0.821] 0.628** [0.471,0.835] (0.092) (0.093) (0.090) (0.091)

Very small/less than 25 0.828 [0.545,1.257] 0.812 [0.535,1.233] 0.796 [0.524,1.209] 0.833 [0.548,1.265] (0.176) (0.173) (0.170) (0.178)

Sheriff 1.827* [1.121,2.978] 1.856* [1.137,3.031] 1.833* [1.124,2.987] 1.854* [1.138,3.022] (0.455) (0.464) (0.457) (0.462)

County police 1.251* [1.014,1.542] 1.265* [1.025,1.560] 1.251* [1.014,1.543] 1.205 [0.976,1.488] (0.134) (0.135) (0.134) (0.130)

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Notes: a Comparison group is “Fair”. b Comparison group is “Non-Supervisor”. c Comparison group is “Line Officers”. d Comparison group is “Patrol”. e Comparison group is “Very Large/over 500”

167

Table 13: Odds Ratios (OR), Standard Errors (SE), and Confidence Intervals (CI) for Potential Moderators of Relationship between Offense Seriousness and Willingness to Report for Case 5: Speeding Motorist Bribe (N = 3,107)

Predictors of Willingness to Model 12A Model 12B Model 12C Model 12D Report OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) Independent Variable Offense Seriousness (OS) 3.357*** [2.751,4.095] 3.912*** [3.009,5.085] 3.315*** [2.673,4.111] 1.663* [1.059,2.611] (0.341) (0.523) (0.364) (0.383)

Moderators and Interactions Discipline Fairness (DF) a Too harsh 2.359 [0.231,24.11] (2.798)

Too lenient 23.70** [2.240,250.7] (28.52)

OS x DF OS x Too harsh 0.743 [0.461,1.198] (0.181)

OS x Too lenient 0.530** [0.328,0.857] (0.130)

Supervisor b 2.597 [0.188,35.81] (3.477)

OS x Supervisor 1.131 [0.663,1.927] (0.308)

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 a b c d e Notes: Comparison group is “Fair”. Comparison group is “Non-Supervisor”. Comparison group is “Line Officers”. Comparison group is “Patrol”. 168 Comparison group is “Very Large/over 500”

Table 13 (cont.) Predictors of Willingness to Model 12A Model 12B Model 12C Model 12D Report OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) Length of Service 0.491** [0.295,0.818] (0.128)

OS x Length of Service 1.186** [1.069,1.316] (0.063)

Control Variables Rank c First-Line Supervisors 5.960*** [4.349,8.168] 5.800*** [4.224,7.963] 1.690* [1.019,2.803] 4.918*** [3.545,6.822] (0.958) (0.938) (0.436) (0.821)

Middle Managers 6.003*** [3.571,10.09] 5.505*** [3.279,9.245] 1.481 [0.730,3.009] 4.493*** [2.640,7.647] (1.591) (1.456) (0.535) (1.219)

Top Administrators 5.102*** [2.142,12.15] 4.426*** [1.925,10.18] 1.883 [0.746,4.755] 4.216** [1.787,9.946] (2.259) (1.881) (0.890) (1.846)

Current Assignment d On-call or control 1.785*** [1.416,2.249] 1.782*** [1.413,2.247] 1.802*** [1.430,2.271] 1.524*** [1.199,1.937] (0.211) (0.211) (0.213) (0.186)

Detective/investigative 1.460** [1.125,1.896] 1.483** [1.141,1.927] 1.458** [1.122,1.894] 1.341* [1.029,1.748] (0.194) (0.198) (0.195) (0.181)

Traffic 0.816 [0.209,3.184] 0.636 [0.158,2.558] 1.136 [0.264,4.891] 0.695 [0.178,2.714] (0.567) (0.452) (0.846) (0.483)

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Notes: a Comparison group is “Fair”. b Comparison group is “Non-Supervisor”. c Comparison group is “Line Officers”. d Comparison group is “Patrol”. e 169 Comparison group is “Very Large/over 500”

Table 13 (cont.) Predictors of Willingness to Model 12A Model 12B Model 12C Model 12D Report OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) Administrative 2.130** [1.338,3.390] 2.101** [1.317,3.354] 2.020** [1.268,3.220] 1.877** [1.171,3.008] (0.505) (0.501) (0.480) (0.452)

Other 1.445* [1.016,2.055] 1.485* [1.043,2.115] 1.407 [0.987,2.005] 1.368 [0.960,1.949] (0.260) (0.268) (0.254) (0.247)

Agency Type e Large 201-500 0.610*** [0.457,0.816] 0.637** [0.476,0.853] 0.598*** [0.446,0.800] 0.635** [0.475,0.850] (0.090) (0.095) (0.089) (0.094)

Medium 76-200 0.747* [0.572,0.976] 0.750* [0.573,0.981] 0.755* [0.577,0.988] 0.753* [0.575,0.984] (0.102) (0.103) (0.104) (0.103)

Small 25-75 0.337*** [0.253,0.449] 0.343*** [0.257,0.459] 0.318*** [0.238,0.425] 0.332*** [0.249,0.443] (0.049) (0.051) (0.047) (0.049)

Very small/less than 25 0.464*** [0.303,0.711] 0.437*** [0.286,0.668] 0.442*** [0.288,0.678] 0.464*** [0.303,0.710] (0.101) (0.095) (0.097) (0.101)

Sheriff 1.822 [0.988,3.358] 1.788 [0.968,3.303] 1.815 [0.984,3.346] 1.884* [1.020,3.481] (0.568) (0.560) (0.566) (0.590)

County police 1.616*** [1.252,2.086] 1.604*** [1.241,2.073] 1.614*** [1.249,2.085] 1.554*** [1.201,2.010] (0.211) (0.210) (0.211) (0.204)

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Notes: a Comparison group is “Fair”. b Comparison group is “Non-Supervisor”. c Comparison group is “Line Officers”. d Comparison group is “Patrol”. e Comparison group is “Very Large/over 500”

170

Table 14: Odds Ratios (OR), Standard Errors (SE), and Confidence Intervals (CI) for Potential Moderators of Relationship between Offense Seriousness and Willingness to Report for Case 6: Theft at a Burglary Crime Scene (N = 3,107)

Predictors of Willingness to Model 13A Model 13B Model 13C Model 13D Report OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) Independent Variable Offense Seriousness (OS) 4.734*** [3.621,6.190] 5.069*** [3.648,7.043] 4.651*** [3.400,6.363] 2.953*** [1.657,5.262] (0.648) (0.850) (0.744) (0.870)

Moderators and Interactions Discipline Fairness (DF) a Too harsh 4.994 [0.219,114.1] (7.971)

Too lenient 9.614 [0.331,279.2] (16.52)

OS x DF OS x Too harsh 0.559 [0.291,1.072] (0.186)

OS x Too lenient 0.605 [0.306,1.198] (0.211)

Supervisor b 1.919 [0.0933,39.49] (2.961)

OS x Supervisor 1.122 [0.612,2.055] (0.346)

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 a b c d e Notes: Comparison group is “Fair”. Comparison group is “Non-Supervisor”. Comparison group is “Line Officers”. Comparison group is “Patrol”. 171 Comparison group is “Very Large/over 500”

Table 14 (cont.) Predictors of Willingness to Model 13A Model 13B Model 13C Model 13D Report OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) Length of Service 0.640 [0.343,1.194] (0.204)

OS x Length of Service 1.115 [0.983,1.266] (0.072)

Control Variables Rank c First-Line Supervisors 7.478*** [4.725,11.83] 7.434*** [4.677,11.82] 2.781** [1.355,5.708] 6.563*** [4.088,10.54] (1.751) (1.758) (1.020) (1.585)

Middle Managers 6.942*** [3.509,13.73] 6.844*** [3.452,13.57] 2.319 [0.903,5.955] 5.759*** [2.873,11.54] (2.417) (2.391) (1.116) (2.043)

Top Administrators 11.84*** [3.099,45.22] 12.22*** [3.010,49.60] 4.783* [1.021,22.41] 11.47*** [2.894,45.47] (8.094) (8.733) (3.768) (8.060)

Current Assignment d On-call or control 2.199*** [1.610,3.003] 2.164*** [1.584,2.956] 2.197*** [1.609,3.001] 1.960*** [1.419,2.708] (0.350) (0.344) (0.349) (0.323)

Detective/investigative 1.396* [1.019,1.911] 1.425* [1.038,1.957] 1.387* [1.012,1.902] 1.308 [0.951,1.797] (0.224) (0.231) (0.223) (0.212)

Traffic 1.285 [0.196,8.436] 1.205 [0.189,7.667] 1.506 [0.202,11.20] 1.091 [0.171,6.953] (1.234) (1.138) (1.542) (1.031)

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Notes: a Comparison group is “Fair”. b Comparison group is “Non-Supervisor”. c Comparison group is “Line Officers”. d Comparison group is “Patrol”. e 172 Comparison group is “Very Large/over 500”

Table 14 (cont.) Predictors of Willingness to Model 13A Model 13B Model 13C Model 13D Report OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) Administrative 1.012 [0.605,1.692] 0.974 [0.581,1.632] 0.989 [0.591,1.655] 0.899 [0.534,1.515] (0.265) (0.257) (0.260) (0.239)

Other 2.124** [1.286,3.506] 2.180** [1.318,3.606] 2.098** [1.270,3.467] 2.076** [1.255,3.432] (0.543) (0.560) (0.538) (0.532)

Agency Type e Large 201-500 0.523*** [0.375,0.729] 0.498*** [0.357,0.694] 0.515*** [0.369,0.718] 0.539*** [0.386,0.751] (0.089) (0.085) (0.087) (0.092)

Medium 76-200 0.547*** [0.405,0.739] 0.548*** [0.404,0.742] 0.543*** [0.402,0.734] 0.546*** [0.404,0.738] (0.084) (0.085) (0.083) (0.084)

Small 25-75 0.368*** [0.265,0.512] 0.364*** [0.261,0.506] 0.355*** [0.255,0.495] 0.364*** [0.262,0.505] (0.062) (0.061) (0.060) (0.061)

Very small/less than 25 0.385*** [0.239,0.620] 0.373*** [0.232,0.601] 0.372*** [0.230,0.601] 0.385*** [0.239,0.620] (0.094) (0.091) (0.091) (0.094)

Sheriff 3.120* [1.181,8.243] 3.064* [1.148,8.182] 3.101* [1.174,8.188] 3.114* [1.181,8.211] (1.547) (1.535) (1.536) (1.540)

County police 1.684** [1.197,2.371] 1.646** [1.167,2.321] 1.684** [1.196,2.370] 1.636** [1.161,2.306] (0.294) (0.289) (0.294) (0.286)

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Notes: a Comparison group is “Fair”. b Comparison group is “Non-Supervisor”. c Comparison group is “Line Officers”. d Comparison group is “Patrol”. e Comparison group is “Very Large/over 500”

173