The Importance of the of Divine Sovereignty for Our View of Scripture Stephen J. Wellum

Stephen J. Wellum is Assistant Pro- When one thinks of the topics that create sovereignty-human freedom merely fessor of Christian at the South- friction among Christians, the subject of collapse into the age-old Calvinist and ern Baptist Theological Seminary. Dr. divine sovereignty is probably high on the Arminian debates over divine election, Wellum received his Ph.D. degree in the- list. We all have experienced heated dis- free will, and the nature of human deprav- ology from Trinity Evangelical Divinity cussions over the nature of divine sover- ity. No doubt these debates are important School, and has also taught theology at eignty, especially as it relates to the issues and they must be handled with care and the Associated Canadian Theological of divine election and salvation. Many faithfulness to the biblical text. However, Schools and Northwest Baptist Theologi- Christian people, even seminary students, what is sometimes lost in these discus- cal College and Seminary in Canada. He have expressed to me and again that sions is the fact that one’s view of divine has contributed to several publications they wish the subject would somehow dis- sovereignty has massive implications for and a collection of essays on theology appear. But that is hardly likely since the one’s whole theology, not simply for issues and worldview issues. subject of divine sovereignty is so founda- of soteriology. Theology, as J. I. Packer tional to one’s entire theology and praxis. reminds us, is a “seamless robe, a circle In fact, within evangelical theology within which everything links up with today, the perennial polemics over divine everything else through its common sovereignty-human freedom are heating grounding in God.”2 In other words, up more than ever given the rise of the theological doctrines are much more view entitled “.” At the heart organically related than we often realize of the “open view” proposal is a reformu- and that is why a reformulation in one lation of the doctrine of divine sovereignty area of doctrine inevitably effects other that has massive, and in my view, dam- areas of our theology. This is important to aging implications for how we think of remember, especially in evaluating old God and his relation to the world.1 That and new proposals regarding the nature is why, given the recent trends, it seems of divine sovereignty. unlikely that discussion over the sover- In this regard, there are at least two eignty-freedom relationship will fade into ways to evaluate theological proposals. the background. Instead, the subject, First, does the proposal do justice to all of because it is so critical, must be revisited Scripture? Second, does the proposal lead once again with a renewed sense of vigor us to affirm and not contradict other and determination as we seek to test our areas of our theology that we know to be proposals, whether new or old, against the true, or, at least, are more confident of? If standard of God’s Word. the answer is yes to both of these ques- The goal of this essay is to do just that, tions, then we may be assured that our but not in the typical way of evaluating theological proposal is on track and faith- this issue. Often our discussions of divine ful to Scripture. However if our answer is 76 negative on both counts, then it should conceptions of the sovereignty-freedom encourage us to reject our proposal or, at relationship make any difference in how least, rethink it through very carefully we view Scripture and what we may before embracing it as a correct view. In affirm about it. this essay, I want to apply the latter option of evaluating theological propos- Two Views of Human Freedom als to the subject of divine sovereignty. I In the current philosophical literature, want to investigate the question: What is there are two basic views of human free- the relationship between one’s view of dom that are primarily discussed and divine sovereignty-human freedom and adopted—an indeterministic notion one’s view of Scripture? More specifically, referred to as incompatibilism or libertar- I want to ask whether different concep- ian free will (among various labels), and tions of the sovereignty-freedom relation- a deterministic notion referred to as ship make any difference in how we view compatibilism or soft . Let us Scripture and what we may affirm about look at each of these views in turn.4 it. In other words, are all views of divine First, there is the view of incom- sovereignty equal when it comes to up- patibilism or libertarian freedom. What do holding a high view of Scripture? 3 Or, will philosophers and theologians mean by some views of the sovereignty-freedom this concept of freedom? The most basic relationship undermine Scripture’s own sense of this view is that a person’s act is testimony about itself, namely, that it is free if it is not causally determined. For nothing less than God’s Word written? incompatibilists this does not mean that Now before we turn to our investiga- our actions are random or arbitrary. Rea- tion, we must first define some key terms. sons and causes play upon the will as one Probably the most important reason for chooses, but none of them is sufficient to the diversity of opinion regarding the incline the will decisively in one direction nature of divine sovereignty is due to how or another. Thus, a person could always one defines the nature of human freedom. have chosen otherwise than he did. David In fact, how one construes the sover- Basinger states it this way: for a person to eignty-Scripture relationship will also be free with respect to performing an ac- greatly depend upon how one under- tion, he must have it within his power “to stands and defines human freedom since choose to perform action A or choose not Scripture is both the words of God and to perform action A. Both A and not A human authors, that is, a divine-human could actually occur; which will actually product. As a result, let us first begin by occur has not yet been determined.”5 defining two different conceptions of Second, there is an alternative con- human freedom that will preoccupy our ception of human freedom known as attention throughout this essay. After that compatibilism or soft determinism.6 In is done, we will then relate those defini- contrast to incompatibilism, the most tions to the subject of divine sovereignty basic sense of this view of human freedom in order to clarify what people mean is that human actions are causally deter- exactly by divine sovereignty. Finally, we mined, yet free. In other words, unlike will then turn to the critical concern of this incompatibilism, a compatibilist view of essay—an evaluation of whether different freedom perceives the human will as 77 decisively and sufficiently inclined toward God’s sovereignty in some sense. Now it one option as opposed to another, yet it is must quickly be added that by the use of still free as long as the following require- the word “limit,” I am not necessarily ments are met: “(1) The immediate cause using the word in a pejorative or nega- of the action is a desire, wish, or intention tive sense. Instead, “limit” is being used internal to the agent, (2) no external event in the sense that God freely chooses to or circumstances compels the action to be limit himself by virtue of the fact that he performed, and (3) the agent could have has chosen to create a certain kind of acted differently if he had chosen to.”7 If world, that is, a world that contains these three conditions are met, then even human beings with incompatibilistic free- though human actions are determined, dom. In this sense, then, “limit” does not they may still be considered free. John refer to a weakness or imperfection in Feinberg summarizes this view well when God; rather it refers to a self-imposed limi- he states, “if the agent acts in accord with tation that is part of his plan, not a viola- causes and reasons that serve as a suffi- tion of it.9 cient condition for his doing the act, and But it must still be asked: how does if the causes do not force him to act con- God’s creation of people with incom- trary to his wishes, then a soft determin- patibilistic freedom “limit” his sover- ist would say that he acts freely.”8 eignty? What exactly is the nature of God’s sovereign rule over the world given Divine Sovereignty and incompatibilism? David Basinger states Human Freedom the limitation well when he acknowledges It is quite evident that incompatibilism that incompatibilists are quite willing to and compatibilism are two very different admit that a sovereign God “cannot cre- ways of viewing human freedom. It ate a co-possible set of free moral agents should not surprise us, then, that when without also bringing about the possibil- these two views are combined with divine ity that states of affairs will occur which sovereignty, they lead to two very differ- God does not desire but cannot pro- ent conceptions of how one views God’s hibit.”10 In other words, this particular rule and Lordship over his creation. Given proposal of the nature of divine sover- the above definitions of human freedom, eignty entails that God cannot guarantee let us now think through how God’s sov- that what he decides will be carried out. ereignty is first construed with incom- Of course, the important word here is patibilism and then with compatibilism. guarantee. Given the incompatibilist’s view of human freedom, it is not possible Divine Sovereignty and to affirm “that the exercise of the gift of Incompatibilism freedom is controlled by God.”11 John Given the most basic sense of incom- Feinberg concurs with this observation patibilism, what, then, is the relationship when he writes, “no matter how much between an incompatibilistic view of God inclines someone’s will toward what human freedom and God’s sovereign rule he has chosen, such inclination, on an in- over the affairs of humanity? Most theo- deterministic account of freedom, can never logians who argue for humans having be sufficient to produce God’s decreed incompatibilistic freedom tend to “limit” action.”12 78 At this point, it might be helpful to clude about the sovereignty-freedom re- illustrate this proposal of divine sover- lationship? Pinnock is very straightfor- eignty by giving two examples of think- ward in his answer. He admits that as ers who have commented on it. The creator, God is unquestionably the supe- purpose of looking at these two individu- rior power. For example, God has the als is to help us better grasp and clarify power to exist and the power to control the precise nature of the sovereignty-free- all things. But almightiness, according to dom relationship, given incompatibilism. Pinnock, is not the whole story. As First, let us look at the example of Pinnock states, philosopher Bruce Reichenbach.13 Reich- enbach begins by defining God’s omni- Though no power can stand against him, God wills the existence of crea- potence and sovereignty in a fairly tures with the power of self-deter- traditional fashion. When we say that God mination. This means that God is a is omnipotent or sovereign, he asserts, we superior power who does not cling to his right to dominate and control mean that he meets the following two con- but who voluntarily gives creatures ditions: “(1) he can do any action which room to flourish. By inviting them is not contradictory or absurd; and (2) no to have dominion over the world (for example), God willingly surren- being with greater power can be con- ders power and makes possible a ceived.”14 Now, given that definition of partnership with the creature.19 omnipotence, how does Reichenbach relate it to incompatibilistic freedom? In other words, due to God’s own free Reichenbach first reminds us that from an choice to create creatures with incompati- incompatibilist’s perspective, it is contra- bilistic freedom, God limits himself. But, dictory “for an act to be free and caused as Pinnock states, this is not to be seen as 20 by another.”15 That, of course, as we have a limitation “imposed from without;” it discovered, is the basic understanding of is a self-limitation. In fact, for Pinnock, he incompatibilism. But, as Reichenbach does not view this self-limitation of God insists, given that understanding of as a “weakness” since, as he argues, it incompatibilism, there is necessarily a limit requires more power to rule over an placed on God’s sovereignty. Reichenbach undetermined world than it does over a states the limit this way: “God limits him- determined one. But as a result of God’s self in the creation of individuals who are own self-limitation, it does entail that God free. God cannot, without destroying our is a risk-taker. What does this mean? In freedom,16 control us or compel us to the end it means that God must respond choose to act in ways that accord with his and adapt to surprises and to the unex- will or plan.”17 In this sense, God cannot pected. As Pinnock states, “God sets goals guarantee that what he wants done will be for creation and redemption and realizes carried out, and as such, his sovereign them ad hoc in history. If Plan A fails, God 21 control is limited over the affairs of is ready with Plan B.” Thus, says humanity. Pinnock, because of God’s creation of A second example of a theologian who human beings with incompatibilistic free- limits God’s sovereignty due to an accep- dom, the sovereign God delegates power tance of incompatibilism is open theist, to the creature, making himself vulner- Clark Pinnock.18 What does Pinnock con- able. Sovereignty does not mean that 79 nothing can go contrary to God’s will, but facing this view is exactly how a strong that God is able to deal with any circum- sense of divine sovereignty and human stances that may arise. As Pinnock asserts, freedom can be logically reconciled. In this “by his [God’s] decision to create a world regard, there are a number of different like ours, God showed his willingness strategies compatibilists utilize. But what to take risks and to work with a history is central to all of these strategies is the whose outcome he does not wholly attempt to demonstrate that even though decide.22 Hence, to a large extent, reality there is some tension in attempting to is “open” rather than closed. For Pinnock answer all the “hows” of the sovereignty- and other open theists this ultimately freedom relationship, in the end, there is means that “genuine novelty can appear no logical contradiction. in history which cannot be predicted even One illustration of the compatibilist by God. If the creature has been given the strategy is that of John Feinberg.25 In ability to decide how some things will his article “God Ordains All Things,” turn out, then it cannot be known infalli- Feinberg is clear about his commitment bly ahead of time how they will turn out. to a compatibilistic view of human free- It implies that the future is really open and dom and a strong view of divine sover- not available to exhaustive foreknowledge eignty. In regard to divine sovereignty, even on the part of God.”23 Feinberg appeals to such texts as Ephes- ians 1:11 in order to argue that God’s will Divine Sovereignty and is not only the basis of his eternal plan, Compatibilism but also that it is all-inclusive. And as a Thinkers who opt for compatibilism, in result, God’s sovereignty means that he contrast to incompatibilism, have a far is able to guarantee that his plan will come different understanding of the nature of to pass without eliminating human free- divine sovereignty. In fact, compatibilists, dom. Exactly how this is so is linked with such as myself, argue simultaneously that the fact that God’s plan includes not only God rules absolutely over his world—i.e., God’s chosen ends but also the means to God is able to guarantee and accomplish such ends. Such means include whatever everything that he has ordained—and that circumstances and factors are necessary this rule does not take away the freedom to convince an individual (without con- of his creatures. Compatibilists, who are straint) that the act God has decreed is much more Calvinistic in their theology, the act he or she wants to do. Thus, given agree with the Westminster Confession the sufficient conditions, the person of Faith when it states: “God from all will do the act.26 In this sense, then, a eternity did, by the most wise and holy compatibilist view of divine sovereignty counsel of his own will, freely and attempts to maintain that God is able to unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes render certain what he ordains, without to pass: yet so, as thereby neither is God removing human freedom. the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures, nor is the lib- Divine Sovereignty, erty or contingency of second causes taken Human Freedom, and Scripture away, but rather established.”24 With definitions and explanations Of course, one of the crucial challenges aside, we are now in a position to turn to 80 the main concern of this essay—an evalu- both free and spontaneous on their part ation of whether different conceptions of and divinely elicited and controlled.”31 In the sovereignty-freedom relationship fact, it is for this very reason that propo- make any difference in what we may nents of a traditional view of Scripture affirm about Scripture. have argued for a concursive theory of An excellent place to begin our evalu- inspiration, in contrast to a dictation ation is with a short but very insightful theory. The rationale for this is to empha- article by David and Randall Basinger size that both God and the human author entitled “Inerrancy, Dictation, and the Free are active in the process, thus guarantee- Will Defence.”27 What is significant about ing that what God intended was written. this article, at least for our purposes, is the Now at this point, the Basingers insist Basingers’ argument—“one cannot con- that in order for the proponents of iner- sistently affirm the total inerrancy of rancy to succeed in their reply to the crit- Scripture and yet also utilize the Free Will ics, they must accept as true the following Defence as a response to the problem of proposition: “Human activities (such as evil.”28 Now at first sight this argument penning a book) can be totally controlled might seem somewhat removed from our by God without violating human free- investigation regarding whether different dom.”32 If this proposition is accepted, construals of divine sovereignty make any maintain the Basingers, then the argument difference in what one may affirm about for a high view of Scripture must look Scripture, but it is really not. In fact, if we something like this: carefully unpack the Basingers’ argument, we will soon discover that it has a direct (1) The words of the Bible are the product of free human activity (are bearing on our investigation. human utterances). The Basingers begin their article by (2) Human activities (such as pen- observing that “one of the stock argu- ning a book) can be totally controlled by God without violating human ments employed by the challenger to the freedom. inerrancy position is that inerrancy im- (3) God totally controlled what plies a dictation theory of inspiration.”29 human authors did in fact write. (4) Therefore, the words of the Bible That is, in order to obtain a verbally are God’s utterances. inspired and inerrant Scripture, one must (5) Whatever God utters is errorless (inerrant); affirm, so says the critic, that the human (6) Therefore, the words of the Bible authors were reduced to impersonal are errorless (inerrant).33 instruments, and as such, in the writing of Scripture their freedom was taken away. But, contend the Basingers, there is a In response to the critics, the Basingers major problem with this argument. The rightly acknowledge that modern propo- problem is not so much with the argument nents of inerrancy emphatically deny that itself, but with its implications. For ex- dictation is necessary in order to accept ample, if one accepts premise (2), then this the inerrancy position.30 In reply, propo- will have major implications for how one nents of inerrancy insist that the reason attempts to answer the problem of evil, one can affirm verbal inspiration and especially if one adopts the Free Will inerrancy is precisely because the Scrip- Defense (FWD). In fact, the Basingers tural writers’ “thinking and writings were argue that the acceptance of (2) is incom- 81 patible with the FWD. Why is this the instance of moral evil in the world and the free will defence fails. In case? In order to answer that question, let short, the free will defence can only us look briefly at the FWD. work—i.e., divine responsibility for Among Christian theologians and phi- the actuality of moral evil in the world can only be absolved—by losophers, the FWD is probably one of the denying that God can totally control most popular ways of defending the free creatures, that is, by denying 35 goodness of God, given the fact of moral premise (2). evil in the world. The object of the FWD Given the fact that the FWD is bound up is to absolve God of the responsibility for with the acceptance of incompatibilism moral evil in the world in light of its own (and its particular construal of divine sov- theological commitments. How does it do ereignty), it should now be quite evident that? The Basingers succinctly summarize why an adoption of the FWD is incom- the basic strategy of the defense: “The patible with (2). Premise (2) assumes that object of this ‘defence’ is to absolve God God can infallibly guarantee that human of the responsibility for moral evil by beings will perform the specific actions he arguing that moral evil is the result of free desires without violating their freedom, human choices and hence the responsibil- whereas incompatibilism denies this pos- ity of humans rather than God. God, by sibility. Thus, the Basingers conclude their the act of creating free creatures, is respon- article with the following dilemma: either sible for the possibility of evil, but the affirm (2) and thus inerrancy, but at the actuality of each given instance of moral cost of making God responsible for all the evil in the world is due to the free will moral evil in the world; or adopt the use of humans.”34 of the FWD, thus absolving God of any Now as the Basingers rightly point out, responsibility for evil, but at the cost of in order for the FWD to be successful, it rejecting (2) and thus being “left with the must assume a specific conception of hu- seemingly impossible task of showing man freedom, namely incompatibilism. The how God could perfectly control what the Basingers state it this way: biblical writers uttered without removing 36 The assumption behind this argu- their freedom.” ment [FWD] is the belief that God How are we to evaluate the Basingers’ cannot both create free moral crea- argument? Two points need to be empha- tures and still bring it about (infalli- bly guarantee) that they will sized. First, we need to acknowledge that perform the specific actions he their argument has very important impli- desires. For once it is assumed that cations for our discussion of the relation- God can control the actions of free creatures, it follows immediately ship between divine sovereignty-human that God could have created a world freedom and Scripture. Basically, the containing free moral agents but absolutely no moral evil—i.e., God Basingers are underscoring the fact that could have brought it about that an incompatibilistic view of human free- every individual would always dom entails that God cannot both create freely choose in every situation to perform the exact action God free individuals and still bring it about desired. But if God could have (infallibly guarantee) that they will do the brought it about that every instance specific actions he desires. The Basingers, of moral evil was freely not per- formed, then we must conclude that in my view, are highlighting a genuine God is directly responsible for each inconsistency between both affirming 82 incompatibilism (and its construal of offer two concluding reflections, one divine sovereignty) and maintaining (2), pertaining to incompatibilism and the which, of course, is essential in uphold- other to compatibilism.39 ing a high view of Scripture. First, if one accepts incompatibilism However, secondly, it needs to be (and its particular construal of divine sov- stressed that the Basingers’s argument is ereignty), I would agree with the Basing- reductionistic. Why? Because there are ers that one must reject premise (2). But more options available to us than what they with the rejection of premise (2) there is a seem to allow. For example, the FWD is not very serious entailment, namely, that the the only way to absolve God of the respon- theological underpinnings for a high view sibility for evil in the world. No doubt, for of Scripture have been greatly weakened. a person who embraces an incompatibilistic Why? Because if God cannot infallibly view of human freedom, the FWD is a logi- guarantee what the human authors freely cally consistent and attractive option. wrote was precisely what he wanted writ- Nonetheless, it is not the only defense avail- ten, without error, then it seems difficult able to an incompatibilist.37 And for other to substantiate the traditional view of theological viewpoints that do not embrace Scripture at this point. In fact, most incompatibilism, there are certainly more defenders of a high view of Scripture have options than just the FWD.38 Moreover, viewed premise (2) as bound up with a along a similar line and more importantly proper defense of inerrancy. As E. J. Young for our purposes, the Basingers are reduc- wrote many years ago, “inspiration is de- tionistic in presenting incompatibilism as signed to secure the accuracy of what is the only option for a defender of inerrancy. taught and to keep the Lord’s spokesman To be sure, the Basingers’ dilemma is cer- from error in his teaching … inspiration tainly valid for one who embraces a view is designed to secure infallibility.…”40 But of divine sovereignty and also embraces with the undermining of premise (2), incompatibilism. However, their dilemma incompatibilism greatly weakens the is not valid for a person such as myself who theological defense for an infallible and adopts a view of divine sovereignty that inerrant Bible. incorporates a compatibilistic understand- But does this then entail that the per- ing of human freedom. Why? Simply son who adopts incompatibilism cannot because a compatibilistic view is able to logically affirm inerrancy? In terms of logi- affirm premise (2) without contradiction, cal possibility, the answer is no. It is logi- and as such, is able to defend a high view cally possible that the biblical authors “just of Scripture. happened” to write everything that God wanted them to write, without God guar- Concluding Reflections anteeing it.41 For it is true, as Norman What, then, are we to conclude from Geisler contends in his response to the our investigation of the sovereignty- Basingers, that “it is not essential (neces- Scripture relationship? Are all views of sary) for humans to err whenever they divine sovereignty equal when it comes speak or write . . . human free choice only to upholding a high view of Scripture or makes error possible, not necessary.”42 But will some views of the sovereignty-free- even if it is logically possible to affirm dom relationship undermine it? Let me incompatibilism and inerrancy, it must be 83 acknowledged that it is highly improb- of the issues, but if they are, there are at able. For without an infallible guarantee, least three main responses. First, there is given the diversity of the biblical authors a commitment to incompatibilism and its and the nature of the content of Scripture, implications with a corresponding move the probability that the biblical authors away from an inerrancy position to an “just happened” to get everything correct, “essentially reliable message” position.44 thus resulting in an infallible and inerrant But, it may be questioned, whether this is text, is indeed very low. a helpful position at all. In the end, can it Moreover, a commitment to incom- do justice to the historic confession of the patibilism also raises an important epis- church regarding Scripture, let alone temological issue. What happens when Scripture’s view of itself?45 I would argue we find an apparent mistake or contradic- in the negative on both accounts. tion in Scripture? What should our atti- Second, there is a commitment to tude be toward the Bible? Should we seek incompatibilism and a high view of Scrip- to resolve it because we are convinced that ture along with the affirmation that it is Scripture is inerrant? And if we are so con- simply a “paradox”46 as to how God can vinced, from whence does this conviction guarantee that what the human authors come? For if God cannot guarantee that write is what he wants written.47 The what he wanted written was written, then problem, however, with this view is that our conviction on these matters certainly it forces us to believe in logically contra- does not stem from the view that the Scrip- dictory states of affairs. If one thinks in tures were “divinely elicited and con- terms of logical consistency, it does not trolled, and what they [biblical writers] seem possible to affirm simultaneously wrote was not only their own work but incompatibilism and God’s ability to also God’s work.”43 On the other hand, guarantee an infallible and inerrant text, when we do come across an apparent con- unless, of course, he takes away the free- tradiction or problem in Scripture, do we dom of the author by dictating the text. then admit that it is an error? For after all, Thus, if one attempts to give a logical given incompatibilism, it may be true that explanation regarding the sovereignty- it is logically possible to affirm inerrancy, freedom and Scripture relationship, then but the probability of it is so low that we the paradox alternative is not really an have no overwhelming reason to think alternative after all. that the apparent problem is not really an Third, there is a commitment to incom- error after all. And if we move in this di- patibilism and a high view of Scripture rection, can Scripture then serve as its own along with some other plausible account self-attesting authority by which we of how God can control free human evaluate all theological proposals? activities in such a way as to guarantee Indeed, these are serious implications an inerrant Scripture. What is that other for one’s view of Scripture given a com- plausible account? In a recent article on mitment to incompatibilism and its par- this issue, William Craig argues that it is ticular construal of divine sovereignty. the theory of middle .48 I do not How do evangelicals who are also have the to do justice to this view, incompatibilists respond to such prob- except to say that if the theory can be sub- lems? Many, I believe, are not even aware stantiated, then it does provide a way to 84 reconcile incompatibilism and inerrancy. sovereignty-freedom relationship equal Nevertheless, the problem with the when it comes to upholding a high view view, as many have pointed out, is that it of Scripture or will some views under- depends upon knowing what we would mine it? The conclusion of this essay is that freely do, not just could do, were we all views of divine sovereignty are not placed in different circumstances, and on equal. In fact, this is not only true when the basis of that knowledge, God then we furiously debate points of election and freely decides to actualize one of those soteriology, but it is also true when we worlds known to him through this middle engage in discussions over the nature of knowledge. What is the problem? It is Scripture. For if one desires to ground a simply this. Given incompatibilism, it is high view of Scripture on a strong foun- very difficult to explain how God can dation, while maintaining a concursive know, even counterfactually, what we view of inspiration that incorporates free would do if we can always choose other- human agency, one would be better to wise. Hence, in the end, I do not think employ a compatibilistic view of divine middle knowledge will be able to deliver sovereignty. what it promises.49 Furthermore, there is one final obser- The second concluding reflection per- vation that I must make that is a corollary tains to compatibilism. Since this particu- to what has already been stated. Not only lar view of divine sovereignty-human is it important to evaluate views of divine freedom is able to substantiate premise (2), sovereignty in light of whether they can then it best provides the necessary sup- uphold a high view of Scripture, but it port for upholding a high view of Scrip- is also crucial to maintain that in defend- ture. It, in other words, helps make sense ing any view of Scripture, one cannot of how God can guarantee what he intends adequately do so unless one self-con- to be written, through the free agency of sciously thinks through one’s view of human authors. In fact, I would claim that divine sovereignty. In fact, without the it is this conception of divine sovereignty discussion of divine sovereignty being alone which best accounts for the con- brought to the table in our doctrine of cursive theory of inspiration, a view Scripture polemics, I am convinced that which is at the heart of a high view of we will not make any headway in our con- Scripture. Why? Because it is only this temporary bibliology discussions. Indeed, view of divine sovereignty that truly J. I. Packer summarizes this observation allows both God and the human author well when he argues that, to be active in the process of inspiration so that the final result is exactly what The customary apologetic for bibli- cal authority operates on too narrow God intended. On the other hand, other a front. As we have seen, faith in the views that tend to weaken divine sover- God of the Reformation theology is eignty have a much more difficult time the necessary presupposition of faith in Scripture as “God’s Word writ- accounting for the confluent authorship ten,” and without this faith sola of Scripture.50 Scriptura as the God-taught principle What shall we then say in the end? of authority more or less loses its meaning…. we must never lose Does it matter what view of divine sover- sight of the fact that our doctrine of eignty we hold to? Are all views of the God is decisive for our concept of 85 Scripture, and that in our contro- Canon (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1986). versy with a great deal of modern 4 theology it is here, rather than in re- Scripture does not precisely define the lation to the phenomena of Scrip- nature of human freedom, but philoso- ture, that the decisive battle must be phers and theologians discuss it. As joined.51 stated, there are two main notions of freedom—incompatibilism and com- ENDNOTES patibilism. As we shall see, these two 1 The literature on “open theism” is grow- conceptions of human freedom clearly ing by the month. For two helpful sum- contradict one another, but both are pos- maries of the view see Clark Pinnock, et sible views of freedom in the sense that al., The Openness of God (Downers Grove: there is no logical contradiction in affirm- InterVarsity Press, 1994); David Basinger, ing either view. Supporting the notion The Case for Free Will Theism (Downers that both views of freedom are coherent Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1996); Gregory and defensible is Thomas Flint, “Two A. Boyd, God of the Possible (Grand Rap- Accounts of Providence,” in Divine and ids: Baker, 2000). Human Action, ed. Thomas V. Morris 2 J. I. Packer, “Encountering Present-Day (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988) Views of Scripture,” in The Foundation of 177-179. Ultimately the view of freedom Biblical Authority, ed. James M. Boice that one ought to embrace should be the (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1978) 61. view that best fits the biblical data, not 3 In this essay I am taking “a high view of our pre-conceived notions of what Scripture” as my given. By this expres- human freedom is or ought to be. sion I am referring to what Kevin J. 5 David Basinger, “Middle Knowledge Vanhoozer has labeled, “The Received and Classical Christian Thought,” Reli- View” (see “God’s Mighty Speech-Acts: gious Studies 22 (1986) 416. Also see Wil- The Doctrine of Scripture Today,” in A liam Hasker, Metaphysics (Downers Pathway Into the Holy Scriptures, ed. Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1983) 32-44; Philip E. Satterthwaite and David F. Ledger Wood, “Indeterminism,” Dictio- Wright [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994] nary of Philosophy, ed. Dagobert Runes 143-181), that is, the orthodox, historic (Savage: Rowman & Littlefield Publish- view of Scripture held by the church ers, 1983) 159; Michael Peterson, et al., throughout the ages, at least up until the Reason and Religious Belief (New York: present time. This view affirms that Oxford Press, 1991) 59-61; Thomas Scripture is nothing less than God’s Talbott, “Indeterminism and Chance Word written through the free agency of Occurrences,” The Personalist 60 (1979) human authors, the product of God’s 254. mighty action through the Word and by 6 Even though compatibilism or soft the Holy Spirit whereby human authors determinism is a view of human free- freely wrote exactly what God intended dom that fits under the broad category to be written, without error. For a sample of determinism, it is important to distin- defense of this view of Scripture, see the guish it from the concept of “hard” following two works edited by D. A. determinism found in the natural sci- Carson and John Woodbridge, Scripture ences and from the concept of fatalism. and Truth (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, For more on these distinctions see John 1983) and Hermeneutics, Authority, and 86 S. Feinberg, “God Ordains All God Does Not Do?,” Christian to exert in the world. See ibid., 109. Things,” in Predestination and Free Scholar’s Review 16 (1987) 400. 17Ibid., 108. Will, ed. David Basinger and 9 On the issue of “limit” in regard to 18See especially two of Pinnock’s Randall Basinger (Downers Grove: divine sovereignty see the helpful works for a statement of his posi- InterVarsity Press, 1986) 21-26; Ri- article by John Frame, “The Spirit tion: “God Limits His Knowledge,” chard Taylor, “Determinism,” in The and the Scriptures,” in Hermeneutics, in Predestination and Free Will, 143- Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 2, ed. Authority, and Canon, 217-235. For 162, and “,” in Paul Edwards (New York: Mac- the outworking of this view in rela- The Openness of God, 101-125. millan, 1967) 359-373. For more on tion to divine sovereignty and 19Clark Pinnock, “Systematic Theol- compatibilism in general see Paul incompatiblism see Jack Cottrell, ogy,” 113. Helm, Eternal God (Oxford: Claren- “The Nature of Divine Sovereignty,” 20Ibid. don Press, 1988) 157-158 and The in The Grace of God and the Will of 21Ibid. For a further development of Providence of God (Downers Grove: Man: The Case for Arminianism, ed. God as a risk-taker see open theist InterVarsity Press, 1994). Clark H. Pinnock (Grand Rapids: John Sanders’s treatment of divine 7 Michael Peterson, et al., Reason and Zondervan, 1989) 108-110. providence in his work The God Who Religious Belief, 59. The third require- 10David Basinger, “Human Freedom Risks (Downers Grove: InterVarsity ment that Peterson, et al. lists is very and Divine Providence: Some New Press, 1998). important—the agent could have Thoughts on an Old Problem,” 22Ibid., 116. acted differently if he had chosen to. Religious Studies 15 (1979) 496. 23Clark Pinnock, “God Limits His Incompatibilists, as noted, argue 11William Hasker, “God the Creator Knowledge,” 150. It is worth noting that no one is free who could not of Good and Evil?” in The God Who that for Pinnock and other open the- have (actually) done otherwise. On Acts: Philosophical and Theological ists, the acceptance of incom- the other hand, compatibilists argue Explorations, ed. Thomas F. Tracy patibilistic human freedom not only that the meaning of the phrase (University Park, PA: leads them to limit God’s sovereign “could have done otherwise” must State University Press, 1994) 139. control over the world, but also be carefully defined. The key issue 12John Feinberg, “God Ordains All leads them to deny what even here is the meaning of can or could. Things,” 30-31. traditional Arminian thought has There are at least seven ways that 13See Bruce Reichenbach, “God Lim- affirmed, that God is able to know this expression can be understood. its His Power,” in Predestination and future free actions of human beings. And it is only in one of these ways Free Will, 101-124. It is at this crucial point that open that the compatibilist can not affirm 14Ibid., 107. theism is not Arminian in its “could have done otherwise.” How- 15Ibid. theology, even though it attempts to ever, in the other six ways, it is 16“Without destroying our freedom” present itself as a variation of perfectly appropriate for the is an important phrase. Incom- Arminian thought. compatibilist to affirm that the patibilists do argue that God can 24G. I. Williamson, ed., The West- “agent could have done otherwise,” and does at restrict human minster Confession of Faith (Philadel- and if being able to do otherwise is freedom in order to accomplish his phia: Presbyterian & Reformed, the criterion for being free, then a purposes. But they are quick to add, 1964) 30. compatibilist can legitimately speak in those cases, human beings are not 25See John Feinberg, “God Ordains of freedom. On this important point acting freely. However, normally, in All Things,” 19-43. For other illus- see John Feinberg, “God Ordains All order to preserve our freedom, God trations of compatibilism see D. A. Things,” 26-28. allows human beings to make their Carson, Divine Sovereignty and 8 John S. Feinberg, “Divine own choices, which, necessarily, Human Responsibility (Atlanta: John and Evil: Is There Anything Which limits the kind of control God is able Knox Press, 1981); How Long O Lord? 87 (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1990); Paul B. B. Warfield, “Inspiration,” in the problem of evil, it is still true Helm, The Providence of God; Millard Selected Shorter Writings, vol. 2., ed. that if one adopts incompatibilism, Erickson, Christian Theology, 2d ed. John E. Meeter (Nutley: Presbyte- there is a problem with holding (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1998) rian & Reformed, 1973) 614-636. For premise (2). 371-390. a discussion as to why the dictation 38See John Feinberg’s defense of a 26Ibid., 26. theory of inspiration is contrary to compatibilistic theological position 27David Basinger and Randall the biblical evidence and thus why in The Many Faces of Evil, 124-155. Basinger, “Inerrancy, Dictation, and it should be rejected see I. H. Also see John Frame, Apologetics to the Free Will Defence,” Evangelical Marshall, Biblical Inspiration (Grand the Glory of God (Phillipsburg: Pres- Quarterly 55 (1983) 177-180. See also Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982) 32-33. byterian & Reformed, 1994) 149-190; the exchange of articles that the 31Packer, ‘Fundamentalism’ and the , Always Ready (Tex- Basingers’ article has generated Word of God, 80. Also see John Davis, arkana: Covenant Media Founda- between themselves and Norman Foundations of Evangelical Theology tion, 1996) 163-175. Geisler. See Norman Geisler, “Iner- (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1984) 39I am assuming in the following dis- rancy and Free Will: A Reply to the 174-176; Gordon R. Lewis, “The cussion that the dictation theory of Brothers Basinger,” Evangelical Quar- Human Authorship of Inspired inspiration is not an option. No terly 57 (1985) 349-353; Basinger and Scripture,” in Inerrancy, ed. Norman doubt, one could always defend Basinger, “Inerrancy and Free Will: Geisler (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, inerrancy and incompatibilism by Some Further Thoughts,” Evangeli- 1980) 227-264; A. N. S. Lane, “B. B. affirming that in the special case of cal Quarterly 58 (1986) 351-354; Warfield on the Humanity of Scrip- Scripture, God took away the free- Geisler, “Is Inerrancy Incompatible ture,” Vox Evangelica 16 (1986) 77- dom of the authors and dictated the with the Free Will Defence?,” Evan- 94. text. But for anyone who takes the gelical Quarterly 62 (1990) 175-178. 32Basinger and Basinger, “Inerrancy, phenomena of the Scripture seri- 28Basinger and Basinger, “Inerrancy Dictation, and The Free Will ously, this is not really a viable and Free Will: Some Further Defence,” 178. option. Thoughts,” 351. 33Ibid. 40E. J. Young, Thy Word is Truth (Grand 29Basinger and Basinger, “Inerrancy, 34Basinger and Basinger, “Inerrancy, Rapids: Eerdmans, 1957) 41-42 Dictation, and The Free Will Dictation, and The Free Will De- (emphasis mine). Defence,” 177. For two contempo- fence,” 179. In the contemporary lit- 41The Basingers admit this possibil- rary examples of the charge of dic- erature, no one has done more to ity as a mere possibility, but then tation see William Abraham, The develop and defend the FWD than correctly argue that if (2) is false Divine Inspiration of Holy Scripture in God, Freedom, and then “God can never guarantee that (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Evil (New York: Harper & Row, any human will freely do what he 1981) 28-38, and James Barr, Funda- 1974). wants” (“Inerrancy and Free Will: mentalism (London: SCM Press, 35Ibid. On this same point cf. Alvin Some Further Thoughts,” 354). 1981) 290-293. Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity 42Norman Geisler, “Inerrancy and 30For denials that the traditional view (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974) Free Will,” 350. of Scripture implies a dictation 166-167. 43Packer, ‘Fundamentalism’ and the theory of inspiration see Carl F. H. 36Ibid., 180. Word of God, 80. Henry, God, and Author- 37On this point see John S. Feinberg, 44This seems to be the position of ity, vol. 4 (Waco: Word Books, 1979) The Many Faces of Evil (Grand Rap- Clark Pinnock in The Scripture Prin- 138; J. I. Packer, ‘Fundamentalism’ and ids: Zondervan, 1994) 111-123. ciple (New York: Harper & Row, the Word of God (London: Inter- However, regardless of which way 1984) 100-101. Also see Scott R. Varsity Fellowship, 1958) 78-79; an indeterminist attempts to solve Burson and Jerry L. Walls, C. S. 88 Lewis and (Downers truths.” This does not mean that all theism with its weakened view of Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1998) 129- theological truths are totally com- divine sovereignty, has also shifted 138. For a very helpful discussion prehensible to our intellects or that to a weakened view of inerrancy. of these issues from a non-evangeli- our theological proposals do not The early-Pinnock maintained that cal perspective see Edward Farley, contain a great deal of mystery. But the concept of confluent authorship Ecclesial Reflection (Philadelphia: it does mean that since the God of is only intelligible within the con- Fortress Press, 1982). Interestingly, Scripture does not contradict him- text of biblical theism. By this he Farley correctly analyzes that the self, we should then affirm the same meant, “God and man can both be traditional view of Scripture has truth about his revelation. And as significant agents simultaneously in rested upon a strong view of divine such, our theological proposals may the same historical (Acts 2:23) or lit- sovereignty. However, he also contain “mysteries” and “tensions” erary (2 Pet 1:21) event. The Spirit admits that if God’s sovereignty is but not contradictory statements. of God worked concursively along- weakened in any way, then it On this see John Frame, The Doctrine side the activity of the writers, Him- becomes much more difficult to of the Knowledge of God (Phillipsburg: self being the principal cause and conceive of how God can guarantee Presbyterian & Reformed, 1987) they the free instrumental cause. that the human words collected in 242-260. The result of this concursive opera- Scripture will reflect his Word. In 47I. Howard Marshall seems to take tion was that their thinking and the end, Farley opts for a weakened this approach in Biblical Inspiration, writing were both free and sponta- sense of divine sovereignty along 44. neous on their part and divinely the lines of process theism. How- 48William L. Craig, “‘Men Moved By elicited and controlled, and what ever, in so doing, he also sees that it the Holy Spirit Spoke From God’ (2 they wrote was not only their own is necessary for him to give up the Peter 1:21): A Middle Knowledge work, but also God’s work. There is traditional view of Scripture and Perspective on Biblical Inspiration” a monotonous chorus of protest affirm another formulation of it due Philosophia Christi. Series 2, 1:1 against the biblical concept of to his weakened sense of God’s rule (1999) 45-82. inspiration on the grounds that it over the world. 49For similar critiques of middle involves mechanical dictation. The 45On the Scripture’s view of itself see knowledge at this point see Paul only way to explain the repetition Wayne Grudem, “Scripture’s Self- Helm, The Providence of God, 55-61; of this false charge is to recognize Attestation and the Problem of J. A. Crabtree, “Does Middle Knowl- the sad eclipse of biblical theism Formulating a Doctrine of Scrip- edge Solve the Problem of Divine today. Men seem unable to conceive ture” in Scripture and Truth, 19-59; Sovereignty?” in The Grace of God, of a divine providence which can John Frame, “Scripture Speaks for The Bondage of the Will, vol. 2, ed. infallibly reach its ends without Itself” in God’s Inerrant Word, ed. Thomas Schreiner and Bruce Ware dehumanizing the human agents it John W. Montgomery (Minneapolis: (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1995) 429- employs. According to the Bible, the Bethany House Publishers, 1974) 457; John Feinberg, The Many Faces sovereignty of God does not nullify 178-200; , “How of Evil, 89-90. the significance of man” (Biblical Does the Bible Look at Itself?” in 50In this regard, it is interesting to Revelation [Phillipsburg: Presbyte- Inerrancy and Hermeneutic, ed. compare the early-Clark Pinnock rian & Reformed, 1985 (1971)] 92- Harvie Conn (Grand Rapids: Baker, with the current-Clark Pinnock. The 93). However, the current-Pinnock 1988) 47-66. early-Pinnock, by his own admis- views the traditional emphasis on 46I am using the word “paradox” in sion, was a strong advocate of both concursus as suggesting total divine the sense of contradiction and I inerrancy and a Calvinistic view of control, tantamount to saying God am assuming that Scripture does divine sovereignty. The current- dictated the text (see The Scripture not present us with “paradoxical Pinnock, now an advocate of open Principle [New York: Harper & Row, 89 1984] 100-101). 51J. I. Packer, “‘Sola Scriptura’ in His- tory and Today,” in God’s Inerrant Word, 60.

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