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HONDURAS: DEMOCRACY WAS and IS the SOLUTION the People of Honduras Wins, and Chávez, the Chavistas and Those in Favour of the Coup Lose

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HONDURAS: DEMOCRACY WAS and IS the SOLUTION the People of Honduras Wins, and Chávez, the Chavistas and Those in Favour of the Coup Lose 09/12/2009 Nº 125 INTERNATIONAL HONDURAS: DEMOCRACY WAS AND IS THE SOLUTION The people of Honduras wins, and Chávez, the Chavistas and those in favour of the Coup lose José Herrera, Deputy Director for International Relations at FAES e t r o C i r u Y / O T O H P P F A Elvin Santos, former Vice-President of the Honduras Government and candidate for Zelaya’s party in the elec - tions held on November 29th, casts his vote in Tegucigalpa. After months of uncertainty, democracy has been consolidated in Honduras. The presidential, legislative and municipal elections last November 29th were held in a festive climate and with the utmost democratic normalcy. For the ninth time since 1981, the inhabitants of Honduras have elected their president when they were expected to, the last Sunday of November, four years after the previous election. These elections have not been the escape valve for a coup d’état but the fulfilment of a constitutional expectation, just like all the previous ones since 1981. The people of Honduras have voted in freedom, have overcome the interference by the followers of Chavez and deserve international backing to consolidate their democracy. Because democracy was and is the solution for Honduras. TABLE 1. Elections 2009 (Participation: 61.36%) CANDIDATE PARTY VOTES PERCENTAGE Porfirio Lobo Honduras National Party (PNH) 1,085,566 55.9% Elvin Santos Honduras Liberal Party (PLH) 728,602 38.1% Bernard Martínez Social Democratic Party of Innovation and Unity 36,907 2.2% Felicito Ávila Christian Democratic Party (PDC) 35,424 2.0% César Ham Democratic Unification (UD) 33,216 1.8% Source: Supreme Electoral Court of Honduras From the results of the November 29th during the election campaign. A wide elections in Honduras, two main con - majority of the population of Hon - clusions can be drawn. The first is that duras backs and has confidence in its the people of Honduras decided to democracy, as was shown by the re - make a massive turn-out at the ballot sults of the elections. And has also boxes. Despite the attempts by Hugo been shown by the automatic protec - Chávez, Manuel Zelaya and some in - tion included in the Constitution by al - ternational leaders to discourage par - lowing the immediate dismissal of ticipation, more than two and a half any president promoting their own re- million voters exercised their right to election, as was the case of Manuel vote and pushed the turn-out up by Zelaya. more than 11% compared to the elec - tions held in 2005. In the current climate of reconcilia - tion and unity, the only discordant The second conclusion is that all voice in Honduras has been that of the the parties have seen their support in - deposed president, who has less and crease in terms of the absolute num - less support within the country with ber of votes except the Honduras Lib - every day that passes. eral Party, precisely the one under which Manuel Zelaya was voted into The attitude of Elvin Santos, the office. candidate put forward by Zelaya’s party, has illustrated the will that ex - In contradiction of the distorted ists to establish a wide-ranging na - image transmitted by some media, tional agreement that will allow the the truth is that total normality ruled country to move out of its institutional “The people of Honduras have given an exemplary response to the crisis by ignoring those from outside who had tried to impose a solution that better fitted their interests. Honduras has voted massively in favour of peace and freedom” 2 TABLE 2. Elections 2005 (Participation: 50.34%) CANDIDATE PARTY VOTES PERCENTAGE Manuel Zelaya Honduras Liberal Party (PLH) 918,408 49.9% Porfirio Lobo Honduras National Party (PNH) 849,816 46.2% Juan A. Almendarez Democratic Unification (UD) 29,754 1.5% Juan R. Martínez Christian Democratic Party (PDC) 27,812 1.4% Carlos Soza Social Democratic Party of Innovation and Unity 20,093 1.0% Source: Supreme Electoral Court of Honduras crisis. Elvin Santos was Vice-Presi - scribed these polls as “the cleanest dent of the Republic at Manuel Ze - ever held”, despite the scant presence laya’s instance. of international observers. The Armed Forces have fulfilled their task of en - He resigned from his post last suring peace of mind and the trans - March, as required by law, in order to parency of the electoral process. head up the Liberal Party’s presiden - tial ticket. As soon as the result was In short, the Constitution and the in - announced, Santos demonstrated his stitutions have withstood the attacks statesmanship by acknowledging the and democracy has once more be - transparency of the elections and the come the essential framework for their victory of Porfirio Lobo. He also ac - co-existence. The people of Honduras cepted the President-elect’s offer to are the great winners in these elec - form “a national unity and reconcilia - tions. The victory of Porfirio “Pepe” tion government”. The other candi - Lobo deserves international recogni - dates made similar announcements tion and best wishes for the future. and called on the electorate’s patriot - ism to overcome their differences. Honduras now needs to turn the page in peace. Zelaya and Micheletti The people of Honduras have given are now part of the past, and the same an exemplary response to the crisis by should apply to the pressure exerted ignoring those from outside who tried by some countries and international to impose a solution that better fitted bodies, most notably Brazil and Spain. their interests. Honduras has voted While many Governments played down massively in favour of peace and free - their initial rejection of the de facto dom. The mass media, the political Government in order to facilitate the parties and the international ob - search for feasible solutions, the Gov - servers have all indicated that the ernments led by Lula Da Silva and Ro - presidential election took place in an dríguez Zapatero have systematically atmosphere of peaceful and scrupu - boycotted any agreement that did not lous respect for the ground rules of include the return of Zelaya to the democracy. The candidates have de - presidency; in itself a contradiction 3 with the provisions of the Honduras ico, Costa Rica, Panama, Peru, Colom - Constitution (please see Papeles 110) bia, Germany, France, Italy and Japan, and with the subsequent Tegucigalpa- which have already acknowledged the San José Pact. outcome. In line with the terms agreed in the In this process, the attitude of the Tegucigalpa-San José Pact, 110 mem - Spanish Government has been neither bers of parliament (out of a total of constructive nor useful, but irrelevant 128) opposed the restitution of ex- and even counterproductive, as in the President Manuel Zelaya. The four re - case of Brazil. These contrast with the ports submitted to the Congress by attitude shown by the United States, the Office of the Public Prosecutor, the both constructive and intelligent Supreme Court of Justice, the Office of throughout the crisis: unblocking the the Attorney General of the Republic situation, getting the Tegucigalpa-San and the National Commissioner for José Pact signed and devising a Human Rights also were against his peaceful, democratic result. restitution. The crisis in Honduras has helped Now that the Hondurans are manag - highlight the new struggle for the ing to resolve the problem for them - West’s leadership in the region in a selves, it is time to ask for a greater scenario in which Hugo Chávez counts degree of responsibility from those for naught thanks to his “eccentrici - Governments who favoured, willingly or ties” and his dangerous liaisons. otherwise, the interests of Hugo Brazil, meanwhile, was leading from Chávez. Brazil and Spain brought in - the front with its shock permission for tense diplomatic pressure to bear with Zelaya to take refuge in its Embassy, a view to achieving the political isola - the United States discreetly brokered tion and the economic asphyxia of the the agreement dated October 29th de facto Government and the whole and now leads the group of countries country with it. By denying the people deeming legitimate the result of the of Honduras the right to resolve the in - presidential election held on Novem - stitutional crisis for themselves and ber 29th. through the ballot box, the Govern - ments of both countries are making a On this occasion, Lula Da Silva serious mistake. To correct this, Spain seems to have overestimated his own and Brazil must urgently join such chances of success. For some time, countries as the United States, Mex - Brazil has been a major player at any “Honduras now needs to turn the page in peace. Zelaya and Micheletti are now part of the past, and the same should apply to the external pressure, most notably from Brazil and Spain” 4 “It is difficult to understand the stubbornness of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero in his attempts to scorn the legitimacy of the electoral result and defend the interests of Hugo Chávez in Honduras” summit regarding the priority issues on position and join the front-line defend - the global agenda, such as free trade ers of democracy in the region. agreements, energy and climate change. What is more novel now is its The Pact contained the following presence in internal conflicts of Latin- points: American countries where it didn’t use to take a stand. The recent visit to the 1. Creation of a national unity and rec - country of Mahmud Ahmadineyad is an - onciliation government. other worrying symptom that, in ex - change for achieving a position of 2. Rejection of any amnesty for politi - global leadership, Lula Da Silva is pre - cal crimes and a moratorium on pared to seek alliances with whomever.
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