Detecting and Mitigating Denial-Of-Service Attacks on Voice
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View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Illinois Digital Environment for Access to Learning and Scholarship Repository 1 Detecting and Mitigating Denial-of-Service Attacks on Voice over IP Networks Zahid Anwar, Shaya Potter, Chandra Narayanaswami, William Yurcik , Carl Gunter, Roy H Campbell [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], {byurcik, cgunter, rhc}@uiuc.edu IBM Watson Research, Department of Computer Science Columbia University, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Abstract— Voice over IP (VoIP) is more susceptible to Denial Only recently [23] a hacker breached into a Newark- of Service attacks than traditional data traffic, due to the based company, which transmits VoIP services for other tele- former’s low tolerance to delay and jitter. We describe the com businesses, using their networks to route calls for his design of our VoIP Vulnerability Assessment Tool (VVAT) with which we demonstrate vulnerabilities to DoS attacks inherent own customers. The victim company was billed for more in many of the popular VoIP applications available today. In than 500,000 unauthorized telephone calls routed through its our threat model we assume an adversary who is not a network calling network. Eavesdropping software [17] was used on administrator, nor has direct control of the channel and key Vodafone’s voice service in Greece recording conversations VoIP elements. His aim is to degrade his victim’s QoS without of the Prime Minister, security officials and other important giving away his presence by making his attack look like a normal network degradation. Even black-boxed, applications like Skype dignitaries around the time of the Athens Olympics. that use proprietary protocols show poor performance under It is a common myth that it is just Voice applications specially crafted DoS attacks to its media stream. Finally we show based on IETF and open standards that are vulnerable and how securing Skype relays not only preserves many of its useful that proprietary protocols such as Skype that obscure their features such as seamless traversal of firewalls but also protects traffic are secure. A Chinese firm [13] recently showed how its users from DoS attacks such as recording of conversations and disruption of voice quality. We also present our experiences scary it can be to trust another Skype user when they reverse- using virtualization to protect VoIP applications from ’insider engineered Skype to make free calls. attacks’. There are relatively few tools available today that check for Our contribution is two fold we: 1) Outline a threat model for VoIP media vulnerabilities against realistic attacker models. VoIP, incorporating our attack models in an open-source network Vendors can claim that they encrypt every piece of information simulator/emulator allowing VoIP vendors to check their software of your call but how does that effect the quality? The reason its for vulnerabilities in a controlled environment before releasing it. 2) We present two promising approaches for protecting the hard to develop tools is because typically a VoIP application confidentiality, availability and authentication of VoIP Services. can not be tested alone. Fundamentally a VoIP application is at least a two-party software requiring multiple machines to work properly and there is generally a requirement of some I. INTRODUCTION sort of server support. For instance a SIP Voice call setup will typically require two user agents (UA), one or more SIP IP Telephony is gaining rapid momentum to become a core Proxies and optional Registration and/or Directory Servers. part of our future communication infrastructure. However, be- Similarly a H.248 or MGCP call will require Signaling, Media fore it can be widely deployed to fully replace traditional PBX Gateways and Controllers apart from the actual end hosts. or telephone networks within enterprises, many challenges In this paper we introduce VoIP Vulnerability Assessment need to be addressed. Besides maintaining continuous high Tool (VVAT) and describe how it was designed by extending availability and error-free operation, the IP Telephony system a popular Network Simulator (J-Sim) to incorporate DoS should be secure enough to maintain the integrity of the data attacker models. Using J-Sim network emulation feature to streams and protect the privacy of its users. bridge between simulated and real applications we are able to Quality of service (QoS) and security are the two major test third-party VoIP applications for security vulnerabilities. issues that need to be addressed when voice traffic is trans- For instance a SIP UA can be easily tested by peering it with ported over the Internet. While some traffic streams require a simulated UA and Proxy running inside J-Sim and mounting guaranteed delivery, real-time traffic (voice, video) requires attacks on the transmitted traffic to check its behavior. low end-to-end transmission delay across the network. Secu- The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sec- rity is another important aspect that needs to be considered tion II puts this work in context by providing background on when using the Internet for communication. Due to the usage existing VoIP network security tools and how they fall short. of shared media, user data across the Internet is susceptible Section III describes the architecture of VVAT and its key to many attacks. Similar to data traffic, voice traffic is also components. Section IV describes the various attack models exposed to the security attacks. in detail and investigates their devastating effect on different VoIP Applications with a detailed case-study of the Skype P2P This work was funded by NSF CNS 03-05537. network in particular. In Section V and VI we outline how to 2 use Session Border Controllers as a more secure alternative to IPSec-protected paths for signaling: One each between the Skype’s concept of relay nodes and how to secure USB-Key telephone and its respective proxy, and one between the VoIP phones that have been becoming increasingly popular proxies. According to our experiments, in the case where recently. We end with conclusions and ideas for extending all signaling is protected (hop-by-hop IPSec), the call-setup this work in Section VII. delay is 24 seconds on a 100MB Ethernet which is probably unacceptable to most users. II. BACKGROUND In this section we give an overview of existing work on B. Packet Expansion tools available for testing VoIP security. Most of the work in A typical 40-B packet will grow up to 96-B when it VoIP DoS has been geared towards testing of the SIP signaling undergoes tunnel-mode ESP expansion causing the ciphertext protocol, and it falls short when considering the security holes I/O bitrate to be 2.4 times less than that of the cleartext bit-rate of the underlaying media protocol. which is not very suitable for media transformation. Besides SiVus the SIP Vulnerability Scanner [16] is a VoIP vulnera- additional overhead, IPSec and its key exchange protocol bility scanner developed for Miscrosoft Windows by the group (IKE) suffer from other problems detrimental to VoIP e.g., lack at vopsecurity.org. It comprises three parts, a SIP message of support for header compression, lack of suitable transforms generator, a SIP discovery component and a SIP vulnerability and too many round trips required to complete key exchange. scanner. It checks the SIP parser of the test application to see if it works smoothly with different variations of the SIP C. No room for selective Encryption signalling messages. Similarly, Security Testing of Protocol IPSec security associations identify (i.e., trust) devices Implementations (PROTOS) [14] implements a basic set of rather than sessions and applications. Since IPSec is a network functional tests for the SIP Signaling Protocol. It checks for layer solution it will encrypt everything which is a disadvan- implementation errors and software robustness using black box tage when several sessions and applications are running on the functionality testing by injecting anomalies and unexpected same device, (some trusted and some not). input elements. In previous work [3] we presented security design patterns The SIP Torture tests [22] are a comprehensive set of for VoIP and in this paper we extend that by developing a tool SIP parser tests to check grammer that is legal in the pro- that VoIP developers can use to check whether their products tocol specification but likely not implemented. For instance conform-to or need to incorporate those patterns. they check whether the parser can withstand messages with whitespaces (around colons, around semicolons), empty values III. ARCHITECTURE in unstructured headers (e.g. Subject), multiple requests in a Our VoIP Vulnerability Assessment Tools (VVAT) high UDP packet, extra bytes at end of UDP packet etc. level architecture is show in Figure 1. The CERT website [15] provides a somewhat compre- hensive list of VoIP Vendor Vulnerabilities although not all of them are well documented. For instance there have been A. Packet Capture and Injection security bug reports listed for the Columbia SIP User Agent VVAT is built on top of Libpcap [20] and Libnet [9] (sipc), Cisco Call Manager, Asterisk PBX , IPTel’s SIP Ex- network tools. The packet capture library has access to all press Router and Nortel’s Communication Server 2000. the packets in the network driver’s buffer through the adapter The Ethereal Network Analyzer [8] has some of the features independent dev interface. In addition it can sniff packets in we use in VVAT. For instance it can capture packets and store promiscuous mode enabling all packets received at the NIC, them to a file for later viewing and also has a easy-to-use regardless of whether they originated at the machine to be interface to view individual headers and IP options.