Whistleblowing on Village Fund Fraud: the Dynamics and Challenges

WHISTLEBLOWING ON VILLAGE FUND FRAUD: THE DYNAMICS AND CHALLENGES

Intiyas Utami1 Prodi Akuntansi FEB Universitas Kristen Satya Wacana Salatiga [email protected] Florenshi Aditya Prodi Akuntansi FEB Universitas Kristen Satya Wacana Salatiga Aprina Nugrahesty Sulistya Hapsari Prodi Akuntansi FEB Universitas Kristen Satya Wacana Salatiga [email protected]

ABSTRACT

Village funds are a program of the Village Ministry in Indonesia to advance community development. The phenomenon in Indonesia shows that there is fraud in the management of village funds. The strategy to mitigate fraud is to provide opportunities for community to whistleblowing. This research aims to describe the dynamics and challenges of the potentials of whistleblowing on village fraud fund. We conducted the study in all villages in Kledung Sub district, Temanggung Regency. The sub district is the largest tobacco producer in Indonesia. Using the qualitative descriptive research method, we relied on the village officials in those villages as our research informants. Our study shows that in administering village fund, whistleblowing on village fund fraud is mainly driven by the courage of village fund administrators. Further, whistleblowers consider the existence of safer whistleblowing mechanism and reporting lines to be the main challenges of the whistleblowing activity.

Keywords: whistleblowing, fraud of village fund, dynamics, challenges

1 Corresponding Author: Intiyas Utami is a senior lecturer at the Accounting Departement Faculty of Economics and Business Universitas Kristen Satya Wacana Salatiga Indonesia, email: [email protected]

INTRODUCTION Kledung Subdistrict, Temanggung Regency is the largest tobacco producer in Indonesia. In the 2017 budget year, this subdistrict received the allocation of village fund of more than Rp 207.45 billion. This amount was larger than the 2016 allocation that was only Rp 164.4 billion. The increase in village fund allocation in 2017 was significant. It is thus expected that such a large increase stimulated village heads and their village officials to comply with the existing procedures in administering the village fund in correspondence.

However, several accounts in the media indicate that irresponsible individuals misappropriated the distribution of village fund in this regency for their interests. For example, in 2012 Eko Prabowo, the village head of Jumo Village, Jumo Subdistrict was alleged of corrupting the village land (bengkok) replacement fund from the municipal government budget (APBD). It was estimated that he misused the of Rp 243,939,000 of the fund that was proposed to build the Progo Pistan dam for his personal needs. Consequently, the village could not afford to pay the land (www.suaramerdeka.com). With 20 subdistricts and 266 villages, Temanggung Regency still exhibits an ineffective village fund administration. All villages have not implemented the village financial system application (SISKEUDES) developed by the State Development Audit Agency (BPKP – Badan Pengawasan Keuangan dan Pembangunan), mainly because the regency lacks qualified human resources (www.merdeka.com). Consequently, until March 2017 Temanggung Regency could not disburse village fund because no village submitted the village fund utilization report for the 2016 budget year (www.metrotvnews.com).

The courage of individuals who are willing to reveal frauds in these villages or whistleblowers prompted the revelation of these cases. The Circular Letter of Supreme Court (SEMA – Surat Edaran Mahkamah Agung) No. 4 Year 2011 point-8 defines a whistleblower as an individual who is aware of and reports a certain criminal act as mentioned in this SEMA without taking part in the reported crime. Whistleblowers have to provide clear and specific proofs or information on fraud events to facilitate the follow-up actions. It is very difficult to respond the whistleblowers’ reports without adequate information and clear proofs because whistleblowers will potentially receive terror threats from those who dislike their whistleblowing activities.

Numerous studies have investigated the whistleblowing activity. For example, using the Chinese sociocultural context, Hwang et al. (2008) examine the effect of culture on accountants’ and professional auditors’ intention to become a whistleblower. Elias (2008) analyzes US students’ attitude towards whistleblowing. Xu and Ziegenfuss (2008) suggest the role of reward model in motivating individuals to report wrongdoings. They show that internal auditors are more likely to report wrongdoings when they receive rewards. Taylor (2015) argues that monetary incentive is insufficient to protect whistleblowers from perpetrators’ threats. Besides rewards, an anonymous reporting mechanism is effective in encouraging whistleblowing. Therefore, regarding the village fund administration, it is interesting to investigate the whistleblowing activity on village fund fraud. More specifically, what are the

dynamics and challenges of whistleblowing on village fund administration fraud in all villages in Kledung Subdistrict, Temanggung Regency. We expect that this study enables the stakeholders to design an effective whistleblowing mechanism.

LITERATURE REVIEW Whistleblower Whistleblowing is an action to achieve certain economic and social objectives so that the whistleblower expects supports from various parties to ensure that the objectives are achieved. Whistleblower faces various threats such as retaliation (Liyanarachichi and Newdick, 2009; Arnold and Ponemon, 1991; Elliston, 1982; Elliston and Coulson, 1982). Miceli and Near (1985) propose that whistleblowers exhibit the following four characteristics, (1) are employees or former employees of the organizations in which the wrongdoings are committed; (2) do not have authority to stop or change frauds that are under their control; (3) are either authorized or not authorized to submit reports; (4) do not have the positions that should report corporate frauds.

Whistleblowing can go through internal or external lines. Whistleblowing through the internal line takes place when employees are aware of frauds committed by other employees and report the frauds to their superiors. Meanwhile, whistleblowing through the external line emerges when employees are aware of frauds committed by their organizations or members of their organizations, and they choose to report the wrongdoings to external parties or law enforcers because such frauds harm the public (Elias 2008). Park and Blenkinsopp (2009) describe that there are three whistleblowing reporting lines, namely anonymous and identified, formal and informal, and internal and external. Whistleblowers behave differently in choosing reporting lines. Kaplan (20120 shows that the possibility of retaliation measures affect participants’ intention to report through an anonymous or identified line.

Alleyne et al. (2013) suggest that perceived organizational support motivates individuals to report unethical behavior in their organizations. Individuals should assess the expected level of organizational support when deciding to report any wrongdoing because lack of organizational support only causes negative effects.

Kaplan et al. (2009) empirically demonstrate that the effectiveness of anonymous reporting lines depends on the extent of frauds or indications of frauds found and employees’ intention to report their findings to the appropriate receiver. The anonymous reporting line is more effective in preventing frauds than the identified one. Seifert et al. (2010) investigate the effectiveness of the anonymous reporting line in the reward model.

Focus of Study: Whistleblowing at Village Fund Administration Act No. 6 Year 2014 on Village explains that villages receive greater freedom to self- regulate their governance and to develop for higher welfare and better quality of life. Further, villages have to be more independent in managing their governments and resources, including financial administration and village assets. Greater village autonomy implies greater

responsibility. Consequently, village governments have to apply the accountability principle in their governing activities. Government Regulation No. 6 Year 2004 article 1 clause 2 explains that village fund is the allocation of the national budget (APBN – Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara) to villages that are transferred through regencies’ or cities’ regional budgets. The fund is used to finance village government, village development, and community empowerment and advocacy. The central government transfers village fund through the State General Cash Account (RKUN – Rekening Kas Umum Negara) to regency/ city governments through Regional General Cash Account (RKUD – Rekening Kas Umum Daerah). Next, regency/ city governments transfer the fund through Village Cash Fund (RKD – Rekening Kas Desa) after village governments submit relevant documents such as village regulation on current village budgets and the previous-year statement of village fund realization (www.djpk.depkeu.go.id). Presidential Decree No. 60 on Village Fund article 2 stipulates that village fund must be administered orderly, in compliance with existing regulations, efficiently, economically, transparently, and responsibly to promote surrounding public interests by considering public fairness and consideration. Minister of Finance Regulation No. 49 Year 2016 on Procedures of the Allocation, Distribution, Use, Monitoring, and Evaluation of Village Fund, article 22 clause 2 mentions that activities financed by village fund should be based on the self-operation principle, rely on local resources or inputs and employ as many local labors as possible. Village heads have the authority in administering village finance. Government Regulation No. 72 Year 2005 article 68 stipulates that budget post transferred to villages is from municipal government budgets. The allocated components should be at least 10% from the balance fund received by cities/ regencies as the revenue sharing fund of taxes and natural resources, added with General Allocation Fund (DAU -Dana Alokasi Umum) after deducted with the employee compensation. The fraud triangle can explain fraud in village fund administration. This concept explains that pressure, opportunity, and rationalization motivate fraud (Cressey 1966).

RESEARCH METHOD Research Design This study is a qualitative descriptive study. We conducted our study in all villages in all villages in Kledung Sub District, Temanggung Regency. We generated our data using the interview method, i.e., by directly asking village officials and community leaders.

We analyzed our data by organizing the interview results in transcripts, mapping and making an in-depth analysis of the data based on the previous literature. We then interpreted and narrated the results by presenting the phenomena and synthesizing previous literature. We also validated our data by comparing the interview result of one source with another source and comparing the interview results with existing regulation.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION The General Description of Kledung Sub District Kledung Sub District is one of 20 Sub Districts in Temanggung Regency. It has borders with Wonosobo Regency in the west, Bansari Sub District in the north, Parakan and Bulu Sub Districts in the east, and Magelang Regency in the south. On average, this sub-district is 1,138 meters above sea level with the maximum temperature is 29 Celsius degree and the minimum temperature 18 Celsius degree. Also, on average there are 64 rainy days per year, and the annual rainfall is 22 mm.

Based on the 2012 registration, Kledung Sub District has the total population of 24,770, implying that the population density is 765 per km2. Most of its residents work as farmers. Covering the area of 3,221 Ha, Kleding Sub District has the farming area of 247 Ha and non- farming area of 2,974 Ha. Administratively, this sub district is divided into 13 villages, 37 sub- villages, 157 RT (neighborhoods), 39 RW (hamlets), with 13 village heads, 141 other village officials, and 99 BPD member (Village Consultative Board – Badan Permusyawarahan Desa).

Profile of Village Fund Administration in Kledung Sub District Village fund is allocated from the national government budget (APBN) to develop villages and to improve villagers’ welfare. Villages have to use this fund for running their governments, development, and local empowerment and advocacy. In 2017, the village fund in Kledung Sub District was distributed in two phases. The first phase (in April) distributed 60% of the total fund, and in October the remaining 40% was distributed.

As stipulated by the Minister of Village Regulation No. 5 Year 2015, the priorities of the village fund utilization are village development and community empowerment. Accordingly, all villages in Kledung Sub District prioritized these two sectors in using their village funds.

The village fund administration starts with the planning phase that is discussed in the Village Development Plan Consultation Meeting (Musyawarah Rencana Pembangunan Desa) that involve all villagers to implement participative development and to accommodate public aspiration. The decisions of these meetings are the basis of the formulation of RKPDes (Rencana Kerja Pemerintahan Desa – Village Government Workplan) and APBDes (Village Budget – Anggaran Pembangunan dan Belanja Desa). These documents are specified in village regulations as the guidance of the village development. In the implementation, all villages deliver village funds received to TPK (Tim Pelaksana Kegiatan – Activity Organizer Team) that administer the fund and are responsible to village heads. This team consists of village officials, village youth association (Karang Taruna), and villagers. The use of village fund should prioritize local resources and employ local labors as stipulated by Ministry of Finance Regulation No. 49 Article 22 clause 2 that mentions that activities financed by village fund should be executed based on self-management principle, use local resources/ inputs and employ local labors.

The Potentials of Whistleblowing on Village Fund Administration Village fund administration is prone to potential fraud and fraud reporting is likely to mitigate this possibility. Indeed, intention to report motivates fraud reporting. According to Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB), intention is a process when individuals exhibit their behavior. Ones will have the intention to commit an action before they show their behavior they wish to exhibit. According to the theory, intention is manifested from behavior and produces behavior, subjective norm, and perceived control on behavior (Ajzen 1991). Meanwhile, attitude is ones’ responses to and beliefs on something beneficial or less beneficial to commit desired actions. Further, the subjective norm is external party’s influence or pressure on the individual to exhibit a certain behavior.

In the village fund administration, the village officials of all villages in Kledung Sub District have never found significant financial problems or village fund fraud. However, they often made administrative errors in administering village fund because they lacked human resources. The treasurer of Petarangan village express his following opinion:

“….So far I’ve never seen any fraud, but I sometimes miscalculate. For example, I find it difficult to calculate taxes. I have been the village treasurer only since 2017 so that I still have to learn a lot. We make the official report to deal with the errors.”

Although so far there was no fraud in village fund administration, eight village officials were willing to report fraud and five of them were unwilling to report fraud if in the future they would find fraud. As the secretary of Jambu Village said:

“Of course I will report (the fraud) because I will surely be drawn into the case and I will have to be responsible for the fraud. I’m sure I do the right thing. If there is fraud in the provincial level why shouldn’t I report? Their case will eventually cause me to be responsible. So, why should I be afraid of reporting? I will surely report.”

The secretary of Canggal Village stated that he was ready to report fraud in village fund administration:

“...If there is a fraud, we are ready to report it. For example, if we find budget misappropriation, we are ready to report it because this case does not comply our plan. Everything must be based on regulations. This year we are serious about it. We must stick to the rules.”

The secretary of Kwadungan Gunung Village also mentioned that fraud reporting deter those who planned to commit fraud in village fund administration.

“...I will report it if I find any fraud. We must govern our village based on transparency. Every year we make reports to our fellow villagers and institutions in this village. If we don’t, there will be potentially frauds”.

Similarly, the village officials of Kwadungan Jurang, Tuksari, Jeketro, Kruwisan, and Kledung also mentioned that they have the intention to report fraud because they want to give a deterrent effect on the perpetrators. They emphasized that such actions broke the rules and brought harm to various parties. Further, the corrupted fund is public money that must be publicly accounted for the public.

Different from the previous villages, the other five villages in Kledung Sub District still implemented whistleblowing ineffectively. The village officials still hesitated to report if there is a fraud because they were unwilling to report their superiors or colleagues and apathetic towards reporting if fraud happens. The treasurer of Petarangan Village revealed the following:

“...I will not report. The government already have those who monitor the fund. Even without any report, they will know. I think once there is a fraud; everyone will intervene. Police will intervene, the sub-district will intervene, and even the Regency will also intervene. They monitor us every month. But honestly, I cannot answer this question because apparently there is no fraud.”

The finance staff of Kalirejo Village added:

“...I think I don’t have the heart to report. Once there is a fraud, we all will know. Everyone in this village will know. Don’t forget that we are in the village. In villages, everyone knows everyone. So, if there is a fraud, I will not have the heart to report.”

The findings highlight village officials’ different intention to report fraud in Kledung Sub District. Some village officials intend to be whistleblowers while several others are not willing to be whistleblowers of fraud in village fund administration.

Intention to behave is the determinant of one’s decision to commit or not to commit a certain action. Theory of planned behavior explains that individual behavior is the result of the intention to behave. As explained by this theory, one with a positive attitude will have the intention to commit an action while one with a negative attitude will not have the intention to commit the action. The village officials considered fraud is reporting to be beneficial because this action complied with their religion and belief. More specifically, they considered fraud reporting to help law enforcement and to help them to be accountable to the public. Positive attitude implies that they would report if there were frauds.

However, the village officials of five other villages in Kledung Sub District were apathetic towards reporting of fraud in village fund administration because of their interest. The village officials considered external monitoring to be sufficient because eventually fraud will be exposed, implying that fraud reporting was unnecessary. They also did not intend to report a fraud because they hesitated (sungkan) to report their superiors or colleagues.

Regarding the intention to report, if there were frauds, the village officials would make personal approaches to their colleagues who committed the frauds. A village meeting followed. If the perpetrators were willing to return the corrupted fund, they would be forgiven. However, if they refused to do so are to be held liable, the village officials would report the fraud to the police.

The following are the village officials’ answers related to the medium of fraud reporting they would use. The treasurer of Kledung Village explained:

“...We will hold a meeting to generate consensus if there is a fraud. If that suffices, we will then stop. However, if the perpetrator refuses to be held liable, it is probable that we will report the case to the police.”

The secretary of Jambu Village also opined the following:

“...At first, I will probably report to the village head. But beforehand, I analyze the case carefully because I don’t want to get involved in an unconfirmed case. If I can confirm the case to be true, we will report it. We will then report the case to the government at the higher level. We will report to the sub-district. They will follow up our report. I will surely do these.”

As explained by Elias (2008), whistleblowing reporting through the internal line emerges when employees are aware of frauds committed by their colleagues and report the frauds to their superiors. Meanwhile, the external line is used when employees chose to report a fraud to the external parties or law enforcers because the frauds harm the public.

The village officials in Kledung Sub District would use both lines. They would use the internal line and report the fraud to their superiors and also the external line by reporting the fraud to the law enforcers if the case happens to be confirmed.

Supports from the closest individuals (families and friends) motivated village officials to report a fraud. Some of our informants mentioned that their families supported their positive actions, including reporting fraud, as long this action did not harm village officials or their families. Besides, other village officials also supported the action because they consider this action to improve their villages as long the case was not slander. This support motivated village officials to report a fraud. As the treasurer of Kledung Village said:

“..As long as it is good, my family supports me.”.

The secretary of Kwadungan Gunung Village also informed us that his family and the closest friend supported his decision to report fraud in village fund administration:

“...I’m sure that I will have the supports as long as it’s the truth and not slander. The report must match with the reality. Nowadays there are a lot of dubious reports. When officials try to confirm, it is revealed that the reports do not match with the facts.”

However, some other village officials in Kledung Sub District did not have such supports. Their families and colleagues did not support the reporting decision to report because they are afraid that this action would only harm them or village. This lack of support did not motivate village officials to report a fraud. As mentioned by the secretary of Canggal Village:

“...Village fund frightens my family and close friends. They worry that village fund implies stricter rules and regulations, stricter monitoring. They worry that I will make an administrative mistake”.

The secretary of Paponan Village informed that he did not have family support to report a fraud because he never told his problems at the office to his family:

“...In the meantime, I have never reported a fraud, so I have no idea about it. Also, my principle is that official matters remain official and family matters remain in the family.”

The treasurer of Petarangan Village also mentioned that other village officials did not directly support the decision to report fraud:

“...We initially need to clarify the case before receiving supports. If there is an indication of fraud, it is probable that it is unintentional. It is impossible to manage such huge amount of fund compliantly because we do not fully understand so many regulations regarding village fund. If any mistake, including the administrative or unintentional ones, is punished, then it is better that we do not receive any village fund.”

As suggested by the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB), when individuals believe that their environments accept a certain behavior, they will have the intention to exhibit the behavior. Our interview reveals that not all village officials in Kledung Sub District believed that fraud reporting was acceptable in their environments because they did not receive support from their families or colleagues. The village officials believed that their closest persons feared that reporting a fraud would harm themselves or their villages. However, other village officials believe that reporting fraud is acceptable in their environments because they receive support from their families and colleagues. The village officials believed that their closest persons disagreed with fraud because it would harm their villages. Consequently, their closest persons would support their decisions to report frauds.

Regarding the perceived behavioral control, the village officials in Kledung Sub District perceived that not all village officials have equal opportunities to report fraud if there is any. Some village officials in Kledung Sub District informed that it was easy to report fraud because they were already suggested to report fraud if there is any. As the treasurer of Kledung Village said:

“...They give us the opportunity to report. It’s impossible that they would obstruct our report. If we have already met to generate a consensus but the perpetrator is not willing to be held liable, we will report the case to give the deterrent effect to the perpetrator. Whether I have the protection or not, I will report it. When there is fraud, I will have the intention to report it for the sake of our village.”

However, the village officials of Kalirejo Village argued that it was difficult to report fraud in his village:

"...It’s not easy. If we can still make a gentleman agreement, we will do it. Besides, we don’t have the heart to report the case. Protection is not the main issue. Even if have the full protection, it’s awkward to report our colleagues. We will leave it out to the public.”

The Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) explains that ones’ intentions to behave are driven by how he perceives the ease or difficulty in behaving. When they believe that their behavior is the product of their self-control, those individuals will intend to exhibit a certain behavior. The intention to report fraud indicated the dynamics of whistleblowing. However, the village officials also faced the challenges that their organizations did not give sufficient opportunities to report fraud. Those who administer village fund did not fully understand the mechanism of reporting fraud.

CONCLUSION, LIMITATION, AND SUGGESTION Conclusion The dynamics of whistleblowing on village fund fraud showed that eight village officials in Kledung Sub District had the intention to report fraud and five village officials who have no intention to report fraud. Eight village officials have the intention to report the fraud because they have a positive attitude towards fraud reporting. They also received support from their families as long as their actions did not harm themselves or their families. Other village officials also supported their decisions to improve the village condition. Further, they intended to report because they consider fraud reporting in their villages to be easy to implement.

Whistleblowing activity on village fund also faced various challenges. Internally, several village officials were apathetic towards fraud reporting and hesitate to report their colleagues or respected individuals in their villages. Externally, whistleblowing required a safe reporting mechanism and procedure. In the context of village fund, one has to take cultural factors into account in implementing effective whistleblowing.

Limitations and Suggestion for Future Research This study is subject to the following caveats. First, we only managed to interview a limited number of respondents that are representatives of village fund administrators. Secondly, this research has not stressed the importance of local wisdom in Kledung Sub District. We suggest that future research could address the role of local wisdom in influencing the whistleblowing mechanism in a certain area.

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