Opinion Filed June 30, 2017 Ashley ROTH, Appellant, Background: Defendant Was Charged with Driving Without a License As a Habitual V

182 Kan. 400 PACIFIC REPORTER, 3d SERIES

Stegall, J., not participating. 3

Michael J. Malone, Senior Judge, 54 Kan.App.2d 377 assigned.1 STATE of Kansas, Appellant, v. , Charles GLOVER, Appellee. No. 116,446 Court of Appeals of Kansas.

1 Opinion filed June 30, 2017 Ashley ROTH, Appellant, Background: Defendant was charged with driving without a license as a habitual v. violator. The District Court, Douglas BARBER EMERSON, L.C., Appellee. County, Paula B. Martin, J., granted de- No. 115,958 fendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained after traffic stop. State filed inter- Court of Appeals of Kansas. locutory appeal challenging suppression. Opinion filed March 24, 2017 Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Stand- ridge, P.J., held that: Appeal from Douglas District Court; RICH- ARD M. SMITH, Judge. (1) a law enforcement officer has reason- Affirmed. able suspicion to initiate a stop of a vehicle to investigate whether the driver has a valid driver’s license if, inter , alia, the officer knows the registered owner of the vehicle has a suspended license, and

2 (2) officer had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant’s vehicle. Darren K. KEARNS, Appellant, Reversed and remanded. v. NEW YORK COMMUNITY BANK 1. Arrest O60.4(1) and James Ricca, Appellees. A seizure occurs when an officer has No. 115,470 restrained the liberty of a person by means of physical force or show of authority. U.S. Court of Appeals of Kansas. Const. Amend. 4; Kan. Const. Bill of Rts. § 15. Opinion filed March 24, 2017 2. Arrest O60.4(1) Appeal from Johnson District Court; A law enforcement officer who stops a JAMES F. VANO, Judge. vehicle on a public roadway has effected a Affirmed. seizure. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; Kan. Const. Bill of Rts. § 15. 3. Arrest O60.3(1) , Automobiles O349(2.1) To comply with the Fourth Amendment, a law enforcement officer conducting a vehi-

1. REPORTER’S NOTE: Senior Judge Malone Justice Stegall under the authority vested in the was appointed to hear case No. 109,272 vice Supreme Court by K.S.A. 20-2616. STATE v. GLOVER Kan. 183 Cite as 400 P.3d 182 (Kan.App. 2017) cle stop must know of specific and articulable the whole picture that must be taken into facts that create a reasonable suspicion the account when evaluating whether there is seized individual is committing, has commit- reasonable suspicion to detain a person. ted, or is about to commit a crime or traffic U.S. Const. Amend. 4; Kan. Const. Bill of infraction. U.S. Const. Amend. 4. Rts. § 15.

4. Searches and Seizures O23 10. Arrest O60.2(10) The inquiry into the reasonableness of The appellate court is called upon to searches and seizures balances the state’s employ common sense and ordinary human interests against an individual’s right to be experience in evaluating whether circum- secure from unwarranted governmental instances justify the detention of a defendant. trusion. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; Kan. Const. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; Kan. Const. Bill of Bill of Rts. § 15. Rts. § 15. O 5. Arrest 60.2(10) 11. Arrest O60.2(10) O Automobiles 349(2.1) ‘‘Reasonable suspicion’’ to detain a per- The reasonableness of an officer’s suspi- son represents a minimum level of objective cion that an individual is committing, has justification which is considerably less than committed, or is about to commit a crime or proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of traffic infraction, for Fourth Amendment the evidence. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; Kan. purposes, depends on the totality of circum- Const. Bill of Rts. § 15. stances in the view of a trained law enforce- See publication Words and Phrases for ment officer. U.S. Const. Amend. 4. other judicial constructions and defini- tions. 6. Arrest O60.3(1) O ‘‘Reasonable suspicion,’’ justifying an au- 12. Criminal Law 392.49(2) tomobile stop under the Fourth Amendment, On a motion to suppress evidence by means a particularized and objective basis reason of an unlawful vehicle stop, the bur- for suspecting the person stopped is involved den is on the state to demonstrate the lawful- in criminal activity; something more than an ness of the stop. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; Kan. unparticularized suspicion or hunch must be Const. Bill of Rts. § 15; Kan. Stat. Ann. articulated. U.S. Const. Amend. 4. § 22-3216(2). See publication Words and Phrases for O other judicial constructions and defini- 13. Automobiles 349(4) tions. A law enforcement officer has reason- 7. Arrest O60.3(1) able suspicion to initiate a stop of a vehicle to investigate whether the driver has a valid Reasonable suspicion for a vehicle stop driver’s license if, when viewed in conjunction can arise from information that is less reli- with all of the other information available to able than that required to show probable the officer at the time of the stop, the officer cause. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; Kan. Const. knows the registered owner of the vehicle Bill of Rts. § 15. has a suspended license and the officer is 8. Arrest O60.2(10), 63.4(2) unaware of any other evidence or circum- Both reasonable suspicion and probable stances from which an inference could be cause to detain a person are dependent upon drawn that the registered owner is not the the content of information possessed by the driver of the vehicle. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; detaining authority and the information’s de- Kan. Const. Bill of Rts. § 15; Kan. Stat. Ann. gree of reliability. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; § 22-2402(1). Kan. Const. Bill of Rts. § 15. 14. Automobiles O349(4) 9. Arrest O60.2(10) Police officer had reasonable suspicion Quantity and quality of information pos- to stop defendant’s vehicle, where officer sessed by a detaining authority are consid- observed vehicle being driven on public ered in the totality of the circumstances, i.e., roadway, officer determined vehicle to be 184 Kan. 400 PACIFIC REPORTER, 3d SERIES registered to defendant, who had suspended cle to investigate whether Glover had a valid driver’s license, and there were no facts or driver’s license: the evidence established that circumstances suggesting that owner was the officer knew the registered owner of not driver. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; Kan. Glover’s vehicle had a suspended driver’s Const. Bill of Rts. § 15; Kan. Stat. Ann. license and there was no evidence from which § 22-2402(1). the officer could have inferred that anyone but the registered owner was the driver of Syllabus by the Court the vehicle. A law enforcement officer has reasonable suspicion to initiate a stop of a vehicle to FACTS investigate whether the driver has a valid The parties stipulated to the facts of this driver’s license if, when viewed in conjunction case. On April 28, 2016, Douglas County Dep- with all of the other information available to uty Mark Mehrer was on routine patrol when the officer at the time of the stop, the officer he observed a 1995 Chevrolet 1500 pickup knows the registered owner of the vehicle truck. Mehrer ran the truck’s license plate has a suspended license and the officer is number through the Kansas Department of unaware of any other evidence or circum- Revenue’s file service, which confirmed that stances from which an inference could be the plate was registered to the truck and drawn that the registered owner is not the indicated that the truck was registered to driver of the vehicle. Glover. The report also stated that Glover had a revoked Kansas driver’s license. Al- though Mehrer did not observe the driver of Appeal from Douglas District Court; PAU- the truck commit any traffic infractions, LA B. MARTIN, judge. Mehrer initiated a traffic stop based solely John Grobmyer, legal intern, Andrew on the information that the driver’s license of Bauch and Kate Duncan Butler, assistant the truck’s registered owner was revoked. district attorneys, Charles E. Branson, dis- Mehrer identified Glover as the driver of the trict attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney truck. Glover was charged with driving with- general, for appellant. out a license as a habitual violator under K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 8-287, which is a class A Elbridge Griffy IV, of Lawrence, for appel- nonperson misdemeanor. lee. Glover filed a motion to suppress the evi- Before Standridge, P.J., McAnany, J., and dence obtained as a result of the traffic stop, Hebert, S.J. arguing that Deputy Mehrer initiated the stop without the necessary reasonable suspi- Standridge, J.: cion to believe a crime had been, was being, The State takes this interlocutory appeal or was going to be committed. Specifically, challenging the suppression of evidence ob- Glover argued the existence of evidence to tained after a law enforcement stop of show that the registered owner of a vehicle Charles Glover’s vehicle. The district court has a suspended driver’s license is insuffi- found that the initial stop was unlawful be- cient, without more, to support a reasonable cause it was not supported by reasonable inference that the owner of the vehicle is the suspicion. The State contends the district person driving the vehicle. The State filed a court erred in finding a lack of reasonable response in opposition to the motion to sup- suspicion because the officer obtained a re- press, arguing that Mehrer had a reasonable port that the registered owner of Glover’s suspicion that Glover was the driver of the vehicle had a suspended driver’s license and truck because it was reasonable for the offi- the officer reasonably inferred that Glover, cer to infer that the registered owner of a the owner of the vehicle, was driving. Based vehicle was also the driver of the vehicle in on the particular facts presented in this case, this case because there was no evidence from we find the law enforcement officer had rea- which a contrary inference could be made. sonable suspicion to initiate a stop of a vehi- The district court ultimately granted Glover’s STATE v. GLOVER Kan. 185 Cite as 400 P.3d 182 (Kan.App. 2017) motion to suppress, holding that the officer traffic infraction.’’ State v. Jones, 300 Kan. did not have reasonable suspicion to initiate 630, 637, 333 P.3d 886 (2014); see K.S.A. 22- the stop. The court reasoned: 2402(1) (codifying requirement that law en- ‘‘I mean, just as a personal observation, forcement officer may stop any person in a I have three cars registered in my name. public place whom the officer reasonably sus- My husband drives one every day; my pects ‘‘is committing, has committed or is daughter’s in [Washington, D.C.] with one about to commit a crime’’). The inquiry into every day, and I drive the other. And I the reasonableness of searches and seizures think that’s true for a lot of families that if balances the State’s interests against an indi- there are multiple family members and vidual’s right to be secure from unwarranted multiple vehicles, that somebody other governmental intrusion. Terry, 392 U.S. at than the registered owner often is driving 20–21, 88 S.Ct. 1868. The reasonableness of that vehicle.’’ an officer’s suspicion depends on the totality of circumstances in the view of a trained law The State timely filed an interlocutory ap- enforcement officer. State v. Martinez, 296 peal seeking review of the district court’s Kan. 482, 487, 293 P.3d 718 (2013). decision on the motion to suppress. ‘‘Reasonable suspicion means a particularized and objective basis for suspecting STANDARD OF REVIEW the person stopped is involved in criminal On appeal of a district court’s ruling on a activity. Something more than an unpartic- motion to suppress, the ultimate determina- ularized suspicion or hunch must be articu- tion of suppression is a question of law over lated. Reasonable suspicion can arise from which this court has unlimited review where, information that is less reliable than that as here, the parties have stipulated to the required to show probable cause. Both rea- material facts. See State v. Ramirez, 278 sonable suspicion and probable cause are Kan. 402, 404, 100 P.3d 94 (2004). ‘‘Whether dependent upon the content of information reasonable suspicion exists is a question of possessed by the detaining authority and law and is reviewed de novo.’’ State v. Cole- the information’s degree of reliability. man, 292 Kan. 813, Syl. ¶ 4, 257 P.3d 320 Quantity and quality are considered in the (2011). totality of the circumstances—the whole picture that must be taken into account REASONABLE SUSPICION when evaluating whether there is reason- [1, 2] The Fourth Amendment to the able suspicion.’’ State v. Toothman, 267 United States Constitution and Section 15 of Kan. 412, Syl. ¶ 5, 985 P.2d 701 (1999). the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights pro- [10–12] The appellate court is ‘‘called hibit unreasonable government searches and upon to employ common sense and ordinary seizures. A seizure occurs when an officer human experience’’ in evaluating whether the has restrained the liberty of a person by circumstances justify the detention. Jones, means of physical force or show of authority. 300 Kan. at 647, 333 P.3d 886. ‘‘ ‘[R]easonable State v. Greever, 286 Kan. 124, 135, 183 P.3d suspicion represents a ‘‘minimum level of ob- 788 (2008) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, jective justification’’ which is ‘‘considerably 19 n.16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 [1968]). less than proof of wrongdoing by a prepon- A law enforcement officer who stops a vehi- derance of the evidence.’’ ’ ’’ City of Atwood cle on a public roadway has effected a sei- v. Pianalto, 301 Kan. 1008, 1011, 350 P.3d zure. State v. Marx, 289 Kan. 657, 661, 215 1048 (2015). The burden is on the State to P.3d 601 (2009). demonstrate the lawfulness of the stop. See [3–9] To comply with the Fourth Amend- K.S.A. 22-3216(2). ment, a law enforcement officer conducting a vehicle stop must ‘‘know of specific and artic- ANALYSIS ulable facts that create a reasonable suspi- The question presented on appeal is cion the seized individual is committing, has whether Deputy Mehrer had reasonable sus- committed, or is about to commit a crime or picion to initiate a stop of Glover’s vehicle to 186 Kan. 400 PACIFIC REPORTER, 3d SERIES investigate whether the driver had a valid tered owner of a vehicle is the driver of the driver’s license based solely on the fact that owned vehicle, absent evidence to the con- Mehrer knew that Glover, the registered trary. One presumes that it is common for owner of the observed vehicle, had a sus- a reasonably cautious citizen to honk or pended license. wave at a moving vehicle that is owned by In support of its argument that Mehrer a friend without first having identified the had reasonable suspicion, the State relies on vehicle’s occupants, and in doing so, ration- State v. Hamic, 35 Kan.App.2d 202, 129 P.3d ally expect that the friend will receive the 114 (2006), for guidance. In Hamic, an officer greeting. Further, the caveat, that the observed a green Jeep Cherokee, which he owner-is-the-driver inference may lose its believed was owned by Jena Hamic–Deutsch. rationality where the officer possesses con- The officer had personal knowledge of two trary information, is simply another way of previous instances in which Hamic–Deutsch saying that we must look at the whole operated the Jeep with a suspended license picture.’’ 35 Kan.App.2d at 209, 129 P.3d and without proof that the vehicle was cov- 114. ered with liability insurance: once approxi- The court specifically noted that any infer- mately 2 months before the stop, and once ence drawn from the fact that the registered approximately 1 month later. The officer also owner of a vehicle is the driver of the owned knew that a warrant had been issued for vehicle ‘‘must be viewed in conjunction with Hamic–Deutsch’s arrest for a probation vio- all of the other information available to the lation and that Hamic–Deutsch was a regis- officer’’ and that ‘‘it will not always be deter- tered coowner of the Jeep. The officer did minative.’’ 35 Kan.App.2d at 210, 129 P.3d not observe a traffic violation and did not 114. As such, the court used the officer’s visually confirm that Hamic–Deutsch was op- inference as one point in its analysis of the erating or occupying the Jeep. Upon stop- totality of the circumstances to determine ping the vehicle, the officer learned that the that the officer had reasonable suspicion to driver was Hamic–Deutsch’s mother and that initiate a vehicle stop. So while the court in Hamic–Deutsch was an occupant. After in- Hamic ultimately concluded under the facts vestigation, the officer arrested both women presented that officers may reasonably infer on several charges. The defendants moved to the registered owner of a vehicle is the driv- suppress the evidence obtained as a result of er, it did not create a bright-line rule for the the traffic stop. question presented here: whether a law en- The Hamic court analyzed the totality of forcement officer’s knowledge that the vehi- the information known to the officer at the cle owner’s license is revoked alone provides time of the vehicle stop and ultimately deter- reasonable suspicion to initiate a vehicle stop. mined that it supported a reasonable infer- Although Kansas courts have not yet con- ence that Hamic–Deutsch was either the fronted this narrow issue, courts in other driver or occupant of the vehicle. 35 Kan. jurisdictions have provided helpful guidance. App.2d at 210, 129 P.3d 114 (‘‘The officer State supreme courts that have considered personally knew that Hamic–Deutsch had this issue have consistently held that an offi- been driving the Jeep on two separate occa- cer has reasonable suspicion to initiate a sions within the past 2 months, supporting a vehicle stop when (1) the officer knows that reasonable presumption that Hamic–Deutsch the registered owner of a vehicle has a sus- was the Jeep’s principal operator.’’). On the pended license and (2) the officer is unaware issue of whether a law enforcement officer is of any evidence or circumstances which indi- justified in suspecting that the registered cate that the owner is not the driver of the owner of a vehicle is the driver of that vehi- vehicle. See Armfield v. State, 918 N.E.2d cle, the court stated as follows: 316, 321–22 (Ind. 2009) (‘‘[A]n officer has ‘‘Perhaps it is more a matter of common reasonable suspicion to initiate a Terry stop experience than a profound legal maxim to when [1] the officer knows that the regis- declare that a law enforcement officer is tered owner of a vehicle has a suspended reasonable in suspecting that the regis- license and [2] the officer is unaware of any STATE v. GLOVER Kan. 187 Cite as 400 P.3d 182 (Kan.App. 2017) evidence or circumstances which indicate would be impractical in some cases, such as that the owner is not the driver of the vehi- in heavy traffic, at night, or where the vehicle.’’); State v. Vance, 790 N.W.2d 775, 781 cle has dark-tinted windows. See Vance, 790 (Iowa 2010) (‘‘[A]n officer has reasonable sus- N.W.2d at 782; Armfield, 918 N.E.2d at 322. picion to initiate an investigatory stop of a The Vance court concluded that ‘‘to forbid vehicle to investigate whether the driver has the police from relying on [an inference that a valid driver’s license when the officer the owner of the vehicle is the driver] to form knows the registered owner of the vehicle reasonable suspicion for an investigatory has a suspended license, and the officer is stop would seriously limit an officer’s ability unaware of any evidence or circumstances to investigate suspension violations because indicating the registered owner is not the there are few, if any, additional steps the driver of the vehicle.’’); State v. Tozier, 905 officer can utilize to establish the driver of a A.2d 836, 839 (Maine 2006) (‘‘[I]t is reason- vehicle is its registered owner.’’ 790 N.W.2d able for an officer to suspect that the owner at 782. is driving the vehicle, absent other circum- In response to the public policy concerns stances that demonstrate the owner is not set forth by other state courts as noted driving.’’); State v. Pike, 551 N.W.2d 919, 922 (Minn. 1996) (‘‘[T]he knowledge that the own- above, Glover contends in his brief that Dep- er of a vehicle has a revoked license is uty Mehrer could have investigated the iden- enough to form the basis of a ‘reasonable tity of the vehicle’s driver further before suspicion of criminal activity’ when an officer initiating a vehicle stop: Mehrer ‘‘could have observes the vehicle being driven.’’); State v. obtained a description of the owner of the Neil, 350 Mont. 268, 271, 207 P.3d 296 (2009) vehicle and compared the description with (‘‘ ‘[A]n officer may rationally infer the driver the driver,’’ or he ‘‘could have found out of a vehicle is the vehicle’s registered owner whether the owner of the vehicle had prior unless the officer is aware of any facts that convictions for driving while suspended[,] would render that inference unreason- which would have offered additional justifica- able.’ ’’); State v. Richter, 145 N.H. 640, 641– tion for the stop.’’ Like the Vermont Su- 42, 765 A.2d 687 (2000) (‘‘It was reasonable preme Court held in response to a similar for the officer to infer that the driver was the contention, we find requiring the officer to owner of the vehicle. TTT Such an inference gather the additional evidence set forth by gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that the Glover to confirm driver identification prior driver was committing a violation of [the to a vehicle stop essentially raises the eviden- law].’’); State v. Edmonds, 192 Vt. 400, 404, tiary standard from one of reasonable suspi- 58 A.3d 961 (2012) (‘‘[R]easonable suspicion cion to the more demanding standard of lay in the troopers’ knowledge that the owner probable cause. See Edmonds, 192 Vt. at 404, of [the] car was under license suspension, 58 A.3d 961. Our courts have held that rea- and the reasonable inference that the driver sonable suspicion requires only a ‘‘ ‘minimum of a car could be its owner.’’). level of objective justification’ ’’ that is ‘‘ ‘considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a Some state courts that have adopted the preponderance of the evidence.’ ’’ Pianalto, rule have relied on policy reasons to support 301 Kan. at 1011, 350 P.3d 1048. their conclusion that the inference is reasonable. For example, the Indiana Supreme Raising his own public policy concerns, Court reasoned that requiring law enforce- Glover contends that allowing law enforcement to verify the driver of the car matches ment to stop any vehicle when the officer has a physical description of the owner would knowledge that the owner’s license is sus- strike ‘‘ ‘against basic principles of safety [be- pended would give the State an unwarranted cause it] puts the onus on the officer to right to stop persons who are not breaking maneuver himself [or herself] into a position the law, such as co-owners of the vehicle or to clearly observe the driver in the midst of persons who are driving the owner’s vehicle traffic.’ ’’ Armfield, 918 N.E.2d at 322. Simi- to assist the owner with transportation. Glo- larly, courts have found requiring the police ver also contends that driving with a sus- to verify the driver’s identity as the owner pended license does not harm the safety of 188 Kan. 400 PACIFIC REPORTER, 3d SERIES the public, so ‘‘[t]he need to stop motorists with a suspended license. The Fourth who might be driving on a suspended license Amendment does not countenance such an is not so urgent as to grant the [S]tate’s intrusive violation of privacy.’’). While the request for a bright line rule.’’ And Glover cases cited by Glover demonstrate that inter- argues that such a rule is susceptible to mediate courts of appeal of other states have being applied in a racially disparate manner, held officers must rely on additional investi- citing an ACLU of Illinois report detailing gation to confirm a vehicle owner’s identity data that the Chicago Police Department uti- prior to conducting a vehicle stop, we do not lized stop and frisk disproportionately in the find those cases persuasive. black communities of Chicago. But Glover’s concerns that police may initiate seizures of [13, 14] In sum, we agree with the con- persons other than the vehicle’s owner sensus of state supreme courts that have should be alleviated by the fact that the considered this issue and hold that a law reasonable suspicion inquiry considers the enforcement officer has reasonable suspicion totality of the circumstances. Martinez, 296 to initiate a stop of a vehicle to investigate Kan. at 487, 293 P.3d 718. If an officer is whether the driver has a valid driver’s li- aware of any information suggesting that the cense if, when viewed in conjunction with all inference is not valid in a particular case, for of the other information available to the offi- example that the vehicle’s driver appears to cer at the time of the stop, the officer knows be much older, much younger, or of a differ- the registered owner of the vehicle has a ent gender or race than the vehicle’s regis- suspended license and the officer is unaware tered owner, reasonable suspicion would dis- of any other evidence or circumstances from sipate. which an inference could be drawn that the Finally, Glover cites several out-of-state registered owner is not the driver of the intermediate appellate court decisions that vehicle. Here, the undisputed evidence estab- support the requirement that police officers lishes that Deputy Mehrer observed the pick- conduct additional investigations to confirm a up being driven on a public roadway. He vehicle owner’s identity prior to conducting a determined the pickup to be registered to vehicle stop. See, e.g., State v. Cerino, 141 Glover, who had a suspended driver’s license. Idaho 736, 738, 117 P.3d 876 (2005) (‘‘Officers There were no facts or circumstances sug- could run owner registration and driver’s gesting that the owner was not the driver. license checks for any vehicle they see in Considering the totality of the information operation, seeking an owner without [a] li- available to the officer at the time of the cense and a driver of the same gender, and stop, we find it was reasonable for Mehrer to would be authorized to stop any vehicle infer that the driver was the owner of the meeting these criteria. In our judgment, the vehicle; in other words, there were specific Fourth Amendment safeguard requires more and articulable facts from which the officer’s particularized suspicion to justify the ‘consti- common-sense inference gave rise to a rea- tutionally cognizable intrusion’ of stopping a sonable suspicion that the driver was com- motorist.’’); State v. Parks, 288 N.J. Super. mitting a violation of K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 8- 407, 412, 672 A.2d 742 (1996) (‘‘When there is 287. Therefore, Mehrer properly initiated a additional evidence of defendant’s identity as traffic stop to investigate whether Glover was the driver of his vehicle at a particular time, driving his vehicle in violation of the law. it may be inferred that the owner was the The district court’s decision to grant Glo- driver.’’); Worley v. Commonwealth, No. ver’s motion to suppress the evidence is re- 1913-94-2, 1996 WL 31949, at *1 (Va. Ct. versed, and the matter is remanded for fur- App. 1996) (unpublished opinion) (‘‘Nonethe- ther proceedings. less, to hold that a police officer has a reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop where the officer has determined only that the vehicle’s owner has a suspended opera- , tor’s license would justify the indiscriminate stop of every vehicle owned by an individual