Jemaah Islamiyah and Indonesian Terrorism: a Renewed Struggle?

Jemaah Islamiyah and Indonesian Terrorism: A renewed struggle?

Noor Huda Ismail, Carl Ungerer

Jemaah Islamiyah and Indonesianbased on several recent interviews conducted Terrorism: A renewed struggle? with former JI members in Indonesia, highlights some of the shifting patterns of leadership Noor Huda Ismail and Carl Ungerer behaviour and patronage among sections of the organisation. The recent arrest near Johor Bahru, Malaysia of Mas Selamat Kastari, a fugitive Singaporean We argue that two recent developments—the member of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) group is current leadership tensions and the release an important achievement in the effort to from prison of former JI members—at least stamp out Southeast Asian terrorism. Other raise the possibility that splinter factions might actions by the Indonesian police over the past now seek to re-energise the movement through 18 months, including the arrest of JI members violent attacks. Although that possibility in Palembang and Central Java, have dealt a remains low, and further work is needed to further blow to the organisation. understand the thinking and motivations of JI members as they transition out of the prison Kastari’s earlier escape from a Singaporean system, there is evidence that some of these detention facility in February 2008 and his individuals are gravitating towards hardline ability to evade the police and security services groups who continue to advocate al-Qaeda-style of both Singapore and Malaysia for over 12 attacks against Western targets. months was less encouraging. It suggests that JI’s informal networks and support groups in Tensions in the leadership the region remain active, and that many of them are probably unknown to the authorities. Several senior JI leaders remain at large, including the leader of JI’s most violent group, But, despite several attempts, JI has failed to Noordin Top; JI’s military commander, replicate the mass casualty attacks of the years Zulkarnaen; an electronics and bomb-making between 2002 and 2005. And, in the absence of specialist, Dulmatin; and recruitment expert a renewed bombing campaign, questions have Umar Patek, who has sought sanctuary among been raised concerning the nature of the the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines. continuing threat from JI as an organisation. The prevailing view among leading analysts is Pressured by police and security operations that the overall threat from JI is receding and since the first Bali bombings, however, JI is no that another campaign of expensive, large-scale longer a cohesive organisation with a clear, bombings is unlikely.1 unified leadership structure. In fact, further divisions have arisen among group members, Four years after the second Bali bombings, and including the emergence last year of JI spiritual 12 months since ASPI last wrote on this leader Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s new group Jama’ah subject, an update on JI’s current status and Anshorut Tauhid (JAT). There is also a capabilities is warranted.2 This short paper, mainstream faction led by Abu Rusdan—the

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‘traditionalists’—who constantly oppose further These hardline groups continue to believe that bombings and encourage members not to the use of violence against the ‘enemies of participate in any attacks. Islam’ is justified under any circumstances. Far from satisfied with the Bali bombings and other For the faction led by Rusdan, the use of attacks now several years in the past, they violence is only justified as a way to defend dismissively refer to many senior JI members as Muslims in conflict areas. ‘The time isn’t yet ‘NATO’—No Action, Talk Only. In line with JI’s ripe to wage jihad in Indonesia,’ he says. In a original manifesto, Pedoman Umum Perjuangan recent interview, Rusdan argued that acts of Al‑Jama’ah Al-Islamiyah (PUPJI—or the General indiscriminate violence like the first Bali guide for the struggle of JI), these individuals bombings have damaged the image of the remain convinced that an armed struggle (jihad organisation and done a disservice to Islam. musallah) is the primary means to achieve the Moreover, he contends, the Bali attacks have ultimate goal of an Islamic caliphate. hurt the group by bringing its activities and operations under the now-constant scrutiny of The continued leadership split in the JI the police and security authorities. organisation and the release from prison of unreformed members of the group such as These leadership divisions have become deeper Sunarto bin Kartodiharjo (alias Adung) raises in recent times. One JI member convicted of the possibility that splinter factions might now involvement in terrorist activities argues that seek to re-energise the movement through there have been efforts by an influential violent attacks. The hardline group is fully member of the mainstream group to isolate supported by a group of young, dedicated convicted JI members because some of them individuals who share a deep commitment to are seen as ‘tainted’. ‘We testified in court and the cause, advocating al-Qaeda-style attacks this was seen as revealing secrets of the that directly target Westerners and Western organisation. Moreover, we are told that we are interests if the time is ‘ripe’ for them. being monitored by authorities,’ he said. Members of this faction are a fringe minority There are, in fact, more than a hundred JI even within a radical movement like JI. But members who have been released from jail while some of them believe that the sustenance because they have finished their prisonof JI as a whole requires an array of logistical sentences or have undertaken some form of operators, ideologues, trainers, recruiters and rehabilitation. Some of them had significant the like, simply carrying out an isolated attack roles in the organisation, including Abu Tholut, can be done by a handful of individuals. Three a former regional commander and a military suicide bombers from this faction were able to trainer in the Hudaibiyah Camp in Mindanao, cause significant carnage in the second Bali southern Philippines. He had been arrested for bombings in 2005. weapons possession. There is an ongoing discussion inside the group The exclusion of individuals like Abu Tholut that the splintering has divided JI members into from the central JI command structure is hardly three categories: black (those who are likely to prompt him to give up his jihadist cooperative with the police), grey (their aims. If shunned by Rusdan’s faction, he and position is unclear) and white (those who resist others now leaving jail would be more likely to the police). But cooperation with the police join the violent factions of JI, like Noordin Top’s should not be confused with a broader rejection group or other splinter groups that continue to of JI’s violent goals. Some younger JI recruits evade the Indonesian security services. are happy to declare that they have dual

2 7 | 29 | 2 APJ | JF membership in both the open organisation of mail, and password-protected websites and Rusdan’s traditionalists and the clandestine web forums. pro-bombing factions. The counter-terrorism response Shifts in radicalisation To stay ahead of splinter factions and the more Identifying and countering these fringe groups activist, al-Qaeda-inspired element within JI, poses significant challenges for intelligence the authorities will have to pay close attention and law enforcement agencies. The profile of to events and developments that could prompt the would‑be radical as young, male,these groups into action. The execution of the religiously-devout, alienated, angry,three main perpetrators of the first Bali disenfranchised, and living on the edges of bombing could be one such event. The death by society is outdated and not reflective of the firing squad of Imam Samudra, Mukhlas and broader JI membership. Amrozi will clearly not stop the spread of their ideology. The group will perceive the execution JI and its affiliate groups continue to engage as a sacred date to be leveraged in order to pragmatically with what would otherwise be attract new support and recruits. referred to as ‘homegrown’ terrorists from different socio‑economic backgrounds and Aside from identifying and neutralising violent professions, and with vastly different technical groups, building on the successes of the and operational capabilities. Rather than current counterterrorism effort will require conforming to a specific terrorist profile, that the Indonesian Government also finds a complex radicalisation processes shape these way to address the problems of unemployment, individuals into terrorist operatives.3 poverty and corruption that continue to contribute to the spread of, and support for, the The complexity and increasingly decentralised ideology of violence. structure of the militant movement is also evident in the wide-ranging efforts to find As a recent counter-radicalisation conference moral justifications for violent acts. Rather than in Singapore noted, working with moderate simply seeking permission for the act through a Muslims from mainstream organisations such fatwa, or religious opinion issued by a senior as Muhammadiyah or Nadhlatul Ulama to cleric in Indonesia, the activist, pro-al-Qaeda counter radical ideology is considered an faction of JI have turned to the internet to find important element in the fight against religious justifications for their actions. Some extremism. But ultimately it may not have admit to ‘shopping’ on‑line for religious edicts much impact for two straightforward reasons. that would support violent jihad. First, the majority of the members of the fringe groups do not listen to them, and second, For recruitment purposes, these fringe groups mainstream organisations do not fully still employ traditional methods such asunderstand the nature and dynamics of the schools, kinship networks, friendships and emerging fringe groups. small Islamic discussion groups. These latter groups, consisting of six to ten people, meet Perhaps the best way to counter radical regularly for social and religious activities, ideology is by empowering militant leaders which inhibits authorities from preventing whom the fringe group continues to trust, such possible violent outcomes. And the fringe as Afghanistan or Philippines veterans, and groups continue to embrace new technologies who are now lying low. This is a challenging such as DVDs, coded SMS messages, secure e- strategy both because identifying the

3 7 | 29 | 2 APJ | JF individuals ready to take such a step will be He continues to preach difficult and because the political backlash extreme hatred from enlisting former radicals into the toward the US and its government’s counterterrorism effort could be allies in each strong. Nonetheless, it may represent the most of his sermons. effective means of actually reaching out to With the help of his son, those individuals who may very well be Iim Ba’asyir, planning the next major terrorist attack. his speeches are now available on YouTube. Ba’asyir established a new organisation Conclusion Recently, Iim called Jama’ah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT) in established a 2008. radio service Its members at present count to 3,000 called RDS, The JI organisation has continued to evolve people spread over Java, Sumatra, Radio Kalimantan, Sulawesi and West Nusa Dakwah since the first Bali bombings catapulted the Tenggara. In Solo there are more than 400 Syariah. The members. Every Sunday morning, the group to international prominence in 2002. As Abu Bakar radio service Anshoru Tauhid congregation hold an Ba’asyir is funded by several studies have shown, the main JI faction honouring and prayer meeting in the a mosque of Salamah in the Tipes area of businessman, has in recent years limited its direct support for Solo. Those attending the meeting include Haji ustadz Muzayyin, ustadz Abu Bakar violent activities and has also suffered from a Suparno. Ba’asyir, ustadz Abdul Madjid. Suparno was Some members of this group adopt JAT as loss of supporters following years of arrests a supporter their public face but privately, they have of Abdullah and internal discord. their own agendas. Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir However, the emergence of hardened, during their experienced militants from the conflict in the exile in Malaysia in southern Philippines and the recent release of the 1980s. He is a JI cadres from prisons in Indonesia, who have former military become ostracised by the mainstream JI group, officer who are breeding a new generation of radicalised was involved in the fringe groups. Together with regional countries ‘Komando Jihad’ such as Australia, the Indonesian Government, movement. religious and community leaders will need to take effective action in order to stem the emergence of these radical movements.

Table: Jemaah Islamiyah’s factional leadership

Name of the leader of Type of activity Remarks the faction He lives a very simple He continues his dakwah (preaching) life in Kudus, activities in small group discussions, Central Java. mosques, and Islamic book launchings. Most of the There is no evidence to suggest that his Afghan Abu Rusdan faction conducts any military training. veterans Members of this faction such as Qital and respect and Fahim, want to reform JI by following the consider him PUPJI guidelines. as the suitable leader for JI.

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Ustadz Aman Abdurrahman is a young 2 This paper seeks to update judgements that ustadz, admired by some circles of youngsters in Bandung, Bogor, Jakarta and were made in ASPI’s June 2008 Strategy Paper, some areas in West Java, and founded a specific congregation named the Jamaah Neighbourhood watch: The evolving terrorist Tauhid wal Jihad. This study group make threat in Southeast Asia, by Peter Chalk and use of material translated by ustadz Aman Abdurrahman from the text of Abu Carl Ungerer. Muhammad Al Maqdisi, Abu Basher, Syaikh Abdul Kadir bin Abdul Aziz and some tauhid He is not a JI thinkers and other contemporary jihadis member but from Saudi Arabia. As an idolised figure, the 3 For an analysis of radicalisation processes many role of Aman Abdurrahman is very members of among JI members, see Kumar Ramakrishna, important, i.e. activator of the dakwah JI, especially ideology of tauhid and jihad which were the younger Radical Pathways: Understanding Muslim flourishing recently. At the Jamaah Tauhid Aman recruits, wa Jihad, Aman Abdurrahman once played a radicalisation in Indonesia, Westport: Praeger Abdurrahman admire him role as chairman of the Syuro Board, by and invite Security International, 2009. giving advice and fatwas to this him to give congregation in carrying out organisation talks and activities. Because of that respected sermons at position, there is also a site specifically their dedicated to accommodate his translations gatherings. in: www.anshortauhidwassunnah.blogspot.com, the site of progressive dakwah jihad in Indonesia. Aman Abdurrahman had also Noor Huda Ismail has a Masters degree in been crowned as Imam at the JamaahTauhid wa Sunnah, which is centred in Bandung. As International Security from St Andrews a leader, Aman Abdurrahman has the task University, Scotland. He is the Executive to carry on the regular study program with analysis of the tauhid books and spreading Director of the International Institute for the dakwah jihad to other areas. Noordin’s group, sometimes referred to as Peacebuilding in Jakarta, Indonesia. al-Qaeda for the Malay archipelago, is the Noordin Top most dangerous of the JI factions. He continues to inspire a minority of young JI Carl Ungerer is the Director of the National recruits to join his group. Security Project at ASPI.

This policy analysis was published by The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Endnotes www.aspi.org.au on July 16, 2009.

1 For comprehensive assessments of JI see: Recommended Citation: Noor Huda Ismail and Greg Barton, Indonesia’s Struggle: Jemaah Carl Ungerer, "Jemaah Islamiyah and Islamiyah and radical Islamism, Sydney: UNSW Indonesian Terrorism: A renewed struggle?" Press, 2004; Aldo Borgu and Greg Fealy, Local The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 29-2-09, July 20, Jihad: Radical Islam and terrorism in Indonesia, 2009. ASPI Strategy Paper, September 2005; International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Jemaah See also Noor Huda Ismail,Al Queda's Islamiyah’s Current Status, Asia Briefing No. Southeast Asia, Jamaah Islamiyah and Regional 63, 2 May 2007. Terrorism: Kinship and family links