Document of The World Bank

Report No: ICR00001164

Public Disclosure Authorized IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-H0270, TF-53633, and TF-55364)

ON AN

IDA GRANT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 24 MILLION (US$ 33 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

AND A

Public Disclosure Authorized MDRP GRANT

IN THE AMOUNT OF US$ 48.4 MILLION

AND

A EUROPEAN COMMISSION GRANT

IN THE AMOUNT OF EUR 13.4 MILLION (US$ 16.6 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE Public Disclosure Authorized REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA

FOR AN

EMERGENCY DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION PROJECT

June 25, 2009

Sustainable Development Department

Public Disclosure Authorized Fragile States, Conflict an Social Development Unit Africa Region

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective 06/01/2009)

Currency Unit = Angolan New Kwanza (AON) 1.00 AON = US$ 75.16 US$ 1.00 = 0.013 AON

FISCAL YEAR July 1 – June 30

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADRP Angola Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Program D&R Demobilization and Reintegration DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration EC European Commission FAA Armed Forces of Angola FAO Food and Agriculture Organization FMPU Financial Management and Procurement Unit FMU UNITA military forces FNLA National Front for the Liberation of Angola GoA Government of Angola ICR Implementation Completion and Results Report IDA International Development Association IP Implementing Partner IRSEM Institute for the Socio-Professional Reintegration of Ex-Combatants LEAP Learning for Equality, Access and Peace M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MDRP Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program MIS Management Information System MPLA Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola MTR Mid Term Review NGO Non Governmental Organization PAD Project Appraisal Document PDO Project Development Objective PGRR Government Reinforcement of Reintegration Program PIM Project Implementation Manual UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNITA National Union for the Total Independence of Angola URMA Registration, Monitoring and Evaluation Unit UTGV Unit to Support the Reintegration of the Vulnerable Groups VG Vulnerable Groups

Vice President: Obiagely Ezekwesili Acting Country Director: Peter Nicholas Sector Manager: Ian Bannon Project Team Leader: Marcelo Fabre ICR Team Leader: Maria Correia

ANGOLA Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project

CONTENTS

Data Sheet A. Basic Information B. Key Dates C. Ratings Summary D. Sector and Theme Codes E. Bank Staff F. Results Framework Analysis G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs H. Restructuring I. Disbursement Graph

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ...... 1 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes ...... 5 3. Assessment of Outcomes ...... 10 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ...... 18 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ...... 19 6. Lessons Learned ...... 21 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners ...... 22 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing ...... 25 Annex 2. Outputs by Component ...... 26 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ...... 333 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ...... 34 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ...... 35 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results ...... 44 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ...... 45 Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ...... 477 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents ...... 488 Annex 10. Memo to RVP regarding clarification of PDO……………………………49 MAP

A. Basic Information Emergency Country: Angola Project Name: Demobilization and Reintegration Project IDA-H0270,TF- Project ID: P078288 L/C/TF Number(s): 53633,TF-55364 ICR Date: 06/29/2009 ICR Type: Core ICR GOVERNMENT OF Lending Instrument: ERL Borrower: ANGOLA Original Total USD 33.0M Disbursed Amount: USD 32.2M Commitment: Revised Amount: USD 0.0M Environmental Category: B Implementing Agencies: IRSEM Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:

B. Key Dates Revised / Actual Process Date Process Original Date Date(s) Concept Review: 08/01/2002 Effectiveness: 03/02/2004 Appraisal: 10/17/2002 Restructuring(s): Approval: 03/27/2003 Mid-term Review: 10/15/2005 10/22/2005 Closing: 12/31/2006 12/31/2008

C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: Low or Negligible Bank Performance: Satisfactory Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Quality at Entry: Satisfactory Government: Satisfactory Implementing Quality of Supervision: Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory Agency/Agencies: Overall Bank Overall Borrower Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory Performance: Performance:

i C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation QAG Assessments Indicators Rating Performance (if any) Potential Problem Project Quality at Entry Yes Satisfactory at any time (Yes/No): (QEA): Problem Project at any Quality of No Satisfactory time (Yes/No): Supervision (QSA): DO rating before Moderately

Closing/Inactive status: Satisfactory

D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Other social services 100 100

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction 28 30 HIV/AIDS 14 10 Improving labor markets 29 30 Social safety nets 29 30

E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Callisto E. Madavo Country Director: Peter Nicholas Darius Mans Sector Manager: Ian Bannon Darius Mans Project Team Leader: Marcelo Jorge Fabre Johannes C.M. Zutt ICR Team Leader: Maria C. Correia ICR Primary Author: Chantal Rigaud

F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The ADRP aimed to assist the Government of Angola in creating long term sustainable social development and supporting macroeconomic stability in its territory through: (i) the demobilization of approximately 138,000 ex-combatants; (ii) the provision of support for the social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants; (iii) the provision of assistance to special target groups; and (iv) institutional development and program implementation support. (see para. 1.2 of ICR for explanation on PDO based on DGA rather thatn Technical Annex)

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Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)

(a) PDO Indicator(s)

Original Target Formally Actual Value Values (from Revised Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value approval Target Completion or documents) Values Target Years -- nos. demobilized Indicator 1 :

Value up to 105,000 quantitative or 0 demobilized 97390 Qualitative) Date achieved 05/31/2003 04/23/2008 12/31/2008 Comments (incl. % % achievement: 92.5% achievement) Indicator 2 : -- nos. reintegrated 50% of total demobilized Value involved in some 58.6% employed quantitative or 0 form of economic (from independent Qualitative) activity 3 months survey) after receiving assistance Date achieved 05/31/2003 12/31/2006 12/31/2008 Comments 58.6% of ex-combatants are self-employed; 36.8 % are unemployed, 4.6% are (incl. % formally employed, and 91.2% have access to agriculture land. achievement)

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Original Target Actual Value Formally Values (from Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value Revised approval Completion or Target Values documents) Target Years Indicator 1 : having received economic reintegration support up to 133,000 148;000 Value (revised target to opportunities (quantitative 0 include EC created of an or Qualitative) financing and estimated revised of removing FAA) 166,000 Date achieved 05/31/2003 04/01/2008 12/31/2008 Comments 60% of targeted beneficiaries were registered in the MIS (incl. %

iii achievement) Indicator 2 : having received subsistence agricultural support Value (quantitative 0 50,000 44,816 or Qualitative) Date achieved 05/31/2003 05/31/2003 12/31/2005 Comments (incl. % 90% beneficiaries reached achievement) contracting of reintegration opportunities through implementing partners (NGOs Indicator 3 : and UN agencies) Value up to a maximum (quantitative 0 148,225 of 133,000 or Qualitative) Date achieved 05/31/2003 04/01/2008 12/31/2008 Comments (incl. % achievement) Indicator 4 : special vulnerable groups reintegrated 10.238 up to 12,500 Value opportunities for disabled 16.000 (quantitative 0 disabled, 22.466 for child soldiers, and or Qualitative) women and 26.245 16,000 women for children Date achieved 05/31/2003 12/31/2006 12/31/2008 Comments 90.8% children registered in MIS compared to target, 63.7% of women and (incl. % 42.9% of disabled. achievement)

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

Actual Date ISR No. DO IP Disbursements Archived (USD millions) 1 06/26/2003 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 11/26/2003 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 3 05/19/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 3.01 4 11/30/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 3.01 5 04/08/2005 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 3.87 6 08/24/2005 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 7.39 7 12/20/2005 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 8.23 8 05/22/2006 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 11.28 9 08/31/2006 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 14.63 10 03/21/2007 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 19.05 11 09/14/2007 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 22.53 12 04/28/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 30.06 13 12/19/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 31.65

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H. Restructuring (if any) Not Applicable

I. Disbursement Profile

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1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design (this section is descriptive, taken from other documents, e.g., PAD/ISR, not evaluative)

1.1 Context at Appraisal (brief summary of country and sector background, rationale for Bank assistance)

1. Angola’s struggle for independence from Portugal started in 1961 and ended in 1975 with the signature of the Alvor Accords. A transitional government composed of representatives from the various factions (MPLA, FNLA and UNITA) quickly broke down under the pressure of divergent views and a long civil war ensued. Foreign powers sided with the various groups in the conflict. In 1988, a first attempt at peace (the New York Accords) resulted in the withdrawal of foreign troops from Angola. In 1991, the Bicesse Accords were signed between the MPLA and UNITA. Elections that brought to power Jose Eduardo dos Santos of the MPLA did not end the civil war. A new peace agreement – the Lusaka Accords – signed in 1994 also failed to bring calm back to the country. Instead, heavy fighting erupted again in 1999. Finally, in 2002, the warring parties signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) as an addendum to the Lusaka Accords. This MOU included an amnesty law for crimes committed during the conflict, the integration of 5,000 UNITA soldiers into the armed forces and the demobilization of the rest of UNITA combatants.

2. The economic impact of long years of civil war was profound, with widespread poverty, corruption, mismanagement of natural resources and a destabilizing effect on the region. Social indicators were very low, Angola ranking 13th from the bottom of UNDP’s Human Development Index in 2002. Overall seven percent of Angolans had died from conflict-related causes since the country’s independence, and the majority of civilians have been affected by famine and diseases.

3. The international community responded with humanitarian assistance as well as support to the government’s efforts to demobilize and reintegrate ex-combatants. In particular, the Serviço Comunitario de Referência Project (1995-98), funded by various donors through a UNDP-managed trust fund, supported demobilization and provided reinsertion assistance for close to 35,000 ex-combatants. Despite achievements, the program also experienced significant shortcomings, both internal (lack of technical and management capacity) and external (decrease in financial assistance due to the increase in government military spending). But important lessons were drawn along the way, notably the need to offer similar levels of assistance to ex-combatants from various armed groups, the value of a strong implementing agency, the centrality of good information, the importance of counseling and referral services at the pre-demobilization stage, the essential role of a management information system (MIS), and finally the need for adequate financial resources and donor coordination.

4. On the basis of these lessons, the World Bank responded positively to the government’s request to redesign and support its demobilization and reintegration (D&R) efforts and to coordinate donor support through the Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), which had just been launched in the Great Lakes Region. The regional platform provided by MDRP was meant to create synergies that would lead to greater impact than individual programs. The operation that resulted, the Angola Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Program (ADRP) was processed as

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an emergency operation in the World Bank, consistent with the country’s interim poverty reduction strategy. The emergency operation was justified by the need to quickly process 105,000 ex-combatants already in quarters across the country and awaiting D&R support. Bank support came in the way on an IDA grant of US$ 33 million, approved in March 2003 and which became effective in March 2004. The IDA grant was complemented with a grant from the MDRP Trust Fund of US$48.4 million (effective in September 2004). A European Commission (EC) grant of €13.4 million for vulnerable groups would follow in December 2005.

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved)

5. The ADRP aimed to assist the government of Angola in creating long term sustainable social development and supporting macroeconomic stability in its territory through: (i) the demobilization of approximately 138,000 ex-combatants; (ii) the provision of support for the social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants; (iii) the provision of assistance to special target groups; and (iv) institutional development and program implementation support.

6. This PDO and related results indicators are stated in the Development Grant Agreement (DGA) signed with the Borrower in 2003. It is slightly different than the PDO from the Technical Annex prepared during appraisal, which included as an objective the reduction in military expenditures thanks to an increase in social sectors spending. This difference was the subject of extensive discussions between the project team and relevant Bank units. Finally, it was agreed that a reduction in military spending was clearly outside of the ADRP’s scope. OPCS subsequently advised the task team to seek approval from the regional Vice-President to clarify the PDO. This approval was obtained in June 2007 (see additional Annex 10 for a copy of the memo).

7. Based on the PDO, the following results framework was agreed:

Result 1: Support the Government of Angola (GoA) to implement its demobilization commitments made under the Luena Memorandum of Understanding Intermediate Result 1.1: Encampment, identification and discharge of up to 105,000 members of the UNITA ex-Military Forces (FMU). Intermediate Result 1.2: Selection, screening and discharge of up to 33,000 members of the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA). Intermediate Result 1.3: Facilitated resettlement through the provision of subsidios de contingência (contingency allowances) and resettlement kits to eligible ex-FMU and/or ex-FAA personnel.

Result 2: Improved livelihoods of program beneficiaries (at a minimum) to the level of the communities of resettlement Intermediate Result 2.1: Enhanced economic self-sufficiency and food security. Intermediate Result 2.2: Improved perception of wealth in beneficiary population through increased capital assets.

Result 3: Increased social acceptance of program beneficiaries in destination communities

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Intermediate Result 3.1: Progressively increased participation of program beneficiaries in community affairs and traditional processes. Intermediate Result 3.2: Increased reconciliation and reduced community tensions. Intermediate Result 3.3: Increased availability of basic community services as an indirect result of the assistance provided to ex-combatants.

Result 4: Significantly reduced levels of social and economic vulnerability of special target groups Intermediate Result 4.1: Enhanced capability of disabled ex-combatants and families of the severely disabled to become economically self-sufficient. Intermediate Result 4.2: Increased availability of specialized rehabilitation services for disabled ex-combatants and other disabled in the community. Intermediate Result 4.3: Enhanced access to legal protections for disabled ex-combatants. Intermediate Result 4.4: Increased availability of mainstream and specialized support services for youth and children associated with fighting forces. Intermediate Result 4.5: Increased availability of gender sensitive programming for female ex-combatants and other women associated with fighting forces.

Result 5: Increased capacity to coordinate, supervise and manage the delivery of assistance to target groups by the Program Implementation Unit, IRSEM Intermediate Result 5.1: Enhanced capacity to prepare and disseminate guidelines for sub-project preparation. Intermediate Result 5.2: Enhanced efficacy to review, award and process sub-projects. Intermediate Result 5.3: Improved monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to assess the effectiveness of sub-projects.

1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification

8. The original Project Development Objective (PDO) and key indicators were not revised.

1.4 Main Beneficiaries (original and revised, briefly describe the "primary target group" identified in the PAD and as captured in the PDO, as well as any other individuals and organizations expected to benefit from the project)

9. The program beneficiaries were the 105,000 ex-FMU ex-combatants and the 33,000 FAA soldiers to be discharged. Among these were some female ex-combatants, former child soldiers and a large contingent of disabled ex-combatants. The EC grant allowed the project to extend support to other vulnerable populations in the resettlement communities, notably family members of ex-combatants. Finally, the implementing agency, IRSEM, was to benefit from support to enhance its capacity to manage the project effectively.

1.5 Original Components (as approved)

10. The project had four components.

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(a) The demobilization component was aimed at facilitating the transition of 105,000 ex- FMU and 33,000 FAA ex-combatants to civilian life, consistent with the letter of demobilization policy issued by the Angola government in 2003. Demobilization processes of ex-FMU and FAA ex-combatants differed slightly, the former being gathered in quarters and the latter in discharge centers. The timeframes were also different: the ex-FMU demobilization having already begun at the start of the project while the FAA soldiers were to be discharged after the finalization of a strategic threat assessment. Transitional reinsertion assistance, both in-cash and in-kind, was to be provided shortly after demobilization to give ex-combatants the immediate means to support their basic needs and that of their families before reintegration.

(b) The reintegration component provided for both economic and social reintegration support to ex-combatants, with a view to ensuring the country’s economic recovery and contributing to national reconciliation. Ex-combatants were to receive: (i) information and counseling to help them make the best choice of economic activity in their area of return; (ii) support to secure employment through formal and informal channels; and (iii) training to increase their education and skill levels and thus their employment prospects. The project proposed two types of reintegration opportunities: one primary – based on the socio-economic background, personal preference and place of return – and the other complementary – to further enhance the support to the primary opportunity. Economic reintegration focused on agricultural activities as well as the rehabilitation of essential infrastructure in communities where ex-combatants resettled. Their participation in rehabilitating schools, roads or medical centers would not only respond to a critical public need, but also promote reconciliation.

(c) Assistance to special target groups aimed to provide targeted support to female ex- combatants (who represented about 0.4% of the demobilized), former child soldiers and the disabled. Underage ex-combatants were to be put under the protection of specialized agencies in order to receive appropriate support at demobilization and to be reunified with their families. Finally, disabled ex-combatants represented a large sub-group among the targeted beneficiaries in need of ongoing medical care and specialized training.

(d) Institutional development and support to program implementation. Considering the scope of the project and the weaknesses of IRSEM, this component assisted IRSEM with the preparation of an implementation manual. An estimated 75% of the total value of the reintegration component ($57 million) would be implemented by primary and secondary contractors, the remainder staying under the direct control of IRSEM. The contracting arrangements for each level of implementation were clearly defined, along with monitoring and reporting requirements.

1.6 Revised Components

11. Project components were not revised; however, additional financing obtained from the EC in 2005 allowed to extend component three (support to vulnerable groups) beyond the original beneficiaries in order to target the larger communities where ex- combatants resettled.

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1.7 Other significant changes (in design, scope and scale, implementation arrangements and schedule, and funding allocations)

12. The closing dates of the three grants, initially different, were harmonized and extended to December 31, 2008 to take into account the long delay in project effectiveness as well as delays in implementing the support to vulnerable groups.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

13. The difficult context in which the project was prepared and implemented is noteworthy: risks were high, IRSEM suffered from a bad reputation at the outset which translated into little confidence among government and implementing partners and the need for significant capacity building. This said, the Government displayed storn project ownership and despite all the challenges, the project was able to be innovative in implementation. In particular, thanks to complementary funding from the European Commission, the project was able to support activities for widows and communities – activities which went beyond the objectives of the project.

2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry (including whether lessons of earlier operations were taken into account, risks and their mitigations identified, and adequacy of participatory processes, as applicable)

14. The project benefited from lessons from previous reintegration programs (e.g. Bicesse and Lusaka processes), and the substantial experience gained by the World Bank from a number of D&R programs it supported in Africa and elsewhere. As a result the following mitigation measures were adopted:

(a) All ex-combatants would receive the same levels of assistance irrespective of their previous affiliation (FAA or FMU). (b) The capacity of the national implementing agency (IRSEM), which was created in 1995, was to be strengthened over the life of the ADRP. (c) The GoA was to prepare, finance and implement an Information, Counseling and referral service (the Programa Nacional de Informação, Sensibilização e Referência - PRONAISAR) in the areas were ex-combatants were quartered and in areas of return. (d) Counseling and referral services would promote the integration of ex-combatants into broader recovery efforts (e.g. demining, public works, community rehabilitation). (e) An international firm was recruited to oversee the Financial Management and Procurement Unit (FMPU), which would provide guidance to the Director General of IRSEM and be responsible for managing IDA and other project funds. (f) The program established a specialized unit for documentation and M&E.

The project was reviewed for quality at entry by the Bank’s quality group.

15. The program was designed with broad participation of key local stakeholders, including local authorities, traditional leaders and NGOs. Ex-combatants were able to

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select freely the area of resettlement and their economic reintegration options according to their profile and expectations.

2.2 Implementation (Including any project changes/restructuring, mid-term review, Project at Risk status, and actions taken, as applicable)

16. A Program Implementation Manual (PIM) was designed by the GoA and approved by the World Bank before project effectiveness. The PIM included information on partners responsible for implementation, both technical and political, at the central and local levels, and their coordination, as well as a framework for M&E. Before implementation began, an intensive training program on the PIM was carried out for IRSEM and implementation partners at the central and provincial levels.

17. To strengthen reconciliation and reduce potential tensions that may have emerged if assistance was provided only to ex-combatants, the EC provided a complementary grant of €13.4 million. The grant financed the social and economic reintegration of vulnerable populations through: vocational training; promotion of income generating activities; physical rehabilitation; and social reintegration (sensitization and confidence building, information on civil rights and responsibilities, information and orientation on health and sanitation, sexually transmitted diseases, and media and community campaigns.) The EC grant targeted reintegration support at specific vulnerable groups (women and children) who were known to have been under-registered through the formal demobilization process. It also extended support to other war-affected vulnerable populations in the same communities where ex-combatants resettled.

18. To overcome weaknesses identified during supervision missions, three additional technical documents were produced: (a) a guide for the participation of vulnerable groups, including eligibility and selection criteria, registration forms, and procedures to insert their data into the MIS; (b) a strategy for monitoring and evaluation (M&E), including guiding principles, tools, procedures for their use and linkages between M&E and the MIS; and (c) a strategy for assistance to disabled ex-combatants.

19. To improve the project’s performance vis-à-vis vulnerable groups, two specialized units were created at the central level with ramifications at the IRSEM provincial offices: (a) the Registration, Monitoring and Evaluation Unit (URMA), foreseen at the design stage but implemented later, was charged with MIS and recruiting specialized staff at the central and provincial level; and (b) the Unit to Support the Reintegration of Vulnerable Groups (UTGV), with staff at the central level and focal points in key provincial offices, was established to coordinate assistance to the vulnerable groups.

Mid Term Reviews

20. The project benefited from a Mid Term Review (MTR) in October 2005, which recommended the following:

 Harmonize the PDOs in the technical annex and grant agreement to conform with the latter, and inform the Board accordingly;

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 Update the project results framework and revise the project’s legal agreement as required;  Harmonize and extend the closing dates of the relevant legal agreements to December 31, 2007, to take into consideration (i) the 1-year delay in effectiveness, and (ii) the expanded scope and slower start of the vulnerable group component;  Conduct a technical review mission with key MDRP partners to assess the newly proposed strategy for addressing reintegration needs of disabled and other special target groups; and  Discuss options for the use of a possible financing surplus with the World Bank and MDRP donors.

21. It also took into account a MTR of the EC grant, which recommended: (i) encouraging the FAA to accelerate the discharge process; (ii) recruiting specialized agencies to provide services to severely disabled persons; (iii) launching a call for proposals from Implementing Partners (IPs) to extend services of reintegration and rehabilitation to vulnerable ex-combatants; (iv) simplifying administrative approval and contracting procedures; (v) creating a mechanism in the project’s MIS to better plan reintegration support per province and per municipality; and (vi) improving the quality of reporting and requests for payments from IPs through training and technical assistance.

22. Recommendations of the MTRs as well as those of the 2006 external evaluation were taken into account by ADRP management to improve program performance, as noted in the 20071 and 20082 external evaluations. Notwithstanding these improvements, some weaknesses continued to affect the overall implementation of the program, namely the processing of proposals, assistance to the disabled ex-combatants and FMPU performance, as described in the next sections.

Cancellation of FAA Demobilization

23. FAA soldiers were not demobilized as planned, despite the commitment in the letter of demobilization policy in 2003. Demobilization was to have been completed by December 31, 2006. Although significant policy, planning and operational preparatory work was carried out, the demobilization of the FAA only began on a pilot basis, with

1 Point 74 of the 2007 evaluation report (page14) by Creative Associates International, Inc.: “IRSEM implemented recommendations to support vulnerable groups by modifying eligibility criteria in the implementation manual, creating a specialized unit within IRSEM to work with vulnerable groups, and establishing partnerships with MINARS and the European Union”.

2 Points 84 and 85 of the 2008 independent evaluation report (page14): “84. IRSEM has taken steps to implement recommendations to increase the number of UGFA project visits and simplify the implementation manual. The December 2006 version of the manual makes project procedures more accessible, which IPs regard as positive. … 85. The 2007 evaluation also recommended reorientation towards development, combating poverty and support to vulnerable groups. Through the ADRP, IRSEM managed to a certain extent to effect this reorientation, including a greater number of demobilized persons from other processes in the projects, vulnerable groups, and carrying out projects of a community nature.”

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278 processed over the life of the project. These delays were attributed to: (i) difficulties in establishing adequate opportunities for the large number of disabled among those proposed to be demobilized; (ii) specific challenges regarding the severely disabled and those with chronic illnesses; (iii) political concerns about the release of a fairly large number of disabled veterans in the run up to national elections; and (iv) expectations of support from the disabled in excess of what the program had planned for. To reflect the delay, the ADRP was reformulated to remove the FAA demobilization from the project scope, and the MDRP grant was reduced from US$48.4 to US$30.25 million.

Project Extension and Revision of Milestones

24. Based on a GoA request, the closing dates of the IDA and MDRP grants were extended to end December 2008. The EC also agreed to extend its grant to December 2008 to harmonize financing parameters. Program milestones were revised as follows:

Milestones Dates Starting recruitment of a partner to assist the severely disabled (100% disability) July 31, 2007 Reception of the last regular project proposals November 30, 2007 Reception of the last proposals for VG November 30, 2007 Signature of the last regular sub-projects December 31, 2007 Signature of the last sub-projects for VG December 31, 2007 Contract Signature with the selected partner to assist the severely disabled December 31, 2007 Closing of the access window to the program January 31, 2008 Restructuring of the Project (Program) based on the final project portfolio January 31, 2008 Closing of project implementation October 31, 2008 Closing of the Project (Program) December 31, 2008

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation Design, Implementation and Utilization

25. The program established a management information system (MIS), which was used to: (i) register and monitor beneficiaries to their areas of resettlement and the sub- projects where they were integrated; (ii) record relevant data from potential IPs and their capacity evaluation undertaken by IRSEM provincial offices; (iii) control the processing of reintegration project proposals; (iv) register the delivery of reinsertion support; (v) monitor payments made to the IPs; (vi) manage reintegration support projects; (vii) follow-up on beneficiaries, including registering the interviews undertaken after their participation into a sub-project; and (viii) produce automated reports to support program management and monthly and quarterly reports for the MDRP.

26. In addition, the following measures were taken:

 A set of tools were designed to monitor reintegration. Provincial M&E officials conducted regular visits to the sub-projects to check progress against the approved timetable, enrolment of planned beneficiaries and to assess community perception of the sub-project and the reintegration of ex-combatants.  IRSEM local staff carried out “exit surveys” interviewing 13,012 ex-combatants 3 to 6 months after their participation in the sub-projects. Subsequently, 4,167 ex- combatants were interviewed a second time 3 to 6 months after the first interview, and 2,512 were interviewed a third time.

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 Several external evaluations were undertaken, including three global external evaluations (September/October 2005, June/July 2007 and November/December 2008), a mid-term review of the vulnerable groups component (April/May 2007) and an environmental and social impact assessment (October 2007).  M&E data were used to improve program performance and correct some sub- projects that were not achieving their objectives. The data also allowed IRSEM management to provide regular and updated information to MDRP stakeholders.

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance (focusing on issues and their resolution, as applicable)

Safeguards

27. At appraisal the project was classified as a category B following an environment assessment. No other safeguard policy was triggered. The project was not expected to have a significant environmental impact. The phased and widely dispersed reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life was environmentally neutral. No major physical works were undertaken under the program. Micro-project activities, estimated at $400 per ex- combatant and financed under the reintegration component, were screened for environmental impact and monitored in accordance with Bank procedures.

Financial Management and Procurement

28. Given the large and complex nature of ADRP and the short timeframe (three years) envisaged, the program established an autonomous financial management and procurement unit (FMPU) to oversee financial and procurement activities. The international firm KPMG was hired to manage the unit. Given this arrangement, the initial financial management risk was considered low, although this may have been ambitious for a project like the ADRP, as well as the Angola’s overall high risk environment. Residual financial management risk remained substantial and although the arrangement with KPMG worked largely satisfactorily, some audits were qualified due to cross payments between the various financiers (IDA, MDTF, and EU). The FMPU arrangement remained in place until the final year when staffing changes by KPMG to the FMPU team led to the cancellation of the contract before the project closed.

29. Procurement capacity weaknesses were identified during preparation with both the GoA and IRSEM. The project addressed these by hiring qualified procurement experts as part of the FMPU. The PIM also gave ample details on procurement arrangements to be followed. Nevertheless, three cases of ineligible expenses were identified during project implementation, with the Bank alerting the auditing unit and IRSEM. In the first two instances, the expenses were not presented for payment by IRSEM. In the third case the Bank requested IRSEM to reimburse the amount to the Special Account.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase (including transition arrangement to post-completion operation of investments financed by present operation, Operation & Maintenance arrangements, sustaining reforms and institutional capacity, and next phase/follow-up operation, if applicable)

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30. Under normal circumstances, D&R operations and institutions are not set up as long-term services that Borrowers generally sustain. However, the ADRP supported an institution, IRSEM, which serves in part as the veterans support agency. Furthermore, there are pending caseloads that will require further assistance. The Government adopted a transitional strategy to conclude reintegration activities under the ADRP. The strategy aims to: (i) reinforce assistance to the ADRP target groups to meet reintegration objectives; (ii) ensure a “smooth” closing of ADRP; (iii) evaluate the impact of implemented sub-projects in terms of the level of reintegration achieved; (iv) close ongoing sub-projects according to the procedures established in the PIM; and (v) identify lessons for the implementation of future reintegration programs.

31. As various factors hampered the execution of previous reintegration support programs (Bicesse and Lusaka Processes), a new program has been designed for socio- economic reintegration of 150,152 ex-combatants discharged from the FAA into civilian life. The total budget for this program is estimated at US$300 million, to be covered in totality by the Government.

32. The new program will target demobilized ex-combatants from the Bicesse and Lusaka processes as well as meet other commitments assumed by the Government that have not been supported by ADRP. Ongoing sub-projects and activities at the close of the ADRP in December 2008 will be concluded. Beneficiaries’ follow-up activities will be continued to control the reintegration progress and to identify possible complementary actions. Lastly the continuation of support to targeted ex-combatants will be ensured through specific national programs.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

33. Overall, the ADRP should be applauded for its significant achievements, especially if compared to other projects in Angola’s portfolio. Dealing with ex- combatants in a post-conflict setting is high risk in and of itself, but in addition the project was faced with an executing agency with low credibility and capacity and generally low capacity in the country. Despite these challenges, the project demobilized almost 100,000 ex-combatants and put in place a vast network of some 250 IPs to provide reintegration support. Moreover, the project was highly innovative in putting in place support to widows and communities.

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation (to current country and global priorities, and Bank assistance strategy)

34. Relevance of objectives, design and implementation is rated highly substantial given that demobilizing ex-combatants to promote peace, reconciliation and foster development after prolonged conflict was essential in Angola’s recovery. The inclusion of UNITA ex-combatants in the ADRP was considered an important national security and reconciliation measure, thereby supporting macroeconomic stability and increasing the scope for development work and for private investment.

35. The Government's request for technical and financial assistance for the ADRP came at a critical time in the Angolan peace process. IDA involvement was justified by its considerable experience with such programs, the scale of resources required, the focus

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of the program on sustainable economic reintegration of ex-combatants, and the need to be responsive to a client request. Furthermore, IDA involvement was logical given the Bank's lead role in the MDRP and the fact that the ADRP fit within that framework. 36. Failure to act rapidly and professionally to demobilize and reintegrate ex- combatants posed the risk of widespread residual banditry. Discontented ex-combatants could also pose a threat to social stability. At the same time, lack of reintegration support also contributed to a stalling of the peace process, not only in Angola but also in the greater Great Lakes region. Angola has been a major player in several sub-regional conflicts, including in the two Congos; several neighboring countries had intervened in the Angolan conflict.

37. By helping to finance the reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life, thereby easing some of Angola's human capacity constraints, the ADRP provided the Government with additional means to help achieve social and economic recovery. Because ex-combatants were widely dispersed throughout the country, these resources were also injected into the rural economy in the areas of ex-combatant return, forming a significant stimulus to the local economy.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives (Including brief discussion of causal linkages between outputs and outcomes, with details on outputs in Annex 2)

Result 1: Support the GoA to implement its demobilization commitments made under the Luena Memorandum of Understanding

38. Under the program framework, 97,112 members of the UNITA ex-Military Forces were registered, formally integrated into the FAA and demobilized. Additionally, 5,047 UNITA ex-combatants were integrated into the FAA and the national police.

39. Due to reasons described in paragraph 23 above, the government only demobilized 278 FAA of the planned 33,000 on a pilot basis; the demobilization of the remaining FAA members planned was postponed sine die. The table below shows the final demobilization numbers under the ADRP.

ADRP - Demobilization of ex-combatants Adults Minors Total Target % of achievement Female Male Female Male demobilized projected 3,338 94,052 0 0 97,390 105,278 92,5%

40. IRSEM also delivered resettlement kits to 43,675 ex-combatants and paid the transitional allowances to 52,720 ex-combatants, as shown in the table below.

ADRP – Reinsertion support to ex-combatants (government financed) Adults Target % of Total receiving Female Male projected achievement In kind (kits) 1,141 42,534 43,675 62,716 69.6% In cash 933 51,787 52,720 62,716 84.1%

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Note: the target numbers are the number of UNITA combatants who reported to demobilization centers by the agreed cut-off date of August 21, 2002. Additional UNITA combatants were demobilized after this date but they were not guaranteed reinsertion support.

41. The delivery of reinsertion packages was done before implementation of the MIS thus some ex-combatants received this benefit twice. However, duplication rates are relatively low, as shown in the table below.

ADRP – Duplication of Reinsertion Benefits (government financed) Benefit N.º of Benefits delivered N.º of Beneficiaries receiving Duplication rate In kind (kits) 46,455 43,675 6.37%

In cash 56,864 52,720 7.86%

Result 2: Improved livelihoods of program beneficiaries (at a minimum) to the level of the communities of resettlement

42. Under the ADRP framework, the numbers of the economic reintegration component at closing (December 31, 2008) were the following3:

 Around 500 sub-project proposals were received and 265 sub-projects approved under the framework of ADRP. However, due to the time limitations to analyze, approve and contract all the sub-projects, only 177 were funded by ADRP.  The remaining sub-projects (88) will be financed and implemented under the framework of the new Government Reinforcement of Reintegration Program (PGRR). The implementation of the new program will increase the beneficiaries’ coverage; thus the number of assisted ex-combatants and vulnerable groups will reach most of the planned targets.  The reintegration opportunities created by these sub-projects and the beneficiaries registered into the MIS, as well as the percentage of registers in relation with the target are shown into the following table.

% registers Type of beneficiary Target Opportunities (*) Registered/MIS (*) /targets Ex-combatants (primary opportunities), excluding women and 91,718 70,526 57,494 62.7 disabled ex-combatants Youth and children associated with 16,000 26,245 14,535 90.8 fighting forces Women (**) 16,000 22,466 10,196 63.7 Disabled ex-combatants (**) 12,500 10,238 5,358 42.9 Complementary opportunities for ex- 20,160 18,750 5,716 28.4 combatants Total 156,378 148,225 93,299 59.7

Note: The column “Target” shows the target numbers of demobilized ex-combatants. “Registered/MIS”

3 For details, see Annex 2.

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shows the number of beneficiaries that were recorded in the MIS (not all demobilized were registered). “Opportunities” refers to the number of reintegration options offered to beneficiaries. (*) Including 3.115 beneficiaries of the sub-projects implemented under the Special Project and the beneficiaries of FAO agriculture kits that didn’t receive assistance through a sub-project. (**) Including 1,981 women and 3,691 disabled ex-combatants. 42. It is important to note that the percentage of coverage was not expected to reach 100% since ex-combatants could opt not to claim reintegration support. The “self- reintegration” rate is conservatively estimated at about 20%.

43. The total cost of approved proposals was over US$77 million, of which US$62 million were foreseen to be funded by ADRP, while the remaining US$15 million were direct contributions from IPs or from other donors. Opportunities created represent 94.8% of the planned target, while the registration into the MIS only represents 59.7 % of the targets at closing. The large discrepancy (54,926) can be explained by: (i) delays in approving and contracting the last 105 sub-projects, many of which could not be started because the signature of contracts happened after the December 31, 2007 agreed milestone; (ii) shortfalls in mobilizing beneficiaries; and (iii) difficulties in gathering data on those ex-combatants enrolled in sub-projects very far from provincial capitals.

44. As part of M&E, approximately 13,000 ex-combatants were interviewed 3 to 6 months after receiving reintegration support. According to the data gathered, 58.6% of ex-combatants are self-employed; 36.8 % are unemployed, 4.6% are formally employed, and 91.2% have access to agriculture land. External evaluations, including the last independent evaluation in 2008 confirmed that “there is a general feeling of social and economic reintegration on the part of the beneficiaries and some cases of significant improvement in living conditions”.4 The 2007 evaluation considered that “ex-combatants recognized that the support provided through ADRP was critical to resuming civilian lives. A significant number of beneficiaries say they achieved better social and economic conditions than the rest of their community”.

Result 3: Increased social acceptance of program beneficiaries in destination communities.

45. Beneficiary interviews showed that 99% are living with their families and the great majority of them feel socially reintegrated (94%). Some 99.4% consider that they have been well received by the community without any problem of social acceptance. The external evaluation undertaken in November/December 2008 noted that, “in general terms, the social reintegration of ex-combatants in receiving communities was good and their reintegration did not cause very serious problems. There was generally good collaboration among receiving communities (for example in terms of handing over land to be divided into individual production plots), including for ex-combatants from other communities in the province and even from other provinces”.

4 On November and December 2008, the evaluation team surveyed 40 ex-combatants and community members selected at random from among the groups convoked by the Implementing Partners and IRSEM; also for the purpose of evaluating the program impact, the evaluation team organized 16 interviews with focus groups and a total of about 250 ex-combatants and community members, for a total of more than 290 interviews.

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46. The same evaluation stated that “traditional authorities, religious organizations and some residents, despite also being in need of support, played an important role in the reconciliation of families. In many villages, pacification rituals were performed for families that had been divided because of the war. Actions were carried out through specific local mechanisms to pardon those that had killed during the war.”

Result 4: Significantly reduced levels of social and economic vulnerability of special target groups.

47. IRSEM placed increasing importance on vulnerable groups in the last two years of the program. The ADRP provided specialized support for the social and economic reintegration of specific strata of the target group: female ex-combatants, widows of eligible ex-combatants, wives to whom ex-combatants have transferred their participation rights, disabled ex-combatants, and young children of ex-combatants, most of whom were not registered as part of the demobilization process and whose support was made possible through the EC grant.

48. The assistance to disabled ex-combatants in terms of provision of specialized rehabilitation services was the most challenging area of ADRP due to the lack of capacity of the existing Physical Rehabilitation Centers (10) and the scarcity of logistic conditions (transportation, housing, etc.) to undertake the medical screening of the disabled (at the resettlement areas or capital of provinces) and to provide the required specialized services (always at the provincial capitals).

49. In terms of economic reintegration, ADRP created opportunities to support 10,238 disabled ex-combatants while 5,360 were registered into the MIS as receiving economic reintegration support. The program also provided physical rehabilitation (mainly orthopedic assistance) to 777 disabled ex-combatants as registered by the MIS.

50. The assistance provided by ADRP to youth and children associated with fighting forces reached a total of 14,535, and included access to education (11,758 direct beneficiaries registered into the MIS), support to the promotion of income generating activities (1,496 beneficiaries registered) and vocational training (897 beneficiaries registered).

51. The program created opportunities for 22,466 women and registered 10,196 of them into the MIS. Assistance included the provision of agriculture inputs and technical assistance, support to the promotion of income generating activities (micro loans) and the delivery of short-term vocational training. Women also benefited from health centers and day-nurseries that were constructed or rehabilitated through on-the-job training of ex- combatants supported by the project.

52. Lastly, in June 2008, the program recruited a specialized consortium of firms to reinforce the delivery of specialized services to severely disabled ex-combatants.

53. Due to the limited time available to implement the project, some outputs were not delivered, which meant a reduction of 45% of the total project payment (consulting services and reimbursable costs). For example, training on wheelchairs and seating as well as auditive rehabilitation was not provided; and equipment planned to be purchased under the procurement plan has not left the port of origin.

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Result 5: Increased capacity to coordinate, supervise and manage the delivery of assistance to target groups by the Program Implementation Unit (IRSEM).

54. Since the preliminary stages of ADRP, a set of training programs were carried out to increase the capacity of IRSEM to coordinate, supervise and manage the delivery of assistance to target groups.

55. Internally within IRSEM and its structures, the main obstacles were: the model established for the FMPU – external to IRSEM; the lack of articulation between the programming part and the financial part of the program; the conception and management of information/communication between units and between the provincial and central structures; and the insufficient empowerment of IRSEM and its human resources. Although these problems were addressed systematically throughout project implementation, gaps remained that affected project efficiency.

56. Although important investments were made in terms of recruitment and training, M&E was “in global terms, inadequate, insufficient and slow. The system of monitoring did not work promptly enough in the identification of insufficiencies and in the indication of timely corrective measures”.5

57. ADRP enabled IRSEM to strengthen its capacity in reintegration. Essentially, IRSEM staff was trained before and during program implementation and will benefit from the lessons generated for future projects.

58. The involvement of various governmental structures in the process of reconciliation, the integration of members of UNITA in the National Commission for the Social and Productive Reintegration of the Demobilized and Displaced (CNRSPDD) and in IRSEM itself, and the setting up of Commissions for the Evaluation of Projects (CCAPs) benefitted the development of the program. Specific institutional adaptations incorporated under the ADRP are indicated for adoption under the government’s follow- on program, including the use of independent auditors, annual evaluations and an autonomous financial management and procurement unit.

3.3 Efficiency (Net Present Value/Economic Rate of Return, cost effectiveness, e.g., unit rate norms, least cost, and comparisons; and Financial Rate of Return)

59. The project was designed to minimize costs without compromising quality. This was achieved by relying on existing structures wherever possible, rather than creating new ones. The cost per beneficiary of the program was projected at $1,200 at the start of the project, and ended up being slightly higher, but still well within the range of comparable programs in sub-Saharan Africa. The removal of the 33,000 FAA soldiers from the project scope resulted in program fund cancellations, thus not increasing the overall per unit cost.

5 Cristina Udelsmann & others, Report of the ADRP Annual Independent Evaluation, December 2008.

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3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating (Combining relevance, achievement of PDOs, and efficiency)

Rating: Moderately satisfactory 60. The overall outcome rating is moderately satisfactory based on highly substantial relevance of the project, a moderately satisfactory PDO achievement and a satisfactory rating for efficiency. The main objective of the ADRP was to help the GoA create long term sustainable social development and support macroeconomic stability in its territory through the demobilization and reintegration of up to138,000 ex-combatants, the support to vulnerable groups, and the reinforcement of capacity at the institutional program levels. This objective was partly achieved with 92% of UNITA ex-combatants demobilized, but the FAA soldiers were not discharged during the life of the project.

61. Reintegration support was provided to 77% of demobilized ex-combatants, with training and longer term reintegration assistance opportunities. The reach of the project in the end was much larger than the groups of beneficiaries it intended to support initially. The country as a whole benefitted from the project. “In summary, the DDR program has laid the foundation for sustained economic and social recovery, especially in those regions like the central highlands (Planalto) that had experienced considerable damage during the war 6 .” The Angola CAS evaluation also rates the ADRP outcome as moderately satisfactory.

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (if any, where not previously covered or to amplify discussion above)

(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

62. The ADRP was integrated within the broader efforts of the GoA to fight poverty and provide support to the most vulnerable, including ex-combatants. With the EC grant, the ADRP funded increasing numbers of sub-projects involving vulnerable groups (women, youth and disabled) contributing to reduce poverty in rural areas and to increase community social assets.

63. Thanks to the ADRP, IRSEM managed to carry out many sub-projects of a community nature, such as the construction/rehabilitation of schools, rural health centers, day-nurseries, and dirt roads. These activities often involved the beneficiaries themselves, through on-the-job training and/or temporary employment, contributing to community reconciliation and a sense of common purpose.

Summary of some community works developed by ADRP Type of community work Quantity Estimated beneficiaries (*) Schools (classrooms) 95 (380) 38.000 Rural Health Centers 7 7.000 Community agriculture 25 2.500 warehouses

6 Angola Country Assistance Evaluation. Report 39829. World Bank, October 1, 2007.

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Community social centers 15 4.500 (“Njangos”) Day-nurseries 8 600 (*) Direct and indirect beneficiaries (community members). 64. Despite long delays, the ADRP eventually provided support to 6,788 women, either ex-combatants or wives and partners of demobilized ex-combatants. The UGTV never hired a gender specialist, but several sub-projects included innovative gender interventions such as the registration of children, and the provision of child care facilities to allow women to participate in training and income generating activities. Lastly, towards the end of the program, the ADRP endorsed a gender study on urban young men at-risk of engaging in conflict in Angola, which was funded by the MDRP’s Learning for Equity, Access and Peace (LEAP) Program.

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening (particularly with reference to impacts on longer-term capacity and institutional development)

65. As discussed above, capacity building supported by ADRP was substantial, especially at the IRSEM and IP levels. IRSEM provincial offices and central departments, and more than 80 IP were mobilized and greatly empowered to implement reintegration interventions. ADRP contributed to strengthening the capacity of local, national and international NGOs it partnered with to implement reintegration activities, helping them to shift from emergency operations (the predominant interventions during the long conflict) towards development projects and to strengthen their administration, fiscal management and accountability – benefits which will endure beyond the life of the program itself.

66. Additionally, ADRP financed the rehabilitation of 50 IDA (Institute for Agricultural Development) outposts, and has provided, through the program strategic partner (FAO), technical support and training to agrarian technicians to build their capacity. However, the technicians were insufficiently involved in the projects, despite ADRP’s intention to integrate the IDA outposts and the Veterinary Services into the program through Institutional Protocols signed with these entities.

(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)

67. An indirect and unforeseen effect of the sub-projects was the creation of groups and associations of local farmers for the development and improvement of working conditions and the generation of income for participants (ex-combatants and community members). These groups/associations have played and continue to play an important role in the development of traditional agriculture through:

 Dialogue and access to regular agriculture development programs promoted by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (provision of seeds, fertilizers, etc.);  Facilitation of the use of common resources such as cattle, tractors and accessories, warehouses, camps for the multiplication of seeds, technical assistance;  Joint access to markets where prices are higher (Luanda, Benguela and other cities) and requiring more valuable agriculture products (vegetables, fruits, etc);

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 Creation of small cooperatives to transform agriculture products increasing their value and improving their life.

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops (Optional for Core ICR, required for ILI, details in annexes)

68. Surveys undertaken by IRSEM showed that the social reintegration of ex- combatants targeted by ADRP was very successful:  Around 99% of interviewed beneficiaries are living with their families;  The number of children per family increased since the demobilization time until now from 1.15 to around 5 (in average);  Around 99% of interviewed beneficiaries consider themselves as having been well accepted by the community; and  More than 90% consider themselves as reintegrated in their communities of resettlement.

69. In terms of economic reintegration, even if ex-combatants generally consider themselves as being better off that other community members, the situation is still complex and needs to be monitored by IRSEM as follows7:  More than 50% of the beneficiaries are integrated in economic activities (employed or self-employed);  Around 80% of the beneficiaries consider that they have a level of monthly income smaller than the national minimum salary;  More than 60% have tried to find employment, but only a minority is employed (4,53% in the first interview);  At least 75% use the tools received from the program;  More than 90% of the interviewed have land for agriculture.

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome

Rating: LOW

70. Justification. The risk that the project development outcome will not be maintained is low. The UNITA movement was effectively disbanded, thus leaving little to no chance for remobilization of ex-FMU ex-combatants. Moreover, the various independent evaluations and surveys carried out over the life of the program show that most beneficiaries are well reintegrated into their communities of return and are able to sustain a livelihood through agriculture or other forms of employment. The long term effect of reintegration support cannot be foreseen with certainty, but the ADRP has helped reinforce the capacity of many stakeholders, both local and national, who will continue to provide support to ex-combatants and their communities in a follow-up program financed by the government. It is expected that this continued support will strengthen the outcome obtained during the ADRP.

7 Further details in annex 5.

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5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance (Relating to design, implementation and outcome issues)

5.1 Bank Performance

(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry (i.e., performance through lending phase)

Rating: Satisfactory

71. Bank performance at entry is rated satisfactory. The Bank project team responded quickly to the request from the GoA for support to its demobilization efforts, all the while setting up the appropriate mitigation measures to address identified risks of low capacity in the GoA and the implementing unit. The project clearly fit within the Bank strategy for assistance to Angola. The Bank provided excellent management and coordination of the various sources of funding (IDA, MDRP, EC). The project was processed quickly as an emergency operation. However, the Bank lacked foresight when establishing as a condition of project effectiveness the recruitment of an international financial management firm, knowing that the required procurement process would take at least six months before a selection could be made. This delay in effectiveness was mitigated by the funding of an MDRP-funded special project implemented by UNDP to jump-start the ADRP until the other sources of funding would become effective.

(b) Quality of Supervision (Including /fiduciary and safeguards policies)

Rating: Satisfactory

72. The quality of supervision is rated satisfactory. The Bank carried out regular supervision missions to Angola (three or four times per year in the early stages of implementation then twice a year) with the participation of relevant technical specialists to oversee all aspects of the project. Moreover, by financing technical specialists, the MDRP allowed the Bank to provide enhanced project supervision over the life of the project. The Bank team was able to accurately assess fiduciary and safeguard aspects, development outcomes, and to report candidly on issues identified. The Bank’s performance was lacking in the area of financial management due to the difficulty in finding qualified FM specialists who spoke Portuguese.

73. In 2005, a Bank internal review of project supervision resulted in an excellent rating for the team, who received an award on this occasion. The Bank was not able to travel to Angola to carry out a final supervision mission before the project closed due to the impossibility to obtain visas to Angola. Nevertheless, at that stage in the life of the project, most components had already reached their target beneficiaries (with the exception of the FAA soldiers) and the project team continued regular contacts with the implementing agency and other partners to support final activities before project closing.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance

Rating: Satisfactory

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74. The overall Bank performance is rated satisfactory. A procurement consultant was in place throughout the life of the project, greatly enhancing the capacity of the Bank team to monitor implementation. The FMPU also played an important role, with the availability of electronic records facilitating quality supervision. Finally, the Bank team was able to undertake field visits during every mission, which is typically difficult in post-conflict contexts.

5.2 Borrower Performance

(a) Government Performance

Rating: Satisfactory

75. Government performance is rated satisfactory. The GoA contributed the largest proportion of funds to the project (US$76 million or 44% at appraisal). If the cost of demobilization is also considered, the share of government funding reaches more than US$157 million. The government also contributed counterpart funds to the various project components according to a set percentage. Political support for the program allowed for this high level of results. However several conditions of effectiveness were met much later than anticipated, creating an initial delay of one year before implementation could start. Moreover, the inability of the government to develop a framework for the discharge of the 33,000 FAA soldiers as agreed in the letter of demobilization policy was a clear shortcoming.

(b) Implementing Agency Performance

Rating: Moderately satisfactory

76. The performance of IRSEM is rated moderately satisfactory. At the outset of the project, IRSEM’s credibility generally and among implementing partners was very low; thus the ability of IRSEM to effectively manage such a complex project in a high risk environment is noteworthy. Moreover, implementing agency staff was trained during workshops at the start of the project, thus allowing IRSEM to take on the complex task of launching and monitoring more than 250 sub-projects with a large number of implementation partners, all with various levels of capacity. Based on this indicator alone, the achievement of IRSEM was remarkable. A higher rating may have been possible if the agency had displayed greater proactivity in its responses to the Bank’s recommendations to close sub-projects that were finished and to execute pending payments to contractors. This led to several complaints. The M&E system experienced some shortfalls and there were delays in installing adequate technical capacity to address the specific needs of the vulnerable group component. Also there were a few cases of ineligible expenditures.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance

Rating: Moderately satisfactory

77. The overall borrower performance is rated moderately satisfactory. The leadership of the GoA and IRSEM was significant in achieving the project results. Moreover, the difficult context in which the project was implemented, after decades of

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civil war and latent mistrust among members of various factions, must be considered. However, higher levels of cooperation with the Bank and faster response times to launch many sub-projects before the agreed deadlines would have allowed the project to reach a larger number of beneficiaries.

6. Lessons (Both project-specific and of wide general application)

Positive Factors

78. The creation of a favorable environment was conducive to the political and national reconciliation success. Contributing to this success was: the adoption of an Amnesty Law, the program’s strong emphasis on community participation (civil society, churches), the involvement of various sectors and institutions in the demobilization process, the continued dialogue with the former belligerent groups, large sensitization campaigns, the promotion of citizenship principles, and the promotion of a permanent involvement of UNITA into the full DDR process.

79. The experience of the project highlighted the importance of locally defining each reintegration support intervention, starting from the local context, the demand of services and the profile of the target group, stimulating the permanence of ex-militaries in rural areas, and reinforcing the skills at various endogenous and exogenous knowledge levels.

80. A strong and permanent involvement of the local authorities also proved valuable for the project. Local authorities were key players into the reintegration process and were widely involved in the M&E of ex-militaries’ reintegration support. The involvement of local authorities represented an efficient and permanent follow-up of reintegration support and facilitated the reconciliation and the promotion of peace at the community level.

Areas for Improvement

81. Implementation was affected by some weaknesses in the project, which constitute lessons for future implementations of DDR programs by IRSEM as follows:

 The absence of a sufficient number of qualified IPs was a problem. Lack of NGOs and other partners with capacity in Angola, despite having increased in recent years, did not allow for the national coverage foreseen in the ADRP. Furthermore, activities and types of projects included in the ADRP did not correspond, in the majority of cases, to the type of vocation and qualifications of the IP, so that these partners had to adapt to both the procedures and objectives of the projects. IP had different levels of capability (technical; administrative and managerial; financial; social/community action), which had direct implications on project results. The identification of IPs with an appropriate technical profile and with management capacity and financial autonomy was of vital importance for the success of sub-projects.

 From the outset, the program had cumbersome and slow administrative procedures, which resulted in payment delays. The most serious consequence of this situation was the long period required to allocate resources for the implementation of the sub-

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projects vis-à-vis the periods that were appropriate for their use. For example, this often caused the non-availability of seeds where needed at the best times for sowing, or the non-availability of construction materials during the dry season. Delays in payments were fundamentally due to bureaucratic deficiencies at the level of central management, to poor administrative capacity and management of IPs, especially with regard to the submission of proof of expenses incurred, which was a condition for refund.

 The failure to predict difficulties regarding transport, storage and distribution of inputs (cattle, seeds, kits, etc.) led to poorer results on the part of the IP. These difficulties could very rarely be addressed and the additional amounts spent recovered.

 M&E were not adjusted in line with the progress of the relevant projects and, in many cases the system did not work promptly enough to identify shortcomings and timely corrective measures.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing/Agencies/ Partners

(a) Borrower/implementing agencies

78. The Borrower and its implementing agency, IRSEM, consider that the World Bank (WB) and the MDRP have contributed to peace and stability in Angola, as well as in the Great Lakes region. They expect to continue to collaborate with the WB in future programs. IRSEM considered that the MDRP staff provided important technical assistance and training in areas such as the MIS, monitoring and evaluation, assistance to disabled ex-combatants and other vulnerable groups (especially women), and organized a very useful study tour in Sierra Leone. However, IRSEM’s view is that the results achieved under the program could have been maximized if there had been a permanent MDRP presence in Angola, if some WB procedures could have been simplified and several critical decisions taken quickly. 79. The following comments can be made in response to the key points raised by IRSEM: i) Permanent presence in Angola of a senior MDRP staff member. This certainly could have facilitated ADRP implementation; however the available resources did not allow the MDRP Secretariat to field a senior staff member in each one of the seven countries covered by this regional program. ii) Lack of procedural flexibility. The PIM was based on the guidelines established by the Bank for this type of operation and they could not be by-passed without posing serious problems to the successful implementation of the signed grant agreements. On several occasions, supervision missions undertaken by WB/MDRP teams drew IRSEM’s attention to the fact “that the project took a long time to process procurement activities. Often, contracts are not awarded within the bid validity period and in many instances, bids expire and require extensions before technical reviews have been completed”. The missions also recommended “that all actions are completed in the planned period and if for

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some reason there are delays, there is a need to request extension of bids validity and bid securities”. iii) Short-term timeframe for implementation of a large number of sub-projects. Once again, the missions always “expressed significant concern about sub-project processing and implementation issues including unacceptably long times for sub- project approvals; unduly stringent application of financial and other review processes, and an unacceptably large number of open sub-projects that had passed their contract closing dates without fulfilling project closing requirements”. As a result, the Bank “recommended a detailed review of the processes and procedures around sub-project review, approval and implementation in order to identify ways of streamlining procedures and speeding up implementation”. To help IRSEM overcome these problems, several workshops were organized by the MDRP team with the participation of central and provincial officials and staff of the key Implementing Partners. (b) Cofinanciers

Not available.

(c) Other partners and stakeholders (e.g. NGOs/private sector/civil society)

80. Implementing Partners (IPs) recognized that their participation in the program was very positive and helped them move faster from emergency to development. Even if they consider that in general IRSEM has provided a good assistance to the sub-projects, they highlighted some aspects for enhancement: (i) The long time needed to approve sub-project proposals and to pay the second and the third installments of sub-contacts. The delays were a consequence of two different issues: the difficulties faced by the IP themselves to present the expenditures and financial reports as required by the PIM, which did not allow IRSEM/FMPU to process payments without additional delays; and, the lack of appropriate communication between IRSEM provincial and central offices, which extended the time needed for processing IP proposals and requests. The WB/MDRP support missions tried to help overcome these delays, but IRSEM/FMPU should have invested more in training of IP staff (before the start of sub-projects) and provision of targeted assistance to help IPs understand and apply PIM procedures. (ii) The lack of cooperation and understanding of the Consortium implementing the FMPU. The Consortium was contracted by IRSEM and its activity was controlled by IRSEM management. However, the Implementation Support Missions, as this one undertaken in June 2007, was pleased “with IRSEM’s submission of a proposal to correct a number of the issues highlighted as constraints to the efficient processing and implementation of sub-projects. The issues included approval requirements for the use of contingency funds and reallocations between cost categories; line-item versus cost category expenditure controls; and delays in extending closed contracts.”

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(iii) The duration of sub-projects. The Bank did not impose any limit to the duration of sub-projects. The experience showed that the nine months planned initially were too short for the mobilization of beneficiaries, the presentation of progress and financial reports and the payment of second and third installments of the sub- contracts. In accordance, the duration was extended and several addenda to the contracts were approved by MDRP. Once again, the slow processing of addenda also delayed the process and rendered almost ineffective their original purposes.

81. The ADRP Strategic Partner, FAO, highlighted a communication problem between the different ADRP stakeholders and the time required to process proposals. This was also noted by the WB/MDRP support missions and several workshops were organized during the program. As a follow-up to the workshop, the Bank suggested to IRSEM that: a) “All recommended simplifications and streamlining efforts be put in place immediately to ensure rapid processing of all current and new sub-projects; b) Better communication and cooperation between FMPU, DEP and Provincial offices to clarify roles and responsibilities and to put the recommended actions in place to significantly reduce sub-project processing times; c) All options for improving the speed and reliability of documentation movement between provincial and central levels should be utilized (DHL, scanning, etc.); and d) A simple system is required to adequately track the movement of project files from proposal submission to contract signature, and the status of project files should be checked weekly by the General Direction of IRSEM to identify and resolve any bottlenecks.”

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Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent) Actual/Latest Appraisal Estimate Percentage of Components Estimate (USD (USD millions) Appraisal millions) DEMOBILIZATION 0.00 0.00 0 REINTEGRATION 57.72 0.00 32% TRANSITIONAL 71.34 40% ASSISTANCE ASSISTANCE TO SPECIAL 31.625 0.00 18% TARGET GROUPS INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND 10.53 0.00 6% PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT

Total Baseline Cost 171.215 0.00 --

Contingencies 8.56 0.00 4%

Total Project Costs 179.775 0.00 100%

(b) Financing

Appraisal Actual/Latest Type of Estimate Estimate Percentage of Source of Funds Cofinancing (USD (USD Appraisal millions) millions) Borrower 77.0 76.6 43% IDA GRANT FOR POST- 33.00 32.15 18% CONFLICT Bilateral Agencies (unidentified) 69.7 36.1 39% Total 179.7 144.85 100%

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Annex 2. Outputs by Component

Demobilization. Final destination

Demobilized ex-combatants Province Adults Children % of Total Target Female Male Female Male achievement Bengo 42 635 00 677 - - Benguela 203 11.899 0012.102 - - Bié 488 11.251 0011.739 - - Cabinda 0 5 00 5 - - Cunene 17 409 00 426 - - Huambo 777 24.528 0025.305 - - Huíla 149 6.725 00 6.874 - - K.Kubango 243 4.610 00 4.853 - - K. Norte 3 442 00 445 - - K. Sul 464 7.458 00 7.922 - - Luanda 202 2.214 00 2.416 - - Lunda N. 11 1.181 00 1.192 - - Lunda S. 28 1.477 00 1.505 - - Malanje 84 3.545 00 3.629 - - Moxico 83 1.748 00 1.831 - - Namibe 8 81 00 89 - - Uíge 12 2.175 00 2.187 - - Zaire 0 171 00 171 - - N/defined 535 13.487 0 0 14.022 - - Total 3.349 94.041 0 0 97.390 105.278 92,5%

Reintegration. Distribution by geographical area (province) of the beneficiaries registered into the MIS

Adults Children % of Province Subtotal Target Female Male Female Male achievement Bengo 46 647 0 0 693 - 0 Benguela 1.787 9.615 1.665 1.879 14.946 - 0 Bié 885 10.511 42 45 11.483 - 0 Cunene 23 542 16 12 593 - 0 Huambo 1.397 20.759 2.611 2.924 27.691 - 0 Huíla 1.539 6.864 382 447 9.232 - 0 Kuando Kubango 233 3.887 86 107 4.313 - 0 Kwanza Norte 379 386 501 508 1.774 - 0 Kwanza Sul 1.923 7.247 618 913 10.701 - 0 Luanda 1.173 555 89 31 1.848 - 0 Lunda Norte 23 1.415 89 89 1.616 - 0

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Lunda Sul 18 843 0 0 861 - 0 Malanje 233 1.693 0 0 1.926 - 0 Moxico 189 1.024 232 278 1.723 - 0 Namibe 8 63 36 31 138 - 0 Uíge 606 2.133 67 127 2.933 - 0 Zaíre 193 212 230 193 828 - 0 Total 10.655 68.396 6.664 7.584 93.299 156.378 59,7%

Disabled and Women ex-combatants registered into the MIS

Women Disabled Province Total % the assisted Total % the assisted Bengo 41 6,45 17 2,67 Benguela 120 1,25 547 5,72 Bié 424 4,20 463 4,58 Cunene 12 2,99 21 5,24 Huambo 537 2,83 677 3,57 Huíla 149 1,89 955 12,14 Kuando Kubango 195 5,87 19 0,57 Kwanza Norte 3 0,72 27 6,51 Kwanza Sul 368 5,38 428 6,26 Luanda 18 9,33 130 67,36 Lunda Norte 21 1,49 36 2,56 Lunda Sul 15 1,90 2 0,25 Malanje 20 1,18 275 16,23 Moxico 44 4,35 37 3,66 Namibe 4 6,56 3 4,92 Uíge 10 0,48 39 1,87 Zaíre 0 0,00 15 8,67 Total 1.981 3,02 3.691 5,63

Community Vulnerable Groups registered into the MIS

Women Children Port. Def. Province Total % the VG assisted Total % the VG assisted Total % the VG assisted Bengo 5 100,00 0,00 0,00 0 0,00 Benguela 1.628 28,93 3676,00 65,33 243 4,32 Bié 399 70,12 87,00 15,29 81 14,24 Cunene 1 0,69 28,00 19,44 113 78,47 Huambo 619 9,04 5637,00 82,34 387 5,65

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Huíla 1.409 56,91 788,00 31,83 201 8,12 Kuando Kubango 2 0,96 201,00 96,17 0 0,00 Kwanza Norte 417 27,29 1064,00 69,63 0 0,00 Kwanza Sul 1.499 44,31 1556,00 45,99 270 7,98 Luanda 1.080 68,61 117,00 7,43 372 23,63 Lunda Norte 2 1,03 180,00 92,78 0 0,00 Lunda Sul 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 Malanje 213 100,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 Moxico 149 20,75 511 71,17 0 0,00 Namibe 2 2,78 69 95,83 0 0,00 Uíge 595 72,74 194 23,72 0 0,00 Zaíre 195 31,10 427 68,10 0 0,00 Total 8.215 32,86 14.535 58,13 1.667 6,67

Sub-projects approved and financed by ADRP

Province Municipality MIS Code IP Benef. Total cost IP cont. ADRP Bengo All the Province BGO/001/2006 V. Mundial 556 219.387 46.744 172.643 Subtotal 556 219.387 46.744 172.643 Benguela Balombo BGA/006/2005 CARITAS 800 254.508 10.300 244.208 Bocoio BGA/004/2005 ALISEI 800 287.348 0 287.348 Chongoroi BGA/005/2005 ODLAC 500 169.626 2.765166.861 Cubal BGA/002/2005 ADRA 1.000 347.577 10.470337.107 Ganda BGA/003/2005 ADRA 1.000 345.138 7.554337.584 Caimbambo BGA/007/2005 SERVIR 200 72.416 2.640 69.776 Benguela BGA/002/2006 CORB 250 879.729 583.482296.247 Balombo BGA/001/2006 Missão 411 192.911 40.075152.835 Ganda BGA/004/2006 M. Ndunde 618 352.717 75.999 276.718 All the Province BGA/003/2006 V. Mundial 250 410.410 111.210 299.200 Lobito BGA/007/2006 SERVIR 100 27.529 1.000 26.529 Lobito BGA/008/2006 CRP Cabaia 175 40.649 0 40.649 Lobito BGA/006/2006 Inforpesca 100 67.867 3.555 64.312 Lobito BGA/005/2006 CFP Lobito 120 50.481 0 50.481 Bocoio II BGA/009/2006 ALISEI 1.200 473.533 0 473.533 Balombo II BGA/001/2007 CARITAS 1.620 479.288 4.000 475.288 Balombo BGA/003/2007 AAESMC 905 377.647 80.370297.277 Ganda BGA/020/2007 GTZ 1.200 570.911 70.952499.959 Cubal BGA/014/2007 GTZ 1.200 550.414 50.500499.914 Balombo BGA/007/2007 AAF 265 49.823,30 19.947,5029.876 Bocoio BGA/006/2007 AAF 265 49.722,30 19.947,5029.775 Caimbambo BGA/004/2007 SERVIR 160 37.420,50 8.000,0029.421 Lobito BGA/005/2007 SERVIR 162 36.759,96 7.500,0029.260 Cubal BGA/013/2007 AGRISUD 1.250 521.661,28 22.614 499.047 Benguela BGA/012/2007 Escola Sijoma 86 63.934,26 0 63.934 Chongoroi BGA/010/2007 AAESMC 250 38.203,25 8.686 29.517 Benguela BGA/015/2007 Dom Bosco 290 233.536,99 108.527 125.010

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Baía Farta BGA/009/2007 SERVIR 420 227.319,55 50.374176.946 Caimbambo BGA/008/2007 SERVIR 640 303.354,90 62.825240.530 Bocoio BGA/021/2007 KWATOKO 1.200 301.980,00 2.380 299.600 Benguela BGA/001/2008 Ig. Baptista 339 60.401,64 12.882 47.520 Chongoroi BGA//2008 AAESMC 875 361.714,40 104.755296.736 Ganda BGA/002/2008 AAF 220 113.781,05 23.10890.673 Bocoio BGA/006/2008 KWATOCO 355 193.938,49 40.520 153.418 Ganda BGA//2008 V. Mundial 70 55.754,00 11.000 44.754 Balombo BGA/004/2008 AMMIGA 80 75.599,20 17.43458.165 Benguela BGA/003/2008 Ir. Cons.Jesus 400 244.688,58 62.454 182.234 Lobito&Benguela BGA//2008 AAF 30 38.770,04 9.22229.548 Subtotal 19.806 8.959.060 1.647.049 7.351.787 Bié Kamacupa BIE/003/2005 Accord 1.000 349.985 8.181341.804 Andulo BIE/001/2005 ADMA 1.504 444.422 11.800432.622 Catabola BIE/002/2005 Accord 600 210.002 1.100208.902 Chinguar BIE/004/2005 V. Mundial 1.100 480.695 95.931 384.764 Kuito BIE/007/2005 CARE 1.200 544.332 184.695359.637 Andulo BIE/005/2005 CARE 1.200 658.955 302.474356.481 Nharea/... BIE/006/2005 CARE 1.200 760.393 377.311383.082 All the Province BIE/001/2006 V.Mundial 250 418.110 123.090295.020 Kuito BIE/002/2006 Africare 1.500 620.928 135.481485.447 Andulo BIE/003/2006 FAS 400 188.000 94.00094.000 Chitembo BIE/001/2007 CARE 500 405.239 74.801330.438 Nharea BIE/002/2007 Africare 300 387.266 82.606304.660 Camacupa BIE/003/2007 Africare 300 387.266 82.606304.660 Subtotal 11.054 5.855.591 1.574.075 4.281.516 Huambo Bailundo I HBO/011/2005 ADRA 1.186 420.548 5.280 415.268 Catchiungo HBO/002/2005 OIKOS 750 269.537 7.150262.387 Chinjenje HBO/008/2005 CIC 352 148.333 0148.333 Londuimbali HBO/003/2005 OIKOS 750 269.942 16.150253.792 Ukuma HBO/010/2005 CIC 650 245.451 0245.451 Bailundo II HBO/004/2005 V. Mundial 1.200 789.047 369.067 419.980 Caála HBO/005/2005 V. Mundial 1.200 634.557 215.336 419.221 Longondjo HBO/009/2005 CIC 860 345.436 25.945319.491 T. Tcholohanga HBO/007/2005 OADECO 1.200 446.160 3.575 442.585 Calima HBO/006/2005 OADECO 600 232.174 0 232.174 Ekunha HBO/013/2005 IMVF 900 1.300.049 966.196333.853 Mungo HBO/012/2005 OIM 1.600 660.840 162.882497.958 Huambo HBO/016/2006 Handicap Fr. 150 309.069 212.701 96.368 Huambo HBO/001/2006 M. V. Queve 316 145.303 35.020 110.283 Bailundo HBO/012/2006 DW 1.400 342.108 86.378255.731 T. Tcholohanga HBO/003/2006 DW 911 222.371 54.678167.693 Catchiungo HBO/017/2006 DW 1.400 342.108 86.378255.731 Caála HBO/018/2006 DW 507 267.734 187.05380.681 Catchiungo HBO/020/2006 CCF 433 372.649 80.388292.261 Katchiungo HBO/019/2006 OIKOS 1.700 444.033 11.650432.383 Bailundo I HBO/004/2006 ADRA 1.200 474.382 9.346465.037 Bailundo II HBO/005/2006 V. Mundial 1.200 513.876 93.940 419.936 Caála HBO/006/2006 V. Mundial 1.000 398.750 101.090 297.660

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Londuimbali HBO/013/2006 OIKOS 826 332.230 10.800321.430 T. Tcholohanga HBO/014/2006 OADECO 900 351.978 23.650328.328 Huambo/Comunas HBO/015/2006 OADECO 1.000 358.612 22.944 335.668 All the Province HBO/002/2006 V.Mundial 250 418.110 123.090295.020 Chinjenje HBO/022/2006 CIC 320 90.480 18.09672.384 Ucuma HBO/023/2006 CIC 320 90.480 18.09672.384 Longonjo HBO/021/2006 CIC 522 115.065 23.01392.052 Londuimbali;Bailundo HBO/002/2007 V.Mundial 200 385.616 86.240299.376 Mungo HBO/020/2008 V.Mundial 200 385.616 86.240299.376 Ukuma HBO/004/2007 CIC 320 131.736 26.347105.389 Longonjo HBO/006/2008 CIC 495 174.211 34.842139.369 Chinjenje HBO/005/2008 CIC 286 135.381 27.076108.305 Mungo HBO/003/2007 OIM 600 398.223 75.705322.518 Ukuma, Longodjo, Chinjenje HBO//2008 CIC 240 324.893 26.738298.155 Subtotal 27.944 13.287.089 3.333.080 9.954.009 Huíla Chipindo HLA/002/2005 ACORD 1.200 484.515 35.284449.232 Caluquembe HLA/003/2005 ADRA 1.000 377.459 14.878362.581 Kuvango HLA/001/2005 ACORD 575 261.438 8.351253.087 Matala HLA/007/2005 CARE 750 287.938 11.515276.423 Chicomba HLA/006/2005 CARE 350 142.608 15.380127.228 Caconda HLA/005/2005 CARE 800 303.772 10.766293.006 Jamba HLA/004/2005 CARE 250 116.971 12.606104.365 Cacula/Quil. HLA/008/2005 ACORD 320 143.295 13.091130.204 Quipungo HLA/001/2007 GTZ 500 416.799 125.501291.299 Caluquembe HLA/004/2007 Mis.Cat. 444 225.783 48.980176.803 Kuvango HLA/005/2007 Mis.Cat. 390 261.207 52.660208.547 Caconda/Chicomba HLA/012/2007 CARE 855 375.164 75.416299.748 Matala/Jamba HLA/006/2007 CARE 750 375.710 77.367298.343 Lubango HLA/003/2007 OIKOs 850 491.366 96.918394.448 Subtotal 9.034 4.264.025 598.712 3.665.313 Malange Malange MAL/003/2005 ADRA 1.000 381.007 32.245348.762 Caculama MAL/001/2005 OIKOS 300 114.247 3.475110.772 Kangandala MAL/002/2005 OIKOS 300 115.314 4.856110.458 Cacuso MAL/001/2006 ADMERA 59 19.842 3.510 16.332 Kalandula MAL/001/2008 Missão 370 231.082 45.300185.782 Caculama MAL//2008 M. Católica 100 55.996 11.200 44.796 Subtotal 2.129 917.487 100.586 816.901 K.Norte All the Province KUN/001/2005 CARITAS 770 187.655 5.348 182.308 Dondo KUN/003/2008 Dom Bosco 631 443.048 143.060 299.988 Ambaca KUN/002/2008 Mis. Cat. 520 440.604 140.760 299.844 All the Province KUN/004/2008 CARITAS 160 40.909 11.824 29.085 Subtotal 2.081 1.112.217 300.991 811.225 Kunene Toda a Prov. CNE/001/2005 ACORD 1.367 492.986 30.908462.078 Kwanhama, Nam. CNE/001/2008 AMMIGA 250 260.253 17.011243.243 Subtotal 1.617 753.239 47.918 705.321 K. Kubango Menongue KKB/001/2005 CARITAS 1260 534.674 34.873 499.801 PPD's/Prov. KKB/002/2006 V. Mundial 250 410.740 112.200 298.540 Mavinga KKB/001/2006 V. Mundial 800 383.999 84.150 299.849 Menongue KKB/001/2007 V. Mundial 800 485.509 186.100 299.409

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Menongue KKB/002/2007 V. Mundial 400 358.831 77.242 281.589 Mavinga/sede KKB/005/2007 V. Mundial 480 383.744 84.480 299.264 Mavinga/C. KKB/006/2007 V. Mundial 450 375.593 76.560 299.033 Menongue KKB/004/2007 CARITAS 200 81.962 0 81.962 Rivungo KKB/003/2007 COOPIL 215 251.526 28.416223.110 Cuchi KKB/001/2008 ADC 420 285.478 24.905260.573 Subtotal 5.275 3.552.056 708.926 2.843.130 K. Sul Cassongue KUS/002/2005 V. Mundial 1.250 541.211 104.236 436.975 Quibala KUS/001/2005 ACM 1.000 364.445 15.007349.438 Mussende KUS/003/2005 CARITAS 930 270.869 8.395 262.475 Libolo KUS/004/2005 M.Católica 255 116.563 3.026 113.536 Cela KUS/001/2006 OIKOS 1.329 520.329 23.261497.069 Kilenda, Amboim, etc KUS/003/2006 Africare 700 483.935 209.316274.619 Seles e Conda KUS/002/2006 Africare 700 386.010 153.516232.494 Quibala II KUS/005/2006 ACM 1.000 318.416 26.299292.117 Cassongue II KUS/004/2006 V. Mundial 1.000 393.030 66.330 326.700 Mussende II KUS/001/2007 CARITAS 800 260.508 4.841 255.667 Sumbe,P.Am. KUS/004/2007 V.Mundial 510 549.780 221.232328.548 Gabela KUS/005/2007 GTZ 637 674.308 374.349299.959 Calulo KUS/002/2007 Dom Bosco 593 436.496 136.500 299.996 Subtotal 10.704 5.315.899 1.346.307 3.969.592 Luanda All the Province LAD/001/2006 V.Mundial 250 362.340 82.720279.620 Viana LAD/002/2006 CORV 180 328.148 130.000198.148 Viana LAD/003/2006 CCF 512 253.186 87.885165.301 Cidade LAD/001/2007 ADRA-I 661 499.635 199.973299.662 Kikuxi LAD/004/2007 GTZ 80 219.489 80.644138.845 All the Province LAD/003/2007 Dom Bosco 33 48.370 18.381 29.989 Subtotal 1.716 1.711.168 599.603 1.111.565 Lunda Sul All the Province LUS/001/2006 CARITAS 1.450 509.921 38.600 471.321 Lunda Norte Chitato LUN/001/2006 Diocese 200 57.000 12.00045.000 Xa-Muteba, etc LUN/003/2006 CARITAS 1.100 493.484 19.900 473.584 Cambulo LUN/002/2006 Ig.Met.Angola 240 123.115 5.311 117.804 Chitato, Lucapa LUN/001/2007 ADESPOV 741 294.668 29.529 265.139 Subtotal 2.281 968.267 66.740 901.527 Uíge Uíge UGE/002/2005 CARITAS 800 291.019 3.000 288.019 Negage UGE/001/2005 CARITAS 200 85.078 1.442 83.636 Sanza Pombo UGE/001/2006 ACM 345 109.589 3.060106.529 Puri UGE/001/2007 Ig.kimb.(IKA) 110 51.175 1.184 49.991 Bungo UGE/002/2008 IERA 171 87.142 2.59184.551 Negage UGE/002/2007 Paróquia/S.José 120 118.413 24.400 94.013 Maq.do Zombo UGE/004/2007 CARITAS 458 271.218 51.800219.418 Dange UGE/003/2007 MIDA 100 85.004 2.35282.651 Kimbele UGE/007/2008 MIAZAZA 225 307.633 21.250 286.383 Ambuila,Bembe e Songo UGE//2008 IKA 315 171.592 15.190156.402 Negage e Uíge UGE//2008 CARITAS 468 292.279 0 292.279 Buengas&Milunga UGE/008/2008 MIAZAZA 260 154.937 26.970 127.967 Cangola UGE/009/2008 C. Vermelha 241 174.405 36.411 137.994 Subtotal 3.813 2.199.484 189.650 2.009.834 Namibe Namibe Nam/001/2005 CARITAS 140 159.139 62.561 96.578

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Subtotal 140 159.139 62.561 96.578 Moxico Lwena (N/s) Mox/001/2005 Dom Bosco 568 542.488 443.476 99.012 Lwena, Leua, .. Mox/002/2005 Dom Bosco 1.031 574.943 75.911 499.032 Luau Mox/001/2007 OIM 692 371.385 72.130299.255 Alto Zambeze Mox/002/2007 OIM 350 330.183 65.793264.390 Luena Mox//2008 CAPDC 430 181.588 46.000135.588 Luena Mox/002/2008 C.R.Física 120 192.764 50.300 142.464 Luena Mox/001/2008 Promaica 220 237.659 48.415 189.244 7 Subtotal 3.411 2.431.008 802.024 1.628.985 Zaire N'Zeto ZAI/001/2006 Est. Des. Rural 32 35.256 7.051 28.205 Kuimba, M.Congo, S ZAI/001/2007 AFRICARE 163 206.927 126.349 80.578 Soyo/Kuim. ZAI//2007 Ig.B.N.S.J.C. 560 294.103 57.866 236.236 Nzeto ZAI//2007 Ig.B.N.S.J.C. 350 220.564 44.506 176.058 Tomboco ZAI//2007 EDR 60 33.411 6.682 26.729 Noki ZAI//2008 Vida Sagrada 280 290.367 63.660 226.707 Nzeto ZAI//2008 EDR 100 98.234 19.647 78.587 7 Subtotal 1.545 1.178.862 325.761 853.101

Total number of projects: 177 Total 104.556 53.393.899 11.789.328 41.644.348

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Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis (including assumptions in the analysis)

An economic and financial analysis was not carried out.

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Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members Responsibility/ Names Title Unit Specialty Lending

Supervision/ICR Maria Margarida Baessa Executive Assistant AFMAO Mendes Aniceto Timoteo Bila Senior Operations Officer AFTAR Sean Bradley Senior Social Development Spec EASSO Inguna Dobraja Advisor to Executive Director EDS20 Marcelo Jorge Fabre Senior Social Development Spec AFTCS Olivier J. Lambert Sector Leader MIGOP Elvis Teodoro Langa E T Consultant AFTFM Elisabeth Maier Consultant COCPO Esteves Mbangu E T Consultant AFMAO Maria Isabel Nhassengo- Procurement Asst. AFCS2 Massingue Jonathan Nyamukapa Senior Financial Management Spec. AFTFM Pia Peeters Senior Social Development Spec AFTCS Domingas de Fatima Rego Team Assistant AFMAO Pegado Francesco Sarno Consultant HDNSP

(b) Staff Time and Cost Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) Stage of Project Cycle USD Thousands (including No. of staff weeks travel and consultant costs) Lending FY02 8 81.13 FY03 35 324.20 FY04 0.00 FY05 0.00 FY06 0.00 FY07 0.00 FY08 0.00

Total: 43 405.33 Supervision/ICR FY02 0.00 FY03 11.73 FY04 8 95.89 FY05 16 87.09 FY06 20 113.12 FY07 18 100.86 FY08 12 70.08 FY09 17 0.00 Total: 91 478.77

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Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results

a) Stakeholder Surveys8 An end-of-project survey was conducted with the IPs and FAO to evaluate the following aspects: (i) evaluation of the level of reintegration achieved by the ex-combatants assisted through the implemented sub-projects; (ii) a critical analyze of the support received from IRSEM (central, provincial and local levels) to implement the sub-projects; (iii) identification of the main difficulties and constraints for sub-project implementation; and (iv) the lessons learnt that could be useful for the implantation of new sub-projects to support the reintegration of vulnerable groups in Angola.

The key findings on the experience of the IP participation into ADRP included:

(i) the program played a critical role in supporting the peace process in Angola and a significant part of the ex-combatants are social and economic reintegrated in their communities of resettlement. (ii) The level of economic reintegration could be higher if the investment per beneficiary was in accordance with the Angolan cost of life and the sub-project installments were paid by IRSEM/FMPU in-time. (iii) The main difficulties in implementing the sub-projects were related with the long time taken by IRSEM to analyze the sub-project proposals, to process the payments, mainly the second and the third payments, making difficult to enroll and to keep the ex-combatants involved into the sub-projects. Frequently the ex- combatants, due to the long time required to implement the sub-project activities moved away from the area and new beneficiaries have to be identified and approved by IRSEM to fill the vacancies. (iv) The FMPU did not understand the PIM procedures and has considered as non- eligible expenditures that were made under the sub-project objectives to respond to unexpected events or to the increase of prices, which posed additional delays in processing the request of payments. (v) To implement the sub-projects respecting the rigorous requirements of financial management and procurement it will be necessary to train the IP staff before the starting of the subprojects and to provide a permanent support to the sub-project management to respect the established procedures. (vi) Sometimes the IRSEM provincial staff was not able to provide the appropriate answers to the implementation problems because they have problems of communication with the central structure and with FMPU. (vii) The delays in funding the last sub-projects has created serious problems to the IP respecting the intended beneficiaries (already identified during the sub-project designing) and their financial management, as a result of the investments made after the contracting with IRSEM with their own resources.

8 Based on the answers to a questionnaire sent to the IP and FAO project management.

35

(viii) The implementation of the ADRP sub-projects has allowed reinforcing the activities that the IP was implementing in the area, allowing a better use of the resources made available by other donors. (ix) An important lesson learnt is that the sub-project budget should include a budget line to compensate the partner for the depreciation and sometimes destruction of the IP assets (mainly vehicles) during the implementation. (x) In the future, a better linkage with government entities, employers and development programs should be ensured to facilitate a sustainable reintegration of the beneficiaries. (xi) ADRP was an important step in moving the IP from emergency to development- oriented interventions and it has strengthened their human capacity to implement new reintegration projects.

The management of FAO project supports the IP comments, formulating the following additional findings:

a) Collaboration with IRSEM was a bit difficult in the beginning where there was an important lack of communication; this was solved through the recruitment and out posting of FAO staff in the main IRSEM provincial offices. b) The implementation of ADRP projects allowed a better integration of FAO with Ministry of Agriculture through support to EDA and veterinary services, and integration of FAO and IRSEM in the agricultural sector. c) The main difficulty was the communication among partners in the beginning of the process. d) The experience and the results of the ADRP Project were useful in designing similar activities in other countries covered by MDRP.

b) Outputs of the interviews conducted by IRSEM local representatives

Social context

36

Economic context

37

38

Indicators of effectiveness and efficiency:

39

c) Questionnaires’ Results/Graphs - External Evaluation Mission

Methodology of the evaluation

40

41

42

43

Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results (if any)

No stakeholder workshop was carried out.

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Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR

Brief Comments on the Draft Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the PGDR/ADRP ______

REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA Institute for Social and Professional Reintegration of Ex-Combatants

Ms. Maria Correia Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) Program Manager

0922/00.01/GAB.DIR.G/IRSEM/2009

SUBJECT: Brief Comments on the Draft Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the PGDR/ADRP sent by the MDRP

Dear Madam,

1. Further to our analysis of the draft Implementation Completion Report on the Angola Demobilization and Reintegration Program (ADRP/PGDR), and our evaluation of the same, we have the following comments:

i. The report is well written, highlighting various relevant and significant aspects of the implementation of the ADRP/PGDR. We would like to recognize the quality of the work. ii. As noted in the report, the ADRP/PGDR, as an emergency program, was implemented in a country that was in a post-conflict period and where the supply of goods, services and specialized consultants represented a serious challenge. For IRSEM and its Implementing, Institutional and Strategic Partners, this was an important opportunity to learn and garner valuable lessons and capacity, with a view to maintaining peace and national stability through the reintegration of ex-combatants and associated vulnerable groups. iii. With regard to the overall ratings of the Program, in terms of the Recipient and the Bank, we are generally in agreement. Given the enormous effort of the implementing agency IRSEM and the particular context in which the ADRP/PGDR was implemented, however, we consider that the performance of the Recipient could be elevated to “satisfactory” for the following reasons: a. The Program was implemented for the most part by nationals, with IRSEM fully assuming its role of national execution. b. On the other hand, it was the first time that IRSEM assumed complete responsibility for a program of this dimension; as you know, past demobilization and reintegration processes were the control of the United Nations.

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c. Contracting of an independent Financial Management and Procurement Unit (FMPU/UGFA) in order to create the capacity required of the Program, was a condition of project effectiveness of the ADRP/PGDR, and due to the procedures themselves was a slow process. d. The goal of the FMPU/UGFA was to provide advice and/or technical assistance in financial management and procurement to the Program, as per the World Bank procedures laid out in the Grant Agreement. e. The World Bank duly alerted IRSEM to the quality of the services provided by the firm responsible for managing UGFA, for which we were again grateful. This said, fearing a repetition of the long process of contracting a new firm to replace KPMG/Frennan, taking into account the emergency nature of the project and knowing that this was a condition of eligibility, we were left in a very difficult situation; after all, the cancellation of the KPMG/Frennan contract could have led to a stoppage in the project, with corollary implications on peace and stability in the country. At the time, the absence of the Task Manager in Angola was noted. f. Finally when we were forced to terminate the contract, which took place in the final phase of the project (April 2008), it was done at a time when little could be done to reduce the damage done. g. As to the irregularities identified, these were withheld for submission for payment; moreover in the interests of the project, we are still awaiting a response from the Firm [KPMG/Frennan] given that these processes were under their responsibility.

2. IRSEM, in its capacity as government Agency and implementing agency of ADRP/PGDR, greatly appreciates the World Bank’s prompt response it demonstrated to the government’s request for support to DDR in Angola and hopes to count on future support.

IRSEM CENTRAL, LUANDA, 22 JUNE, 2009

General Director

Antonio Francisco de Andrade General

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Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders

n/a

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Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents

Technical Annex for a proposed grant of SDR 24 million (US$ 33 million equivalent) to the Republic of Angola for an Angola Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project – World Bank, March 7, 2003

Integrated Safeguards Data Sheet (ISDS) – World Bank, March 2003

IDA Development Grant Agreement H027- ANG – September 2004 and its amendments

European Community Grant TF054552ANG related to IDA Grant Number H027-ANG – December 2005

Implementation Completion Memorandum for the Special Project to Support the Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in the Framework of the Peace Process in Angola – World Bank, December 2005

Independent Progress Review of the Angola Demobilization and Reintegration Project (ADRP) – Creative Associates International, January 2006

Annual Independent Evaluation of the Angola Demobilization and Reintegration Program (ADRP) – Creative Associates International, September 2007

Annual Independent Evaluation ADRP – Angola Demobilization and Reintegration Program - Cristina Udelsmann Rodrigues and João Neves, December 2008

Implementation Status Reports and aide memoires throughout the life of the project

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Annex 10. Approval from RVP on PDO Clarification

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