Patricia Wallace Ingraham Syracuse University

Rethinking the Building Bridges over Troubled Waters: Merit as a Guide Conceptual Foundations of : An Exchange

Patricia Wallace Ingraham is Th e federal has developed in fi ts and starts, to. Its own top administrative unit — the Civil Service Distinguished Professor of Public with specifi c reforms fashioned in reaction to the particu- Commission— was oddly disjointed, having responsi- Administration at Syracuse University ’s Maxwell School. She was the founding lar political considerations of a given time. Yet the con- bility for both advising the president on political director of the Alan K. Campbell Public cept of merit has remained a central, albeit malleable, appointments and ensuring that those appointees did Affairs Institute and a fellow of the National sometimes neglected, and perhaps quaint ideal. Reinven- not intrude into the operations of the civil service.1 Academy of Public Administration. Dr. Ingraham has received the Dwight tion, effi ciency, and eff ectiveness must honor excellence Th e hierarchical classifi cation system stipulated by the Waldo, Donald Stone, and Paul Van Riper and the notion of as a calling. law ensured that bureaucratic processes and operations awards for distinguished research career would be key characteristics of the system as it grew. and distinguished service from the American Society for Public Administration, n 1883, nearly two years after President James A. Each of these contained the seeds of dysfunction. But and the John Gaus Award for distinguished Garfi eld had been shot by a federal offi ce seeker more fundamentally, except for a brief time immedi- career contributions from the American who believed he had been treated unfairly in his ately preceding and following the passage of the Pend- Political Science Association. Her research I interests include the performance of public job search, Congress passed the Pendleton Act. Th e leton Act, the system did not earn the respect of the organizations and leading and managing act was intended to restore professional competence citizens whom it was designed to serve. Hugh Heclo the people of those organizations. to the federal service and signifi cantly limit the observes, “ Repeatedly, the energy behind civil service E-mail : [email protected] . intrusion of politics into its composition and conduct. reform has come from exploiting public dissatisfac- Th e Pendleton Act had three main provisions: (1) It tions and distrust of government. … What the public provided that admission to the federal service be based is not prepared to accept, indeed what it has been on open, competitive testing; (2) it prohibited fi ring persistently educated to reject in a political culture of federal employees for any reason other than cause; and bashing, is the idea that the civil service (3) it provided that no political pressure or coercion itself could be a high professional calling ” (2000, be exerted on federal employees for contributions or 230 – 31). specifi c actions. Th e act also directed that federal work be arranged in hierarchical classes and that appoint- Did the system, despite these problems, instill merit, ment and promotion occur in accordance with that the objective it sought? Should we now be referring to structure. Th e Pendleton Act, in classic incremental the contemporary civil service system as a merit sys- American fashion, initially covered only 10 percent of tem? Current interchangeability of the terms would new employees. Other members of the service could suggest so. In fact, some debates about federal govern- be “ blanketed in ” by special order of the president ment reforms that are now on the table suggest that ( Ingraham 1995 ; Van Riper 1958). Over time, and changing the procedures of the civil service system with ebbs and fl ows, they were. would fundamentally attack the Seventy years later, during the concept of merit ( Partnership for Eisenhower administration, the … characteristics of systems that Public Service 2005 ). We know, system established by the Pendle- are designed to foster merit and however, that civil service sys- ton Act had expanded to cover those of systems notable only tems are not meritorious in many 86 percent of the U.S. federal for bureaucratic features have ways. We also know that charac- service (Pfi ff ner 2000, 30). become intricately commingled. teristics of systems that are de- Rendering civil service synony- signed to foster merit and those In this less than spectacular of systems notable only for bu- fashion, the administrative sys- mous with merit has become reaucratic features have become tem that is now most frequently commonplace but has caused intricately commingled. Render- referred to as the merit system was untold confusion, obfuscation, ing civil service synonymous born and grew. It never abolished and dissatisfaction. with merit has become common- patronage, nor was it intended place but has caused untold

486 Public Administration Review • July | August 2006 confusion, obfuscation, and dissatisfaction. Indeed, notable for their Weberian structures, and merit, former President Jimmy Carter advocated for the whose emphasis is not on structure but on the value Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 by arguing that of public service, quality, and neutrality. Merit ’s there was “ no merit in the merit system! ” ( Ingraham core features are qualifi cations, competence, and the 1995, 76 ). Th e president was talking about the worst absence of political favoritism. In 1935, Lucius characteristics of a rigid civil service system and bu- Wilmerding, writing for the Commission of Inquiry reaucracy: excessive rules, slowness, and apparent lack on Public Service Personnel, was straightforward of accountability and sensitivity to the world beyond about the separate defi nitions and merit ’ s special bureaucratic boundaries. Th at does not characterize features: “Th e civil service is the personnel of the merit. Indeed, it is these dysfunctional bureaucratic administrative apparatus of government ” (1935, 2). characteristics of the civil service system that have He then broached the subject of a meritorious civil been the targets of past and contemporary reforms, service: “Th e real problem is to explain how men of including those aimed at better presidential direction character and competence are to be discovered and and control. Merit and meritorious service have not how, when discovered, they are to be induced to been maligned. Th at is also true in relation to the enter and remain in the public service” (1935, 8; current emphasis on performance. Th ese reforms do emphasis added). Th e civil service system, in short, not undermine merit and are, in fact, compatible with is the administrative system that governs the opera- merit if public action is meritorious in pursuit of better tions and procedures of daily government activities. performance. Some kind of administrative apparatus has existed as long as governments themselves; some structure Th at is why merit needs to be considered separately as for carrying out the business of government will an end in itself. Merit is having not only the necessary always be necessary. In the 21st century, enduring skills and competencies to fi ll the job in question but tensions between partisan politics and administra- also a public service character — a desire to act, not for tion, the defi nitional diffi culties of separating the individual self-interest but for a broader good. Merit merit system from the civil service system, and the is related to values, ideals, and ethics, to the appropri- disjointed growth of both merit and the civil ate role of the civil service in democracy, and thus to service underpin most civil service reform eff orts. governance in a democratic society. For government, But separating the two is a critical place to begin merit and meritorious service are the objectives of the eff ective reform. civil service system; they are related to public service in the highest sense of the term. Th e confusion — and To deal fi rst with basic defi nitions, Merriam-Webster ’ s a good bit of the contemporary debate — arises when 9th New Collegiate Dictionary provides this defi nition merit is used interchangeably with civil service to of merit: “ to deserve or to earn; to be worthy of or describe the administrative apparatus of government entitled to. ” Th is comports with the emphasis on management. For example, the Offi ce of Personnel neutral testing and fairness in promotion and reward Management ’ s history of the U.S. civil service is titled in the civil service. It does not, however, convey the Biography of an Ideal (OPM 2003). Despite the fre- passionately moral dimension considered critical by quency with which it occurs, existing structures, pro- many of the early merit reformers: “ Offi ce would rise cesses, and procedures should not necessarily be in public respect, and government itself would have a defi ned as the merit system . Many of these have been higher dignity in the eyes of those who saw it spurn- created or adopted, not in pursuit of merit but in ing servility, while seeking the service of the ablest and accordance with the long-term impact of bureaucrati- the worthiest among its citizens ” ( Eaton 1880, 401 ). zation, standardization, and haphazard incremental policy development. itself is not central Such a lofty purpose contrasts sharply with Merriam- to merit, although both emphasize neutrality and Webster ’ s simple defi nition of civil service: “ the ad- qualifi cations. A focus on these commonalities of merit ministrative services of a government; esp. one in and civil service, but not on the potential separability, which appointments are determined by competitive deters the careful analysis that should be central to examination. ” However, even at the time of the reform eff orts today. government-wide reform in 1883 (there had been an earlier, even more limited merit experiment during the I argue here that because merit is a value, it can be administration of President Rutherford B. Hayes), pursued in a variety of ways. It does not reside in a there was occasional reference to the merit system specifi c mechanism, such as the civil service, for its because it was hoped that the reforms would inject pursuit. merit into a civil service dominated by patronage. But the fundamental elements of merit were competitive Civil Service and Merit: Considering examinations, the absence of partisan political pres- the Separability sure, and the prohibition of fi ring except for cause. Scholars and reformers alike have attempted to Even then, the underlying structure was assumed to clarify the distinctions between civil service systems, be faulty.

Building Bridges over Troubled Waters 487 Commingled Growth: Values to Principles; practical impact of numerous decisions to create Clerks to Technicians narrow exceptions was to promote unguided diff er- As part of a 1998 eff ort to reassess the impact of the ences. A coherent approach to the ideal of merit — Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 — at that time, the despite the consistent growth in its principles — was fi rst major reform of the civil service system in nearly similarly dissipating. 100 years — James Pfi ff ner considered the transforma- tion of the concept of merit over the years. He noted Considering Merit and Fragmentation that the merit principles — specifi c statements of the Not all of the fragmentation is the result of recent values inherent in the merit ideal — have grown along events, however. Some fragmentation of a carefully with the civil service: originally three, they now tech- bounded centralized model has always existed. Th e nically number nine, but with “ subprinciples ” reach Pendleton Act contained language that gave special 13 (U.S.C., Title V, § 2301). In their current form, consideration to military veterans in both hiring and they range from guaranteeing “ fair and equitable ” promotion. Special authorities for professionals tested treatment to all employees and applicants to the elsewhere — lawyers, for example — have also existed protection of whistleblowers. Pfi ff ner also observes, for decades ( Ingraham 1995 ). From the high of the however, that as the principles have grown in number, 86 percent civil service coverage reported during the they have exhibited an increasingly negative stance. Eisenhower presidency, the number of federal employ- Th eir intent is now primarily to protect from specifi c ees covered by traditional civil service provisions had actions thought to constrain individual rights rather declined substantially to less than 50 percent by 2000 than to support specifi c actions that would advance (OPM 2003). Th e abolition during the 1980s of the merit (Pfi ff ner 2000). Although this point might seem standardized examinations that had been designed to obvious, it is central to a better understanding of ensure merit and competence (but were found to dis- contemporary perceptions of merit. As merit has criminate against persons of color) was one contributing “ aged, ” the protections from politics it was created to factor. A rapid growth in “excepted authorities ”— guarantee have morphed into much broader means of appointment that did not require standard- protections. ized testing — was another. Th e downsizing of government, use of temporary workers, and contract- Th e civil service has also undergone changes. It has ing for the provision of goods and services were also increased in size and scope, refl ecting the growth of very signifi cant contributors. Th e creation of an government generally and the increasing complexity independent Postal Service, the hiving off of agency- of the tasks assumed. Th e exact size of government is specifi c personnel systems — most recently, the now diffi cult to ascertain because such practices as Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the contracting and the use of temporary and part-time Department of Defense (DoD) — and a general sense workers obscure precise numbers. Generally, however, that the old civil service system was a problem, the total size of government spiked during World not a solution, were additional evidence of the War II, declined thereafter, and has remained rela- dissatisfaction. tively stable, at about 2 million, in the years since. “ Reinventing government ” initiatives led to a tempo- Th e point to be taken here is that, although many of rary reduction, but various post – 9/11 measures these actions were relatively small and considered created gradual increases ( Kettl 2005, 363 ). What isolated from other qualities of the civil service (the happened to the civil service inside those numbers, DHS and DoD are clearly the exceptions), their however, is as important as the total. In 1950, “ more cumulative eff ect was serious distortion and lack of than half the classifi ed civil service was in lower level focus. Hugh Heclo (1977) summarizes the reason: clerical jobs, GS4 or below. … By the year 2000 [such “ Most eff orts to plan and coordinate the civil service jobs constituted] only about 15 percent ” (Ingraham system as a whole have been accepted only grudgingly, 2005, 300). Furthermore, by 2000, fully 10 percent if at all, by Congress; by contrast, detailed administra- of the total workforce occupied engineering and tive interventions on those personnel issues of particu- scientifi c positions (OPM 2005). lar interest to individual congressmen fi nd ready acceptance on Capitol Hill. ” Th e impact of these Th e mismatch between a rigid system of classifi cation, informal reforms was to create sets of systems that, in a system of protections that contributed to rigidity theory, continued to constitute a federal merit system. and standardization, an increasingly professional and But did they? In a word, no. technical workforce, and the need for greater fl exibil- ity in recruiting, retaining, and rewarding the public Each of these exceptions contributed to additional service led to a predictable outcome: enormous frag- rules, regulations, and oversight mechanisms in the mentation of the very system that standardization and civil service. Continued adherence to the idea of rigidity were theoretically preserving. Th ough it sym- standardization created very strong structural disin- bolically continued to promote not only organization- centives to civil service reform, even in a fragmenting wide but also government-wide standardization, the reality. Indeed, it is possible to categorize many of

488 Public Administration Review • July | August 2006 the “ fl exibilities ” adopted from the time of the Civil successfully challenged both the DHS and the DoD Service Reform Act onward as “ rigid innovations ” — in court, signifi cantly delaying implementation of the that is, some relaxing of the rules and regulations but proposed reforms in those organizations. Th is has not only within tightly prescribed conditions and over- been a friendly debate, and it has demonstrated very sight procedures and only in carefully (and centrally) diff erent views of the future federal civil service and selected cases.2 Even innovation, in other words, the values and priorities within which it will operate. proceeded in bureaucratic terms. Th is stand-off is not an aberration in the long history In recent years, the strong emphasis on performance of merit in the federal government. Rather, it frames has created new separations: distinctions between in nearly classic terms the long-held fear of political agencies that are high performers patronage and political intrusion and those that are not. Perfor- In recent years, the strong into merit — as pursued by cur- mance forces reconsideration of rent structures of the civil ser- the idea of merit and civil service emphasis on performance has vice. Regardless of whether the as synonymous. “ Competent and created new separations: distinc- unions ’ perceptions are correct, qualifi ed ” — cornerstones of early tions between agencies that are they are framed precisely by the defi nitions of merit — become high performers and those that history and evolution of the threshold conditions but not are not. Performance forces debate: Th e sanctity of merit and ultimate measures of success. reconsideration of the idea of (by association) the civil service Performance on the job becomes can be ensured only if elected as critical as qualifi cations for the merit and civil service as offi cials and their appointees job. Th e performance focus (both synonymous. operate with clearly defi ned individual and organizational) boundaries and constraints. In has deepened over the past decade. It is very strongly this view, fl exibility is not the path to better perfor- refl ected in the reforms at the DHS and DoD. It is mance or more eff ective government; it is simply an the rationale for President Bush ’ s Management opportunity for political abuse of merit. Agenda. Under the terms of the Bush administration ’ s proposed Working for America legislation, perfor- Considering Merit and Power mance would move center stage, government-wide. In these terms, contemporary eff orts at reform can be viewed as purely political eff orts to rebalance power Many other voices have joined the chorus. In its in the executive branch. To some extent, they are report on 21st Century Challenges, the Government ( Ingraham 1995; Pfi ff ner 1988 ). Th e milieu in which Accountability Offi ce argues, “ In many cases, the the seeds of contemporary federal bureaucracy were government is still trying to do business in ways that planted was clearly one whose tensions could not are based on conditions, priorities, and approaches be easily reconciled. As government grew, confl icts that existed decades ago … to successfully navigate between the executive and legislative branches over transformations across the government, it must funda- appropriate direction and control were inevitable. mentally examine not only its business practices, but Scott James recently wrote of the presidency that “ its also its outmoded organizational structures, manage- constituent elements emerged piecemeal over the long ment approaches, and, in some cases, outdated mis- course of American history, the product of constitu- sions ” (GAO 2005, 8). Th e Merit Systems Protection tional ambiguities, political and electoral necessity, Board, a steadfast guardian of merit, observed, “ If the developments in technology and social organization, new systems deliver what is promised, the human and unvarnished presidential ambition ” (2005, 4). capital rules and regulations will be more fl exible, Were we to substitute bureaucracy for the presidency managers will be more involved in and accountable in all but the last phrase, the description would be for decisions, and HR staff s will receive the resources quite apt. and support they need. If the new systems don ’ t deliver, we may miss an opportune time for change ” Furthermore, as patronage reached its peak during the (MSPB 2004, 11). 19th century, both the president and members of Congress were highly dependent on the practice for In the American tradition, however, one set of values party building, reward of personal favors, and agency and priorities has been quickly challenged and ques- shaping. Abolishing patronage in favor of merit meant tioned by another. Federal unions, whose power and ceding a great deal of power — which largely explains infl uence waxes and wanes with partisan political the very limited way in which the reform was initially changes, but whose members have been steadfast adopted. Over time, and notably with the growth of supporters of the multiple protections now off ered by bureaucracy, the power of the president to appoint the the civil service, have vociferously opposed the perfor- political leaders of executive agencies, to direct modest mance focus and the move away from traditional program changes, and fundamentally, to monitor processes and procedures. Union leaders have thus far bureaucratic activities on a daily basis if desired was

Building Bridges over Troubled Waters 489 conceded to have an advantage in the direction and in that environment, most debates are about power. control department (but see Rosenbloom 2000 ). How do merit, the civil service, and the president fare Carpenter argues, in fact, that in such debates? Th e sheer size of the bureaucracy, the legal insularity of its structures and members, and its U.S. national bureaucracy is fi rmly rooted in stability over time create natural centers of power. For the executive branch. Th is does not belie the presidents with relatively short windows of opportu- forceful harnessing power of Congress … but nity for policy change, both bureaucratic size and various attempts to create more “ legislative ” insularity are natural challenges. Size and insularity forms of bureaucracy — in councils and commit- become natural policy targets for change, not only in tees, in independent commissions, and in the arena of civil service reform but also in the arena government corporations — have been dwarfed of budget cutting and cost saving. So a core diff erence by the continued growth of hierarchical and between merit and civil service deserves restating: Th e largely centralized executive departments. Th e size of bureaucracy is not linked to merit. Decreasing executive nature of the U.S. administrative state bureaucratic size does not lead to decreasing merit. remains its most enduring and telling feature. Decreasing bureaucratic insularity to improve respon- (2005, 65 – 66) siveness to presidential or congressional direction could be more directly linked to merit issues if due As a result, presidential power over the bureaucracy care is not taken. But if bureaucratic size and structure has become more apparent in policy debates. Th e are serious problems, and the civil service is now number of presidential appointees steadily increased notable for these bureaucratic characteristics, the during the last half of the 20th century, as did the structure of the service itself may be as much of a methods of appointment to those positions. Th e threat to true merit as improved political direction. Senior Executive Service, created by the Civil Service Reform Act, contained a provision mandating that 10 Th e reform problem is this: If the core elements of the percent of its ranks be fi lled by political appointment. merit ideal can be untangled from the mundane com- When Scotty Campbell, the reform’ s architect, ponents of the civil service, and if the relationship declared it to be a reform that could serve both merit between the president and the civil service system is and presidential interests, Ronald Reagan promptly one that necessitates both fl exibility and responsive- put that assertion to the test (Ingraham and Ban ness, can elements of reform that continue to preserve 1988). Reagan ’ s political management strategy was a and value merit but also dismantle some of the civil clear eff ort to bypass career decision makers whenever service crust be defi ned? possible ( Ingraham and Ban 1986 ). Technically, he did not cross the political abuse line, but the clear attitude Elements of Reform: Reinforcing toward merit —as well as a neutral and professional the Bridge or Eroding the Foundation? civil service —was that they were not valued com- modities. Such stark examples have not been as clearly Performance and Merit Are Compatible present in more recent presidencies, but concerted Th ere is little doubt that effi ciency as a measure of eff orts to better direct and control have continued. performance has always been important to both civil service systems and merit. It would be hard to argue, In fact, presidential direction and control eff orts are for example, that actions that purposely squandered central to many of the debates about current reform public moneys are meritorious. Alexander Hamilton ’ s and current defi nitions of merit. In a nutshell, the writings in the Federalist Papers and his actions after dilemma is this: Th e president ’ s legitimate authority to 1789 argued for both structures and actions that direct the executive branch must be recognized. Th e support a government that is able to meet citizen career civil service, whose legitimacy hinges on its expectations ( Carpenter 2005 ). Prior to the passage of members ’ competence and expertise, has a legitimate the Pendleton Act, measures directed toward the more duty to be responsive to those directives. But “ loyalty orderly classifi cation and reward of federal employees that argues back, ” as Heclo terms it, assumes a level of were passed (Van Riper 1958). Scientifi c administra- expertise that permits questioning political directives tion, however, was the real milestone in cementing if they are questionable or unsound — and most effi ciency and neutrality onto civil service. Woodrow assuredly if they are illegal (Heclo 1999, 132). If no Wilson ’ s work in this regard was very infl uential; so, dissent is tolerated, both merit and the civil service too, was the work of early theorists who argued — have failed. Eventually, the elected offi cials who have convincingly, so it seems — that as in the private taken such a stance will fail as well. Th us, merit and sector, government work could be standardized, eff ective political direction imply a level of mutual measured, and reduced to its most simple and effi cient trust and respect. level ( Ingraham 1995, chap. 3 ). Oddly, some of the early debates about the issue occurred within govern- But that mutual trust and respect must be earned and ment, between the Bureau of Effi ciency and the Civil exercised in an intensely political environment. And Service Commission. Th ey centered on the most

490 Public Administration Review • July | August 2006 eff ective structures for achieving effi cient outputs Service) or were broadly based in the demonstration (Van Riper 1958, chap. 12). project title of the Civil Service Reform Act. None was as sweeping as the changes adopted in the DHS Th e relationship between merit and effi ciency is some- and DoD. Th ose changes, in combination with those what more complex. Essentially, both competence and of the Intelligence Community, other proposed neutrality are the foundations of effi ciency in that agency-specifi c changes (NASA), the Government they permit the appropriate skills to be applied to the Performance and Results Act, the Presidential Man- requisite task. In this sense, merit and bureaucratic agement Agenda, the Offi ce of Management and theory are conjoined. Th at neutrality had become the Budget ’ s Program Assistance Rating Tool program, ascendant value was startlingly clear in an annual and now the proposed Working for America legisla- report from the fi rst director of the Bureau of the tion, are intended to bring the performance focus to Budget, General Charles Dawes: most of government but within the context of a given agency ’ s mission ( Kettl 2005 ). Much as we love the President, if Congress, in its omnipotence over appropriations and in Has that focus obliterated merit? No, it hasn’ t. But it accordance with its authority over policy, passed has sparked new thought about the ideal. Th e Offi ce a law that garbage should be put on the White of Personnel Management, the Government Account- House steps, it would be our regrettable duty, as ability Offi ce, and many single agencies have propos- a bureau, in an impartial, nonpolitical, and als for “modernizing merit,” that is, new ways in nonpartisan way to advise the Executive and the which government organizations must act to be eff ec- Congress as to how the largest amount of gar- tive. New competencies to support merit include bage could be spread in the most expeditious better communication abilities, specialized coordina- and economical manner. ( Ingraham 1995, 38 ) tion and collaboration skills, and an improved sense of partnering with other organizations and levels of Predictably, this crystal-clear defi nition was quickly government (NAPA 2002). Th e Government Ac- challenged. Under President Franklin D. Roosevelt, countability Offi ce and the intelligence community eff ectiveness rose to at least par with effi ciency; that is, speak of “transforming merit” and a “transformed considerations other than the purest effi ciency mea- government, ” respectively. Both emphasize changed sures became important. Various sets of reforms in the structures of government, transformed management years since have emphasized broader civic defi nitions practices, and an emphasis on the networked nature of of effi ciency and eff ectiveness, and meritorious con- the contemporary world (Sanders 2005). All of these duct has been associated with both. Th e Civil Service changes propose simplifi ed and more fl exible internal Reform Act of 1978, for example, introduced merit structures that will support more eff ective action and pay, which was based on individual performance better performance— under the umbrella of merit. appraisals, but also provided protection for whistle- blowers who publicized inappropriate — including For the civil service, the implications are profound. grossly ineffi cient — actions and behavior in their Chief among these is increased focus not only on organizations. individual performance but also on the potential for that performance to be assessed from an external Th e advent of New Public Management reforms — perspective. Th is, indeed, is far removed from a defi ni- contracting for services, performance contracts, clearer tion of merit based on protection from external political direction — returned both effi ciency and intrusion for a civil service accustomed to those individual performance to the spotlight but also protections. focused on organizational performance ( Kettl 2005 ). Th is development again clearly linked individual Bureaucratic Clutter Is Not Merit, but Neither Is performance to organizational mission — and organi- Rule Simplifi cation without Direction zational mission and performance to the broader In the years since the Civil Service Reform Act of public good in one important sense. In another sense, 1978, key elements of reform have emerged again however, these reforms directly challenged defi nitions and again. Two of the most prominent elements are of merit that had come to rely on standardization, simplifi cation and fl exibility. Simplifi cation predictability, and broad security. reforms — elimination of unnecessary rules and regula- tions, reduction of multiple overhead controls and Th e problem in the United States was that the chal- appeal mechanisms, and elimination of processes that lenge was not supported by legislation. Expectations deter timely work — are intended to improve clarity were government-wide, but the legislative actions that about government operations, improve accountability embodied them were most often agency specifi c. through that better clarity, and enhance productivity. Changes in the federal government resulted from In other nations, such as the United Kingdom, simpli- legislation directed at a single agency (e.g., the Federal fi cation reforms have included the reshaping of large Aviation Administration, the Internal Revenue ministries, creating small, single-mission agencies

Building Bridges over Troubled Waters 491 whose purpose, productivity, and remaining rules are Furthermore, because the scope of bargaining is lim- easier to understand ( Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004 ). ited, in practice these confl icts are waged over fairly In the United States, the reforms have focused on narrow fi elds— work conditions, for example. Federal simple — and frequently symbolic — reduction of rules union membership is extensive if the count includes and other bureaucratic clutter. represented members, not just dues-paying members, but it varies substantially among the major federal Th e need for these simplifi cation measures provides a unions. Collective bargaining ranges over a wide range classic example of the obfuscation of merit over time. of occupations (Ingraham 2005). Patent Offi ce law- It can be argued, for example, that if simplifi cation yers are unionized, many employees of the Border creates new fl exibilities within an organization, eff ec- Patrol are unionized, and many lower-level employees tive employees and managers use those fl exibilities of the Internal Revenue Service are unionized, for appropriately to achieve better public service. In this example. When current reform discussions began in case, “appropriately ” is the key word for merit —the the DoD, it was determined that negotiations would meritorious employee acts in the broader interests of be necessary with literally thousands of bargaining the program, the organization, and the government. units ( Partnership for Public Service 2005 ). In short, Abolishing rules without clearly establishing new rules the numbers are large and the dimensions complex. of the game, however, introduces not greater clarity but greater confusion. Furthermore, asking public Traditionally, however, it has been the stance of service employees to act diff erently without changing national union leadership to present a united front, the legal umbrella of legitimacy that shields them from built on a premise that resists organizational reforms reprisal is unfair. Many examples of this are provided and rule-reducing changes because it perceives that by the Clinton administration’ s reinventing govern- fewer rules will lead to greater political intrusion. ment initiatives. When regulatory waivers for non- sense rules proved hard to come by in some agencies, Change always introduces a lack of clarity that is leaders and managers who believed in the reform ’s anathema to collective bargaining agreements. Both purpose had two choices: behave as usual and lose the the history and theory of the civil service demonstrate opportunity, or seize the opportunity and take the risk that if new operating procedures are not made clear, of bureaucratic retribution from higher-ups in the organizational resistance will increase. At a 2004 organization. Sanders describes this tension: “ Th ere is meeting at the Government Accountability Offi ce, for a good reason why many reinvention eff orts are clan- example, Colleen Kelley, the national president of the destine. When they are not, some reinvention leaders National Treasury Employees Union argued, “ Th e pay the ultimate organizational price” (1998, 50). federal employee is not afraid of change if the change is fair and the changes are made clear ” (GAO/ Th is starkly describes the diff erence between merit National Commission on the Public Service 2004, 9). and civil service. If “ doing the right thing ” is always Th is statement assumes that the old rules, however defi ned as “ just follow the rules, ” civil service is numerous, were clear. It also assumes that the path to fundamentally bureaucratic. Th e sense of broad change can be precisely specifi ed. Again, both history common purpose that should underpin merit in the and theory suggest the diffi culty of meeting that federal service is substantially diminished by such a challenge. punitive hierarchical setting. Th e changes that are now under way in both the DHS Merit, broadly defi ned, rests on a foundation of com- (MaxHR) and the DoD (National Security Personnel mon purpose among members of the public service, System, or NSPS) are instructive. Both move away elected offi cials, and citizens. All of the relationships in from the strong role that collective bargaining has this governance equation have some troublesome played in workplace conditions toward performance dimensions: interagency rivalry, political control, and rewards and more stringent disciplinary systems. Both multiple citizen expectations of public service value simplify and streamline disciplinary processes and are all important issues and have been widely analyzed. keep them internal to the agency to a much greater Within the public service, the “common purpose ” extent. Both systems place a strong emphasis on per- component is particularly troublesome in relation to formance management and performance reward and public unions and their participation— or lack assess top management on their ability to make the thereof —in reform activities. In the United States, the new systems work. Th e NSPS emphasizes simplifi ed collective bargaining relationship is perceived to be hiring; both sets of changes turn their attention to confrontational, not consensual; that is to say, the promotion systems and eliminate automatic annual assumption is that agreement will be reached with pay increases. Th e NSPS emphasizes, to a much employers through confl ict. When the employer is the greater degree than before, workforce planning with , the assumption is, therefore, that public an eye toward workforce restructuring and potential sector managers and leaders will not act in the best downsizing (and additional contracting out). Both interests of other public employees— union members. reforms would increase managerial discretion in these

492 Public Administration Review • July | August 2006 matters very sub stantially. Both obviously move away Because merit is a value, it does not and cannot reside from standardization toward agency-specifi c tailoring in only one guise or only one place. Merit in pursuit and away from predictability toward agility and of mission very strongly suggests that, as a value, it responsiveness ( Ingraham and Getha-Taylor 2005 ). must be in many places throughout government, not as a rigidly standardized vision but as an objective Th ese components directly challenge what Kettl calls that considers individual eff ort and performance — the federal government ’ s — and certainly federal as well as organizational eff ort and performance — in unions ’ — “ bias toward permanence ” ( Kettl et al. pursuit of organizational mission and govern- 1996, 91 ). Separating merit from that permanence, mental eff ectiveness. A government whose agencies however, produces diff erent themes. Th ese themes cannot meet performance challenges is not a emphasize the contemporary balances between stabil- meritorious government. ity and fl exibility, between political responsiveness and protection from political abuse, between permanent Conclusion job security and national needs, and between “neutral ” Th roughout this essay, I have argued that eff ective recruiting mechanisms and immediate demands for consideration of reform of the federal service necessar- critical skills. Th ese balances do not necessarily ily separates and preserves the ideal of merit from the threaten merit, but in the context of changing times, bureaucratic structures that are often described as the they cannot allow for answers that remain fi rmly merit system . Reform of the structures that characterize fi xed over time. To strengthen merit, they demand a the civil service must be considered, but from a diff er- guiding set of clear values. Th e ideal of merit can ent perspective. Many elements of those structures provide that span. But both balance and merit have been widely conceded to be dysfunctional and demand a community of federal employees who agree costly, and in fact, some of them have already been on a common purpose and mission, which is neces- reformed in single agencies. Others are current targets sary for a fi rm future foundation. of change. None of the past or current changes pro- poses to abandon merit. Some Fragmentation Is Necessary Earlier, I argued that extensive and uncoordinated Th e global environment in which the U.S. federal fragmentation of federal systems detracts from a coher- service operates demands a new emphasis on the ent modern defi nition of merit. But there is another dimensions of merit that comport with its original side to fragmentation that must be considered. Mod- intent: to guarantee the presence of a well-qualifi ed, ern merit cannot be defi ned as one size fi ts all, except talented, responsive workforce that functions well in in the sense that merit continues to govern all of the rapidly changing conditions. Recent analyses of the public service. As the performance focus has come into current global environment describe it as “ permanent sharper play, however, it has become very clear that whitewater ” or a “ constant spin cycle ” ( McAllister, performance— both individual and organizational— forthcoming; Sanders 2005). Th e old structures will must be considered in light of agency mission. It attempt to withstand such turbulence in classic bu- becomes necessarily multidimensional, even within a reaucratic fashion: Th ey will become more insular, less single agency, because most government organizations responsive, and less eff ective. Reforming them is fun- and programs have multiple missions. With multiple damental to successfully meeting new challenges. missions, multiple implementation strategies, and therefore multiple means of pursuing merit, diff erences Current reform proposals envision a federal public among agencies necessarily emerge. So, too, do diff er- service of the future that is diff erent from today’ s ser- ent capabilities to engage in the pursuit of merit. vice, but none advocates eliminating a well-qualifi ed and competent federal workforce. None suggests that If merit is to be given a stronger footing for the future, the entire workforce be employed “ at will. ” And none it is necessary to ensure that this diversity contributes suggests that merit has run its course. Rather, contem- to a stronger core ideal, not to porary views of merit envision it further incoherence and distance as the energizing force of the among agencies. Again, common A commitment to public goals and ideas that guide reform. values are critical. A commit- service and a broader public Merit as a value and an ideal can ment to public service and a good, integrity in performing or cannot reside in mechanisms broader public good, integrity in one’ s job to the best of one ’ s created to attain it, but those performing one ’ s job to the best ability, and performance in mechanisms can generate their of one ’ s ability, and performance pursuit of agency mission are own value by pursuing merit and in pursuit of agency mission are eff ectively structuring the busi- strong links to merit. Develop- strong links to merit. ness of government. Sadly, in the ment of these strengths across federal government, the present government will strengthen merit ’ s foundation, not civil service is not meeting these positive objectives. erode it further. Simply put, the existing civil service structures and

Building Bridges over Troubled Waters 493 processes are not providing merit a happy home. Some — — — . 2005 . Th e Federal Public Service: Th e People structure or set of structures is obviously necessary to and the Challenge . In Institutions of American carry the value forward. Th at is why both the ideal of Democracy: Th e Executive Branch , edited by Joel D . merit and the best means of attaining it are critical Aberbach and Mark A . Peterson , 283 – 311 . elements of eff ective reform. Structural changes to the Oxford : Oxford University Press . bureaucratic systems surrounding civil service should Ingraham , Patricia W. , and Carolyn Ban . 1986 . not proceed without the pursuit of merit as their most Models of Public Management: Are Th ey Useful to fundamental objective. But they must proceed. Managers in the 1980s? Public Administration Review 46 ( 2 ): 152 – 60 . Acknowledgments — — — . 1988 . Politics and Merit: Can Th ey Meet in I am grateful to several special teachers who have a Public Service Model? Review of Public Personnel guided me on this issue over the years: Ronald Administration 8 ( 2 ): 7 – 19 . Sanders, who has served at the Department of Ingraham , Patricia W. , and Heather Getha-Taylor . Defense, the Internal Revenue Service, the Offi ce of 2005 . Management Flexibilities in the Federal Personnel Management, and now in the Intelligence Government: Lessons Learned? In Contemporary Community; Chris Mihm and Nancy Kingsbury of Issues in Human Resource Management , edited by the Government Accountability Offi ce; and John Norma Riccucci , 18 – 35 . New York : Longmans . Palguta of the Merit Systems Protection Board and James , Scott . 2005 . Th e Evolution of the Presidency: now the Partnership for Public Service. Of course, Between the Promise and the Fear . In Institutions of they are not responsible for any interpretations I off er American Democracy: Th e Executive Branch , edited here. I also thank Vadym Pyrozhenko for research by Joel D . Aberbach and Mark A . Peterson , 3 – 40 . assistance and James P. Pfi ff ner, Ronald P. Sanders, Oxford : Oxford University Press . and David Van Slyke for excellent comments on an Kettl , Donald F . 2005 . Reforming the Executive earlier draft of this paper. Branch of the U.S. Government . In Institutions of American Democracy: Th e Executive Branch , edited by Joel D . Aberbach and Mark A . Peterson , Notes 344 – 78 . Oxford : Oxford University Press . 1 . Th e Civil Service Commission was abolished by Kettl , Donald F. , Patricia W . Ingraham , Ronald P . the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. Its functions Sanders , and Constance Horner . 1996 . Civil were assumed by the Offi ce of Personnel Manage- Service Reform: Building a Government Th at Works . ment, the Merit Systems Protection Board, and the Washington, DC : Brookings Institution Press . Offi ce of Special Counsel. McAllister , Keith . Forthcoming. Leadership in the 2 . Th e exception here was the delegation of hiring Spin Cycle . In Symposium on Leadership and authority from the Offi ce of Personnel Manage- Leading Change , edited by Patricia W . Ingraham ment to the various federal agencies. and David Van Slyke , American Review of Public Administration . References National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) . Carpenter , Daniel . 2005 . Th e Evolution of National 2002 . Th e 21st Century Federal Manager: A Study of Bureaucracy in the United States . In Institutions of Changing Roles and Competencies . Washington, American Democracy: Th e Executive Branch , edited DC : National Academy of Public Administration . by Joel D . Aberbach and Mark A . Peterson , 41 – 71 . Partnership for Public Service . 2005 . Th e Daily Oxford : Oxford University Press . Pipeline , February 2 . www.ourpublicservice.org . Eaton , Dorman B . 1880 . Civil Service in Great P fi ff ner , James P . 1988 . Th e Strategic Presidency . Britain . New York : Harper & Brothers . Chicago : Dorsey Press . Heclo , Hugh . 1977 . A Government of Strangers: — — — . 2000 . Government Legitimacy and the Role Executive Politics in Washington . Washington, DC : of the Civil Service . In Th e Future of Merit: Twenty Brookings Institution . Years after the Civil Service Reform Act , edited by — — — . 1999 . OMB and Neutral Competence . In James P . Pfi ff ner and Douglas A . Brook , 15 – 38 . Th e Managerial Presidency , edited by James P . Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press . P fi ff ner , 129 – 37 . College Station : Texas A&M Pollitt, Christopher , and Geert Bouckaert . 2004 . University Press . Public Management Reform: A Comparative — — — . 2000 . Th e Future of Merit . I n Th e Future of Analysis . 2nd ed . Oxford : Oxford University Press . Merit: Twenty Years after the Civil Service Reform Rosenbloom , David . 2000 . Retrofi tting the Act , edited by James P . Pfi ff ner and Douglas A. Administrative State to the Constitution: Congress Brook , 226 – 38 . Baltimore : Johns Hopkins and the Judiciary ’ s 20th Century Progress . Public University Press . Administration Review 60 ( 1 ): 39 – 46 . Ingraham , Patricia W . 1995 . Th e Foundation of Merit: Sanders , Ronald P . 1998 . Heroes of the Revolution: Public Service in American Democracy . Baltimore : Characteristics and Strategies of Reinvention Johns Hopkins University Press . Leaders . In Transforming Government: Lessons From

494 Public Administration Review • July | August 2006 the Reinvention Laboratories , edited by Patricia W . Meeting on Merit System Reform, March , Ingraham , James R . Th ompson , and Ronald P . Washington, DC . Sanders , 29 – 57 . San Francisco : Jossey-Bass . U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) . 2004 . — — — . 2005 . Comments on Transforming the U.S. Issues of Merit 9 ( 3 ): 1 – 11 . Intelligence Community . Maxwell Deans U.S. Offi ce of Personnel Management (OPM) . 2003 . Symposium on Leading Change, November Biography of an Ideal: A History of the Federal Civil 10 – 11 , Syracuse , NY . Service . Washington, DC : U.S. Government U.S. Government Accountability Offi ce (GAO). Printing Offi ce . 2005 . 21st Century Challenges: Transforming — — — . 2004 . Federal Civilian Workforce Statistics: Government to Meet Current and Emerging Demographic Profi le of the Federal Workforce . Challenges . Washington, DC : Government www.opm.gov [ accessed March 29, 2006 ]. Accountability Offi ce . GAO-05-830T . Van Riper , Paul . 1958 . History of the United States www.gao.gov/new.items/d05830t.pdf [accessed Civil Service . Evanston, IL : Row, Peterson . March 29, 2006 ]. Wilmerding , Lucius . 1935 . Government by Merit: An U.S. Government Accountability Offi ce, and National Analysis of the Problem of Government Personnel . Commission on the Public Service . 2004 . New York : McGraw-Hill .

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