Airand defence in Europe

IHS Jane’s Strategic Assessment and Futures Studies Centre

Rising tensions As regional security deteriorates, Europe is bolstering its national anti-ballistic missile defences

Also in this supplement n Theglobalcontext n Current andfuturethreats n Concepts,tensions, requirements

NOVEMBER 2016Sponsored content in association with Raytheon AiRAnd missilEdEfEncE in EuRopE

(Top) ATHAAdmissileinterceptor is put through an operational test Editorial in Hawaii (Below) us Army private JonathanValentine demonstrates IHS Jane’s Strategic Asessments and Futures Studies how to reposition apatriot missile Centre is pleased to present this special report examining launcher while on an exercise with the Romanian Air force. the future of air and missile defense in Europe

ir and, particularly,missile defence interoperability) to meet the certainty of effortsinAsia-Pacific and the Mid- new threats. The need in some cases to A dle East have outpaced activity in engage local industry introduces potential- Europe for much of the past decade. How- ly complicating dynamics into an already ever, Russia’sState Armaments Programme, hyper-competitive environment and could annexation of Crimea and invasion of East- extend timelines associated with the devel- ern Ukraine,escalatory rhetoric and struc- opment, delivery and deployment of air tural state weakness have recently infused and missile defence capabilities. the missile defence discussion in Europe Ultimately, the ability of industry com- with aheightened senseofurgency. petitorstoprovide aproven capability that So, too, have broader concerns about will have multiple channels –user commu- proliferation of unmanned systems, nities, lower cost technologies, new oper- and rockets to and from Iran, as well as the ational concepts and capacity to leverage possibility of arogue launch or coercive use the full-rangeofcompany resources –for of air and missile systems. NATO and sev- reducing cost will provide significant com- eral individual European states –notably, petitive advantages in an active market. Poland, Germany and the – This supplement is divided into four are investinginmultiple, sometimes com- linked sections that seek to: Agency/Flickr peting, approaches to meeting the diverse, n framethe discussion around the impor- dynamic and durable air and missile defence tance of air and missile defence capability in Defence challenge. Industry leaders will be present- ashifting global context;

Missile ed with atarget rich and competitive mar- n explorethe current state and possi- US ket. They will need to work closely with ble future trajectory of European missile end-user communities to strike complicat- defence and the air and missile threatsit Kimball/ ed, but critical, balances between several faces; Brian tensions and emerging requirements. n assess active or impending air and mis- Sgt sile defence programmes in Europe and Tech layeredcapabilities identify key market trends, procurement Notably, industry and militaries must priorities or emerging operational require- develop layered capabilities to meet avig- ments; and Photography: conTEnTs orous and varied threat and be able to create n exploreaseries of concepts, tensions and high-degrees of interoperability with allies requirements for national and multi-na- 3 Theglobalcontext and regional neighbours, all while manag- tional missile defence systems. Aworldwide perspective on thedrivers ing the typically high-costs associated with Research and analysiscontained in the of missile-versus-missile competition air and missile defence. supplement leverages ongoing SAFS Cen- 6 Current andfuturethreats They also must balance the need to tre research initiatives (NATO Futures, Russia’s annexation of Crimea hasgiven develop and deploy proven and reliable Emerging MilitaryCompetitions and Defence freshimpetus to defenceprogrammes capabilitiesthat meet immediate challeng- Industry 20YY) as well as IHS Jane’s report- 10 National missiledefences es while still providing the possibility of ing, secondarysource research and inter- ExaminingGermany, Poland, theNeth- upgrading capability or incorporating new viewswith and commissioned materi- erlandsand ’sdefence efforts technologies (such as gallium nitride als from adozen different subject matter 13 Concepts,tensions,requirements technologies, 360-degree , and open experts within IHS AD&S and ournetwork Examining thefactors that areshaping architectures to enhance plug-in-and-fight of experts and industrycontacts. n thefutureofEuropeandefence This report hasbeencommissioned by Raytheon, but IHS AD&Sretained full control over the content

2 IHSAerospace,Defense andSecurity November 2016 AiRAnd missilEdEfEncE in EuRopE ckr Kimball/DoD/Fli Brian Sgt Tech y:

ARomaniansoldier inspectsamim-23missile system duringanexercise with the us in capul midia on 7november 2016. Photograph The global context Aworldwide perspective on the drivers behind missile-versus-missile defense competition

he missile-versus-missile contest is one is occurring between far more than the small narrative of atransforming geopolitical sys- of six domain area competitionsthe handful of great powers. Think of Iran and tem and the frailty of existing norms, such T SAFS Centre monitors due to their Saudi Arabia (and other Gulf States); or Chi- as those around armscontrol. Russia’s 2013 central role in shaping the future of military na and Japan (or ); or the tense situation ForeignPolicy Concept said: “The princi- conflict, as well as the trajectory of global and on the Korean peninsula. pal and emblematic feature of the current regionalgeopolitical competitions. Rising competitive geopolitical forces are international landscape is the deep-seated The confluenceofthese pervading geo- the result of asense that the predominante transformationofthe geopolitical land- political, technological, military and securi- US/Western-led geopolitical frameworks scape, the essence of whichistransition to ty trends and drivers ensures thatcapabilities of the past 25 years are eroding or faltering apolycentric or multipolar world ... [in this and related conepts steadily evolve, or even in response to the manifold pressures of the environment] states seek to augment their radically shiftattimes. Suchdevelopments modern world. Some of these are domestic offensive potentials and developnew kinds could undermine,abrogate or,conceivably, in origin or borne of widening gaps in val- of weapons thuseroding the structure of reinforce strategic balances or stabilise mili- ues, perceptions and prioritiesbetween key global security and even the system of arms taryimbalances. Disturbances to these could, stakeholdersinthese frameworks. controlagreements.” in turn, driveregionalcompetitions and Otherpressures, though, are driven by The erosion of existing geopolitical securityenvironments along new, potential- state and non-state actors seeking to estab- frameworks has increased the incentives ly destabilising and perhaps under-explored, lish anew type of international relations, forbothstate and non-state actors to take pathways in ashifting global context. in whichrulesand institutions are changed greater risks. Sound frameworks tend to and global power and influence is diffused engender (mostly stabilising) norms that Theglobalcontext from the US and its closest allies. China’s bind behaviours and ensure there are con- In aNovember 2015 speech in Aspen, Colo- leadership consistently raises this theme, sequences for violatingthese norms. Over rado,RobertWork, the US Deputy Secretary frequently coupling it with the concept of the past two years,the international system of Defense, said: “Great power competition “win-win co-operation” with few condi- has experienced more assertive behaviours – has returned.” His comment was accurate, tions between China and its partners. Rus- more rules breaking –from many states with butalso incomplete: intensified competition sia, too, has embracedand furthered the few, if any, consequences –from Crimea to

November 2016 IHSAerospace,Defense andSecurity 3 AiRAnd missilEdEfEncE in EuRopE Flickr Force/ Air /US orrell MW Sean gt rS Maste phy: Photogra us soldiers talk after aroutine inspection of apatriot missile battery at aTurkish military base in Gaziantep in 2013.

common THEmEs the Korean peninsula to the South China tional concepts that can: hold more militar- Sea. The result, for now at least, is acon- ily advanced adversary or competitor assets Missile defenceactivity in Asia andthe vulsive world vulnerable to repeated retch- at risk; create anti-access/area denial (A2/ Middle Eastare notnecessarily aperfect ing shifts and brazen applications of national AD) cordons in which adversaries cannot analogue forunderstanding thefuture power. Defence and security communities effectively operate; and/or deter, dissuade or challenges,opportunities andrequire- will need to expand their thinkingabout coerce adversaries and competitors in times mentsfor missile defenceinEurope. likely, possible and even previously un- or of crisis.Cyber-technologies, effective stra- However, several common themes can under-explored plausible threats; namely, tegic communications and influence oper- be appliedtodiscussionsofEuropean missile strikes against Europe or, perhaps ations, electronic warfare weapons (such missile defence. more likely, Russian use of missile threats as jammers), swarmed unmanned systems, n Thepersistentneed forlayered mis- to subordinate, destabilise and intimidate enhanced sensors, nuclear weapons and, of sile defencetomeetamulti-dimensional NATO allies or other vulnerable states in course, cruise and ballistic missiles top the threat. the former Soviet “near abroad”. listofthese diffused and impactful technolo- n Thegrowing need forinteroperability The diffusion and clever use of advanced gies that target the vulnerabilitiesofmodern betweenlayersinanationalsystemand military and, in some cases,dual-use and militaries and liberal political systems. between multi-nationalpartners. commercial technologies is also affecting Another challenge posed by the diffusion n Theneed to evolve deployedcapabili- the global context, amplifyinggeopolitical of novel technologies and capabilitiesisthe ties overtime. competitions and shapingthe current and creation of unbalanced cost curves. Devel- n Thecost-imposing element of devel- future parameters of air and missile defence oping asymmetric capabilitiesisfrequently oping missiledefence capabilities and challenges. Proliferation of advanced tech- inexpensive, but defending against them can concepts in responsetorobust A2/AD nologies affords actors the opportunity to impose disproportionate costs, alesson those capabilities. develop asymmetric capabilities and opera- tracking missile defence issues will know

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tin’s Terminal HighAltitude Area Defense which noted: “Growing numbersofaccu- (THAAD)system.Details of the deploy- rateconventionalballistic and cruise missile ment are still being determined, but the sys- threats represent an additionalcost-impos- tem is expected in 2017 to join Raytheon’s ing challenge to US and partner navalforces Patriot PAC-3and PAC-2systemsthatare and land installations.” being upgradedtothe new configuration. The air and missile defence challenge Japan is adding new layerstoits exist- is alsoplaying outacross the Middle East. ing air and missile defence capabilitiesas Iran, in particular, is developing and diffus- well, possibly THAAD or the Aegis Ashore ing unmanned systems, missile and rocket batteries thathaveformedthe foundation technologydesigned to “compensate forthe of NATO’s European PhasedAdaptive weakness of its air force and as acredible Approach (EPAA)missile defense system deterrent”,according to Jane’s Defence We ek- (see pages 6-9). Japan’s defence ministry ly in its October 2015 article “Gulf Shield: is also bringing forward the purchase of Missile threats and defence in the GCC”. additionalground-based Patriot PAC-3 Many Gulf Stateshave responded by interceptor missiles, among other moves upgrading their current missile defence designed to enhance layered missile defence. systems or procuring multiple overlapping These announcementshavenot been and layered air defence systems capable of well-receivedinChina, which has expressed countering current and future Iranian air- disquiet withSouth Korea’s deployment of a borne threats. The UAE has upgraded its THAAD system thatwill include coverage Patriotanti-ballistic missile defencecapabil- of Chinese territory, limiting potentialair ities to PAC-3 standard while also becom- and missile operations within China’s sov- ing the first export customer to equip the ereign territory(NATO has asimilarcon- THAAD system. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia cernwiththe deployment of Russian S-400 have committed to upgrading their ageing air defence systemsthatcould conceivably Patriotbatteries to PAC-3, while targetNATO assets operating in NATO is due to have 10 PatriotPAC-3 batteries territory: Poland, forexample). operational by the end of the decade. While acknowledgement that regional air and mis- well. Flipping asymmetric cost curves by sile defence collaborationisuseful, US-led developing new competition-affecting The proliferation of missile efforts to forgeacollective approach to mis- sile defence amongst Gulf Stateshas thusfar technologies is among the primary moti- and rocket technology to non- vations for the US Department of Defense’s been stymied by individual securitycon- recently announced Third Offset Strategy. state actors in the region has cerns and regional political issues. produced another layer of air The proliferationofmissile and rocket missile-versus-missile defense and missile defence concerns in technologytonon-state actors in the region has produced another layer of air and missile The missile-versus-missile defense competi- the Middle East tionhas unfoldedand escalated forwell over defence concerns in the Middle East (with adecadeaspart of the geopolitical struggle potential consequences forEurope as well). in Asia-Pacificand the Middle East. In the Saudi Arabia has claimed on multiple occa- WesternPacific, NorthKorea’s develop- Moreover, these systems and other missile sions in the past year to have intercepted ment and repeatedtesting of ballistic mis- defence systemsoperating in Northeast Asia missiles and rockets fired by non-state armed siles –over20ballistic missile testsin2016 could compromise the efficacyofChina’s groups within Yemen, including on 21 June as well as twonuclear tests–and the opaque A2/AD modernisationeffort.Akey com- 2016 when aSaudi Patriotbattery operat- and unpredictabledecision-makingofKim ponent of thisprogrammeisthe develop- ing within Yemen shot downaprojectile Jung Un havecreated heightened anxiety in ment and deployment of increasingly capa- fromaBM-27 Uragan multiple rocket sys- South Korea and Japan about missile attacks ble ballistic missilesand land, air and ship- tem based in Yemen. is also threat- or coercive use of NorthKorea’s missile and launched cruise missilesthattogether can ened by saturationattacksfromnon-state nuclear programmes. Both countries have overwhelm existing missile defences. The groups armed with ahugecache of prolif- invested in enhanced and layered missile US Department of Defense highlightedthis eratedshort-range rockets and has devel- defence capabilitiesasaresult. threat from China’s military modernisation oped arobust layered system as aresult that In July 2016, the South Koreangov- in multiple annualreviews to Congress, as includes IronDome, David’s Sling, -3 ernment agreedtodeployLockheed Mar- well as the 2014 Quadrennial DefenseReview, and Patriot. n

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current and future threats Since Russia annexed Crimea and invadedeastern Ukraine in early 2014, NATO and some European states have renewedtheir focus on the diverse, dynamic and durable threatto Europe and the evolvingmissile defence landscape that it has precipitated

issile defense in Europe has lagged and deployment of both sea-and land-based BarackObama, who said in 2009: “If the behind effortsinAsiaand the Mid- ballistic missile defence systems (see chart on Iranian threat is eliminated, we will have a m dle East as the continent sought to page 9). In May of 2015, work was com- stronger basis forsecurity, and the driving balance aspectrum of more urgent threats pleted on the installation of the Aegis Ashore force formissile defence construction in and crises: terrorism, the war in Afghanistan capability in Romania –combiningLock- Europe will be removed.” and Libya, the fallout of the global financial heed Martin’s Aegis ballistic missile defence Such benign assessments are premature crisis,the rise of nativists and populist move- system with Raytheon’s SM-3 interceptor. and optimistic, apoint aUSDepartment of ments, and, most recently, immigration The second phaseofthe programme became State official effectively made to IHS Jane’s from the Mediterranean, the Syria conflict, fully operational in July2016. Phase III plans on 16 July 2015, two days after the JCPOA the coup and purge in Turkey, Brexit and to install an Aegis Ashore platform in Poland agreement was signed. He said: “Iran has existential threats to the European project. in 2018. the largest inventoryofballistic missiles in However, the threat environment over PhaseIVwas cancelled in March 2013 the Middle East, which continuestobea the past five years –and especially sincethe purportedly due to cost and capability con- source of concerntousand the international Russian annexation of Crimea and inva- community.” Trust between the US/Europe sion of eastern Ukraine in early 2014 –has and Iran remains low, and fundamental dis- changed. In response, NATO and individual The resolution of the agreements remain over the future of Iran’s European states are demonstrating renewed nuclear issue does not obviate nuclear and missile capabilities. focus on the diverse, dynamic and durable the need for ballistic missile These capabilitieshaveprogressed in air and missile threat to Europe. recent years. ReedFoster,anIHSAD&S con- defences to counter the Iranian tributor responsible forthe IHSJane’s Middle TheEpAA ballistic missile threat East and North Africa capability assessments, For NATO, the Europe-widemissile noted: “The advancement and growthofan defence discussion startedinthe mid-2000s offensive missile capability has allowed Iran and came to fruition in September 2009 cerns.Some viewed the cancellation of to maintain acredible threat to its potential when US PresidentBarack Obama launched PhaseIVasameans of engagingRussia, adversaries, primarily regionally, butincreas- the European Phased Adaptive Approach which strenuously objected to all of EPAA, ingly beyond, as Iranian missile technology (EPAA). It became aNATOprogramme but especiallythe PhaseIVdeployment of continues to extend the envelope of weapons in 2010. NATOsaysthe EPAAis“purely longer-range interceptors as athreat to Rus- range, accuracyand reliability.” defensive”and of “limited capability” to pro- sia’s strategic nuclear deterrent. Foster added: “Iranian rocket and missile vide enhanced security to allies in an uncer- capabilities are orientedtoward ... over- tain and acceleratingthreat environment. Thethreat from iran whelmingregionalrivals’ missile defence NATO’s websiteexplains:“Proliferation EPAA was originallyconceivedtodefend capabilities with short-to-medium range of ballistic missilesposes an increasing threat against and deter either coercive use of ballistic missiles, anti-ship missilesaswell as to Alliedpopulations,territory and deployed advancing missile capabilities by or amis- various long-range rocketslaunched from forces. Many countrieshave, or are try- sile strike fromanisolated, alienated and multiple sea-and shore-based platforms.” ing to develop or acquire ballistic missiles. antagonistic Iran. Someobservers, especially Recent development efforts have extend- The proliferation of these capabilities does those in Iran and Russia, argue that the jus- ed the range of several ballistic missile pro- not necessarilymean there is an immediate tificationfor the programmewas eliminated grammes well beyond the vicinity of the intent to attack NATO, but it does mean by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action immediate Persian Gulf. The recently-tested that the Alliance has aresponsibility to take (JCPOA) agreement, signed on 14 July Emad, has an estimated range of 1,700km this into account as part of its core task of 2015, which placed limits on Iran’s nuclear with apayload capacity of 750kg; late-se- collective defense.” and ballistic missile programmeinreturn for ries Qadr F- and H-series variants possess The programme originally involved four the phased lifting of international sanctions. arange in excess of 1,700-2,000kmwith a progressive phases of capability development These arguments frequently site President 750kg payload; and solid-propellant Sejil-2

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two-stage ballisticmissiles have arange of up to 2,200km with a750kg payload. These phase ii of the European phased adaptive approach (EpAA) to all have the capacity to threaten or strike missile defencesaw sm-3 Block iB Europe in response to real or perceived interceptors(here launching from threats against the Islamic Republic, as well aship) deployed in Aegis Ashore as to hold European assets and infrastructure batteries in Romania in 2016. at risk in times of crisis.Foster also believes advancements reportedly made in re-entry vehicle technology would also indicate that Iran seeks aweapon that could potentially penetrate the defences of astate with mod- erate to advanced air-defence technologies. The Iranian missile challengetoEurope is complicated by what Foster calls “unconven- tionaland asymmetrical warfaredoctrine”. Rapidsaturation attacks withshort-to-me- dium rangeguided missilesorrockets upon naval or commercial shipping vessels, port facilities, urban population centres or offshore energy infrastructureremains acornerstone of IRGC Navy doctrine and are reflectiveof IRGC approachesmorebroadly to imple- menting the full suite of its asymmetric capa- bilities. Should such tactics be exportedtothe Mediterranean during any potential conflict, even modest tactical success would likely result in significant psychologicaland eco- nomic impacts in Europe. Beyondits developmentofweapon sys- tems,Iranisalsosuspected of activelysup- porting the export of missile technology andemploymenttofurther empowerproxy forces alignedtoits geopolitical aspirations, suchasLebaneseHizbullah. Missile technol- ogies ranging from the pervasive 122mm Katyusha rocketartillery possessingarange of 20kmtothe more advanced Iranian-man- ufactured 75kmFajr-5 systems have been usedbyHizbullahagainstIsrael in various conflictsover the pastdecade. Although Europe is unlikely to be con- frontedwith the thousands of stockpiledmis- silesthat inducedthe rapiddevelopmentand fieldingofIsrael’s andDavid’s r Sling systems, European states remainvul- /Flick

nerable to thesetypes of asymmetric attacks, Agency especially during timesofcrisis. Defence Thethreat from Russia Missile

The missile threat to Europe goes well-be- US yond Iran’s missiles and proliferation tech- y: nologiestostate and non-state actors.The graph threat from Russia is real and currentand is a Photo

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powerfuldriver of the ongoing discussion of advisor on securityissues to President Putin. pose amorepronounced challenge to Russian missile defence in Europe. Dr Karaganovwrote:“By placing missile securityand could violate theIntermediate NATO has resisted publicallyhigh- defence systemsinEurope, the West is sort of Nuclear Forces (INF)treaty. After thecom- lighting the missile threat from Russia as a inviting Russia to withdraw from the (INF) pletion of theRomania Aegis Ashore site in justification of the continued development treaty and deploymissilesthatcan destroy May 2016, President VladimirPutin said: “At and deployment of EPAA.Such astate- these systemsalmost instantly. This would themomentthe interceptor missiles installed ment would have destabilisingeffects on the complete the picturewithanew edition of havearange of 500km, soon this will go up (admittedlyalready taut) US/NATO rela- the missile crisis of the late 1970s and early to 1,000km,and, worse than that, they can be tionship with Russia. In addition, it would 1980s and anew round of structured military rearmed with2,400km-range offensivemis- play directly into the post-Yeltsin Russian and political confrontationinEurope.” siles eventoday, and it can be done by simply narrative of arapacious US and West pre- Thereisnocurrent evidence thatthe switching thesoftware.” occupied with targeting, provoking and EPAA (or any other system currently under diminishing Russia as part of an inexorable considerationbyindividual European states) modernisationand coercion move east to tame, subsume or defeat the would threatenRussia’s strategic inter-conti- In 2010, Russia began the StateArmaments Russian state. Olga Oliker, director of the nentalballistic missile deterrent. The cancel- 2020 Program (SAP 2020), amassive effort Russia and Eurasia programme at the Cen- lationofPhase IV of the EPAA was designed to recapitalise around 70 per cent of Russia’s ter for Strategic and International Studies in –implicitly if not explicitly –toreassure Rus- armed forces by 2020, including modernisa- Washington, captured this mind-set in an sia thatthiswas not an objectiveofthe pro- tionand upgrading of Russia’s missile forces. interview with the Christian Science Monitor gramme. Moreover,a2015 RAND Corpora- The programmeoriginally allotted $600bn in August 2016. He said: “The Russiansare over 10 years, plus between $50bn-$100bn terrified of us. They see themselves as push- to upgrade the defence industry, according ing back against US hegemony –and they At the moment the to IHS Jane’s Navigating the Emerging Mar- really do see this, this isn’tjust rhetoric.” interceptor missiles installed kets: Russia.The figures have been revised Nonetheless,the prominent and coercive have arange of 500km, soon downward considerably and timelineshave displays of Russia’smilitary strength, its risk- been extended. IHS Jane’s estimates the new prone foreignpolicy, bellicose rhetoric and this will go up to 1,000km,and value of the investment at $350bn and the even structural state weakness are driving worse than that,they can be completion of the programme moved out to national and multi-national development rearmedwith 2,400km-range 2023, largely due to the combined effect of and modernisation of varying tiers of missile offensive missiles even today, sanctions and lost revenues emanating from defence systems in Europe. the volatility of the energy market. and it can be done by simply Still, SAP 2020/23 is still investing in negative response switching the software capabilities, many asymmetric in nature, Russia’s response to the EPAAand to layered that leverage the strengths of Russia’s indus- missile defence programs poppingupacross try, are relatively cheap to build and deploy, Europe has been strongly negative.The tion report asserted thatresearchand simu- and, according to Dr Stephen Blank, a interplay between European missile defence lations showed: “The restructured EPAA sys- senior fellow with the American Foreign and Russian rhetoric has had an escalatory tem does not pose athreat to RussianICBMs. Policy Council, can have an outsized dis- effect on the US/NATO-Russiacompeti- The interceptors at Deveselu (Romania) are ruptive effect on Western military capabil- tion in Europe and beyond. not capable of reaching RussianICBMs. In ities. Tactical ballistic missile systems, such Russia objects to the EPAA(andEurope- addition ... when real-world, operational as Iskander M, RS-24 and Bulava, and stra- an missile defence more broadly) as adirect timedelays are imposed the (SM-3BlockII) tegic ballistic missile/strike systems –RS-26 and proximate threat to Russian security. interceptorsatRedzikowo(Poland) haveno Rubezh, RS-28 Sarmat, Project 4202 –were Russia alsoviews the EPAAasaneffort to capability against RussianICBMs.” identified as priority categories of capabili- fundamentallyupsetthe strategicbalance in Unsurprisingly, the Russiangovernment ties in which to invest, as were S-400 and Europe by, first, seeking to abrogate Russia’s has not beenassuaged by these assurances and S-500 air and missile defence systems. strategicnuclear deterrentand, second, by continues to see the system as acompelling That this investment in strike capacity starting aspirallingarms race to escalate ten- threat to Russiannational securityand the coincided with the start of the finalisation of sionsbetween the Westand Russia and help broaderstrategic balance betweenthe US/ the EPAA is not acoincidence. In aJanuary delaygeopoliticaltransitions away from NATO and Russia.Atthe rootofthisper- 2015 Jane’s Intelligence Review article “Russia Western-ledinstitutions. ception is asense thatthe current iterationof upgrades its missile arsenal”, IHS Jane’s ana- These connected sentiments werecap- the EPAA system is simply an early version lystSean O’Connor noted: “The upgrade tured in aJuly 2016 essay by SergeiKara- of amorerobustfuturecapability, including, programmes currently under way within ganov,aninfluential Russianscholar and potentially, an offensive capability, thatwill Russia’sstrategic nuclear forces are in part

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AcTiVE AndAnTicipATEd ElEmEnTs of THEEuRopEAnpHAsEdAdApTiVE AppRoAcH(EpAA)

PhaseTimiNg DesCriPTioN ComPoNeNTs Phase i 2011 n Deployment of Aegis ballistic missile defense capa- n SM-3 Block IA interceptor ble ships based in Rota, n AN/TPY-2 radar n Deployment of AN/TPY-2 radar deployed to Turkey n C2BMC upgrades n Command, control, battle management and com- n Designed to defend against short- and medium-range missiles munications upgrades to Ramstein, Germany n Aegis ballistic missile defence ships Phase ii July 2016 n Deployment of Aegis Ashore at Deveselu, Romania n Aegis combat system BMD 5.0 n SM-3 Block IB interceptor n Designed to defend against short- and medium-range missiles Phase iii Anticipated in 2018 n Deployment of Aegis Ashore in Redzikowo, Poland n Aegis combat system in 2018 n SM-3 Block IIB interceptor n Designed to defend against medium- and intermediate-range missiles Phase iV Cancelled in n Originally designed to provide alonger-range ca- n Aegis combat system in Deveselu, Romania and Redzikowo, Poland March 2013 pability to intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles n SME-IIB missiles (ICBMs) n Designed to defend against intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles designed to offer new capabilities to counter to 12 times the speed of sound, all [air]defense urgency of Europe’sperception of the Russian US anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems in systemswill be weakened considerably.” threat. But it could be that underlyingRussian Europe without violating the letter of the Russia’s enhanced missile and advanced weakness –demographic,educational, eco- Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty.” capability programmes are alsoleveraged to nomic, civil society, political, in innovation – In addition to strategic and tactical bal- deter and intimidate. For example,inMay will ensure the durability and unpredictability listic missile programmes, Russia has, since 2016,Russia announced it would deploy of this perceived threat and the propensity for 2004, invested in ahypersonic weapons pro- the IskanderMmobile short-range ballistic Russia to pursue risk-burdened and aggressive grammeknown as Project 4202. Hypersonic missile permanently to the exclave of Kalin- policiestodistract or slow decline. glide vehicles travel at speedsbetween Mach ingrad later this decade. The missile has been SEnders Wimbush, along-time Russia/ 5and 10. Dr Blank said: “[They] use sophis- deployed to Kaliningrad twice previously, Eurasia analyst, SAFS Centre senior asso- ticated technologies for manoeuvring and but only in support of exercises. The move ciate and director of the Russia in Decline boost that allow them to deliver warheads was ostensibly in direct response to the open- programme at the Jamestown Foundation rapidly,evade defences and target precisely.” ing of the first Aegis Ashore site in Romania, in Washington DC, has been examining the Russia is not the only country with a though many observers believe the Iskander signposts and possible implications of struc- hypersonic weapons programme –the US would have been deployed to Kaliningrad tural Russian weakness.According to Wim- and China have relatively mature projects – regardless. For NATO, and especiallythe bush: “Evidence of Russia’s decline across but Dr Blank believes Project 4202 is part Baltic States and Eastern European allies, every aspect of its power and authority is of an effort to reinforce Russia’sstrategic the announcement was provocative. With a voluminous and compelling, and seasoned nuclear deterrent, saying that the project range of up to 500km, all of the neighbour- analysts in both the West and Russia itself is part of an “obsession –not too strong a ing Baltics, Poland –includingRedzikowo, are turning their attention increasingly to the word here ... to build supposedlyinvulner- the site of the secondAegis Ashore system kinds of dynamics decline could produce and able nuclear weapons, like hypersonics,that –and parts of Germany will be within range possible contingencies flowing fromthese cannot be attacked by missile defences.” of the nuclear-capable SRBM. Fears that dynamics. Most Western policy makers and The capability is not expected to be these statescould become isolated and vul- defense and security planners are stuck in the deployeduntilpossibly the early-to-mid nerableare drawingabold lineunder per- Russia-as-normal-country paradigm, but this 2020s, butclearly it is conceived of as anoth- ceptions of the need for more robust missile ceased to be the case long ago.” er asymmetric means of bypassing European defence capabilities and reinforcingthe dif- Crucially,this weakness willengender missile defence effortsand holding the West ficult to escape security dilemma unfolding behaviours that posepersistent challenges at risk. Boris Obnosov, directorofthe state- in Eastern and Northern Europe. to Europeand the US over time,includ- runTactical Missiles Corporation, which is ingusing current andfuture air andmissile developing the Yu-71 hypersonicglide vehi- Russiandeclineand durability capabilities to confront the West in Russia’s cle, told Russia’s statenews agency Sputnik Russia’s perceived strength demonstrated “near abroad”. To Wimbush,“adeclining in August 2016: “It’s obvious thatwithsuch through its assertive foreign policy,military Russiawhichmust takemore risks to remain speeds –whenmissileswill be capable of fly- modernisation and advancement of its mis- competitive is aserious challenge” for Euro- ing throughthe atmosphere at speeds of seven silecapabilities is drivingthe intensity and peanand US security. n

November 2016 IHSAerospace,Defense andSecurity 9 AiRAnd missilEdEfEncE in EuRopE

national missile defencesinEurope The way in which Germany, Poland, the Netherlands and Lithuania are bolstering their air defences provides avaluable insight into how current and emerging market dynamics, procurement priorities and capability requirements are developing

he missile threat to Europe is multi-di- and diverse threats through the implementa- of Understanding (MoU) between the US, mensional and omnidirectional.NATO tionofthe Lockheed Martin PAC-3 Missile Italy and Germany, with the intentionof Tstates will rely on the European Phased Segment Enhancement (MSE) missile, the developing anovelsystem capable of meet- Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to meet the medi- MultifunctionFire ControlRadar (MFCR ing threats fromtactical ballistic missiles, um- andintermediate-range ballisticmis- –anX-band, solid-state, phased array radar cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles sile threats, butNATO members –aswellas using element-level transmit/receivemod- and aircraft. MEADS suffered asetbackin partnersand non-members –are increasingly ules developed in Germany), the MEADS 2011when the US Army ceased its partici- either actively seeking or investigating alterna- 360-degree ultra-high frequency(UHF) pationinthe programme, instead opting tivenational or regionalsolutions to meet the activeelectronically steered array radar, continued investment in Raytheon’s Patriot low-tier air and missile threats, as well as short- and MEADSBMC4I TacticalOperations systems. MEADS was subsequentlyrestruc- rangeair defence (SHORAD) and veryshort- Centre. Forthe TLVS program, MEADS tured, enabling all three countries to harness rangeair defence (VSHORAD) missions. has proposed to augment PAC-3 MSE with and leverage the technology following the As procurement competitionsunfold in Diehl’s IRIS-T-SLS as anotional low cost 2013 demonstrationphase. Finalising the placessuch as Poland, Germany, Lithuania, medium-rangeinterceptorsolution. TLVS contract could serve as the life-line Spain, the Netherlands, Romania, the Czech forthe program, especially giventhe influ- Republic,, Switzerland and Sweden ence that the German defence market can (among others), theyare revealing critical The TLVS is among the have on many of its neighbours. insights about the emerging competitive first major procurements in Second, the TLVS procurement is also dynamics, futureparametersand trajectories which the German government notable because it is among the first major of what will be averyactive market over the is employing anew process to procurements in which the German gov- nextfive to 10 years. Four deals are partic- ernment is employing anew process to limit ularly useful in understanding current and limit risk to cost overruns and government risk to cost overruns and delayed emerging market dynamics, procurement delayed delivery delivery.Toretain the contract, MEADS must priorities and capability requirements. meet six milestones along what Rick Edwards, executive vice-president of Lockheed Martin’s Germany: TlVs MEADSisstill being developed, and Missile and Fire Control division, referred to In June 2015, Germany announced that Germany plans to continue to operate Patri- at the ILA 2016 exhibition in Berlin in June as it had chosen to move forward with the ot systemswell into the next decade. Esti- “an ambitious timeline”. “Lockheed Martin is MediumExtended Air Defence System mates forfielding the TLVS capability range 100 per cent committed to the successofthe (MEADS) International consortium(led by from “around 2030”, according to General [TLVS-MEADS] programme and our part- MBDAand Lockheed Martin) to meet its Michael Grossmann, directorofground- nership with MBDA,” Edwards said. Taktisches Luftverteidigungssystem (TLVS) based operations at German Air Force, to a Adefence analystspeaking to IHSJane’s ground-based air defence system require- June 2016 Jane’s Defence We ekly assessment after the 2015 award, said German Defence ment.MEADSwas chosen to replaceGer- of “about 2025”. State Secretary Katrin Suder “hasinitiated many’s Patriot air defence systems,original- The deal underscores three notable mar- achange of paradigm” in German defence ly fielded in the 1980s. Stated procurement ket dynamics and potential emerging pro- procurement to help mitigate risk. “The tac- requirements include: afully-hemispherical curement priorities. ticalair defence system is the first procure- 360-degree coverage; an open architecture First, the estimated €4bn ($4.5bn) deci- mentprogrammebased on firm milestones to ‘plug in and fight’; increased mobility, sion is asignificant opportunity forthe with an opt-out option in casethe mile- especially in terms of air transportationby MEADS programmetoestablish itself in stonesare not met. It is againstthisback- the air force’sA400M airlifter;aswell as the highly-competitiveinternational export ground that the defence ministry willkeep reduced crew and life-cycle costs. market afterasomewhat mixed history since in contact with Raytheon,whichoffered The MEADSprogrammepromised 2011. The MEADS programmewas formal- an enhancedPatriot version.The MEADS enhancedcapability to meet longer-range ly established through a2004 Memorandum Consortiumhas been giventounderstand,

10 IHSAerospace,Defense andSecurity November 2016 AiRAnd missilEdEfEncE in EuRopE ckr D/Fli ll/Do Kimba Brian Sgt Tech : raphy Photog patriotmissile batteries were deployed in Romania during ajoint training exercise with the us on 7november2016

that the opt-outclause is for real,” the analyst competitive dynamics in this market as all sion interceptor was high and that, while the said. In ahighly competitive market requir- companies seek to either establish or expand MEADS system has demonstrated capabilities ing heavy investment, agovernment’s abil- user communities within Europe. in live simulations,the system stillrequires ity to play competing companies and their Third, the deal reflects the challenges further developmentbefore being fieldedthat systems off one another, even after awarding associatedwithcosts of advanced air and could alsoadd previously unanticipatedcost. acontract, could become acommon way to missile defence systemsgenerally and still The German government has not help them drive down costs and gain amore developing systems, in particular. MBDA responded directly to the report, comment- reliable capability within afaster timeline. Deutschland submitted its proposalfor the ing only thatitisstill evaluating the pro- It is alreadyhappening to adegree in Ger- development of TLVS to the German Fed- posal. If contract signaturepushes beyond many and, to alesser extent in Poland, two eralOffice of Bundeswehr Equipment, mid-2017, it could conceivably be delayed competitions that demonstratethe “gloves InformationTechnology and In-Service further by Germany’s federalelections, off” natureofthe air and missile defence com- Supporton28September 2016. The orig- betweenlate August and late October 2017. petitions in Europe. During ILA 2016, Ray- inal goal was forMEADSand the German theonannouncedthat it is in renewed discus- government to sign acontract in the first poland’sshield sions with Germany to potentially resubmit half of 2017 basedonthisproposal. On 21 April 2015, just weeks beforeGer- its Patriot ground-based air defence system This timeline may be in jeopardy. Report- many’s TLVS announcement, then-Pol- for TLVS in case MEADS fails to meet the ing from ReutersinOctober 2016 –citing ish president Bronislaw Komorowski mandated milestones. Lockheed Martin and “multiple sources familiar withthe proposal” announced that Raytheon’s Patriotmissile MBDApushed backagainst the statement, –indicated thatthe proposed MEADS cost system had been selected forthe country’s responding that MEADS was on-course to was higher thananticipated. IHSJane’s ana- Wisla medium-rangeair- and missile-de- meet the TLVS stated requirements. The lysts interviewed for thispaper wereunable fence (AMD)system.Patriotwas chosen exchangeand continued engagement of both to confirm Reuters’ report,but did notethat over Eurosam’s SAMP/T system in the final firms afteraward indicates the accelerating the costofPAC-3 Missile Standard Exten- round of the competition.

November 2016 IHSAerospace,Defense andSecurity 11 AiRAnd missilEdEfEncE in EuRopE

After over 15 months of discussions, as part of the procurement.SkyCeptorwill lithuania the Polish governmentconfirmed it would leverage the Raytheon/RafaelStunner missile Lithuania’s decision to acquiretwo batteries move forward with the procurement of eight design, though SkyCeptor will have some of the Norwegian Advanced Surface-to-Air of the latestPatriot (Configuration +3) sys- characteristics specially designed for the Polish Missile System (NASAMS) fromNorway in tems on 6September 2016 at Poland’s annual threat environment,such as low-observability. October 2016 demonstrates the urgent per- MPSO defence exhibition. All eight batteries Polish industrywill be responsible for 50 per ceptions of the Russian threat in the Baltics. are expected to be delivered by 2025. The cent of the missile’s production. It also serves as acatalyst fordiscussion of a Patriot systems will replace Poland’s exist- The Wisla procurement constitutes the Baltics-wide air and missile defence system ing air-defence capabilities based on ageing low-tier component of Poland’s plan for a or new operational conceptsfor the deploy- Soviet-designed equipment. Estimates of the layered air and missile defence system known ment of low-tier integrated air and missile cost range from around $3bn-$5.6bn. as Poland’sShield. Poland is still considering defence systems fromother NATO states. The award is asignificantdevelopment options for the Narew programme, which will The NASAMS systems are expected to be for the Patriot system in acompetition that be designed to address short-range threats. delivered in 2020 and, according to Jane’s had taken on increased urgency and political Longer-range threatswill be addressed by Defence We ekly,will “offer astep-change significance in the context of the Crimea and land-based Standard Missile-3 Blocks IB and in air defence capability forthe Lithuanian Ukraine crises and rising tensionsbetween IIA Aegis Ashore interceptors based at Redzi- Armed Forces”. Latvia is also reported- NATO and Russia. kowo from 2018, as part of EPAA Phase III. ly receiving older NASAMS systems from The deal calls for the phased delivery of MEADS was originally eliminated prior , and multiple IHS Jane’s analysts progressively advanced capabilities.The first to the downselect to SAMP/Tand Patri- have suggested that over the next few years two Patriot batteries will be “interim stan- ot, but renewed discussions with the Polish the Baltic Statesmay consider “clubbing dard” of the Patriot (Configuration +3) and Ministry of Defence in February 2016,near- together to buy atruemedium-to-long will be delivered in 2019. Two batteries fea- ly ayear after the original Patriot announce- range(70km+) air-defence system,such as turing Raytheon’s next-generation gallium ment. Whilethe discussions did not lead to the Patriot”, according to recently published nitrite (GaN) AESA 360-degree radar –a aWisla award, MEADS reportedly remains analysis fromNick de Larrinaga, Europe and key requirement of the competition –are acandidate for the Narew procurement. CIS editoratJane’s Defence We ekly. expected to be delivered in 2022. Fourmore Kongsberg’s Norwegian Advanced Surface- While thecostsofadvancedmissile systems will be delivered by 2025 at which to-Air Missile System(NASAMS), defence systems are notoriously high, cir- point the two interim standard versions will (also being offered for aPolish Navyrequire- cumspection of Russia in theBalticshas driv- be upgraded to the Wisla standard, accord- ment), Iron Dome/SPYDER,MBDA’s en dramatic risesindefence budgetsacross ing to IHS Jane’s. MICA-VL and Diehl’s IRIS-T-SLSare also theregion that could enable suchacom- The procurement also calls forthe incor- contenders, according to IHSJane’s analysts. bined procurement of an advancedsystem. porationofanopen-architecturedesign that Craig Caffrey, principalanalyst on IHSJane’s wouldallow for full operational compatibility netherlands Defence Industryand Budgetsteamnoted with the Northrop Grumman Integrated Bat- In October 2016, the Netherlands chose to in October 2016 that “theprofile of defence tle Command System (IBCS), further stressing upgrade its Patriot systems with the Modern spending [in theBaltics] has changed dra- the needfor open architecture and the capac- Man Stationuser interface.The deal guarantees matically in thelast twoyears. Their defence ity to integratenew capabilities intoexisting that Dutch Patriot systems will be operation- budgets will all be over2percent of GDP by systems. According to IHS Jane’s reportingin al out to 2040.According to Robin Hughes, 2018,and eachcountrywill havedoubledor September2016, theIBCSsystem is not yet in editor of IHS Jane’s Missiles and Rockets,akey tripled their budgetsfrom10yearsago.In service, thought it has successfully completed discriminator in the procurement was Raythe- 2005,the region’s total defence budget was test firings. It is not currently exportable. on’s ability to offer the Netherlands acomplete $930m. By 2020,the region’s defence budget Another corecomponent of theagreement re-capitalisation of their Patriot systems due to will be $2.1bn. This growth is faster than any is extensiveindustrial co-operationbetween funding received from“Patriot sales to South other regionglobally.” Raytheonand thePolish defence industry. Korea and the UAE”, highlighting the value Even if such aprocurement does not hap- Raytheonhas already signed agreements with of large user communities in defraying costs of pen, or alternatively if an enhanced air and PGZ, Poland’snational defence industrial system upgrades. missile defence requirement becomes more consortium, to build the identification friend The Netherlands currently fields the PAC- prominent in the short-term, other NATO or foe (IFF) modules for the AESA radars. 3and PAC-2 ABM missiles for its system and nations may choose to deploy their own Raytheon is also collaborating with Polish is also considering procurement of alow-cost national systems to the Baltics. In fact, Ger- industryonthe development and production interceptor such as Stunner/SkyCeptor or many and the Netherlands have discussed of the SkyCeptor low-cost interceptor, one Diehl’s IRIS-T. Some reports indicate Lock- this contingency as part of their ongoing of fourinterceptors –PAC-2 GEM-T, PAC- heed Martin’s PAC-3 MSE is also being con- Patriotinteroperability program known as 3and PAC-3 MSE are the others –offered sidered for the Netherlands’ Patriot batteries. Project Apollo. n

12 IHSAerospace,Defense andSecurity November 2016 AiRAnd missilEdEfEncE in EuRopE concepts,tensions and requirements Threat and market environments are challenging end-users and air and missile defence system manufacturers as they seek to balance the key concepts, tensions and emerging requirements shaping the future of European defence

he missile-versus-missile defence Even with these budget increases, cost rate new generations or capabilities, depot competition is among the most acute will remain an important –though not nec- maintenanceand the manpower to actually T examples of the cost-imposing chal- essarilyprohibitive–factor in the procure- operate asystem. lenges of the diffusion of advanced military, ment of air and missile defence programmes commercial and dual-use technology.The as statesacross the continent grapplewith layers andinteroperability costs of resilient, adaptive and layered missile how best to prioritise spending in afull Arecurring theme throughoutthispaper is defence systems are considerably more expen- threat environment. Even in countries such the need forlayered air and missile defence sive to develop, test and maintain than the as Poland, where the sense of threat is largely systems. From Israel, UAE and Qatar to cost of developing aviable cruiseand ballistic focused on Russian activity and capabilities, South Korea and Japan to Poland, Germa- missile threat. One IHS Jane’s expert referred analystsbelieve the expandingrequirements ny, Romania and the Netherlands, defence to the cost for the highest-end interceptors are outpacing expandingbudgets.AsIHS communities are investing in multiple sys- on the market today as “eye-watering”. temstooptimise existing capabilities and Emerging low-cost-of-shot/deep-maga- ensureredundancyagainst multiple threats zine solutions, such as directed energy and Expensive kinetic along multiple axes and from multiple direc- hyper-velocity projectiles fired from naval tions at multiple speeds and traveling multi- powder guns, operational concepts (left- interceptors willremain the ple distances. of-launch interventions, forexample) and anchorofthe missile defence However, developing and deploying competitive strategies designed to mini- solutions well into the multiple layersofmissile defence is not mize the need forintercepts in the first place next decade cheap or easy, placingapremiumonhigh offer some promise in changing current cost degreesofintegration of and interoperabil- curves. However, these capabilities and con- ity in and among variouslayersinnational cepts are not yet mature, and the path from and multi-national systems. This frequently concept to deployment of new technologies Jane’s contributor Reuben Johnson pointed requires the enhancement of openarchitec- and concepts is longer,harder and more out in his Jane’s Defence We ekly coverageof tures –anincreasing requirement formissile expensive than fully appreciated when con- the September 2016 MSPO defence exhibi- defence systemsacross Europe –thatallow cepts are being initially trialled or explored. tion in Poland. He wrote: “The projected for“plug-in and fight” interoperability Expensive kinetic interceptors will remain cost of all the systems Poland plans to pro- between multi-national systemsor, even, the anchor of the missile defence solutions cureismorethan twice what the country’s as withthe Poland Wisla procurement, well into the next decade. Finance Ministry has projected in termsof between different missile defence compo- Within the European context, the bud- future tax revenues.” nents manufactured by different companies. getaryenvironment has improved since the The result of this tension is amarket that Bi-lateral and regional collaboration low point of 2014 when IHS Jane’s Defence is still active,but will need to be responsive efforts are ongoing. Forexample, in October Budgets assessed that NATO accounted to evolving and expanding air and missile 2016, Germany and the Netherlands test- for12ofthe 20 fastest declining defence threats while also seeking to managepoten- ed joint operationsoftheir Patriot systems budgets in the world. As captured in the tially spiralling costs of layered, interoper- during an exercise off the coast of Crete, chartsbelow,spending across most of the able, adaptive,and flexible air and missile as apartofaprogrammeknown as Proj- continent is increasing, especially in East- defence systems. ect Apollo. During aspeaking engagement ern Europe and the Baltic States. Indeed, Procurement of air and missile defence at the European Integrated Air and Missile Chris Lombardi, vice-president forEuro- systems is not the only cost end-user com- Defence ConferenceinLondoninFebru- pean Business Development at Raytheon, munities incur, of course. Operating and ary 2016,Brigadier GeneralMichael Gross- told IHS Aerospace, Defence and Security that maintaining these systems is aconcern mann,directorofground-based operations he had seena“very strong recentpush by to end-user communities, particularly withthe German Air Force,noted thatthe countries and leadership to increase budgets costs associatedwith transportingsystems programmecould be amodel formulti-lat- and develop solutions to meet the expanding to wherethey are needed, training pro- eraldeployments to Poland or the Baltic threat environment.” grammes, exercises, upgrading to incorpo- States in the future. AccordingtoBrigadier

November 2016 IHSAerospace,Defense andSecurity 13 AiRAnd missilEdEfEncE in EuRopE

General Grossman,the programmeis“also the time, but Ifought our interoperability curement (2020) all progressed in the 2016 hoping to open up Apollo to other Euro- issues.” Commander Ulm continued: “What strategic context, butare unlikely to be pean countries to allow them to bring their ASD15 proved to me was that ‘plug-in and fieldeduntilnextdecade, creating apoten- capabilities to the project”. fight’ is just adream, unlessyou are on an tially destabilising imbalance between the But the appropriate and admirable ambi- Aegis destroyer in awell worked–up Aegis immediacy of amorerobust threat and the tion of Project Apollo should be tempered task group ... But again, it was not ‘plug-in ability of states in Europe to field the right to adegree by the recognition that achiev- and fight.” capabilitytodirectly address the threat and ing an operationally effective bi-lateral or avoid coercion, manipulation or akinetic multi-lateral “plug-in and fight” interoper- strike in atime of crisis. ability can be acomplicated task. What ASD15 proved to Someofthis potential vulnerability has In October 2015, eight member nations me was that ‘plug-in and fight’ been met through the signing of procure- of the Maritime Theatre Missile Defense is just adream, unlessyou are ment and/or upgrade deals with “name Forum held the At Sea Demonstration 2015 brand” US and European suppliers with (ASD 2015) exercise on the Hebrides Range on an Aegis destroyerinawell proven capabilities that will shorten these off the coast of Scotland. The “landmark” worked–up task group ... windows of strategic vulnerability. This exercise was first multi-national Integrated was almost certainly apowerful consider- Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) test and, ationinPoland’s decisiontomoveforward according to Richard Scott, IHS Jane’sNaval immediate threat withPatriot forits Wisla requirement. As a contributor, “the most technicallycomplex The air and missile defence threat fac- defence analyst basedinWarsaw noted to naval live-firingevent ever attempted in ing Europe is neither notionalnor distant. IHSJane’s after the April 2015 announce- Europe.” Enhancement, development and prolifer- ment of Patriot’s selection, “after Raytheon’s The exercise achieved several tactical and ationofair breathing and ballistic threats business development team,the personper- operational successes, but it alsoexposed is happening now and are playingamore haps most responsible forRaytheon’s win persistent challenges related to “plug-in consequential role in intensifying regional in Poland is Vladimir Putin. Otherwise the and fight” interoperability and establish- geopolitical competitions, especially with Polesmight havebeenwilling to go with ing robust network links for real-time tac- Russia. anothersystem withalonger procurement tical data exchange. At the MAST 2016 Developing,acquiring and deploying timeline thatallowed themtobeinvolved in conference in AmsterdaminJune 2016, individual systems–muchless layered sys- the designfromthe ground up.” Commander Andreas Ulm, ballistic mis- tems–takesyears. The TLVS (2025-30), One important caveat: akey discrimina- siledefence project officer in the German Wisla (2019 beforethe initialPatriot is torfor all industry seeking to be successful Navy headquarters and ASD15 chief of staff, deployed, 2025 beforethe final system is in theEuropean air and missile defence mar- noted: “I didn’t fight the enemy most of active), and the LithuanianNASAMS pro- ket,especially in states seeking to upgrade EAsTERnEuRopEdEfEncE ExpEndiTuRE

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Poland 7,449 7,715 7,365 8,295 9,852 9,181 9,391 9,758 10,147 10,488 greece 3,538 3,423 3,742 3,102 2,862 2,718 2,660 2,676 2,706 2,736 romania 2,076 2,031 2,092 2,648 2,662 3,083 3,480 3,925 4,147 4,266 Ukraine 1,023 1,226 1,098 1,699 2,332 2,427 2,379 2,348 2,353 2,378 1,804 1,762 1,680 1,638 1,686 1,829 2,027 2,246 2,496 2,766 1,019 972 932 934 947 1,108 1,161 1,210 1,310 1,423 slovakia 788 830 759 787 921 918 959 995 1,035 1,077 Croatia 733 664 664 591 589 583 572 591 614 639 Bulgaria 558 547 604 570 538 623 680 668 662 706 serbia 751 512 527 544 493 484 482 494 517 550 Lithuania 302 293 306 327 446 599 680 740 790 841 estonia 322 381 389 405 430 468 481 491 500 518 slovenia 501 375 369 355 344 363 353 366 379 396 Latvia 246 259 256 236 265 384 486 597 614 630 ToTaL 21,111 20,991 20,782 22,132 24,365 24,768 25,791 27,104 28,271 29,414

Source: Jane’s Defence Budgets

14 IHSAerospace,Defense andSecurity November 2016 AiRAnd missilEdEfEncE in EuRopE

wEsTERnEuRopEdEfEncE ExpEndiTuRE

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 United Kingdom 63,648 62,732 60,968 60,734 60,662 60,945 60,765 60,615 60,673 60,822 France 43,896 44,159 44,924 44,407 44,338 44,877 45,287 45,687 45,866 45,856 germany 35,788 35,718 36,480 35,199 35,906 35,754 37,539 37,208 37,626 38,395 italy 23,612 23,407 24,377 23,601 22,986 23,055 22,253 21,927 22,002 22,299 spain 13,360 12,016 11,043 10,934 10,991 11,008 11,207 11,312 11,402 11,587 Netherlands 9,293 8,816 8,352 8,295 8,443 8,586 8,595 8,464 8,288 8,068 switzerland 6,308 5,993 6,099 6,208 6,125 6,161 6,156 6,178 6,189 6,216 sweden 5,495 5,602 5,533 5,754 5,679 5,687 5,788 5,827 5,987 6,127 Norway 4,777 4,771 4,842 4,878 5,120 5,824 5,937 5,913 5,886 5,836 Belgium 4,180 4,083 4,040 3,805 3,511 3,460 3,467 3,526 3,646 3,782 Denmark 3,633 3,576 3,490 3,297 3,021 2,997 3,043 2,961 2,904 2,972 3,277 3,174 3,124 2,939 2,826 3,009 3,022 3,022 3,243 3,338 Portugal 2,275 2,267 2,255 2,079 2,060 2,038 2,049 2,071 2,126 2,224 austria 2,319 2,323 2,183 2,084 1,942 2,277 2,322 2,319 2,324 2,322 ireland 1,056 1,017 1,004 999 958 942 908 885 880 863 ToTaL 222,916 219,656 218,713 215,213 214,568 216,620 218,339 217,915 219,041 220,707 Source: Jane’s Defence Budgets old Soviet equipment and improve domestic shipswithother foreign suppliersonrelated petitions. In additiontothe growing interest industry in the process, will be the capacity programmes. Delays to post-award develop- in open architecturesand abilitytoreduce of firms to partner with and provide mean- ment timelinesand unintended diffusionof operational costs, three additionalrequire- ingful workshare to local industry in procur- critical technologies are both possible. mentsstand outasrelevant over the next five ing states and maintain aviable supply chain Forend-user communities, evenmod- to 10 years. across Europe. Poland’sWisla procurement erate delaystotimelinescan be worrisome, n Missilemixes andlow–cost intercep- included an extensive role for Polish indus- reinforcing thesense of urgency of theneed tors: The cost of kinetic interceptors is one try in the co-development of the SkyCeptor to beginprocurement programmes, evenif of the main drivers of the high costs of air LCI and GEM-T missile systems and in the thecapabilitieswill not be fielded foranoth- and missiledefence systems. Not only are production of ancillary system, such as con- er decade. the handful of high-end interceptors on the tributions to wheeled vehicles, for the Patri- market expensive, users frequently need to ot systems. Adaptive capability procure many of these systems in order to But industry engagement adds alayer In his remarks initially announcing the US ensure adequate redundancy. of complexity to closing the gap between intentiontopursue the EPAA in Septem- But not all threats require high-end inter- threat and capability that could introduce ber 2009, President Barack Obamasaid: ceptors. UsinganSM-3 Block IIA or PAC-3 risks for both industry and for end-user “Because ourapproach will be phased and MSE against lower-tier, but diffused and still communities.For industry, the need to have adaptive, we will retain the flexibility to menacing, threats, is not an effective way acomprehensive understanding of local adjust and enhanceour defences as the threat to optimize air and missiledefence invest- industry strengths, weaknesses, relation- and technology continue to evolve.” ments. Amore modular “horses-for-cours- ships,opportunities and challengesand to The need to affordably augment or es” approach that enables systems to use developand operationalise effective strate- upgrade acurrent system with new technol- awider-rangeofmissile types to meet a gies forengagement of partnersand suppli- ogies and capabilities is not uniquetoEPAA. wider-rangeofthreat types is one effective ers in country is acritical considerationfor It is acentral requirement forair and missile means of balancing the need for aflexible marketentry. This is especially thecase in systems at all levels, given the interactiveand capability while managing procurement and theair and missile defence marketinwhich, shifting natureofthe competition between operational costs. as discussed above, savvybuyerswill have emerging offensive and defensiveair and The highly-sophisticated technologies many options and expect rapid delivery of missile capabilitiesand the pace at which of the kind used on the PAC-3 MSE will reliable capability.Sticking to timelineswill new technologies and operational concepts be part of this mix for countries building be critical. Many local firms maynot be able are proliferating. defences against sophisticated theatre ballis- to absorbrelevant technologies or,alterna- Some end-user operational requirements tic missiles. But air and missile defence sys- tively, because onlysomefirmscan absorb are alreadyknownand are influencing tems will be required to be able to accom- these technologies they will haverelation- requirements of current and imminent com- modate less expensive systems, such as the

November 2016 IHSAerospace,Defense andSecurity 15 AiRAnd missilEdEfEncE in EuRopE

GEM-T, and low cost interceptors, such as and communications systems. Several com- main sellingpoints in the current market is Diehl’s IRIS-T-SLS and Raytheon/Rafael’s panies, particularly those in the US, now that “operational engineering upgrade costs Stunner, the model for the made-in-Poland offer GaN technologiesinmulti-role radars, are shared across auser-community of 14 SkyCeptor, which will be used in Poland’s including NorthropGrumman (G/ATOR) nations –including five NATO members. Shield Patriot systems. and Lockheed Martin (TP-77). Raytheon— Common training, similar depot mainte- n 360-degree radar: Guided missiles, low which according to Lombardi, has invested nance and joint exercises also help reduce observable aircraft and the proliferation of over $300mofits ownmoney into GaN manpower and overall operational costs.” unmanned systems all serve to expandthe research –operates the only US Department Of course, Raytheon isn’t the only com- geographic range that militaries must plau- of DefencecertifiedGaN foundry. pany seeking to develop these communities. siblymonitor for air and missile threats in GaN is just one –albeit immediately rel- Capital Alpha, afirm monitoring defence times of crisis. Militaries cannot necessarily evant –critical technology impacting the developments for the financial services indus- assume with ahigh degree of certainty the futureofmissile defence. Thereare many try, identified the importance of anchor cli- nature of attack vectors against them, creat- others. In the diverse, dynamicand dura- ents and user communities to both industry ing growing demandfor fully-hemispheric ble threat environment described above, and national militaries in its October 2016 360-degree coverage for missile defence. industrywill be pressured to develop, test coverage of an Atlantic Council event on This was astated requirement forthe large “The Future of US-Swedish Defense Co-op- deals unfolding in Germany and Poland. The eration.” The report noted: “Air defense sys- still in-development MEADS system will Commontraining, tem commonality with Poland, Sweden and include a360-degree UHF active electroni- similardepot maintenance Germany remains an intriguing prospect. It’s cally steered arrayradar when it is scheduled to and joint exercisesalso help why the stakes remain high for Lockheed comeonline in 2025-30. Neitherthe current Martin to have MEADS procured by Germa- generation of the Patriot nor the SAMP/T sys- reduce manpower and overall ny, as that might also raise prospects for Swe- tems considered by Poland offered 360-degree operational costs den. Equally, if Raytheoncan keep Poland in capability. However, the next generation Patriot and MEADS proves unaffordable for Patriot system selected by Poland will add this Germany, it can offer upgrades to existing capability through upgrades and the incorpo- and field new and relevant technologiesas German Patriot unity, and that would also ration of rear panels that utilize “staring”arrays. theycomeavailable in order to mitigate enhance prospects for Sweden.” Regardless of the particular approach, new threats and also, potentially, drivethe being able to field areliable and affordable missile-versus-missile defence competition conclusion 360-degree capability will be asignificant along anew trajectory. Europe’s threat environment is expanding; discriminator in the market. its geopolitical and political context growing n Incorporating novelemerging tech- customers anduser communities more complex and competitive. Developing nologies: Perhaps the most notable com- The air and missile defence market is already and deploying resilient, robust and affordable ponent of the AESA next generation Patriot very competitive and will become more so as capabilities to address the full spectrum of secu- radaroffered to Poland is its use of gallium states in Eastern Europe and the Baltics seek rity challenges will requireahigh-degree of nitride (GaN)one of many novel emerging to upgrade old Soviet equipmentand states cross-NATO and multi-national collaboration, technologieslikely to affect the futureofthe in Western Europe look to procure more co-ordination, commonality and co-opera- air/strike versus missile defence competition. robust layered missile defences or upgrade tion. It will also requireaneffective diagnosis According to aSeptember 2015 IHS Jane’s existingsystems to meet new threats. and prioritisation of emerging threats. This is Intelligence Briefing webinar on GaN tech- Companies are increasingly seeingthe especially the case with meeting air and mis- nologies, the technology provides consider- advantage of commonality andmomen- sile threats and the coercivediplomacy they ably more thermal conductivitythangalli- tum as powerful discriminators in this mar- can enable. Defence communities and industry um arsenide(GaAs) as well as higher-power, ket environment andare therefore trying to must find means of balancing cost while incor- improved reliability, rangeand affordability. establishanchor clients that can opendoors porating layered, interoperable, adaptable and, The technology is particularly relevant to to additionalmarkets,prioritisinginterop- critically, demonstrated air and missile defence the radarmarket as it offers greaterpower erability with theirneighbours.The end- systems capable of deterring, dissuading and density, improved efficiencyand facilitates goal is achainreaction(or seriesofthem) in defeating the probable and possible threats of the development of new equipment and whichsuccessive states linked by proximity today, tomorrowand an increasingly anxious, upgradestoexisting AESAs. IHS Jane’s anal- andshared threatperception select asimilar contested and uncertain future. n ysis also statedthatGaN would “rejuvenate or complementary capability,ensuring “user Ta te Nurkin, the Senior Director of the SAFS the radarmarket foryearstocome”. communities”that helpdefray operational Centre, managed the production of this report. GaN technology is also now being and engineering upgradecosts across multi- Formoreinformationabout the SAFS Centre, incorporated into radars, electronic warfare ple users. As Lombardi noted, one of Patriot’s please visit: www.ihs.com/Info/0116/safs.html

16 IHSAerospace,Defense andSecurity November 2016