CAN YOU HOME AGAIN? Desertion and Control of Hometowns in Civil Wars

Theodore McLauchlin

2011/34

Theodore McLauchlin

McGill University

ISSN: 1886-2802 IBEI WORKING PAPERS 2011/34 Can You Home Again? Desertion and Control of Hometowns in Civil Wars

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Depósito legal: B-21.147-2006 ISSN:1886-2802 Imprime: CTC, S.L. Barcelona, December 2011 CAN YOU HOME AGAIN? DESERTION AND CONTROL OF HOMETOWNS IN CIVIL WARS

Theodore McLauchlin

Abstract: What allows an armed group in a civil war to prevent desertion? This paper addresses this question with a focus on control in the rearguard. Most past studies focus on motivations for desertion. They explain desertion in terms of where soldiers stand in relation to the macro themes of the war, or in terms of an inability to provide positive incentives to overcome the collective action problem. However, since individuals decide whether and how to participate in civil wars for multiple reasons, responding to a variety of local conditions in an environment of threat and violence, a focus only on macro-level motivations is incomplete. The opportunities side of the ledger deserves more attention. I therefore turn my attention to how control by an armed group eliminates soldiers’ opportunities to desert. In particular, I consider the control that an armed group maintains over soldiers’ hometowns, treating geographic terrain as an important exogenous indicator of the ease of control. Rough terrain at home affords soldiers and their families and friends advantages in ease of hiding, the difficulty of using force, and local knowledge. Based on an original dataset of soldiers from Santander Pro- vince in the Spanish Civil War, gathered from archival sources, I find statistical evidence that the rougher the terrain in a soldier’s home municipality, the more likely he is to desert. I find complementary qualitative evidence indicating that soldiers from rough-terrain communities took active advantage of their greater opportunities for evasion. This finding has important implications for the way observers interpret different soldiers’ decisions to desert or remain fighting, for the prospect that structural factors may shape the cohesion of armed groups, and for the possibility that local knowledge may be a double-edged sword, making soldiers simul- taneously good at fighting and good at deserting.

Key words: Desertion; Defection; Military Cohesion; Civil War; Spanish Civil War

-3- 2011/34 • IBEI Working Papers merely an artifact of differences in motivations. Net of motivation differences, and differences, motivation of Net motivations. in differences of artifact an merely not were communities difficult-terrain of rates desertion high the area, study my in that, demonstrate I terrain, by vary also may motivations While police. to difficult is sis withqualitativeevidence. analy statistical the supplements paper The model. multilevel a in hometowns their of and soldiers of War.characteristics Civil combines Spanish It the in Cantabria) of community autonomous the (now province Santander from drawn desertion of set tion itself,andextendintocivilianlife. fac the beyond the well go thus desertion prevent to Effortshometown, desert. to is he likely less soldier’s a controlled easily I more the hometowns. that soldiers’ evidence over statistical find maintains group armed I an here that but control groups, the armed within consider hierarchy of terms in control study desertion of trol by an armed group eliminates soldiers’ opportunities to desert. A few accounts side of the ledger deserves more attention. I therefore turn my opportunities attention The to how con incomplete. is motivations macro-level on only focus a violence, and threat of environment an in conditions local of variety a to responding reasons, multiple for wars civil in participate to how and whether decide individuals since However, problem. action collective the overcome to incentives positive provide to where inability of an of terms in war, or terms the of themes in macro the to relation in desertion stand soldiers explain They desertion. for motivations on focus ies stud past Most rearguard. the in control on focus a with question this addresses 1. Introduction -4- the source ofinsurgency but, potentially, asperipheral tothewaritself. ion. Finally, the paper suggests a particular role for the periphery in civil wars: not as motivations can be revealed and constructed at the same time, in an endogenous fash knowing soldiers’ motivations might of be unpacked difficulty by examining the ways in that which suggest those I deserting. at good and fighting at good knowledge both be local may good with soldiers tradeoff: fascinating potentially a creates that point a is This desertion. facilitating in knowledge I local of importance the terrain, highlight about argument an constructing in Moreover, terms. better for negotiate groups and rearguard communities: communities that cannot easily be controlled can turn, In vary.this suggests downstream implications for the process of might negotiation between armed control this why reasons structural some suggests and guard rear the of control of importance the up points It directions. theoretical new opens ing in other micro-level settings, and two possible macro-level tests. This finding also rely ontheirfamiliesand friends. impact its has deserters and hills, the in hide to easy is it mechanisms: of obvious throughmost the terrain that appears it evidence, qualitative considerable of light in What allows an armed group in a civil war to prevent desertion? This paper This desertion? prevent to war civil a in group armed an allows What The paper concludes with the broader context. I propose replication of the find terrain Difficult steepness. especially terrain, on focusing by control examine I data original an of analysis statistical a via argument its develops paper This ------IBEI Working Papers • 2011/34 ------5- In addition, In 7 10 or a lack of socialization of lack a or 4 Scholars may also focus on focus also may Scholars 3 In any is case a there selection bias at work in 12 pointing out that divergence from a grand, im 6 This argument ignores important variation in the ability the in variation important ignores argument This 11 Another group of scholars takes more seriously Mancur 5 In particular, Costa and that Kahn in Union argue the troops In particular, 9 They then characterize how soldiers stand with regard to that cleavage, scholars focus on the social solidarity of the unit as providing reasons to 2 8 Most past studies of desertion in civil wars, and a kind of shorthand conven 1 The focus on motives has intuitive appeal, but there are theoretical difficulties This paper defines desertion as rule-breaking exit from military service, includ service, military from exit rule-breaking as desertion defines paper This Wickham-Crowley 1993, 63–68. Wickham-Crowley Costa and Kahn 2003; Costa and Kahn 2008. Lonn 1928, 53. I do not discuss civilian defection or ethnic defection (the phenomenon of co-ethnics fighting on the “wrong” side); these issues are covered at length covered side); these issues are of co-ethnics fighting on the “wrong” defection or ethnic defection (the phenomenon I do not discuss civilian Kalyvas 2003. 465. 2000, Enloe 1980; Fairbanks 1995, 19, 25; Kaufmann 1996; Horowitz 1997. Giuffre Bearman 1991. Olson 1971. Collier and Hoeffler 2004. et al. 1949; Marshall 1947. Shils and Janowitz 1948; Stouffer in Kalyvas 2006; Kalyvas 2008; Christia 2008; Lilja and Hultman 2011; Staniland forthcoming. in Kalyvas 2006; Kalyvas 2008; Christia 2008; Lilja and Hultman 2011; Costa and Kahn 2008, 5.

9. 10. 11. 12. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. forts against desertion improved dramatically after General Gideon Pillow formed a ill-equipped the on relying than rather deserters, find to try to branch military special and undermanned Conscript Bureau. using the rate capture of deserters as an indicator of the likelihood of punishment. If with this approach. First, keeping analysis limited to motivations suggests that sol diers essentially have the freedom to act as they see fit. Costa and Kahn argue that in the Union “most Army, soldiers stood by their comrades even though a rational soldier would have deserted. Punishments were too rare and insufficiently severe to deserting.” from men deter ef side, Confederate the on example, For punishment. such inflict to groups armed of stay and keep fighting. fought US for Civil each War other; this cooperation was facilitated by homogeneity within military units. age groups of hometowns, occupations and cash payment, for example, or norms of cooperation among soldiers. sol that Thus, suggest do though they Hoeffler’s focus, and Collier is desertion not and recruitment army. the of outside better are opportunities economic when desert diers their for fighting soldiers on focus that sociology military of works classic on drawing comrades, into Southern nationalism. Olson’s collective action problem, personal cause necessary is to hardly explain why individual a would self-interested may principle in cause a with agree who those Even cause. that support to not choose may groups Armed it. for fighting with associated costs personal the pay to agree not try to overcome this problem by providing soldiers certain positive inducements: cleavage.” and predict their desertion decisions from there. For out-groups. ethnic of desertion the predict scholars some example, in ethnic conflicts, Confed the in desertion highlighting example for cause, the to commitment of lack a slavery beyond interests economic of consequence a as eracy ing both desertion proper (i.e. returning to civilian life) and defection (i.e. switching sides). tional wisdom, focus on soldiers’ motivations for deserting. In one approach, schol ars begin with the large labels applied to civil wars—what Kalyvas calls the “master 2. Desertion, control, and hometowns and control, 2. Desertion, 2011/34 • IBEI Working Papers ing soldiers’ behaviour closely and threatening punishments that anyone would try would anyone that punishments threatening and closely behaviour soldiers’ ing trust. of lack a Whatever the motivations, on soldier’s desertion can be built prevented or deterred desertion by watch against safeguard a is behaviour of punishment and monitoring via Control defect. to likely are soldiers its when tell to leadership all. at aim group’s armed the share not may them of Many assess. to leaders group’s armed an for difficult are that motivations diverse highly with soldiers recruiting however,requires size, this Tobeyond well. grow pretty soldier every know to get to possible be may small—it quite be necessarily must armies—which close-knit extremely In coercion. and trol strong assumptionsaboutsoldiers’motivesmaybeanoverlyboldtheoretical move. interests. locally-derived and conditions local dividuals in civil wars make decisions in response to a wide variety of fundamentally reasonsmultiple for desert differentthey in likewise, and conditions. gain; personal to defense community to ideology from reasons, of variety a for fight soldiers that indicate surveys But problem. action collective the solve helps that est, commitment, of degree their for scale of sort a as serves that cause grand a soldiers: for motives of set core a ing environment offearandcoercion. an in but choice free of out participate not do individuals wars: civil in participation to approaches voluntaristic overly of critique general morerecent a to similar is ture degreeoverall the controllitera of motivations the of critique This face. soldiers that about little very say may deserters among rate punishment low a Thus leave. to try never and punishment fear who many be may there still justified, is judgment that if and caught, get to unlikely are they that anticipate who those are desert who those -6- 18. 17. 16. 15. 14. 13. that creatingmeans disposal, also its deterrent.families at a of tools punishment The deserter is not himself caught, an armed group may decide to resort to other coercive a if since sense, makes This desertion. their for punishment bear often families ers’ desert Second, food. and shelter including support, and help for friends or families First, deserters often head back to home districts as a matter of first resort, relying on the faction exercises can have a strong influence on a opportunities soldier’s to desert. control can also be exercised over soldiers’ hometowns, and the degree of control that soldiers. group’sit armed and the command between distance physical the and tures like the structure of an army, the autonomy that subordinate military units have, to avoid.

Gates 2002;Johnston2008. Weinstein 2007;Mueller2000;Kalyvas2006. Kalyvas 2003. Arjona andKalyvas2006;Humphreys andWeinstein 2004;PetersandRichards 1998. DeNardo (1985)makesthisscaleexplicitinatheoretical analysisofsocialmovementactivists. Kalyvas andKocher2007. Control can be a matter of hierarchical military organization, trading on fea on trading organization, military hierarchical of matter a be can Control con of importance the suggests actually motives of variety very the Instead, A second theoretical difficulty is that motive theorists typically begin by assum 17 Heterogeneity means that it is hard for an armed group’s armed an for hard is it that means Heterogeneity 14 or a predominant motive, such as economic self-inter economic as such motive, predominant a or 13 16 Assuming away this diversity with diversity this away Assuming 15 In general, in general, In 18 But ------IBEI Working Papers • 2011/34 - - - - -7- is com

25 20 And it can 19 armed groups in civil wars can 23 I extend Kalyvas’ insight on this 21 In addition, the classic loss-of-strength gradi loss-of-strength classic the addition, In 24 Thus heading to the hills is a ubiquitous feature Similarly, civilians have frequently headed to the to headed frequently have civilians Similarly, 26 27 control within the control state-like by entities armed controlled Where Kalyvas focuses on problematic control predicated on 22 internal In this paper, I explore geography, specifically difficult terrain, as an important I geography, explore In this paper, However, However, beyond cooperation, finding deserters may be a matter of monitor Factions vary in their ability to control the rearguard. What factors help Factions ensure vary in their the ability rearguard. to control Hence the use of terrain to evade firepower in modern warfare. Biddle 2004. in modern warfare. Hence the use of terrain to evade firepower Boulding 1962. Scott 2009, 43–48. Lonn 1928, 25. Weinstein 2007. Weinstein Costa and Kahn 2004. Kalyvas 2006. McColl 1969. 1992; Herbst 2000. Mann 1986; Migdal 1988; Tilly

24. 25. 26. 27. of the armies of the United States.” United the of armies the of 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. pounded by the friction of terrain. of desertion. Confederate deserters hid in bands in the hills to resist capture. When the Confederate War Office was analyzing problemthe of desertion,“the condition of things in the mountain districts itof North Carolina, South Carolina, noted that Georgia, and Alabama menaces the existence of the Confederacy as fatally as either structural attribute shaping patterns of local control. It has historically been quite dif quite been historically has It control. local of patterns shaping attribute structural ficult over to control mountainous exercise locations. It is, of course, easier to hide in land. flat on than earth the of folds the ent, based on the difficulty of transporting men and supplies over distance, side. I focus on variation in control that still occurs where the pose a serious other threat. This internal side control is analytically does distinct from the not problems of control that competition with the other side creates. I argue that, just as states can vary in their ability to compel citizens’ compliance, vary as well. point to the issue of groups in civil wars. competition with another armed group, I abstract from contestation with the other “master cleavage”: where one side’s control is uncontested, civilians are much more likely to comply than where control is in dispute. faced social sanctions rather than social rewards when they returned home. when they returned social rewards faced social sanctions rather than ing and coercion. Patterns of cooperation may in fact be partially contingent upon the patterns of territorial control exercised by the different sides of the civil war’s local control? There may be a role for positive cooperation. Armed groups in civil wars civil in groups Armed cooperation. positive for role a be may There control? local as civilians, with relationships cooperative have they which to degree the in vary may argues. Jeremy Such Weinstein cooperation can provide armed groups with various different kinds of support, including supplies, information, and shelter. for example, War, also help with the offindingdeserters. and In capture the US Civil the civilian population on the Union side bought in to the cause, such that deserters proper, proper, back to the rearguard; if a soldier defects, his family can still be That threat may punished. be more or less credible depending on the control the armed group has over the soldier’s hometown. hometowns are important for defection—i.e. side-switching—as well as for desertion desertion for as well side-switching—as defection—i.e. for important are hometowns 2011/34 • IBEI Working Papers the face of a conventional wisdom based on motivations. The historiography of the of historiography The motivations. on based wisdom conventional a of face the in which to investigate a control- and opportunity-based explanation for desertion in 3. The Setting: Santander Province, Spain group’s command. armed the of orders the follow to do they than deserters help to incentives stronger autonomous; politically be deserters may therefore be to able to gain help from cooperative likely local officials who have are they that mean communities mountain of advantages defensive the provide.addition, mountains In that concealment physical of the terrain, soldiers from the mountains will be able to exploit the opportunities for stem from their ability to escape control. Possessing an unparalleled local knowledge peoples highland among rates desertion high that slavery,argue of I cause the from plains. coastal the from soldiers Carolinathan North weredesert inland moreto of fromlikely piedmont the actually are who the projection ofcontrol ofpeoplesoverdistance. as of conceived state-building of part important vitally a therefore is road-building, Karen. the against campaign counterinsurgency Myanmar’s to response in do still many and hills, the to fleeing by armies marauding of pillaging the and conscription fled long Asia east South in civilians numbers, massive In warfare. of depredations the avoid to hills -8- 31. 30. 29. 28. Republican the On party. Falange fascist the and pretenders, different supporting monarchists officers, military junior on drawing rebellion “Nationalist” right-wing a against Republic Spanish Second incumbent the of defense in and Anarchists nists War,FrontPopular tense a pitted it Commu Socialists, Republicans, Left of coalition democracy.and communism fascism, among contest European broader a of context the in ideologies right-wing that province’s conservatism. and cause left-wing the between mismatch a of result the as theme: first the of terms in understood generally is Santander in rate desertion high the context, that Within side. Republican or left-wing the on control and centralization forging of problems the and right, and left of cleavage master the themes: basic two by dominated is war

bly thebestshortintroduction); Thomas1994. This account oftheSpanishCivilWar drawson Alpert 1989;Beevor2006;Bolloten1991;Cardona 2006;Carr1977;Graham2002;Preston 2007(proba Giuffre 1997. Herbst 2000. Scott 2009,94–95,146–149. The Spanish Civil War is easily treated as an elemental clash of left-wing and left-wing of clash elemental an as treated easily Waris Civil Spanish The Warresearchappropriatesetting Civil an Spanish is the in province Santander those be should hide to opportunities the of advantage take to able best Those from 28 The increasing ability to cross rough terrain, especially through especially terrain, rough cross to ability increasing The hill communities. So, for example, Giuffre finds that soldiers that finds Giuffre example, for So, communities. hill 30 nie ifr, h fcss n il epe’ detachment peoples’ hill on focuses who Giuffre, Unlike 31 Fought in the three years prior to the Second World Second the to prior years three the in Fought 29 - - - IBEI Working Papers • 2011/34

- - - - - 32 -9- This paper focuses on Santander province (now Cantabria), between Asturias to Asturias between Cantabria), (now province Santander on focuses paper This The map of Spain was divided between these two camps. Republican territory The following account draws on Salas Larrazábal 1973; Saíz Viadero 1979; Martínez Bande 1972; Martínez Bande 1980; Solar 1996; Solla Gutiérrez 2005; Martínez Bande 1980; Solar 1996; Solla Gutiérrez 1979; Martínez Bande 1972; Viadero 1973; Saíz The following account draws on Salas Larrazábal Solla Gutiérrez 2006. Solla Gutiérrez

32. the west and the Basque Country to the east on Spain’s northern coast (see Figure 1). Figure (see coast northern Spain’s on east the to Country Basque the and west the Cut off by the Nationalist zone from the bulk of the Republic, Santander developed an autonomous government and war as effort, did the Basque Asturias Country and unlike the However, next other door. two areas, Santander’s war effort followed the lican territory and by April of 1939 the Republic was thoroughly defeated. thoroughly April of 1939 the Republic was lican territory and by in Spain Province Santander of 1. Location Figure beginning with the siege of the capital, from that point along lines. bloody stable But manoeuvres front the Nation the bogged down into slow, war in much of Spain territory Republican of strip northern the offensives; steady mount to able were alists fell over the course of 1937, after which Franco then turned his Repub took steadily Nationalists the years, two attention next the of course the Over to mainder. the re was itself split too, with the bulk stretching from the Mediterranean coast through Madrid in the centre, and a strip of land along most of the northern coast from As turias through to the Basque Country that was cut off from the rest as of September 1936. Nationalist offensives brought Madrid under siege by November of 1936, and, the army that remained loyal were supplemented by a large array of autonomous mi autonomous of array large a by supplemented were loyal remained that army the litias formed by political parties and unions. This was and a frequently disorganized began whole coherent and hierarchical a into it uniting of process The force. fractious in the autumn of 1936, met considerable resistance and only really ended by May of 1937. side, after the failed coup attempt of 18 July 1936 that began the the war, sections of 2011/34 • IBEI Working Papers to relieve the siege of Madrid in November 1936, offensives which stalled easily as easily stalled offensiveswhich 1936, November in Madrid of siege relievethe to offensives by Republican of punctuated was front the stability The 1936. in fall draft unteer militias, but over time they were centralized into the CES, which instituted a southern frontier.on Santander’s Initially the Republican fighting was done by vol greater initiativeamongRepublicanofficersduringthecoupattempt. much notably circumstances, fortuitous of series a of because Republic the for kept was forces,it organizedleft-wing presenceof weak the and conservatism its Despite Asturias. and Barcelona Madrid, of centres union key the than less much certainly 1936. February of elections majority,the right-wing in a fact in and parties, right-wing for votes of proportions largest of one the returned had Santander Republic, the of part were that provinces Spain’s all Of forces. political conservative of strength prewar in miniature. reassert it at the centre. In some ways, therefore, Santander province was the Republic fragmented among local committees at first, and it was a long and difficult process to cal strength raised suspicions among the other factions. As elsewhere, political power Anarchist presence; and a small but rising Communist Party whose increasing politi active highly still but weaker a with partnership uneasy an government; dominated Socialist- a with 1936-1937, period the in general in Republic the of those mirrored of the directives laid down by the capital. Moreover, its formal political forces closely Santander de Ejército the army, conscripted regular, a developed gradually it Republic, the to loyal remained that forces security uniformed the of remnants the and parties litical closely.rather policies Republic’s po on based system militia loose a with Beginning -10- 33. offered explanation, frequent most the is conservatism province’s The among highest. the have to acknowledged generally is province Santander exist, not do Spain in rates desertion on figures overall reliable Though desertion. to approach tives most surrendered. but 1950s; late the until sporadically lasted which warfare, guerrilla to took others the in forcesCES remainedcollapsed Some October; assault. in until the on of fight face to Asturias resistance CES’ the weeks: two within over was and in mid-August began This was invasion. it Nationalist point a faced this Santander at before June; time of of matter a end only the at fell Country, Basque the of capital Bilbao, desertion. with plagued was offensive its again, attack; failed another conducted allies, German Country.troopsBasque Santander the Meanwhile, of and conquest the with on carried Italian their with forces, Nationalist the when 1937, of until April stabilized front northern The frequently. deserting began soldiers Santander

Linz anddeMiguel1977,43. 33 The conservatism of Santander province makes it a most-likely case for a mo up set quickly was front quiet relatively and stable a attempt, coup the After the Republic: the of much differentfrom wholly was it respect vital one in But And it had a weaker union presence than most other Republican provinces— Republican other most than presence union weaker a had it And (CES). In this, the autonomous government followed the letter the followed government autonomous the this, In (CES). uro de Cuerpo - - - - IBEI Working Papers • 2011/34 - - -11- under 1.54 1.54 - 2.42 - 3.65 2.42 - 6.95 3.65 6.95 over In the Spanish context, Santander is strong ground for a motivations story. 34 A A challenge in measuring the degree of control over different municipalities Over the course of this fighting, desertion rates varied widely by soldiers’ Gámir Ulibarri 1939, 37; Salas Larrazábal 1973, 358–359; Martínez Bande 1980, 153, 167.

34. desertion rates is that the CES varied in the degree to which it could impose its control control its impose could it which to degree the in varied CES the that is rates desertion on those municipalities. hometowns. Figure 2 maps the estimated rate of desertion from my data—deserters divided by the weighted estimate of soldiers from the same What municipality. ex in varied municipalities why reason important an that suggest I variation? this plains data author’s Source: quintiles. by given are Results 4. Hypotheses and control variables and control Hypotheses 4. soldiers), (% of Municipality by Desertion of Rate 2. Estimated Figure Province Santander should be particularly telling. should be particularly tionalists:thebylast Republican commanding officer the in north, General Mariano Gámir Ulibarri, and by the pro-Franco historiansBande. Salas Larrazábal and Martínez There was a poor fit between the political attitudes of the population andof the themaster cleavage side that the province was called to Iffight there for. is support, support that then opportunities, and control on instead based approach an for here, both by the Left and the Right. This is a claim made both by Republicans and Na 2011/34 • IBEI Working Papers rvn nta b lwadr gna. hs s ifr’ agmn i atmtn to attempting in argument Giuffre’s is This agendas. lowlander by instead driven is it fight; their not just is war civil the that believe may people margins, geographic the On terrain. over substantially differ preferences political and economic people’s be associated with desertion rates not because of opportunities to desert, but because ferent social, economic, and political conditions than the centre. Terrain may therefore home municipality, thehigherhislikelihoodofdesertion. the that thereforehypothesize I pretation of terrain is its ability to allow deserters and their families to evade capture. to inter chief my places costly.above, more outline even I transportation As makes create and hide, can terrain Steep themselves. highlands the within operating and using force, abstracting from the cost of moving from a lowland core to in the highlands difficulty of sources localized more measures terrain Steep distance. over power projecting of costs the thus and costs transportation increasing base, lowland a from access difficult implies core.Altitude industrial lowland its in based government ed with its capital in Santander city on the coast and with its left-wing Socialist-dominat province, Santander in case the certainly was this and ground, low on located often rain. I measure this with two indicators: altitude and steepness. Centres of power are ment ofsecurityforces forasearch (inthiscase,by aunitoftwenty). from the municipalities of Solórzano and Entrambasaguas, would lead to the deploy an deserters as reporttwelve such 1937of largedeserters, April of groupsof Reports desertion. of terms in problematic particularly are that locations to needed: are they a in Obviously,location. particular deserters forcessecurity its deploy to likely whereis faction the for search to able forces security of numbers the of true particularly is This desertion. to endogenous be to likely is control this respects, some in that, is -12- 40. 39. 38. 37. 36. 35. mountain districtskeptupsupportfortheRight. success. limited of and had little political appeal. Left the districts, mountainous in wererelativelyuncommon unionization, left-wing railroads. or highways to cattle, and livestock of shipping railroads permitted closer integration of rural Although communities into the broader basin. economy, with mining the surrounding the and Astillero and Santander of 19 late the of development the province,opportunity. Santander and controlin Indeed, tend to support a voluntarist, motives-based approach and not an approach based on country.Carolinahill North in rates desertion higher for account

th Memoria Histórica[CDMH],Salamanca,Serie Político-Social[PS]SantanderL,caja412,carpeta22,expediente22. Obregón Goyarrola 2007,36–37. Gutiérrez Lázaro andSantoveñaSetién2000;Toca 2005. Obregón Goyarrola 2007,30–31. de PuenteFernandez1992. Giuffre 1997. Radio ComunistadeSecretario Políticoand Agrupación SocialistadeRiañotoFrente PopularSantander, 30 April 1937.Centro Documentaldela and early 20 early and Of course, communities on the geographic periphery may often have very dif very have often may periphery geographic the on communities course, Of I turn instead to a strongly exogenous factor in control over a hometown: its ter th century was very much concentrated in the lowlands: in the ports the in lowlands: the in concentrated much very was century 40 In addition, the strong presence of the Catholic Church in Church Catholic the of presence strong the addition, In 38 39 Since mining and industry, the two major early targets of targets early industry,major and two mining the Since The Socialists’ efforts to unionize agriculture were belated 37 higher the altitude the higher many mountainous areas did not have easy access easy have not did areas mountainous many and steeper the terrain the steeper 36 If true, this would this true, If 35

of a soldier’s soldier’s a of - - - - - IBEI Working Papers • 2011/34 ------13- How 44 ). In the Spanish the In 43 incontrolados control on a place. Cohen, place. a on control impose be the local rate of violence. This is consistent with a perspec theoretical also may or the presence of the organizational arm of 42 The vote share for right-wing parties in the February 1936 February the in parties right-wing for share vote The 41 This may indicate the pursuit of local rivalry and competition outside of 45 Soldiers from rough-terrain communities may also desert less often because of Finally, an indicator Finally, of lack of control Economic and political marginality could be considered indicators of a lack of con of lack a of indicators considered be could marginality political and Economic These characteristics indicate the importance of controlling for economic devel economic for controlling of importance the indicate characteristics These Mann 1986. 1981. and Organski Cohen, Brown, Beevor 1982, 106–107. Balcells 2010. Dirección General del Instituto Geográfico, Catastral y de Estadística 1930. Dirección

42. 43. 44. 45. differences differences in individual characteristics. They may be less likely than agricultural their be lowland frequently more may They place. first the in serve to want to comrades 41. or, from or, another point of it view, may indicate efforts to eliminate the opponents of the left, and hence an attempt to reassert control. Because local violence may be an ambiguous indicator of state control of a location, I include a measure of local vio rather than to test a theory-derived hypothesis. lence as an exploratory project, ever, systematic analysis is somewhat ambiguous on this point. Balcells, in a statistical statistical a in Balcells, point. this on ambiguous somewhat is analysis systematic ever, study of violence in Catalonia, finds that rates of local violence were correlated with pre-war political competition, so that closer election results predicted higher rates of violence. the Republican and leadership’s hence interests, a lack of Republican central control; occur, or violence could be the result of an attempt to attempt an of result the be could violence or occur, Brown and Organski capture this ambiguity by terming state building “the in violence violent produces building state that level, macro a at find, they order”; of creation well-established. is state the once order long-run but instance first the was side Republican the on civilians against violence that argued often is it War, Civil the consequence of lack of control over undisciplined militias ( with desertion goes beyond its association with people’s motives. I suggest, then, that then, I suggest, motives. people’s with its association beyond goes hide. desertion with to easier it makes terrain rough that one: intuitive most the is explanation best the fundamentally ambiguous, however: lack of control can allow for more violence to my opportunities story, because they both are my opportunities story, tive focused on motives rather than on opportunities. I examine therefore literacy rates ge about hypothesis major the for variables control as Right the for support political and desertion with correlation substantial a have terrain steep and altitude high If ography. even after controlling for these two variables, it indicates that terrain has a relationship political parties. However, such marginalities cannot stand on their own as evidence of of evidence as own their on stand cannot marginalities such However, parties. political degree of local political opposition to the Republican cause. of local political opposition degree trol in the sense of infrastructural power opment and political support. Literacy rates indicate the degree of development in different areas, since literacy reflects educational opportunities and enables a wider array of economic According activities. to the 1930 census, literacy varied quite sub under 50% from to over 80%; the stantially rate by for municipality the in Santander, 72%. was province whole the of indicator straightforward a is war), the of start the before months (five elections 2011/34 • IBEI Working Papers Figure 3. Relief Mapof Santander Province 5. Potential biases from case selection acteristics occasionallythoughttocorrelate withapropensity todesert. char category,demographic occupational several and capture status, to marital age, may also indicate his general degree of political commitment to the left. I also include of latent motivations. Whether or not a soldier has an official party or union affiliation array wide a for proxy a as serves thus status conscription place. first the soldier’s A in voluntarily up join to willingness his in captured be likely will motivation a such general preference a for serving. Whatever of reasonthe soldier’s for wanting indicator to fight oruseful not fight, a joining—as of date the and conscript, a as or vol unteer a as up—whether joining of circumstances soldiers’ examine I systematically. conduct a multilevel analysis, therefore, I to control for these others. individual characteristics than strongly more home of pull the feel to and married be to likely more be may soldiers Rural survival. for them on depending families their with workers, -14- 46. suggests This centre. industrial lowland the in towns and capital the was province Santander in support Republican the of heart the Moreover,indicated, cordillera. as tabria (see Figure 3). The geography of the province ranges from coastal plains to high namic of coastal core and mountainous periphery is particularly pronounced in Can Source: Government of Cantabria.

Bearman 1991;CostaandKahn2003. The geography of Santander may suggest some biases in case selection. The dy 46 - - - - IBEI Working Papers • 2011/34

- - - - -15- It is 47 lowers Therefore, 48 to switch sides at the not than average motivation to try to evade to try to motivation average than lower On the one hand, this may suggest that some high-altitude sol 49 The focus of this paper, on soldiers’ hometowns, would perhaps be best treated treated best be perhaps would hometowns, soldiers’ on paper, this of focus The As well, much of mountainous terrain in Santander province is located along Scott 2009. Ibid. 2007. Goyarrola Guinea 2005; Obregón García

47. 48. 49. cal. No complete set of hometown-by-hometown lists of soldiers exists, and so there was no real basis for sampling this Instead, way. therefore, I decided to sample on individuals. 6. Data and Method 6. Data with a hometown-by-hometown sampling method. this However, proved impracti outset of the war, and thus likely have a have likely thus and war, the of outset military service. The possibility of evasion at the start of the war thus actually of motivation rather than opportunity. the likelihood that terrain picks up the effect not necessarily challenge the broad theory at stake, because it effect selection this case, is any In control. faction’s also the of soldier’sout a is which family a scenario in the understate would analysis the because bias, conservative a produce actually may potential impact of hills on desertion. Those soldiers high-altitude who from regions to remain be included in my dataset those are who decided the province’s borders with Nationalist-held Palencia and Burgos provinces. At the beginning of the civilians war, were able to take to the hills to cross the lines before they even got in to the removing army, them from the ambit of the army and from thus my dataset. diers not were going home when they deserted but the crossing lines to with reunite families who had already switched sides—indicating a strong motive. This would ence in desertion rates when controlling for altitude above sea level: altitude should capture the lowland-rule dynamic, while steepness captures more municipality-by- of using force. municipality variation in the ease limited in geographic scope because of the difficulty of transportation. even when armed groups emerge from the mountainous periphery itself, they may have considerable difficulty in controlling territoryand preventingdesertion. If the relationship between terrain and desertion is due only to a dynamic of lowland rule over highland areas, we should expect local steepness of terrain to make no differ possible that a faction rooted in the mountains themselves may not have as much dif much as have not may themselves mountains the in rooted faction a that possible and authority lowland of pattern the However, dwellers. highland controlling ficulty highland periphery is common enough because of the wealth and power of lowland urban cores that this analysis should be applicable Republican Within fairly widely. well, As instance. for Aragón, and Catalonia for holds also pattern the alone, territory even where authority emerges from the mountains themselves, it tends to be very the classical pattern of a lowland state ruling over a mountainous periphery. 2011/34 • IBEI Working Papers paper trail, could not be found. ample, there is a case of a soldier from Battalion 130 who disappeared and, after a long dataset. my in included be could reported menfiles andtheirbattalion hadthemdeserted; have7by of to of two only list a indicated Miera of municipality the from report one example, unfortunate larly reportstary refer reportedto are who deserters elsewhere not referenced. particu a As There were other deserters that are not included here. Scattered and disorganized mili serious inconsistency in preservation, aside from under-sampling some military units. cards that have been preserved. Unlike the deserter files, these cards appear to have no desertion. I compiled every soldier with a desertion report in all of the oversubsequent 32,000military career, army battalionsuchas reassignments, leave,hospital visits,and soldiers indicating his background information. These cards also included notes on his preserved.are others, scattered and is unfortunately highly inconsistent: only those with last names beginning A through L, name, deserter’s reports these of preservation The the desertion. of circumstances and including details, background desertion, of reports individual produced army the month; the last set of lists was created in July 1937. subsequenteachcontinuingNovemberand in1936, to back wentFebruary that 1937 retrospective a in with list beginning month, and battalion by names, deserters’ of lists communication—the individualinquestionwasexcluded. the initial report was in error—for example, a leave unreported because of a failure in that indicated report subsequent a Where leave. without calls roll consecutive three for appear to failed who soldier a deserter: a of definition following the used army Civil the -16- 55. 54. 53. 52. 51. 50. not are that occasions prior multiple on desert to failed already have period” “militia datenotcapturedis approach.myby Therefore, anyvolunteers whoremain from the that to prior deserted and joined who anyone that means This 1937. January in earnest arises from the time period covered by the data. Reports of deserters only really begin in ing personnelfiles. true number the of deserters. In addition, understates I took a simple random certainly sample of 1,305 of the almost remain This 1,313. totalling above, defined as deserter compile amore definitive listofdesertersinSantanderprovince. to needed is effort time-intensive and unfortunately.labour- further,these, moreA of

King andZeng2001. CDMH, PSSantanderL,caja412,carpeta20, expediente21. CDMH, PSSantanderL,caja444,carpeta13, expediente19. The large filesare bulkofthese containedinCDMH,PSSantander A,cajas1-72. CDMH, PSSantanderC,caja26,carpetas1-4; CDMH,PSSantanderM,caja7,carpeta12; PSSantander A, caja188,carpeta4. CDMH, PSSantander A, caja180,carpeta7;CDMH,PSSantander A, caja190,carpeta4. Centro Documental de la Memoria Histórica , in Salamanca. I began by identifying deserters on the basis of army records. The To preserve as much information as possible about deserters, I included every every included I deserters, about possible as information much as preserveTo There are at least two validity concerns with this approach to desertion. The first Data on deserters and other soldiers were obtained from the archives located in I identified deserters from three kinds of document. First, the army compiled army the First, document. of kinds three from deserters identified I 55 Theindividualswere givencorresponding probability weights. 54 Time did not allow for a systematic accounting of each 53 There are also numerous ambiguous cases. For ex For cases. ambiguous numerous also are There 51 Finally, thearmy produced carda foreach itsof , formerly the 50 Second, beginning in January 1937, Archivo General de la Guerra 52 - - - -

IBEI Working Papers • 2011/34 ------17-

58 This state This 57 My data thus cannot speak to those situations. My data thus cannot 56 A graver concern, since it deals with validity and not just reliability, is that com that is reliability, just not and validity with deals it since concern, graver A A A second validity concern with this measure of desertion arises from the incen McLauchlin 2010. McLauchlin Documentación de la General Militar de Ávila [AGMAV], Archivo 15 July 1937. Norte,” Valencia, en el “La Lucha Martínez Cabreras, General Toribio 2005. Weitz other cases as well, such as the Confederacy. of desertion is found in This underreporting República [DR], Armario 63, Legajo 853, Carpeta 7, Documento 4, pp. 27-28. República [DR],

56. 57. 58. frequently. However, frequently. the conventional wisdom was much more dominated by the idea that soldiers deserted because they were not attached to the cause, or because particularly fearful. they were would therefore be inclined to quash such a report: either to not deliver it at all, or to be inclined to quash such a report: would therefore report some other reason why the soldier was not present to be reviewed: a “disap pearance,” for example. This is a plausible logic, and it suggests that the picture of deserters may be artificially biased in favour ofThat the conventional wisdom army’s conventionaldid include wisdom. the stereotype that soldiers from mountain ous communities—in particular, the Pasiego nomadic-pastoralist group—deserted General Staff expected it to be. If, for example, the General Staff saw hidden right- wingers as the major problem of desertion, then it would deserted unsurprising. findBut this right-wingerswould also who imply that a report of the desertion of a good party comrade would reflect badly on a commander who could not even keep those individuals in line. The commander’s career could then be jeopardized. He systematic bias in the data, just that the baseline rate of desertion was lower than true, true, than lower was of desertion rate baseline the that just data, in the bias systematic of non-deserters may actually have deserted. and that some members of my sample manders might also have wanted to report that the profile of deserters was as the government on 15 July 1937 that in Asturias and Santander, “despite certain problems of of problems certain “despite Santander, and Asturias in that 1937 July 15 on government organized and leadership regular with provided now forces, armed the order,” political discipline.” of norms to responding at day each “improve units, regular into written, was it which in month the in Santander: in desertion of true all at not was ment peak. a at were and frequency in increased steadily had desertions data, my to according a suggest immediately not does desertion to underreport tendency the In of and itself, General Staff what it wanted to hear. For example, commanders would have wanted to to wanted have would commanders example, For hear. to wanted it what Staff General figure low surprisingly the for account may which low, were rates desertion that report of 1,313 deserters, a rate of about 4%, compared to a at existed anecdotal bias certainly much a An higher rate. evidence underreporting high level: General Republican that the to suggests reported time, the at North the in serving Cabreras, Martínez Toribio ently in a cascade such as at the end of August, with soldiers responding endogenously endogenously responding soldiers with August, of end the at as such cascade a in ently of defeat. to the prospect the telling in interest an had have may commander A reporting. the doing those of tives to desert. This should exaggerate the differences between conscripts and volunteers. Involunteers. and conscripts between differences the exaggerate should over This desert. to offensives Nationalist of face the in crumbled Corps Army Santander the addition, the course of about one week in late August 1937. Because reporting would have be not is occurred apparently that desertion of wave the time, same the at unreliable come Janu period, stable relatively a during desertion capture then data My either. captured ary to mid-August 1937. There is reason to believe that desertion may operate differ captured in my analysis. Volunteers in my data set should thus be particularly unlikely particularly be thus should set data my in Volunteers analysis. my in captured 2011/34 • IBEI Working Papers 63. 62. 61. 60. 59. my measure of local violence, I divided this number of deaths by the total population ac froma community, wherever the person’s execution ultimately took place. To construct an individual, however, is quite relevant: it indicates the CivileffortWar tookplace withkidnappings to executionsthe andeliminate elsewhere.during province seizureanThe itselfSantander individualof in violence the of much Flores, Gutiérrez to according occurattributeddeaththere;notcommunitywasdidmeansThisathat ita ifevento municipality.the in residing individuals against violence local in deaths of number the 50%. Icombinedthesetwomeasures inasingleindexofsteepness,definedasfollows: nicipality’sterrain that is between mu 30 and the 50% of in proportiongrade, the on and complete) the proportionyet not is survey greatergeographic (the municipalities than steep terrain, I constructed an index. There are data available for all but two of Santander’s ness. Altitude is defined as the altitudesteep and altitude terrain: of measures two ofexamined I government. regional Santander the municipal seat in meters above sea level. Foravailable forit,andbecause hypothesesmy really onlyapply thedirectto ambittheof with Santanderfrom total),insteepnessprovincethebecause onreadilysoldiers dataonlywereof (92% only include I province. Santander in municipalities 102 the to ing problems from reporting is,therefore, inconclusive. validity of prospect The negligent. was commander the that mean to taken be might the reports: to inclination commanders’ from counter-bias a expect to reason is there Therefore, abilities. superior’s immediate his on aspersions casting escape, to allowed been had it since was an unimportant front.night that duty on sentinels two only were there because front Nationalist watch by the captain of his company; the report says that he was able to defect to the right-winger with no official political affiliation, he had been placed under “discreet” fromsoldier 115one Battalion of case 1937. the July 27 on deserted apparentwho An questions uncomfortable Consider place. first the in vigilance sufficient raise under not was soldier that why about might it deserted, soldier a such If desert. to likely werethought who soldiers those constrain to attempt an in policies various pursued -18- Oficial delaProvincia deSantander the in published were elections 1936 February the of results by-municipality

Gutiérrez Flores 2006. Dirección GeneraldelInstitutoGeográfico,CatastralydeEstadística 1930. Boletín OficialdelaProvincia deSantander, 26February 1936. Instituto Cántabro deEstadística2009. Oficial Informador, Batallón 115, toJefeSecciónInformación Santander, 30July1937.CDMH,PSSantanderL,caja412,carpeta16,expediente1. Data on local violence were compiled by Jesús Gutiérrez Flores. Gutiérrez Jesús by compiled were violence local on Data There may be a countervailing bias from reporting as well, however. The CES however.The well, as reporting from bias countervailing a be may There The data are given by the by given are data The (0.3 *proportion ofterritory 30%to50%ingrade)+(0.5*proportion >50%ingrade) Soldiers’ hometowns were given on their files. I classified these hometowns accord under -report unsurprising desertions, because unsurprising desertions unsurprising because desertions, unsurprising -report 59 This suggests an effort to determine how a likely deserter . Instituto Cántabro de Estadística de Cántabro Instituto 61 Literacydataare drawnfrom the1930census. . 60 The municipality- The 63 They indicateThey Boletín 62 - - - - - IBEI Working Papers • 2011/34 ------); ); -19- labradores Therefore, it Therefore, 68 but this was a was this but 66 and Bringas Gutiérrez’s data Gutiérrez’s and Bringas 65 soldier or militiaman. This indicates whether the soldier was I attempted to estimate the effect of wages directly by drawing drawing by directly wages of effect the estimate to I attempted 64 ” or none), but soldiers were also coded as unaffiliated if there ninguna agricultural workers were not included under the same surveys as industrial industrial as surveys same the under included not were workers agricultural 67 Occupational codings were quite difficult. I broke down the sample into different different into sample the down Ibroke difficult. quite were codings Occupational Data on conscription versus voluntarism were gathered from the card’s indica the card’s from gathered versus voluntarism were Data on conscription Soldado o miliciano— Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsión 1931. y Previsión Ministerio de Trabajo 2000. Montes Bringas Gutiérrez 1931; Malaquer de Montes and Llonch 2005, 1205. y Previsión Ministerio de Trabajo Malefakis 1970, 112–121. Collier and Hoeffler 2004.

65. 66. 67. 68. litical preference. The latter were often excluded from Spanish left-wing coalitions, even even coalitions, left-wing Spanish from excluded often were latter The preference. litical where, as in Cantabria, they formed a large proportion of the rural poor. 64. workers); of classes different among distinguishing of way practicable no was there and workers; these Considering farmhands. and hired yeomen as such between worker, agricultural particular, In sources analysis. of the random in and systematic categories error, it income seemed broad more plausible employ to and fairer variable to an control im portant po in farmers yeomen and day-labourers rural between differences important were there on agricultural wages, gathered from the Spanish Statistical Yearbooks, quiteoften was rates wage industrial for information of base The approach. questionable small, measuring only one or two and enterprises in a given province; professionals many agricultural different occu especially for records, government (especially by Spanish covered not were informal pations was compensation workers’ of much businesspeople; miners and industrial workers; service-sector workers (other than businessmen and pro fessionals); students; and a combined business-professional I category. broke down oc In Collier with line opportunities categories. income broad in way to this economic in capture order cupations better when desert should soldiers that argument Hoeffler’s and exist outside the army, on contemporary government data on industrial wages was often left blank; if it was truly unknown, then, the clerk could leave it as it was. no-one was listed as having a right-wing affiliation.) (For obvious reasons, economic sectors: day-labourers and unskilled workers; yeomen farmers ( filiated unions; in a Left Republican party (the Republicana Izquierda and the Unión or the joint FAI, the anarchist the Communist party, Republicana), the Socialist party, Socialist-Communist youth wing, the JSU. Non-membership was often indicated ex plicitly (e.g. “ was a line drawn through the cell for political affiliation. Thereason is that the field tor a member of the ad-hoc volunteer militias that had emerged at the beginning of the or was incorporated regularly via war, the draft. Political affiliations were also listed on the left-wing A card. affiliation was defined as follows: indicated membership in one of the two large unions, the Socialist or UGT af or the anarcho-syndicalist CNT, 1, 1937, because desertions were only measured in earnest after that point; this allows me me allows this point; that after earnest in measured only were desertions because 1937, 1, to efforts in violence of use the from arising endogeneity of problems potential avoid to at executions any I remove course, of And, families. their punish and deserters capture desertion. tend to be quite endogenous to since this would the front, cording to the 1930 census. I limited the violence measure to the period prior to January January to prior period the to measure violence the limited I census. 1930 the to cording 2011/34 • IBEI Working Papers 70. 69. and widowerswouldhaveattachmentstochildren andin-laws. home, at attachments soldiers’ capture to intended is variable of this because category married, the under widowers included I files. soldiers’ from directly taken also was status Marital rates. desertion with relationship inverted-U an has enlistment of date that therefore, possible, is war.It of burdens the and exhaustion to less soldier the subjects potentially date late a but commitment, greater indicate may joining of enlistment, I included a square term because two effects may be present: an early date greaterserve. would mid-20s presumptiontheir cultural in those that a was There families. their to committed too be to old the vulnerable, and fearful be wereyoung The moremid-20s. desert theirto to inthought thought those than often War,Civil Spanish the wereold the 21—and under those young—especially very the non-linearity. plausible In a is there because each, for term square a included I files. able relationship tothelikelihoodofdesertion. discern no had income categories, occupational regressorof a instead as included when seems wiser to employ a measure that distinguishes between these groups. In any event, -20- Age Continuous Variables Date of enlistment (days since 17July1936) Home county: Occupation: Married Single Affiliated to left-wing organization Unaffiliated to left-wing organization Volunteers Conscripts Deserters Non-deserters Categorical variables Table 1.Descriptive Statistics: Individual-Level Variables

tion. Bearman1991;CollierandHoeffler2004. Thisisunfortunateconsideringthepr Corral 2007,162–163. In addition,sincemy datacoveronlytheperiod January-August1937,there wasnowayoftestingtheeffect oftheharvestonlikelihooddeser Other provinces Torrelavega-Besaya Santoña-Miera Reinosa-Campoo Pas-Castañeda Liébana Laredo Costa Occidental Castro Urdiales Cabuérniga-Tudanca Asón-Ramales Área deSantander Commercial/professional Student Services Mining/industrial Yeoman farmer Unskilled/day-labourer ae f nitet n ae ee tagtowrl cdd rm h soldiers’ the from coded straightforwardly were age and enlistment of Date Frequency (81.07) (5.42) 25.89 Mean (SD) 909 838 862 856 345 354 398 287 392 332 100 416 142 421 195 138 172 174 48 48 60 96 55 27 41 13 Analyzed sample 69

evalence ofagriculturalworkersinmysample. Maximum Minimum Percent 66.83 26.48 68.26 22.89 28.23 72.49 33.57 68.74 13.88 31.26 33.17 13.72 27.51 31.74 11.00 11.32 4.39 3.83 3.83 3.27 4.78 7.66 384 7.97 1.04 2.15 62 16 1 Frequency (84.46) 25.75 (5.41) Mean 1450 1200 1305 (SD) 488 443 506 1221 420 286 1313 220 552 259 799 279 188 104 128 159 617 174 85 58 82 66 95 33 Whole sample 70 of date for As Maximum Minimum Percent 68.49 20.04 49.85 26.62 29.85 73.38 22.74 38.14 10.25 50.15 12.07 13.32 13.33 24.15 70.15 4.85 4.43 31.51 3.08 3.82 5.96 3.96 2.77 1.58 8.12 7.41 391 62 16 1 - - IBEI Working Papers • 2011/34 - - - -21- 5 0 0 1.3 957 .814 .326 .467 .950 .302 Minimum Maximum .170 237 .710 .670 (SD) (.149) Mean (.218) .0688 (.084) (.0573) (280.82) Of the 2618 soldiers in the sample, over half are deleted from the eventual logit eventual the from deleted are half over sample, the in soldiers 2618 the Of Summary statistics for each of these variables are given in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 Table 2. and 1 Tables in given are variables these of each for statistics Summary Literacy rate (proportion) rate Literacy (proportion) share vote Right-wing Altitude (metres above sea level) sea above (metres Altitude 30-50% territory municipality’s of = (proportion index Steepness >50% * .5) in slope * .3) + (proportion 1930) population as of 10,000 per (deaths Violence Table 2. Descriptive Statistics: Hometown-Level Variables Hometown-Level Statistics: 2. Descriptive Table is apparently known about urban soldiers than about rural soldiers. This is consistent is This soldiers. rural about than soldiers urban about known apparently is something but of it a represents with my overall to approach the and core periphery, selection bias. very difficult to determine this after the fact, but in any event the data must be inter had army the soldiers about us tell can paper this mind: in possibility this with preted who soldiers about little very say can it example, for Thus, others. not but on, records deserted prior to January 1937. Otherwise, yeomen farmers are under-represented; unskilled workers, day labourers, industrial workers and those from the capital re This indicates an urban gion over-represented. bias are in the eventual sample: more are are blank apart from their name, battalion number, and a report of their desertion; this indicates that the cards may have been created after the fact, as placeholders in a file-keeping system rather than as a substantive data-gatheringthis substantively, operation.raises the More concern that deserters about whom little is known are systematically different from deserters about whom much is known. It is obviously municipalities. This large loss of cases is as a consequence mainly of missing data, but also because of the geographical limitation I placed on the dataset. this large missing Because data problem, there is of some concern about systematically missing data. As it is possible to see 1, from missing Table data has a large effect on the out come variable, desertion rate. Deserters are much more likely to have missing data than non-deserters. Many deserters’ military cards, especially before January 1937, they dropped out due to missing data, leaving 101. out due to missing data, leaving they dropped analysis, reducing the dataset to 1254. further Two municipalities, with 43 soldiers, leave the analyses that include the steepness index, because it is not available for all included in the statistical models and for the full sample before geographic limits and limits geographic before sample full the for and models statistical the in included missing data delete cases. It also reports the eleven counties of Santander province, of distribution geographic basic the show to municipalities, 102 its aggregated which the at measured variables, hometown-level the for descriptives gives 2 Table soldiers. level of the 102 municipalities. One municipality had only six soldiers sampled, and gives summary statistics of individual-level data, both for the sample of soldiers that is that soldiers of sample the for both data, individual-level of statistics summary gives 2011/34 • IBEI Working Papers 7. Results -22- a InModel4, right-wing vote share andsteepness are centered atthegrand mean. * p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. Hometown literacy rate Hometown steepness Hometown altitude Occupation: Commercial orprofessional Occupation: Student Occupation: Services Occupation: Miningorindustrial Occupation: Yeoman Date of enlistment squared Date of enlistment Age squared Age Married Left-wing affiliation Volunteer Dependent variable: 0=didnot desert; 1=deserted Table 3. Multilevel Logit Results N of hometowns N of individuals BIC statistic Log likelihood Variance inconstants Constant Right-wing vote *steepness Hometown right-wing vote share Hometown violence a a a -.000054** (.0000156) (.000315) Estimate -9.767*** -1.529*** -624.326 .0255*** 1377.065 .000592 -.870*** (.00621) (.00619) (.00310) -.00579 .0247** Model 1 (2.451) 1.602* (1.745) (.698) (.258) .0944 (.395) (.524) (.224) .0436 .488* .0672 .309* .330* (.210) -.668 (.190) (.165) (.165) (.271) (s.e.) (.172) 1254 -.121 .180 101 -.0000564*** (.0000158) -9.982*** -596.569 Estimate 1320.924 .0249*** (.00636) (.00302) -1.727*** (.00632) -.803*** Model 2 3.698** .0207** -.00416 (2.384) 1.677** -.0498 (1.081) (1.681) (.300) (.230) (.522) (.279) (.378) (.709) .562* (.216) (.271) (.193) 1.238 (s.e.) (.167) (.161) .249 -.113 .186 .143 .183 .241 1211 99 -.0000665*** (.0000152) -603.882 -5.763*** 1264.558 Estimate .0283*** (.00603) -1.813*** Model 3 (.00617) -.775*** 3.345** .0199** (1.026) (.255) (.229) (.693) (.157) (s.e.) .224 1211 99 (.0000153) -.0000666 -2.542*** -.603.623 Estimate -1.826*** .0283*** (.00596) Model 4 (.00619) -.775*** .0201** (.0703) (1.342) 2.705* 1271.14 (.602) .0508 (.256) (.263) (.157) (s.e.) .201 1211 99 IBEI Working Papers • 2011/34 - - - - -23- .3 .2 Municipality steepness in index steepness Municipality .1 .06). In Model 2, however, rough terrain has a much stronger, terrain has rough a much stronger, .06). In Model 2, however, p > 0 We We can better characterize the relationship between terrain and desertion Thus it is the roughness of the terrain, rather than altitude, that drives the asso the drives that altitude, than rather terrain, the of roughness the is it Thus I first ran two multilevel logit models, corresponding to altitude and steepness. .1 0

.16 .12

.14 .06 .02 .04 .08 Predicted probability of desertion of probability Predicted through a visual representation. Reporting the raw percentage of deserters in my da my in deserters of percentage raw the Reporting representation. visual a through weaker. As weaker. I argue above, steepness is a better indicator of the opportunity to hide, should Mountains elevation. its than rather terrain of ruggedness the captures it since have a comparative advantage over plateaus in the opportunity to hide, as should coastal terrain over coastal plains. rough Based on estimates in Model 2 estimates on Based substantially is altitude for result The rates. desertion and geography between ciation

Figure 4. Predicted Probabilities of Desertion According to Home Municipality Municipality Home to According Desertion of Interval Probabilities Predicted Confidence 4. 95% Figure with Soldier, Typical a for Index, Steepness yeoman farmer who is affiliated with a Popular Front organization, from ahometown support 67% and 71%, of rate literacy a population, pre-war 10,000 per deaths .17 with for right-wing parties. Predicted probabilities of desertion at municipality different steepest levels the of from steep soldier a indicates, it As 4. Figure in given then are ness flattest. the from soldier a as desertion of likelihood the times 3.15 average, on had, fit to the data. The result for steepness is also substantively important. Based on Model Model on Based important. substantively also is steepness for result The data. the to fit and age soldier—mean typical a for desertion of probabilities predicted I estimates, 2’s vote right-wing and violence, literacy, mean with hometown a from enlistment, of date share, and modal values on the other variables. This hypothetical soldier is thus 26 years old, joined 195 days after the start of fighting, and is an unmarried, conscripted Results Results are 3. in In Table Model 1, between the and altitude is relationship desertion positively signed, as expected, but this relationship falls just short of statistical signifi and cases 43 cance at the .05 level ( that fact the Despite desertion. with association significant, statistically and two municipalities drop out of the data set because of unavailable data on steepness, Model 2 has a lower Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) statistic, indicating a better 2011/34 • IBEI Working Papers iue . eeto rts y tens dcl (ih tnad ro of error standard (withestimate) decile steepness by rates Desertion 5. Figure have itseffect attheupperreaches ofsteepness,ratherthanatthelowerend. to fluctuation. appears trendless Terrain as characterized better is municipalities the of half flattest the across rate desertion in variation that but decile, highest the to est in Figure 5. They indicate that the desertion rate increases considerably from the low of deserters is much lower in the population than in my sample. The results are given centage of deserters at each decile, adjusted to reflect the fact that the true proportion technique. sampling the for account to term constant sertion rate according to King and Zeng’s “prior correction” method for adjusting the the of deciles steepness index against alone, with desertion no other covariates. of I then model adjusted its logit estimates of the a de ran I method, sampling my given possible, as desertion of rates true to close as generate to order in Instead, deserters. rates raw of desertion, because giving my sampling method, by in design, inflates theuseful proportion of be not would example) (for decile steepness each across taset -24- 71. or local weak ganizational a presence. Both factors had suggest that such left communities were places the where where places been have may and stripe, political any of deserters to help provided have may communities Right-wing exist. possibilities other analysis, ecological of difficulties logical the of However,because Left. the for fight to not question in soldiers the of motivation stronger the by explained be then would rates desertion with association The themselves. attitudes right-wing hold to likely more were locations right-wing from soldiers individual that suggesting tor, indica ecological an as taken be might It result. this interpret to how obvious ately municipality.given froma soldiers among was desertion However, immedi not is it desertion. This indicates that, in general, the stronger the local right wing, the likelier Based onestimates inModel2

Desertion Rate .08 King andZeng2001. .04 .02 .06 .14 .12 .16 0 .1 oa rgtwn vt sae a a out pstvl sge ascain with association signed positively robust, a had share vote right-wing Local 1 2 3 4 Steepness Deciles 5 6 71 This gives an estimate of per of estimate an gives This 7 8 9 10 ------IBEI Working Papers • 2011/34

------25- overall likelihood of desertion. Interestingly, the demographic the Interestingly, desertion. of likelihood lower to handle interaction effects among second-level variables by centering them centering by variables second-level among effects interaction handle to 72 Does rough terrain facilitate desertion in all municipalities, or only in some As for the control variables, voluntarism versus conscription was, of course, Local violence, included for investigative purposes rather than for hypothesis Enders and Tofighi 2007. Enders and Tofighi

72. The more general the result, the more universal the importance of terrain; it would suggest that terrain is not just something that affects some municipalities’ desertion rates and not others. In Model 4 Tofighi’s and I Enders explore follows model an This sake. interaction clarity’s for effect, baseline using a as the 3 Model stripped- down advice 1320.924 in the best-fitting saturated model to 1264.558. political settings? This question essentially addresses the uniformity of the relation ship between terrain and desertion, allowing us to characterize the fully. more result occupations (not shown) is 1297.051 lower, as compared to 1320.924 for Model 2. In fact, a stripped-down model, removing the apparently non-influential demographic indicators of marital status, age, and occupation, and the apparently hometown conditions of violence and literacy rates, performs rather unimportant better given the investment of degrees of freedom (Model 3): the BIC statistic clearly declines, from or university) came from elite families. But the lack of other consistent relationships better-off clearly were who farmers, yeomen categories—especially occupational with than day-labourers—suggests that this is not a the robust conclusion. lack However, of an apparent association could be an artifact of the limitations of my occupational informa much add codings occupational the that unclear is It scheme. categorization the without model a for statistic BIC the freedom: of degrees of investment the for tion variables of marital status and age had no clear relationship with desertion. is There also very little clear association interpretation an fits between finding This students. occupational frequently-deserting of exception categories the with and desertion, more desert group armed the outside opportunities economic better with those where often: students (especially military-age students, who would generally be in college substantively important across substantively all important models, or as across was membership in a popular-front ganization. The date of enlistment was likewise important: later were recruits in term square the on sign negative the but recruits, earlier than desert to likely more dicates a curvilinear downward-trending relationship. That is, as time wears on fur a have recruits later ther, lack of literacy control or rates efforts did to not reassert that have control. Similarly, any clear association with desertion rates. This suggests that even if local develop ment patterns gave individuals different economic interests in fighting, this did not to desert or not to desert. translate into a decision this relationship appears to be an important area for future research. for future important area appears to be an this relationship testing, had no apparent relationship with the likelihood of desertion. This is unsur either indicate can violence that case plausible a is there above, noted as since, prising soldiers would have a better Adjudicating chance at deserting without being caught. 2011/34 • IBEI Working Papers relatively easy to hide? There is suggestive anecdotal evidence in this regard. In this regard.In this in evidence anecdotal suggestive is There hide? to easy relatively it find families, their and terrain, rough with towns from deserters reason—because difficult terrain and high desertion rates. Does this association occur for the suggested 8. Qualitative evidence from Santander there isnoapparent relationship todesertionrates. for turnouttovoteintheFebruary 1936electionsasameasure ofpoliticalalienation; centre’s politics. I therefore estimated a separate model, not reported here,the controllingfrom disengagement broader a with associated be to centre the from autonomy preferencefor cultural a expect would one addition, In values. differencein a of fect ef the of much for controltherefore should variable voluntarism The conscripts. be to soldiers other than morelikely be preference thus that should with Soldiers place. first the in up joining against resistance a into translate also should authority sider’s out an to subject being not for preference stronger a However, desertion. and ness steep between relationship observed the for account could and data, my by for led authority.litical contribution, frequently indicate a strong preference for autonomy from lowland po important recent Scott’s notably peoples, mountain of ethnographies and Histories portunities foranyonetodesert,regardless oflocalpoliticalconditions. op offers it general; relatively is desertion and terrain between relationship the that indicates This significant. statistically not is term interaction The mean. grand the at -26- 75. 74. 73. with assist could terrain the of knowledge good Aadvantages. particular had areas the militiamen never came up looking for them.” near Esles, served as a refuge for dozens, and, according to Obregón, “it was said that there wasn’t anyone who was hiding out.” The mountains of the Peña Herrera massif, ...Aroundhere,militia below, the go to want not did above... up Esles of] village [the “ serters. One civilian witness from a valley distinguishes between “ help them hide, and the advantages of the hills loomed large in the calculations of de gests the importance of whatever could help a soldier hide. The hills, of course, could where army posts and patrols were located in order to avoid being caught. inter whose views inCantabriahaveledtomultiplevolumesoflocalhistorythewar.Goyarrola, Obregón Fernando of work the on heavily draw I section abajo

Obregón Goyarrola 2005,90,157. Obregón Goyarrola 2005,90;Obregón Goyarrola 2007, 131–132;García Guinea 2005. Scott 2009. ” (below, where he lived) in describing the importance of the hills: “Those from Deserters did worry about capture, attempting to develop a good knowledge of between association an of suggestive strongly is above analysis statistical The cleavage. master left-right the to limited be not need differences Motivation 73 One might then argue that such a systematic pattern is not controlnot is pattern systematic a such arguethat then might One 75 Those who were actually arriba ” (above) and 74 This sug from hilly ------IBEI Working Papers • 2011/34

- - - - - 81 -27- In contrast, 78 Civilians also typically made typically 86 76 Division, the Pas area “even nd

83 80 Neighbours also helped: “if anyone came from 82 87 This applied both to deserters and to defectors. In a 84 —they tended to hide in those very cabins. 77 Noted the commander of the 2 79 If a soldier could anticipate that his family was likely to suffer 85 Division nd Families were also very important because, as elsewhere, family members were were members family elsewhere, as because, important very also were Families In addition, local contacts in the hills were of vital importance. Where desert Jefe, 2ª Sección, Estado Mayor, Cuerpo de Ejército de Santander, to Frente Popular de las Izquierdas, Torrelavega, Santander, 22 June 1937. CDMH, PS Santander, Torrelavega, Popular de las Izquierdas, to Frente de Santander, Cuerpo de Ejército Mayor, Jefe, 2ª Sección, Estado Guinea 2005, 17. García 2009, 132–134. Goyarrola Obregón Freeman 1979. Freeman DR, armario 63, legajo 855, carpeta 1, documento 1, page 3. AGMAV, Ontaneda, 23 June 1937. E. de Santander, Jefe del C. de Jefe, 2a División, to Sr. 2005, 90. Goyarrola 2009, 125; Obregón Goyarrola Obregón Obregón’s. 2005, 90; bracketed notes are Goyarrola Obregón DR, armario 63, legajo 855, carpeta 1, documento 1, page 3. AGMAV, Ontaneda, 23 June 1937. E. de Santander, Jefe del C. de Jefe, 2a División, to Sr. 2007, 176. Goyarrola Obregón 2009, 125, 192. Goyarrola Obregón Obregón’s. 2005, 90; bracketed notes are Goyarrola Obregón August 1937. 9 Santander, Municipal, Los Tojos, del Consejo Alcalde-Presidente del Norte to For example, Jefe de Investigación, II Cuerpo, Ejército Santander L, caja 406, carpeta 5, page 57. CDMH, PS Santander L, caja 412, carpeta 18, page 25.

85. 86. 87. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. Whole families in Reinosa, a mid-size town in southern Santander province nestled took in to a the valley, nearby hills for safety at the outset of the war. that fogs thick the by aided were they where district, Pas the in flee to hills the to took characteristic of hill country. were residence, Torrelavega, to request that an residence, investigation Torrelavega, take place to determine if his to him encouraged have might them of one if or him sheltering was friends or family defect to the enemy. were families Deserters’ defect. to likely less be might he therefore, defection, his from districts. mountain in lived they if easily more punishment escape to able apparently ince to initiate a local investigation and attempt to apprehend family members. The standard order to a local municipal government was to detain the deserter in ques tion, but if he could not be detained within 48 hours, the government was directed to seize his family and goods. typical example, when a soldier in Battalion 118 deserted, the head of the Informa tion Section of the General Staff wrote the Popular Front committee of his town of Santander to look for us, our neighbours warned us. We lived this way almost a year, year, a almost way this lived We us. warned neighbours our us, for look to Santander until [the Nationalists] took Santander.” punished for desertion. It was standard bureaucratic procedure in Santander prov make more credible commitments to help. For example, in the Pas region, one witness one region, Pas the in example, For help. to commitments credible more make remembers keeping his brother in a hay loft for several days early on in the Spanish Another that remembers her fiancéwas kept hidden in a sort ofCivil sepulchre War. in his mother’s house for nine months, his mother advising him whenever a indicating car— a patrol—was coming. in normal times is difficult to control.” in normal times ers did not know the terrain, they could attempt to arrange a local guide, for a fee. Help family from and friends could be quite important for deserters, and they could their way in itinerant fashion among a network of cabins in the hills. When Pasiego soldiers deserted—which was often, according to a June 1937 letter from the mander com of the 2 those who did the searching were frequently lowlanders, according to one witness: “If they caught you they shot you, but they [the Republican military authorities] did not know [the hills].” hiding. The Pasiegos, a group of nomadic pastoralists in the Pas area, Pas the in pastoralists nomadic of group a Pasiegos, The hiding. 2011/34 • IBEI Working Papers master cleavageofthewar, thatproduces hills’associationwithdesertion. left-right the with association their than rather capture, of evasion the and tunities oppor with association their is It from. hiding are they “side” what matter no hide, got assistance from villages at all says something telling about hills. They help people the denied often right-wing as identified that places while produced,and repressionit the that resentmentfor local generated activity their capture.While evade to knowledge local their and friends and families on again once drawing district, this in force guerrilla the staffed themselves soldiers guerrilleros war. the after fighting guerrilla anti-Franco of years eighteen of side Loyalist fromthe desertion high very of district a both was This war.civil in mountains fromwell. comes as evidence interestingLiébana of An piece ing over left-wing attitudes in the mountains, was not determinative of the role of the prevail though sentiment, right-wing Indeed, side. other the for motivated strongly little presence as left-wing labourunions. as had organizing, right-wing of locus key a syndicates, agricultural Catholic war, moreseems, it was, strongthan option default a before right: the by mobilization the access in Liébana at the time. highway little extremely was there and highway”, the on happened war “The tion: a common expression capturesprovince, removal from the war and its agendas because of isola the of regions mountainous most the among Liébana, In politics. from isolated quite themselves found districts some either; presence little had itself wing village.” right-wing very a Lloredawas werehidden, who many were there hidden, were “We remembers: Lloreda from deserter One terms. left-right political, in space physical of conceived sometimes deserters and deserters, had far.very penetrated not movement providedoccasionally villages refugehidden Right-wing for labour the and industrialization where districts, mountain in ence pres little very had left the noted, As isolation. their of consequence a as politics to -28- 92. 91. 90. 89. 88. system. that defend to fight to their disconnection from the slave economy, and thus to their lack of motivation to soldiers Carolina North upland of rates desertion high the Giuffreattributes terrain. There is one other systematic, large-N study of desertion that examines the impact of instances. other in replicated be potentially can finding This control. that on straint con structural a as terrain particular in and hometown, soldier’s a controlof is rates 9. Conclusion: Location andControl inCivilWars

Giuffre 1997. Ibid., 334–335,340–349. Ibid., 38. Obregón Goyarrola 2007,23. Obregón Goyarrola 2005,90. There is evidence, in addition, that mountain districts had distinctive attitudes distinctive had districts mountain that addition, in evidence, is There This paper has established that an important source of variation in desertion in variation of source important an that established has paper This from other districts taking advantage of the hill country: in fact, Lebaniego 92 89 This is certainly a plausible account, but the more fre more the but account, plausible a certainly is This While Liébana was certainly right-wing politically, this 90 guerrilleros The hills could just be aid, the fact that the that fact the aid, 88 In other places, the right the places, other In 91 isolated This was not just not was This and , rather than a key locus key a guerrilleros ------

IBEI Working Papers • 2011/34 ------98 In -29- 97 This paper goes paper This 96 this paper suggests that suggests paper this 95 Thus we can test the hypothesis that if 93 Terrain may be one source of such opportuni may be one source Terrain 94 The paper’s central finding suggests some important theoretical openings. It Beyond replication, the finding suggests other testable hypotheses. We can test Beyond the replication, finding suggests other testable hypotheses. Kalyvas 2006. 2007. Weinstein Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009. Cunningham 2006. Buhaug, Gates, and Lujala 2009; Raleigh et al. 2010. Fjelde and Nilsson 2011.

95. 96. 97. 98. 93. 94. working there: for example, greater autonomy, working lower there: for taxation example, rates, greater autonomy, or more favour may thus terrain Mountainous men. young community’s that for service of terms able create a sharp tradeoff for the armed group’s leadership: between the cost of impos ing control and the cost of creating incoherent, chaotic organizational structures. resolving conflicts difficulties in may turn, create the fragmentation of armed groups of veto players. in peripheral zones over the long term, because of the proliferation beyond Weinstein to identify terrain as a beyond novel, Weinstein structural of source patterns. control In turn, terrain may have important downstream effects on the process of negotia tion If between it armed is group and particularly civilian expensive community. for an armed group to impose its control over a place, the armed group may be willing to make greater concessions in negotiating an alliance with the civilian community fort. Scholars such as Weinstein have also argued that patterns of control and govern and control of patterns that argued also have Weinstein as such Scholars fort. Weinstein the ance fightingof civilians may varywell inaway from important ways. focuses on characteristics of armed particularly groups, their endow initial resource endowments economic strong without groups armed variation: this explain to ments, must negotiate a more cooperative relationship with a civilian population. Commit credible. more thus are negotiation local of process a in made ments proposes a new view of control over the rearguard. Whereas Kalyvas argues that there there that argues Kalyvas Whereas rearguard. the over control of view new a proposes opponents, by uncontested are that zones in control strong is ef war the for consequences important with zones, such in even vary may control this vestigate the sources of the fragmentation of armed groups in civil wars; in particular, particular, in wars; civil in groups armed of fragmentation the of sources the vestigate opportu structural of result a as comes fragmentation that suggest Nilsson and Fjelde away. nities for a sub-faction to break ties, higher though Fjelde can and Nilsson expect, however, do not investigate it. We difficult terrain. fought in more rates of fragmentation in civil wars a conflict zone is better-documented,and I am currently therefore gathering data on 1990s. the in wars civil in rates desertion their and forces local of use government the In addition, much has been effort recently deployed at gathering data on geographic features of conflict zones on a broad basis. likely more be should they zone, conflict rough-terrain a in employed are forces local to desert than local in forces easier In ground. addition, scholars beginning are to in from particular motivation stories and shift instead to opportunity structures. to opportunity and shift instead stories particular motivation from whether the finding holds in broad, cross-national terms. It is often difficult to find to locally recruited forces of use the but military, a of composition geographic the out quently the finding isreplicated elsewhere, the more we would be forced to abstract 2011/34 • IBEI Working Papers ness totheorizing. rich of layer a add can loyalty of markers of construction the studying but markers, on with this point, focusing instead on static moments without such pervasive group endogenously.“revealed” then, be to sense, come may a motivations In defeat. of outcome the fear to reason more the all have in-groups while possible, if sides switch to not reason little have suspicion, under Out-groups, prophecy.self-fulfilling of kind a reliability,creates it soldier’s a of indicator good a identity—as communal as marker—such particular a regard elite military a as such actors when that elsewhere argue I conflict. of course the in constructed be may tion reliability.in advantage comparative a have may scope population informa well, As and geographic in limited are ambitions whose further,groups suggests, armed that dense on motivations. soldiers’ their about information better draw have and networks social to able be may groups armed small particular, In others. than tion different armedgroups are likelytoplaythetradeoff differently. assess the degree to which that decision really exists, and the circumstances in which capabilities. such of potential coup the fear they if capabilities forces’ armed their limit states that conflict international in hint analogous an There reliability? their guarantee to order in knowledge local with soldiers recruit to not shelter.find choose and autonomy soldiers’ their groups limit armed consciously Do may hide. If he knows which civilians shelter the adversary, he knows where he may he where knows he hiding, is enemy the where knows soldier a if general: more be may point the but them, finding with tasked group armed the of members over tage the point that deserters with good knowledge of mountainous terrain have an advan made have I fight. to as well as desert to it use can knowledge local good have who knowledge is a precious military asset, especially in counterinsurgency, -30- 103. 102. 101. 100. 99. can perhaps gohomeagain. they fight, to want not do hills the fromwar. soldiers the fromIf themselves remove conditions of wars, therefore, they should be cognizant of this ability of peripheries to to resist the government side. As new civil war projects compare the local geographic that a peripheral position can help people avoid the war entirely, not just enable them suggests This desertion. for propensity hometown’s a with associated strongly pear lages certainly had a preference for the right over the left, this preference does not ap entities based in large political cities and fighting it major out for control two of the state centre. between Though most vil caught themselves found province Santander peripheral roles: other play peripheries advantage. home-field enjoying and people the of sea the in swimming tactics, guerrilla employing insurgency the with centre,

Arreguín-Toft 2006;Kilcullen 2010. McLauchlin 2010. Weinstein 2007. Biddle andZirkle1996. Kilcullen 2010. h ppr ugss frhr hr taef aon lcl nweg. Local knowledge. local around tradeoff sharp further a suggests paper The It is a trope of the literature to focus on the revolt of the periphery against the against periphery the of revolt the on focus to literature the of trope a is It informa to access better have groups armed some why reasons be may There o h wr itself war the to 103 This paper suggests that, sometimes, that, suggests paper This 102 Te onan ilgs of villages mountain The . This paper has not carried not has paper This 100 Future research can researchFuture 99 but soldiers 101 This ------IBEI Working Papers • 2011/34 . . ------31- . Lon Oxford Eco . Barcelona: , 53 (4): 544- . London: Wei London: . , 19: 171-212. , 19: 171-212. . New York: Harp York: New . , 118 (2): 519-548. . 2nd ed. Madrid: Siglo Madrid: ed. 2nd . 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