' I-NATC GEORET- 17 Th December, 1954 .SUMMARY RECORD '.C-R(5A) 50

E',X E M PLA, A H '-^s- ' — N» COPY

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH ' I-NATC GEORET- 17 th December, 1954 .SUMMARY RECORD '.C-R(5A) 50

Summary RecorA of a meeting of the Council held at the Palais de Chaillot. Paris, on 17th Decemher. 195A at 10 a.m. ,

PRESENT

Chairman : H.E. Mr. Stephanos Stophanopoulos (Greece) Vice-Chairman and Secretary General The Lord Ismay BELGIUM Mr. P.H. Spaak ^Minister of Foreign Affairs) Mr, A. Spinoy ^Minister of National Defence) Mr. H, Liehaert (Minister of Finance) Mr. A. de Staercke (Permanent Representative) CMADA

The Hon. L.B. Pearson £ Secretary of State for External Affairs) The Rt, Hon. C.D. Howe (.Minister of Defence Production and Minister of Trade and Commerce-) The Hon. R.O. Campney (Minister of National Defence) Mr. L.D. Wilgress (Permanent Represontative) DENMARK

a?. II.C. Hansen (Minister of Foreign^Affairs) Rasmus Hansen ^Minister of Defence) Jens Otto Krag tMinister of Economics and Labour) Mr, Anthon Vesthirk (Permanent Representative) FRMCE

Mr, P, Mendès-France (Prime Minister5 Minister of Foreign Affairs) Mr. E, Temple (Minister of Defence) Mr. R. de MoustIer 'Minister of State for Foreign Affairs) DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED Mr. M. Couve de Murville (Permanent Representative) GREECE Lt. Gen. Pallxs Mr. Georges Exintaris (Permanent Representative) ICELAND Kristlnn Gudmunds son (Mini ster of Foreign Affairs) Hans G, Andersen Permanent Representative; I (ii)

IT; Ji Y

Mr. Gaetano Martino Minister of Foreign Affairs) Mr. Paolo Emilio Taviani jMinister of Defenco) Mr. Ezio Vanoni .Minister of the Budget) Mr. Adolfo -xlessandrini (Permanent Representative)

LUXEMBOURG

Mr. J. Bech Minister of Foreign Affairs) Mr , P. Werner UvIinIster of Defence, Minister of Finance) Mr, N. Hommel (permanent Representative)

NETHERLANDS

Mr J.W. Beyen Minister of Foreign Affairs) Mr 0. Staf Minister of Defence) Jonkheer A.W.L. Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer (Permanent Representative)

NORWAY

Mr. Halvard M. Lange (Minister-of Foreign Affairs) Mr. Kai Knudsen (Minister of Defence) Mr. Nils Langhelle ^Minister of Commerce) Mr. Arne Skaug (permanent Representative)

PORTUGAL

Prof. Docteur Paulo Cunha (Minister of Foreign IdTfairs) Colonel Santos Costa (Minister of Defence) Comte de Tovar (Permanent Representative)

TURKEY

Prof. Fuad Köprülü (Minister of Foreign Affairs) Mr. Ethem Menderes (Minister of Defence) Mr. Fatln R. Zorlu (Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of State, Permanent Representative)

UNITED KINGDOM

. The Rt. Hon Sir Anthony Eden (Secretary of State, Foreign Office) The Rt. Hon. Harold Macmillan(Minister of Defence) Mr. R. Maudling Economic Secretary to the Treasury) "Sir Christopher Steel (Permanent Representative ) UNITED STATES DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED Mr. John Foster Dulles (Secretary of State) Mr. Robert B, Anderson (Deputy Secretary of Defence) Mr. George M. Humphrey (Secretary of Treasury) Mr. Harold E. Stassen (Director of Mutual Security) Mr. John C. Hughes (Permanent Representative) INTERNATIONAL STAFE

Mr. H. van Vredenburch (Deputy Secretary General) Mr. S. Fenoaltea (Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs) Mr. L.P. Weicker (Assistant Secretary General for Production and Logistics) Mr. R. Sergent (Assistant Secretary General for Economics and Finance) Mr. R.D. Coleridge (Executive Secretary) ALSO PRESENT

General Guillaume {Chairman;, Military Committee) General A. Gruenther (SACEUR) Admiral J. Wright (SACLMT) Air Marshal J. Boothman (CINCMAIRCHM) Admiral Sir George Creasy (CINCHAN) CONTENTS

Item Subject Page No. I. Opening statement by the Chairman of the Council 1 II. Procedural questions 1 III, Report by the Secretary General of progress during the period 3ra December., 1933 to (th December5 195 A" 2 IV. Exchange of views on political matters of common concern 2

V. The military progress of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization " °

VI. Most effective pattern of military strength for the next few years S DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED I. OPENING STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL

1 . Mr'. STEPHANOPOULOS (Chairman of the North Atlantic Council) pointed out that the present meeting was one which would deal with regular, though extremely important, business. He therefore suggested that Lord Ismay, Secretary General of the Organization and Vice-Chairman of the North Atlantic Council, should conduct the business of the meeting, since he was completely familiar with the current business involved. However, before calling on Lord Ismay to do so, he wished to make a few brief comments on certain items of the Agenda, There was first the Secretary GeneraliS Progress Report, a document of great clarity and of great interest to all Ministers. There 1Was next the document on the Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy, the essential conclusion of which was that there was no reason to believe that the long-term alms of Soviet policy had changed In the past year, or that the threat from the USSR had in any way diminished. In the light of that conclusion, the Military Committee paper' on the most effective pattern of military strength for the next few years was of the very greatest importance. In this report the military advisers had issued a warning, the gravity of which must be apparent to everyone. It was true that the views expressed in the document created difficult problems, but the Council must find a solution to them, since the fate of Western civilisation depended on so doing. If a satisfactory solution could be found, then the Council could congratulate Itself on a constructive year's work, since barely two months ago agreement had been reached in the Council as to a method of including Western Germany In the defence of the West and, a few weeks ago, the political unity of the member governments had been demonstrated In the reply sent to the Soviet Note of 13th November. He then asked Lord Ismay to conduct the business of the meeting.

2. The COUNCIL:

endorsed Mr5 Stephanopoulos' proposal' that Lord Ismay should conduct the business of the meeting,

II. PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS

3. The COUNCIL:

(l) agreed to take the items on the Agenda set out In C-A(54)50(Revised) in the order In which they were listed;

• (2) agreed to discuss Item IV (The Most Effective Pattern of Military Strength for the Next

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED Few- Years) In a restricted meeting limited to Ministers, Permanent Representatives and at most three advisers per delegation;

(3) agreed to decide later In the day as to whether a private meeting of-Foreign Ministers or of' Defence Ministers should be held during the course of the session;

(A) agreed to set up a Communiqué Drafting Committee under the Chairmanship of the Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs which would convene, after each meeting of the Council, to prepare ^ the appropriate paragraphs of the final Communiqué, DIAT O SECRET C-R(5b)50 ~

HI, REPORT BY TKE SECRETARY GENERAL OF PROGRESS DURING THE-PERIOD 3BD DECEMBER, 1953 TO~7TH DECEMBERT 195b Document; C-M(54)H5

b- Lord ISMAY said that he had no comment to make on his Progress Report, -He wished, however, to apologise for the delay that had marked the publication of his Fiye-Year Report. Although that Report covered only the period ending Uth April, 1954, he had felt that it would he Incomplete without the text of the Protocols and Agreements approved hy the Council in October last. The Report would therefore only be available in January 1955. 5 . The COUNCIL:

took note of the Report by the Secretary General of progress during the period 3rd December, 1953 to 7th December, 1954 (C-M(54)115), IV. EXCHANGE OF VIEWS OF POLITICAL D1A.TTERS OP COMMON CONCERN

Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy (April to December. 1954T Docujnent : C-M(54)116

6. The various Ministers who spoke on this item of the Agenda all congratulated those concerned on the clarity and Interest of the Report. 7. Mr. HARTINO (Italy) said that he wished to draw the attention of the Council to two aspects of this question to which his Government attached great importance. His Government felt that the degree of co-ordination achieved by MTO governments In their reply to the Soviet Note of 13th November was of great significance. His Government believed that it was important to ensure diplomatic 'unity among NATO countries, as well as military and cultural unity. His Government therefore hoped that the unity achieved on this occasion would be pursued in the future and that NATO countries would synchronise more and more their diplomatic activities. Unity in all fields was essential, and better results would be achieved in the diplomatic, as in other, fields if greater unity could be achieved. Secondly, he hoped that NATO would, be able increasingly to unify its propaganda. Good progress had already been made In this field, but one of the main objects of Soviet diplomacy was propaganda, and propaganda could only be fought effectively on its own ground. His Government hoped that NATO would regain the initiative In the field of

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED propaganda, and be able- to Influence public opinion on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

8. Finally, he wished to give the Council some information with regard to the prospects of ratification of the London and ' Paris Agreements in the Italian Parliament . He was glad to say that his hopes, expressed during the Pearls meetings with regard to the date of ratification by the Italian Parliament, seemed likely to be realised. The Parliamentary Commission had already completed their work, and the debate on ratification in the Italian Chamber was about to start. He fully believed that when he returned to Rome at the bôginning of the following week to wind up the debate, a favourable vote would be obtained. This meant that public opinion In Italy was fully aware of the Implications of the London and Paris Agreements and had not "been deceived hy insidious propaganda against them; the Italian public opinion realised that the Agreements would help to build up unity and strength in the West5 and would lead to a fuller Integration of Europe,

' 9. Mr. KÖPRlÜLU (Turkey) emphasised that, as a result of the London and Paris Conferences and the Agreements then concluded, the political balance-sheet, at the end of 1954? was such as to allow the West to envisage the future with some confidence. However, in spite of this gleam of hope, the Turkish Government thought it was essential to remain vigilant. They had not forgotten the years immediately following the war, which had shown how dangerous it was for the West to give way too soon to optimism. A study of the trend of Soviet policy during the last few years showed that this policy was primarily dependent on the degree of firmness and unity of the Atlantic Alliance. Any signs of weakness or disunity in the West were the signals for a more aggressive Soviet policy. One point in. particular should be emphasised in this connection. If today the threat of Soviet aggression appeared less immediate, this was no doubt due to the superiority of the MTO countries In nuclear weapons, Soviet Russia was anxious to gain time in order to close this gap and was, therefore, taking a more conciliatory attitude.

10. The studies prepared by the. ITATO military experts showed that Soviet Russia was desperately trying to gain supremacy In the field of nuclear weapons. Her efforts should stimulate the countries of the Atlantic Alliance to maintain and even increase the rhythm of their rearmament in order to build up their defence potential, both In nuclear and conventional weapons. The prospect of a contribution by German armed forces to Western defence could not justify any relaxation of AATO efforts. The slightest weakening on the part of the West might undo what had already been accomplished to safeguard peace and security.

11. It was, of course, necessary to take into account certain changes in the situation as they might affect this collective effort towards peace and security. Thus, particular attention should be paid at the moment to the problem indicated in the comparative study made by the International Staff of the economic situation in the HATO countries and the Soviet bloc. More than ever today there was a need, for close economic co-operation between MAT0 countries within the framework of Article 2 of the Treaty. Apart from the unfavourable situation 121 certain member countries themselves, there were other countries close to the NATO area which had a very low standard of life and were anxious to develop their economic resources by the most rapid and effective means, NATO must strive to counteract the strong attraction which Communism tended to have for under-developed countries, by showing

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED that the "Western economic system was still the best way to raise the standard of life while respecting individual liberties and the rights of man. Action in this field 1Would not only help under-developed countries but provide new outlets for the more industrialised countries of the Alliance, It was not suggested that NATO should duplicate the work of the OEEC or other international organizations in the economic field, but that NATO countries who were members of the OAEC should co-operate closely to guide the activity of that organization in the direction desired,

12. Finally, the Turkish Government did not think that- a purely negative attitude should be adopted regarding possible negotiations with Soviet Russia and her satellite states. But it should never he forgotten that the intention of Soviet Russia in undertaking such negotiations was not" to find solutions for specific problems, hut to divide the members of the Atlantic Alliance and to bring about a relaxation of their defensive effort. Only by strengthening their unity and their defensive power could, the NATO countries hope for a successful outcome of any negotiations with the Soviet Union,

13. Mr. DULLES (United States) said that Soviet policy could be compared to a stream which at one moment might appear smooth and at another present a ruffled surface: but the force of the current could not be .judged by surface appearance. NATO5 he thought, should proceed steadily on Its path of building up unity and the"strength that resulted therefrom. Three pitfalls in particular must be avoided: (a) NATO countries must not allow themselves to be lulled into a false sense of security by a surface calm. There was no basic change in long-term Soviet aims, a point clearly borne out in the paper on Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy now before the Council. In fact, the forces of the USSR5 China and the satellite countries were being increased, and development of atomic weapons was proceeding apace. Hand in hand with that, the subversive tactics to which the USSR were pledged were being developed in many countries, particularly in colonial territories or territories that recently had been colonial. The fact that the USSR had no genuine interest in estab- lishing better relations with the West was shown by their refusal to participate in the common bank for fissionable materials, proposed by President Eisenhower, or to take part in any serious proposals for the limitation of armaments.

(b) NATO countries must not be paralysed by fright and, in consequence, refrain from taking those measures which would lead to greater unity among them and consequently to greater strength. During the past ten years there had been many occasions on which the Soviet, by threats, had attempted to prevent those measures which aimed at building up Western unity. He could quote many examples: the occasion of the publication of the Marshall Plan, the months during which the North Atlantic Treaty had been under discussion" the period during which the accession of Greece and Turkey to NATO was being considered, the time when Yugoslavia made its break with the USSR, the conclusion of the Japanese peace treaty and, finally, the

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED negotiations in connection with the Manila pact. In other words, the pattern had been the same for the past ten years: threats by the USSR whenever the West attempted to build up Its' unity and strength, followed by a conciliator;/ attitude as soon as the USSR was faced by a fait accompli,

(c) NATO countries must not bo provoked by Soviet threat or Soviet action into hasty, Ill-considered moves « The United States, in particular, was at present being subjected in the Far East to provocation apparently aimed at spurring the US Government Into hasty action which might disrupt the unity of NATO. He assured the Council that the US had no Intention of being thus provoked. An obvious case in point was the illegal sentence on a number of US airmen shot down during the Korean war. In this connection, he paid a tribute to MTO governments members of UN who had supported UN action in this matter.

li-j-. In conclusion, he said that he was convinced that the free world had made a great advance since the days In which a number of free countries had fallen before the USSR, and that the sense of' unity among the countries of the Vlest was growing. The task ahead of them was a long and hard one, and would call for great efforts. But he believed that so long as they remained calm and steady and allowed themselves neither to be lulled, paralysed nor provoked, the West would succeed in achieving its object: peace with justice,

15, M, IiIENDES-ERANCE (Prance) endorsed the distinction made by Mr. Dulles between the surface appearance of Soviet policy and its underlying, permanent features. An example of the kind of threat to which Mr» Dulles had referred had occurred with regard to France only the day before: • the French Government had been threatened by the USSR that if tho London and Paris Agreements were ratified, then the USSR would denounce the Franco-Soviet pact. A great deal of propaganda had been attached to this latest move, which was clearly intended as a threat to French public opinion and to the French Parliament, The Council should not take this latest threat too seriously: he could assure them that France would not be Influenced by It, and that its policy would remain unchanged. In fact, public opinion in France was more likely to be stiffened than to be intimidated by threats. Finally, he pointed out that France, and NATO as a whole, was threatening no one; this point had been made clear by the French Representative at UN, who had stated publicly that If Eastern Europe followed the line taken by the West and built up an organization in which its military forces were subject to the type of controls envisaged under the Paris Agreements, the West would welcome the move. 16, Sir Anthony EDlA 'United Kingdom) said that he could approve every word spoken so far in the debate. He hoped, as a result of the CouncilTS deliberations, that there would be increasing clarity with regard both to the policy being followed by the USSR against NATO, and to the steps NATO should take to counter those measures. NATO policy had always been, and should be, to negotiate from positions of strength. From the military point of view, progress had been made, but full strength had not yet been achieved. From the political point of view, the USSR was making every effort to disrupt the growing unity among NATO nations, partly by threats and partly by propaganda. His Government believed that the ratification of the London and Paris Agreements would mark a great step forward towards the unity of the West and that, once Western Germany was a member of NATO, the essentially defensive purpose of the Alliance

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED could be reaffirmed. He wished to make one point with regard to WEU: it was in no way a rival to NATO, but it had an important c ont ributi on- to make to the unity and strength of Europe. In Europe, memories of recent wars were hard to efface; in WEU old fears could be reconciled on a new basis , The Interim Commission of WEU in London was studying the links that could be created with NATO. While the precise form of those links could not yet be defined, it was clear that they must be close and intimate. He believed that it was vital for NATO not to lower Its guard but, at the same time, to preserve its calm and its patience and to Investi- gate any possibilité^ of serious negotiations once the London and Paris Agreements had been ratified.. Finally, he urged that the recent announcement of a new military organization among the satellites and the USSR, should not be taken too seriously. No -G-

essential change was implied, since the armed forces of the USSR and its satellites were already enormous, and were limited only hy the strain they placed on the economies of the Iron Curtain countries. 17. The COUNCIL: (1) noted with approval the Report on Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy (C-M(54)116) ;

(2) took note of the statements made in the course of discussion.

Y. THE MILITARY PROGRESS OP THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

Document: M.C. 5/9(Pinal) 18. The CHAIRMAN of. the MILITARY COMMITTEE said that Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, Commander in Chief, Channel Command, and Supreme Allied Commander Europe had- statements to make, which he thought, would he of interest to the Council,

19. The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, ATLANTIC said that he was convinced that every effort should he made to__ enhance. NATO's collective ability to withstand atomic attack Jmjijfco maintain the security-of the seas during any emergency. While the offensive capability of the forces earmarked for his command was only a small proportion of the total available to NATO, his plans pro- vided for an effective effort not only on missions of primary importance to his Command, but also in support of Channel Command and SACEUR.

20. His principal mission was to gain and maintain control of the Atlantic sea areas and to ensure their availability for NATO use. What happened in Europe would have a profound effect on the task he had to perform. Hence, the closest possible co-ordination with SACEUR was required, and he assured the Council that ^this was being continuously maintained.

21. In conclusion, he wished to mention that information available to his Headquarters indicated clearly- that the Soviet Union was rapidly buildin.fr up and expanding a formidable navy ai* a greater rate than all the NATO navies combined. There appeared to him to be un- mistakable evidence of the Soviet -intention to disrupt the NATO life- line across the 'Atlantic; it was SACLANT's joe to prevent this and with the support of the Council, he would do so.

? 22. The COMMANDER IN CHIEF, CHANNEL COMAND, took the oppor-

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED tunity of restating the main theme of his remarks before the Military Committee. He believed that there was a dangerous tendency to lay down the precise form which any future war might take. In his view, history had shown that in general war never- followed any predicted form. Nevertheless, he thought it'certain that in the war at sea they could never expect a breathing space in which to build up strength^- they must therefore struggle to obtain and hold command of.the sea from the first day. Within any measurable time, bulk supplies for . the alliance would continue to be carried in merchant ships, and on our success in protecting shipping would depend the existence of the- civil populations and the safe arrival of the means with which the armies and air forces -would fight. If we lost command of the sea, - they would lose all. 23. He was greatly relieved to DO assured BY the Military Committee that, although the paper now before the Council dealt largely with land and air matters, sea problems had not been lost to view and that the Military ConTiiittec was thoroughly aware of the great need for adequate maritime strength,

2b, The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE, referred to document M.G.5/9 and especially to that section concerned with air defence. He was happy to report to the Council a further step recently taken to tackle the many serious air defence problems by which SHAPE was faced, AIhe conversations, recently announced by tho United States Representative, on the creation of an Air Defence Technical Centre had now been completed, and he was able to inform the Council that the Netherlands and United States authorities had made arrangements for the establishment of the SHivPE Air Defence Technical Centre, to be financed initially by the United States, in The Hague-, He was particularly grateful that this had been brought .about, as hc believed that it was a clear step forward in the efforts to improve NATO's currently inadequate vital air defence. .

25, The Centre would carry out research, studies, investigations, development, operational tests and such other projects as might be required by SHaPE. In general, it would work towards meeting the military requirements for air defence ss established by his Headquarters. 2'6„ Vfnile the establishment of the Centre was in itself a most significant advance, its success would depend on its'ability to obtain and pool the services of the best scientific and technical authorities in tho various countries. More specific -requests for assistance wotild be made to the appropriate national authorities, as plans for the operation of the Centre matured. 27. GENERAL GRUENTHER went on to say that while he felt a great deal of progress had been made In recent years in building up the military strength of the West, the period ahead would be difficult, particularly in convincing the public opinion of their countries that a great effort still had to be made. This point had been repeated to him by a number of ministers in recent weeks. He felt, however, that the problem could be solved and hc called on the help of Ministers to solve it. SHAPE had found a way of helping which he wished to emphasise,. In the past year, 105 groups, comprising 3,300 individuals had visited his Headquarters to hear a presentation of the facts about NATO. Those visits had been highly successful, but time and again members of the groups had said to him how much they wished that they had known earlier about these simple facts. In other words, Ministers and Supreme Commanders must act as crusaders on behalf of NATO. Not only that, but they must dramatise NATO and what NATO was doing: abstractions meant nothing to the ordinary man, and the ordinary men of NATO countries who knew nothing of NATO or what it stood for could be numbered in millions. He hoped that DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED Ministers would do everything in their power to support the views he had just expressed, 28. Mr. ANDERSON (United S Ca ces) said that hc v/ss'glad that' SACETJR folt satisfied with the arrangements made for the establishment of an Air Defence Technical Centre in the Netherlands. US military assistance funds had made it possible to finance this centre without loss of time, and- it could thus be financed until June 1957. However, if the Council so desired, his Government was prepared to transfer the .Centre to NATO at any time. At present, as General Gruenther had pointed out, It was an adjunct and under the direction of SHilPE. PinallJr, he agreed with General Gruenther that the success of the Centre would depend in the long run on the co-operation of NATO countries in making scientists available for the necessary research work, 29. Mr. STAR (Netherlands) said that his Government appreciated the line taken hy General Gruenther and the United States in this matter. It was clearly essential to have a sound system of air defence and the Netherlands was glad to co-operate in the matter. His Government had granted the necessary rights and privileges to foreign nationals to enable the Centre to function effectively, and hoped that the Centre would develop into a live organization devoted to international research. Finally, if it were decided to transfer the Centre to NATO control, his Government would continue to co-operate as fully as possible. 30. The YICE-CHAIPAiAN said that he was grateful to General Gruenther for urging that "the Gospel" of NATO should be preached as widely as possible. He agreed with him that this was essentially the responsibility of national governments, but there were also Inescapable responsibilities on the part of the International Staff, Finance, of course, was always an obstaale to be overcome, and he hoped that Finance Ministers would look favourably on any worthwhile schemes which the International Staff might put forward, even if some financial commitment was involved.

31. The COUNCIL : took note of the Report of the Military Committee on the military progress of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (M.C. 5/9(Final)). YI, MOST EFFECTIVE PATTERN OF MILITARY STRENGTH FOR THE NEXT FEW YEARS Document: M.C,48(Pinal) 32. The YICE-CHAIPJVIAN pointed out that this document, one of the most important to be considered by the Council, had been the. subject of much speculation in the press, much of it misinformed. The International Staff, in co-operation with others, had prepared a text which might be adopted by the Council as a conclusion to the report as a Yifhole if the Council saw fit.

33. Mr, DULLES (United States) reminded the Council that, at 'a meeting.of NATO Foreign Ministers the previous April, he had made a statement to the effect that under modern conditions of war atomic weapons could almost be regarded as a new form of conventional weapons ; and that the free world would find it difficult to develop two separate strategies or two separate capabilities, -the one based on the use of atomic weapons at least for tactical purposes, the other based on a refusal to use such weapons. The -point of view he had then expressed was borne out by the conclusions of 1.0.48, In which it. was made clear that the unanimous view of the Military Committee was that the only effective means of defending Western

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED Europe involved the possible use of atomic weapons. The ideals that NATO had constantly had before it in defensive thinking were first, the maintenance of a forward strategy, secondly, that defence would be effective and would not call for liberation at a later stage of ravaged territories, and thirdly, that the NATO.defence build-up would act as an effective deterrent to war. He felt a sense of relief that the military plan outlined in M.C.48 covered all three of these ideals. In view of this, it seemed to him inconceivable that the Council should not approve M.C.48 as a basis for military planning: to do otherwise would in fact be condemning the West to a second-rate defence. 3A. The problem as to whether, and in what circumstances, the defence plans were to he put into action, was a difficult one, and one which was of concern to all NATO governments, his own Included. History gave a line in this connection: it had always been accepted that it was the/civilian branch of government who would take decisions of this kind, and the military who would carry them into effect. His Government believed that this tradition should be maintained, and that it should be made clear, in approving M.C.AS as a basis for military planning, that the Council did not imply any delegation of governmental responsibility for taking the vital decisions. To sum up, he approved both the Military Committee's report and the text proposed by the Vice-Chairman.

35. Mr. TEMPLE (France) said that he could support the Vice- Chairman's text, since it covered two points: (a) it left the military authorities freedom to continue their planning for the reorganization of their forces in the light of the possible use of atomic weapons in a future war; (b) it left responsibility to political authorities to decide If atomic weapons were to be used.

V • 56. Mr, MARTINO (Italy) said that he too could approve the Military Committee document and the Vice-Chairman's text. He agreed with Mr. Dulles that it was essential to make it clear that the ultimate authority, so far as decisions to use atomic weapons .was concerned, must be left with governments. He added that his Government would support any attempt to reach agreement on a Convention limiting aijEtasien±^_ and atomic weapons on the lines of the proposals recently made in the Armaments Commission of DN. Finally, he believed that approval of document M.C.48 should be subject to a limitation: that it should apply only so long as no Convention limiting armaments and the use of atomic weapons could be universally agreed. He believed that a Council confirmation of its desire to limit and control armaments would represent valuable propaganda in respect of the public opinion of NATO countries,

37. Mr. EXINTARIS (Greece) said that his Government warmly aprjroved M.C.48, <~nd was willing to support the views' of the military authorities to the fullest possible extent, 38. Mr, PEARSON (Canada) said that he could also approve both M.C.48 and the Vice-Chairman's text, because he believed that unanimous approval by the Council might bring an end to unfortunate controversy due to press leakages. The text proposed by the Vice- Chairman reconciled certain doubts ills Government had had with regard on the one hand to paragraph 37 of M.C.48, and on the other hand its fears, that NATO might be faced with what Mr. Dulles had rightly called DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED a second-rate defence. The main problem which preoccupied him was the way in which the Council's agreement could be presented to public opinion. If reference was made' to M.C. 48, which would clearly have to remain a secret document, then ill-informed speculation would probably continue. This was a question which the Council would have to consider at a later stage.

39. Mr, BEYEN (Netherlands) agreed with Mr. Pearson that the question of presentation was important. Most Ministers would have to answer questions in Parliament connected with the Military CommitteeFS report. He suggested that, if Foreign Ministers were to hold a private meeting during the present session, the question not only of the statement to be made to the public, but also that of a common line in replying to parliamentary questions should be examined. 40,' Mr. CUNHA (Portugal), in vre looming the proposed resolution, pointed out that there were two problems: one of preparing plans and reorganizing the NATO defence system on the basis of the possible use of atomic weapons; and the other of determining the authority which would take the decision to use atomic weapons.

41, Mr. LANGE (Norway) and Sir ANTHONY EDEN (United Kingdom) said that they approved both M.C, 48 and the Vice- Chairman's text, and also agreed with Mr, Pearson that the question of presentation was an important one. 42, The COUNCIL: (1) approved the Military .Committee's report (M.C, 48(Pinal)) as a basis for defence ^planning and preparations by the NATO .. Jmilltary authorities, noting that this fapproval did not involve the delegation of I the•responsibility of governments for putting ' plans into action in the event of hostilities; (2), instructed the Communiqué DraftingCommittee to prepare a paragraph or paragraphs to be included either in the Çinal Communique or as a separate Communique making clear the unanimous agreement of the Council with regard to (I) above; (3) agreed that the Press could be informed that the subject had "be'en discussed, that there had been no difficulties and that the results of the discussion would appear in the Gommàniqué DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED