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S-0901-0003-07-00001

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Title items-in-[Vietnam] - other interested countries - USA

Date Created 21/04/1972

Record Type Archival Item

Container s-0901-0003: Vietnam and Indo-China 1972-1981

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Date: FROM: DE: 9.4.74. Elisabeth

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GLS:aqm cc: Secretary-General- OUSGSPA (2)

The Secretory-General of the United Nations presents his eoropliiaents to the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United ifations and has the honour to acknowledge receipt of his note of 13 January 1975 on the subject of current developments in the Hepublic of Viet-Nata. As the Permanent Representative of the United States is aware, the Act of the International Conference on Yiet-Hara confers no function on the Secretary-General regarding the supervision of the Agreement on Ending the tfar and Restoring Peace in Viet-Stam other than that of receiving information and reports concerning the implementation of the said Agreement, which are forwarded to hist for his informtion. At the saae time, the Secretary-General is deeply concerned at the intensification of fighting in Viet-Kam, at the resulting heavy toll of human life and at the failure to abide by the Paris Agreement both, as regards its military and its political provisions* In this connexion, the Secretary-General vishes to drav the attention of the Pereianent representative of the United States to the statement on this subject vhich the Secretary-General made in the course of his press conference on lU January 1975» and vhich reads as follovs: "The situation in Indo-China once again gives cause for the greatest concern. The increased scale of the fighting in recent veeks is taking a heavy toll of human life. la such circumstances it is essential for all of the parties involved to renew their cozmaitnents to abide by the terias of the Paris agreements and raake progress towards the required political settlement of this lengthy and tragic war". The text of the above statement has been transmitted to the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. The Secretary-General takes this opportunity to express to the Permanent Representative of the United States of America the renewed assurances of his highest consideration.

23 January 1975 cc: Secretary-General --

le 5 Avril 1574

Cher Raymond, Ci-joint, je vous envoie pour infonaation une copie d»une note verbale en date du 15 mars 1974 adress&e au . Secretaire general par le Representant permanent des Etats-TJnis d'&aierigue ainsi qua do la r%>orxse du Secretaire g&n£ral en date du 2 av±il 1974, , Etant donn^ la teneur de 1'avant-dernier alin^a de la note des Etats—Unis, nous avons demand^ a Monsieur Van Bellinghen d'en transmettre une copie a I'toibassadQ de la Republique d&ssocraticpae du Vietnam a Paris, procedure identique a celle que nous avons suivie a 1) egard de certaines coasaunications du Gouvemenent revolutionnaire provisoire de la Rdpublique du Sud Vietnam qui denandaient au Secoretaire general d'user de son influence a lfegard des Gouvernements des Etats-Unis d'Anerique et de la Republique du Vietnam, Je vous prie, cher Raymond, d'agreer I'escpression de mes sentiments les plus cordxaux.

Brian E. Urquliart Secretaire general adjoint aus: affaires politiques speciales Monsieur Rayiaond Aubrac c/o FAO Via delle terme di Caracalla Rome, Italie cc: Secretary-General-^ OUSGSPA Mr. Luc Van Bellinghen 5 April If 74 Director UNIC, Paris

Brian E. Urquhart Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs

Please find attached copies of a note verbale dated 15 March 1974 addressed to the Secretary-General by the Permanent Representative of the United States of America, and of the Secretary-General's reply dated 2 April. We draw your attention to the penultimate paragraph of the United States note which, in certain respects, is similar to certain passages that appear in cossaaiications addressed to the Secretary- General by the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet-Nam, most recently on 2 March 1974. • " ' ••.-.• -i . ' . As you know, the Secretary-General replied to the PEG by stating that he would bring the content of their consaunications to the attention of the Governments of the United States of Ansrica and of the Republic of Viet-Ham. We thereupon informally transmitted copies of the PEG '. notes to the Permanent Mission of the United States and to the Office of the Permanent Observer of the Republic of Viet-Mao, with their consent* We propose to follow the same procedure with regard to the United States note of 15 March. Accordingly, we request you to hand a copy of the United States note, with the printed covering transmittal note "With the compliments of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Embassy of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam in Paris. In doing so, please explain that you are transmitting the copy to the Embassy informally and that the same procedure was followed in the case of certain cocasunications from the PEG. GLS/hmj cc: Secretary-General — M. Luc Van Bellingher OUSGSPA

PO 2l»O.VIM (2)

The Secretary-General of the United Rations presents his compliments to the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations and has the honour to acknovledge receipt of nis note verbale of 15 March 197^ referring to the Agreement on Ending the ¥ar and Restoring Peace in Viet-ftam signed in Paris on 27 January 1973, and to the Act of the International Conference on Viet-Eam signed in Paris on 2 March 1973. The Secretary-General has given careful attention to the content of this coanaunicatioa and vill bring it to the attention of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Kasu The Secretary-General takes this opportunity to express •%•'.- • to the Permanent Representative of the United States of America the assurances of his highest consideration.

2 April 197** ^ \ . /•- i - - . \ '• CONFIDENTIAL •' . '

Meeting in the Secretary-General's Office on •'Thursday, 2 September 1976 at 12;00 noon Present: Secretary-General Secretary of State Kissinger -Ambassador Tapley Bennett Mr. Rowe, U.S. Mission Mr. William Buffum . Mr. Roberto Guyer Mr. Brian Urquhart

•JAW OF-THE' SEA CONFERENCE • • The Secretary-General noted the good reaction to Dr. Kissinger's • rproposals made yesterday. .Dr. Kissinger said he also believed some progress was being -•v3nade. Other countries would be making a mistake if they felt rthey were doing the United States a favour in adopting its "parallel" âpproach. Although there was a possibility of a compromise in •^Committees 2 and 3, Committee 1 was the crucial question. He îhoped it was now clear that the United States would proceed .ûnilaterally if no agreement was reached. The United States was ^now offering to put half of the mineral wealth of the seabed under ;a regime for international exploitation, would help ..finance it -.and provide U.S. technical assistance with provision for a review --of the agreement in 25 years. There ware approximately 500 sites in the ocean to be developed, and approximately $700 million -would be required in capital investment just to start the drilling. In practice, only the United States, Western Europe, Japan and ^perhaps the Soviet Union could undertake this during the next forty years, Therefore, other countries should understand that •they were not doing the United States a favour in accepting its -proposal. The Secretary-General said he believed Dr. Kissinger's talks -had had a good effect. He was confident Ambassador Araerasinghe would make a. real effort to produce a consolidated text. - 2 -

AFRICA Dr. Kissinger emphasized that the current U.S. efforts are not related to domestic politics or the forthcoming Presidential election. On the contrary, his recent efforts to help resolve this problem.had met with highly critical reactions in the United States. He had received over 1,700 critical letters and only a handful of laudatory letters about his efforts. The black members of Congress had not had a single word of praise for what he was trying to do, and he was being strongly criticized by -•«» Congressman Diggs. Black Americans would in any event vote over- whelmingly for the Democratic Party, and therefore the Administration had nothing to gain domestically from its African efforts. It was motivated solely by its concern for future peace and stability in southern Africa and was concerned that, if some solution was not found, there would be another Angola. The' Secretary-Genera1 expressed his appreciation for the courageous attitude on southern Africa taken by the United States, which was a crucial element in making progress. Dr. Kissinger said that this was why the United States was doing what it could. Although in some ways it would have been tempting to let nature take its course, Southern Rhodesia could become another Angola in two years and the question would arise as to why no effort had been made to avoid it. There was a time limit for bringing Namibia to independence, and the wrong development could poison the Assembly. He considered the chances for success in Rhodesia were less than fifty-fifty since so many diverse elements, including the liberation movements, would have to be brought together in a common programme. He was also not sure anyone could obtain the essential assurance that guerrillas would stop fighting after majority rule in Southern Rhodesia. The white population would either accept majority rule of would not. He did not expect to talk to the Southern Rhodesia leaders before he had clarification about South Africa's position. Whether he went to Pretoria would depend on the situation after his forthcoming meeting with Prime Minister Vorster. He would not make a courtesy visit and would consider going only if Vorster indicated / I ~ 3 •-

•this would be the only way he could provide satisfaction on the ..future of Namibia and whether Kissinger concluded that a solution -was possible. The •Secretary-General mentioned the importance of the United Nations role, especially in supervising the elections. • pry Kissinger commented that the United Nations representative, Sean MacBride, "had an unusual capacity for infuriating people" ^and his public statements tended to inflame the situation and were a big obstacle to a positive United Nations role. The United States favoured the participation of SWAPO in the election process -and also the setting of a date for elections. "The" 'Secretary-General mentioned that he had discussed this -question with the SWAPO representative in Colombo who attached ^importance to the participation, but had also said if there was no possibility, he would be willing to negotiate directly with Vorster. • Dr. Kissinger said he was not sure he could get immediate -agreement on a date for elections, but undertook to urge the -^South African Government to accept United Nations participation in the election process. The' Secretary-General said he would talk to Mr. MacBride 'When he comes to New York next week about the impact of his public statements. - 4 -

THE MIDDLE EAST The Secretary-General said that in his discussions with President Sadat at the non-aligned conference, the latter had expressed deep concern that the negotiating machinery had broken down. Although the Secretary-General had noted that the Lebanese situation made the resumption of negotiations difficult, Sadat insisted that he could not wait forever and that if nothing happened by next year, he must take "certain measures". The Secretary- General^ had tried, in a follow-up conversation with Foreign Minister .Fahmy, to get clarification of this remark, but Fahmy also spoke only in general terms. Fahmy requested the Secretary-General to make a proposal for convening an international conference on the Middle East. When the Secretary-General asked if he meant Geneva or a peace conference, Fahmy said the important thing was some kind of a United Nations initiative. The Secretary-General told him he was reluctant to take any steps at this time with the Lebanese situation complicating the picture and with the continuing dispute over PLO participation in the neogtiations. Fahmy would resume discussion of this question when he came to New York for the General Assembly. • Dr. Kissinger agreed fully that the negotiating process must start again next year. He was confident that the Adminis- tration would initiate new moves after the election and believed this would be both essential and acceptable no matter which party won. It would be better if the Arabs did not insist on initial PLO participation since Israel either would not attend or would insist on a high price. The best approach would be to proceed with the same delegations as in the past and to begin with frontier questions, but to agree that the Palestinian issue must be discussed at a later stage. The Secretary-General asked if he believed the creation of a separate Palestinian state, for example, on the West Bank and in Gaza, was a practicable solution of the Palestinian problem. - 5 -

• Dr. Kissinger said this would be a nightmare. Such a state -••would put pressure on both Jordan and Israel. It would not be viable/ and would become an appendage of Syria or Jordan. - For this reason, federation with Jordan or even Syria would ..seem more practical. However, there was no U.S. national interest -•to preclude any particular formula. The Secretary-Genera1 mentioned that in his talk with President Assad of Syria, the latter had defended his actions in Lebanon and -•* .-.had said his troops were there only to restore order and to -maintain the unity of the country, after which they would withdraw. ^He had some confidence in Lebanese President-elect Sarkis. v Dr!.' Kissinger said that any new initiatives were better left .alone until after the United States election, at which time he —would be glad to discuss the subject with the Secretary-General Again. With regard to current problems in the buffer zone in 'Sinai, it was his view that such matters should be worked out in the joint commission. - 6 -

CYPRUS

Dr. Kissinger said it was desirable to make progress or •at least to have further rounds of talks. The United States, in conjunction with the Western Europeans, might possibly put jforward some -principles as a basis for further talks. Another .idea was that a study group of three Members, designated by -Turkey, Greece and the Secretary-General respectively, should -address itself to the issue. "The Secretary-General explained that the completely different -views of the two sides was the real problem. The Turks wanted Tonly a general discussion in the talks, which would immediately -set up two sub-committees. Makarios said this was out of the -.question and that the talks must discuss the substance and reach •.basic agreement before referral to sub-committees of the •-.outstanding details. Furthermore, Makarios would not be willing have a bland communique at the next round, but would denounce as a failure if no progress were made. This would in all -probability be the end of the talks. The Secretary-General had .suggested holding the talks after the Greek Cypriot elections - on 5 September, but Makarios opposed such a move if there was "to be no discussion of substance. He had also suggested •preparatory meetings between the two interlocutors under his Special Representative in Cyprus, but this too had run into obstacles. He was now thinking of inviting the interlocutors •to New York for consultations before the General Assembly. If there was any agreement on procedure, a sixth round might l>e held forthwith, or it would be agreed that there was no Ji>asis for calling a sixth round. Dr. Kissinger expressed great interest in this proposal and would be discussing it with the British and French in the coming week. The United States Mission will transmit to the -Secretary-General the text of the suggested principles mentioned Dr. Kissinger. - 7 -

VIET NAM JThe Secretary-General said that he was prepared to talk to the Vietnamese representative about the American missing in action. Dr. Kissinger said this would be most helpful. It would _be possible to change the United States position on membership if the Vietnamese were prepared to give clear-cut assurances --and that the Secretary-General could quote Kissinger to the Vietnamese in this sense. He could also explain that some --assu±ances of this kind were necessary if the United States -was to change its position during an election year. He asked -that the High Commissioner might take up with the Governments -concerned the refusal to receive Vietnamese refugees by Singapore, Malaysia and several other Asian countries.

cc; Secretary-General I' •Mr. Buffum Mr. Guyer Mr. Urquhart

p-1.

RECEIVED IN RECORDS CONTROL

U NITED STATES TO THE UN ITED ^/ / 7 D PUT AV^/AY OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE INtTIALS ...... - ...... March 15, 1974 D BRING FORWARD ON ...... | ...... / DAY MONTH YR. TO:

The Representative of the United States of America

to the United Nations presents his compliments to the

Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honor

to refer to the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring

Peace in Viet-Nam signed at Paris January 27, 1973, and

to the Act of the International Conference on Viet-Nam

signed at Paris March 2, 1973.

The Department of State of the United States is

informed that the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, on

March 1, 1974, sent to the participants of the International

Conference on Viet-Nam and to the members of the

International Commission for Control and Supervision, a

note marking the first anniversary of that conference.

In its note the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam seeks to

shift the blame for the lack of a true cease-fire in South

Viet-Nam from its own aggressive policies to alleged truce

violations by the United States and the Government of Viet-Nam.

It is therefore necessary once again to point out the clear

UN-3418/209 fact that it is Hanoi which is prolonging the misery of

South Viet-Nam's people and that the decision to end this suffering can only be made in Hanoi.

The United States has implemented the Viet-Nam Peace

Agreement in good faith. There are no United States

Military Advisers, nor is there United States intervention in South Viet-Nam; our present activities there are in strict accord with the Agreement. Our assistance to the

South Vietnamese has been open and in keeping with the provisions of the agreement dealing with military resupply, in contrast to the clandestine activities of the other side. Our inability to carry out Article 21 regarding aid to North Viet-Nam follows from Hanoi's unwillingness to fulfill its cease-fire commitments.

With regard to the true nature of the continuing conflict in South Viet-Nam, it should be recalled that the Democratic

Republic of Viet-Nam did not wait until the ink on the

January 27 Peace Agreement was dry before undertaking major violations of that Agreement. On the first day of the cease- fire, North Vietnamese troops pressed heavy offensives to capture Government of Viet-Nam Territory in wide-ranging parts of the country. Hanoi's cease-fire violations, resulting in tens of thousands of battlefield fatalities and the totally needless deaths of nearly three thousand innocent civilians, have continued from that day. Of the numerous cease-fire violations committed by Hanoi, the following are especially flagrant:

(A) The Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam has infiltrated into South Viet-Nam over 100,000 troops since January 27, 1973, through Laos and Cambodia and through the Demilitarized Zone, in contravention of Articles 7, 15, and 20.

(B) Hanoi has shipped vast quantities of military equipment, including SA-2 Missiles, tanks and heavy artillery into the South, also in violation of Article 7.

(C) In violation of Article 8(B), the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam has refused to provide the United States with information on our missing in action.

(D) The Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam has shown its disdain for international peacekeeping efforts by firing at International Commission of Control and Supervision aircraft, kidnapping International Commission personnel and blocking deployment of International Commission of Control and Supervision teams to areas under its control. The Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam seeks further to undermine the International Commission of Control and Supervision by refusing to pay its and the Provisional Revolutionary Government's legitimate share of Commission expenses.

(E) The Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam has continued its campaign of terrorism directed against the-South Vietnamese people. A recent example of these wanton acts was the shelling of an elementary school in Cai Lay on March 9, which brought death to thirty-two school children and injuries to fifty-five more.

The Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam has also followed its familiar course as chief spokesman for the so-called Provisional Revolutionary Government by seeking to claim governmental status for that party. The Provisional

Revolutionary Government was not, however, as Hanoi has asserted, one of "12 governments" to sign the Act of the

International Conference since it is not and has never been a government. Article 9 of that Act expressly stated that signature did not constitute recognition of any party in any case in which it was not previously accorded. As is well known, the Provisional Revolutionary Government controls but a small minority of the population of South

Viet-Nam and has none of the inherent attributes of a government, such as a capital, a body of laws or jurisprudence, or any governmental institutions apart from some visible units of authority established to advance its international aspirations. Through sheer propaganda and the trappings of diplomacy, Hanoi is attempting to place on the Provisional

Revolutionary Government the mantle of legitimacy which the people of South Viet-Nam have so emphatically denied.

The Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam continues to avow that its policy is to strictly respect and scrupulously implement the Paris Agreement. Unfortunately, it is evident that this Hanoi policy is being honored in the breach.

The Representative of the United States hopes that the Secretary-General will take the occasion of the anniversary of the International Conference on Viet-Nam

to urge the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam to begin to comply seriously with the provisions of the Peace

Agreement. Only then can the hopes of the world for

i 1 -^al^tiaj*"•»*>^ ^-iifcVsiiVea.rf**'*' ^' peace in Viet-Nam be realized.

The Representative of the United States has the honor to inform the Secretary-General that copies of

this note have been sent to the participants in the

International Conference on Viet-Nam (with the exception of the Government of Viet-Nam, the Democratic Republic of

Viet-Nam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government) and to members of the International Commission of Control and Supervision. GZ'S/hmj

r P.(*. I Secretary-General OUSGSPA

The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the Acting Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations and has the honour to acknowledge receipt of his note verbale of 18 December 1973, transmitting the text of a Note dated 15 December 1973 from the Department of State of the United States of America to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.

The content of the communication transmitted by the Acting Permanent Representative of the United States of America has been duly noted*

The Secretary-General takes this opportunity to renev to the Acting Permanent Representative of the United States of America the assurances of his highest consideration.

27 December 1973 TEXT OF UNITED STATES NOTE TO DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM

"The Department of State of the United States of America presents its complimerits to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and has the honor to refer to the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam of January 27, 1973„

"On December 15, 1973, Communist forces attacked three unarmed helicopters of the Four Party Joint Military Team (FPJMT) in Binh Chanh District, Gia-Dinh Province of the Republic of Viet-Nam. This attack resulted in the destruction of one helicopter, the death of one American and one Vietnamese and the wounding of several Americans and Vietnamese in the party. These helicopters and personnel were engaged in the search for missing personnel, a humanitarian mission specifically authorized by the Agreement. The helicopters were clearly marked in orange, the color designating them as FPJMT vehicles. As is customary, the Communist side had been notified in advance of the details of this search mission and had been invited to participate.

I "The United States condemns in strongest terms this unprovoked act by the Communist side and deplores the unnecessary loss of life which has resulted. The United ' States is gravely concerned over this latest contemptible ; violation of the Agreement by the Communist side. The j United States notes that the Communist side has consistently ; adopted a callous attitude toward the provisions of the j Agreement that call for a full accounting of the Missing- j In-Action. Now, not content with obstructing the I implementation of those provisions through its indifference ! and total lack of cooperation, the Communist side has again | resorted to criminal acts to prevent their implementation. ! ? ' "The United States urges the Democratic Republic of ; Viet-Nam to promptly identify and punish those on its i side who were responsible for the deplorable attack in Gia Dinh. Beyond that, the United States once again calls on the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam to fulfill its . undertakings as specified in the Agreement and to demonstrate in real terms its cooperation in accounring for the Missing- In-Action. The Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam will recognize clearly the grave responsibilities it had in this matter." 19DFC 973 i TO: 3* U N ITED STA MISSION TO TH E UNI NATIONS

< orF!-;-AL ccR;-'C£POMrT-:\'0:- i "^T^r"!

•;;£;! Ih !;j!:K;,i:i; !l' .N/^, | December 18, 1973 .;CO;^ CC;;HCL ^i:!?074n>P^i

The Acting Representative of the United States of

America to the United Nations presents his compliments

to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has

the honor to refer to the Agreement on Ending the War

and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam, signed at Paris,

January 27, 1973, and to the Act of the International

Conference on Viet-Nam, signed at Paris on March 2, 1973.

In accordance with Article 6 of the Act, the

Acting Representative of the United States has the honor

to enclose the text of a note dated December 15, 1973, from

the Department of State of the United States of America

to the Ministry of Foreign.Affairs of the Democratic

Republic of Viet-Nam on the subject of Communist attack on

helicopters of the Four Party Joint Military team on

December 15, 1973.

UN-3418/201 Enclosure: As stated. GLS/praw

cc: Mrs. Mira ' OUSGSPA Registry

The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations and has the honour to acknowledge receipt of his Note Verbale of 29 October 1973, transmitting the text of a Note dated 26 October 1973 from the Department of State of the United States of America to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Ham. The content of the communication transmitted by the Permanent Representative of the United States of America has been duly noted. The Secretary-General takes this opportunity to renev to the Permanent Representative of the United States of America the assurances of his highest consideration*

31 October 1973 JOINT COMMUNIQUE

The Parties signatory to the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam, signed on Janu- ary 27, 1973, Considering that strict respect and scrupulous implementation of all provisions of the Agreement and its Protocols by all the parties signatory to them are necessary to ensure the peace in Viet-Nam and contribute to the cause of peace in Indochina and Southeast Asia, Have agreed on the following points (in the sequence of the relevant articles in the Acrrfiennp.nt) : 1. In conformity with Article 2 of the Agreement, the United States shall cease immediately, completely,

and indefinitely aerial reconnaissance over the territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. 2. In conformity with Article 2 of the Agreement and with the Protocol on Mine Clearance: (a) The United States shall resume mine clearance operations within five days from the date of signature of this Joint Communique and shall successfully complete

those operations within thirty days thereafter. (b) The United States shall supply to the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam means which are agreed to be adequate and sufficient for sweeping mines in rivers. - 2 -

(c) The United States shall announce when the mine clearance in each main channel is completed and issue a final announcement when all the operations are completed. 3. In implementation of Article 2 of the Agreement, at 1200 hours, G.M.T., June 14, 1973, the High Commands of the two South Vietnamese parties shall issue identical orders to all regular and irregular armed forces and the armed police under their command, to strictly observe the cease-fire throughout South Viet-Nam beginning at 0400 hours, G.M.T., June 15, 1973, and scrupulously implement •cne Agreement and its Protocols. , 4. The tv/o South Vietnamese parties shall strictly implement Articles 2 and 3 of the Protocol on the Cease- Fire in South Viet-Nam 'which read as follows: ^. "Article 2 (a) As soon as the cease-fire comes into force and until regulations are issued by the Joint Military Commissions, all ground, river, sea and air combat forces of the parties in South Viet-Nam shall remain in place; that is, in order to ensure a stable cease-fire, there shall be no major redeployments or movements that would extend each party's area of control or would result in contact between opposing armed forces and clashes which might take place. (b) All regular and irregular armed forces and the armed police of the parties in South Viet-Nam shall observe the prohibition of the following acts: (1) Armed patrols into areas controlled by opposing armed forces and flights by bomber - 3 -

and fighter aircraft of all types, except for unarmed flights for proficiency training and maintenance; (2) Armed attacks against any person, either military or civilian, by any means whatsoever, including the use of small arms, mortars, artillery, bombing and strafing by airplanes and any other type of weapon or explosive device; (3) All combat operations on the ground, on rivers, on the sea and in the air; (4) All hostile acts, terrorism or reprisals; and (5) All acts endangering lives or public or private property. ' Article 3 (a) The above-mentioned prohibitions shall not hamper or restrict: (1) Civilian'supply, freedom of movement, freedom to work, and freedom of the people to engage in trade, and civilian communication and transportation between and among all areas in South Viet-Nam; (2) The use by each party in areas under its control of military support elements, such as engineer and transportation units, in repair and construction of public facilities and the .transportation and supplying of the population; (3) Normal military proficiency training conducted by the parties in the areas under their respective control with due regard for public safety. (b) The Joint Military Commissions shall immediately agree on corridors, routes,and other regulations governing the movement of military transport aircraft, military transport vehicles, and military transport vessels of all types' of one party going through areas under the control of other parties." JI t !

5. The Two-Party-Joint Military Commission shall im- i / 'mediately carry out its task pursuant to Article 3(b) of the Agreement to determine the areas controlled by each /f of the two South Vietnamese parties and the modalities of f/" -: stationing. This task shall be completed as soon as possible. The Commission shall also immediately discuss the movements necessary to accomplish a return of the armed forces of the two South Vietnamese parties to the ; positions they occupied at the time the cease-fire entered

6. Twenty-four hours after the cease-fire referred to in paragraph 3 enters into force/ the commanders of the opposing armed forces at those places of direct contact shall meet to carry out the provisions of Article 4 of the Protocol on the Cease-Fire in South Viet-Nam with a view to reaching an agreement on temporary measures to avert conflict and to ensure supply and medical care for these armed forces. 7. In conformity with Article 7 of the Agreement: (a) The two South Vietnamese parties shall not accept the introduction .of troops, military advisers, and military personnel, including technical military personnel, into South Viet-Nam. (b) The two South Vietnamese parties shall not accept the introduction of armaments, munitions, and war material into South Viet-Nam. However, the two South Vietnamese parties are permitted to make periodic replacement of armaments, munitions, and war material, as authorized by Article 7 of the Agreement, through designated points of entry and subject to supervision by the Two-Party Joint Military Commission and the International Commission of Control and Supervision. In conformity with Article 15 (b) of the Agreement regarding the respect of the Demilitarized Zone, military equipment may transit the Demilitarized Zone only if introduced xiixu buutii Tle-c- N^" ac replacement^ pur«v>?Ti-»- -ho Article 7 of the Agreement and through a designated point of entry. (c) Twenty-four hours after the entry into force of the cease-fire referred to in paragraph 3, the Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall discuss the modalities for the supervision of the replacements of armaments, munitions, and war material permitted by Article 7 of the Agreement at the three points of entry already agreed upon for each party. Within fifteen days of the entry into force of the cease-fire referred to in paragraph 3, the two South Vietnamese parties shall also designate by agreement three additional points of entry for each party in the area controlled by that party. - 6 -

8. In conformity with Article 8 of the Agreement: < (a) Any captured personnel covered by Article 8(a) of the Agreement who have not yet been returned shall be returned without delay, and in any event within no more than thirty days from the date of signature of this Joint Communique. • (b) All the provisions of the Agreement and the Pro- tocol on the Return of Captured Personnel shall be scrupulously implemented. All Vietnamese civilian personnel covered by Article 8(c) of the Agreement and Article 7 of the Protocol on the Return of Captured Personnel shall be returned as soon as possible. The two South Viet- namese parties shall do their utmost to accomplish this within forty-five days from the date of signature of' this Joint Communique. (c) In conformity with Article 8 of the Protocol on the Return of Captured Personnel, all captured and de- tained personnel covered by that Protocol shall be treated humanely at all times. The two South Vietnamese parties shall immediately implement Article 9 of that Protocol and, within fifteen days from the date of signature of this Joint Communique, allow National Red Cross Societies they have agreed upon to visit all places where these personnel are held. (d) The two South Vietnamese parties shall cooperate in obtaining information about missing persons and in determining the location of and in taking care of the graves of the dead. (e) In conformity with Article 8(b) of the Agreement,

the parties shall help each other to get information about those military personnel and foreign civilians 'of the parties missing in- action, to determine the location and take care of the graves of the dead so as to facilitate the exhumation and repatriation of the remains, and to take any such other measures as may be required to get information about those still considered missing in action. For this rmrnosfi. freauent and regular liaison flights shall be made between Saigon and Hanoi. 9. The two South Vietnamese parties shall implement

Article 11 of the Agreement, which reads as follows: . "Immediately after the cease-fire, the two South Vietnamese parties will: —achieve national reconciliation and concord, end hatred and enmity, prohibit all acts of reprisal and discrimination against individuals or organizations that have collaborated with one side or the other; —ensure the democratic liberties of the people: personal freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of meeting, freedom of organization, freedom of political activities, freedom of belief, freedom of movement, freedom of residence, freedom of work, right to property ownership and right to free enterprise." 10. Consistent with the principles for the exercise

of the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination stated in Chapter IV of the Agreement: — 8 —

(a) The South Vietnamese people shall decide themselves the political future of South Viet-Nam through genuinely free and democratic general elections under international supervision. (b) The National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord consisting of three equal segments shall be formed as soon as possible, in conformity with Article 12 of the Agreement. The two South Vietnamese parties shall sign an agreement on the internal matters of South Viet-Nam as soon as pccr.i^'1 <=>. ^r>r3 shall do their utmost to accomplish this within forty-five days from the date of signature of this Joint Communique. (c) The two South Vietnamese parties shall agree through consultations on the institutions for which the „- free and democratic general elections provided for in Article 9(b) of the Agreement will be held. (d) The two South Vietnamese parties shall implement Article 13 of the Agreement, which reads as follows: "The question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Viet-Nam shall be settled by the two South Vietnamese parties in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, equality and mutual respect, .without foreign interference, in accordance with the postwar situation. Among the questions to be discussed by the two South Vietnamese parties are steps to reduce their military effectives and to demobilize the troops being reduced. The two South Vietnamese parties will accomplish this as soon as possible." • 11. In implementation of Article 17 of the Agree- ment : (a) All the provisions of Articles 16 and 17 of the Protocol on the Cease-Fire in South Viet-Nam shall immediately be implemented with respect to the Two-Party ;! I; Joint Military Commission. That Commission shall also I. immediately be accorded the eleven points of privileges I and immunities agreed upon by the Four-Party Joint Mill- f i tary Commission. Frequent and regular liaison flights . I i shall be made between Saigon and the headquarters of the i i; Regional Two-Party Joint Military Commissions and other .places in South Viet-Nam as required for the operations :. of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission. Frequent and regular liaison flights shall also be made between Saigon and Loc Ninh. | I (b) The headquarters of the Central Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall be located in Saigon proper or at a place agreed upon by the two South Vietnamese parties where an area controlled by one of them adjoins an area controlled by the other. The locations of the headquarters of the Regional Two-Party Joint Military Commissions and of the teams of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall be determined by that Commission within fifteen days after the entry into force of the cease-fire referred to in paragraph 3. These locations may be changed at any time as determined by the Commission. The locations, except for teams at the points of entry, shall be selected from among those towns specified in Article 11(b) and - 10 -

and those places where an area controlled by one South Vietnamese party adjoins an area controlled by the other, or at any other place agreed upon by the Commission. (c) Once the privileges and immunities mentioned in

• paragraph 11(a) are accorded by both South Vietnamese parties, the Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall be fully staffed and its regional commissions and teams fully deployed within fifteen days after their locations have been determined. ,. (d) The Two-Party Joint Military Commission and the International Commission of Control and Supervision shall closely cooperate with and assist each other in carrying . out their respective functions. 12. In conformity with Article 18 of the Agreement and Article 10 of the Protocol on the International Commission of Control and Supervision, the International Commission, including its teams, is allowed such movement for observation as is reasonably required for the proper exercise • • of its functions as stipulated in the Agreement. In carrying out these functions, the International Commission, t s including its teams, shall enjoy all necessary assistance ^ |. and cooperation from the parties concerned. The two [ 3 South Vietnamese parties shall issue the necessary in- | structions to their personnel and take all other necessary j measures to ensure the safety of such movement. 13. Article 20 of the Agreement, regarding Cambodia and Laos, shall be scrupulously implemented. 14. In conformity with Article 21 of the Agreement, the United States-Democratic Republic of Viet-Nain Joint Economic Commission shall resume its meetings four days from the date of signature of this Joint Communique and shall complete the first phase of its work within fifteen days thereafter. Affirming that the parties concerned shall strictly respect and scrupulously implement all the provisions of the Paris Agreement, its Protocols, and this Joint Com- munique, the undersigned representatives of the parties signatory to the Paris Agreement have decided to issue this Joint Communique to record and publish the points •"" on which they have agreed. Signed in Paris, June 13, 1973. - 12 -

For the Government of the For the Government of the United States of America: Republic of Viet-Nam:

J f'" Henry A. Kissinger "guyen Luu Vien Assistant to the President Representative of the of the United States of Government of the America Republic of Viet-Nam - 13 -

For the Government of the For the Provisional Democratic Republic of Revolutionary Government of Viet-Nam: the Republic of South ' Viet-Nam: 1 /// /? I/"1-'"

Le Due Tho Nguyen Van Hieu Representative of the Minister of State of ..the Government of the Democratic Provisional Revolutionary Republic of Viet-Nam Government of the Republic of South Viet-Nam W-- -'/

JOINT COMMUNIQUE

From May 17 to May 23, from June 6 to June 9, and on June 12 and June 13, 1973, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, on behalf of the Government of the United States of America, and Mr. Le Due Tho, on behalf of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, reviewed the implementation of the Paris

Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet- Nam and its Protocols and discussed urgent measures to ensure the correct and strict implementation of the Agree- ment and its Protocols. The Government of the United States of America, with the concurrence of the Government of the Republic of Viet- Nam,

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam', with the concurrence of the Provisional Revolutionary

Government of the Republic of South Viet-Nam, Considering that strict respect and scrupulous implementation of all provisions of the Paris Agreement and its Protocols by all the parties signatory to them are necessary to ensure the peace in Viet-Nam and contribute to the cause of peace in Indochina and Southeast Asia, Have agreed on the following points (in the sequence

of the relevant articles in the Agreement): 1. In conformity with Article 2 of the Agreement, the

United States shall cease immediately, completely, and

\ - 2 -

indefinitely aerial reconnaissance over the territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. 2. In conformity with Article 2 of the Agreement and with the Protocol on Mine Clearance: (a) The United States shall resume mine clearance operations within five days from the date of signature of this Joint Communique and shall successfully complete those operations within thirty days thereafter. (b) The United States shall supply to the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam means which are agreed to be adequate ^nri csvif f•? -7-? c"4: for c'rc-^i.^ ^liico iu rivers. (c) The United States shall announce when the mine clearance in each main channel is completed and issue a final announcement when all the operations are completed. 3. In implementation of Article 2 of the Agreement, at 1200 hours, G.M.T., June 14, 1973, the High Commands of the two South Vietnamese parties shall issue identical orders to all regular and irregular armed forces and the armed police under their command, to strictly observe the cease-fire throughout South Viet-Nam beginning at 0400 hours, G.M.T., June 15, 1973, and scrupulously implement the Agreement and its Protocols. 4. The two South Vietnamese parties shall strictly implement Articles 2 and 3 of the Protocol on the Cease-fire in South Viet-Nam which read as follows: - 3 -

"Article 2 (a) As soon as the cease-fire comes into force and until regulations are issued by the Joint Mili- tary Commissions, all ground, river, sea and air combat forces of the parties in South Viet-Nam shall remain in place; that is, in order to ensure a stable cease-fire, there shall be no major redeployments or movements that would extend each party's area of control or would result in contact between opposing armed forces and clashes which might take place. (b) All regular and irregular armed forces . and the armed police of the parties in South Viet- Nam shall observe the prohibition of the following acts: (1) Armed patrols into areas controlled by opposing armed forces and flights by bomber and fighter aircraft of all types, except for unarmed flights for proficiency training and maintenance; (2) Armed attacks against any person, - either military or civilian, by any means whatsoever, including the use of small arms, mortars, artillery, bombing and strafing by airplanes and any other type of weapon or explosive device; (3) All combat operations on the ground, on rivers, on the sea and in the air; (4) All hostile acts, terrorism or reprisals; and (5) All acts endangering lives or public or private property. - 4 -

Article 3 / ' (a) The above-mentioned prohibitions shall of not hamper or restrict: (1) Civilian supply, freedom of movement, freedom to work, and freedom of the people to engage in trade, and civilian communication and transportation between and among all areas in South Viet-Nam; (2) The use by each party in areas under its control of military support elements, such as engineer and transportation units, in repair and construction of public facilities and the transportation and supplying of the population; (3) Normal military proficiency training conducted by the parties in the areas under their respective control with due reaard for public safety. (b) The Joint Military Commissions shall immediately agree on corridors, routes, and other regulations governing the movement of military transport aircraft, military transport vehicles, and military transport vessels of all types of one party going through areas under the control of other parties." 5. The Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall immediately carry out its task pursuant to Article 3(b) of the Agreement to determine the-areas controlled by each of the two South Vietnamese parties and the modalities of stationing. This task shall be completed as soon as possible. The Commission shall also immediately discuss the movements necessary to accomplish a return of the armed forces of the two South Vietnamese parties to the positions they occupied at the time the cease-fire entered into'force on January 28, 1973. — 5 —

6. Twenty-four hours after the cease-fire referred to in paragraph 3 enters into force, the commanders of / the opposing armed forces at those places of direct con- : tact shall meet to carry out the provisions of Article 4 of the Protocol on the Cease-Fire in South Viet-Nam with a view to reaching an agreement on temporary measures to avert conflict and to ensure supply and medical care for these armed forces. 7. In conformity with Article 7 of the Agreement: (a) 11.10 Lvrc "cutli Vic'':r."!??ccr.e p^-r-hi ^<=s shall not i accept the introduction of troops, military advisers, and military personnel, including technical military personnel, into South Viet-Nam. (b) The two South Vietnamese parties shall not accept the introduction of armaments, munitions, and war material into South Viet-Nam. However, the two South Vietnamese parties are permitted to make periodic replacement of armaments, munitions, and war material, as authorized by Article 7 of the Agreement, through designated points of entry and subject to supervision by the Two-Party Joint Military Commission and the International Com-^ mission of Control and Supervision. In conformity with Article 15(b) of the Agreement regarding the respect of the Demilitarized Zone, military equipment may transit the Demilitarized Zone only _ g —

if introduced into South Viet-Nam as replacements pursuant to Article 7 of the Agreement and through a designated point of entry. /

Joint Military Commission shall discuss the modalities for the supervision of the replacements of armaments, munitions, and war material permitted by Article 7 of the Agreement at the three points of entry already agreed

UpOll rOi Bcti^l! yen. Ly . Vvo.unj.ii i.JL.L uetu'i Qciyb G.L. CUt= vJuLj-^ i into force of the cease-fire referred to in paragraph 3, the two South Vietnamese parties shall also designate by agreement three additional points of entry for each party in the area controlled by that party. 8. In conformity with Article 8 of the Agreement: (a) Any captured personnel covered by Article 8(a) of the Agreement who have not yet been returned shall be returned without delay, and in any event within no more than thirty days from the date of signature of this Joint Communique. (b) All the provisions of the Agreement and the Protocol on the Return of Captured Personnel shall be scrupulously implemented. All Vietnamese civilian personnel covered by Article 8(c) of the Agreement and Article 7 of the Protocol on the Return of Captured - 7 -

Personnel shall be returned as soon as possible.' The two South Vietnamese parties shall do their utmost to accomplish this within forty-five days from the date of signature of this Joint Communique. (c) In conformity with Article 8 of the Protocol on the Return of Captured Personnel, all captured and de- tained personnel covered by that Protocol shall be treated humanely at all times. The two South Vietnamese parties shall immediately implement Article 9 of that Protocol and, within fifteen days from the date of signature of

i-ln 1 R .ToT n+- Prrnimnn-! ro-io a 1 1/-V.T TJ ^ -t- n <-* »-. -»1 r>^<=! rtm?r-~'2 !^C~ictiC~

they have agreed upon to visit all places where these personnel are held. (d) The two South Vietnamese parties shall cooperate in obtaining information about missing persons and in determining the location of and in taking care of the graves of the dead. (e) In conformity with Article 8(b) of the Agree- ment,' the parties shall- help each other to get information about those military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties missing in action, to determine the location and take care of the graves of the dead so as to facilitate the exhumation and repatriation of the remains, and to take any such other measures as may be required to get information about those still considered missing in action. For this purpose, frequent and regular liaison flights shall be made between Saigon and Hanoi. 9. The two South Vietnamese parties shall implement / Article 11 of the Agreement, which reads as follows: •"Immediately after the cease-fire, the two South Vietnamese parties will: —achieve national reconciliation and concord, end hatred and enmity, prohibit all acts of reprisal, and discrimination against individuals or organizations that have collaborated with one side or the other; —ensure the democratic liberties of the people: personal freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of nitec-Li^ , frr-"9^™ nf organisation, freedom of political activities, freedom o± Deo.ie.il, freedom of movement, freedom of residence, freedom of work, right to property ownership and right to free enterprise." 10. Consistent with the principles for the exercise / of the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination stated in Chapter IV of the Agreement: (a) The South Vietnamese people shall decide themselves the political future of South Viet-Nam through genuinely free and democratic general elections under international supervision. (b) The National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord consisting of three equal segments shall be formed as soon as possible, in conformity with Article 12 of the Agreement. The two South Vietnamese parties shall sign an agreement on the internal matters of South Viet-Nam as soon as possible, and shall do their utmost to accomplish — 9 —

this within forty-five days from the date of signature of this Joint Communique. (c) The two South Vietnamese parties shall agree through consultations on the institutions for which the free and democratic general elections provided for in Article

9 (b) of the Agreement will be held. (d) The two South Vietnamese parties shall implement

Article 13 of the Agreement, which reads as follows: "The question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Viet-Nam shall be settled by the two South Vietnamese parties in a spirit of national

V£i*~»/-M-l/-T-l "I -1-V4--1 ,--*-. ^t-, A ,-.,-, ,~ ««-.-,3 ~ — - —^1 J J -^-- ^ ~li~^i ' V^CU.1 respect, without foreign interference, in accordance with the postwar situation. Among the questions to be discussed by the two South Vietnamese parties are steps to reduce their military effectives and to demobilize the troops being reduced. The two. South Vietnamese parties will accomplish this as soon as possible."

11. In implementation of Article 17 of the Agreement:

(a) All the provisions of Articles 16 and 17 of the

Protocol on the Cease-Fire in South Viet-Nam shall immediately be implemented with respect to the Two-Party Joint Military Commission. That Commission shall also immediately be accorded the eleven points of privileges and immunities agreed upon by the Four-Party Joint Military Commission. Frequent and regular liaison • \. flights shall be made between Saigon and the headquarters of the Regional Two-Party Joint Military Commissions and other places in South Viet-Nam as required for the operations - 10 -

of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission. Frequent and regular liaison flights shall also be made between Saigon and LOG Ninh. (b) The headquarters of the Central Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall be located in Saigon proper or at a place agreed upon by the two South Vietnamese parties where an area controlled by one of them adjoins an area controlled by the other. The locations of the headquarters of the Regional Two-Party Joint Military Com- missions and of the teams of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall be determined by that Couauloolw^ -.rithir fifteen days after the entry into force of the cease-fire referred to in paragraph 3. These locations may be changed at any time as determined by the Commission. The locations, except for teams at the points of entry, shall be selected from among those towns specified in Article 11 (b) and (c) of the Protocol on the Cease-Fire in South Viet-Nam and those places where an area controlled by one South Vietnamese party adjoins an area controlled by the other, or at any other place agreed upon by the Com- mission. (c) Once the privileges and immunities mentioned in paragraph 11 (a) are accorded by both South Vietnamese parties, the Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall be fully staffed and its regional commissions and teams - 11 -

fully deployed within fifteen days after their locations have been determined. (d) The Two-Party Joint Military Commission and the International Commission of Control and Supervision shall closely cooperate with and assist .each other in carrying out their respective functions. 12. In conformity with Article 18 of the Agreement / and Article 10 of the Protocol on the International Cora- mission of Control and Supervision, the International Commission, including its teams, is allowed such movement for observation as is reasonably required for the proper exercise of its functions as stipulated in the Agreement. In carrying out these functions, the Inter- national Commission, including its teams, shall enjoy all necessary assistance and cooperation from the parties -•" concerned. The two South Vietnamese parties shall issue the necessary instructions to their personnel and take all other necessary measures to ensure the safety of such movement. 13. Article 20 of the Agreement, regarding Cambodia and Laos, shall be scrupulously implemented. 14. In conformity with Article 21 of the Agreement, the United States-Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam Joint Economic Commission shall resume its meetings four days from the date of signature" of this Joint Communique and shall complete the first phase of its work within fifteen days thereafter. - 12 -

Affirming that the parties concerned shall strictly respect and scrupulously implement all the provisions of the Paris Agreement, its Protocols, this Joint Communique, and a Joint Communique in the same terms signed, by representatives of the Government of the United States of America, the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, and the- Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet-Nam, the representative of the United States of America, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, and the representative of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, Mr. Le Due Tho, have decided to issue this Joint Communique to record and publish the points on which they have agreed. Signed in Paris, June 13, 1973. - 13 -

For the Government of the For the Government of the United States of America: Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam:

Henr.y A. Kissinger Le Due Tho Assistant to the President Representative of the of the United States of Government of the Democratic America Republic of Viet-Nam CONFIDENTIAL

. 26 April 1973

Note for the Record

Meeting of the Secretary-General vith Ambassador Scali (USA) on 26 April 1973

Middle East .

Ambassador Scali called on the Secretary-General accompanied by Mr. Hovison. Referring to the Security Council debate on the Middle East, the Secretary-General stressed that he considered the debate constructive and positive. He expressed his appreciation for the efforts and the attitude taken by the United States. The resolution requesting "a comprehensive report^ did not put him in an easy situation; whenever too much substance - vas put into previous reports it gave rise to .difficulties. The Secretary-General vas veil aware of the possible dangers involved in such a report. Already, after the meeting, Ambassador Tekoah had told the Secretary-General that-'he hoped that not too much substance would go into the report. The Secretary-General would try to avoid presenting a controversial report which could lead to an acrimonious debate. Ambassador Scali remarked that his delegation had tried to co-operate constructively during the last debate; he would try to calm the atmosphere when the Council would meet on the Middle East towards the end of May. Referring again to the report the Secretary-General said that for the composition of his report the ""•* already existing reports would be largely used. Replying to a question of Ambassador Scali, the Secretary-General said that his impression vas that Egypt vas still firmly behind resolution 242. He added that he vas afraid that the debate on the report could do possible harm to Ambassador Jarring's position. Ambassador Tekoah had also expressed the hope that the confidential conversation would not be reflected in the report. Asked about Jarring's willingness to continue his mission the Secretary-General replied that his impression was, when he last met with Jarring, that Jarring understood that the parties concerned would not be able to agree on another mediator; he, therefore, felt that he had to continue. As to the recent move by Egypt the Secretary-General felt after his discussions that Egypt considered the mission of Ismail discouraging and was therefore looking for new avenues. Ambassador Scali then referred to an apparent misunderstanding in the Arab world due to the fact that 1973 has been declared the year of Europe. It never had been the intention of the United States Administration to neglect any other region in particular the Middle East; besides Europe cannot be considered separately from the- Middle East. Many European countries had considerable interests in the area. On the other hand, some of the Arab countries were intentionally exaggerating the alleged US interest in the region. - 2 -

'/let-Nam

The Secretary-General informed the Ambassador about the complaints he had received from Ilorth Viet-Ham and the PRG, and expressed his gratitude for also having received the United States' reply to these complaints. According to Ambassador Scali the United States took these violations very seriously and the question had to be asked if North Viet-Iiam. intended to uphold the Agreements. Mr. Kissinger •would tell Mr. Tho in Paris that these violations changed the whole bases of the Agreements. The United States -would also try to make use of the influence of the USSR and China on Horth Viet-lTam. There was serious concern in Washington about the deterioration of the situation in Cambodia and Laos, in particular since a total withdrawal of all foreign troops was agreed upon. Under such circumstances the Administration was not in a position to approach Congress for any relief or assistance. .Ambassador Scali wanted to assure the Secretary-General that President Uixon would, in spite of the withdrawal of US troops, not sit back paralysed, and will not permit that the Agreements be torn up.

The Secretary-General then told Ambassador Scali that he had not received any reply from Hanoi regarding the United Nations Relief offer. Saigon had until now only clarified its position towards the PRG in this respect. The PRG had on various instances shown considerable interest in the United Nations Relief Operation. As far as a Liaison Office of the PRG was concerned, Ambassador Scali said that they had heard from different sources •chat the PRG was spreading the rumour that it was the Secretary-General"-. > vho had asked them to write a letter like tie one addressed to the Secretary- C-eneral by Madame Binh. The Secretary-General categorically denied ever having suggested such a letter to Madame Binh or her representatives.

Namibia

The talks with Foreign Minister Muller in Geneva were according to the Secretary-General very useful, however, there were apparently at present difficulties in the South African Government on the paper agreed upon by Mr. Muller and the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General then informed the Ambassador of the contents of the paper. Ambassador Scali assured the Se'cretary-General that his Government was very pleased with the Secretary- General's activities regarding this question, and fully agreed with his approach. Washington was hopeful that the contacts could be continued. The United States Ambassador in Capetown had intervened once and another intervention in support of the agreed paper was envisaged. As far as the time- table was concerned, Ambassador Scali agreed with the Secretary-General that any mention of the 10 year period as suggested by South Africa would have had bad psychological effects; it would be better to speak of the 5-10 year period as suggested by the Secretary-General.

Finally the Secretary-General informed the Ambassador about his reasons for convening the Special Committee on World Disarmament and of the fact that it was now possible to achieve agreement on the composition of the AD Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, which will be convened on 16 July 1973. UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

April 20, 1973

The Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations presents his compliments to the

Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honor to forward a copy of a letter to the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam from the Government of the United States.

This copy is being provided to the Secretary-General as an interested party to the Agreement on Ending the

1|(lw^n«wff~i^,,n.^^v*-.J-.-.-^«n.-iJi.«-',..W.n('yi.»lll-.«l1 I,,- , "•-•

War and Restoring the Peace in Viet-Nam, signed at

Paris on 27 January 1973.

UN-3418/189 The Department of State of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and has the honor to refer to a note dated April 16, 1973, transmitted by the

Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam to the

Government of the United States and, it is assumed, also to the other signatories of the Act of the International

Conference on Viet-Nam.

In its note, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, on its own behalf and occasionally also in the name of the "Provisional Revolutionary Government", purports to describe the situation in South Viet-Nam and lodges charges against the Government of the United States and the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam.

The United States rejects as utterly groundless the accusations of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, and views this note as an ill-disguised attempt by the Democratic

Republic of Viet-Nam to divert attention away from its own numerous and extremely serious violations of the cease-fire.

Contrary to the contentions listed in the note, it is abundantly clear that the main obstruction to peace consists of the military activities carried out by the Democratic

Republic of Viet-Nam and forces under its control in South - 2 -

Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia in direct and unexcusable contravention of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring

Peace in Viet-Nam and of the Agreement on the Restoration of Peace and Reconciliation in Laos.

Of extreme concern is the vast quantity of military equipment shipped clandestinely since January 28 from

North Viet-Nam into South Viet-Nam without the least effort to observe Articles 7 and 20 of the Peace Agreement of

January 27. Evidence is overwhelming of continued illegal movement of equipment and supplies out of North Viet-Nam into or through Laos and Cambodia and into South Viet-Nam for the use of the military forces opposing the legitimate governments of those countries. Included in the supplies reaching South Viet-Nam are over 400 tanks and armored vehicles, 300 artillery pieces of various types and vast quantities of ammunition, vehicles, etc. For example, from the time of the Viet-Nam cease-fire through April 18,

1973, over 27,000 short tons of military supplies have been moved through the demilitarized zone into South Viet-Nam.

In the same period, over 26,000 short tons were moved from

North Viet-Nam into Laos. Also during this period, we have detected over 17,000 military truck movements from

North Viet-Nam into Laos and over 7,000 crossing the - 3 - demilitarized zone into South Viet-Nam. None of the peacekeeping organs.;: established by the Peace Agreement has been given the opportunity to monitor these shipments.

Evidence of an intention to persist in violations of

Article 20 of the Agreement is the substantial effort being made to upgrade the road system within Laos and adjoining parts of South Viet-Nam. Bridge and drainage ditch construction have been observed on Route 7, the primary route into the Plain of Jars from North Viet-Nam and on

Routes 4 and 4/7 which transit the Northern Plain in an

East-West direction. Furthermore, there is evidence of continuing North Vietnamese efforts to construct a road from Southern Laos into Quang Tri and Quang Ngai Provinces.

This: cross-border route is not close to any of the designated entry points and its only logical use could be as a clandestine supply highway into the central coastal regions of South

Viet-Nam.

The Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam also has moved military personnel and military equipment in and through the demilitarized zone in direct violation of Articles 7 and 15(B) of the Peace Agreement and of Article 7 of the

Cease-fire Protocol. - 4 -

In the most serious violation of the Agreement, more than

30,000 North Vietnamese army personnel are known to have continued moving through Laos and Cambodia into South

Viet-Nam after the cease-fire on January 28. These combat replacements have greatly increased the capability of

North Vietnamese army units in the South. In addition there is evidence that new North Vietnamese army organizations, such as anti-aircraft artillery units, entered South

Viet-Nam after January 28. For example, Khe Sanh Airfield complex has recently been ringed with SA-2 missiles, which clearly were not present prior to the ceasefire.

Not content with illegally building up its military potential, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam has since the cease-fire actually employed these and other forces under its command to launch attacks on hamlets, villages and

Republic of Viet-Nam military positions throughout the country in unequivocal violation of the fundamental purpose of the Peace Agreement as embodied in Articles 2 and 3.

The assaults have generally consisted of mortarings and shellings, frequently followed by ground attacks in an obvious effort to expand the area controlled by forces under

North Vietnamese command. In some cases the assaults were - 5 -

of such intensity as to require withdrawal of Government

defending forces, for example, from positions at Hoang

Hau near Hue, on the Cambodian border in Chau Doc Province

and in Bac Lieu Province. Other beleaguered outposts long

occupied by the Republic of Viet-Nam forces continue to

hold out despite persistent harassment, such as at Tonle

Cham in Tay Ninh, at Rach Bap in Binh Duong and the Hong

Ngu and Cai Cai Districts of Kien Phong Province.

North Vietnamese forces, moreover, continue larger

military offensives aimed at opening up new supply routes and

expanding their control, such as in the Sa Huynh area of

Southern Quang Ngai Province.

Troops under the control of the Democratic Republic of

Viet-Nam also have placed many mines in violation of Article

5 of the Cease-fire Protocol and have tried to interfere

with resumed train service. Earlier this month, in Phu

Yen Province, a mine was set under a train and a ground

attack was launched on a track repair crew.

These forces, moreover,, have fired mortars and artillery

indiscriminately into many cities, refugee camps and other

centers of population, for example in Tan Chau and Phan Thiet,

causing heavy civilian casualties. They have even mortared

the team locations of the International Commission for Control - 6 - and Supervision at Tri Ton and Hong Ngu.

In addition to widespread attacks on Republic of

Viet-Nam territorial security forces, agents of the Democratic

Republic of Viet-Nam have continued their acts of terrorism including assassination, tossing grenades in public places, minings of public thoroughfares and widespread abductions.

Another serious impediment to peace is the record of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the "Provisional

Revolutionary Government" of clear and calculated obstructionism in the Four Party Joint Military Commission. Both consistently refused to participate meaningfully in any four party military commission investigation which would not benefit their cause.

Accordingly, they blocked or prevented investigation of the downing of a CH-47 helicopter, of the Sa Huynh attack and the Khe Sanh missile installation, to cite only three representative examples.

The tactic to stall and obstruct was also clearly evident in the refusal to deploy fully to the field. The

North Vietnamese deployed to only five of the seven regional headquarters, and their associates of the "Provisional

Revolutionary Government" to only one. Deployment to sub- regional teams was minimal. The "Provisional Revolutionary

Government" had less than one quarter of its authorized - 7 - contingent functional at any one time.

Thus the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the

"Provisional Revolutionary Government" must bear the responsibility for failure of the Four Party Joint

Military Commission to fulfill its assigned functions.

Of particular concern to the United States is the failure to date of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam to provide information about Americans missing in action in

Indochina or about those known to have died there, as required by Article 8(B) of the Paris Agreement.

The charges levied against the United States by the

Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam in its note, include the allegation that the United States gave "backing" to the

Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam in failing to observe the cease-fire and thereby seriously violated Articles

2 and 3 of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring

Peace in Viet-Nam. The entire charge is without foundation.

The United States concentrated instead after January 28 on observing the terms of the Agreement scrupulously by withdrawing its own military forces from Viet-Nam and refraining from participating in any hostilities in Viet-Nam.

Any arms and military equipment provided to the Republic of

Viet-Nam have been strictly in accordance with Article 7 of - 8 - the Paris Agreement and Article 7 of the Cease-fire Protocol.

The Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam also alleges that the withdrawal of United States forces has been concluded in a manner at variance with Articles 5 and 6 of the Paris

Agreement and accuses the United States of failing to withdraw its armaments and dismantle its bases as required by those articles. Article 5, however, required withdrawal only of those armaments, munitions, and war material which the

United States (or Allies of the United States and the Republic of Viet-Nam) may have owned in South Viet-Nam at the date of or subsequent to the date of entry into force of the

Agreement. It did not require the withdrawal from South

Viet-Nam of any armaments which the United States, prior to the entry into force of the Agreement, no longer owned because of prior transfer. This was the meaning of the phrase "of the United States" in Article 5. The same phrase with the same meaning was used in Article 6 with respect to military bases to be dismantled. The United

States has fully complied with these provisions. All military equipment and military base facilities formerly owned by United States forces in South Viet-Nam which remained there after March 28, had been transferred to the

Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam prior to January 27. - 9 -

The referenced note makes the further charge that the

United States has supplied arms, munitions, and war materials

to the Republic of Viet-Nam in violation of the Agreement

and its Cease-fire Protocol. This charge is specious and without merit. Article 7 of the Agreement permits the

South Vietnamese parties to replace, on a piece-for-piece basis, destroyed, damaged, worn out or used-up armaments, munitions and war material. The United States and the

Republic of Viet-Nam have established procedures for monitoring

arms shipments, to ensure compliance with these restrictions,

and records are being maintained which verify this compliance.

Introduction of these replacements, as well as these records

and procedures, are always open to inspection and observation by the International Commission of Control and Supervision

and the Two Party Joint Military Commission. Introduction

of these replacements has been restricted to those three

points of entry that have been designated by the Republic

of Viet-Nam under the terms of the Agreement.

The contention in the note of the Democratic Republic

of Viet-Nam that the United States has left behind over

10,000 military personnel disguised as civilian advisers

has no basis in fact and is undoubtedly an attempt to

draw attention from the large numbers of North Vietnamese - 10 - armed forces in the South. The United States, in accordance with Article 5 of the Peace Agreement, has withdrawn its troops and its military and police advisers. There remain in South Viet-Nam only about 200 American military personnel, belonging to the Defense Attache office, the Embassy Marine

Security Guard and the team attempting to resolve the status of the missing in action. There are no military persons disguised as civilians. As publicly stated, the total number of official American personnel in South Viet-Nam is less than 9,000, the large majority of whom are filling logistical and maintenance functions which are soon to be taken over by the South Vietnamese.

Other Americans are performing the kinds of functions conducted by Diplomatic, Consular and Aid Missions throughout the world. The purposes and functions of the personnel of the United States remaining in South Viet-Nam are fully known to the Government of the Democratic Republic of

Viet-Nam and are completely in keeping with the January 27

Agreement.

The United States also is accused of violating Article

8 of the Act of Paris by virtue of its military activities in Laos immediately after the conclusion of the Cease-fire

Agreement between the Lao Parties. United States Military - 11 - activities since the cease-fire have been very limited.

They were conducted at the request of Prime Minister

Souvanna Phouma. They were made necessary by, and were in direct response to, major and flagrant violations of that

Agreement by the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces, specifically the Post-Cease-Fire attacks at Pak Song on

February 23 and Tha Vieng on April 13.

The Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam further alleges

United States violation of the "independence, sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and neutrality" of Cambodia by continuing to conduct military activities in that country.

In fact, these activities are limited to air support operations in response to the continued military operations in Cambodia by the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, and were requested by the Khmer Republic itself. In late January, the

Government of the Khmer Republic suspended all offensive operations and the United States likewise halted offensive air operations. However the reaction of the Democratic

Republic of Viet-Nam and Cambodian forces under its control was a total military offensive, despite obligations assumed by the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam in Article 20 of the

Agreement and Article 8 of the Act of Paris. In order to induce compliance with those essential provisions, without - 12 - which the entire Viet-Nam Agreement would be endangered, the

United States is giving air support to the Khmer Forces.

With respect to allegations by the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam concerning the '.continued detention of South

Vietnamese civilians, the Government of the Republic of

Viet-Nam will doubtless wish to rebut them, but the Government of the United States wishes to point out that the "Provisional

Revolutionary Government" has offered to release only several hundred civilian"prisoners despite the fact that it has captured many thousands. This is an issue where reciprocity is clearly essential.

The allegation that the United States Government was deliberately delaying mine-clearing operations is patently false. The United States mine-clearing operation has progressed as rapidly as safety, available forces, weather and restrictions imposed by the Democratic Republic of

Viet-Nam would allow. We have been able to adhere to our agreed schedule despite the loss of two helicopters.

Every available United States mine counter-measure unit has been marshalled for this operation. In fact, a force significantly greater than that originally proposed by the United States and accepted by the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam has been employed. - 13 -

The fact that only a few mines have been observed to

explode is completely understandable and not at all

surprising. As has been carefully explained to Democratic

Republic of Viet-Nam representatives on numerous occasions,

the mines have a variable neutralization capability that

can be programmed and which has resulted in the neutralization

of most of them by now. Nevertheless, adequate safety

cannot be guaranteed unless all affected areas are methodically

swept with proper equipment by highly trained personnel.

However, in view of the many serious violations of other

provisions of the Agreement by the Democratic Republic of |\ ' Viet-Nam, which have been discussed above, the United States

/has decided to suspend its miie clearance operations. This

suspension is justified as a response to the numerous

material breaches of the Agreement by the Democratic

Republic of Viet-Nam in accordance with the rule of

international law that a material breach of an international

agreement by one party entitles the other party to suspend^

operation of the agreement in whole or in part. This rule

of customary international law is set forth in Article 60

of the 1969 Convention on the Law of Treaties. The United

States is, of course, prepared to resume mine clearance

operations as soon as the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam - 14 -

begins to act in compliance with its obligations under

the Agreement.

The Government of the United States thus categorically -" ••• •••" •«-->«*~*>>>**--*~-~» rejects the general and the specific charges that it has

violated the terms of the Agreement on Ending the War and >««''=«'^1'W«^^ Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam. For its part, except

as noted above, the Government of the United States again

affirms its intention to adhere to the terms of the Agreement

of January 27 and will exert its best efforts to help

bring about a lasting peace in Indochina. It calls on the

Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and all other parties to

the final act of the International Conference on Viet-Nam

to lend their support to this endeavor. - THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, 30 MARCH 1973 . Keeping 7,266 Civilians in the South

Special to The New York Times tions center in the heart of its of more than( 450 Ji52Lheavy,_ SAIGON, South Vietnam,! 513 headuiiatleis- bulftllng. ^ftt .bo•mbers. N About__l50 otKer March 29—The United States was, from -the center, with—ititss 522''s are six houTS away from glowing, illuminated charts and so>utn Vietnam on .Guam, and military mission in Vietnam has eialbjrate^jetnnniuriications "fa- there is at least one Dnited formally ended, but 7,200 ci- cifitles, that the American war States carrier with fighter- vilian employes of the bepafF eff orFwas~31reCl£it=-^- bombers offshore. ment of Defense remain, most TKe"-ceSfer, now called the President Nixon issued a of them technicians helping the readiness room, is being thinly veiled warning to the South Vietnamese armed t'orcgsr manned around the clock by a North Vietnamese two weeks The civiliansIre EKere- staff of about 40 civilians,— ago concerning their possible sponsibility of Maj. Gen. John mostly retired' majors and plans for future military activi- E. Murray, the highest-ranking lieutenant colonels — who will ty in South Vietnam, and these American military man remain- monitor military activity aircraft are clearly being kept ing in South Vietnam, who has throughout South Vietnam. ready to back up his words. been designated the senior de- They will be in constant Pentagon officials estimate fense attached touch with the United States' that the United States will The United States has organ- newly developed combat cen- spend about $6-billion for mili- ized some of the attaches under ter in Nakom Phanom, Thai- tary purposes in South Vietnam General Murray to handle the land, where Gen. John Vogt, this year, te—additifla. to the replacement of supplies and commander of the Seventh Air more than SlPS-billion. that has equipment to the South Viet- Force, who had been based already gone into the country namese on a piece-by-piece here, has shifted his headquar- since the introduction of large 4, basis as authorized by the Paris ters. 5—;--~ .merican combat units irf iflfift L cease-fire accord. There are nearly 150,000 The officials estimate that[ I Furthermore, the United American servicemen in Tnai- military spending will drop ten States has-decided to retain the land. Most are airmen either a little more than $2-bilUenl heavily guarded combat opera- flying or supporting an armada .next year. ne=-""" US. IN VIETNAM; 1961-73 Build-Up and Withdrawal ,.543,400 April.1969

500,000 First troop— withdrawal 400,000 ordered

300,000-'

200,000—

100,000

1961 '62 '63 '64 '65 '66 '67 '"'68 !69 70 71 72 73

Casualties (From Jan.I.ISei, to cease-fire of Jan. 28,1973) •I Killed QSeriously Wounded / Total: 45,948 Total: 153,303 (303,640 if less seriously wounded are added) 50,000'

40,000

1961-64 '65 '66 '67 '68 '69 70 71 72

.. . Sot/roe; Defense Department

•••.-. •• The New York Times/March 30,1W3 Departure of last troops left only 800 U.S. truce observ- ers in Vietnam, and they are to leave by weekend. While casuaities_5are• coimtedjrpm 1961, U.S. military presence \iit Vietnam :goes back to 1950's, when average of 650 American advisers were assigned there. CONFIDENTIAL . 19 December 1972 AP/dm

'•Tote for the File on Meeting in the Secretary-General's Office on 19 December

Present were: The Secretary-General Ambassador Bush, accompanied by Mr. Howison Mr. Prohaska fA

The Ambassador came to see the Secretary-General upon, the latter's request. The Secretary-C-eneral expressed his deep concern over the-resumption of hostilities in Vietnam, which appeared to indicate a break-down of the cease-fire negotiations. Ambassador Bush understood the Secretary-General's concern and underlined that the American people also were disappointed at the recent developments. Ee continued to say that he had no inside.- information, but insisted at the same time that the President's decision was certainly not taken lightly. There must have been serious reasons. What appeared to be unilateral to the outside -was in fact not unilateral, since the Horth, all through the negotiations, so far has continued its military build-up and contributed substantially to a strengthening of its position, in particular in the field of logistics.

Ambassador Bush said that he would- convey the expression of concern to the appropriate authorities in the spirit in which it was expressed. The decision on the part of the U.S. indicated should not be taken as to imply a lack'of interest in entering into a peace agreement. Ambassador Bush also promised to try to get more information on the reason that might have prompted the decision to resume the hostilities.

On other matters, the Secretary-C-eneral and Ambassador Bush had a brief exchange of views on the outcome of the 2Jth General Assembly and discussed the possibility of a luncheon vith the new US Representative to the unitsd ilatio-ns, Mr. Scali, early in January. UNITED NATIONS $ NATIONS UNIES ^•^Cr'

Untied Nations Information Centre, Washington, D. C., 20036 102S Connecticut Avenue, N.W. | 296-5370 1 S. i V'- I \ ' CONFIDENTIAL • s '

28 November 1972

Dear Mr. Hennig: One of our standing congressional sources lias indicated that during Thanksgiving week, at an "off-the-record" meeting with congressmen in New York, Ambassador Bush expressed the following opinion, in direct ^response to a question regarding a possible role for the United Nations in post-war "Vietnam. HanojL has^shown^np..interest whatsoever, in a role for the United Nations, either in the " ' "~ peace "dl's cuss ions or'in 'the 'matter of reconstruction and rehabilitation of Vietnam,

This view underscores, as you recall from my previous correspondence on the matter^ Assistant Secretary of State de Palma's pessimism on an active United Nations involvement in the task of reconstruction of Vietnam. Yours sincerely,

N,\ \ "Mvi — Marcial Tamayo- Director ;

Mr. Georg Hennig, Head of the Secretariat of the Secretary-General United Nations New York, New York 1001? cc: Mrs. E. Mlra ' bf. filing: CT/AP TC/kg

19 May 1572:

Dear Mr. Seiberllng,

I thank you for your letter of May 15. I was indeed encouraged to learn of the support of fifty members of the United States Congress for the United Nations efforts aad the offer of cay good offices for negotiation of the Vietnam conflict*

Z sincerely appreciate your thoughtfulness.

Sincerely yours

Kurt Jfeldheim

The Honorable John F, Seiberling Member of Congress Congress of the Waited States Washington, B.C. iP^TOHh}N F. SEYl3ERL.lNG WASHINGTON OFFICE: 14TH DISTRICT, OHIO 1223 LONGWORTH HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING AREA CODE 202. 225-5231

COMMITTEES: Congress of tijc Uniteti States DISTRICT OFFICE: SCIENCE AND AKRON. OHIO 44311

ASTRONAUT-OS Of AREACoDE2,e. 7S2-9323

.C 20515 May 15, 1972

H. E. Mr. Kurt Waldheim Secretary General of the United Nations United Nations New York City, New York 10017 Dear Mr. Secretary General: I am writing to inform you of the effort I and my colleagues have made to call President Richard Nixon's attention to your offer of "good offices" for negotiation of the Vietnam conflict.' Fifty Members of Congress signed the attached letter to the President. A list of those Members is enclosed for your information. Your efforts to aid in a resolution of this tragic conflict are deeply appreciated. I pray they will be received favorably by the parties concerned.

Sincerely,

John F. Seiberling Member of Congress /a enclosures

THIS STATIONERY PRINTED ON PAPER MADE WITH RECYCLED FIBERS €. • • 20515. ; May 11,.:-1972 :? '.'If

The Honorable" Richard M.; Nixon V.:'.: .,.-.: .The President of the United .States ._. ••; .• \1, V'.^ The" White House- :-;L':,:--",,.-;'-• •• :.;''^ \y , ... _- Washingtonj;D. C.•_-.;20025 ; "'" . ./ 'r'j'. - r "'

.Dear" Mr. President: y";;•"";"-.^'"•/--. -••'..- '"•'••''.:"•'- :. We. have learned1 from "recent press'-reports that Secretary General; of the United Nations Kurt Waldheim has of fered'his ."good offices" :. for negotiation of the Vietnam conflict. .-:;_> ;...-;. -^- :/-"...- .:• "/According .to a spokesman for the Secretary General,.none of the l ^parties has formally ."responded to'his offer. ; :-; * -: :-. ~~'-' ' ''"'•'-, '....•;'"'- With''the"'recent'escalation 'of'hostilities., in Vietnam it is easy '~ '•• to understand v?hy this offer has not" received the attention "it merits. ' Yet"it is jusf at this critical moment that"ther.Secretary General's ;. good-off ices'may be most "helpful.- :. _.':^-:.':,..-• ^, ' ;'- -.^..-.J, -;.-">;...•'•.. '...:.' _~ , In any'eventy;we believe it would be a.'grave mistake for the ' ", : United States, to fail to make a formal response to:such an offer from .the Secretary:-General; of the World Organization.

^'-">v-'•':-"';;,•.. .'-".We respectfully.- recommend-a prompt and positiveL response., ^ • "\- ; ~ ";:

: : : T •'^•^r'r^' '• '!'::.. -'''•• ^-"j--.;"":^-'^:-'.'-'" "-J :---:."• ';,"' '" ••_.-' ... ";•':-'"": Sincerely, ,::'--^r---- '-- '•--"-- "r v' .'-:

- . ' ^:.; " /^Jonathan B. Bingham {/ . .-r .-

Spark M. Matsunaga c

(contii(ued).:, ' Cosigners of letter to President Nixon urging acceptance of Secretary General's offer of good offices for negotiation of Vietnam conflict: Brock Adams (D-Uash) Joseph Addabbo (D-NY) William Anderson (D-Tenn) Herman Badillo (D-NY) Nick Begich (D-Alaska Jonathan Bingham (D-NY) Edward Boland (D-Mass) John Brademas (D-Ind) Charles Carney (D-Ohio) George Danielson (D-Calif) John Dow (D-NY) Robert Drinan (D-Mass) Bob Eckhardt (D-Tex) Don Edwards (D-Calif) Joshua Eilberg (D-Pa) Joe Evins (D-Tenn) Donald Frr.ser (D-Minn)- Saa Gibbons (D-Fla) Ella Grasso (D-Conn) Martha Griffiths (D-Mich) Seymour Halpern (R-NY) Michael Harrington (D-Mass) H. John Heinz, III (R-Pa) - Henry Helstoski (D-NJ) Frank Horton (R-NY) ~' Joseph Karth (D-Minn) "Edward Koch (D-NY) Arthur Link (D-ND) • Spark Matsunaga (D-Hawaii) Lloyd Meeds (D-Wash) Abner Mikva (D-I11) '. Patsy Mink (D-Hawaii) '-•'.. William Moorhead (D-Pa) John Moss (D-Calif) Morgan Murphy (D-I11) Luciea Nedzi (D-Mich) Esrtran Podell (D-NY) Thomas Rees (D-Calif) Robert Roa (D-NJ) Benjamin Rosenthal (D-NY) William Ryan (D-NY) Paul Sarbanes (D-Md) m James Schetier (D-NY) John -Seiberling (D-Ohio) j£™23. V. Stanton (D-Ohio) Janas Si^nir.gton (D-Ko) Charles TJilscn (D-Calif) Sidney Yates (D-Calif) Margaret Heckler (R-:iass) Frcnk Tho-psen-(D-NJ) • HOWARD W. ROBISON ,1 / MEMBER: 33D DISTRICT. NEW YORK ;'' ' ^1• '. COMMITTEQOMMITTEEE O ONN / / ~) / {^^APPROPRIATIONS ' I! I CHARLES O. IH6RAHAM 1 ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT ff A«4r,v4» Affff f,f f h * 7313T** »f <«kX

DISTRICT OFFICE: 302 FEDERAL BUILDING 20515 BlNGHAMTON, N.Y. May 12, 1972

AN OPEN LETTER

We are Republican Congressmen who — with others — addressed an appeal to President Nixon, last Friday, urging him to forego further recourse to high-level bombing attacks in Indochina unless the same were directly related to the need to blunt the current invasion of South Vietnam. In that same letter (of which a copy is attached), we called upon the President to undertake yet another "end-the-war" initiative, the method we suggested being for him to "place high on the agenda" for his upcoming talks with leaders of the Soviet Union the question of obtaining their cooperation in arranging a cease-fire-inplace by both sides in Indochina, with the simultaneous transfer of the political issues underlying the conflict to the United Nations.

Our letter has been acknowledged by the White House, but if there has been a substantive reply, it was that indirect one contained in the President's address to the Nation last Monday night.

The President's decision, was to interdict arms shipments from the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China by mining certain North Vietnamese harbor entrances and by resuming high-level bombing attacks against new targets throughout North Vietnam. We have certain differences among us as to the immediate military value and political necessity for this decision. But, without attempting to resolve those differences, we can and do state our regret over the fact that the human suffering and physical destruction that has gone on too long in Indochina has again been escalated.

We regret, too, that the political rhetoric over this portion of the President's decision has also been escalated to such levels that the constructive portion of the President's statement has been largely ignored. It is on that portion that we wish to focus Congressional, and public, attention, so that our efforts are directed at enhancing the possibilities for a peaceful solution and reducing the dimensions of the confrontation now threatened. -2-

Despite all the renewed interest in legislated "end-the-war" solutions here in Congress, no such approach can effectively end the war for any party other than the United States. If the bloodshed and physical destruction now continuing in Indochina is ever to end, the first step has to be a cease-fire agreement. If that cease-fire is to be "internationally supervised," as the President has said, the logical body to undertake that task is the United Nations. The equally logical body — indeed, the only such body — that can undertake that difficult task of negotiating a political settlement between the com- batants is, again, the United Nations.

Accordingly we call upon:

The President, through our Ambassador to the United Nations to make an immediate and favorable response to the recent offer by Kurt Waldheim, Secretary General of the United Nations, of his "good offices" for negotiating an end to this tragic conflict.

The Secretary General of the United Nations to immediately convene the Security Council of the United Nations — under the authority vested in him to do so — for the purpose of considering a negotiated end to this tragic conflict;

The leaders of both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China to recognize the fact that President Nixon's latest offer to end our involvement in that conflict — by ceasing all military activities throughout Indochina and withdrawing all our forces there- from within four months, conditioned only upon the return of American prisoners—of-war and an internationally-supervised ceasefire — is simple, straightforward, and eminently fair, and to use whatever influence they have on North Vietnam to accept that offer and to transfer the search for a settlement of the remaining political issues to the United Nations;

The leaders of North Vietnam to join with the United States and its allies in recognizing the urgent human need for an immediate end to the carnage that has wracked both North and South Vietnam for so long and which will take generations to repair;

Upon all self-styled "peace groups" within the United States to lift their sights from the responsibility our Country has for ending its involvement in this misbegotten war so as to include the responsibility that the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China bear for similarly ending their involvement therein, and, finally, -3-

All people of good will throughout the world to join with us, this Sunday, May 14, 1972, in making that day a "day of prayer" for a cease-fire-inplace throughout Indochina.

Sincerely,

William A. Steiger (Wise.) Howard W. Robison (N.Y.)

Orval Hansen (Idaho) John Dellenback (Oreg.)

Tom Railsback (111.) William Stanton (Ohio)

Bill Frenzel (Minn.) Fred Schwengel (Iowa)

Joseph McDade (Pa.) Stewart B. McKinney (Conn.)

Hamilton Fish (N.Y.) William B. Widnal (N.J.)

Robert McClory (111.) 12 May 1972

Note to the Secretary-General

Congreaman Howard Robison's office (Rep., N.Y.) telephoned this afternoon to alert the Secretary-General to another open letter which has been prepared for the leaders of the parties concerned in the Viet-Nam conflict, as well as the Secretary- General (with information copy to Mr. Bradford Morse). This letter is being mailed to the Secretary-General today but, inasmuch as a press announcement will be released tomorrow, Congressman Robison's office thought it best to inform the Secretary-General of its contents. The open letter, which is signed by IT moderate Republican Congressmen, refers to the letter of last Saturday addressed to President Nixon and reported in the NEW YORK TIMES regarding U.N. participation in the settlement of the Viet-Nam conflict. This new letter, regretting the escalation of the conflict and stating that the first step might be a cease-fire, proposes that, if such a cease-fire is to be internationally supervised, the logical body is the United Nations for negotiation of a political settlement. The letter calls upon President Nixon, through his Ambassador to the U.N., Ambassador Bush, to give an immediate and favourable response to the Secretary-Geneial's offer of good offices. In addition, it calls upon the Secretary-General to inmediately convene the Security Council for the purpose of considering a negotiated end to the conflict. It also contains exhortations addressed to China, the USSR and other parties concerned and proposes an international day of prayer on 14 May.

Kate Starr Newell STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

10 May 1972

Note for the Record

Re; Vietnam - U.S. Attitude

I have seen instructions from Washington to the United States Mission clearly stating that Washington is opposed to a Security Council Debate on Vietnam. Orally I was told that Ambassador Bush may not have explained this clearly enough to the Secretary-General. ROUTING SLIP FICHE DE TRANSMISSION TO: n» Secretarv-Genera1 FOR ACTION POUR SUITE A DONNER FOR APPROVAL POUR APPROBATION FOR SIGNATURE POUR SIGNATURE PREPARE DRAFT PROJET A REDIGER FOR COMMENTS POUR OBSERVATIONS MAY WE CONFER? POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER? YOUR ATTENTION VOTRE ATTENTION AS DISCUSSED COMME CONVENU AS REQUESTED SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE NOTE AND FILE NOTER ET CLASSER NOTE AND RETURN NOTER ET RETOURNER FOR INFORMATION POUR INFORMATION Sir, You may wish to see these Reuters dispatches on reactions to PresidentT s speech on Vietnam.

M. Tlili

Date: FROM: 9 May 1972 DE: M. Tlili

CR. 13 (i:U64) REUTER, TUESDAY, 9 MY 1972

PMS 99, 100 UNITED NAII.QIJ.S, WAY 9, REUTER - SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER JCOE A. MALIK ASKED FOR /W URGENT APPOINTMENT TODAY WITH SECRETARY- GENERAL KURT J. WALDHEIM TO DISCUSS THE VIETNAM SITUATION, WHICH S)VIET OFFICIALS SAID PRIVATELY HAD ASSUMED ALL THE SERIOUS-JESS (F THE 1962 CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS. THE PRECISE PURPOSE 07 MALIK'S PROPOSED VISIT WAS NOT CLEAR IMMEDIATELY, BUT SOME SOURCES SA;D KE MIGHT DELIVER AN EMPHATIC PROTEST AGAINST THE AMERICAN CONTENTION THAT THE MEASURES ANNOUNCED B/ PRESIDENT NIXON WERE PROVIDED TOR IN THE U.N. CHARTER. THE U.S. MISSION RELEASED TODAY THE TEXT OF U.S. AMBASSADOR GEORGE H. BUSH'S LETTER DECLARING THE DECISION TO .MINE NORTH VIETNAM HARBORS TO HAVE, BEEN MADE UNDER THE "INHERENT RIGHT 0? COLLECTIVE SELF DEFENSE." ARTICLE 510? THE CHARTER COVERS THIS CONTINGENCY. BUSH'S ETTER WAS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THE OFFICE WHICH HE HIMSELF HOLDS THIS MONTH. _ _ THE VIETNAM PROBLEM HAS BEEN OH THE AGEN DA "OF THE COUNCIL SINCE FEBRUARY 19

PMS 82

PARIS, MAY 9, REUTER - FRANCE TODAY DEPLORED PRESIDENT NIXON'S DECISION TO MIME ALL NORTH VIETNAMESE PORTS. FOREIGN MINISTER MAURICE SCHUMANN SAID THAT FRANCE ALWAYS PREFERRED "AN ESCALATION OF PEACE TO AN ESCALATION OF WAR." THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAS ALWAYS FAVORED A POLITICAL ., SOLUTION, AS OPPOSED TO THE PURSUIT AND EXTENSION OF MILITARY OPERATIONS, HE TOLD A LIHCHEON MEETING 0? THE FRENCH DIPLOMATIC PRESS ASSOCIATION. SCHUMANN SAID "FAR FROM BURNING ITSELF OUT, THE WAR IS FEEDING UPON ITSELF." HE ADDED "WHERE DOES THIS ESCALATION LEAD ? I SHALL REFRAIN FROM SPECULATING. FRANCE, FOR ITS PART, CAN ONLY DEPLORE ONCE MORE THAT THINGS HAVE COL'E TO THIS STAGE.11 HE ADDED "BUT ON THE OTHER HAND, ..I WOULD WILLINGLY SPECULATE ON WHAT COULD BE-AH ESCALATION OF PEACE." SCHUMANN SAID THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WOULD DISCUSS THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM AT ITS WEEKLY CABINET MEETING TOMORROW. PRESIDENT NIXON GAVE AN ADVANCE BRIEFING ON HIS TELEVISION BROADCAST TO FRENCH PRESIDENT GEORGES POMPIDOU OH A DIRECT LINE UNKING THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE ELYSEE PALACE HERE. ~-? t K \" £ "' * ,- ' *

REUTER, TUESDAY, 9 KAY 1972

PMS 72, 75

PARIS, MAY 9,~REUTER - H£1QI TODAY DENOUNCED PRESIDENT NIXON'S DECISION TO MINE ALL NORTH VIETNAMESE PORTS AS "THE MOST SERIOUS^ STEP IN THE ESCALATION 0? THE WAR" AND "A CHALLENGE TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE flN D THE PEOPLES OF- THE WHOLE WORLD." THE SPOKESMAN FOR THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION TO THE SUSPENDED PARIS PEACE TALKS ALSO SAID IN A STATEMENT ISSUED THIS AFTERNOON THAT PRESIDENT NIXON 'ViOT ONLY ATTACKED THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF NORTH VIETNAM.BUT ALSO THE RIGHT 07 FREE NAVIGATION OF OTHER COUNTRIES IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF NORTH VIETNAM," THE STATEMENT SAID: "3Y OBSTINATELY OPPOSING ANY NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT OF THE VIETNAMESE PROBLEM, BY DECIDING TO MINE ALL j PORTS OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF NORTH VIETNAM AND TO : INTENSIFY AIR AND NAVAL ATTACKS AGAINST THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF NORTH VIETNAM, NIXON HAS ACCOMPLISHED THE MOST SERIOUS STEP SO FAR IN THE ESCALATION OF THE WAR, THROWN AMD INSOLENT CHALLENGE TO THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE, TO THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, TO PEACE-LOVING COUNTRIES, TO THE AMERICA!] PEOPLE AND THE PEOPLES OF THE WHOLE WORLD." IT ADDED "MR, NIXON NOT ONLY ATTACKED THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF NORTH VIE™ AM BUT ALSO THE RIGHT OF FREE NAVIGATION OF OTHER COUNTRIES IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF NORTH -VIETNAM." THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE WOULD NEVER ACCEPT NIXON 'S ULTIMATUM, THE SPOKE SM/W SAID, HE CONCLUDED "AS LONG AS THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION CONTINUES ITS AGGRESSION IK ..VIETNAM. CARRIES ON ITS POLICY OF 'VIETN AMIZATION ' OF THE WAR, AND CONTINUES THE ESCALATION OF THE WAR AGAINST THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, THE WHOLE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE, UNITED LIKE A SINGLE MM, IS RESOLVED TO CONTINUE ITS RESISTANCE STRUGGLE UNTIL IT OBTAINS ITS FUNDAMENTAL AIMS, NAMELY INDEPENDENCE, FREEDOM AND PEACE." EARLIER TODAY, _THE VIET CONG DENOUNCED PRESIDENT NIXON AS A "BARBAROUS AGGRESSOR" FOR HIS LATEST WAR MOVES AND SAID THE U.S. LEADER WAS MAKING A GREAT MISTAKE IF HE THOUGHT HE COULD SUBJUGATE THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE BY MINING AND BLOCKADING NORTH VIETNAMESE PORTS. rffruJttftteftfc

REUTER, TUESDAY, 9 MAY 1972

PMS 65, 66, 68, 71

MQSQO.W, MAY S>. REUTER ~ PRESIDENT NIXON *S MOVES TO STEP UP PRESSURE ON NORTH VIETNAM WERE BRANDED HERE TODAY AS "UNCONCEALED AGGRESSIVE ACTS." TASS MEWS AGENCY DESCRIBED THEM AS SIGNIFYING "THE AGGRAVATION OF THE AMERICA INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM AND THE VIOLATION OF THE NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAU." IT SAID THE PRESIDENT HAD MADE MANY REFERENCES IN HIS SPEECH TO HIS DESIRE TO END THE WAR AND BRING U.S. SOLDIERS HOME, "BUT PRACTICAL STEPS, INCLUDING THE MEASURES THE PRESIDENT ANNOUNCED TODAY, SPEAK DIFFERENTLY." THIS FIRST REACTION TO NIXON'S DECISION TO, MINE THE APPROACHES TO NORTH VIETNAMESE PQRTS AND ORDER CONTINUING AIR STRIKES AGAINST THE COUNTRY'S COMMUNICATIONS CAME ALMOST 12 HOURS AFTER THE PRESIDENT SPOKE TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE LAST NIGHT BUT IT CAME IN A TASS DESPATCH FROM WASHINGTON, WHICH WILL HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY CHECKED HERE BEFORE PUBLICATION, AND GAVE NO CLUE TO HOW THE KREMLIN WILL RESPOND IN PRACTICE. NIXON'S EXPLANATION OF THE MOVES BY THE NEED TO SAVE THE LIVES OF 60,000 AMERICAN SOLDIERS AND THE EXISTENCE OF AN ALLEGED COMMUNIST THREAT TO SOUTH VIETNAM WAS REJECTED. TASS SAID THIS WAS WHAT AMERICAN PROPAGANDA ALWAYS RESORTED TO IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY "ACTS OF ESCALATION OF THE WAR AGAINST THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE."-, IT QUOTED THE PRESIDENT 'S ASSURANCE THAT THE LATEST MOVES WERE NOT DIRECTED AGAINST OTHER COUNTRY, BUT MADE HO COMMENT. THE REPORT DID NOT MENTION THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS ADDRESSED TO THIS COUNTRY, IN WHICH HE CALLED ON KREMLIN LEADERS TO UNDERSTAND THE UNITED STATES' POSITION. BUT IT QUOTED WITHOUT COMMENT HIS PLEDGE TO STOP ALL ACTS OF FORCE IN INDOCHINA ONCE U.S. PRISONERS ARE RELEASED AND AN INTERNATIONALLY SUPERVISED CEASEFIRE HAS BEG UN • IT ALSO CITED HIS ASSURANCE THAT U.S. CONDITIONS DID NOT REQUIRE EITHER SIDE'S SURRENDER AND WOULD ENABLE THE UNITED STATES TO WITHDRAW HONORABLY, A •-^** »v ^- Krf

REUTER, TUESDAY, 9 MAY 1972

PMS 6^ BRITAIN—BRITAIN TODAY SAID THAT PRESIDENT HIXOU'S PROPOSALS OH VIETNAM OFFERED THE CHANCE 0? ENDING THE FIGHTING WITHIN A VERY SHORT TIME UNDER INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION AND THE OPENING 0? REAL NEGOTIATIONS. "UE GREATLY HOPE THAT ALL NATIONS CONCERNED WILL SEE IN THESE PROPOSALS AN OPPORTUNITY TO PUT AN END SOON TO THE IvAR WHICH HAS ALREADY GOME ON FOR TOO LONG, " A BRITISH FOREIGN 0?7ICE SPOKESMAN SAID. THE SPOKESMAN, ASKED AT HIS DAILY PRESS CONFERENCE TO COMMENT ON NIXON'S SPEECH, SAIDt "WE HAVE,ALREADY EXPRESSED OUR CONCERN AT THE INTENSIFICATION Q? THE WAR AS A RESULT OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFENSIVE IN SOUTH VIETNAM. "CO INTER-MEASURES BY THE UNITED STATES WERE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES INEVITABLE, " HE ADDED. THE SPOKESMAN SAID THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD IMPRESSED ON THE RUSSIANS ALL ALONG THE NEED TO PREVENT A DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION BY RECONVENING THE 1954 GENEVA CONFERENCE ON INDOCHINA. "WE SHALL CONTINUE TO BE IN TOUCH WITH THE RUSSIANS IN THIS CONTEXT, " THE SPOKESMAN ADDED. BRITISH OFFICIALS SAID THERE MAY AT PRESENT BE TWO BRITISH SHIPS -- ONE REGISTERED IN LONDON AND THE OTHER IN HONGKONG -- IN HAIPHONG PORT. UN/TED NATIONS Distr. GENERAL

SECURITY S/10631 COUNCIL 9 May 19T2 ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 8 MAY 1972 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The President of the United States of America today announced that he had directed United States forces in South-East Asia to take additional measures, in conjunction with the forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam, in response to the new armed attacks launched by North Viet-Nam. The President directed that the entrances to the ports of North Viet-Nam be mined and that the delivery of seaborne supplies to North Viet-Nam be prevented. These measures of collective self-defence are hereby being reported to the United Nations Security Council as required by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

The massive invasion across the demilitarized zone and international boundaries by the forces of North Viet-Nam and the continuing aggression of those forces against the people and territory of the Republic of Viet-Nam have created unprecedented dangers to the forces of the Republic of Viet-IIam, to the Republic of Viet-Nam itself, and to those United States forces which remain in that country. This invasion has been carried out in blatant violation of the understandings negotiated in 1968 in connexion with the cessation of the bombing of the territory of North Viet-Nam. The extent of this renewed aggression and the manner in which it has been directed and supported demonstrate with great clarity that North Viet-Nam has embarked on an all-out attempt to take over South Viet-Warn by military force and to disrupt the orderly withdrawal of United States forces.

At the same time that North Viet-Nam has launched this massive invasion, it has refused, both in public and in private, to negotiate to bring about a peaceful settlement of the conflict in South-East Asia.

A major portion of the supplies through which the invasion of South Viet-Nam is being supported enters North Viet-Nam from the sea. It is essential that this delivery of supplies from the sea be prevented so that North Viet-Nam cannot continue to resupply both its forces in the field and its logistics base.

Accordingly, as the minimum actions necessary to meet this threat, the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States of America have jointly decided to take the following measures of collective self-defence. The entrances to the ports of North Viet-Nam are being mined, commencing 0900 hours Saigon time, 9 May, and the mines are set to activate automatically beginning 1800 hours Saigon time, 11 May.

72-09702 ^

STRICTLY COHFIDEHTIAL 8 May 19T2 GH/jd

Note for the Record

Re: Vietnam

In the absence of Ambassador Bush, Ambassador Bennett visited the Secretary-General at the letter's request, on 8 May 1972, at 10.15 a.m. The Secretary-General referring to Vietnam and the meeting of the National Security Council of the United States, expressed his great and deep concern about the present situation. He also asked Ambassador Bennett to convey to his Government that his "good offices" vhich he had first offered in Paris and repeated later, still stood. In the meantime, the situation in Vietnam had changed and the time night have come for the United Nations to play an active role in providing for a cease-fire. The Secretary- General further mentioned that he would inform the other Permanent Members of the Security Council accordingly. UNITED STATES MISSION/\O THE UNITED NATIONS

799 UNITHD NATIONS PLAZA \s \J Mav 8 1972 Niw. YORK. N. Y. 10017 y '

His Excellency George Bush President of the Security Council United Nations, New York Dear Mr. President: The President of the United States of America today announced that he had directed United States forces in Southeast Asia to take additional measures/ in conjunction with the forces of the Republic of Vietnam, in response to the new armed attacks launched by North Vietnam. The President directed that the entrances to the ports of North Vietnam be mined and that the delivery of seaborne supplies to North Vietnam be prevented. These measures of collective self-defense are hereby being reported to the United Nations Security Council as required by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The massive invasion across the demilitarized zone and international boundaries by the forces of North Vietnam and the continuing aggression of those forces against the people and territory of the Republic of Vietnam have created unprecedented dangers to the forces of the Republic of Vietnam, to the Republic of Vietnam itself, and to those United States forces which remain in that country. This invasion has been carried out in blatant violation of the understandings negotiated in 1968 in connection with the cessation of the bombing of the territory of North Vietnam. The extent of this renewed aggression and the manner in which it has been directed and supported demonstrate with great clarity that North Vietnam has embarked on an all-out attempt to take over South Vietnam by military force and to disrupt the orderly withdrawal of United States forces. At the same time that North Vietnam has launched this massive invasion, it has refused, both in public and in private, to negotiate to bring about a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Southeast Asia. A major portion of the supplies through which the invasion of South Vietnam is being supported enters North Vietnam from the sea. It is essential that this delivery of supplies from the sea be prevented so that North Vietnam cannot continue to resupply both its forces in the field and its logistics base.

Accordingly, as the minimum actions necessary to meet this threat, the Republic of Vietnam and the United States of America have jointly decided to take the following measures of collective self-defense. The entrances to the ports of North Vietnam are being mined, commencing 0900 Saigon time, May 9, and the mines are set to activate automatically beginning 1800 hours Saigon time, May 11. This will permit vessels of other countries presently in North Vietnamese ports three daylight periods to depart safely. The mines will be so positioned within the internal waters and claimed territorial waters of North Vietnam as to prevent access to North Vietnamese ports and North Vietnamese naval operations from these ports. In addition, the Republic of Vietnam and the United States are advising their respective naval and air forces to take appropriate measures within the internal and claimed territorial waters of North Vietnam to prevent the delivery of seaborne supplies to North Vietnam. In addition to this and other general notices of these measures, the naval forces of the Republic of Vietnam and of the United States will notify any vessels approaching the internal and claimed territorial waters of North Vietnam of these measures. As can be seen from the foregoing, the measures being taken by United States and South Vietnamese forces are restricted in extent and purpose. The President also announced that as soon as there is an internationally supervised cease- fire throughout Indochina and prisoners of war have been released, we will terminate all acts of force throughout Indochina, and United States forces will be withdrawn from South Vietnam within four months. I request that this letter and the text of President Nixon's announcement, which is enclosed, be circulated as a Security Council document. Sincerely,

George Bush > Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations v •;"

Annex

Text of Announcement made by the President of the United States ,'on.8 May 1972

! -GOOD EVES1XS. FIVE WELKS A30, ON InSTf.-.i ,/:-Jt" . ... > T: , " THE COTÛHIST ARMIES OF NOfiTK VIETNAM LAUNCHED A rtA&'.'il ", .^~5j; 'OF SOUTH VIETKAK, AM WAS ION THAT WAS tfADE PDSSIuL^ fc1:' i V, • -, ARTILLERY, '• AND OTHER ADVANCED OFFENSIVE WEAJ'^NS 3'Jf7 L Jf i *• ... HANOI BY THE SOVIET UNIGtf AND OTHER COMMUNIST riATKiK?. if'"..' THE.'SOUTH. Vl'£'TN.A'«itSE HAVE FOUGHT BRAVELY TO HEFEL I THIS BRUTAL ASSAULT. C/.S'JALTIIS 0?4 SOTH SITES HAV> sLfif- v:>.V |, .••,..H;-QH-.'..-MOST. TRAGICALLY, TH>RZ HAVE BE EH OVE.M 21;,^; j'îu^. CA3UALTIKS, INCLUDING wCi'E?; AN'; CHILDREN, IN r-:'t CMI;'S 4:-:OK i : 5 r :MORTH VIETWArttSfc' HAVt ?HtLLEO 1^ WANTON I'ISRI: C-iArcE- O î /;::' ; LIFE.

' " ; AS I ANÛHCEC Isv ^V >:i--'jRT TO UiL "AIIOK t£ i;AV:^ ••••:'.': -AGO, THE.ROLE 'jf THc L'iaTEO JTATES H PESISTUKs T-i'U 1'• V^'-;j :,' :•'" HAS BEEN LIMITED TO Aln A^!D MAVAL .JT;-;1K£S ON /IHi'A-.T V/.^JFi'S I« NORTH A«D SOUTH vUTÂ^, A3 I ALSO POI^T^D OUT ! "4 THAT ; REPORT , WE HAVE r^SPONDFD T3 NORT^ VIcTNA'I'S ÂSSIV^ rillTAVy OFFENSIVE BY JNDiRT^KISti WlLE>3ANSIN-i «£f PEACE trFO'.IV Î^fiD •: AT.'ENDING THE ^?AR THÔUvH NEGOTlATfOH.

:•'••: :tB APRIL 2tlH, 1 3L-;iT OH. KISSINGER "TO MOSCOW FOR '.FOUR DAYS'OF rEEIIN-JS vJHH j?;HS.3AL SECnETASY BRflZHîiv i'^L- OTHER SOV-IET**L£Af'£.s3. I I^ÎRUCTED HIM TO t^.PHASIIb OLR DL- SI.RE FDR .a ÂPID 50L:JTI-'>fi TO ! HE W/^R AND OUR VILLIN5N1F.? TO LOOK AT ALL POSSIBLE ^PF?tCACHEj. AT THAT TIÊr THE SOVIET ••-V LEADERS SHOWED AiV UT.-ESEST IN BRINGING THE ÂR 10 AM l>iD -3$ A BASIS JUST TO BOTH SIDES. THEY UKGSTD RESWPTIOf) OF i*£GOIlA- TIONS IN PARIS, AND THrlY INDICATED THEY tfOiJLD USE THEIr: CON- ;-..STRUCTIVE ISFLUtNCE. I AUTHORIZED DR, KISSINGER TQ KEET PRIVATELY WITH •••"'v-TKE TOP NORTH VIETNAMESE NEGOTIATOR, LE DUC THO, ON TUESDAY, - -.MAY 2ND, IN PARIS. ANBASSAPQR POSTrH, AS YOU KNOW, RESUMED THE PUBLIC PE,".C£ NEGOTIATIONS IS PA-IS ON APRIL 27TH AND AGAIN -ON-PfAY 4TH. AT THOSE rtEETlKUS, iOTH PUBLIC-AMD PRIVATE, ALL WE HEARD FHOM THE ENEKY WAS BO*.&ASTIC RHETORIC AND A RE- --•••'. .PLAYIWG OF THEIR DEMAKD FOR SURftENDf.R. FOR EXAMPLE, AT THE KAY 2WD SECRET EETING, J. AUTHORIZED DK. KISSINGER TO TALK ABOUT -EVERY CONCEIVABLE AVENUE,TOWARD F'tACE. THE NORTH VIET- NAMESE FLATLY HE/USFD TO CONSIDER ANY OF THFSE APPROACHES. •THEY REFUSED TO OFfe ANY KZ'H APPftOACH OF TKEIR OWPJ. INSTEAD, .THEY 31KPLY RKAD VER&ATIW THE. IS- -PREVIOJS PUBLIC

: HERE IS WHAT GV£R THRji^'fKA? OF PUBLIC AMD PRIVATE •. KESOTIfeTIOHS W!TH-KA'NOI v"iAS COWE DOWS TC: THE UNITED STATES, WITH THE FULL C&SCURREHCE OF OUR 5IOUTH VlfTWAMESE ALLIES, HAS OFFERED THE MAXIX'Ufi Or WHAT ANY PReSlDLNT OF THE UNITED STATES COULD OFFER. WE HAVE OFFERED A DE-ESCALATION OF THE FIGHTING. WE H£VE OFFERED A CEASE-FIRE WITH THE DEADLINE FOR WITHD3A*.»L j? ALL AMERICAN FORCES. WE HAVE OFFERED NEW ELECTIONS WHICH WOULD BE INTERNATIONALLY SUPERVISED'WITH THE COMMUNISTS PARTICIPATING BOTH U THE SUPERVISORY BODY' A9D IN THE ELECTIONS PRESIDENT THIEU HAS OFFERED TO RESIGN ONE MONTH BEFORE THE ELECTIONS. "WE HAVE OFFERED AN EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS CFtfAK IN A RATIO OF 10 NOHTH V1ET?*AMES£ PRISONERS FOR EVERY GH'L •AWiSRICAH; PRISONER. THAT THEY RELEASE. -AND NOttTK VIETNM* HAS MET EACH OF THESE OFFERS WITH INSOLENCE A^D INSULT, THEY HAVE FLATLY ABD ARROGANTLY REFUSED TO NEGOTIATE ANJ ESD TO THE WM ASD. BRING PEACE. THEIR ANSWER 7C EVERY PEACE OFFER WE HAVE KADE HAS BEEN TO ESCALATE THE WAR, IN THE TWO WEEKS ALONE SINCE I OFFERED TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS H&BOl HAS LAUNCHED THREE HEW MILITARY OFFENSIVES IN SOUTH VIETNAM. IN THOSE TWO WEEKS THE RISK THAT A COMMUNIST GOVEftNMEfe'T KAY BE IMPOSED ON THE 17 MILLION -PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM HAS INCREASED A SO' THE COKWUN1ST OFFENSIVE HAS 80tf REACHED THE POINT THAT IT GHAVELY THREATENS THE LIVES OF $0,600 AMERICAN TROOPS WHO ARE STILL IN VIETNAM. THERE 'ARE ONLY TWO ISSUES LEFT FOR US IN THIS WAR. FIRST, IK THE FACE OF A MASSIVE INVASION'DO WE STAND BY, JEOPARDIZE THE LIVES OF 60,020 AMERICANS, JfiD LEAVE THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE TO A LONG SIGHT OF TERROR? THigÎLL NOT HAPPEN. WE SHALL SO WHATEVER IS REQUIRED TO SAFEGUARD 'APO'ICASI LIVES APERICAN^HONOR. ,T:> SECOND,'.IN TH£ FACE OF COf^PLETE INTRANSIGENCE AT THE COKFfiftENCE TABLE .DO WE JOIN WITH CUR ENEMY TO INSTALL A CGHHUfJIST GOVERNMENT '1H SOUTH VIETNAM? THIS, TOO, WILL HOT HAPPEN. WE WILL SOT CROSS THE LIME FR03 GENEROSITY TO TREACHERY.":; ... '•,= ; ;v-:- - * •.•-'••.'•• NOW HAVE A CLEAR, HARD CHOICE AMONG THREE COURSES ~l 0? ACTION! IMMEDIATE VHTHDÂWAL OF ALL AW£RICA« FORCES, \ COyiI*sUE0 ATTEMPTS AT NEGOTIATION, OR DECISIVE MILITARY ACTION '- TO END THE WAR. I ~KHOtf THAT MANY AMERICANS FAVOR THE FIRST COURSE* V : ;; • OF ACTIQfi, IW1EDIATE WITHDRAWAL. THEY BELIEVE THAT THE WAY TO END THE WAR IS FOR THE UNITED STATES TO GET OUT AND TO . REilOVE THE THREAT TO OUR REMAINS FORCES BY SIMPLY WITHDRAWING r v -; THEM* .-.:;;;::.. . . . t ...-• ;_.. :.;•:••- . ,. ..-.: . FSO?! A POLITICAL STANDPOINT, THIS WOULD BE A VERY f EASY CHOICE FOR ME TO ACCEPT. AFTER ALL, I DID NOT SEND OVEH ' 0HE-HALF-A" HILLIOS AMERICANS TO VIETKAtf. I HAVE BROUGHT 506,633 K£& HOKE FROM VIETNAM SINCE I TOOK OFFICE, BUT, ABANDONING OUR CQfcfclTHENT IB'VIETNAM HEHE AND NOW WOULD MEAN TURNING 17 MILLION "SOUTH VIETNAMESE OVER TO COMMUNIST TYRANNY AND TERROR* IT ÔULD ' fEAH LEAVING:HUNDREDS OF AMERICAN PRISONERS IN COMRUNIST HAl'DS VJITH..SO.;.BAR6AINI-KQ LEVERAGE TO GET.THEM RELEASED. •Afl Af1£HICA$ DEFEAT IH VIETNAM WOULD ENCOURAGE THIS KlKD OF AGGRESSION ALL OVER THE WORLD, AGGRESSION IN WHICH SMALLER EAtlOHS ARMED BY THEIR MAJOR ALLIES, COULD BE TEMPTED TO ATTACK •NEIGHBORING NATIONS AT WILL IN IHE WID-EAST, IN EUROPE, AfJD OTHER AHEAS, TOLD PEACE WOULD BE 18 GRAVE JEOPARDY, THE'SECOND COURSE OF ACTION IS TO KEEP 08 TRYING TO NEGOTIATE A SETTLEMENT, NOW THIS ;s .THE OCUHSE WE HAVE PREFERRED . FROM THE BEGINNING AND W£ SHALL CONTINUE TO PURSUE IT. WE WAST TO NEGOTIATE, BUT WE HAVE MADE EVERY REASONABLE OFFER : AND TRIED EVERY POSSIBLE PATH FOR EKDIR& THIS WAS At THE .CONFERENCE TABLE, .."••...' • * . .. ,, .•••':••-••;". - •/- ; ,. • . • "' THE PROBLEM IS, AS YOU ALL KNOW, IT TAKES TWO TO SEQOT.IjATE A8D NQtf, AS TU.HQUGHOUT Ti?E PftSX FOUR YEA3S»...THE..80STrt - - ViETHASESr ARROQABTLf REFUSE.TO NEGOTIATE ANYTHING BUT AN ; - IKPOSZTIOS, :ANfe.ULTIBATTOr>THAI THE UNITED STATES IMPOSE A ' COP1MUNIST REGIME ON 17 RILLIOH PEOPLE IS SOUTH VIETNAtl WHO DO Wpt.WAST A COMHUMIST GOVERNMENT. . •.. X • ..'..••:••'.„-" . * /iT-'-iS-TLAlH THE8 THAT'WHAT APPEARS TO BE A CHOICE '"•''; AftOMG THREE COURSES OF ACTION FOR THE UNITED STATES IS REALLY : tlO.CHOICE AT ALL. THE KILLING IN THIS TRAGIC WAR MUST STOP. BY SIMPLY GETTING OUT, WE fe'GULD ONLY WORSEN' THE BLOODSHED, BY ^ RELQYIN6 SOLELY ON NEGOTIATION'S, WE WOULD GIVE AN* INTRABSIGEST THE TIME HE NEEDS TO PRESS HIS AGGRESSION ON THE BATTLEFIELD, THERE IS OfJLY ON£ WAY TO STOP THE KILLING. THAT IS *, TO KEEP THE fcEAPG^S OF WAR OUT OF THE HANDS OF THE INTERNATIONAL .OUTLAWS-OF RORTH VIETSAK« .; ; i THROUGH OUT THE WAR IN VIETNAM, THE UNITED STATES HAS EXERCISED A DEGREE OF RESTRAINT UNPRECEDENTED IN THE ANNALS OF WAR, THAT WAS OUR RESPONSIBILITY AS A GREAT RATION, A NATION fc/HICH IS INTERESTED — AND HE CAN BE PROUD OF THIS AS AMERICANS -- AS AMERICA HAS ALWAYS BEEN, IN PEACE KNT CORaUEST» HOVfEVES , WHEB THE EKtMY AEA9ifONS ALL RESTRAIN! , THROWS ITS WHOLE ARKY INTO BAITLE IH THE TERRITORY OF ITS' KEIGHEOR, REFUSES TO NEGOTIATE, WE SIMPLY FACE A MEW SITUATION.

IK THESE CIRCilMSTANCES, WITH 60f&08 AMERICANS THREATENED, ANY PRESIDENT WHO FAILED TO ACT DECISIVELY WOULD HAVE BETRAYED THE TRUST OF HIS COUNTRY AND BETRAYED THE CAUSE OF WOHLD PEACE, I THEREFORE CONCLUDED HANOI ttUST BE DENIED THE WEAPOSS AMD SUPPLIES IT SEEDS TO .CONTINUE IHE AGGRESSION, IN FULL C003PINATION WITH THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM I HAVE ORDERED THE FOLLOWSG MEASURES WHICH ARE BEI83 IMPLEMENTED A3 I AM SPEAKING TO YOU. ALL LHTRA^CtS 10 ^GRTH VIETÂÊSE PORTS WILL B£ KINSD TO P.*tVEHT ftCCrf-S 10 THESE PORTS AMD NORTH VIETNAMESE NAVAL OK3 Fk3"- THESE PORTS, UNITED STATES FORCES HAVE SEEN ii TO TAKE APPROPRIATE MF.ASl'RES WITHIN THE AÔ CLMNFD TL.-rtJTORIAL WATERS OF iÔRTH VIETNAM TO INTERDICT THE rt'LlVE.'Y OF ANY SUPPLIES* HAIL AMD ALL OTHE.R COMT*UhICATI08S WILL bE CUT OFF TO THE MAXlr-U-l tXTtHT POSSIBLE, AIR A^D N'PVAL sTSIXf^ ACÎNST MILITARY lA.-ifcETS l» NORTH VIETNAK WILL

• .X ±M.t«iMB.JMm. 4 -,.;••.•• .,..'•;..„ ;&.. ;C..-..-"ff ..'?•'' THESE ACTIONS ARE KOT DIRECTED AGAIK3T AKY OTHER K.IT I OH, COUNTRIES WITH SHIPS FRESESTLY IB NORTH VIETNAMESE FCRTS HAVE ALREADY BEEN NOTIFIED THAT THEIR SHIPS WILL HAVE THREE DAYLIGHT PERIODS TO LEAVE IN SAFETY. AFTER THAT TIKE, THE RISES WILL EECCf'tE ACTIVE AND ANY SHIPS ATTEMPTING TO LEAVE OR ENTER THESE PORTS WILL DO SO AT THEIR OWN RISK, THESE ACTION'S I' HAVE ORDERED I'iLL CEASE WHEN TM£ FOLLOWING CONDITIONS ARE METl FIRST, ALL flKERICAH PRISONERS OF WAR BUST BE RETURNED, SECOKD* THERE K'JST BE AM INTERNATIONALLY SUPERVISED' - CEASE-FIRS THROUGHOUT".IBDOCHIBA. 08CE PRIS08ERS OF WAR ASE'RELEASED, ONCE THE INTER- NATIONALLY SUPERVISED CEASE-FIR& HAS BE-GIJN, WE WILL STOP ALL- ACTS OF FORCE THROUGHOUT INDOCHINA, AND AT THAT TIME WE WILL PROCEED WITH A COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL AMERICAS FORCES PROS.VIETNAM WITHIN FOUR MONTHS. •BOW,''THESE TER8S ARE GENEROUS TERM'S. THEY*ARE : TERMS WHICH VJGULD HOT REQUIRE SURRENDER AND HUMILIATION ON THE PART OF ANYBODY, THEY WOULD PERMIT THE UNITED STATES TO-WITHDRAW WITH HONOR, THEY WOULD" EHD THE KILLING, THEY • WOULD'BRING OUR POWS HOME* THEY WOULD ALLOW NEGOTIATIONS m A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT 3ETWEEH THE VIETNAMESE-THEMSELVES. THEY WOULD PERMIT ALL THE NATIONS WHICH HAVE SUFFERED IS THIS*' •LOHG WAR — CARBODIA, LAOS, NORTH VIETNAM, SOUTH VIFTSA3 — TO TUB'N AT LAST TO THE URGENT ^CRKS OF HEALIHS AND OF PEACE. ' THEY' DESERVE, IMMEDIATE ACCEPTANCE BY,. KORTH VIETJ1AM. , % IT IS APPROPRIATE TO CONCLUDE «Y REMARKS TONIGHT WITH SOWE COiXÊNTS DIRECTED INDIVIDUALLY TO EACH OF THE MAJOR PARTIES INVOLVED IN THE CONTINUING TRAGEDY OF THE VIETNAM WAS. FIRST, TO THE LEADERS OF HAHOI, YOUR PEOPLE HAVE ALREADY SUF- FERED TOO MUCH IN YOUR PURSUIT OF CONQUEST. 00 NOT COMPOUND THEIR AGONY WITH CONTINUED ARROCAHCEf CHOOSE I8STEAD THE PATH OF A PEACE THAI REDEEMS YOUR SACRIFICES, GUARANTEES TRUE ISDE- PEKDEMCE FOR YOUR COUNTRY AND USHERS IH AH ERA OF RECONCILIA- TION. - . * • TO THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM, YOU SHALL COHTIHUE TO HAVE OUR FIRM SUPPORT IN YOUR RitSISTENCE AGA1HST AGGÊS- SIOH, IT IS YOUR SPIRIT THAT WILL DETERMINE THE OUTCOME OF THE BATTLE. IT is YOUR WILL THAT WILL SHAPE THE FUTURE OF YOUR COUNThY. TO OTHEft NATIONS, ESPECIALLY THOSE WHICn ARE ALLIED WITH KORTK VHTNAW, THE ACTIONS I HAVE AHHOUHCED TONIGHT ARE fÔT DIRECTED AGAINST YOU, THEIR SOLE PURPOSE IS TO PROTECT THE LIVES OF 60,300 AMERICANS WHO V,'OULD BE GRAVELY EtiDAHGERED IN THE EVENT THE C03MUWI5T OFFENSIVE COST I HUES TO ROLL FORWARD A8D TO PREVENT THE IF1POSITIOS OF A COMMUNIST 30VERH- 1EHT L-Y BRU-TAL AGGRESSION UPON 1? HILL!ON'. PEOPLE. I PARTICULAR/ DIRECT WY COi«if1E?vTS TONIGHT TO THE SOVIET UKICS. *t RESPECT THE 30VIEI UNION AS A 0REAT POÊR, VI 3i:cOG*!IZE: THE RIGHT OF THE SOVIET UtflOH TO DEFEND ITS IKTERLSTS WHcri THEY ARE THREATEKEQ. THE SOVIET UNION IN TURN «U»T ÊCOUMIZE OUR RIGHT 10 DEFE8D OUR INTERESTS, ,cD SOVIET SCLDIEHS ARE THREATENED U VIETNAM. SIXTY THOUSAND AKER1CAKS ARE THREATENED* WE EXPECT YOU TO HELP YOUR ALLIES, AKD YOU CABHOT EXPECT 'US TO DO OTHER THAN TO COHT1BUE TO HELP OUR ALLIES, BUT LET US, AKD LET ALL GREAT POWERS HELP OUR ALLIES ONLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF THEIr; DEFEHSE, KGT FOR THE PURPOSE CF LAUNCHIBK 1SVASIONS AGAINST THEIR •'NEIGHBORS. OTHERWISE THE CAUSE OF PEACE, THE CAUSE if* WHICH WE BOTH HAVE SO CHEAT A STAKE, WILL BE SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZED. '" , ^; OUR TWO BATIOSS HAVE MADE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS IK RECENT ROHTHS. WE ARE NEAR MAJOR AGREEKEHT 0?3 NUCLEAR ARKS L IK IT ATX OR, ON TRADE, OfJ A HOST OF OTHER ISSUES. .-.-• . -' v- • LET US KOT SLIDE BACK'TOWARD THE DARK SHADOWS OF A PREVIOUS AGE* WE DO HOT ASK YOU TO SACRIFICE YOUR PRINCIPLES, OH YOUR FRIEHDS, BUT NEITHER SHOULD YOU PERMIT HAKOI'S INTRANSIGENCE TO BLOT OUT THE PROSPECTS WE TOGETHER HAVE SO PATIENTLY PREPARED, tfE, THE UNITED STATES, A8D THE. *SOVIET UNION, ARE ON THE THHESHOLD OF A IvEW RELATIONSHIP THAT CAN SERVE KOT OfiLY THE INTERESTS OF OUR TUO COUNTRIES, BUT THE CAUSE v. OF WORLD PEACE. WE ARE PREPARED TO CONTINUE 10 BUILD THIS RELATIONSHIP. THE RESPONSIBILITY IS YOURS IF WE FAIL TO DO SO, *> ''. • , * AMD FINALLY, KAY I SAY TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, I ASK YOU FOR THE SAME STRONG SUPPORT YOU HAVE ALWAYS SIVEfc YOUR PRESIDENT IN DIFFICULT MOHEBTS. IT'IS YOU MOST OF ALL THAT THE WORLD. WILL BE'WATCHING. I KNOW-HOW RUCK YOU WANT TO END THIS WAR. I KKOW HOW MUCH YOU WANT TO BRING OUR KEN HOME AUD 1 T4INK YOU KNOW FR03 ALL THAT I HAVE SAID AND' DONE THESK FAST THREE AND ONE-HALF YiftriS KOW MUCH I, TOO, WABT TO END THE WAR TO BRING OUR MEN HOKE» YOU WAST PEACE.'I WANT PEACE. BUT, YOU ALSO WAKT HOHOB AND NOT DEFEAT. YOU WAST A GEMUIHE PEACE, KOT A PEACE THAI IS MERELY A PRELUDE TO ANOTHER WAR, AT THIS WOMIST, VE t«UST STAND TC3ETHSR I« PURPOSE ASD- RESOLVE, AS £0 OFTEH IS THE PAST, WE AMERICAHS DID SOT CHOOSE IP RLSORT TO WAR, IT HAS EIEN FORCED UPON US BY AH EWEKY THAT HAS SHOWN UTTER COHTEKPT TOWARD EVERY OVERTURE Wi: HAVE MADE FOR PEACE. A MO THAT IS WHY, MY FELLOW AMERICANS, TONIGHT I ASK FOR YOUR SUPPORT OF THIS DECISION, A DECISION WHICH HAS OKLY OSE PURPOSE, KOT TO EXPAND THE WAR, SOT TO ESCALATE THE WAS, BUT TO END THIS WAR AND TO'WIHD THE KINO OF PEACE THAT IMLL LAST. WITH GQj'S HLLP, rflTH YOUR SUPPORT, WE WILL ACCO?1PLI3H THAT GREAT FOAL. THANK YOU A?:*) GOOD NIGHT*'' '•. "" •.•'-." '•.'-"-"•'• .V- ".. '" ' :v-'?- UPl-133 . (INDOCHINA) WASHINGTON—AMID RUMORS OF A POSSIBLE NEW ALLIED COUNTER-OFFENSIVE, OR EVEN A BLOCKADE OF HAIPHONG HARBOR, PRESIDENT NIXON MET FOR THREE HOURS TODAY'WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL. THERE WAS NO IMMEDIATE WHITE HOUSE COMMENT ON THE EXTRAORDINARY SESSION, BUT THE PENTAGON SAID MEANTIME IT WOULD BE "DELIGHTED" IF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE TOOK TODAY'S AIR RAID NEAR HANOI AS AN "OBJECT LESSON" AND HALTED ITS INVASION .OF SOUTH VIETNAM. NIXON CONVENED THE SECURITY'COUNCIL, WITH SECRETARY OF STATE WILLIAM p.'ROGERS RECALLED FROM HIS EUROPEAN TRIP, AT 9 A. M. EDT. THE SESSION ENDED SHORTLY AFTER NOON. IT WAS AN UNUSUALLY LONG MEETING AND THERE WAS SPECULATION THAT THE PRESIDENT PROPOSED SOME NEW KIND OF MILITARY INITIATIVE TO HALT HIE MOST SERIOUS NORTH VIETNAM THREAT YET TO TAKE OVER SOUTHH-VIETNAM WITH A MASSIVE GROUND INVASION. AS FOR THE AIR STRIKE NEAR HANOI SUNDAY, PENTAGON SPOKESMAN JERRY W. FRIEDHEIM SAID "SEVERAL TENS" OF NAVY PLANES BOMBED A COMPLEX ABOUT 15 MILES WEST OF THE NORTH VIETNAM CAPITAL — A TRAINING AND SUPPLY STORAGE AREA, IT WAS THE FIRST RAID SO DEEP WITHIN THE NORTH "IF THE OTHER SIDE CHOSE TO TAKE IT AS AN OBJECT LESSON AND STOP THE INVASION," SAID"FRIEDHEIM, "WE'D BE DELIGHTED." THE AIR STRIKE IN THE HANOI AREA OCCURRED AS RUMORS CIRCULATED HERE THAT'NIXON MIGHT ORDER A NAVAL BLOCKADE OF HAIPHONG HARBOR, ENTRY POINT FOR VAST AMOUNTS OF SOVIET SUPPLIES $ SUPPLY U. S. AIR SUPPORT FOR A SOUTH VIETNAMESE INVASION ON THE NORTH TO RELIEVE PRESSURE IN THE SOUTH; CALL FOR AN ALLIED SEABORNE INVASION OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE TO INTERDICT THE NORTH-TO-SOUTH MOVEMENT OF COMMUNIST TROOPS AND SUPPLIES, ULRflLD L. WARREN, DEPUTY WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY, DECLINED TO DISCUSS THE MILITARY OPERATIONS. • BUT WHEN ASKED ABOUT HANOI'S CLAIM THAT U. S. PLANES BOMBED THE RED RIVER DIKES, WARREN SAID .IT WAS STILL AGAINST U. S. POLICY TO BOMB THE DIKES BECAUSE OF THE CIVILIAN CASUALTIES SUCH BOMBARDMENT WOULD CAUSE, NIXON HAS RULED OUT USE OF NUCLEAR POWER AND REINTRODUCTION OF U.'S. GROUND TROOPS, BUT THE PENTAGON INDICATED LAST WEEK THAT A NUMBER OF MARINES MIGHT BE SENT BACK TO THE WAR ZONE "TO PROTECT AMERICAN FORCES" THAT ARE BEING WITHDRAWN UNDER THE PRESIDENT'S VIETNAMIZATION ELAN. WARREN ALSO'SAID PLANS WERE PROCEEDING FOR NIXON TO ARRIVE IN MOSCOW FOR SUMMIT TALKS WITH SOVIET LEADERS ON MAY 22. NIXON CALLED THE UNSCHEDULED SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING SUNDAY, SUMMONING ROGERS FROM WEST GERMANY WHERE HE WAS IN THE MIDST OF A NINE-DAY EUROPEAN TOURi ALSO ATTENDING THE MORNING MEETING WERE VICE PRESIDENT SPlRO T, AGNEWJ HENRY A. KISSINGER, NIXON'S ADVISER FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRSj DEFENSE SECRETARY .MELVIN R. LAIRDJ'TREASURY SECRETARY JOHN CONNALLYJ ADM. THOMAS MOORER, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAAFFJ RICHARD HELMS, DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; AND GEORGE LINCOLN, DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE FOR EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS. ' WHILE THE MEETING WAS UNDERWAY, SENATE DEMOCRATS VOTED UNANIMOUSLY TO SEEK AN IMMEDIATE LEADERSHIP MEETING WITH NIXON TO DETERMINE WHAT HIS FUTURE WAR PLANS ARE BEFORE THE SENATE PROCEEDS TO VOTE ON MORE ANTIWAR LEGISLATION. SENATE DEMOCRATIC LEADER MIKE MANSFIELD, JUST RETURNED WITH SENATE GOP LEADER HUGH "SCOTT FROM A VISIT TO MAINLAND CHINA, SAID THE DEMOCRATS WANT NIXON TO MEET WITH THE CHAIRMEN AND RANKING MEMBERS OF THE ARMED SERVICES AND FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEES. ' ALSO ON CAPITOL HILL, ROBERT H. NOOTER, DEPUTY COORDINATOR'FOR SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE OF THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, TOLD"A SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE THAT SINCE APRIL 1, 700,000 SOUTH VIETNAMESE CIVILIIANS HAVE FLED BEFORE THE COMMUNIST INVADERS. SEN. HIRAM.FONG, R-HAUAII, BLAMED THE"PLIGHT OF THE'REFUGEES ON THE COMMUNIST INVADERS, BUT SEN. EDWARD M. KENNEDY, D-MASS., SAID THE BLAME RESTS ON WHAT HE CALLED THE FAILURE OF NIXON'S VIETNAMIZATION POLICY AND THE INABILITY OF THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT "TO REALLY SERVE THE PEOPLE AND SUSTAIN PEACE." _5-S~ PA329PED

UPI-134 (NIXON) WASHINGTON—PRESIDENT NIXON WILL GO ON NATIONAL RADIO AND TELEVISIO, UPI-134 o (NIXON) WASHINGTON—PRESIDENT NIXON WILL GO ON NATIONAL RADIO.AND TELEVISIO.N AT 9:00 P. M.'TONIGHT TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM, THE WHITE Ma mK!l ^----~~-~~ *** *>*i»xlia^ HOUSE ANNOUNCED. 5-8—PA330PED

UPI-135 . • ' •- ADD 1 NIXON, WASHINGTON (UPI-134) PRESS SECRETARY RONALD'L.'ZIEGLER, WHO ANNOUNCED THE SPEECH, REFUSED TO DISCUSS ITS CONTENTS OR TO SAY IF IT RELATED DIRECTLY TO A THREE-HOUR MEETING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL EARLIER IN THE DAY. *. '• . "I'M NOT PREPARED TO TALK TO YOU ABOUT WHAT WAS TALKED ABOUT IN THE_NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING," SAID ZIEGLER WHO ATTENDED THE SESSION. "HE OBVIOUSLY FEELS THAT'HE HAS SOMETHING IMPORTANT TO SAY," ZIEGLER SAID OF THE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS. BUT HE SAID AS TO THE CONTENT, "I"CAN'T PROVIDE ANY.INFORMATION ALONG THAT LINE." 5-S—PA332PED .

UPI-136 - DOW JONES 3:00 P. M. STOCK AVERAGES: 30 INDUS' 936.94 OFF 4.29 20 TRANSP 253.31 OFF 0.99 15 UTILS 109.50 OFF 0.29 65 STOCKS 31S.91 OFF 1.31 VOLUME 9,900,000. , ! 5-8—P A3 3 SPED

UPI-137 >',--'.' - . ADD 2 NIXON, WASHINGTON ASKED IF NIXON HAD CLEARED THE SUBSTANCE OF THE SPEECH WITH SOUTH VIETNAMESEE PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU, ZIEGLER SAID, "ANYTHING THAT WOULD BE SAID IN RELATION TO THE SITUATION IN SOUTHEAST,ASIA, THERE WOULD BE CONSULTATION WITH PRESIDENT THIEU ABOUT IT." IT WAS NIXON'S SECOND NATIONALLY TELEVISED SPEECH ON VIETNAM IN 12 DAYS. IN ADDITION, THE PRESIDENT DISCUSSED THE INDOCHINA FIGHTING AT LENGTH IN A QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION A WEEK AGO AT THE RANCH HOME OF TREASURY SECRETARY CONNALLY. ZIEGLER DECLINED TO SAY WHETHER THE PRESIDENT WOULD DISCUSS HIS SCHEDULED TRIP TO MOSCOW. ASKED IF THE SUMMIT MEETING, SCHEDULED TO BEGIN"MAY 22 3 WOULD 3E CANCELLED, ZIEGLER REPLIED, "WE ARE PROCEEDING WITH OUR PLANNING." ,,5-S—PA335PED

UPI-13S

.. •. . i -.....;>• •'. ::v_"c-.^ L.. 25 April 1972

Dear Mr. Ambassador, Upon ay return I found your letter of 21 April 1972 by which you kindly forwarded the statement of Secretary of State Rogers in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, regarding the situation in Indo-Chlna. I wish to thank you for Mr. Rogers' interesting declaration which I read with due attention. With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

Kurt Naldheim

His Excellency Mr, George Bush Ambassador &xrtrsDedinary and Plenipotentiary Peraanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Kations United States Mission to the United Nations 799 United Rations Plaza New York, H.Y. 10017 THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS

GEORGE BUSH AMBASSADOR April 21, 1972

Dear Kurt: 1 This is for your information only. Please do not feel a reply is necessary. THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS

April 21, 1972

His Excellency Mr. Kurt Waldheim, Secretary General of the United Nations, United Nations, New York Dear Mr. Secretary General: In your absence from UN Headquarters on official duties, I know that you have been following news reports of the situation in Indochina which has resulted from the North Vietnamese invasion of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. On April 17, the Secretary of State in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee provided the United States Government's evaluation of the situation and explained the actions we have taken in response. Since you might not have seen full reports of this authoritative statement, I am enclosing for your back- ground information excerpts of the Secretary's testimony, I hope that you had a successful trip and I look forward to seeing you in the near future. Respectfully yours,

Geon

Enclosure UN 3418/171 EXCERPTS FROM SECRETARY OF STATE ROGERS ' TESTIMONY ON VIETAM t5u.l!; i J'-s iOlGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE ON APRIL 17,

THE CHAIRMAN (SENATOR J.¥. FULBRIGHT) : What is the purpose you seek to achieve by intensified bombing of North Vietnam? SECRETARY ROGERS: We have three purposes in mind, Mr. Chairman, First, we are doing it to protect American troops that are in South Vietnam, protect the lives of those troops while the President's withdrawal program continues. We are doing it to make certain that the withdrawal program that the president has announced can continue, and we are doing it to give the South Vietnamese a chance to defend themselves against the massive invasions by the North Vietnamese. As you know, Mr, Chairman, for a long time the North Vietnamese have been able to peddle, to sell a cruel hoax, to a segment of the American people that somehow the war in Vietnam was a civil uprising. Now, it is quite clear, and I don't believe anyone can deny it, that this is a major invasion of and offensive action by the North Vietnamese into South Vietnam. It comes at a time when its purpose to disrupt the withdrawal program to endanger American lives, the lives of Americans who are still in South Vietnam, and the enemy has committed outside of North Vietnam twelve of its thirteen combat divisions. So we think it is essential to conduct the attacks that the President has ordered to conduct against military targets wherever he decided to make these attacks to protect the American lives, to permit the withdrawals to continue and to give South Vietnamese forces a chance to defend themselves., he has taken this action and he intends to continue to take whatever action is necessary to achieve those purposes. THE CHAIRMAN: What I am trying to understand, what is the interest of the United States, in view of all that we have suffered from with this war, and the conditions that we now contend with, what is the United States interest...! have a great interest, all of my constituents do, in the moves to normalize relations with China and Russia but I can't see what interest of the United States is served by this continuation of this war. I don't see from what you have said, except the lives of our soldiers, I don't think that is a serious one. I don't believe that that is any longer of significance, that as a significant threat. It is significant that we save them, of course, Just as it is the prisoners. But we were in negotiations and according to the press we broke off negotiations... SECRETARY ROGERS: You comment you don't understand why we have taken this action in view of the recent decisions that the President made vis-a-vis People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union. -2-

As you see, the President's decision was right. We had a very successful visit with the People's Republic of China. We are continuing to plan for the visit to the Soviet Union and I think the President's judgment has been sound. Now I think the decisions that we have made recently to bomb military targets in North Vietnam make it clear to the other side that the United States is going to take whatever military action is necessary to achieve the purposes I mentioned... You have a major military offensive invasion of South Vietnam and we have indicated all of these. Nevertheless, we are going to continue to support the people of South Vietnam and their right to determine their own future and we have no intentions at this time of permitting the Communists to take over South Vietnam by force. We are going to do it with South Vietnamese troops, we are going to do it with the use of American air power, we are not going to reintroduce any American ground combat troops in South Vietnam, but we are going to see this major offensive- attack on South Vietnam does not succeed. THE CHAIRMAN: What do you think would happen if the United States had removed its forces, as we have been in the process of, and let the Vietnamese settle these matters themselves? SECRETARY ROGERS: Well, I think as you said yourself, Mr. Chairman, that any immediate withdrawal of American forces would be ridiculous. It probably would result in a blood bath. Secondly, I think it would destabilize the whole area. There are other nations in the area that we have treaty commitments with that have been negotiated and ratified over a period of a great number of years, and it is not a partisan matter in any sense of the word. These treaties have received bipartisan support. SENATOR CHURCH: Why do you think that the resumption of full scale bombing in the North will succeed now when it failed before? SECRETARY ROGERS: Senator, before we had a lot of American ground troops in South Vietnam. The myth persisted at that time that this was a civil war and any attack on the North somehow was unfair. Now, that is wrong, we think. The North is being used to supply the troops in South Vietnam and as long as they are being used for that purpose we think that we will have the right to, certainly, and will continue to attack them to prevent their invasion of South Vietnam from succeeding.., -3- We do not have 535,000 Americans in South Vietnam. Secondly, we have trained and equipped the South Vietnamese to defend their own country. So that a lot of them are well trained and equipped. The enemy has never committed all of its forces outside of its country before. Before we were fighting a sort of guerrilla war and there wexe infiltrations and sapper attacks and so forth. Now it is a totally different concept militarily. There is a major invasion and they have committed all of their divisions except one outside of North Vietnam... Every time I have testified here I have said as we withdraw our troops from South Vietnam we are going to continue to use air power, we are going to continue to use the air power necessary to prevent a takeover by the Communists in South Vietnam. I believe that can be done. We are not going to make any announcements about what we are not going to do. We think that there has been altogether too much of that in this war. The only two announcements I will make about what we are not going to do are these. We are not going to reintroduce American ground combat troops in South Vietnam and we are not going to use nuclear weapons in South Vietnam or North Vietnam. But short of that we are not going to make any announcements of what we are going to do or not going to do. SENATOR SPONG: Could you tell me what your diplomatic objectives are? SECRETARY ROGERS: Principally they are these: That if it is clear that the United States is not going to abandon its ally under these conditions and if it's going to take whatever military steps are necessary and reasonable to see that the invasion is not successful, then not only North Vietnam but possibly those allied with North Vietnam will come to the conclusion it is not worth attempting to continue this indefinitely. So we have reason to think that if these offensives are unsuccessful that the prospects diplomatically are improved,.. I think any attempt now, while this invasion is occurring to force the President's hand would be very unwise, and my comment about the invasion was because it seems to me in all of these discussions we have to point out what the President is faced with. He is faced now with a massive invasion by the enemy at a time when we are withdrawing. He said that if that happened he would take action. He has taken that action. It doesn't change our policy. Our policy still is to Vietnamize the war, to get out, and we are going to do that, but we are certainly not going to do it as a surrender, we are not going to do it to abandon our allies. We are going to continue to support South Vietnam, and we think, I think, the American people will support the President.