Sheldon H. Harris. Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932-1945, and the American Cover-up. New York and London: Routledge, 2002. x + 385 pp. $24.95, paper, ISBN 978-0-415-93214-1.

Reviewed by Linda Goetz Holmes

Published on H-US- (March, 2003)

Legacy of Denial: The Pacifc War Shame lished since Harris's work frst appeared. In By the time Sheldon H. Harris, Professor Japan, a comparable bombshell of a book was Sei‐ Emeritus at California State University, ichi Morimura's three-volume novel, The Devil's Northridge, published the frst edition of this Gluttony, published in 1983-85 by Kadokawa landmark work in 1994, the focus of his research Shoten. Seiichi shocked his countrymen by de‐ had already been the subject of special reports on scribing Japan's biological experiments on hu‐ CBS's 60 Minutes (1982); a British Independent mans. Television documentary (1985); an excerpt of the But what sets Harris's work apart is the depth British broadcast on ABC's 20/20 (1985); Congres‐ and painstaking thoroughness of his research, as sional hearings (1982 and 1986), the latter well as the impressive amount of material which prompted by the British broadcast; and numerous he was the frst to uncover. A glance at Harris's newspaper articles dating as far back as 1946 (Pa‐ extensive bibliography listing archival deposito‐ cifc Stars and Stripes) and 1950 (Kyodo News Ser‐ ries, private collections, diaries, personal inter‐ vice) in such key cities as New York, Washington, views, journals, periodicals, Con‐ Los Angeles, San Francisco, Miami, Chicago, Lon‐ gressional reports, television documentaries, don, and Tokyo--to name just a few. books, and pamphlets allows the reader to see at Probably the most prominent English-lan‐ once why Professor Harris spent nearly ten years guage book on this subject prior to the publication preparing the frst edition of this work, and near‐ of Harris's text was Unit 731: The Japanese ly all of his subsequent waking hours adding to it Army¹s Secret of Secrets, published in London by in order to produce this revised 2002 edition. If Hodder and Stoughton in 1989, and written by Pe‐ anyone can be said to have become obsessed in ter Williams and David Wallace, co-producers of his determination to get at the full truth of what the 1985 British broadcast; numerous books, TV went on in Unit 731 and the other "factories of documentaries, and news articles have been pub‐ H-Net Reviews death" operated by the Imperial Japanese Army, formed by the late Professor Ding Zemin of North‐ that person would surely be Sheldon Harris. east Normal University in Changchun, China that And a glance at his acknowledgments, thank‐ during the Japanese occupation, a suburb of the ing individuals all over the globe for their assis‐ city, Mokotan, had been the site of a "death facto‐ tance to him, gives the reader an inkling of why ry": biological experimentation by Japanese mili‐ Professor Harris was so deeply mourned when he tary medical personnel. Harris was astounded. He died in Los Angeles, Calif. on August 31, 2002. The was then invited to travel to Manchuria to see the loss of this scholar who had become an icon to the ruins of Japan's other major biological experimen‐ Chinese community, both in mainland China and tation site, at Ping Fan, near Harbin. The visit lit‐ the United States, as well as a respected resource erally changed Harris's life. Learning, writing, person much in demand at symposia in Japan, the and talking about what really went on at Ping Fan United States, and the global academic communi‐ and elsewhere became his mission for the rest of ty, has indeed been keenly felt. It is a testament to his days. his research that Japan's wartime biological and In compiling Factories of Death, Harris di‐ chemical warfare, and the experiments of Unit vides his material into two parts. Part 1 describes 731 in particular, have continued to be the focus how Japan's factories of death came into being, of so much media, academic, and United States and provides extensive details about their opera‐ government attention. tions; part 2 details what Harris terms the Ameri‐ Those who had worked with Professor Harris can government's eforts to cover up the extent of in China, Japan, and the United States were grati‐ Japan's biological warfare, and our United States fed that he lived long enough to see his research military and governmental knowledge of and sub‐ vindicated by a court in Japan. Four days before sequent possession of some (but not all) of Japan¹s he died, a Tokyo District Court made a decision BW research. which admitted, for the frst time in that country's The author begins with a summary of the his‐ judiciary, that Japan had used germ warfare in oc‐ tory of Manchuria, and goes on to chronicle how cupied China in the 1930s and 1940s. The ruling Ishii Shiro travelled the world in pre-war days (in‐ was bittersweet for the plaintifs, Chinese victims cluding visits to facilities in the United States), seeking compensation from Japan. The court gathering data and making contacts for his inter‐ ruled that postwar treaties prevented such com‐ est in biological research; how he rose to promi‐ pensation. But Professor Harris's points had at nence in the Army Medical College; and how he last been acknowledged in a Japanese court of used his infuential contacts to obtain extraordi‐ law. nary funding for his research, fnally seizing the Sheldon Harris frst became aware almost by opportunity to be posted to Manchuria where he accident of the plagues visited by Imperial Japa‐ could work relatively unfettered. Harris describes nese Army units on the Chinese countryside, caus‐ the building and operation of facilities supervised ing the death of over 250,000 Chinese; and the by Ishii at Ping Fan, Changchun, and Nanking. It is even more horrible death of, by his estimates, an regrettable that Harris's new edition of Factories additional 10,000 to 12,000 prisoners subjected to of Death went to press before his colleague (and medical experiments at Unit 731 main headquar‐ the man he credits with being his mentor for this ters at Ping Fan, near Harbin, Manchuria, during edition), Kondo Shoji published his remarkable Japan's wartime occupation of the region. By his 2001 volume, Evidence of Unit 731 Crimes: Kwan‐ own account, it was during an academic exchange tung Army Documents of the "Specially Deliv‐ trip to China in 1985 that Professor Harris was in‐ ered", published in Harbin by Heilongjiang

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People¹s Publishers in 2001. After many years of whose survivors provide the strongest allegations requests, Kondo was able to obtain records and about Japanese medical experimentation on Al‐ photographs of the Kwantung [Japanese] Army, lied prisoners. He describes the arrival of the frst now in Chinese police fles, showing Chinese pris‐ group of (1,202) American POWs at Mukden in No‐ oners whose punishment was to be sent to Harbin vember 1942, most already sick and weakened to be experimented upon. ("Specially Delivered" from surviving the Bataan Death March, condi‐ was the court term used to approve sending a tions at their Philippine camps, and a horrendous prisoner to Unit 731 to be used for medical experi‐ sea voyage in unspeakable conditions aboard a Ja‐ mentation.) This, in efect was their prison sen‐ panese merchant ship. Harris quotes (pp. 165-169) tence--and their death warrant.[1] Harris was excerpts from the diaries of the POW camp com‐ aware of these new fndings, by his own account mander, British Major Robert Peaty, and Ameri‐ in his preface (p. xvi), but one suspects he would can POW Sigmund Schreiner to detail conditions have loved to reproduce the evidence in some of in the camp, the high death rate among Ameri‐ the photos and records made available to Kondo. cans there, and the periodic visits by Japanese Harris devotes a chapter to what is probably medical teams. Mukden was about 350 miles the most contentious unresolved issue of the Pa‐ away from Unit 731 headquarters at Harbin, but cifc war: whether Japanese medical personnel the prisoners had no way of knowing about Gen‐ experimented on Allied, and particularly on eral Ishii¹s operation, so they had no idea where American, prisoners of war. He cites (pp. 152 f) the visiting Japanese doctors came from, or what the 1985 British TV documentary[2] which led to the purpose of their visits was. inquiries both in the British parliament and the In beginning his discussion of the Mukden United States Congress, and traces the issue of ex‐ camp, Harris states: "The paucity of available periments on POWs back to 1946, when articles records makes it impossible for the modern re‐ frst appeared quoting sources on the subject, and searcher to ofer a defnitive answer" as to American military action culminating in the deci‐ whether medical experiments on POWs took place sion to grant Lt. Gen. Ishii immunity from war there (p. 163). "However," Harris notes, "some of crimes prosecution in exchange for his BW data, the survivors do have memories of their experi‐ and more important, the decision to believe Gen. ences which can be substantiated with documen‐ Ishii¹s repeated statements that he did not experi‐ tary evidence, and their comments, therefore, can ment on American POWs, despite data which sur‐ be given a degree of credence." Despite this decla‐ faced in FBI memoranda, military records, and ration, Harris concludes that the evidence avail‐ various publications. Next, Harris spotlights (pp. able [to him at the time] "suggests strongly" (p. 156-162) the Congressional hearings of 1982 and 170) that American POWs in Mukden were not 1986, at which ex-POWs from the Mukden, subjected to BW experiments by the Japanese. Manchuria POW camp testifed. U.S. Army Chief Unfortunately, Harris bases his conclusion on Archivist John H. Hatcher in his remarks at the several misconceptions. First, he states that "Red 1986 hearing stated that the United States govern‐ Cross representatives visited the camp routinely ment had returned fles, including Unit 731 data, and enjoyed free access to the inmates" (p. 171). to Japan. This was not true, but it continues to be Nothing could be further from the truth. Appar‐ widely believed. Hatcher was not well informed ently Harris confused the notations about period‐ about the contents of fles returned to Japan.[3] ic arrivals of Red Cross parcels (slightly more fre‐ Finally in this chapter, Harris turns his atten‐ quently mentioned at Mukden than at other POW tion to the POW camp at Mukden, Manchuria, camp locations this writer has researched) with

3 H-Net Reviews actual visits by Red Cross personnel. "There is no troops, invading Manchuria on August 8, 1945, record of Red Cross complaints," he writes.[4] In immediately captured all the Japanese personnel fact, Major Peaty asked on August 27, 1943, for at the Harbin site. And most signifcantly, it was permission to contact the International Commit‐ precisely to avoid such a massacre that a six-man tee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in . Permission team, led by American Ofce of Strategic Services was denied, according to an entry in Peaty's diary. personnel, parachuted into the Mukden POW Finally, on November 13, 1943, a Red Cross ofcial camp on August 16, 1945, one day after Emperor was allowed to make a frst visit to the camp, but Hirohito's radio address announcing acceptance only Major Peaty and the senior American ofcer, of Allied surrender terms. Sure enough, the Japa‐ Major Stanley H. Hankins, were allowed to speak nese commandant had not yet heard of the sur‐ to him. Major Peaty noted that the question and render, so he had not implemented the long- answer session was "very limited." The second standing instructions to Japanese camp comman‐ visit by a Red Cross ofcial was not until Decem‐ dants to dispose of all POWs prior to surrendering ber 6, 1944, more than a year later. Again, only their position.[6] The next day, liberating Russian Majors Peaty and Hankins were allowed to see the troops arrived at Mukden. ICRC ofcial, and both were guarded in their re‐ In his fnal footnote to this chapter, Harris marks for fear of "reprisals," as Major Peaty put it, cites the bill sponsored by Senator Dianne Fein‐ but they did manage to request dental and optical stein in 2000, which became incorporated into the care, as well as food and boots. The third and fnal Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act of 1998, and ex‐ visit by a Red Cross ofcial occurred just as the pressed hope that it would prompt fuller disclo‐ war was about to end, on August 5, 1945. Dr. Mar‐ sure of material relating to Japanese war crimes. cel Junod was on his way to Tokyo as the new The ofcial name of the Act thus became the Nazi ICRC representative to Japan, and his account of War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government that visit is chilling.[5] Apparently Harris was not Records Disclosure Act. In 1999, President Clinton familiar with Dr. Junod's account of the visit. Dr. ordered that under the aegis of The National Ar‐ Junod was appalled at the intimidation of the chives, a government Interagency Working Group POWs, and was especially disturbed that none of (IWG) be created to implement the Act. (This writ‐ the POW doctors were allowed to talk to him er is a member of the IWG Historical Advisory when he insisted on visiting the hospital. Dr. Jun‐ Panel.) Although in his preface Harris complains od also mentioned seeing stacks of undistributed that government agencies have not been forth‐ Red Cross parcels in the corner of a hut, and ask‐ coming enough in responding to the Act, it should ing why they had not been given out to the prison‐ be noted that when the revised edition of Facto‐ ers. He was informed by the commandant that the ries of Death went to press, the IWG had only just were being "saved for later ... at Christmas." And begun to search for documents relating to Japa‐ Major Peaty noted in his diary, "No one was al‐ nese war crimes, having concerned itself exclu‐ lowed any contact with [Dr. Junod]," and that all sively with Nazi war crimes during the frst year prisoners were sent to the factory some distance and a half of its work. At this writing (March away, "[p]resumably to keep them away from the 2003), the IWG has made some progress in locat‐ Red Cross visitor." ing documents pertaining to Japan, and most gov‐ Harris also believed that Gen. Ishii's asso‐ ernment agencies are responding to the IWG ciates at Ping Fan, after destroying that facility, search criteria. Much remains to be done, but the would surely have killed any Mukden POWs who Feinstein bill has extended the time frame for were the subjects of their experiments. But this IWG to complete its work. So like any good re‐ assumption overlooks the fact that Russian searcher, Harris leaves open the possibility that

4 H-Net Reviews information may come to light in the future which nist party in Japan was undoubtedly a key ele‐ will provide a more defnitive answer to the ques‐ ment in the U.S. decisions to discount such infor‐ tion of experimentation on American POWs by mation as Soviet propaganda, although belief in the Japanese in World War II. its veracity has lingered to this day, as Harris Following his own examination of the Allied notes so well in these chapters. And American POW experimentation issue, Harris, in a chapter prosecutors were indeed on the horns of a dilem‐ titled "Who Knew?" (ch. 10) discusses eforts by ma: how to discuss such information in open Allied military and intelligence personnel to dis‐ court without sharing biological data with a pow‐ cover who in the Japanese hierarchy knew about er now poised to use such warfare against Ameri‐ Gen. Ishii's program, and whether the experi‐ cans? The interests of "national security" seemed ments involved Allied POWs. This chapter makes much more logical in 1947 than they may seem to‐ fascinating reading, especially the follow-up inter‐ day. Harris seems more disturbed about the cov‐ views with American scientifc experts who were er-up of data than about the decision not to hold fown to Tokyo to participate in the interroga‐ General Ishii accountable in a court of law, and tions, and years later said they believed they had most scholars would probably agree with him. been misled by the Japanese involved in Unit 731, It is certainly one of the ironies of history that including Gen. Ishii himself. Josef Mengele, General Ishii's counterpart in Nazi In part 2 of his text (chs. 11-16) Harris discuss‐ Germany, was indicted and sought for trial at es in sequence the American biological warfare Nuremberg, but slipped through the Allied net be‐ program; the wartime discovery by Allied intelli‐ cause of a series of bureaucratic bungles, while gence of information about Japan's BW and CW General Ishii came into custody and was allowed programs; postwar investigations, including the to escape prosecution for essentially the same decision to allow Gen. Ishii and his associates im‐ crimes. munity from prosecution; and in separate fnal In his new concluding chapter, Harris up‐ chapters, evidence provided by Harris's own re‐ dates the powerful new evidence disclosed by search and that of others documenting cover-ups both Chinese and Japanese sources about the lin‐ by both scientifc and the military personnel. Al‐ gering efects of chemical and biological warfare though new data since the 1994 publication is in the Chinese countryside, and the deadly legacy scattered throughout this edition, much of it is in of Unit 731 which is still being tallied. Most strik‐ part 2. The reader will fnd that Harris's footnotes ing is the new information being made available deserve careful scrutiny; sometimes they contain from Japanese sources, and Harris's continuing the most intriguing tidbits of all. screed on Japanese and American medical ethics It is easy to fault United States military and which, in his view, have allowed so much infor‐ government decisions to grant immunity from mation to remain out of reach for researchers, prosecution to Gen. Ishii and his associates, but and have allowed collaborative biological re‐ the context of the immediate postwar period search to continue. needs to be understood in making such judg‐ At this writing, much attention is being fo‐ ments. The threat posed by the to cused on the potential threat for biological war‐ American security was considered to be very real fare to be waged by Iraq. Shipments of anthrax in the immediate aftermath of World War II, and strains to Iraq during the 1980s have been widely the nomer "Cold War" is apt. The fact that infor‐ noted in recent months. One can only hope that mation about experiments on American prisoners American policy makers can learn from our histo‐ of war came from Soviet sources and the Commu‐ ry, and are not condemned to repeat it.

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Finally, one can hope that Professor Harris Corps, SCAP, Far Eastern Command, Judge Advo‐ would be pleased to note that Greg Bradsher at cate General).... It is also possible that some of the The National Archives has recently (May 2002) records may have been destroyed.... My best guess compiled a 300-page "Finding Aid to Records at is that the Unit 731 records are still in the legal the National Archives at College Park, Maryland custody of one or more government agencies.... It Relating to Japanese War Crimes, War Criminals is possible that some records are simply buried in and War Crimes Trials; Post World War II Restitu‐ some agency storage area." See also Dr. tion and Reparations; and to the Exploitation of Bradsher¹s October 21, 2002 report: "The History Japanese Records During and After World War II." of the Capture, Exploitation and Return of the Many of these fles are, in Dr. Bradsher¹s words, Captured Japanese Records, 1942-1962," posted on "under researched"; moreover, he is adding to the National Archives website. them each month. This writer, who frst met Pro‐ [4]. Factories of Death, p. 171. fessor Harris in 1996 at a Tokyo War Crimes sym‐ [5]. Marcel Junod, Warrior without Weapons, posium at the Admiral Nimitz National Museum ICRC pub. 1982, pp. 262-264. of the Pacifc War, intends to exploit those fnding aids as fully as possible. Sheldon Harris's legacy is [6]. See chapter 12 in my book, Unjust Enrich‐ to demand no less of future research, with the ment (2001, Stackpole Books) for a full discussion goal of fnding answers to the questions he has and display of the extant copy of this instruction raised so compellingly with his work and writing. document, issued by the Japanese Vice Minister of War, August 1, 1944. Notes [1]. Mr. Kondo has done considerable re‐ search and produced Unit 731 documentaries for Japanese TV. He testifed as an expert witness at the Tokyo trial which concluded in August 2002. He has travelled the world gathering data on Unit 731 from various archives, and provided much new information to this writer about experiments on American POWs. [2]. "Unit 731: Did the Emperor Know?" British Independent Television, August 13, 1985. [3]. E-mail reply dated July 30, 2002, from se‐ nior archivist Greg Bradsher, Ph.D., the National Archives, to Ivy Lee, President of the Global Al‐ liance for Preserving the Truth of the Sino-Japa‐ nese War, stating that "None of the records we re‐ turned [to Japan] were the records of Unit 731. I do not believe these records came into our cus‐ tody as part of the "captured Japanese records" collection we received in 1948 and returned in 1958.... Any Unit 731 records that came into U.S. government custody were not returned to Japan, but were incorporated into the fles of one or more agencies (e.g. Surgeon General, Chemical

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Citation: Linda Goetz Holmes. Review of Harris, Sheldon H. Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932-1945, and the American Cover-up. H-US-Japan, H-Net Reviews. March, 2003.

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