Moral Grandstanding 1 Moral Grandstanding and Political Polarization: A Multi-Study Consideration Joshua B. Grubbs1, Brandon Warmke2, Justin Tosi3, A. Shanti James1

The present work posits that social motives, particularly status seeking in the form of moral grandstanding, are likely at least partially to blame for elevated levels of affective polarization and ideological extremism in the U.S. In Study 1, results from both undergraduates (N=981; Mean age =19.4; SD=2.1; 69.7% women) and a cross-section of U.S. adults matched to 2010 census norms (N=1,063; Mean age =48.20, SD=16.38; 49.8% women) indicated that prestige-motived grandstanding was consistently and robustly related to more extreme ideological views on a variety of issues. In Study 2, results from a weighted, nationally-representative cross- section of U.S. adults (N=2,519; Mean age =47.5, SD=17.8; 51.4% women) found that prestige motivated grandstanding was reliably related to both ideological extremism and affective polarization.

The American populace is sharply divided issues. Study of these divides has led to several over political and moral issues (Dimock et al., recent empirical articles (for reviews, see: Iyengar 2014). Online outrage about political phenomena is et al., 2019; Lelkes, 2016), books (e.g., McCarty, common (Brady & Crockett, 2019; Crockett, 2017), 2019), and even documentaries (e.g., “Divided and there is considerable evidence that public States of America,” 2017) on the rifts between discourse has become more ideologically polarized political partisans in the U.S. Although there is and less civil over the past several years (Doherty broad consensus that some of these divides in the et al., 2019). Several possible explanations of both American populace are worsening (for a review, increasingly polarized beliefs and a decline in see: Iyengar et al., 2019), the nature of political and civility have been posited, including economic partisan polarization is a controversial topic in trends, the behavior of political or party elites, political science (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008; media consumption, technological influences, and Druckman & Levendusky, 2019; Fiorina & Abrams, partisan sorting (Brady et al., 2019; McCarty, 2019). 2008) and political psychology (Blatz & Mercier, However, there is also growing evidence that 2018; Westfall et al., 2015). Some research has individual differences may contribute to these focused on divisions in the populace in terms of trends. The present work examines one such partisan identity (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008) individual difference—moral grandstanding and extreme endorsement of ideological views motivation—that may be partially responsible for (Brandt et al., 2014), whereas other work has some of the divisions in contemporary American focused on issue-based ideological divides (Fiorina public discourse. & Abrams, 2008) or emotional reactions to Ideological Extremism and Affective Polarization outgroup members (Iyengar et al., 2012). For the According to recent studies, politicians present work, we were interested in studying these (Banda & Cluverius, 2018), news media (Martin & divides in terms of ideological extremism and Yurukoglu, 2017), and average citizens (Johnston, affective polarization. Given that these terms are 2018) are divided on a range of sociopolitical

1 Department of Psychology, Bowling Green State University 2 Department of Philosophy, Bowling Green State University 3 Department of Philosophy, Texas Tech University Correspondence regarding this pre-print should be directed to the first author at [email protected]. The work was supported via research grants provided to the authors from the Charles Koch Foundation, the National Institute for Civil Discourse, and Bowling Green State University.

Grubbs, J. B., Warmke, B., Tosi, J., & Shanti James, A. (2020). Moral Grandstanding and Political Polarization: A Multi-Study Consideration. Journal of Research in Personality, 104009. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2020.104009 Moral Grandstanding 2 often used differently across different disciplines, people often show strong antipathy toward we define our use of each below. outgroup members and strong preference for Ideological Extremism. We use the term ingroup members (for reviews, see: Hewstone et ideological extremism as it has been understood in al., 2002; Mackie et al., 2016; Riek et al., 2006; prior psychological literature, namely, the extent to Robbins & Krueger, 2005). Similarly, groups often which people report extreme political or ideological share emotions at the group level, particularly views at either end of the political spectrum negative emotions in relation to outgroup members (Lammers et al., 2017; van Prooijen & Krouwel, (Smith et al., 2007). Researchers have found such 2019). That is, we conceptualized ideological antipathy across political lines as well. Consistent extremism as the self-reported adoption of extreme with previous research, we use the term affective political views in either direction. Relatedly, we polarization to refer to the phenomenon of will use the term ideological polarization to refer to demonstrating extreme positive affect toward the process by which an individual becomes more members of one’s preferred political party and ideologically extreme. We will therefore think of extreme negative affect toward members of polarization as the process that tends to result in opposing political parties (Iyengar et al., 2019). ideological extremism. In this project, we were That is, affective polarization is best understood as specifically interested in examining factors that the gap between the extremity of one’s affect predict ideological extremism (i.e., self-report of toward the political outgroup and the extremity of extreme political or ideological views), as such one’s affect toward the one’s political ingroup. factors may also be related to the process of Importantly, affective polarization seems to ideological polarization (i.e., the process by which function at least somewhat independently of one’s reported views move to extremes). ideological extremity. Even when people might be For the present work, we considered ideologically similar to members of another ideological extremism as a key outcome variable in political party, affective reactions to those partisan our analyses. However, we note ideological others are often quite negative (Iyengar et al., 2012). extremism itself often functions as an important People might experience extreme negative predictor of symmetric effects in political and emotions toward political outgroup members moral psychology (Brandt et al., 2014). Ideological independent of how ideologically different they are extremists demonstrate overly simplistic from said others (Iyengar et al., 2019). evaluations of political phenomena (Fernbach et al., There is clear evidence that affective 2013; Lammers et al., 2017; van Prooijen et al., polarization has increased over the past several 2018). Similarly, extremists are also likely to decades (Iyengar et al., 2012; Mason, 2015). This has describe their beliefs as being objectively correct, happened in multiple ways. First, more people have regardless of the actual evidence for their beliefs come to hold negative attitudes about those in the (Toner et al., 2013). These same extremists are also other party. For example, over a 50-year time span, more likely to reject outside influences on their the proportion of American adults who would decision making process (Brandt et al., 2015). object to their children marrying a member of the Finally, political extremism is likely associated with opposing political party rose from 4-5% in 1960 to troubling outcomes, such as greater intolerance for 33%-50% in 2010 (Iyengar et al., 2012). Second, non-likeminded others, greater interpersonal individual antipathy toward ideological others has conflict, greater incivility toward ideological others, also apparently risen in recent years (Iyengar & and greater affective polarization (for reviews, see: Westwood, 2015), with partisans themselves Brandt et al., 2014; van Prooijen & Krouwel, 2019). demonstrating stronger negative evaluations of Affective Polarization. Voluminous bodies opposing party members. The present work seeks of work in social psychology demonstrate that to describe one factor that may be contributing to

Grubbs, J. B., Warmke, B., Tosi, J., & Shanti James, A. (2020). Moral Grandstanding and Political Polarization: A Multi-Study Consideration. Journal of Research in Personality, 104009. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2020.104009 Moral Grandstanding 3 this rise in affective polarization: Moral status is known as Moral Grandstanding (hereafter: Grandstanding. MG). Status Seeking and Moral Grandstanding First defined in the philosophical literature Psychologists have long known that, when (Tosi & Warmke, 2016), MG refers to the use of likeminded individuals discuss issues together as a speech (broadly construed) about morality, politics, group, they often leave such discussions with more or other important topics to improve relative extreme ideological positions than they entered station or rank. People share their values, morals, with individually (Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969). or political beliefs in a variety of contexts for a This process of adopting more extreme views is variety of reasons. Sometimes these motivations are known as group polarization (Mackie & Cooper, altruistic—they aim to help others (e.g., seeking to 1984; Mackie, 1986). Similarly, groups may improve the quality of a conversation by providing demonstrate collective emotions together, wherein an insight or new information; seeking to extreme antipathy toward outgroup members is ameliorate suffering by defending an underdog). higher at the group level than at the individual Motivations for engaging in public moral discourse level (Smith et al., 2007). Whereas past research, may also be principled—some people simply aim informed by social identity theory, has often to do what is right (e.g., seeking to stand up for speculated that conformity within the group is part what one takes as the right moral principles; of the reason for this process of polarization, the seeking to do one’s duty by telling the truth). present work seeks to extend beyond these However, some instances of moral talk are likely associations and examine how individual motivated by a strong desire to impress others, differences, such as a desire for status, might either by (1) demonstrating one’s impressive moral predict such divides. qualities to one’s in-group or by (2) attacking As a hypersocial species, humans are ideological rivals or opposites for allegedly inferior characterized by a number of fundamental social moral or political views. Prior psychological work motives that seem to influence behaviors and has validated this notion of MG and found that the beliefs in a wide variety of domains (Neel et al., motivation to engage in MG is expressed in ways 2015). One such motive is status seeking (Anderson consistent with either a desire for prestige or a et al., 2015), which refers to the innate human drive desire for dominance (Grubbs et al., 2019). to improve one’s rank, station, and relative One way humans seek status is by trying to standing among others (Cheng et al., 2013). This gain prestige, a kind of social status associated with drive for status may be seen in a variety of contexts being seen as knowledgeable, skilled, or impressive including the workplace (Loch et al., 2001), social in some way (Cheng et al., 2013). Consistent with media environments (Nesi & Prinstein, 2019), and this conceptualization of status-seeking more even leisure pursuits (Walasek & Brown, 2015). broadly, one type of MG seems to be characterized This tendency toward status seeking also seems to by a desire for respect or admiration from others manifest in behavior in the context of public (e.g., “My beliefs should be inspiring to others”). discourse (Grubbs et al., 2019). Specifically, some This form of MG is associated with desires for people seem particularly prone to use moral talk prestige more generally and is well-predicted by (i.e., public discussions invoking moral rights, narcissistic extraversion (Grubbs et al., 2019). moral principles, moral ideals, and moral practices) MG can also be motivated by a desire for as a means to attain higher status or standing in status that results in dominating others. Here, others’ eyes. In both philosophical work (Tosi & grandstanders shame, hurt, or otherwise exploit Warmke, 2016, 2020) and empirical inquiry potential rivals or ideological opponents (e.g., (Grubbs et al., 2019), this use of moral talk to seek “When I share my beliefs, I do so in the hope that people different than me will feel ashamed of their

Grubbs, J. B., Warmke, B., Tosi, J., & Shanti James, A. (2020). Moral Grandstanding and Political Polarization: A Multi-Study Consideration. Journal of Research in Personality, 104009. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2020.104009 Moral Grandstanding 4 beliefs”). Very much akin to more general status- herself as caring deeply for the poor. If someone striving via dominance (Cheng et al., 2013), this says that justice demands a $15 per hour minimum expression of MG seems to be motivated by a wage, another can simply respond that it would be desire to assert one’s rank or power over another even more just to institute a $20 per hour minimum person, or to elevate oneself by putting others wage. In a grandstanding-rich environment, the down. This form of MG is particularly associated others in the group now must either accept that this with more aggressive tendencies and is very well- person seems to care more for the poor or adjust predicted by narcissistic antagonism (Grubbs et al., their own stated views to keep up. If enough others 2019). in the group accept the ramped-up claim, those Importantly, preliminary empirical with doubts or concerns risk being left behind or examinations of MG have shown that it is related to called out as naysayers. Consistent with previously a number of potentially concerning behaviors and referenced literature on group polarization and outcomes in public discourse (Grubbs et al., 2019). social conformity (e.g., Mackie, 1986), many people For example, MG is related to greater conflict with find it more palatable to subtly calibrate their views others over political and moral issues (both cross- according to their in-group’s platform than to risk sectionally and over time). MG is also related to apostate status. In short, MG might lead to greater engagement in antagonistic social media extremism about any given issue. behaviors in discussions about politics (e.g., A similar dynamic can play out among a sharing messages or posts with the sole intent of likeminded group in response to the views of an shaming or embarrassing the original author of the out-group. Ramping up can occur when group post). Building on these findings, there may also be members engage in a competition to see who reason to suspect that MG relates to affective despises the out-group the most, with the winner polarization and ideological extremism, as we holding the strongest contrary view, and thus, the explore below. moral high ground. Meanwhile, the inverse of this Moral Grandstanding and Ideological Extremism competition could happen among the other group Philosophical work on MG predicts that as well. This ramping up effect may happen not grandstanders tend to stake out extreme moral and only with respect to one’s ideological views, but political positions to differentiate themselves from also with one’s affective reactions to the other side, others in search of attention and praise (Tosi & such that individuals in each group coming to hate Warmke, 2016, 2020). The desire for status the other side more. MG may therefore not only associated with MG likely leads people to express cause ideological extremism but also affective increasingly extreme political and moral opinions polarization. as a means of seeming more virtuous, respectable, As public discourse comes to resemble a or worthy of admiration than others in their group. moral arms race, both affective polarization and MG leads people to “ramp up” their ideological ideological polarization (i.e., increasing amounts of positions (or at least their public presentations of ideological extremism) are predictable them) to impress or appear superior to others. As consequences. As such, we might expect to find individuals seek status, they may take that MG is linked to more ideological extremism progressively more extreme positions in their and affective polarization, particularly among respective groups as a means of presenting those who are seeking prestige or respect from themselves as moral paragons. In short, the likeminded others. motivation to engage in MG is likely associated Consistent with these philosophical with adopting more extreme ideological positions. insights, preliminary evidence suggests that MG is For example, consider a discussion between associated with more extreme political views. MG likeminded individuals, each of whom thinks of motivations—particularly in the domain of

Grubbs, J. B., Warmke, B., Tosi, J., & Shanti James, A. (2020). Moral Grandstanding and Political Polarization: A Multi-Study Consideration. Journal of Research in Personality, 104009. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2020.104009 Moral Grandstanding 5 prestige—are associated with ideological Leonardelli et al., 2010), the basic thought is that extremism, demonstrating a curvilinear people who are strongly inclined to use moral relationship with single-item ratings of political discourse to impress others will also be inclined to ideology (Grubbs et al, 2019). In these preliminary adopt more extreme ideological positions because samples of college students and weighted these views help them “stand out” among the nationally-representative cross-sections in the U.S., crowd. Though such views are seen as extreme by individuals who identified as being more extreme outsiders, they may be seen as more respectable or in their political views (i.e., more to the “left” or the admirable within their group. Essentially, it seems “right” on a sliding scale rating of political that these individuals will take extreme positions in ideology) also reported a greater desire to use order to garner status and esteem among moral talk as a means of appearing respectable, ideological peers. Therefore, we expected to find admirable, or inspirational to others. However, to that prestige-motivated MG would be associated date, no work has systematically examined the with greater levels of ideological extremism. nature of these links beyond simple correlational In contrast with the desire for respect and analyses or determined whether these links persist esteem associated with prestige seeking, in measurement environments more rigorous than dominance-motivated aspects of MG convey a single-item ideology scales. The present work seeks desire to assert one’s rank or power over another to address these areas of deficit. by causing others shame or feelings of inferiority. The Present Work These tendencies are inherently related to Building on the literature reviewed above, antipathy toward ideological opponents. As such, the present work examines the relationships we might expect to find that dominance-motivated between MG and both ideological extremism and aspects of MG are related to more extreme affective affective polarization in the general public, reactions toward outgroup members. The idea is specifically testing whether MG predicts greater that people who are strongly inclined to use moral levels of both. In Study 1, we focused solely on discourse to dominate and humiliate others will be ideological extremism using novel measures of self- also more inclined to feel and express extreme identified political orientation in general and in emotional responses, since these emotional relation to specific issue/positions. That is, we responses can effectively intimidate and instill fear. examined ideological extremism as the gap Although there is very little prior work between participants self-report of themselves suggesting that narcissism might be related to being conservative/traditional or ideological extremism, some recent findings have liberal/progressive in general and in relation to demonstrated that narcissistic antagonism and specific policy domains. In Study 2, we examined narcissistic extraversion are very strongly related to both general ideological extremism using MG motivations and that narcissistic antagonism traditional measures of ideological extremity and often predicts conflict with others over political and affective polarization using widely accepted moral issues (Grubbs et al., 2019). Given these measures of gaps in partisan affect. associations, we included narcissistic antagonism Given that prestige-motivated aspects of and narcissistic extraversion as covariates in our MG are closely related to a desire to appear morally analyses, allowing us to address the possibility that impressive to likeminded others, it seems likely links between MG and polarization might be that individuals who report greater prestige- related to the status-oriented personality traits motivated MG would also report more extreme underlying MG rather than MG alone. views within their own partisan groups. Similar to Finally, we note that the present work is a more seminal works in social psychology around secondary analysis of previously collected data that optimal distinctiveness theory (Brewer, 2011; were partially described in a prior publication

Grubbs, J. B., Warmke, B., Tosi, J., & Shanti James, A. (2020). Moral Grandstanding and Political Polarization: A Multi-Study Consideration. Journal of Research in Personality, 104009. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2020.104009 Moral Grandstanding 6 (Grubbs et al., 2019). Specifically, this earlier work Republican (26.4%), no party affiliation (27.1%); reported associations between basic personality Libertarian (5.0%), Green (0.8%), Independent traits and MG, with a focus on validating the (8.6%), and other (1.1%). construct and measurement of MG. However, Participants for Sample 2 were internet- several of the datasets on which the prior work using adults in the United States recruited by the reported also included measures of polarization Turkprime data-acquisition platform (now known and ideological extremism that were not included as Cloud Research; Litman et al., 2017). Participants in the earlier publication. Although our analytic (N = 1,063; Mage = 48.20, SD = 16.38; 49.8% women) plan was theoretically driven by the above ideas, were recruited in the Summer of 2018 based on U.S. this work was not pre-registered, and we do not demographic norms as of the 2010 census for Race, believe that our results should be interpreted as Ethnicity, Income, Census Region, Age, and confirmation of a prespecified hypothesis. Gender. Sample size was determined by funding More details regarding this entire project, limits, rather than by a priori power analyses. More including analytic code and data, are available via simply, budgetary constraints led us to recruit a the Open Science Framework at target of 1,000 participants. Although participants https://osf.io/3mpx2/?view_only=f9857eebe3f84145 were recruited based on U.S. nationally bf446d4029450252 [ANONYMIZED FOR PEER representative norms, participants were able to REVIEW]. Project materials are available at select the racial or ethnic category that they felt best https://osf.io/6g24r/?view_only=eb22f29d6095410ca applied to themselves (including multiple 49c80d12bf2ea87 [ANONYMIZED FOR PEER categories); as such, totals reported below may REVIEW]. exceed 100%. Participants were primarily White Study 1 (73.8%), followed by African-American/Black To initially test the above ideas and (11.4%), Asian-Pacific Islander (8.4%), examine the links between MG and polarization, Latino/a/Hispanic (7.1%), American-Indian we collected two samples, as detailed below. /Native-American (3.2%), and other (1.6%). Participants Participants primarily identified as Democrat Participants for Sample 1 were (35.7%), followed by Republican (28.9%), undergraduates at a large, public university in the Independent (21.4%), no party affiliation (11.2%), Midwest. Participants (N = 981; Mage = 19.4; SD = 2.1; Libertarian (1.8%), and Other (1.1%). 69.7% women) were recruited from undergraduate Measures psychology classes throughout the university over Moral Grandstanding. We included the the course of four semesters (Fall 2017, Spring, Moral Grandstanding Motivations Scale (Grubbs et 2018, Fall 2018, and Spring 2019). Sample size was al., 2019). This 10-item measure requires determined by maximizing participation over four participants to respond on a scale of 1 (Strongly semesters, rather than by a priori power analyses. Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree) to items on two Participants were able to select the racial or ethnic subscales. The first, six-item subscale assesses the category that they felt best applied to themselves extent to which participants are motivated to use (including multiple categories); as such, totals moral talk to seek prestige or respect (e.g., “My reported below may exceed 100%. Participants beliefs should be inspiring to others” and “I hope primarily identified as White (84%), followed by that my beliefs cause other people to want to share African-American/Black (12.9%), Latino/a/Hispanic those beliefs”). The resulting subscale score is titled (3.6%), Asian/South-Asian/Pacific-Islander (2.1%), Prestige Strivings. The second, four-item subscale American Indian/Native-American (1.0%), and assesses the extent to which participants are other (1.5%). Political affiliations reported by motivated to use moral talk to dominate or shame participants were as follows: Democrat (31%), others (e.g., “When I share my beliefs, I do so to

Grubbs, J. B., Warmke, B., Tosi, J., & Shanti James, A. (2020). Moral Grandstanding and Political Polarization: A Multi-Study Consideration. Journal of Research in Personality, 104009. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2020.104009 Moral Grandstanding 7 show people who disagree with me that I am better Within each domain, we averaged participant than them”). The resulting subscale score is titled ratings of Conservative and Traditional responses Dominance Strivings. options, then subtracted from this value the Ideological extremism. For these samples, average participant ratings for Progressive and we assessed ideological extremism via a novel Liberal response options. This process created an measure of absolute ideological gap. That is, we index with a possible range of -6 to +6, wherein a measured the absolute magnitude of the gap more liberal ideological gap was represented by between participants’ self-reported endorsement of lower values and a more conservative ideological Conservative/Traditional ideology and gap was represented by more positive values. We Liberal/Progressive ideology, so that a greater gap then squared these indices and took the square root value represented more polarized views of various of the resulting values to create a series of political domains. indicators of unidirectional ideological extremism Political views were assessed in five so that more extreme values (i.e., values closer to domains: overall political views (prompt: “To what |6|) were indicative of higher ideological gap and extent do the following items describe your less extreme values (i.e., values closer to zero) were political views?”), fiscal views (prompt: “To what indicative of lower ideological gap. In sum, this extent are your fiscal (money, budget, tax, and created an index of absolute extremism in each finance) views politically:”), social views (prompt: domain, regardless of direction. “To what extent are your social (welfare, Narcissism. Given the robust associations entitlements, social-security, and education) views between narcissistic traits and MG in prior works, politically:”), moral views (prompt: “To what we included the Five Factor Narcissism Inventory extent are your moral (marriage, sexuality, Short Form in our analyses as a covariate (Sherman abortion/reproductive-rights) views politically:”), et al., 2015). The FFNI-SF measures numerous and foreign-policy views (prompt: “To what extent domains of narcissistic personality along several are your foreign policy views (military and war; facets. We focused on two composite indices that U.S. involvement overseas; U.S. involvement in have previously shown robust associations with nation building) politically:”). MG: Narcissistic Antagonism (exploitative, For each of the above categories, we asked aggressive, and entitled aspects of narcissism that participants to rate the extent to which their are strongly associated with MG: Dominance political views were “Conservative,” “Liberal,” Strivings) and Narcissistic Extraversion (grandiose “Progressive,” or “Traditional” on a seven-point and self-important aspects of narcissism that are scale of 0 (Not at all) to 6 (Extremely). That is, we strongly associated with MG: Prestige Strivings). asked participants to respond to all four descriptors Analytic Plan (“Conservative,” “Liberal,” “Progressive,” and In both samples, we computed full “Traditional”) for all five domains.4 descriptive statistics, analysis of internal We calculated our index of ideological consistency (Cronbach’s α and McDonald’s ω), and extremism using the following formula: simple product-moment correlations between all !(#$%&('(&)$*+%,-+$ + /*%0-,-(&%1) − #$%&(4-5$*%1key +variables.6*(7*$))-+$ These))8 variables are all reported in Table 1.

4 Given the novelty of this approach, we tested the general scored substantially higher than self-identified Republicans validity of responses by examining how participants in each for ratings of Liberal and Progressive and substantially lower sample differed on raw ratings in each domain. Specifically, than self-identified Republicans for ratings of Conservative we compared self-identified Democrats and self-identified and Traditional. These analyses are available via the OSF page Republicans within each sample on each of the items for this project at https://osf.io/jgecm/ and described above. For all domains, self-identified Democrats https://osf.io/85mec/. Grubbs, J. B., Warmke, B., Tosi, J., & Shanti James, A. (2020). Moral Grandstanding and Political Polarization: A Multi-Study Consideration. Journal of Research in Personality, 104009. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2020.104009 Moral Grandstanding 8 Subsequent to these analyses, we conducted both samples, the intercorrelations of the various a Structural Equation Model (SEM) in each sample polarization indices were large and positive (i.e., r = using the lavaan package (Rosseel, 2012) for R .653 to .821). Statistical Software (R Core Team, 2018). All With regard to our planned SEM analyses: analyses were conducted using maximum Our specified models demonstrated good fit in likelihood estimation with robust (Huber-White) both samples (Robust Fit Indices; Sample 1:χ2[111] standard errors and a scaled test statistic. In these = 297.99, CFI = .975, TLI = .969, RMSEA = .041, analyses, for each sample, we defined the latent SRMR = .044; Sample 2: χ2[111] = 311.78, CFI = .977, variables MG: Prestige and MG: Dominance by the TLI = 971, RMSEA = .046, SRMR = .035).5 In both items of the corresponding subscales of the MGMS. samples, FFNI Antagonism was unrelated to MG: We also defined the latent variable Ideological Prestige. Similarly, in both samples, FFNI extremism by the five absolute indices of partisan Antagonism demonstrated strong positive ideological gap (Overall, Fiscal, Social, Moral, and associations with MG: Dominance, and FFNI Foreign Policy) described above. In the full SEM, Extraversion demonstrated strong positive MG: Prestige and MG: Dominance were regressed on associations with MG: Prestige. In turn, MG: Prestige observed exogenous variables FFNI: Antagonism demonstrated robust associations with Ideological and FFNI: Extraversion. In turn, Ideological extremism, whereas the relationship between MG: extremism was regressed on MG: Prestige, MG: Dominance and Ideological extremism did not reach Dominance, FFNI: Antagonism, and FFNI: statistical significance. Moreover, in both samples, Extraversion. MG: Prestige and MG: Dominance the total variance accounted for in Ideological were allowed to covary. Similarly, FFNI: extremism was similar (Sample 1, R2 = .110; Sample Antagonism and FFNI: Extraversion were allowed 2, R2 = .112). to covary. This model is summarized in Figure 1. We also considered an alternative Study 1 Results interpretation of our data in which extremism may In both samples, Pearson correlations be understood as predicting MG. That is, we tested revealed small to moderate associations between alternatives to our structural model (where MG MG motivations and ideological extremism across predicts extremism) rather than assuming that ours all indicators (See Tables 1 and 2). In Sample 1, for is the most plausible interpretation of our data. To MG: Prestige these associations were most often accomplish this, in both samples, we compared the positive and moderate in size (i.e., r > .2; Funder & above described model to an alternative model in Ozer, 2019). In contrast, associations for MG which MG: Dominance and MG: Prestige were Dominance and ideological gaps were consistently regressed on Ideological extremism (i.e., where small and negative. In Sample 2, a similar pattern Ideological extremism predicted MG: Dominance and was observed, with small positive associations (i.e., MG: Prestige) rather than the converse. However, r < .1; Funder & Ozer, 2019) being observed such a model demonstrated a noticeably inferior fit between MG Prestige and polarization measures, in both samples (Sample 1, alternative model fit: and small negative associations between MG χ2[113] = 333.87, CFI = .971, TLI = .965, RMSEA = Dominance and polarization measures. In both .048, SRMR = .059; χ2dif [2]= 40.316, p < .001; Sample samples, narcissistic antagonism was negatively 2, alternative model fit: χ2[113] = 343.41, CFI = .973, associated with polarization measures. Finally, in TLI = .968, RMSEA = .048, SRMR = .060; χ2dif [2]=

5 We also conducted these analyses without a latent Supplemental Table 4. Of note, patterns of association for ideological extremism variable (i.e., with just observed gap MG: Prestige remained highly similar across all alternate indices) and another model without narcissism as a covariate. analyses, though MG: Dominance demonstrated significant These results are available via the Open Science Framework negative associations with ideological extremism in models at https://osf.io/68wy9/ as Supplemental Figure 1 and where narcissism was not included. Grubbs, J. B., Warmke, B., Tosi, J., & Shanti James, A. (2020). Moral Grandstanding and Political Polarization: A Multi-Study Consideration. Journal of Research in Personality, 104009. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2020.104009 Moral Grandstanding 9 35.267, p < .001). That is, our theoretically expected engaging in MG and adopting more extreme views. models (See Figure 1), are more consistent with the We sought to address these possible limitations in data obtained than an alternative model wherein Study 2. polarization may be seen as predicting Study 2 grandstanding. To extend the findings from Study 1 to a Study 1 Discussion weighted, nationally representative sample, to Results of our first study demonstrated that, account for general political interest, to measure in two large samples, greater motivation to engage ideological extremism using a more traditional in moral grandstanding for prestige-based reasons measure, and to extend our models to affective was consistently related to greater ideological polarization as well, we collected a cross-sectional extremism. This finding persisted even when sample of the U.S. population, as described below. narcissistic traits were held constant statistically, Participants suggesting that prestige motivated MG is uniquely Participants were adults in the U.S. (N = related to extremism, beyond its links to 2,519; Mage = 47.5, SD = 17.8; 51.4% women) narcissism. Moreover, consistent with our recruited via YouGov polling and matched to predictions, our specified model (where MG nationally representative (2016 American predicted extremism) demonstrated better fit than Community Survey) norms for age, gender, race, an alternative model where extremism predicted education, and U.S. Census Region. Participants MG. Of note, we found consistently negative links identified primarily as 38.7% Democrat, 27.2% between dominance motivated MG and extremism Republican, 25.4% Independent, 3.6% other, and when narcissistic antagonism was not included, 5.1% not sure. Race was reported as follows: 64.1% and insignificant links between dominance and White, 12.0% Black, 15.7% Hispanic, 3.3% Asian, extremism when narcissism was included. These 0.9% Native American, 2.5% Mixed, 1.5% other, findings were contrary to our initial hypotheses 0.2% Middle Eastern. Responses were weighted and suggest that, to the extent MG: Dominance is using YouGov’s proprietary weighting formulae related to ideological extremism, it is likely a (Rivers, 2016). function of the close relationship between Measures narcissistic antagonism and dominance. We measured moral grandstanding Despite our findings regarding prestige motivations and narcissistic motivated MG, these results demonstrated only extraversion/antagonism using the same measures preliminary links between MG and partisan as Study 1. However, we assessed ideological divides, for many reasons. For example, these extremism differently than in Study 1 and also results did not address affective polarization, were assessed affective polarization as described below. based on novel and idiosyncratic measures of Ideological Extremism ideological extremism, and did not control for We asked participants to rate their political general political interest. Given that political beliefs from “left” to “right” on a sliding scale with polarization implies some measure of political and an anchor of -100 (liberal or progressive) on the left news interest, it is possible that a series of questions and +100 (conservative or traditional) on the right. related to moral and political beliefs may be We then folded this measure, keeping the absolute indirectly measuring political interest rather than value of one’s self-rating, with more extreme values status seeking via contributions to moral and signifying polarization, regardless of the direction political discourse. More simply, it may be that of such polarization. This resulting index was links between MG and political polarization are termed Ideological Extremism: Left-Right better explained by how politically engaged a Spectrum. person is, rather than a true relationship between

Grubbs, J. B., Warmke, B., Tosi, J., & Shanti James, A. (2020). Moral Grandstanding and Political Polarization: A Multi-Study Consideration. Journal of Research in Personality, 104009. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2020.104009 Moral Grandstanding 10 We also included panel data provided by participants how they would feel about a child or YouGov on the strength of political ideology. This other close loved one married a member of certain data was collected prior to the administration of political parties (Republicans and Democrats). our study and is a standard part of the political Participants rated their reactions to the following information maintained by YouGov as a part of all prompt: “How would you feel if your child panel-based research they facilitate. For this item, married someone who identified participants responded to the item, “In general, as:______(note: if you do not have how would you describe your own political children, you can imagine how you feel if a close viewpoint?” on a scale of 1 (very liberal) to 5 (very friend or family member married someone who conservative). For this index of polarization, identified as the following descriptors)” on a scale consistent with prior research (Brandt et al., 2015; of 0 (completely negative) to 100 (completely positive). K. N. Garrett & Bankert, 2018; Wegener et al., 1995), For this variable, we followed a similar technique we folded this scale at the midpoint, with the as we did above. We created an affective gap index highest score (2) representing very liberal or very by subtracting feelings toward Republicans from conservative and the lowest score (0) indicating feelings toward Democrats, squaring this resulting moderate ideology. In keeping with prior literature gap index, then taking the square root of the on this topic, the resulting index was titled: squared value to create a single, linear measure of Ideological Extremism: Panel Ideology. polarization. The resulting variable was called Affective Polarization Affective Polarization: Child’s Marriage Gap. We assessed affective polarization via two Political Interest methods. First, we used a gap index based on a In addition to the above measures of feeling thermometer wherein participants were polarization, we also analyzed panel data from asked to rate their feelings toward individuals with YouGov regarding participants’ interest in politics specific political affiliations on a scale of 0 (very cold using a standard item from the American National or completely negative) to 100 (very warm or completely Election Study (ANES). YouGov maintains positive). Participants were asked to rate their participant responses to the standard prompt: feelings toward Democrats and Republicans. “Some people seem to follow what's going on in Consistent with recent works examining gap in government and public affairs most of the time, partisan affect (K. N. Garrett & Bankert, 2018; R. K. whether there's an election going on or not. Others Garrett et al., 2019; Iyengar & Westwood, 2015), we aren't that interested. Would you say you follow looked at the gap in feelings toward each party by what's going on in government and public subtracting feelings toward Republicans from affairs…” Responses were recorded on a scale of 1 feelings toward Democrats. This created a variable (Most of the time) to 4 (Hardly at all). For ease of on a scale of -100 to +100. We then squared these interpretation, we reversed the scoring of this item results and then took the square root of these so that greater values indicated more interest in squares so that all answers were on a scale of 0 to politics. This resulting score was termed Political 100. By doing so, we created a linear absolute-value Interest. index of polarization wherein more extreme Analytic Plan affective polarization was represented by higher All analyses were weighted using values and lower levels of affective polarization population weights provided by YouGov. Analyses were represented by lower values. The resulting for Study 2 were very similar to Study 1. We variable was called Affective Polarization: Feeling conducted Pearson product-moment correlations Thermometer Gap. between all variables. We followed these Consistent with prior work in political correlations with an SEM analyses in lavaan similar science (i.e., Iyengar, 2012), we also asked to those reported in Study 1. Specifically, we

Grubbs, J. B., Warmke, B., Tosi, J., & Shanti James, A. (2020). Moral Grandstanding and Political Polarization: A Multi-Study Consideration. Journal of Research in Personality, 104009. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2020.104009 Moral Grandstanding 11 defined the latent variables MG Prestige and MG our model ranged from R2 = .092 for ideological Dominance by the respective subscale items of the identification to R2 = .240 for affective polarization MGMS. These variables were again regressed on as indicated by feeling thermometer responses. observed variables FFNI Antagonism and FFNI Consistent with Study 1, we also tested Extraversion, as well as the observed variable alternative SEMs and compared them to our Political Interest. In turn, Affective Polarization: preferred model reported above. The first Feeling Thermometer Gap, Affective Polarization: alternative model we tested followed a similar Child’s Marriage Gap, Ideological extremism: Left- pattern to alternative models in Study 1, wherein Right Spectrum, and Ideological Extremism: Panel MG variables were treated as outcomes predicted Ideology were all regressed on the aforementioned by all other variables. In this alternative model, variables described above. This model is MG: Prestige and MG: Dominance were regressed on summarized in Figure 2. observed polarization and extremism indices. This Results model demonstrated much worse fit than the above Pearson correlations revealed highly similar reported model (Robust Fit Indices: CFI = .768, TLI results to those found in Study 1 (See Table 3). = .671, RMSEA = .105, SRMR = .096; χ2dif[6] = 2089.3, Specifically, we consistently found positive p < .001). Additionally, we specified another associations between computed indices of partisan alternative model wherein we defined a latent polarization (both ideological and affective) and variable, General Polarization using all observed MG motivations, particularly prestige motivations, polarization indices as indicators. This model also though these associations were typically small to demonstrated worse fit than the above described moderate in size (r = .1-.2; Funder & Ozer, 2019). model wherein each observed polarization index See Table 2. was treated as an independent outcome (Robust Fit In our subsequent SEM analysis, we found Indices: CFI = .953, TLI = .941, RMSEA = .057, similar patterns to those observed in Study 1. The SRMR = .045; χ2dif[17] = 318.6, p < .001). Finally, we fit of our model was good (Robust Fit Indices: CFI = specified an alternative model where Ideological .977, TLI = .966, RMSEA = .043, SRMR = .038). These Extremism: Panel Ideology was included as an results are summarized in Figure 2. Specifically, exogenous covariate in the model, predicting both consistent with Study 1, we saw strong positive MG: Prestige and MG: Dominance, as well as the associations between FFNI: Antagonism and MG: remaining three measures (Ideological Extremism: Dominance and between FFNI: Extraversion: and Left/Right Spectrum; Affective Polarization: Feeling MG: Prestige. Additionally, analyses demonstrated Thermometer; and Affective Polarization: Child’s positive associations between general political Marriage Gap). In testing this model, we found interest and both MG: Dominance and MG: Prestige. adequate fit (CFI = .975, TLI = .963, RMSEA = .045, With regard to our outcome variables, SRMR = .040), but again found that our original results were generally consistent with Study 1. model demonstrated better fit by a significant General interest in politics was positively margin (χ2dif [2]= 15.383, p < .001). associated with all forms of polarization, as was General Discussion MG: Prestige. MG: Dominance was only positively Past work in philosophy has argued that associated with Ideological Strength and affective MG has a polarizing effect in public discourse. We polarization in the form of feelings about children’s evaluated this possibility in three samples, marriages. Both FFNI Antagonism and FFNI examining both ideological extremism and affective Extraversion demonstrated sporadic relationships polarization. Below we summarize our findings with polarization, either being negatively related to and discuss the implications of the present work. polarization or not significantly related at all. We consistently found robust evidence that Variance accounted for in each outcome variable by prestige-motivated aspects of MG were positively

Grubbs, J. B., Warmke, B., Tosi, J., & Shanti James, A. (2020). Moral Grandstanding and Political Polarization: A Multi-Study Consideration. Journal of Research in Personality, 104009. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2020.104009 Moral Grandstanding 12 related to affective polarization and ideological residual relationships in structural models are a extremism in all ways in which we measured it. function of suppression effects. Alternatively, and This is consistent with preliminary links between perhaps more simply, the relationship between prestige-motivated MG and single-item measures prestige-motivated MG and polarization may of ideological extremism (Grubbs et al., 2019). That overshadow any possible connection between is, prestige-motivated MG was a uniformly positive dominance-motivated MG and polarization. This associate of more extreme political ideology across would suggest that simple correlations between single-item ideology measures, affective gap MG Dominance and affective polarization (as seen measures, and multi-item ideological gap in study 2) may be a function of the shared measures. These links persisted even when general variance between prestige-motivated MG and political interest and involvement were statistically dominance-motivated MG such that dominance- controlled, and testing of alternative models motivated MG is unrelated to polarization when suggest that our conceptualized pathways (i.e., that controlling for prestige-motivated MG. polarization and extremism are predicted by Implications and Future Directions prestige-motivated MG) were more consistent with Links between MG and polarization are not the data than alternative models (i.e., that evenly distributed. Although prior empirical work polarization or extremism predicts prestige- has conceptualized MG as being expressed in terms motivated MG). of prestige strivings (i.e., a desire to be respected, Though we expected that dominance- admired, or emulated for one’s moral beliefs) and motivated aspects of MG would be predictive of dominance strivings (i.e., a desire to shame or affective polarization, we found no support for this embarrass those that disagree with one’s moral notion and some support for its opposite. That is, in beliefs), only the former of these categories is Study 1, we found negative correlations between consistently related to affective polarization or MG Dominance and ideological extremism. more extreme ideological positions. This point is Moreover, in Study 2, raw correlations observed particularly fascinating given the established links between dominance-motivated MG and affective between prestige strivings and other politically polarization were reduced to insignificance in relevant domains, which we explore below. latent variable analyses. In our weighted, Prior works have linked the prestige- nationally-representative sample, dominance- motived aspects of MG to many generally positive motivated MG was not significantly related to any outcomes. For example, both cross-sectionally and of our measures of affective polarization. over time, prestige-motivated MG is related to The reasons for the lack of support for our greater civic engagement in the form of voting hypotheses regarding dominance-motivated MG behavior, volunteerism, and philanthropy (Grubbs, are unclear. In all three samples, the raw Tosi, & Warmke, 2020). Similarly, both cross- associations between dominance-motivated MG sectionally and over time, prestige motivated MG is and narcissistic antagonism were quite large (r > related to reports of growing closer to others over .5), and the magnitude of these relationships political and moral issues (Grubbs et al., 2019). In appeared even larger in latent variable analyses. contrast, dominance-oriented aspects of MG are Additionally, across samples, narcissistic associated with a reduced likelihood of voting and antagonism was most often negatively related to greater reports of conflict and discord over political polarization and political interest. As such, it is issues (Grubbs et al., 2019; 2020). Yet, the present possible that any relationship between dominance- results seem to run somewhat counter to these motivated MG and polarization is overshadowed previous works by demonstrating that prestige- by the negative links between narcissistic motivated MG also seems to be associated with antagonism and such polarization, and that any adverse outcomes for civic life. The present work

Grubbs, J. B., Warmke, B., Tosi, J., & Shanti James, A. (2020). Moral Grandstanding and Political Polarization: A Multi-Study Consideration. Journal of Research in Personality, 104009. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2020.104009 Moral Grandstanding 13 consistently shows that more extreme political suggests a more adroit mechanism (i.e., shifting views, affective reactions to political views, and one’s moral or political views to a more extreme partisan ideology are related to prestige-motivated position) to make oneself morally impressive MG. within a relevant network. In short, we suspect that What follows from these findings is a more built into the very nature of prestige-striving is a nuanced understanding of how MG might be mechanism for ideological polarization which leads related to public discourse and political to greater extremism, and that with respect to polarization more broadly. Specifically, we can dominance-striving, this mechanism is either not consider that prestige-motivated MG might be present, rarely activated, or overridden by some associated with putatively positive outcomes such other process more efficient for attaining as greater civic engagement while also indicating dominance. more extreme political views. This is not surprising A similar dynamic could be at play as more extreme partisans are more politically concerning affective polarization. One need not active (McCarty, 2019). Similarly, although take up highly polarized emotions to abuse others prestige-motivated MG may predict growing closer via dominance grandstanding. For those motivated to others over political issues, such relationship- by prestige, however, being seen as especially strengthening does not preclude the possibility of warm toward or approving of one’s in-group, and polarization. Prestige-motivated MG may simply especially cold toward or disapproving of one’s be associated with stronger relationships to out-group, could promote one’s status within one’s polarized others (i.e., polarized people bond with in-group. Thus, affective polarization also seems others over shared extreme views). In short, more useful as an avenue for seeking prestige than prestige-motivated MG may be related to it does for seeking dominance. On the other hand, seemingly good things while also facilitating however, highly polarized emotions would seem to polarization and extremism, which are known to facilitate dominance grandstanding, too. Hatred drive a range of negative outcomes at societal and resentment of partisan others appear to be levels (McCarty, 2019) and in family relationships natural motivations outlets for status-seeking via (Chen & Rohla, 2018). dominance behaviors. We admit that the lack of Regarding the weaker relationship between closeness between affective polarization and dominance-motivated MG and extremism, we dominance grandstanding is puzzling in light of suspect that this is due to inherent differences the apparent similarities. between dominance and prestige approaches to The present work also may inform future status seeking. To achieve status, dominance work related to group polarization more generally grandstanders are less likely to employ a kind of as well as intergroup relations. Although the moral one-upmanship than they are to simply call current work focuses on the role that individual names or use harsh, condemning language. differences might play in promoting more extreme Crucially, one needs not shift one’s moral or ideology and affective reactions to ideological political views to assert dominance in this way. others, the current results also suggest that Prestige-seeking grandstanders, on the other hand, attempts to seek prestige may also influence often attempt to appear more morally impressive intergroup relations. Desires to be seen as or enlightened. These judgments are typically inspirational and admirable for one’s moral views comparative (one is trying to look morally better (i.e., prestige-motivated grandstanding) than others) and contextual (one is using a consistently predicted not only more extreme particular issue or discursive environment to carry ideological positions but also more extreme out this task). Thus, we hypothesize that affective responses to others. Accordingly, it seems attempting to enhance appearances by prestige-MG that status seeking via prestige within one’s own

Grubbs, J. B., Warmke, B., Tosi, J., & Shanti James, A. (2020). Moral Grandstanding and Political Polarization: A Multi-Study Consideration. Journal of Research in Personality, 104009. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2020.104009 Moral Grandstanding 14 group might ultimately predict more volatile and political knowledge is often associated with greater negative evaluations of members of the outgroup. ideological extremism (Bakker et al., 2020; Limitations Drummond & Fischhoff, 2017; Guay & Johnston, The primary limitations of the present work 2020; Zaller, 1992). Similarly, we did not assess are obvious. We relied exclusively on self-report general belief superiority (i.e., the notion that one data using cross-sectional samples in a purely U.S. has better beliefs or ideas than others). This may be context. As such, we urge caution before particularly relevant given literature suggesting interpreting the present findings as being ideological extremism is indeed related to belief representative of anything more than associations superiority (Toner et al., 2013) and prestige between related domains in the American cultural motivated MG is characterized by a desire to be context. Although our sampling methods were seen as special or admirable for one’s beliefs. rigorous and representative, future longitudinal Conclusions work is needed to determine if prestige-motivated Across three samples, involving aspects of MG are causing polarization or driving undergraduate students and nationally- some parts of polarization. Given the cross- representative U.S. cross-sections, we found sectional nature of our work, we acknowledge that consistent support for the notion that that moral another plausible interpretation of our data is that grandstanding is linked to ideological extremism various aspects of polarization are driving prestige- and affective polarization. These findings are motivated MG. However, given our tests of such particularly clear for prestige-motivated alternative models, we contend that this is less grandstanding, and less so for dominance likely than our proposed model positing that motivated grandstanding. Collectively, our prestige-motivated MG leads to polarization. findings point to the importance of considering We also note that ideological extremism is status seeking as an associate of polarization—both likely to occur with respect to specific issues, such ideological and affective--and indicate a need for as the morality of abortion, minimum wage laws, future research examining whether status seeking immigration, or tax rates. Although we evaluated predicts increases in polarization over time or in ideological extremism within the context of specific specific issue domains domains in Study 1 (e.g., fiscal policy), we did not References examine specific issues themselves (e.g., tax law). Abramowitz, A. I., & Saunders, K. L. (2008). Is MG may lead individuals to take up increasingly Polarization a Myth? The Journal of Politics, 70(2), 542–555. extreme views or attitudes on specific issues, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381608080493 particularly those that are deemed especially Anderson, C., Hildreth, J. A. D., & Howland, L. (2015). important to one’s social group. Thus, we would Is the desire for status a fundamental human expect MG to be associated with the adoption of motive? A review of the empirical literature. more extreme views on issues that are likely to Psychological Bulletin, 141(3), 574–601. confer social status within one’s network. This https://doi.org/10.1037/a0038781 Bakker, B. N., Lelkes, Y., & Malka, A. (2020). presents a need for both longitudinal research Understanding Partisan Cue Receptivity: Tests examining MG and polarization broadly and future of Predictions from the Bounded Rationality and work examining how MG might lead to extremism Expressive Utility Perspectives. The Journal of along specific moral and political issues over time. Politics, 82(3), 1061–1077. Finally, we note that a number of https://doi.org/10.1086/707616 potentially important covariates were not included Banda, K. K., & Cluverius, J. (2018). Elite polarization, party extremity, and affective polarization. in our study. For example, we did not assess Electoral Studies, 56, 90–101. general political knowledge, which could impact https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2018.09.009 our findings as prior works have shown that Blatz, C. W., & Mercier, B. (2018). False Polarization and False Moderation: Political Opponents Grubbs, J. B., Warmke, B., Tosi, J., & Shanti James, A. (2020). Moral Grandstanding and Political Polarization: A Multi-Study Consideration. Journal of Research in Personality, 104009. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2020.104009 Moral Grandstanding 15 Overestimate the Extremity of Each Other’s Druckman, J. N., & Levendusky, M. S. (2019). What Do Ideologies but Underestimate Each Other’s We Measure When We Measure Affective Certainty. Social Psychological and Personality Polarization? Public Opinion Quarterly, 83(1), Science, 9(5), 521–529. 114–122. https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfz003 https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550617712034 Drummond, C., & Fischhoff, B. (2017). Individuals with Brady, W. J., & Crockett, M. J. (2019). How Effective Is greater science literacy and education have more Online Outrage? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, polarized beliefs on controversial science topics. 23(2), 79–80. Proceedings of the National Academy of https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2018.11.004 Sciences. Brady, W. J., Crockett, M., & Van Bavel, J. J. (2019). https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1704882114 The MAD Model of Moral Contagion: The role Fernbach, P. M., Rogers, T., Fox, C. R., & Sloman, S. A. of motivation, attention and design in the spread (2013). Political Extremism Is Supported by an of moralized content online [Preprint]. Illusion of Understanding. Psychological PsyArXiv. https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/pz9g6 Science, 24(6), 939–946. Brandt, M. J., Evans, A. M., & Crawford, J. T. (2015). https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797612464058 The Unthinking or Confident Extremist? Fiorina, M. P., & Abrams, S. J. (2008). Political Political Extremists Are More Likely Than Polarization in the American Public. Annual Moderates to Reject Experimenter-Generated Review of Political Science, 11(1), 563–588. Anchors. Psychological Science, 26(2), 189– https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.05310 202. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797614559730 6.153836 Brandt, M. J., Reyna, C., Chambers, J. R., Crawford, J. Funder, D. C., & Ozer, D. J. (2019). Evaluating Effect T., & Wetherell, G. (2014). The Ideological- Size in Psychological Research: Sense and Conflict Hypothesis: Intolerance Among Both Nonsense. Advances in Methods and Practices Liberals and Conservatives. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 251524591984720. in Psychological Science, 23(1), 27–34. https://doi.org/10.1177/2515245919847202 https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721413510932 Garrett, K. N., & Bankert, A. (2018). The Moral Roots Brewer, M. B. (2011). Optimal distinctiveness theory: of Partisan Division: How Moral Conviction Its history and development. P. AM Van Lange, Heightens Affective Polarization. British A. Kruglanski, & ET Higgins, Handbook of Journal of Political Science, 1–20. Theories of Social Psychology, 2, 81–98. https://doi.org/10.1017/S000712341700059X Chen, M. K., & Rohla, R. (2018). The effect of Garrett, R. K., Long, J. A., & Jeong, M. S. (2019). New partisanship and political advertising on close Evidence on Group Polarization From Partisan family ties. Science, 360(6392), 1020–1024. Media to Misperception: Affective Polarization https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aaq1433 as Mediator. Journal of Communication, 69(5), Cheng, J. T., Tracy, J. L., Foulsham, T., Kingstone, A., 490–517. https://doi.org/10.1093/joc/jqz028 & Henrich, J. (2013). Two ways to the top: Grubbs, J. B., Warmke, B., Tosi, J., James, A. S., & Evidence that dominance and prestige are Campbell, W. K. (2019). Moral grandstanding in distinct yet viable avenues to social rank and public discourse: Status-seeking motives as a influence. Journal of Personality and Social potential explanatory mechanism in predicting Psychology, 104(1), 103–125. conflict. PLOS ONE, 14(10), e0223749. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0030398 https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0223749 Crockett, M. J. (2017). Moral outrage in the digital age. Guay, B., & Johnston, C. D. (2020). Ideological Nature Human Behaviour, 1(11), 769. Asymmetries and the Determinants of Politically https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-017-0213-3 Motivated Reasoning. Dimock, M., Doherty, C., Kiley, J., & Oates, R. (2014). /publication/ja_2020_pmr_ajps/ Political Polarization in the American Public (p. Hewstone, M., Rubin, M., & Willis, H. (2002). 124). Intergroup Bias. Annual Review of Psychology, Divided States of America. (2017, January 17). In 53(1), 575–604. Frontline. Public Broadcasting Corporation. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.53.10090 Doherty, C., Kiley, J., Tyson, A., & Johnson, B. (2019). 1.135109 Public Highly Critical of State of Political Iyengar, S., Lelkes, Y., Levendusky, M., Malhotra, N., Discourse in the U.S. (p. 104). & Westwood, S. J. (2019). The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the

Grubbs, J. B., Warmke, B., Tosi, J., & Shanti James, A. (2020). Moral Grandstanding and Political Polarization: A Multi-Study Consideration. Journal of Research in Personality, 104009. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2020.104009 Moral Grandstanding 16 United States. Annual Review of Political Martin, G. J., & Yurukoglu, A. (2017). Bias in Cable Science, 22(1), annurev-polisci-051117-073034. News: Persuasion and Polarization. American https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-051117- Economic Review, 107(9), 2565–2599. 073034 https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20160812 Iyengar, S., Sood, G., & Lelkes, Y. (2012). Affect, Not Mason, L. (2015). “I Disrespectfully Agree”: The Ideology. Public Opinion Quarterly, 76(3), 405– Differential Effects of Partisan Sorting on Social 431. https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfs038 and Issue Polarization. American Journal of Iyengar, S., & Westwood, S. J. (2015). Fear and Political Science, 59(1), 128–145. Loathing across Party Lines: New Evidence on https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12089 Group Polarization. American Journal of McCarty, N. (2019). Polarization: What Everyone Needs Political Science, 59(3), 690–707. to Know®. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12152 Moscovici, S., & Zavalloni, M. (1969). The group as a Johnston, C. D. (2018). Authoritarianism, Affective polarizer of attitudes. Journal of Personality and Polarization, and Economic Ideology. Political Social Psychology, 12(2), 125–135. Psychology, 39(S1), 219–238. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0027568 https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12483 Neel, R., Kenrick, D. T., White, A. E., & Neuberg, S. L. Lammers, J., Koch, A., Conway, P., & Brandt, M. J. (2015). Individual differences in fundamental (2017). The Political Domain Appears Simpler social motives. Journal of Personality and to the Politically Extreme Than to Political Social Psychology, 110(6), 887. Moderates. Social Psychological and https://doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000068 Personality Science, 8(6), 612–622. Nesi, J., & Prinstein, M. J. (2019). In Search of Likes: https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550616678456 Longitudinal Associations Between Lelkes, Y. (2016). Mass Polarization: Manifestations Adolescents’ Digital Status Seeking and Health- and Measurements. Public Opinion Quarterly, Risk Behaviors. Journal of Clinical Child & 80(S1), 392–410. Adolescent Psychology, 48(5), 740–748. https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfw005 https://doi.org/10.1080/15374416.2018.1437733 Leonardelli, G. J., Pickett, C. L., & Brewer, M. B. R Core Team. (2018). R: A Language and Environment (2010). Optimal distinctiveness theory: A for Statistical Computing. R Foundation for framework for social identity, social cognition, Statistical Computing. https://www.R- and intergroup relations. In Advances in project.org/ experimental social psychology (Vol. 43, pp. Riek, B. M., Mania, E. W., & Gaertner, S. L. (2006). 63–113). Elsevier. Intergroup Threat and Outgroup Attitudes: A Litman, L., Robinson, J., & Abberbock, T. (2017). Meta-Analytic Review. Personality and Social TurkPrime.com: A versatile crowdsourcing data Psychology Review, 10(4), 336–353. acquisition platform for the behavioral sciences. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327957pspr1004_4 Behavior Research Methods, 49(2), 433–442. Rivers, D. (2016). Pew Research: YouGov consistently https://doi.org/10.3758/s13428-016-0727-z outperforms competitors on accuracy | YouGov. Loch, C., Yaziji, M., & Langen, C. (2001). The fight for https://today.yougov.com/topics/finance/articles- the alpha position: Channeling status reports/2016/05/13/pew-research-yougov competition in organizations. European Robbins, J. M., & Krueger, J. I. (2005). Social Management Journal, 19(1), 16–25. Projection to Ingroups and Outgroups: A https://doi.org/10.1016/S0263-2373(00)00067-0 Review and Meta-Analysis. Personality and Mackie, D., & Cooper, J. (1984). Attitude polarization: Social Psychology Review, 9(1), 32–47. Effects of group membership. Journal of https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327957pspr0901_3 Personality and Social Psychology, 46(3), 575. Rosseel, Y. (2012). lavaan: An R package for structural Mackie, D. M. (1986). Social identification effects in equation modeling and more Version 0.5-12 group polarization. Journal of Personality and (BETA). Journal of Statistical Software, 42, 1– Social Psychology, 50(4), 720. 36. Mackie, D. M., Maitner, A. T., & Smith, E. R. (2016). Sherman, E. D., Miller, J. D., Few, L. R., Campbell, W. Intergroup emotions theory. In Handbook of K., Widiger, T. A., Crego, C., & Lynam, D. R. prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination, 2nd (2015). Development of a Short Form of the ed. (pp. 149–174). Psychology Press. Five-Factor Narcissism Inventory: The FFNI-

Grubbs, J. B., Warmke, B., Tosi, J., & Shanti James, A. (2020). Moral Grandstanding and Political Polarization: A Multi-Study Consideration. Journal of Research in Personality, 104009. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2020.104009 Moral Grandstanding 17 SF. Psychological Assessment, 27(3), 1110– van Prooijen, J.-W., Krouwel, A. P. M., & Emmer, J. 1116. https://doi.org/10.1037/pas0000100 (2018). Ideological Responses to the EU Smith, E. R., Seger, C. R., & Mackie, D. M. (2007). Can Refugee Crisis: The Left, the Right, and the emotions be truly group level? Evidence Extremes. Social Psychological and Personality regarding four conceptual criteria. Journal of Science, 9(2), 143–150. Personality and Social Psychology, 93(3), 431– https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550617731501 446. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.93.3.431 Walasek, L., & Brown, G. D. A. (2015). Income Toner, K., Leary, M. R., Asher, M. W., & Jongman- Inequality and Status Seeking: Searching for Sereno, K. P. (2013). Feeling Superior Is a Positional Goods in Unequal U.S. States. Bipartisan Issue: Extremity (Not Direction) of Psychological Science, 26(4), 527–533. Political Views Predicts Perceived Belief https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797614567511 Superiority. Psychological Science, 24(12), Wegener, D. T., Downing, J., Krosnick, J. A., & Petty, 2454–2462. R. E. (1995). Measures and manipulations of https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797613494848 strength-related properties of attitudes: Current Tosi, J., & Warmke, B. (2016). Moral Grandstanding. practice and future directions. In Attitude Philosophy & Public Affairs, 44(3), 197–217. strength: Antecedents and consequences (pp. https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12075 455–487). Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. Tosi, J., & Warmke, B. (2020). Grandstanding: The Use Westfall, J., Van Boven, L., Chambers, J. R., & Judd, C. and Abuse of Moral Talk. Oxford University M. (2015). Perceiving Political Polarization in Press. the United States: Party Identity Strength and van Prooijen, J.-W., & Krouwel, A. P. M. (2019). Attitude Extremity Exacerbate the Perceived Psychological Features of Extreme Political Partisan Divide. Perspectives on Psychological Ideologies. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 10(2), 145–158. Science, 28(2), 159–163. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691615569849 https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721418817755 Zaller, J. R. (1992). The nature and origins of mass opinion. Cambridge University Press.

Grubbs, J. B., Warmke, B., Tosi, J., & Shanti James, A. (2020). Moral Grandstanding and Political Polarization: A Multi-Study Consideration. Journal of Research in Personality, 104009. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2020.104009 Moral Grandstanding 18 Table 1 Study 1, Sample 1: Descriptive Statistics, Internal Consistency Coefficients, and Correlations. MG MG Narc. Narc. Fiscal Social Moral Foreign Overall

Prestige Dominance Antagonism Extraversion Gap Gap Gap Gap Gap M = 4.20 MG SD = 1.11

Prestige α = .815 ω = .818 M = 2.24 MG SD = 1.28 .114** Dominance α = .876 ω = .880 M = 2.33 Narc. SD = 0.59 .054 .510** Antagonism α = .835 ω = .845 Narc. M = 3.33 SD = 0.62 Extraversio .276** .071* .323** α = .640 n ω = .657

Sample 1 (N = 981) = Sample (N 1 M = 1.65 Fiscal Gap .215** -.076* -.120** .071* SD = 1.70 M = 1.92 Social Gap .216** -.111** -.172** .057 .759** SD = 1.92 M = 2.39 Moral Gap .200** -.141** -.175** .036 .653** .752** SD = 2.16 Foreign M = 1.75 .196** -.078* -.137** .027 .762** .762** .685** Gap SD = 1.89 M = 1.89 Overall Gap .209** -.084** -.172** .010 .774** .821** .775** .769** SD = 1.77 **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). α = Cronbach’s Alpha; ω = McDonald’s Omega MG = Moral Grandstanding; Narc = Narcissism

Grubbs, J. B., Warmke, B., Tosi, J., & Shanti James, A. (2020). Moral Grandstanding and Political Polarization: A Multi-Study Consideration. Journal of Research in Personality, 104009. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2020.104009 Moral Grandstanding 19 Table 2 Study 1, Sample 2: Descriptive Statistics, Internal Consistency Coefficients, and Correlations. MG MG Narc. Narc. Fiscal Social Moral Foreign Prestige Dominance Antagonism Extraversion Gap Gap Gap Gap M = 4.30 MG SD = 1.25

Prestige α = .843 ω = .844 M = 2.41 MG SD = 1.44 .263** Dominance α = .912 ω = .912 M = 2.24 Narc. SD = 0.63 .142** .599** Antagonism α = .852 ω = .858 M = 2.96 Narc. SD = 0.72 .389** .333** .463** Extraversion α = .733 ω = .739

Sample 2 (N = 1,063) Sample= (N 2 M = 2.00 Fiscal Gap .105** -.070* -.126** -.095** SD = 1.84 M = 2.19 Social Gap .129** -.113** -.168** -.112** .725** SD = 1.92 M = 2.54 Moral Gap .093** -.179** -.206** -.132** .653** .772** SD = 2.07 M = 1.92 Foreign Gap .129** -.073* -.141** -.081** .757** .760** .696** SD = 1.90 M = 2.27 Overall Gap .131** -.073* -.180** -.114** .743** .803** .730** .747** SD = 1.85 **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). α = Cronbach’s Alpha; ω = McDonald’s Omega MG = Moral Grandstanding; Narc = Narcissism

Grubbs, J. B., Warmke, B., Tosi, J., & Shanti James, A. (2020). Moral Grandstanding and Political Polarization: A Multi-Study Consideration. Journal of Research in Personality, 104009. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2020.104009 Moral Grandstanding 20 Table 3 Study 2: Descriptive Statistics, Internal Consistency Coefficients, and Correlations. M (SD) α ω 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1. Moral Grandstanding: 4.86 (0.99) .767 .770 Prestige Strivings 2. Moral Grandstanding: 2.33 (1.45) .908 .909 .163** Dominance Strivings 3. Narc. Antagonism 2.24 (0.70) .877 .881 .162** .663**

4. Narc. Extraversion 2.92 (0.74) .741 .744 .407** .303** .568** 5. Ideological Extremism: 0.95 (0.80) -- -- .126** .009 -.079** -.049* Panel Ideology 6. Ideological extremism: Left- 56.31 (35.49) -- -- .132** -.057** -.149** -.084** .587** Right Spectrum 7. Political Interest 3.20 (0.09) -- -- .154** -.125** -.206** .021 .262** .328** . 8. Affective Polarization: 44.42 (30.22) -- -- .121** -.155** -.296** -.150** .456** .619** .415** Feeling Thermometer Gap 9. Affective Polarization: 34.14 (31.20) -- -- .128** -.064** -.199** -.091** .445** .560** .337** .775** Child’s Marriage Gap **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). α = Cronbach’s Alpha; ω = McDonald’s Omega MG = Moral Grandstanding; Narc = Narcissism

Grubbs, J. B., Warmke, B., Tosi, J., & Shanti James, A. (2020). Moral Grandstanding and Political Polarization: A Multi-Study Consideration. Journal of Research in Personality, 104009. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2020.104009 Moral Grandstanding 21

Figure 1. Structural Equation Models for Study 1, Samples 1 and 2, Demonstrating the Effect of Moral Grandstanding on Ideological Extremism. Sample 1 estimates are before the slash and Sample 2 estimates are after the slash. Directional arrows represent standardized path estimates; Bi- directional arrows represent standardized covariances. Item loadings for Moral Grandstanding Motivations Scale items are omitted from the diagram for the sake of clarity but available at https://osf.io/q2egp/. FFNI = Five Factor Narcissism Inventory. MG = Moral Grandstanding. CFI = Comparative Fit Index; TLI = Tucker-Lewis Index; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; SRMR = Standardized Root Mean Square Residual.

Grubbs, J. B., Warmke, B., Tosi, J., & Shanti James, A. (2020). Moral Grandstanding and Political Polarization: A Multi-Study Consideration. Journal of Research in Personality, 104009. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2020.104009 Moral Grandstanding 22

Figure 2. Structural Equation Model in Study 2 Predicting Polarization and Extremism Indicators. Directional arrows represent standardized path estimates; Bi-directional arrows represent standardized covariances. Item loadings for Moral Grandstanding Motivations Scale items are omitted from the diagram for the sake of clarity but available at https://osf.io/q2egp/. FFNI = Five Factor Narcissism Inventory. MG = Moral Grandstanding.

Grubbs, J. B., Warmke, B., Tosi, J., & Shanti James, A. (2020). Moral Grandstanding and Political Polarization: A Multi-Study Consideration. Journal of Research in Personality, 104009. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2020.104009 Moral Grandstanding 23 CFI = Comparative Fit Index; TLI = Tucker-Lewis Index; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; SRMR = Standardized Root Mean Square Residual. Robust Fit Indices: CFI = .977, TLI = .966, RMSEA = .043, SRMR = .038

Grubbs, J. B., Warmke, B., Tosi, J., & Shanti James, A. (2020). Moral Grandstanding and Political Polarization: A Multi-Study Consideration. Journal of Research in Personality, 104009. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2020.104009