Alaric Searle. Wehrmacht Generals, West German Society, and the Debate on Rearmament, 1949-1959. Westport: Praeger, 2003. 316 S. EUR 76.00, gebunden, ISBN 978-0-275-97968-3.

Reviewed by Stefanie Trombley

Published on H-German (February, 2005)

Alaric Searle's monograph argues that under‐ questions. First, was the former Ofcer standing the role of former generals in West Ger‐ Corps a unifed body as it approached the rearma‐ man rearmament is crucial to understanding that ment issue? Second, did this group oppose the de‐ process because their divisions--and the public's mocratization of the Federal Republic in general perception of them--illuminate the "political psy‐ and the new in particular? And che of postwar German society in the West" (p. third, both within the ofcer corps and in society 288). In the German public mind, the members of at large, how did the generals address the contro‐ the General Ofcer Corps served as "representa‐ versies over the National Socialist past? tives, leaders, and spokesmen of a political, pro‐ On the question of unity, Searle contends that fessional, and homogeneous social group" (p. 15). though the General Ofcer Corps was initially However, in reality only a select group of politi‐ united by common experience, competition for cally active individuals--from what was ultimately positions in the new armed forces brought out a deeply divided group--infuenced the rearma‐ pre-existing tensions and divisions. In other ment debate. words, though their group sufering and prejudi‐ Searle argues that the role of former cial treatment following World War II united Wehrmacht generals in the rearmament debate them to some extent, it could only whitewash the was "of the utmost signifcance" (p. 3). Some gen‐ deep fssures that existed under the National So‐ erals played active roles as technical advisors, cialist regime. This emerged in political responses public ofcials, and vocal citizens in the public de‐ to the process of dealing with the past (Vergan‐ bate. However, one role shared by the entire rank genheitspolitik)--particularly the debate over the was more passive: their symbolic value as mili‐ role of Nazism in the military and responsibility tarists responsible for the crimes of Nazism, and for the crimes of the Third Reich--as well as the subsequent vilifcation in the public mind. struggle over the present spirit of the armed Wehrmacht Generals addresses three primary forces, between forces supporting military tradi‐ H-Net Reviews tion and hierarchy, and those advocating democ‐ ing to justify the Wehrmacht, they exerted their ratization (Innere Fuehrung). eforts to suppress the past. However, by the mid- In response to the question of whether to late 1950s, the division within the General Of‐ Wehrmacht generals attempted to circumvent de‐ cer Corps was even more apparent, as many more mocratization and subjection of the military to former generals became willing to criticize their civilian authorities, Searle gives a "qualifed yes," colleagues "who had sought to transfer Nazi phi‐ but he also adds that it would be a mistake to losophy to the Wehrmacht" (p. 282). Indeed, Sear‐ overestimate the infuence of neo-Nazi sentiments le argues that most Wehrmacht generals ultimate‐ (p. 281). Instead, he argues that the Speidel- ly accepted key reform concepts and a changed Heusinger group--an infuential group of generals approach to military organization (p. 128). centered around Generalleutnant Hans Speidel While the General Ofcer Corps was undergo‐ and Generalleutnant --exerted it‐ ing this process of development and division, self to minimize the infuence of reformist ele‐ Searle argues that German public opinion never ments for the sake of military tradition and to dis‐ fully lost its strong anti-Wehrmacht sentiment. tance the ofcer corps from any responsibility for Though it diminished to a certain extent in the Nazi crimes. They were not entirely successful, public opinion polls of the early 1950s, by 1954 however, partly because of the eforts of other and 1955 it had risen again to a fevered pitch just generals who were in favor of reform. As the as actual rearmament began. This assertion that democratic government began to function more the generals were vilifed in German society pro‐ and more efectively, the generals' attitudes to‐ vides a less-than-stable foundation for Searle's ar‐ ward it improved. Searle concludes that democra‐ gument. His own evidence indicates that most an‐ tization in the Federal Republic and in the Bun‐ imosity was directed at individual generals guilty deswehr was "never greatly endangered" by the of crimes against Germans; this volume ofered former General Ofcer Corps (p. 282).[1] no persuasive demonstration that Wehrmacht of‐ The third issue is perhaps the most complicat‐ fcers, even at the highest ranks, were universally ed. The debate over the military responsibility for condemned as Nazi criminals in the public mind. the Nazi past fractured the ranks of the former Nevertheless, Wehrmacht Generals is most ef‐ generals like no other issue. Searle presents fective in its contention that there was a distinct polling data indicating that they had been vilifed correlation in German society between public as militarists in large portions of the German pop‐ opinion on rearmament and public opinion on ulation, which of course questioned their trust‐ the General Ofcer Corps of the Wehrmacht. It is worthiness to participate in the creation of a de‐ less convincing in advancing the thesis of a more mocratized military. Some former generals ar‐ active role for this Corps as a group. Though Sear‐ gued that the Wehrmacht had also been betrayed le acknowledges that "the role of former Wehrma‐ by the Nazis and denied any complicity in the Na‐ cht generals was wide-ranging, diverse, and, at tional Socialist regime. However, Searle points out times, contradictory" (p. 277), there is certainly a that these arguments did not reach an audience tension in this work between the tendency to broader than those already convinced and repre‐ speak of the generals as a cohesive interest group sented mostly the small group of military tradi‐ advancing particular aims and his own evidence tionalists. The Speidel-Heusinger group, in order and argument about the great and increasing di‐ to push for rearmament, needed to create a posi‐ visions in the General Ofcer Corps due to past re‐ tive image of generals and military ofcers for the sentments, personal conficts, and increasing West German population, but instead of attempt‐ competition for roles in the new armed forces and

2 H-Net Reviews aspirations for gaining the ear of the Federal Re‐ rearmament and German society by placing too public's political leaders. much emphasis on foreign policy. Searle terms those who actively participated Searle includes a helpful Selected Bibliogra‐ in the conficts surrounding rearmament a "politi‐ phy and several useful tables in this volume. It is cized minority from within the former General clear that he has given great attention to the de‐ Ofcer Corps" (p. 277). His methodological ap‐ tails of his research. Wehrmacht Generals excels proach is one of prosopography, examining the at the presentation of evidence in case studies, roles of approximately thirty generals that appear but the statistical limitations--thirty generals out regularly in the debate over rearmament, and it is of a group of approximately three thousand (p. in these biographies that he is most successful. 17-18)--detract from the efectiveness of his broad‐ The monograph establishes clear connections be‐ er argument. There is a somewhat tenuous con‐ tween individuals' experiences during and imme‐ nection between his discrete points and his broad‐ diately following World War II and their ultimate er conclusions. Nevertheless, Searle has raised position in the rearmament debate. In addition, some provocative questions about the origins of Searle also demonstrates the ways in which earli‐ the Bundeswehr and the relative success of de‐ er relationships, conficts, and connections afect‐ mocratization at diferent levels in the former ed later power struggles. The weakness of the military hierarchy. prosopographical approach is that it is often dif‐ Notes cult to draw the connections between the individ‐ [1]. In this point, he comes to the same conclu‐ ual machinations of these thirty generals--un‐ sion as Jay Lockenour, Soldiers as Citizens (Lin‐ doubtedly an elite sampling--and Searle's broader coln and London: University of Nebraska Press, conclusions about the Generalitaet. Despite quali‐ 2001). However, while Searle argues that impor‐ fying statements throughout the book, these indi‐ tant generals, even those working with the gov‐ viduals are often held up as spokesmen, when--as ernment, tried to circumvent the democratic sys‐ Searle's own evidence refects--they were not tem, Lockenour argues that instead former of‐ even able to control or to consolidate the ideals of cers tried to work within it. the veterans groups (Chapter 5). [2]. James Diehl, The Thanks of the Father‐ According to Searle, Wehrmacht Generals is land: German Veterans after the Second World an attempt to remedy the gap in the English lan‐ War (Chapel Hill and London: University of North guage literature. He claims that very few works Carolina Press, 1993) and David Clay Large, Ger‐ actually examine rearmament within its social mans to the Front: West German Rearmament in and cultural context, and those that do he dismiss‐ the Adenauer Era (Chapel Hill and London: Uni‐ es with somewhat troubling brevity.[2] He ofers versity of North Carolina Press, 1996) receive pos‐ little comment other than that they "contain seri‐ itive comments. However, Searle points out that ous faws and methodological weaknesses" (p. 3). the former is only tangentially related to rearma‐ [3] Further, he attacks what he terms the "Bun‐ ment, while the latter covers "the military and in‐ deswehr-sponsored ofcial history" that gives ternal political dimensions" of the rearmament Speidel and Heusinger (and thus Adenauer) too debate (p. 2). much credit for the ultimate shape of rearma‐ ment, ignoring their eforts to circumvent the de‐ [3]. Included in this list are Lockenour, Sol‐ mocratization of the new military as well as those diers as Citizens and Johannes M. Becher, Die Generals who successfully opposed them (p. 285). Remilitarisierung der Bundesrepublik Deutsch‐ These histories, he claims, distort the realities of

3 H-Net Reviews land und das deutsch-franzoesische Verhaeltnis (Marburg: Hitzeroth, 1987).

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Citation: Stefanie Trombley. Review of Searle, Alaric. Wehrmacht Generals, West German Society, and the Debate on Rearmament, 1949-1959. H-German, H-Net Reviews. February, 2005.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=10199

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