2020 SWF Summit for Space Sustainability Student Essay Competition Elwyn Sirieys

Prompt #3 - How should the approach future space engagement with ? What are the possible benefits and risks in doing so?

Within the month of July 2020 alone, China successfully launched its first rover mission to Mars (Tianwen-1), two additional remote sensing (Shiyan-6 and a new Gaofen), a high- throughput geostationary covering the country (Apstar-6D) and started operating their latest Beidou-3 navigation satellite. In doing so, China again demonstrated the strength of their commercial, scientific and military space programs to an audience of historical space powers like the United States, who are still deeply entangled in the COVID-19 crisis.

The emerging role of China as a top-tier space power goes hand in hand with rising tensions between China and the United States, which have reached an all-time high. The current situation is not sustainable: hostilities will inevitably translate to space and threaten an already fragile geopolitical landscape. To preserve the peaceful nature of human activities in space, we argue that the United States should adopt a new approach to interacting with China for the years ahead. Rethinking the US strategy will not only require encompassing scientific, commercial and military aspects in a coherent policy, but also demands considering the history of this relationship and, for once, the Chinese perspective.

I. The current approach: criticism on security matters, competition and disregard

Recent efforts of the People’s Republic of China to increase their strategic capacities both in space and against foreign space assets prompted US officials to publicly condemn them and redefine their own approach. In a June 17 public address, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Stephen L. Kitay declared: “Their actions [China and Russia] pose the greatest strategic threat with the ongoing development, testing, and deployment of counter space systems and the associated military doctrine designed to hold allied and U.S. space systems at risk” [1]. Hence, in a historical paradigm shift, the United States officially declared considering space as a “warfighting domain”, leading to the creation of the US and a new unified space strategy [2].

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) emphasized recently the potential threats from China in the space domain in their report entitled ‘Challenges to Security in Space’ [3]. They point out the accelerated development of new electronic warfare and directed energy weapons able to target LEO (low Earth orbit) satellites – and possibly geostationary satellites in the future, in addition to already proven Chinese capacities (cyber-attacks, GPS jamming, kinetic weapons among others).

Another factor in the US decision is the growing soft power of China in international discussions on space matters, along with their growing commercial competitiveness. The American withdrawal from any real cooperation with China during the past two decades – from Chinese launches of American satellites in the 90s and exchanges of scientific techniques and Earth observation data to denying China’s participation in the ISS and the in 2011 – has had the effect of pushing China to pursue partnerships with several other international partners, especially in Europe and Asia. This month, Director General of Dmitry Rogozin declared considering a partnership with China for Moon activities and showed a marked disinterest for Artemis [4].

1 2020 SWF Summit for Space Sustainability Student Essay Competition Elwyn Sirieys

Overall, what really defines the current US position is its grounding in space dominance. It is no longer about avoiding asymmetric technology transfers with China, maintaining a competitive advantage, or protecting specific assets; but it’s fundamentally about maintaining the supremacy of the United States and its allies above the skies.

II. The urgent need for a new, global approach

From this analysis of the current situation in space, two aspects of the US-China relationship and balance of power emerge as directly threatening the peaceful use of space in the future.

First, the way both countries communicate and interact today encourages escalation. Each announcement is seen as requiring a direct response, as we have seen with space-based interceptors considerations, US-India extended partnership discussions and even competitive matters unrelated to space. When the capacities mentioned earlier are operational, with anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) at the forefront, this escalation could go further and potentially involve threats to the conventional space assets that support nuclear deterrence.

Second, the situation is unsustainable because the United States is not yet ready for the kind of ‘war’ that China envisions and prepares for. Characterized in ‘Chinese Perspectives on Space Operations and Escalation’ [5] through the term “gray-zone-entangled space age”, confrontations in space could become critical ways of influencing and controlling other countries’ foreign policies. By threatening strategic space assets (on which the US is particularly dependent for communications, geolocation and intelligence), and without any visible escalation or involvement of non-conventional warfare, China could exert its will.

III. Political recognition, scientific cooperation, military preparedness and legitimate competitive behaviors

The failure to recognize China as a legitimate space power is probably the most harmful aspect of the American approach, with even impacts on Chinese domestic politics (SWF Conference on US-China Engagement in Space, March 29, 2019). But this also constitutes a remarkable opportunity for America to mark a turn in its approach to China. Of course, under no circumstances should America indulge China for recent hostile developments in space – and in fact, it should continue condemning maneuvers threatening the peaceful use of outer space – so such recognition must be done in an appropriate manner. The US should seek cooperation on non-strategic scientific missions and exchanges, at the heart of which would be American use of the upcoming Chinese Space Station (CSS) after 2022, starting with experiments, data and standards sharing, and ultimately sending American astronauts on board. The communication channels created through these kinds of initiatives proved critical during the Soviet era. Additionally, the cohabitation of astronauts of both countries in space will considerably smoothen the relationship on Earth (including during changes of administration) and limit risks of escalation.

2 2020 SWF Summit for Space Sustainability Student Essay Competition Elwyn Sirieys

Such an initiative, conducted properly, would probably be welcomed by China (which has shown openness to international collaboration on its space station) as a symbol of recognition. Several obstacles remain of course, starting with the fact that it does not comply with the strategy of the Trump administration and it would require validation by both Congress and the FBI (Wolf amendment). NASA and CNSA (Chinese National Space Agency) would also have to find a way to make such a collaboration mutually beneficial, to subsist on the long run. Finally, an effort should be made to isolate it from the commercial and competitive interests of both nations, even if the same actors are sometimes involved (as is especially the case on the Chinese side).

From a security standpoint, escalation concerns would be significantly decreased thanks to this initiative (and the associated political recognition), but “gray-zone” threats would subsist. For this reason, the US should in parallel ensure the resilience of their space-based capacities, including the conventional capacities supporting nuclear deterrence, to protect this very balance.

The proposed approach would thus be built on a scientific cooperation and a political recognition, but without being limited to these two aspects: it can only succeed in a context of balanced strategic capacities and legitimate competition. There are tangible risks with this proposed approach, but we believe that there are no benefits in keeping the status quo.

3 2020 SWF Summit for Space Sustainability Student Essay Competition Elwyn Sirieys

References [1] “Defense Official Briefs Defense Space Strategy to Reporters”, DoD (June 17, 2020) https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2225281/defense-official- briefs-defense-space-strategy-to-reporters/ [2] “Defense Space Strategy”, DoD (June 2020) https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/17/2002317391/-1/- 1/1/2020_DEFENSE_SPACE_STRATEGY_SUMMARY.PDF [3] “Challenges to Security in Space”, Defense Intelligence Agency (February 11, 2019) https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/Space_Thre at_V14_020119_sm.pdf [4] “Rogozin not interested in cooperating with U.S. on lunar program, prefers China”, SpacePolicyOnline (July 13, 2020) https://spacepolicyonline.com/news/rogozin-not-interested-in-cooperating-with-u-s-on-lunar- program-prefers-china/ [5] “Outer Space; Earthly Escalation? Chinese Perspectives on Space Operations and Escalation” (August 2018) https://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/SMA-White-Paper_Chinese- Persepectives-on-Space_-Aug-2018.pdf

4