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Political Agenda-Setting and Climate Policy in the United States

By:

Kelsey Grant

Department of Political Science, University of Colorado – Boulder

Defended April 5, 2021

Thesis Advisor: Dr. Nancy Billica, Department of Political Science

Defense Committee:

Dr. Nancy Billica, Department of Political Science

Dr. Janet Donavan, Department of Political Science

Dr. Garrett Zantow Bredeson, Department of Philosophy

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Table of Contents

Chapter One: Introduction 3

Chapter Two: Literature Review 6

Chapter Three: Research Design 17

Chapter Four: Background on Public Opinion 22

Chapter Five: Republican Party Establishment 31

Chapter Six: Young Conservatives 56

Chapter Seven: Investors and Financial Community 75

Chapter Eight: Discussion and Conclusion 105

Works Cited 112

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Chapter One: Introduction

In light of the coronavirus pandemic, a historic crash in the oil market, and pivotal presidential and congressional elections, the year 2020 launched a critical moment in the development of climate and energy policy. The volatile political, social, and financial environment may provide a moment that is ripe for a transformation in the United States’ ‘green’ policies and efforts to reduce emissions. Various actors, from environmentalists to the energy industry to corporate America to policymakers to the general public, are all looking to seize the moment and shape our energy recovery and, thus, energy future.

The atmosphere of uncertainty, in addition to calls for using ‘green’ stimulus to recover our economy and to ensure COVID-relief efforts work alongside the tide of environmental progress, may challenge the fossil fuel hegemony and provide a path for a new energy paradigm, led by low-carbon and clean technologies. Conversely, what appears to be an opportunity to catapult the United States towards a sustainable future may prove to be the 2008 Financial Crisis

2.0 – a failed energy transition following an economic recession that was coupled with futile demands for monumental green stimulus and a sustainable recovery. The future of climate policy in the United States remains unknown, though the time is ripe for speculation and conjecturing about what path it will take.

A key area of continued interest and questioning, as the United States moves through the most significant period in terms of climate policy implementation, is the Republican Party. As the group perceived as the greatest political obstacle to the passage of meaningful climate legislation, those most active in the climate movement are either perpetually at war with the

Republican Party and its leaders or are scrambling to compromise and find other ways to bring 4 them on board. Whatever group one may belong to, it is likely they often feel at a loss and struggle to know how to move forward, whether that involves leaving the Republican Party behind or charging forward on the climate issue, side-by-side with Republicans. Neither option seems viable. The Republican Party is here to stay – plowing forward with no Republican support for climate action is simply no path at all. But Republican leaders seem equally disinclined to pick up and claim the climate issue as a problem worth the Party’s time – unless that time is spent opposing the climate agenda of the political Left. However, despite the frequent despair, is there reason to be hopeful that the Republican Party’s long-time obstruction of climate progress will soon be replaced with a newly found sense of political urgency to respond to and lead on the climate issue, helping to push towards achieving broad climate goals?

To explore the movement of climate policy in the period leading up to the start of the

Biden administration, this paper will feature seven following chapters. In Chapter Two, the existing literature on agenda-setting and how an issue rises on the political agenda is reviewed.

Chapter Three states this paper’s hypotheses and explains the research methods being used.

Chapter Four introduces background findings from existing polls and surveys on the general

American public’s attitudes towards climate change. This includes differences in attitudes between members of the Democratic and Republican parties on climate change, and generational divides within the Republican Party. Chapter Five begins this paper’s primary analysis by looking at the Republican Party establishment’s approach to climate change. Chapter Six continues this analysis by evaluating the first of two groups, young conservatives, with meaningful influence in Republican circles and analyzing how they are engaging with the climate issue. Chapter Seven focuses on the second of these groups, investors and financial advisors, and involves a similar analysis as Chapter Six. Then, this paper ends with a discussion 5 and conclusion in Chapter Eight to summarize the key findings and explain how those findings can be used to understand the ongoing developments on climate policy in the United States.

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Chapter Two: Literature Review

Introduction

There is a confusing and complex set of issues challenging national politics. In spite of this, there is also a growing sense across many actors in the political arena that climate change is rising on the public agenda. This research aims to investigate two interrelated questions focused on the climate policy agenda: First, with an eye towards the Republican Party, what is influencing the rise of climate change in the national policy arena? In particular, how are shifts in attitudes and behaviors by actors in the public affecting the climate policy agenda leading up to the beginning of the Biden administration? Second, what can we learn about and add to our understanding of agenda-setting as an essential step in policy processes by applying and testing basic assumptions from the agenda-setting literature to the case of climate policy in the US?

Agenda-Setting Model

Why do some issues gain the attention of policymakers while others languish? Providing a framework for understanding agenda-setting, political scientist John Kingdon sought to explain what brings a particular policy issue into focus and what will push that issue forward among policymakers. In Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, he highlights the conditions which interact with each other to create an opportunity, or a “window,” for a policy issue to make it onto the political agenda (Kingdon, 21). Kingdon identifies three separate, independent policy streams that, when they converge, provide a window of opportunity for an issue to be politically prioritized. These three streams are the problem stream, the solution stream, and the political stream. 7

The problem stream refers to a problem going public, meaning, in reality or due to perception, a problem is seen as an issue at all, the public is paying attention to it, and a response by the government is needed to resolve it. Certain events may launch the problem into the public sphere, capturing the attention of the public. And, certain events, such as widespread demonstrations, the release of public opinion polls, or headline-focusing events such as natural disasters, capture the notice of policy and decision-makers who understand that the problem at hand requires a response. The solution stream, also referred to as the policy steam, pertains to the space where experts, analysts, researchers, businesses, and special interest groups are examining and seeking to advance solutions to the problem. Possibilities are explored, but also eliminated, as the most feasible options come to light. Lastly, the politics stream refers to a dramatic or meaningful change in political conditions, which can involve an election, a change in administration, a change in a party majority, or a sudden push by the public or interest groups.

When these three streams collide, an issue may make it onto and rise on the political agenda. And what Kingdon calls a policy entrepreneur, will take advantage of this “window of opportunity” and push for a policy outcome (Kingdon, 21). These policy entrepreneurs “lie in wait in and around the government with their solutions at hand, waiting for problems to float by to which they can attach their solutions, waiting for a development in the political stream they can use to their advantage” (Kingdon, 165). They can be elected officials, a spokesperson for a group or cause, and others in position to influence policy development. They are the individuals with clout, power, and knowledge needed to facilitate a policy outcome.

This paper seeks to emphasize the problem and policy streams. In Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, Kingdon already identifies what to look for in terms of ripe political conditions for an issue to make its way onto the agenda, that is, political change in some form. 8

He also identifies the channels through which that change may occur, such as an election, a change in administration, or legislative turnover. In light of the 2020 elections, commencement of the Democratic-led 117th Congress, and the beginning of the Biden Administration, it would be redundant and unnecessary to try to identify additional evidence of political change when we are operating in a moment of a major political shift. Alternatively, this paper examines the problem and solution streams to gauge the chance that climate change will build on the federal agenda in the new administration, to better understand the factors influencing climate policy in the United States, and to provide an additional contribution by enhancing the agenda-setting model provided by Kingdon in the context of climate policy development today.

The Problem Stream

Kingdon makes clear that there are several avenues for a problem to come into focus and provoke policymakers. One avenue Kingdon identifies are “focusing events” or, in other words, significant events that draw attention. In his words, a focusing event is “like a crisis or disaster that comes along to call attention to the problem, a powerful symbol that catches on, or the personal experience of a policy maker” (Kingdon, 94). This could include widespread wildfires, mass protests or demonstrations, an oil spill, and so on. For example, as a part of the 2019 Global

Week for Future, a worldwide climate strike drew approximately 4 million protestors across the globe – likely the largest climate strike in history (Laville, Watts). These are key events that can hold the public’s and decisionmaker’s attention hostage and allow them to become aware of a problem.

The second avenue Kingdon identifies is the emergence of opportunities for data collection by the scientific community and systematic reporting of information on a problem. 9

This could involve the release of scientific reports on the rise of global average temperatures, the correlation between climate change and more intense hurricanes, irreversible melting of the

Arctic, the link between climate change and public health crises, and so on. An example is the report produced by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the United Nations body with responsibility for assessing the science related to climate change.

The third avenue Kingdon identifies is population oriented, which could include expressions among the public which signal awareness and concern about a problem among the general electorate. One example includes public opinion and, for the purposes of this paper, will remain a key foundation for understanding the problem stream in the context of agenda-setting and the groups occupying the problem stream.

Existing research on the influence of public opinion in terms of setting the political agenda and shaping public policy outcomes is inconclusive. Some researchers argue that the opinions and desires of the masses are drowned out by an elite class and the institutions that this elite class has authority over (Domhoff). Others place doubts on the public’s ability to formulate coherent or meaningful opinions on political matters, suggesting that policy outcomes are the result of factors other than public opinion (Zaller).

Some provide a more democratically optimistic perspective of the public’s influence over policy outcomes. In “Effects of Public Opinion on Policy,” Benjamin Shapiro and Robert Page argue that there is meaningful congruence between public opinion and policy, particularly on issues of high salience. However, they, too, caution against any conclusion that this linkage means American democratic institutions are functioning properly because public opinion can be influenced by special interests and policy development itself. Some seek to expand this 10 potentially optimistic picture of the responsiveness of American institutions to the public. For example, others make the argument that state governments and policies are not only very responsive to public opinion, but that these governments actively strive to implement mechanisms to promote responsiveness (Erikson, Wright, and Mclver).

In his 2003 paper, “The Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy: A Review and an

Agenda,” Paul Burstein attempts to reconcile the differences and variations amongst the research on how public opinion influences policy in the United States. Given his review of existing literature on the topic, Burstein makes numerous conclusions. The first conclusion is that public opinion impacts policy roughly 75% of the time and one third of that time the impact is “of substantial policy importance” (36). Second, the salience of an issue amplifies the impact public opinion has on policy. And third, the impact of public opinion is substantial even when considering the activities of interest groups and organizations – though, those activities can obscure the direct impact of public opinion.

Research suggests there are many questions that remain unanswered about the effect of public opinion on public policy. One of these questions is whether a threshold in public opinion exists that, when met, could create conditions conducive to getting a problem onto the political agenda. For example, this threshold could be a shift in a certain portion of the demographic that is particularly influential and/or important in terms of securing the support of policymakers. Or perhaps this threshold could be when a certain portion of the population is not only concerned about an issue, but is engaging in organized, targeted efforts to raise awareness around or advance solutions to that problem. 11

Another question remains. Existing literature fails to adequately account for the role of a potentially influential group in terms of drawing attention to environmental issues, especially within Republican circles: the investor and financial community. Some research provides evidence of investor responsiveness to public opinion. For example, it has been shown that institutional investors and advisors pay attention to public attitudes and how proxy voting provides an avenue for the general public to shape the behavior of corporations and investors

(Aggarwal et al). It is worth considering how an increasingly climate-conscious public is shaping the investor community and, in extension, how that influence may lead investors to carve out a space in the problem stream and begin drawing attention to the climate issue in their own capacity.

In summary, public opinion is an imperfect predictor of policy-outcomes and is an imperfect reflection of the public’s attitude. As research suggests, public opinion can be influenced by external factors, forces, and actors. It can also be tied to other factors occupying the problem stream (e.g., the activities of climate organizations, such as mass demonstrations).

Public opinion can very well be captured by major focusing events that make the population concerned about a problem (e.g., wildfires or hurricanes) or public opinion may be shaped by access to new information from the scientific community (e.g., the IPCC report). Public opinion may also play a role in terms of transforming passive actors in the problem stream into active forces drawing attention to an issue, such as the financial community. Thus, public opinion reflects a culmination of multiple influences, but it may also be a factor that interacts with others to amplify them (e.g., investors).

Public opinion can, as Kingdon points out, be helpful when seeking to understand why an issue is coming into focus and rising on the political agenda – whether it results in a policy 12 outcome or not. One of the most important qualities worth understanding about public opinion is that it reflects activation and movement among different sectors of the public. After identifying which sectors these are, it should direct our analysis when evaluating how and why an issue is rising on the political agenda.

The Policy Stream

Considering Kingdon’s framework, the existence and recognition of a problem is insufficient in terms of elevating an issue on the political agenda – a problem must be accompanied by a solution. In the policy stream, solutions are sought out, vetted, and, in the end, either discarded or promoted. But, in terms of changing the agenda, the critical question to ask is to what extent are the options in the solution landscape politically feasible? Solutions are more likely to build political support when they are politically palatable and appealing to policymakers of varying political backgrounds.

Countless climate proposals and ideas occupy and are circulating the policy stream.

There are several ways to think of and divide the suite of climate policy options on the table. To survey this landscape for now, policies that are politically feasible, particularly influential in the solution landscape, and/or are being seriously considered by policymakers will be briefly mentioned and made known.

First, enjoying meaningful public clout are leftist policies and legislative climate packages. Garnering the most attention in the progressive sphere is the Green New Deal. While used by the Green Party and think tanks as a title for a general left-leaning climate platform and plan, Representative Ocasio-Cortez introduced this measure in the 116th Congress (in 2019) as

House Resolution 109. This Green New Deal has taken center-stage as a leading and popular 13 proposal not only amongst progressive proponents, but the climate movement overall. This proposal calls for a drastic, rapid, government-driven transition from fossil fuels, paired with large-scale investments in green technology development and deployment, government-led emission reductions, an overhaul of the transportation sector, job guarantees, and social justice and economic reforms. Other prominent leftist approaches also include wide-spread fossil fuel divestments, fracking bans, and more. Pushing to generate political will for the Green New Deal, and other progressive policies, and to advance them on the political agenda are numerous leftist climate and environmental advocacy organizations. Of these include, for example, the Sunrise

Movement, Sierra Club, Earth Guardians, Extinction Rebellion, Greenpeace, and 350.org.

Stamped as a radical, aspirational, pie-in-the-sky proposal, the Green New Deal and other policies have been criticized as infeasible solutions incapable of generating enough political support. For example, the resolution did not have a single Republican cosponsor and moderate

Democrats, in both chambers, have also expressed in-principle disagreements with the proposal.

Senator Diane Fenstein (D-CA) said upon its introduction in 2019, “I do not agree with every aspect of this particular resolution. It addresses not only climate policy but also long-standing partisan disputes over health care, housing, jobs, and other economic policies” (Feinstein).

Regardless, the Green New Deal has served as a motivating focus for the climate movement’s progressive base and, in the process, has gained public and political clout. However, beyond drawing widespread attention, it is worth considering another role which a strong progressive policy, like the Green New Deal, may serve in the policy stream – a role beyond simply providing a solution to the identified issue. 14

Coined by Herbert Haines as the “radical flank effect,” this term refers to the positive and negative effects of a radical presence on a more moderate group in the same social movement

(Haines, 231). Positive effects of a radical group could include making moderates seem more reasonable and encouraging officials to make concessions to moderates. While originally told in the context of the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s, it may also apply to the modern climate movement. For example, founder of 350.org and major advocate of leftist climate proposals, Bill

McKibben, inspired the term “McKibben effect” to capture how his radical environmental demands recentered the climate debate in the United States around more moderate approaches

(Schifeling, Hoffman). Negative effects could include discrediting the overall movement or making it difficult for moderates to cooperate with third parties. The question remains, however, as to whether there is compelling evidence demonstrating that the radical flank effect is occurring in the context of today’s climate policy developments. Is it true that radical, extreme climate policies are making moderate policies more politically palatable and, thus, more likely to rise on the political agenda?

If the Green New Deal does create the effect of amplifying the appeal of moderate policies, what are those proposals and who are advocating for them? Some environmental groups seriously and deliberately embrace the bipartisan climate cause. These groups include, for example, the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and Citizens’ Climate Lobby (CCL). The former advocates for a suite of bipartisan climate solutions, from methane pricing to carbon removal technology development to agricultural regeneration and so on (Environmental Defense

Fund). EDF’s unique contribution to the bipartisan climate space is their engagement and collaboration with a broad variety of stakeholders, from industry, local communities, universities, scientists, businesses, investors, and so on. CCL, on the other hand, is self-described 15 as being “laser-focused” on bipartisan, revenue-neutral carbon pricing proposals, also known as carbon-fee-and-dividend (Citizens’ Climate Lobby, “About”). CCL has sought to build public and political will for numerous bipartisan proposals of this sort over the years. One of the organization’s standards for endorsing legislation is that it has at least one Republican and one

Democratic sponsor – without bipartisan support, CCL is unwilling to throw its full support behind a bill.

While some bipartisan climate proposals are comprehensive and aggressive, like carbon pricing, there is another broad range of policy proposals that have bipartisan appeal but have earned the label “incremental.” This category of policies tends to include an array of small-scale, innovation and conservation-based bills that are less-ambitious or drastic in nature and, thus, less contentious and divisive. Some examples include the Great American Outdoors Act (H.R. 1957), which would fund the restoration of public parks; the Trillion Trees Act (H.R. 5859), which would direct a major reforestation effort; and the USE IT (Utilizing Significant Emission with

Innovative Technologies) Act (S.383), which will help fund carbon capture research and development.

Conclusion

As this review of current literature makes clear, there are important questions related to the climate change policy agenda and to the agenda-setting process more generally that merit more attention. In particular, how should we be looking at the role of public opinion and demographic shifts in the public in influencing policy agenda development? Is there a direction public opinion may point us that will allow for a deeper understanding of the groups pushing and pulling climate policy? What role might investor behavior and communications play in affecting 16 shifts in policy agendas? Are we seeing a movement towards bipartisan policy proposals and are there reasons to believe more radical proposals have enhanced their appeal? The literature to date leaves these questions open and unanswered. The goal of the research that follows is to fill in important holes regarding the climate agenda and to test the usefulness of Kingdon’s agenda- setting model to understanding cutting edge issues under contemporary debate.

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Chapter Three: Research Design

Introduction

This chapter reviews the research question and related hypotheses, and outlines the methods used to analyze this question and test these hypotheses.

The research question at hand is, using the agenda-setting model, how likely does it appear that climate policy will rise on the federal political agenda following the 2020 elections, what factors are involved in shaping that political agenda, and how are those factors shaping the political agenda? As discussed in the review of the literature, this research seeks to identify problem-defining and solution-providing factors that are shaping climate policy. The aim is to understand and account for previously overlooked groups influencing the Republican Party, and account for and evaluate the emergence and influence of these groups. A question about the climate agenda with an eye to the Republican Party calls for the analysis of three groups: the

Republican Party establishment, young conservatives, and prominent financial actors, such as investors.

Hypotheses

To understand the specific role of these three groups and how they may serve to answer this research question, the several following hypotheses are being tested:

Hypotheses: Republican Party Establishment 18

Hypothesis 1: The Republican Party has a clear position on climate change and is generally opposed to acting on the issue. The Party has an anti-climate agenda and is not interested in prioritizing the climate issue.

Hypotheses: Young Conservatives

Hypothesis 2: There is an organized effort among young conservatives to propel progress on the climate issue.

Hypothesis 3: Young conservative climate and environmental groups are actors in the policy stream that are actively proposing and advocating for conservative climate solutions.

Hypothesis 4: Conservative climate proposals are being proposed as middle-grounded, bipartisan alternatives to more radical, progressive climate proposals.

Hypotheses: Investors and Financial Institutions

Hypothesis 5: Investors and financial institutions are facing pressure to respond to climate change.

Hypothesis 6: Investors and financial institutions are responding to a climate-conscious public and investors are putting pressure on client companies to increase their sustainability efforts and transform them into economic actors whose goals and operations are aligned with climate progress.

Hypothesis 7: Investors are responding to climate change because it is in their financial interest. 19

Hypothesis 8: Republicans who engage on the climate issue are taking signals from investors, economic actors, and financial institutions.

Methods

Different methods will be valuable in researching this question in terms of understanding the movement of climate change on the political agenda.

The first step in answering this research question is to look at public opinion. Public opinion often serves as a signal for or evidence of activation within different sectors of the public. It is important to provide research of public opinion in order to not only understand the degree to which the public is concerned about an issue, gauge the public’s appetite for a solution, and isolate certain subsets of the population and their attitudes towards an issue, but it is also important to seek out agreement and consistency across different polling entities. An independent public opinion analysis will not be necessary here considering that existing public opinion surveys and polls have already explored the trends most relevant to this research. What will be relevant here is synthesizing and summarizing the trends in public opinion that pertain to the general public, the Democratic versus Republican Party, and young conservatives versus older conservatives on the issue of climate change. Public opinion polls and surveys will be collected from various sources including Pew Research, Gallup, Luntz Polling, The Conservation

Coalition, Conservative Energy Network, Resources for the Future, Yale Climate

Communications, and Glocalities.

Public opinion provides an essential foundation for doing a more in-depth content analysis. While public opinion is useful for expressing broad, yet significant, trends, it fails to properly reflect the commitment to an issue, potential solutions, and breadth of interest. A 20 content analysis will be crucial for filling in the gaps left over by public opinion surveys. An analysis of this kind will be used to understand how groups are communicating the problem, why they are concerned, how the language is being used, and identify continuity in messaging, themes, and language. It will also help us understand the many possible policy solutions that are being considered, why they are being considered, and how they are being received politically.

This method will be used to analyze the rhetoric, public statements, and policy solutions made or proposed by climate organizations, investors, and Republican Party leaders.

Evidence for this content analysis will be pulled from a broad array of sources and will be qualitative and quantitative. Falling into the first category will include opinion pieces published by conservative climate advocates and Republican members of Congress; formal letters to company clients from investors; public statements by CEOs of major asset managers and banks; public statements by young conservative climate leaders; public statements by prominent

Republican officials; the 2016 GOP Platform; the mission statements of young conservative climate groups; the text of congressional bills and resolutions; and the content of climate-related shareholder resolutions. For the second category, quantitative research, data will be collected from the Rainforest Action Network Fossil Fuel Finance Report Card, As You Sow shareholder resolution tracker, CERES climate-related shareholder resolution database, and OilPrice.com, which tracks the oil market and prices.

Conclusion

Understanding how the climate policy agenda is shaping up and how key Republican groups, young conservatives and investors, are influencing that agenda is best evaluated by a 21 close and systematic analysis of a broad base of sources, supported by a thorough background review and evaluation of existing public opinion polls and surveys.

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Chapter Four: A Background of Public Opinion

Introduction

This chapter provides a deeper, more thorough summary of the public opinion landscape from which this paper’s content analysis will launch. Using existing data analyses from Gallup,

Pew Research, Luntz Polling, and Stanford University in partnership with Resources for the

Future, and others, this chapter analyzes the degree to which there is agreement and consensus across various polls, surveys, and research. This chapter also summarizes the trends among the general public, Republicans, and young conservatives as it pertains to attitudes on climate change, policy, and clean energy development leading up to the start of the Biden administration.

Public Opinion in 2020

Public opinion polls and surveys suggest that the American public was largely aware of climate change, concerned, and supportive of a governmental response leading into 2020 (Pew

Research). Even in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic and the corresponding economic crisis in 2020, our most recent polls have continued to reflect a climate-conscious public that remains committed to prioritizing and supporting climate action by the federal government.

Just prior to the COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent economic downturn, the general

American public demonstrated not only an acute awareness and recognition of the climate problem, but an unmistakable sense of concern, keen desire for a governmental response, and receptivity to the use of clean energy. In October 2019, 62% of adult Americans said they witnessed the imprint of climate change in their local communities; 67% said that the federal government was not doing enough to mitigate the effects of high emission levels; and 77% 23 supported the expansion of low-carbon energy sources, as opposed to fossil fuels (Pew Research

Center, “U.S. Public Views on Climate and Energy”).

Following the 2008 Financial Crisis, the American public revealed a diminished prioritization of global warming. In 2007, approximately 45% of adult Americans said global warming was a serious problem (Pew Research Center, “Americans, Politics and Science

Issues”). Shortly after 2009, public attitudes had plummeted, with approximately 31-34% of adult Americans saying global warming was a serious problem. Evidence from both the United

States and European nations place doubt on some explanations for this change, including political polarization, climate media coverage, and short-term weather fluctuations (Scruggs,

Benegal). The swift change in public opinion at the time it occurred is arguably best explained by financial factors, as the public’s attention was captured by concerns over the economy and unemployment.

Like 2008, did the financial turmoil of 2020, on top of an unprecedented public health crisis, also coincide with a trend in public opinion that reflected shifting priorities and diminished climate concern among the American public? No. There is no evidence that the trends in public opinion that occurred in 2008 were reproduced in light of the new economic chaos of 2020 – and leading into 2021. The most recent polls available measured the attitudes of

American adults from May 2020 to August 2020 – which was 3 to 6 months after the United

States’ first COVID-related closures, sending the U.S. economy into a chaotic pause. These surveys revealed that 82% of correspondents thought the U.S. government should be doing at least a “moderate” amount to address the changing climate, a historic high (Krosnick,

MacInnis). 24

Other recent polls, conducted from April to May 2020, gauged the American public’s support for a variety of climate and environmental policy proposals. Even in the midst of two crises, U.S. public opinion was strongly receptive to various climate solutions, even a cost-rising carbon tax. For example, 90% supported the creation of natural carbon sinks through a major effort of planting one trillion trees; 80% supported more stringent restrictions or regulations on power plants; 73% supported a carbon tax; and 79% supported the prioritization of clean energy development over other energy sources – slightly higher than in 2019 (Tyson, Kennedy).

While it is unknown whether concern over climate change and support for emission- reducing policies will fluctuate as public health and economic challenges persist, what we can say is that the American public remained a climate-conscious and concerned population throughout 2020, as it was prior to the crises that occurred during the year, and thus, increases the likelihood that the climate issue is also capturing the attention of those most responsive to public opinion, such as policymakers.

Public Opinion Before 2020: Putting 2020 into Context

Public opinion polls and surveys suggest that over the last decade, the public’s concern over climate change, support for a governmental response, and support for clean energy steadily rose, reaching its highest point in 2020 (Pew Research Center, “As Economic Concerns Recede,

Environmental Protection Rises on the Public’s Policy Agenda”). There is evidence and reason to believe that public opinion around climate change and the environment in 2020 is uniquely receptive to some kind of prioritization of these issues on the political agenda, when compared to the previous 10 years. However, there is also evidence of there being earlier moments in the

United States’ history of record high levels of public concern over environmental issues and 25 support for governmental intervention (Gallup). Notably, these moments have also coincided with meaningful actions by the government to solve some of the day’s most pressing environmental dilemmas.

Already mentioned are the most recent surveys that reveal historically high pro-climate attitudes among the American public during 2020 (Krosnick, MacInnis). More polls and surveys point to a similar trend. Between 2008 and 2009, less than one-third of US adults said that environmental and climate policies should be a priority (Pew Research Center, “U.S. Public

Views on Climate and Energy”). This number steadily declined until reversing in 2013, leading up to 2020 when 52% of US adults said policies addressing climate change should be a priority for Congress and the president – whereas 44% thought this in the year prior.

About twenty years before, instead of 10, trends of a similar nature remain. Just before

1999, 27% of the U.S. adult population said that the seriousness of global warming was generally underestimated (Gallup). Reflecting heightened concern over climate change, that percentage increased to 42% in 2019, the highest since 1999.

However, roughly thirty years prior, surveys reveal that the percentage of U.S. adults who were worried about global warming is the same as it is in 2020. In May of 1989, 63% of

U.S. adults said they were worried about global warming a ‘great deal’ or ‘fair amount’ – the same percentage as in 2020 (Marlon et al). It is important to note that the very early 1990’s saw other strong pro-environmental attitudes among the general public. In 1992, 68% of the adult population thought the government was doing too little to address environmental issues in general – compared to the 67% of U.S. adults who said that the federal government was not doing enough to mitigate the effects of specifically climate change in 2020. From 1989 to 1991, 26 the U.S. also witnessed the highest level of concerns over air quality and acid rain in the decades that followed. This coincided with President George H. W. Bush making monumental key revisions to the Clean Air Act in 1990 that resulted in the creation of a successful cap-and-trade program to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions.

Partisan Divide on Climate Change

Supporting common knowledge, polls show that climate change is not only a polarized issue, like many others, but it is the single most divisive issue between the Republican and

Democratic parties.

According to a 2019 survey conducted by Pew Research Center, 90% of self-identified

Democrats and individuals who lean Democrat said that the federal government was doing too little to reduce the effects of climate change – only 39% of self-identified Republicans and individuals who lean Republican said the federal government was doing too little. When asked which issue was “very important” to their vote in the 2020 presidential election, the issue with the greatest difference between Democrats and Republicans was climate change – even more so than race and ethnic equality, another highly contentious issue of 2020. Among Democrats, 68% said climate change was very important to their vote, whereas only 11% of Republicans said it was. This means Democrats are over 5 times more likely to consider climate change as being important in terms of informing their voting decisions in 2020.

Generational Shifts in Republican Party

We run the risk of losing a great deal of understanding when we cluster everybody in large, diverse groups together. It is often assumed that there is a broad, general lack of support 27 for climate action among Republicans. But this assumption may lead to disregarding an interesting set of trends hidden beneath general, nonspecific numbers and categories. Therefore, it is worth diving further into the opinions and changing attitudes of a particular subset of the

Republican Party. For our purposes here, that subset will be the younger generation of conservatives and potential GOP voters.

Public opinion polls and surveys suggest there has been a shift among GOP voters, specifically young conservatives, resulting in a generational division in the Republican party with Gen Z and Millennial voters being more climate-concerned and supportive of clean energy development than their elders (Pew Research Center, “U.S. Public Views on Climate and

Energy”). Combined, Gen Z and Millennial voters are the largest group of eligible voters and hold tremendous political potential. Thus, the evidence provided in this section shows that we are witnessing a shift in a group that has meaningful political clout within the Republican Party: the emerging generation of young GOP voters.

Recent polls show that breaking ideological groups down by age, in particular, merits careful consideration. Despite polls showing that only 11% of Republicans, across all age groups, said climate change was very important to their vote in the 2020 presidential election, other surveys that break down Republican voters by age reveal a starkly different trend.

According to a poll conducted by The Conservation Coalition and Conservative Energy

Network, 81% of all GOP and Independent respondents between the ages of 18 and 34 said that climate change was important to their vote. This compares to the 68% of GOP respondents and

76% of Independent respondents between the ages of 18 and 54. 28

According to the 2019 survey conducted by the Pew Research Center, titled “U.S. Public

Views on Climate and Energy,” more than half (52%) of Millennial and Gen Z Republicans think the government is doing too little to address climate change and more than three-quarters support the development of clean energy – compared to 31% of Boomers or 41% Gen X’ers who think the government is doing too little to reduce emissions. Fifty-three percent of older

Republicans believe the United States should prioritize the development of alternative energy sources, compared to 78% of young Republicans. And, lastly, roughly 20% more of older

Republicans than young Republicans support the expansion of offshore drilling, coal mining, and hydraulic fracturing.

Another poll, conducted by Luntz Global Polling, reveals similar, yet even more striking trends. According to this survey, 69% of GOP voters, across all ages, are worried that their party’s stance on climate change is hurting them with young voters. The survey also demonstrates strong support among young Republicans for specific market-based climate policies. For example, 75% of Republican voters below the age of 40 support what is called the

Carbon Dividends Plan – a revenue-neutral carbon tax.

Lastly, according to a survey conducted by Glocalities, the percentage of the general

American public who agreed with the statement “I worry about the damage that people cause to the planet” had gradually risen by 8% between 2014 (61%) and 2019 (69%) (Lampert et al).

However, a demographic breakdown reveals that the strongest rise in concern occurred among

Republicans, with an 11% increase leaving the total percentage of concerned Republicans at 58%

– this compares to a 9% increase among Democratic voters. But, looking at specifically young

Republicans, the rise in concern from 2014 to 2019 is even stronger with an 18% increase – 29 meaning 67% of young conservatives in the United States considered themselves worried about the environment in 2019, only 2% below the national average.

It is worth noting that this survey’s questions were oriented around the damage humans caused to the planet. This is a broad question which captures a variety of issues, including climate change, pollution, deforestation, and so on. Republicans consistently demonstrate greater concern over environmental issues in general versus climate change. This explains why the

Glocalities poll reveals a percentage of Republicans concerned about the environment that is much higher than other polls specifically focused on climate change. For example, Pew Research conducted a poll that revealed 31% of Republican adults thought climate change was a major threat to the well-being of the United States – much higher than the 69% of Republicans who said, “I worry about the damage that people cause to the planet.”

However, this poll remains relevant and worth attention because it highlights a generational shift and difference in the Republican Party on environmental issues, not only in terms of the total percentage of young versus old conservatives concerned about the environment, but the rate at which the number of environmentally-conscious young conservatives has grown compared to older conservatives.

Conclusion

In this chapter, the United States’ public opinion landscape was surveyed to frame one of

Kingdon’s three streams: the problem stream. Public opinion is playing its part to ‘define the problem’ and is ripe for capturing the attention of policymakers. It is also serving as a signal of potential activation among certain subsets of the population that have the potential to influence how an issue shapes up on the policy agenda. 30

There are four primary findings in this chapter’s summary of public opinion. First, the evidence shows that the American public was highly concerned about climate change and supportive of government action in 2020. Second, the effects of the COVID pandemic and associated economic downturn has not diminished the public’s concern for the environment or support for climate action, as it did following the 2008 Recession. Third, the public’s concern over climate change reached a 10-year peak in 2020. And fourth, there are observable and measurable shifts in the Republican Party’s prospective voters, placing its most recent political platform in conflict with the young, emerging generation’s environmental priorities.

The two subsequent chapters seek to account for what public opinion cannot, by probing more deeply into the motivations behind shifts in the Republican Party and their young base, gauging the depth of these groups’ commitment to the climate issue, and analyzing how it is (or is not) being prioritized.

31

Chapter Five: The Republican Party Establishment

Introduction

It is most commonly thought that the Republican Party is not interested in the climate issue or making it a policy or political priority. Progress on climate change is often considered to hinge upon the willingness of Republicans to migrate to a more pro-climate stance or the

Democratic Party’s ability to trounce the Republican Party and cram an all-Democrat, progressive climate proposal through the legislative process or via executive order. This chapter attempts to test the assumption that climate change is not an agenda item for the Republican

Party and its most prominent leaders.

Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: The Republican Party has a clear position on climate change and is generally opposed to acting on the issue. The Party has an anti-climate agenda and is not interested in prioritizing the climate issue.

Data

In this chapter, data will be collected from the official RNC website, the congressional websites of Republican Members of Congress, and energy and environmentally related bills in

Congress to analyze how climate change is being prioritized, specific wording and language that reveals the Republican establishment’s attitude towards climate change, and the specific legislative initiatives being pursued that pertain to climate, the environment, and/or energy development. Most of the data collected on members of Congress, the Republican Party, and 32

Republican leaders will focus on the period of the 116th Congress because this is the last congressional session before the 2020 elections and the period leading into the Biden administration.

The Republican National Committee

“Climate change is far from this nation’s most pressing national security issue. This is the

triumph of extremism over common sense, and Congress must stop it.”

~Republican Party Platform 2016, section ‘America’s Natural Resources: Agriculture, Energy,

and the Environment.’

The official Republican Party platform of 2016, repurposed for 2020, mentions the word

“climate” or “climate change” a total of 10 times – whereas the Democratic Party platform mentions these words a total of 62 times. The Republican Party platform does reveal an unambiguous and explicit hostility to the implementation of comprehensive climate policy and the prioritization of large-scale clean energy development, in addition to a skepticism of some of the most well-respected sources of climate science and data.

The Republican Party’s platform reflects what is often labeled as an “all-of-the-above” fossil fuel energy approach (Republican National Convention). According to the GOP platform, the Party supports the “development of all forms of energy that are marketable in a free economy without subsidies, including coal, oil, natural gas, nuclear power, and hydropower” (20). The platform makes clear that this approach does not exclude government support for carbon- intensive energy sources (e.g., coal, oil, and natural gas) but does exclude government support 33 for select low-carbon energy sources, such as wind, solar, biomass, biofuel, geothermal, and tidal energy. Republican Party sources suggest that these non-traditional energy approaches, instead, should be supported by “cost-effective development” via “private capital.”

According to the platform, the Republican Party supports opening public lands and the outer continental shelf to exploration and production. It says, “The Democratic Party’s energy policy can be summed up in a slogan currently popular among its activists: “keep it in the ground” (19). Citing concerns over high-energy prices for low-income Americans, employment immobility, and higher food prices, the platform states it will reject the Democratic Party’s approach, in addition to President Obama’s Clean Power Plan. Using language such as “war on coal” and “radical anti-coal agenda,” the platform portrays attempts by the political Left to decarbonize the U.S. economy as fanatical, extremist efforts that maliciously attack a specific industry (e.g., coal) and, in effect, the communities dependent on that industry (19). The platform also makes clear that the Party does not support the implementation of a carbon tax due to concerns over rising energy prices.

Labeling it the Democratic Party’s “most damaging weapon,” the platform condemns the creation of a more rigid, prolonged oil and gas permitting process that has hindered or slowed the construction of pipelines. Citing the Keystone Pipeline and calling it a “a symbol of everything wrong with the current [Obama] Administration’s ideological approach,” the platform affirms the Republican Party’s commitment to complete the pipeline and secure “North American energy security” – all the while using language such as “kill” to characterize the Obama

Administration’s efforts to slow the pipeline's development and depicting these attempts at catering to “environmental extremists” (19). The Republican Party also condemns the Obama

Administration’s push to have the Department of Defense generate 25 percent of its electricity 34 from renewables by 2025. It says “Climate change is far from this nation’s most pressing national security issue. This is the triumph of extremism over common sense, and Congress must stop it” (20).

Despite an outwardly climate-hostile approach to energy and policy, the platform attempts to make a commitment to environmental stewardship: “As the pioneer of environmentalism a century ago, the Republican Party reaffirms the moral obligation to be good stewards of the God-given natural beauty and resources of our country” (19). However, rather than appealing to a need for more environmental progress, the platform cites evidence of clean air and water, pollution reduction, recycling improvements, and better public education, followed by a criticism of the Democratic Party that, in effect, minimizes ongoing concerns over environmental conditions: “These successes become a challenge for Democratic Party environmental extremists, who must reach farther and demand more to sustain the illusion of an environmental crisis” (21). It is worth reemphasizing the platform’s characterization of modern environmental concerns by categorizing them as an “illusion” as if these problems, including climate change, are not problems at all.

Citing “shoddy science, scare tactics, and centralized command-and-control regulation” by the political Left, the Republican Party platform provides an alternative approach that includes drastic federal deregulation, state-level empowerment, transforming the EPA into an independent bipartisan commission, the ‘de-politicization’ of science, enforcement of the original Clean Air Act (without the additional EPA regulations that were later included), freezing funding to the U.N.’s Framework Convention on Climate Change, rejecting the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement, and simplifying the pipeline permitting process (21). The platform also 35 rejects the IPCC report as “a political mechanism, not an unbiased scientific institution” and commits to “evaluate its recommendations accordingly.”

What is said in the platform, has been reinforced by Ronna McDaniel, the Republican

National Committee Chairwoman. When asked by Fox News what her thoughts on the 2020

Democratic Climate Crisis Town Hall were, she said “I think we saw the Democrat Party lurch even further towards socialism. Their answer to everything is more government control” (Fox

News). When presented with polls showing that 74% of young Americans think that climate change is an “emergency,” McDaniel was asked by the news host whether the Republican

Party’s stance on climate change would damage their standing with young conservative voters.

Her response: “Republicans care about the environment...But the extreme measures that the

Democrats are going to, the radical Green New Deal...that will absolutely destroy our economy...it’s just not the answer. So, we are ready to have this debate.” What the Republican

Party would bring to the table, Mrs. McDaniel did not say.

Republican Leaders: Hostile to Climate Action

Many Republican leaders and elected officials in the government, from various branches, have demonstrated a consistent willingness to “toe the party line” and embrace not only an “all- of-the-above” fossil fuel energy approach that is sympathetic to fossil fuel development but is opposed to a large-scale climate agenda, like the Republican Party platform. This paper considers members of Congress as supportive of climate action if they have demonstrated a serious willingness to seek out solutions that are at the same scale as the problem itself, meaning they result in a meaningful reduction in carbon emissions. If not, or if they are explicitly opposed 36 to action on climate, they will be considered hostile to climate action as they are not playing a part in pushing the issue higher on the political agenda.

While Ronna McDaniel is the presiding officer of the Republican Party, the former

President of the United States, Donald J. Trump, served as the principal representative of the

Party to the general American public during the 116th Congress. President Trump’s legacy on climate and energy will be best known by his strong support for fossil fuel development, iconic fondness for “clean coal,” attempting to auction off drilling rights in the Arctic National Wildlife

Refuge at the very end of his term, drastic environmental regulation rollbacks, appointing a former coal lobbyist to lead the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), mocking renowned climate activist Greta Thunberg on social media, dismantling the Obama administration’s Clean

Power Plan, withdrawing from the Paris Climate Agreement, and outwardly doubting the legitimacy of reputable climate science reports, such as the National Climate Assessment.

However, despite a consistently pro-fossil fuel agenda incompatible with the rise of a pro-climate agenda, the Trump administration has backed multiple pro-environmental initiatives that often go unnoticed. The Bureau of Land Management under the Trump administration approved Nevada's Gemini Solar Project, which would be the largest solar plant in the United

States once completed (Permitting Dashboard). President Trump also supported other historical environmental initiatives. In August 2020, Trump signed into law the bipartisan Great American

Outdoors Act – the largest land conservation and national park restoration bill in the history of the United States. Lastly, during his State of the Union address in 2020, Trump stated his support for the United States joining the Trillion Trees Initiative, a major reforestation program started by the United Nations a decade ago (New York Times, “Full Transcript: Trump's 2020 State of the Union Address”). He later referred to the proposal during a 2020 presidential debate, when 37 climate change was unexpectedly included in the questions provided by debate moderator and

Fox News host, Chris Wallace (Aton). In October 2020, Trump also signed an executive order to create a One Trillion Trees Interagency Council (Department of Interior).

While these efforts and initiatives are notable, they are not an indication that Trump’s anti-climate legacy is a mischaracterization of his four years in office. According to the MIT EN-

ROADS climate simulator1, should existing global climate policy remain stagnant, we can expect a 3.6 degrees Celsius increase in global temperature by 2100 (Climate Interactive). Should all other existing global climate policy remain stagnant, but high levels of tree reforestation occur, this would only prevent a .1 degrees Celsius increase in the global average temperature. Like the

Trillion Trees Initiative, the Great American Outdoors Act, while historical, is seldom a targeted, emission-reducing bill. It would, on net, do very little to reduce emission levels in the United

States. The Department of Interior also failed to submit a list of projects it would like to fund under the Great American Outdoors Act for 2021, threatening the success of major conservation initiatives meant to be supported by the money earmarked for the Act (Frazin).

Several, if not most, Republican Members of Congress are known for a similar climate legacy as President Trump. In the 116th Congress, 130 of active members had, at some point, doubted or denied the science supporting human-caused climate change – all of them were

Republican (Cranley). In September of 2019, when asked whether the climate is changing,

Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) responded with “Absolutely” (NBC News). When asked whether the

1 The MIT EN-Roads is a climate policy simulator that allows policy-makers, academics, financial advisors, non- profit organizations, and the general public to design their own climate policy scenarios, to experiment with different policies, and to test assumptions about the potential of various solutions to keep global temperatures below 1.5 degrees Celsius. The model provides a broad array of climate policies and allows users to manually adjust which policies are implemented and to what degree. The model can be accessed at https://www.climateinteractive.org/tools/en-roads/.

38 climate is changing due to human activity and whether we need to reduce our emissions he said,

“the data are mixed,” following a claim that satellite data has shown no statistically significant evidence of the Earth warming – a claim he has made since 2016 (Mooney).

Unlike Senator Cruz, former Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, in 2019, said that he does believe humans are causing modern climate change (Carney, “McConnell: 'I Do' Believe in Human-Caused Climate Change”). However, a week after making that that statement,

McConnell rushed a vote on the Ocasio Cortez-Markey Green New Deal resolution (H.Res.109) in an attempt to force moderate and centrist Democrats to put their name on record as supporting or not supporting the measure, underscoring divisions within the Democratic Party and to put a spotlight on the Republican-labeled “socialist” proposal leading up to the 2020 elections.

McConnell said, “I’ve noted with interest the Green New Deal. We’re going to be voting on that in the Senate; it will give everybody an opportunity to go on record and see how they feel about the Green New Deal” (Nilsen). In the end, 43 Democrats and Independents voted ‘Present’ and

57, including four Democrats, voted in opposition to the resolution (Pramuk).

In May 2019, McConnell also refused to take up a Democratic bill preventing President

Trump from withdrawing from the Paris Climate Agreement (Carney, “McConnell: Senate

Won't Take up Bill Preventing US Withdrawal from Paris Deal”). Democrats in the Senate have labeled McConnell’s desk a “legislative graveyard,” where more than 250 bills passed in the

Democratic-majority House died because they were never brought to a vote in the Senate (Senate

Democrats). This highlights an important characteristic of Republican methodology and strategy.

Republicans don’t need to legislate or engage in anti-climate efforts to achieve a pro-fossil fuel agenda. All they need to do is obstruct or prevent the rise of climate on the agenda and maintain the status quo – a feat that is substantially easier than passing legislation through Congress and 39 pushing an issue higher on the political agenda. Business-as-usual is the most effective, and easiest, anti-climate strategy Republican members of Congress can pursue.

In addition to Senators McConnell and Cruz, other members of Congress have demonstrated rhetoric, made statements, and taken legislative actions hostile to climate policy.

During a floor speech in 2019, Senator Mike Lee (R-UT) jokingly claimed that the Green New

Deal would result in people getting around by riding a fictional creature from “Star Wars” and claimed that the true solution to climate change is having more children (CNN). On Senator

Boozman’s (R-AR) website, he stated support for an “all-of-the-above” approach to energy security, identical to the Republican Party platform, which includes increased domestic fossil fuel exploration, “traditional” at-home energy production, more pipeline projects, and rolling back the Obama administration’s moratorium on new coal mining leases (U.S. Senator John

Boozman). And, in May 2019, 190 out of the 193 House Republicans voted in opposition to the

Climate Action Now Act (H.R.9) which sought to direct President Trump to create a plan to reduce U.S. emissions, in accordance with the Paris Climate Agreement (Office of the Clerk).

The last, and perhaps most interesting, group of Republicans that are classified in this paper as hostile to climate action are those who acknowledge the climate problem and publicly state a need for action but fail to pursue serious solutions. Among these Republicans includes

Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL), member of the 2020 Bipartisan Senate Climate Solutions Caucus.

In an opinion piece authored by Rubio, he cited evidence of climate change impacting Floridian communities and the coast. He said “adaptive solutions” are the way to go, while in the same breath, Rubio condemned serious efforts and proposals meant to aggressively curb emissions, like a carbon tax or the Green New Deal (Rubio). These “adaptive solutions” he refers to include the Central Everglades Planning Project and Restoring Resilient Reefs Act (S.2429), both 40 positive environmental endeavors and parts of a larger climate solution but lack the necessary

‘teeth’ to reduce emissions to recommended levels. In other words, by themselves, these initiatives are largely inadequate in terms of tackling the climate problem at the scale that is necessary.

Another example includes Senator John Barasso, representing the leading coal producing state in the country: Wyoming. As the former Chairman of the Senate Environment and Public

Works Committee, Barasso introduced the bipartisan USE IT Act (S.383) – a piece of legislation that would support the research and development of carbon capture, storage, and utilization technologies. Citing a “war on coal” under the Obama administration, Barasso made an appeal in a 2020 opinion piece for enhanced oil recovery and accelerating carbon capture and utilization technology development “which will allow us to keep using coal.” According to Barasso, technological innovation of this sort “is the solution to addressing climate change,” not

“government regulation or taxation” (Barasso). However, again, using the MIT En-ROADS climate simulator, should existing global climate policy remain stagnant, we can expect a 3.6 degrees Celsius increase in global temperature by 2100. Should existing global climate policy remain stagnant, but high levels of carbon removal and capture technology are deployed, this would only prevent a .4 degrees Celsius increase – leaving the global average temperature meaningfully above the 1.5 degrees Celsius climate threshold established by the IPCC report.

Similar to the positions of Senator Rubio, these climate initiatives are positive and a part of the larger climate solution, but they are by no means sufficient or in line with a comprehensive, complete climate agenda.

Republican Leaders: Supportive of Climate Action 41

“...you don’t have to rely on science. All you have to do is use your eyes...There is no

question, no question, that the earth is warming, and there’s no question that there are

consequences.”

~George P. Shultz, Secretary of State under President Reagan

Every year since 2013, Representative Steve Scalise (R-LA) and Representative David B.

McKinley P.E. (R-WV) have co-introduced a resolution condemning a carbon tax titled

“Expressing the sense of Congress that a carbon tax would be detrimental to the United States economy.” When first introduced in the 113th Congress as H.Con.Res.24, the resolution had 155 co-sponsors – all but one were Republican. When re-introduced in the 116th Congress as

H.Con.Res.41, the resolution had only 24 cosponsors, all of whom were Republican. This change reflects a small evolving subset of Republican leaders who have moved into the climate space as active, positive players and are providing a voice for the growing base of climate-conscious conservatives that are not represented well by the official Republican Party platform.

In 1992, life-long Republican, Bob Inglis, ran his first successful campaign and was elected to the U.S. Congress representing Greenville-Spartanburg, South Carolina. He was re- elected two more times, until taking a break from Congress in 1998. During that time, Inglis was a climate denier. “My first six years of Congress were abysmal on climate. If Al Gore was for it, therefore, I was against it” (Joe Biden for President 2020). It wasn’t until his son, Rob Inglis, sought to transform his father’s stance on climate change, asked him to “do better,” and organized a trip to the Great Barrier Reef, that Bob Inglis experienced an epiphany that marked the beginning of his service to the environment. 42

In 2004, he reentered the political scene and was re-elected. Inglis continued to serve in the House of Representatives until losing his re-election during the 2010 South Carolina

Republican primary. In the deeply conservative 4th Congressional District in South Carolina,

Inglis attracted four primary opponents who (successfully) cast Inglis as being excessively moderate or non-conservative, citing stances on issues straying from the core Republican Party platform. One of these issues was climate change (Kraushaar). By 2009, Inglis had been openly opposed to offshore drilling and frequently condemned climate denialism in front of Congress.

In 2011, Inglis launched the Energy and Enterprise Initiative (E&EI), a group that strives to promote free enterprise solutions to climate change. Three years later, Inglis founded republicEn – a Republican organization whose mission is to “encourage, embolden, and applaud conservative climate leadership” all the while helping “conservatives navigate the treacherous climate conversation with confidence” (republicEn). Coining the term “eco-right,” republicEn works towards carving out a space for conservatives in the climate movement, all the while launching conservative solutions into the climate solution landscape, such as carbon pricing. In

Inglis’ words, “Free market solutions to climate change are embedded in conservative principles and supported by right-of-center economists. You don’t need to grow the government or rely on red tape riddled regulations to solve the climate crisis…Conservatives need to return home to our economic and environmental roots and commit to rebuilding this country on a clean energy economy…” (Inglis).

As for the Republican establishment, Inglis said in a 2020 interview, “There’s a fear in the party of contradicting Trump but there will be a reappraisal at some point because we won’t be able win without talking about climate. Trump may be able to eke out an electoral college victory this time, but that won’t happen again with four more years of demographic change” 43

(Milman). Of course, however, President Trump did not successfully win his re-election race in

2020. If a reappraisal were to happen, we may be operating during one at the time of this writing.

As a climate-denying-Republican-turned-climate-action-champion, Bob Inglis and his individual transformation not only reflect the nonuniformity of the Republican Party, but also the potential for other Republican leaders to ascend the mantle of climate leadership. One of these leaders includes former Florida Representative Carlos Curbelo.

Curbelo represented Florida’s 7th Congressional district from 2015-2019, during which he was in his late thirties. Serving as a mouthpiece for the broad base of young, climate- conscious young conservatives consistently reflected by polls, Curbelo said “While there are still some deniers out there, most Americans today understand that climate change caused by human activity is a reality that must be addressed” (Milman). Like Inglis, Curbelo is and was a proponent of carbon pricing. In 2018, Curbelo co-introduced the MARKET CHOICE Act – a bill that would impose a tax on carbon emissions and use that revenue to invest in infrastructure and fund associated projects (H.R. 6463). On a carbon tax, Curbelo said in an interview,

“Republicans have to understand that [a carbon tax] is a conservative solution, and it happens to be the most effective and efficient solution as well, to recognize an externality in the economy, something that is causing damage yet is unaccounted for, something that can replace arbitrary regulation and give businesses and American families more certainty and more opportunities in the future” (Citizens Climate Lobby, “Former Congressman Carlos Curbelo Weighs in on

Climate Progress”).

In 2017, Curbelo also co-signed a letter urging former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson to maintain the Paris Climate Agreement. The letter read, “Fully implementing the climate 44 agreement reached in Paris will create American jobs, boost U.S. competitiveness, and help to transform today’s low-carbon investments into trillions of dollars of clean prosperity” (Curbelo et al). One day after signing this letter, Curbelo cosponsored a resolution titled “Expressing the commitment of the House of Representatives to conservative environmental stewardship”

(H.Res.195) that sought to call on the House to “commit to working on economically viable solutions that address the risks of climate change” (Dixon). Curbelo said, “Every member of

Congress has a responsibility to our constituents and future generations to support market-based solutions, investments, and innovations that could alleviate the effects of climate change and make our nation more resilient...Our goal with this resolution is to shift the debate from whether climate change is real toward the tangible efforts to reduce carbon emissions and mitigate its effects.” Most notable is the fact 22 other Republican members of the House of Representatives also signed onto this resolution (Dixon). Curbelo was not the lone Republican.

Francis Rooney, another former Republican congressman from Florida who retired in

2020 due to partisan gridlock, was a close climate companion of Curbelo. In 2018 and 2019,

Rooney co-introduced the MARKET CHOICE Act with Curbelo. And, in 2019, Rooney co- introduced the Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend Act (H.R. 763) with Democratic colleague, Representative Deutch, also of Florida. This bill sought to impose a revenue-neutral carbon tax on fossil fuels. Rooney was the lone Republican on the bill.

In 2019, Rooney published an article titled “I’m a Conservative Republican. Climate

Change is Real.” He not only cited his concerns as a representative of a coastal Florida community that would be hit hardest by a changing climate, but he offered the Republican Party a harsh reminder of what an anti-climate agenda would mean for the Party’s electoral success:

“It’s time for my fellow Republicans in Congress to stop treating this environmental threat as 45 something abstract and political and recognize that it’s already affecting their constituents in their daily lives. If we don’t change our party’s position soon, our voters will punish us”

(Rooney). Appealing to the best of the Republican Party, Rooney said “If we want to show

America that we’re the party of the future, then it’s time for all Republicans to return to their roots as champions of our environment.”

Another conservative climate leader who formerly served in the U.S. Congress is the late

Senator John McCain from Arizona. McCain’s climate legacy in Republican politics is, perhaps, one of the most neglected and overlooked, partially because he took a backseat on the climate issue towards the end of his political career. According to former Colorado senator, Tim Worth,

“It was tough politics for him. It was not easy in Arizona, and it was not easy as the conservative wing of the party was getting more vocal. But he kept hammering away at it, which from the perspective of today seems even more impressive” (Lavelle). However, McCain kept hammering away until he no longer could, due to conditions making the political environment hostile to moderate Republicans.

Shortly after losing his presidential bid in 2000, McCain began his charge on the climate front. He was known to use hearings to educate his fellow members of Congress on the science behind climate change. McCain hosted the first three climate hearings of the year, starting in

May 2000, that featured scientists testifying about issues like melting ice caps and the death of coral reefs (Lavelle).

Most notable, however, were his legislative efforts. In 2003, McCain and former Senator

Joseph Lieberman began introducing a series of climate legislation over the span of 4 years known as the Climate Stewardship Acts. The aim of these bills was to create and implement a 46 cap-and-trade system to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the United States. Each time the bill was introduced, it was either defeated or died in committee. Regardless of the outcome,

McCain’s long-term charge on cap-and-trade was monumental. President of the Environmental

Defense Fund (EDF), Fred Krupp, said “The McCain-Lieberman bill was the most substantial bipartisan effort our country has ever made to address the threat of climate change...The Senator will be remembered as being on the right side of this issue. He fought courageously in Congress to get them to take action on this problem long before we even understood how serious and urgent it is” (Lavelle). On the 2007 Presidential Campaign trail, McCain said “Suppose we’re wrong, and there’s no such thing as greenhouse gas emissions, and we adopt green technologies.

All we’ve done is give our kids a better planet” (Holthaus).

McCain’s legacy is historic and for good reason. But the climate legacy that, perhaps, remains unmatched in the Republican Party belongs to George P. Shultz, who, on February 6th,

2021, passed away at the age of 100 years old. A close confidant of multiple Republican presidents, Shultz served as Labor Secretary, Secretary of the Treasury, and Budget Director for

President Nixon, Secretary of State for President Reagan during the ebbing of the Cold War, and an informal advisor to President H.W. Bush. Shultz is only the second person in U.S. history to have held four different Cabinet-level positions. He is not only well-respected in conservative circles, but he is seen as a pioneer on multiple fronts whose judgment and vision is worth following and trusting. Time and time again, Shultz’s voice and efforts proved to be the catalyst behind several notable, and historic, leaps towards progress.

In the late 1980’s, when President Reagan was making attempts to support the effort to preserve the ozone layer, he not only faced opposition but also a scientific landscape with much less consensus than there is on climate change today. Shultz said that he spoke to Reagan twice a 47 week about the ozone layer until he was “convinced it was a real big problem” (McMahon). To the scientists who were less convinced by the destruction of the ozone layer, the cause, and the severity, Reagan went to them and said, “We respect you, but you do agree that if it happens it's a catastrophe, so let's take out an insurance policy.” This framing of environmental policy in terms of insurance policy and risk-mitigation continues to be a framing that pro-climate conservatives embrace and adopt.

Shultz’s greatest climate achievements, however, have taken place over the last decade.

Beginning in 2013, he became an avid supporter and advocate of a revenue-neutral carbon tax. In

2017, and in partnership with his right-leaning organization called the Climate Leadership

Council (CLC), Shultz co-authored a publication called The Conservative Case for Carbon

Dividends which outlined a revenue-neutral carbon pricing proposal formally known as the

Baker-Shultz Plan (Climate Leadership Council). Other prominent Republicans of substantial influence who co-authored this piece include James A. Baker (Secretary of State under President

H.W. Bush, Secretary of the Treasury under President Reagan, and White House Chief of Staff under both), Martin Feldstein (Chairman of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers from

1982 to 1984 under President Reagan), and Greg Mankiw (Chairman of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers under President George W. Bush). This group, CLC, is also behind the publication of a letter in the Wall Street Journal by 45 prominent economists recommending to policymakers a revenue-neutral price on carbon as the single most “cost effective, equitable, and politically-viable” solution (Akerlof et al). Now, with over 3,500 economists that have signed onto the letter, it is the largest statement of support for any policy in the history of the economic profession. 48

Shultz argued the Republican Party should support conservative, economically-sound, small-government solutions to reducing emissions, like a revenue-neutral carbon tax. After all, in his words, “It was a Republican president that created the EPA. It was a Republican president that did the Montreal Protocol. It was a Republican president that did the cap-and-trade system that dealt with acid rain, so we’re the party that has done something” (Climate One).

Bob Inglis, Carlos Curbelo, Francis Rooney, John McCain, and George P. Shultz previously served in some meaningful capacity within the Republican Party’s ranks. However, their relevance persists because of the lasting implications of their legacies and because Inglis and Curbelo are actively propelling the conservative climate movement forward beyond their tenures as congressmen. It is worth, now, considering elected officials that were doing, or were making some attempt to do, the same in the 116th Congress. The Republicans that will now be discussed are ones that served in the 116th Congress and will still be in office moving into the

117th Congress, either due to reelection or serving out the remainder of their term.

In 2019, Senator Bruan (R-IN) and Senator Coons (D-DE) co-founded the bipartisan

Climate Solutions Caucus in the Senate. Senate Republicans in the Caucus included Senator

Murkowski (R-AK), Senator Romney (R-UT), Senator Graham (R-SC), Senator Rubio (R-FL),

Senator Portman (R-OH), and Susan Collins (R-ME). On the House side were 24 Republicans, including Francis Rooney.

Upon the launch of this caucus, co-founder Senator Braun made the following statement:

“For too long, Washington has been paralyzed by partisan gamesmanship, unable to have productive conversations about our changing climate. Through this caucus we can have real conversations about protecting our environment, securing America’s energy future and 49 protecting American manufacturing jobs” (Tsirkin). The year after, Braun co-introduced the

Growing Climate Solutions Act (S.3894) with Senator Graham which would incentivize farmers and foresters to engage in good environmental practices by helping to provide them greater access to carbon credit markets which would allow them to receive money for the carbon they sequester and reduce in their operations. In Braun’s words, “As a Main Street Entrepreneur and conservationist, I know firsthand that if we want to address our changing climate then we need to facilitate real solutions that our farmers, environmentalists and industry can all support, which this bill accomplishes” (Mike Braun U.S. Senator). Again, however, according to the EN-Roads simulator, natural solutions and carbon credits would only result in a small total reduction in greenhouse gas emissions.

After joining the Caucus, Mitt Romney said “Addressing climate change is going to require significant private sector investments and a major global breakthrough in innovation and technology. To that end, Congress should explore ways to incentivize the research, development, and deployment of clean technologies” (Mitt Romney U.S. Senator). That same year, Romney publicly stated that he was “looking into” a carbon pricing proposal put forth by Senator Chris

Coons that would impose a gradually rising tax on greenhouse gas emissions (Utah Policy). On climate change, in general, Romney also said that climate change was one of his top three primary concerns (Nielsen).

Senator Lisa Murkowski, another member of the Bipartisan Climate Solutions Caucus, said during a discussion with Stanford Environmental and Energy Policy Analysis Center, “I think we need to be doing more to address the issue of climate change. I think we need to be doing more to responsibly reduce emissions. I think we need to be doing more to advance those technologies that are really going to move us into this cleaner renewable energy future” 50

(Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research). In an opinion piece co-authored with

Democratic colleague, Senator Joe Manchin, Murkowski called for an immediate and responsible response to the changing climate (Manchin, Murkowski). And, following a hearing on climate change and the electricity sector, which she chaired, her office released a press statement saying that climate change was a policy priority (“United States Senator Lisa

Murkowski”). Lastly, on the legislative front, Murkowski co-sponsored the CREATE Act

(S.4341), which would “establish the Committee on Large-Scale Carbon Management in the

National Science and Technology Council and a Federal Carbon Removal Initiative” (Congress); the Blue Carbon for Our Planet Act (S.3939) which would “restore and expand degraded coastal blue carbon ecosystems” (Congress); and was the prime sponsor for the Nuclear Energy

Leadership Act (S.903) which would promote the development of domestic nuclear energy research and development.

In addition to Francis Rooney, on the House side of the Bipartisan Climate Solutions

Caucus, was Representative Brian Fitzpatrick of Pennsylvania’s increasingly ‘blue’1st congressional district. In 2019, along with Rooney and two Democratic colleagues, he co- introduced the MARKET CHOICE Act, the same as mentioned earlier. Fitzpatrick was one of three Republicans in the House of Representatives to vote in favor of a resolution (HR 9) condemning President Trump from withdrawing from the Paris Climate Agreement (Olson). He said, “Climate change must be addressed proactively with leaders from both sides of the aisle working to protect our planet. Every nation will be affected by climate change, which is why nearly every country agreed to work to reduce carbon emissions in the Paris Climate Accords.

The people in my district remain committed to pursuing bipartisan solutions to address climate change and protect our environment which is why I voted yes on HR 9" (Olson). Fitzpatrick’s 51 climate stance is unsurprising. He has been known to stray from the Republican Party’s core stances to satisfy his often left-leaning constituents.

This is only a sample of the members of the Bipartisan Climate Solutions Caucus, in the

House and Senate, and their environmental actions. And it appears some members have demonstrated a willingness to act on climate and are in the process of seeking out politically palatable solutions from a Republican standpoint. However, it is worth exploring if, as a whole, the members of the Caucus have commendable records on climate change and the environment.

Additionally, while there is evidence of Caucus members demonstrating climate leadership, it is also worth providing a deeper analysis that allows us to gauge whether the statements put out and occasional environmental bills by the Republicans in the Caucus reasonably reflect a consistent commitment to climate action, enough to earn them the label as being “pro-climate.”

According to the League of Conservation Voters (LCV) Scorecard, which measures the pro-environment roll call votes of members of Congress, the average score in the 2019 Senate was 53% and 56% in the House (League of Conservation Voters). In terms of party leadership,

Democrats received an average of 98% in the Senate and 96% in the House. This compares to

Republican leadership in the Senate, which was 14%, and the House, which was a mere 2%.

As can be seen in Figure 5.1, there was a clear difference between Democrats and

Republican members of the House Climate Solutions Caucus in terms of environmental voting records. The average score for Republican House Caucus members on the League of

Conservation Voters Scorecard was 27%, while the average score was in the high 90’s for

Democratic House members. The highest score for a Republican member was Brian Fitzpatrick

(86%), who was endorsed by the League of Conservation voters in 2020. Senator Susan Collins 52 has also been endorsed by the League in the past but was not in 2020 (Sobczyk). And, as can be seen in Figure 5.2, the average score for Republican Senate Caucus members was also 27%, while the average for Democratic Senate members was 97%.

Thus, the Republican members of the Climate Solutions Caucus are well below the total average for each chamber as a whole, which includes those who are and aren’t members of the

Caucus. These Republican members have also underperformed, even more severely, when compared to their Democratic Caucus members. Though, these Republican Caucus members, on average, do perform better than Republican leadership in the House and Senate.

Figure 5.1: LCV scores are calculated using 12 categories pertaining to a vote that may

be taken in Congress. These categories include air, clean energy, climate change, “dirty

energy” (fossil fuels and nuclear energy subsidies), drilling, lands/forests, oceans,

“toxics/public right to know,” transportation, water, wildlife, and other (broad range of 53

regulatory, tax reform, and legal conflicts). Annual scores are based on a scale of 0 to

100. They are calculated by dividing the number of “pro-environment” votes cast by a

member of Congress by the total number of votes scored. This does not include excused

absences. Lifetime scores are calculated using the same methodology. Lifetime scores are

not the average of annual scores. 24 Republicans and 41 Democrats are included in the

calculations for this figure.

Figure 5.2: LCV scores are calculated using 12 categories pertaining to a vote that may be taken in Congress. These categories include air, clean energy, climate change, “dirty energy”

(fossil fuels and nuclear energy subsidies), drilling, lands/forests, oceans, “toxics/public right to know,” transportation, water, wildlife, and other (broad range of regulatory, tax reform, and legal conflicts). Annual scores are based on a scale of 0 to 100. They are calculated by dividing the number of “pro-environment” votes cast by a Member of Congress by the total number of votes scored. This does not include excused absences. Lifetime scores are 54

calculated using the same methodology. Lifetime scores are not the average of annual scores.

7 Republicans, 6 Democrats, and 1 Independent are included in the calculations for this

figure.

Prior to the 116th Congress, some prominent Republicans demonstrated strong and sincere leadership on climate change. However, the League of Conservation scorecards encourage caution by those looking to identify evidence of Republican leadership on climate change in the 116th Congress. Thus, this analysis demonstrates that there are some pro-climate

Republican members of Congress that have been vocal on the issue, but it has not gained traction in the mainstream Republican Party. One could call this ‘all talk, but no action.’ Or, a different, more generous framing, would encourage us to not discount the progress that has been made on the political Right. It may be the case that some of these Republicans are testing the waters, and cautiously (perhaps, bravely) pushing the dangerous boundaries set by their party in hopes they may move the Overton window2 so that it may include serious climate policies.

Conclusion

This chapter sought to gauge the Republican Party and Republican members of Congress’ commitment or lack of commitment to solving the climate issue. The hypothesis being tested was that the Republican Party has a clear position on climate change and is generally opposed to acting on and prioritizing the issue. The evidence presented in this chapter, in general, supports this hypothesis.

2 Overton window is a term that was coined by Joseph P. Overton, a policy analyst. The Overton window refers to the range of policies that, at any given time, are considered by the general population (or a certain group) to be politically “right” or acceptable.

55

This analysis has shown that, first, the official Republican Party platform of 2020 and

President Donald Trump, the representative of the Party, were exceedingly hostile to a pro- climate agenda, as indicated by common repudiations of climate science, efforts to distinguish itself from the pro-environmental Left, support for fossil fuel development and expansion, and the rejection of various standard policy avenues for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, such as regulations and carbon pricing. Second, most Republican members of Congress have demonstrated a consistent willingness to ‘toe the party line’ and engage in lawmaking that is not complementary to serious climate action. Third, there are prominent conservatives not currently in elected office who are strong advocates of climate action and there is evidence, as indicated by public statements and support for small-scale environmental bills, of a desire to address the changing climate by Republicans in the 116th Congress, especially those in the Bipartisan

Climate Solutions Caucus. However, other evidence reveals that much of this is simply ‘talk’ and whatever pro-climate statement most Republican members of Congress make, including those in the Caucus, or whichever environmentally oriented bills they support, it is hardly representative of their entire environmental and climate record.

This is often where the analysis ends, after concluding that the Republican Party as a whole is a denialist group set on obstructing climate progress. But instead, it’s critical to look at the subsets within the Republican Party that have adopted a stance on climate change that is contrary to the Republican status quo. The next two chapters will aim to probe the climate attitudes of two significant and influential groups within the Republican Party circle: young conservatives and the investor community.

56

Chapter Six: Young Conservatives

Introduction

The evidence presented in Chapter Five demonstrated the Republican Party’s general aversion to climate action. However, Chapter Four revealed generational shifts in the Republican

Party, with the younger generation being more aware of climate change, receptive to a governmental response to help mitigate emissions, and supportive of clean energy development than an older generation of GOP voters. Scholars and social scientists have recorded and taken note of this change in public opinion. What is missing from the literature is an accounting for this subset of Republicans as a real challenge to the Party’s climate status quo and an analysis of the seriousness of this shift and whether these changing attitudes in the Republican Party are leading to organized, pro-climate efforts by this young demographic.

Hypothesis 2: There is an organized effort among young conservatives to propel progress on the climate issue.

This hypothesis seeks to explore at what point public opinion becomes pertinent to agenda-setting by making the assumption that organized efforts by an environmentally conscious subset of young right-leaning voters has accompanied and paralleled a shift in public opinion by the Republican Party’s younger base. This hypothesis makes the general assumption that if a meaningful portion of the population, or a subset of the population, is concerned about an issue there will be evidence of some organized attempts by that group to address the problem. The group in question are young conservatives and their organized efforts to advance a pro-climate agenda. 57

To test this hypothesis, the websites and mission statements of young conservative groups and quotes from their leaders will be offered as evidence of these group’s presence, to provide a broad survey of the landscape of organized young conservative environmental efforts, and to analyze how their language and communication on the climate issue differ from the

Republican Party establishment. Furthermore, these sources will be analyzed to gauge whether these organizations are seeking to constructively channel the voice of pro-climate conservatives into the public sphere in a way that may enhance the effect of or make politically relevant the public opinion trends discussed in Chapter Four.

Hypothesis 3: Young conservative climate and environmental groups are actors in the policy stream that are actively proposing and advocating for conservative climate solutions.

This hypothesis will look to understand not only an effort among young conservative groups to push for Republican climate leadership in general, but specifically the types of solutions that are being advocated for and trying to be placed on the climate political agenda. To test this hypothesis, the mission statements, policy platforms, and public statements from young conservative groups will be analyzed to identify the groups’ priorities, make known shared goals, and uncover differences among these groups and the policy approaches they pursue.

Hypothesis 4: Conservative climate proposals are being proposed as middle-grounded, bipartisan alternatives to more radical, progressive climate proposals.

The most popular and well-known proposals in the environmental space are progressive ones, such as the Green New Deal. The Green New Deal has often been labeled as a major catalyst for widespread climate activism and the focus of mass demonstrations. During the largest climate change strikes in history, in September of 2019, thousands of picket signs and 58 posters could be found with “We Need A Green New Deal”, or others with a comparable tone and message, or simply “GND”, written on them. 350.org, one of the largest grassroots environmental organizations and key organizers of these demonstrations, had officially thrown their support behind the Green New Deal and directed their volunteers to pressure their elected officials to support the measure (350.org, “Call on Your Reps to Support a #GreenNewDeal

Now!”).

According to studies, media coverage of climate change plunged in 2018 – down by 48% compared to the previous year (Macdonald, Hymas). However, according to Yale Climate

Communications, that coverage quickly increased the year after (Svoboda). In February of the same year, of 2019, Representative Alexandria Ocasio Cortez and Senator Ed Markey had released H.Res.109 – more commonly known as the Green New Deal. This trend, along with others including the aforementioned climate strikes which occurred in September of 2019, highlight the attention-grabbing quality of this progressive proposal and the ideas put forth in it.

That attention is both positive and negative – with conservative, climate-hostile media source,

Fox News, mentioning the Green New Deal and climate change 22 times in the week following the resolution’s introduction (Hymas). Because of the Green New Deal’s popularity and public nature, it will be used as a prime example of a leading progressive climate proposal.

According to Kingdon’s model for agenda-setting, at any point in time, there may be a plethora of solutions occupying the policy stream, swirling around in what he refers to as a

“policy primeval soup” (169). However, what matters is the feasibility of a solution. Has it been vetted by the policy community? Is it implementable? Is it too costly? Is it accepted by the public? Is it palatable to elected officials? And, so, in spirit of the radical flank effect described in Chapter Two, this hypothesis makes the assumption that politically controversial, expensive, 59 far-left proposals, like the Green New Deal, affect the policy stream by enhancing the appeal of moderate, conservative-friendly, and bipartisan climate solutions – which is necessary for a solution to rise on the political agenda.

To test this hypothesis, data will be collected from the websites of young conservative and environmental organizations and public statements released by leaders in the young conservative climate movement to analyze how the language young conservatives are using when discussing progressive policies and how they are presenting their solutions to the public.

Young Conservative Climate Organizations

“As young Republicans, we believe that solving the climate problem is paramount to our

nation’s future, and our party’s future…”

~ YCCD founding statement, 2020

Chapter Four discussed and provided evidence that there is a shift among a subset of

Republicans, primarily young GOP voters. In tandem with public opinion, there is also copious evidence of a growing organized, strategic, and targeted effort by the young, right-leaning, non- profit sector to push for a Republican response to climate change and advance solutions that provide a conservative path forward. But, in addition to this, several of these groups attribute and directly cite the reversing course of public opinion among conservatives, especially young conservatives, as an inspiration and reason for their creation. Notably, in the last few years, several conservative-oriented climate organizations were created – of these, three were founded by young conservatives and Republicans. Each of these groups are making ambitious attempts to puncture the climate-strike, Green New Deal, progressive climate narrative. 60

The American Conservation Coalition (ACC), founded in 2017, is a Millennial-led organization “dedicated to mobilizing young people around environmental action through common-sense, market-based, and limited-government ideals” – pillars of a conservative ideological framework (American Conservation Coalition, “About”). The group claims “an ideological gap in the environmental movement” that prevented “necessary bipartisan action” – referring to the progressive-leaning majority of the environmentalist crowd – motivated the founding of the group.

In 2019, President of ACC, Benji Backer, made the following statement speaking to the dilemma experienced by young conservative environmentalists in the current state of politics and the failure of Republican Party leadership to respond to the emerging generation’s needs:

“...young conservatives feel left behind by the current environmental movement. Our values...are no longer represented within environmental discussions...Moreover, many older conservative leaders have gone silent on the issue. As a result, many young conservatives have abandoned the environment since they don’t feel they have a home. This doesn’t have to be the case, and a growing number of young conservatives have taken the initiative to change the narrative”

(Backer, “Young Conservatives Want a Voice on the Environment: Bush Center”). In 2020,

Quill Robinson, ACC’s Vice President of Government Affairs, condemned President Trump for missing an opportunity to respond to the growing number of young Republicans concerned about climate change, after the Trump campaign requested that climate change be removed as a topic from a presidential debate. In another opinion piece, Robinson said, “It’s time for Republicans to decide whether they will return to their conservation roots and build a more sustainable future for the party and our country” (Robinson, “Republicans Should Pledge to Protect the Environment”). 61

Another group shining a light on a heightened desire to constructively strengthen the voice of an existing climate-conscious subset of right-leaning individuals includes Young

Conservatives for Carbon Dividends (YCCD). Founded in 2020, YCCD is a right-of-center, youth-led advocacy organization that “aims to mobilize young conservative leaders” (YCCD,

“Home page”).

“What we're hoping to do is amplify the voices of young conservatives. This really is a generational issue,” said Kiera O’Brien, Founder and President of YCCD, in a 2019 interview

(Klar). Like ACC, YCCD has tied their mission and organization’s purpose to closing the ideological gap in the conservative movement that has left young pro-climate conservatives alienated within the general Republican Party and has resulted in a progressive-dominant climate policy agenda that that same subset of young conservatives is ideologically opposed to. In a 2021 opinion piece, O’Brien said “Young people care about protecting our environment and mitigating the impacts of a changing climate. This is increasingly as true for the political right as it is for the left” (O’Brien, “The next generation of young conservatives is ready for climate action”).

YCCD was founded in close collaboration with another right-of-center, though not youth- oriented, climate organization called the Climate Leadership Council (CLC), mentioned in

Chapter Five. As one of the most recently established (2017) conservative climate groups, CLC has demonstrated unparalleled “grasstops” outreach. The group has brought to the table groups, prominent individuals, industries, and other business voices that have often been hush on the climate issue or slow to take the reins on advancing climate solutions. These include the group’s founding members, from corporate America (e.g., AT&T, GM, Goldman Sachs, IBM, Microsoft,

JP Morgan Chase, and more) to major oil and gas companies (e.g., Shell, Exelon, BP, BHP, 62

Calpine, ExxonMobil, and Total). Another voice pushed to the forefront of our climate policy discussions by CLC are economists, both conservative and progressive. As mentioned earlier, in

2019, CLC propelled an effort resulting in the publication of a letter in the Wall Street Journal by

45 prominent economists recommending to policymakers a revenue-neutral price on carbon as the single most “cost effective, equitable, and politically-viable” solution. CLC provided a foundation and created momentum that young climate organizations, like YCCD, were able to take advantage of to launch their own groups.

Another right-leaning and conservative-led group is Students for Carbon Dividends

(S4CD). According to S4CD President, Alex Posner, “We no longer need to choose between party orthodoxy and the mounting risks facing our planet. They know climate change is not a partisan issue and that there is a way for Republicans to help solve it” (Haga). While bipartisan in word, S4CD has demonstrated a focus on and unique ability to involve young conservatives in the climate space. S4CD has built one of the biggest bipartisan coalitions of 100+ student groups across the country, including groups with well-known strong conservative records and affiliations – such as Turning Point USA groups (S4CD, “The Students for Carbon Dividends

Coalition”). In 2020, S4CD also led an effort to join the voices of 400+ active or former university student body presidents in support of the group’s preferred policy (S4CD, “The

Largest Statement of Student Government Leaders”).

Another group worth mentioning is Gen Z GOP. Though not a climate organization, this group reflects a generation of young conservatives disillusioned with the Republican Party and a simultaneous desire to channel the voices of climate-conscious young conservatives into the public and political sphere. Created in 2020, the stated mission of Gen Z GOP is to “chart a new vision for the Republican Party. A party that can find balance, formulate solutions, and focus on 63 the future” (Gen Z GOP, “Join the Movement”). In the founding statement, it says “Our generation needs a party that will address the issues that affect us most.”

One of those issues includes climate change – the first issue listed on the group’s policy platform and the topic of the group’s first public-facing event called “Conservative Climate

Change Town Hall.” Before listing the organization's preferred categories of focus on climate change, the platform says “As the generation most affected by climate change, we have an obligation to address this issue. The Republican Party must be oriented toward concrete results, in contrast with the left’s idealistic and infeasible policy proposals” (Gen Z GOP, “Platform”).

This last group, while not a young conservative climate organization, is worth mentioning. Conservative Coalition for Climate Solutions (C3 Solutions), a group launched in

October 2020, cites similar reasons as YCCD and ACC for their creation: conservative underrepresentation in the environmental movement. John Hart, co-Founder and Vice President of C3 Solutions, stated in the group’s founding statement that the friends, colleagues, and other close members of the conservative movement felt drowned out by the ‘Green New Dealers’ monopolizing the climate and energy space, while simultaneously being committed to the idea that “it was possible to be both conservative and concerned about protecting our natural and economic environment” (C3 Solutions). With former Senator Rick Santorum sitting on the organization’s board, C3 Solutions was founded to promote and advance conservative, market- based solutions to climate change.

John Hart’s founding statement reinforces that the interest among conservatives is real and present. Public opinion is setting the stage and helping to pave the path for a Republican response to climate change. The emergence of groups like C3 solutions, YCCD, and ACC, 64 reflect a changing attitude among conservatives as they have come to realize that they are a part of the population with a position worth sharing, and thus are willing to take various, organized steps to achieve influence in the political sphere.

Young Conservative Climate Organizations: Solutions

“We cannot be the party of the future without a plan to protect the future. Or without policy

solutions that appeal to voters of the future.”

~ Kiera O’Brien, Founding President of Young Conservatives for Carbon Dividends

These young conservative climate organizations share similar origins and political missions. An important component of this mission, that is, pushing the Republican Party to productively engage with the climate issue, is advocating for solutions themselves. These young conservative groups do occasionally envision different paths for climate action, support different policies, and pursue their own strategies for changing the tides of the Republican Party.

However, there are some noticeable continuities and overlap between the priorities of these groups worth evaluating.

At one end of the spectrum is YCCD. YCCD advocates for a specific Republican-created carbon pricing proposal called the Baker-Shultz Plan – named after two prominent Republican officials, mentioned earlier, that served during the Reagan, Nixon, and Bush administrations. In their founding statement, the group says it is working to “advance this free-market climate solution to the forefront of our national politics” (YCCD, “The Challenge: Young Conservatives for Carbon Dividend”). There are four key components to the Baker-Shultz plan: (1) a tax on 65 fossil fuels at the source of extraction, (2) an equal dividend that distributes the collected tax revenue back to qualified American households, (3) a border adjustment, and (4) a pause on additional greenhouse gas regulations by the EPA. This proposal is designed to be a small- government, market-based solution that weakens the regulatory arm of the federal government.

In another opinion piece, O’Brien says “I believe the Baker-Shultz plan, which would reduce carbon emissions by a projected 57 percent by 2035, is the long-awaited solution we need. This plan is unique in the climate discussion because it protects the environment without harming the economy, and because it’s the solution that checks all the boxes that have, until now, remained elusive” (O’Brien, “I'm a young conservative and an environmentalist. Here's what that looks like”).

Like YCCD, S4CD’s policy priority is revenue-neutral carbon pricing, or simply known as carbon dividends. The group calls the proposal “a breakthrough climate strategy,” touting its bipartisan appeal across political lines, sectors, and interest groups. In their mission statement,

S4CD says “What if there were a breakthrough climate solution that appeals to environmentalists and energy companies alike, and to all sides of the political spectrum? What if it could yield more than three times the emissions reductions of all Obama-era regulations, while limiting the size of government? What if it made the bottom 70% of society — more than 223 million

Americans — financially better off, while creating jobs and strengthening our economy? As amazing as it sounds, such a climate solution is within our reach. Students for Carbon Dividends is uniting to promote this much-needed climate breakthrough” (S4CD, “Founding Statement”).

Despite being a bipartisan policy, S4CD frequently asserts the policy framework's most conservative qualifications, for example, by appealing to small government ideals and alternatives to regulatory-based environmental solutions: “This proposal embodies the principles 66 of free markets and limited government. Yet it would also achieve significantly greater emissions reductions than all current and prior climate regulations combined.”

Unlike YCCD, however, S4CD no longer exclusively advocates for the Baker-Shultz

Plan. The group has broadened their policy landscape to include any carbon pricing policy that has the four pillars of the general economist statement on carbon dividends in the Wall Street

Journal mentioned in Chapter 5. The group says, “There are various carbon dividends-style policies that have been proposed, so we at S4CD only rally around the carbon dividends framework—the broad statement of principles outlined in the historic Economists’ Statement on

Carbon Dividend.” For example, S4CD is supportive of the Energy Innovation and Carbon

Dividend Act (H.R.763), a revenue-neutral carbon pricing proposal introduced in the 116th

Congress. H.R. 763 adheres to the same four-pillar framework of the Baker-Shultz Plan and economist statement but, for example, has a different initial starting point of the tax and rate of increase, in addition to other minor variations.

At the other end of the young conservative policy spectrum is ACC. On climate change

ACC says, “In order to avoid the worst impacts of climate change, we must move toward global net-zero carbon emissions by 2050. The best way to do that is through market-based mechanisms, while striking the balance between adaptation and mitigation” (American

Conservation Coalition, “Platform”). In 2020, ACC released the American Climate Contract – a policy platform meant to outline the categories which U.S. legislators should prioritize in seeking to decarbonize the economy. The categories include “Energy Innovation,” “21st Century

Infrastructure,” “Natural Solutions,” and “Global Engagement” (American Climate Contract). In practice, ACC issues support for smaller-scale bills, in terms of the projected emission-reducing capacity, such as the Trillion Trees Act, Growing Climate Solutions Act, the Great American 67

Outdoors Act, and the Energy Act of 2020. ACC advocates for achievable climate and energy bills, while straying away from ambitious policies that have a difficult and uncertain political outlook. “There’s too much division in this country to pass one massive piece of legislation,” said Benji Backer (Newman).

In a 2020 opinion piece, titled “It’s time to allow markets to fight climate change,”

Executive Vice President Danielle Butcher criticized popular proposals such as the Green New

Deal and Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade bill (American Clean Energy and Security Act), while calling for a market-based climate solution. She says, “Innovation — not regulations, mandates, spending and taxes — lowered energy prices and emissions in America” (Butcher, “It's Time to

Allow Markets to Fight Climate Change”). However, many of ACC’s legislative priorities, including all listed above, do involve government spending of some nature. So, what

“innovation” means to ACC remains unclear and, perhaps, contradictory.

All of these groups endorse market-based solutions – though, what that market-based solution is, they cannot seem to agree. ACC’s policy model is oriented around what can be done and achieved today in the current political climate, while YCCD and S4CD have legislative priorities that require more monumental changes within the Republican Party before they can be achieved. While formally neutral on carbon pricing, leadership in the ACC has publicly called for conservative environmental organizations to “ditch” a carbon tax and “embrace less divisive climate change solutions.” In another opinion piece, Danielle Butcher said “No single solution will solve the climate challenge we face, so we’re better off pursuing less isolating, more sustainable carbon-reducing practices. A carbon tax has become so divisive that it is distracting us from implementation of real solutions” (Butcher, “Ditch the carbon tax and embrace less divisive climate change solutions”). 68

On the other end, YCCD and S4CD have casted off what could be characterized as the

ACC-approach, as being an inadequate solution to the problem at hand. In an interview, Kiera

O’Brien said, “The reality these days is there’s a difference between conservation and issues of climate change. Anyone who’s fundamentally serious about conservation should be serious about climate as well, but that’s not always the case, especially among elected Republicans” (Terstein).

While not naming ACC explicitly, this statement does allude to the ongoing tension between conservation efforts and climate action. Among these conservation efforts include legislative initiatives supported by ACC, such as the Trillion Trees Act and Great American Outdoors Act, which have both been characterized by some opponents as half-hearted attempts to resolve the climate issue. For example, over 95 conservation groups opposed the Trillion Trees Act and sent a letter to Congress expressing their disapproval. The letter reads, “While we support ecologically sound tree-planting as a means to increase carbon sequestration and climate adaptation, this legislation presents a false solution for addressing the climate crisis by misallocating resources to focus on industrial logging rather than on urgently needed steep reductions of fossil fuel emissions” (Silicon Valley 350 et al).

Lastly, Gen Z GOP rejects the Green New Deal, embraces a “free-market” path forward, and supports “policies that produce results regardless of the size of implementation.” Gen Z GOP has also called for Republican party to get behind carbon dividends, while paying respect to the climate legacy of George P. Shultz: “Climate change is real, and it has real consequences. As a party majorly concerned with increasing opportunity for future generations, it is well past time for us to rise to the challenge of fighting climate change. In looking to address climate change, the Baker-Shultz Plan is a conservative path forward. In the new Congress and coming years, it is critical that the Republican Party take steps to embrace the free market and innovation while 69 making major investments in opportunity for the next generation” (Connor-Linnabary).

Interestingly, the president of Gen Z GOP, John Olds, is also a prominent leader within YCCD.

Political Feasibility: Moderate Climate Proposals

Many of the groups mentioned in the preceding section, are outwardly conservative or conservative-friendly organizations. They have also made explicit attempts to push Republican- supported solutions into the climate space, along with Republicans themselves. However, as much as these groups may emphasize their conservative focus and the conservative-appeal of their preferred solutions, they are equally vocal about the bipartisan appeal of these solutions and explicitly characterize their conservative solutions as the bipartisan alternative to progressive policies, such as the Green New Deal. In accordance with the radical flank effect discussed in

Chapter Two, more extreme policies start to lose their appeal and legitimacy as it is transferred to more moderate proposals.

Each of the groups mentioned in the previous section of this chapter have publicly condemned the Green New Deal – and other progressive proposals of the same nature.

Explaining why on Twitter in 2019, Benji Backer said “The Green New Deal is the wrong way forward on climate. Why? 1.) it's divisive and polarizing, which leaves out important voices in the discussion 2.) it's unfeasible with the desired energy sources (solar/wind ONLY) 3.) it's economically disastrous 4.) it is unreasonably intrusive. Climate policy needs to be economically

AND environmentally beneficial. It needs conservative AND liberal voices. And it should be done through limited government, in a bipartisan way. There are countless ways to make it happen. The Green New Deal doesn't accomplish any of that” (Backer, Twitter Post on Green

New Deal). 70

Quill Robinson of ACC said in a 2019 opinion piece, “2020 will be the year of climate solutions, not socialist revolution...the Green New Deal gives false hope to young people and provides campaigning politicians, like Sanders, a rhetorical crutch” (Robinson, “2020 Will Be the Year of Climate Solutions, Not a Socialist Revolution”).

And Danielle Butcher accused the Green New Deal as not being serious about climate change at all. In an opinion piece, Butcher said Green New Deal co-sponsor, Representative

Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez is “all talk on environment,” while also offering a series of critiques of the proposal (Butcher, “Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez Is All Talk On The Environment”). These critiques include over-relying on wind and solar, excluding nuclear and natural gas, and burdening low-middle class Americans by requiring upgrades on all residential and commercial buildings.

This is a non-exhaustive collection of Green New Deal criticisms from ACC’s leadership.

The group’s public criticism of the Green New Deal goes on.

YCCD has adopted a similar tone when approaching the Green New Deal. Kiera O’Brien said, “The Green New Deal isn’t a serious plan to fix the climate. It’s just a label they want to use to remake the whole economy on a more left-wing model” (Meigs). On YCCD’s website, they share an article reporting that Ocasio-Cortez’s former Chief of Staff said that the Green

New Deal originally had nothing to do with climate change in the first place: “The interesting thing about the Green New Deal is it wasn’t originally a climate thing at all … we really think of it as a how-do-you-change-the-entire-economy thing” (Crowe).

S4CD leadership has been less inclined to offer such direct condemnations of the Green

New Deal as ACC and YCCD. However, during Kiera O’Brien’s 2019 Senate testimony, in her 71 capacity as an S4CD representative she said, “When I became President of the Republican Club during my sophomore year, I was approached by Alexander Posner, then a student at Yale, with what he believed to be the solution to Democratic dominance of the climate issue: a Republican- led, business-backed climate plan” (O’Brien, Senate testimony). That plan she referred to was the Baker-Shultz Plan and “Democratic dominance,” no doubt, included the Green New Deal.

Thus, some young conservative groups are opposed to the Green New Deal, not only because of the progressive content of the proposal, but also because of its politically divisive nature. By itself, this does not answer the question as to whether the radical-flank effect is at play. All it shows is that conservatives oppose a progressive policy – there is nothing significant or new about this. However, is there evidence that the Green New Deal is enhancing the appeal of other, less-divisive, bipartisan proposals? Maybe. What there is evidence of is that conservative solutions are being propose as direct bipartisan alternatives to the Green New Deal, hinting to how qualities of the Green New Deal may have created a desire for a different policy approach that does not bring with it the same political shortcomings as the Green New Deal, such as its strong leftist nature.

Returning to the words of Danielle Butcher and Kiera O’Brien, both cast off the Green

New Deal as a non-solution to the climate problem, thus undermining its legitimacy, while presenting their proposals as the bipartisan, conservative-friendly alternative. In his Bush Center article, Benji Backer said, “Through the American Conservation Coalition and countless other simultaneous movements, we can finally make the environment a bipartisan issue again”

(Backer). In 2020, ACC released a blog post titled “ACC Announces Conservative Alternative to

Green New Deal” (Bowra). That alternative, according to ACC, is their American Climate

Contract. Quoting Quill Robinson, the blog post said, “The climate discussion has been defined 72 by the partisan divide up until this point, but now is the time to champion real climate solutions.”

Danielle Butcher also wrote another opinion piece, titled “The Green New Deal would never work. This Earth Day, I'm backing a conservative alternative that makes sense for everyone”

(Butcher, “The Green New Deal Would Never Work. This Earth Day, I'm Backing a

Conservative Alternative”).

Taking a similar tone, during her Senate testimony on carbon dividends, Kiera O’Brien used the word “bipartisan” or “bipartisanship” eight times. She spoke not only to the need for a bipartisan climate solution, but the ability of the carbon dividends proposal to cultivate a bipartisan coalition around a single solution, something the Green New Deal has not been able to do: “This consensus is overwhelming, and has helped shift the conversation from asking what pro-growth, pro-economy climate action we should support to why our current representatives have not yet addressed the issue in a serious way” (O’Brien).

Conclusion

This chapter sought to understand and account for a pro-climate shift in a key Republican demographic: young conservatives. The hypotheses that were tested was that (1) in light of public opinion polls revealing strong pro-climate attitudes among young conservatives, there is an organized effort among this demographic to propel progress on the climate issue, (2) young conservatives are active participants in the solution stream by proposing and advocating for concrete solutions, and (3) these solutions not only have bipartisan appeal, but are explicitly being proposed as the bipartisan alternative to more progressive proposals. The evidence presented in this chapter supports each of these hypotheses. 73

There are three important findings that can be demonstrated by this analysis and merit our consideration. This analysis has shown that, first, there has been an emergence of several young conservative climate and environmental organizations in the last few years that have made it their explicit mission to amplify the young conservative voice in the climate movement. These groups have and continue to engage in organized efforts directed at engaging young conservatives and reversing the cultural narrative that climate change isn’t a conservative problem. Second, beyond this, these young conservative groups are actively engaging with policy, seeking to push certain solutions into the national spotlight, and are directly lobbying, and sometimes partnering with, leaders of the Republican Party. The solutions that are being pursued by these groups, however, vary. There are two primary camps within the young conservative climate movement. On one side are incremental policies that do not reduce emissions at the scale that is needed but are politically feasible in the current political climate.

On the other side is carbon pricing, in the form of a revenue-neutral carbon tax, that has the potential to meet our emission-reduction needs but has an ambiguous and uncertain political future. The third primary finding in this chapter is that, regardless of which camp a young conservative may fall into, advocates of both policy approaches are making attempts to explicitly and publicly depict their solutions as the bipartisan, conservative-friendly, and politically palatable alternative to progressive policies, like the Green New Deal, confirming the previously made assumption that the radical flank effect may be at play in the current climate movement.

Again, according to Kindgon’s model, it is not enough for there to merely be solutions out there.

For a solution to rise on the political agenda, it must also be politically feasible.

In the next chapter, another key group enjoying political clout within the Republican

Party, investors and financial institutions, will also be analyzed to not only understand its 74 movement on the climate issue, but it’s potential to move the Republican Party on the issue, as well.

75

Chapter Seven: Investors and Financial Institutions

Introduction

In Chapter Six, evidence was provided to demonstrate a pro-climate shift in an overlooked, yet important, subset of the Republican Party: young conservatives. The second group with meaningful Republican clout that the literature has seldom accounted for is the financial community and investors. Republicans and fiscal conservatives have earned a reputation for being economically and business oriented. They tend to pursue fiscal policies that include deregulation, the removal of “red-tape,” and lower taxes, with the goal of doing what is in the best interest of businesses and investors. It is a conservative belief that prosperous and profitable companies will provide economic growth that will benefit all. This, economic growth, is a priority. A conservative’s free-market, anti-interference approach to understanding the relationship between the government and the economy means Republicans and conservatives err on the side of trusting and placing faith in whatever direction an open and transparent market leads us – in addition to those who have the greatest influence over the market, such as corporations, small businesses, and investors.

This chapter seeks to account for these key economic actors, with a strong emphasis on investors, banks, and asset managers, that have the Republican Party’s close listening ear. More specifically, this chapter will attempt to uncover how investors are responding to climate change by internally restructuring their investment strategies and expectations of client companies; how investors are incorporating climate-risk and sustainability into those strategies and expectations; how this is fundamentally reshaping the marketplace as we move towards a low-carbon economy; and, lastly, how this may push Republican voices to engage with the climate issue. 76

Hypotheses and Data

Hypothesis 5: Investors and financial institutions are facing pressure to respond to climate change.

Elected officials, businesses, and the oil and gas industry have all encountered pressure from environmentalists to address and respond to the climate issue. This hypothesis makes the assumption that investors and financial institutions have not been exempt from this pressure and, like other targets, are presented with the task of figuring out what that response will be. To explore this hypothesis, the websites of climate activist groups will be analyzed, in addition to public statements put out by their groups and representatives, to understand the motivations behind activism targeted at investors and the extent of these activities.

Hypothesis 6: Investors and financial institutions are responding to a climate-conscious public and investors are putting pressure on client companies to increase their sustainability efforts and transform them into economic actors whose goals and operations are aligned with climate progress.

In Chapter Four, the changing tides of public opinion on climate change were discussed.

It was revealed that the public’s concern about climate change and receptivity to a governmental response had reached an all-time high over the last decade. For a large part, investors have been uninterested in taking a leading role on climate change and encouraging sustainable practices among their clients. During the 2008 Financial Crisis, investors demonstrated wavering confidence in the prospects of the renewable and clean energy market (Papandreou). Arguably, this hindered the success of a potential green transition. In light of increased public concern and awareness about climate change, it is worth exploring if there has been a shift in investor 77 behavior. If there is a noticeable correlation between public opinion and investor practices, it is then worth diving deeper to explore a potential causational relationship: investors responding directly to public concern over climate change. Furthermore, this hypothesis will seek to analyze exactly how investors are responding and how it is shaping their demands of and relationship with their portfolio companies.

This hypothesis makes the assumption that investors, like any other business, care about preserving a positive public image, their relationship with the public, and, to an extent, take signals from the public in how they operate. To test this hypothesis, written statements and interviews by leading investors and representatives of financial institutions will be analyzed to gauge their responsiveness to a climate-concerned public or the extent of their attention to public concerns around climate change. In addition to this, official client letters and reports outlining new client expectations will be looked at to further understand the sustainability and climate standards being (or not being) imposed on companies.

Hypothesis 7: Investors are responding to climate change because it is their financial interest.

Investors are rational financial actors who invest in a company or business with the objective of taking advantage of enhanced or high returns by their clients over the long-term.

This hypothesis assumes that if investors are responding to climate change, they view it as a decision that is in their financial best interest – not merely due to altruism or only a desire to preserve their public reputation. To test this hypothesis, the sustainability reports by investors, banks, and asset managers will be analyzed, in addition to public statements from CEOs and representatives from these banks, firms, and asset managers. The stock prices of fossil fuels, renewable energy, and ESG-aligned companies will also be used to track market fluctuations and 78 resilience during 2020. This data will be collected from OilPrice.com, a popular platform for tracking the oil market, and the International Energy Agency.

Hypothesis 8: Republicans who engage on the climate issue are taking signals from investors, economic actors, and financial institutions.

There is a common understanding that Republicans and conservatives tend to be fiscally minded and are inclined to trust the important voices that have the most influence over the markets and economy, such as investors, banks, asset managers, companies, economists, and more. This hypothesis is rooted in this traditional understanding of the Republican Party and assumes that members of the Party will follow the direction of financial actors. And, so, if financial actors are saying our economic and investment decisions should be guided by a climate-informed strategy, Republicans will take this signal and not only agree, but will take steps as legislators to support a pro-climate market, economy, and policy landscape. To analyze this hypothesis, the statements put out by Republican members of Congress, in the form of opinion pieces, formal letters, and press releases, will be evaluated to better understand how

Republicans are responding to this shift among investors, the nature of that response, and how it is (or is not) influencing how they respond to the climate issue legislatively.

Pressure on Investors

“If we stop the flow of money, we stop the flow of oil.”

~Stop the Money Pipeline campaign

While pressure on investors is not a new phenomenon in the climate movement, investor pressure has exploded as a key and leading avenue for climate activism in recent years – 79 including leading up to the start of the Biden Administration. Investors, banks, and other financial institutions are facing pressure from numerous directions to defund fossil fuels, invest in the future, and to incorporate higher sustainability investing standards. The source of this pressure includes climate activist groups, unions, and more.

In 2010, the Rainforest Action Network (RAN) created the Fossil Fuel Finance Report

Card – a report that provides data used to rank banks and financial institutions on how much money they have invested in fossil fuels (Rainforest Action Network). In 2011, RAN launched a campaign targeting Bank of America with a “Billionaires for Coal” protest in California. This campaign lasted for four years and, according to RAN, resulted in 60,000 Bank of America customers closing their accounts due to the bank’s investment decisions. RAN also claims that, as a result of the campaign, “Bank of America has gone from being the top bankroller of coal to having the strongest global coal mining policy of any major global bank” (Nabors).

That same year, in 2011, a group of students at Syracuse University started the first fossil fuel divestment campaign in the United States targeting their school. This movement exploded, spreading across U.S. college campuses. By December 2020, institutions of all kinds, including faith-based organizations, universities, philanthropic foundations, governments, pension funds, for-profit corporations, NGOs, and healthcare institutions, had committed to divesting more than

$14 trillion worth of capital from the fossil fuel industry (Go Fossil Free).

In 2016, the Indigenous Water Protectors organized a series of protests at the Standing

Rock Sioux Reservation, demanding that the Dakota Access Pipelines be defunded by the 17 participating banks. This launched the Defund the DAPL Campaign. Bank protests spread throughout the country, activists met with banking business executives, and hundreds of 80 thousands of people signed petitions demanding that these banks withdraw their financial funds for the project (Friends of the Earth). Banks were inundated with emails and calls from activists.

Two years later, the BlackRock’s Big Problem campaign was launched – “a global network of NGOs, social movements, grassroots activists, finance researchers, and shareholder advocacy organizations” trying to “push asset managers like BlackRock to align their business practices with climate solutions, instead of continuing to fund climate destruction” (BlackRock’s

Big Problem). Similar to the campaigns mentioned above, this campaign has organized, and continues to organize, protests and mobilize their volunteers to call, write, and email BlackRock, demanding that they defund fossil fuels and incorporate higher sustainability standards into their investment strategies. Then, in 2019, Insure Our Future and other allied organizations launched a similar campaign focused on Liberty Mutual, another major financier of fossil fuels.

In 2020, 32 organizations established Stop the Money Pipeline – a campaign dedicated to

“pressuring financial institutions to act on climate” (Stop the Money Pipeline). The number of participating groups has since exploded to 130 organizations as of early 2021. These groups include, but are not limited to, 350.org, Sierra Club, and the Union of Concerned Scientists.

According to the campaign, it seeks to build off the years of previous activism centered around investor pressure.

By the end of 2020, there were 387 active divestment efforts on college campuses throughout the United States taking part in the Fossil Free Campaign (Fossil Free). According to

350.org, “The Go Fossil Free divestment campaign continues to be one of our key strategies to systematically challenge the political power of the fossil fuel industry, create uncertainty about the long-term financial viability of the industry, and move money away from dirty energy 81 towards climate solutions” (350.org, “350 Campaign Update: Divestment”). They also said,

“Over the coming year, we will take our campaign to the next level in both high-visibility campaigning and in strengthening the movement of existing divestment campaigns.”

In addition to environmental activists, other groups have been putting pressure on investors to divest from fossil fuels and embrace a more climate-conscious investment strategy.

The United Nations has called on investors to align their investment portfolios with the Paris

Climate Agreement and consider climate-risk in their financing decisions (United Nations

Climate Change). The United Nations Deputy Secretary General, Amina Mohammed, said in

2018 “Divesting from carbon intensive assets and aligning with the goals of the Paris Agreement is a complex realignment. Your voices need to be clear with regulators, central bankers, finance ministers, board rooms and C-suites for the gathering momentum to continue to gather pace and to become a truly global phenomenon...Governments need to know that the financial element to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement is going to be delivered. It cannot only be public money. There is a major role for investors to play.”

Briefly mentioned before, according to Go Fossil Free, 1,312 institutions have divested from fossil fuels and over 58,000 individuals have divested, amounting to over $5.8 billion as of

March 2021. With both combined, $14.56 billion has been divested. Breaking down these divestments, 34% belongs to faith-based institutions, 15% to educational institutions, 15% to philanthropic foundations, 13% to governments,12% to pension funds, 5% to for-profit organizations, 4% to NGOs, and 1% to healthcare institutions (Go Fossil Free). Overall, pressure on investors and financial institutions is being received from a variety of directions and influential voices. Whether it is having an impact on the behavior of investors will be looked at in the next section. 82

The Rise of Investor Activism

“...awareness is rapidly changing, and I believe we are on the edge of a fundamental reshaping

of finance.”

~Larry Fink, CEO of BlackRock

According to the Rainforest Action Network’s 2020 annual Fossil Fuel Finance Report

Card, of the top 35 banks financing fossil fuels, only 13 have reduced the amount of investments in the industry between 2016 and 2019. And the total amount of fossil fuels investments has also increased in that time period. For example, in 2016, total financing for fossil fuels was $640 billion. By 2019, it had reached $736 billion (Rainforest Action Network).

Leading up to 2020, it is clear, given a simple analysis of fossil fuel financing trends, investors were not changing their behaviors, seriously incorporating climate-risk into their investment strategy, or making any real attempts to divest from fossil fuels – despite a hostile activist landscape that has been placing increasing pressure on financial institutions. However, going into 2020, did the tides start to change? Leading up to the start of the Biden

Administration, does it appear the pressure being applied to investors began producing a positive outcome or does it appear the financing trends from 2016-2019 continued? Investors signal to their clients and other economic actors what they should expect in the coming years. The evidence collected in this section shows that what they are signaling in 2020 is that climate-risk and environmental stewardship will be front and center in their investment decision-making.

Whether that signal is a serious one that will result in real, meaningful change is yet to be fully decided. 83

In 2004, 20 financial institutions published and endorsed a report titled “Who Cares Wins

– Connecting Financial Markets to a Changing World” (International Finance Corporation). For the first time, the term “ESG” was used, meaning “environmental, social, and governance.” The report sought to develop “guidelines and recommendations on how to better integrate environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues in asset management.” By 2018, an estimated $12 million investments were made using capital allocation strategies aligned with

ESG (The Forum for Sustainable and Responsible Investment). Despite initially being cast off as a ploy that would be abandoned at the first challenge faced in its implementation, ESG has reached the point where it is now accelerating and shaping the transformation of the market. In

2018, Larry Fink, the CEO of BlackRock, a global investment manager and one of the largest financiers of fossil fuels, released his annual client letter. In it he said, “a company’s ability to manage environmental, social, and governance matters demonstrates the leadership and good governance that is so essential to sustainable growth, which is why we are increasingly integrating these issues into our investment process” (Fink).

But, in 2020, when Fink released another annual letter, his message took the climate and financial world by storm and reflected the growing influence of ESG on investor’s activities.

Fink put climate change at the center of his letter, titled “A Fundamental Reshaping of Climate

Finance” (Fink). In it, Fink laid out new client expectations as it pertains to their company’s new sustainable, climate-sensitive practices. Fink said, “The evidence on climate risk is compelling investors to reassess core assumptions about modern finance...Investors are increasingly reckoning with these questions and recognizing that climate risk is investment risk. In the near future – and sooner than most anticipate – there will be a significant reallocation of capital.” 84

Fink also foreshadowed upcoming expectations of client companies moving forward.

These expectations include: publishing an end-year disclosure in line with SASB guidelines, providing a climate-risk report that is aligned with recommendations provided by the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), and outlining a plan on how a company will operate under the Paris Climate Agreement scenario. SASB refers to the Sustainability

Accounting Standards Board, which provides metrics and standards for businesses to use when reporting their sustainability practices to investors. TCFD was created to “to improve and increase reporting of climate-related financial information” (TCFD). Other measures announced in Fink’s letter included, “making sustainability integral to portfolio construction and risk management; exiting investments that present a high sustainability-related risk, such as thermal coal producers; launching new investment products that screen fossil fuels; and strengthening our commitment to sustainability and transparency in our investment stewardship activities.”

Beyond BlackRock’s 2020 letter to clients, it is worth noting that the company signed the

Vatican’s pro-carbon pricing statement in 2019, the United Nations’ Principles for Responsible

Investment, and helped to create the Climate Finance Partnership that seeks to create “innovative and globally needed finance solutions that address climate change – including the development of a global price for carbon” (Climate Finance Partners). Additionally, at the same time

BlackRock released their 2020 letter, they also joined Climate Action 100+, “an investor-led initiative to ensure the world’s largest corporate greenhouse gas emitters take necessary action on climate change” (Climate Action 100+).

BlackRock isn’t alone. Multinational investment bank and the largest financier of fossil fuels in the world, JPMorgan, also made a large stride in the direction of climate-sensitive investing. In October 2020, JPMorgan announced that it would align its financing commitments 85 with the goals of the Paris Climate Agreement. And, as a part of this strategy, they said “the Firm intends to help clients navigate the challenges and capitalize on the long-term economic and environmental benefits of transitioning to a low-carbon world” (JPMorgan and Chase,

“JPMorgan Chase Adopts Paris-Aligned Financing Commitment”).

In the bank’s announcement, the company also stated their support for a carbon tax: “The

Firm recognizes that significant changes in policy and the creation of new technologies will ultimately be required to reach net-zero emissions by 2050... To that end, JPMorgan Chase will continue to advocate for market-based policy solutions, including a price on carbon, and the commercialization of new technologies that can help advance deep decarbonization.” Along with this announcement, JPMorgan also launched the Center for Carbon Transition (CTT) which was created to “provide clients in the Corporate & Investment Bank and Commercial Banking with centralized access to sustainability-focused financing, research and advisory solutions.”

JPMorgan is also a member of the Climate Leadership Council and the Business

Roundtable, a nonprofit organization composed of leading business executives. In 2020, the

Roundtable called for a “well-designed market mechanism,” such as a price on carbon, “to provide certainty and unleash innovation to lift America toward a cleaner, brighter future”

(Business Roundtable). They not only called for corporate leadership, but the group also called for government-initiated policies that would support the new sustainability goals of the business community: “Business Roundtable believes corporations should lead by example, support sound public policies and drive the innovation needed to address climate change. To this end, the

United States should adopt a more comprehensive, coordinated and market-based approach to reduce emissions.” 86

In the words of JPMorgan’s co-president, Daniel Pinto, “Climate change is a critical issue of our time. The goals set in the Paris Agreement are commendable and ambitious, but the world is not on track to meet them. While the world has a long way to go, we at JPMorgan Chase want to do more. That means working with clients, policymakers and advocates to transition our economy and turn the goals of Paris into a reality” (JPMorgan and Chase, “JPMorgan Chase

Adopts Paris-Aligned Financing Commitment”). Responding to JPMorgan’s sustainability and climate commitments, President of the Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, Bob Perciasepe, said “Executing this new strategy will be no easy task. But as more and more companies step up to the challenge, it’s now up to our political leaders to enact the policies needed to get the job done.” In other words, the steps taken by the financial community could be setting the stage and paving the way for a pro-climate political agenda. The ball is in our elected officials’ court.

Another asset manager expanding their climate ambitions is Legal and General

Investment Management (LGIM), one of the largest asset managers in the world. In October of

2020, LGIM released its annual Climate Impact Pledge, this time, with sharper teeth (LGIM).

Two primary changes were made to the 2020 pledge that were not in the previous version. First, the asset manager expanded its engagement program so that it aligned with the goal of achieving net-zero carbon emissions globally by 2050. Second, LGIM committed to providing climate ratings for 1,000 companies that would be publicly available. According to the asset manager, this is a “tenfold increase in analysis and [company] coverage, with voting and investment sanctions applied to ‘laggard’ companies.”

BlackRock, JPMorgan Chase, and LGIM are only three investment banks or financial actors making an attempt to enhance their commitment to sustainability. This does not include the other 545 banks, investors, and asset managers in the Climate Action 100+ coalition who are 87 looking to “establish a common high-level agenda for company engagement to achieve clear commitments to cut emissions, improve governance and strengthen climate-related financial disclosures” (Climate Action 100+).

Reshaping investment strategies internally and communicating these new expectations to clients is the first step investors are taking to respond to climate-risk and increasing demands for higher sustainability standards. Another avenue through which investors and other financial actors are applying their investment strategy and putting pressure on the market is through the shareholder resolution process. A shareholder resolution is a proposal presented by the shareholders of a company, which includes investors, that are voted on at a corporation's yearly meeting and are subject to a proxy vote. Though unbinding, they are a powerful tool used by investors to advocate and push for change in a board’s policies so that it may align with their investment goals and expectations. A climate-related shareholder resolution often involves a recommendation that pertains to a company's ability or demonstrated willingness to earn a high

ESG score, consider how their operations contribute to climate change, and mitigate their impact on the climate.

In June 2020, Goldman Sachs, another multinational investment bank, released a report revealing a striking trend (Vigna et al). In general, the total number of climate-related shareholder resolutions globally has steadily increased since 2011, though it reached its peak in

2016. However, the number of climate-related shareholder resolutions that were voted in favor of by shareholders had more than tripled between 2011 (~10%) and 2020 (~34%).

According to the Goldman Sachs’ report, 40% of these shareholder resolutions targeted oil and gas companies. For example, in June of 2020, Chevron’s shareholders approved a 88 resolution, submitted by BNP Paribas Asset Management, that pertained to the oil major’s climate-related lobbying activities (Chevron Board of Directors, “2020 Proxy Statement”). The resolution called for additional lobbying disclosures to ensure that Chevron’s lobbying activities aligned with the goals of the Paris Climate Agreement (Chevron Board of Directors, “Chevron

2020 Shareholder Proposal Voting Results”). Fifty-three percent of shareholders voted in favor of the resolution, despite the Chevron Board’s recommendation to shareholders that they vote against it, stating that the company already had a “disciplined process for lobbying activities that is transparent through existing disclosures.” This was the first climate-related shareholder resolution in the United States that earned a majority of votes from a company’s shareholders.

Investors themselves have also been targeted by climate-related shareholder resolutions, casting doubt on the seriousness of some investors’ commitments to implementing a climate- friendly investment approach. Behind the shareholder resolutions facing investors are activist groups that are intentionally buying shares of banks and fossil fuel companies in order to influence them internally. For example, As You Sow identifies as “the nation’s non-profit leader in shareholder advocacy,” stating that “Shareholder advocacy leverages the power of stock ownership in publicly-traded companies to promote environmental, social, and governance change from within” (As You Sow). And, according to the group, shareholder resolutions are a

“powerful way to encourage corporate responsibility and discourage practices that are unsustainable, unethical, or increase exposure to risk.” As You Sow owns stock in several companies. These include, but are not limited to, Bank of America, BlackRock, Chevron,

Citibank, Dominion Energy, DTE Energy, ExxonMobil, Goldman Sachs, and more.

According to their resolution database, in 2020, As You Sow introduced a climate-related shareholder resolution to Bank of America, requesting that they “issue a report at reasonable cost 89 and omitting proprietary information discussing the range of risks associated with maintaining its current levels of carbon intensive lending”; a resolution for Barclays requiring that it create investment goals that align with the Paris Climate Agreement; and a resolution for JPMorgan requiring “a report at reasonable cost and omitting proprietary information outlining if and how it intends to reduce the GHG emissions associated with its lending activities in alignment with the

Paris Agreement” (As You Sow). The JPMorgan resolution nearly passed with a 49.6% vote in favor. In 2020, As You Sow filed 20 climate-related shareholder resolutions – five of these were targeted at banks or asset managers.

In Europe, Barclays also faced a shareholder resolution, proposed by another shareholder activist group, ShareAction, that asked the company to provide a plan on how it will align its investment strategy with the Paris Climate Agreement and phase out fossil fuels. It failed with only a 24% vote (ShareAction). However, the Barclays resolution highlights an important point: a resolution need not always receive 50% of the shareholder vote of approval in order to have an impact. For some companies, whenever a resolution receives at least a 20% in-favor vote, they are required to issue a response to the shareholders that speaks to the concerns and issues brought up in the resolution.

In early 2020, JPMorgan Chase was targeted by a massive grassroots activist and shareholder effort to remove former ExxonMobil CEO, Lee Raymond, from his executive position on the bank’s leadership board. By May, he had been successfully demoted. According to Majority Action, “Shareholders have demanded that JPMorgan Chase be held accountable for its failure to address the systemic risks presented by climate change, and the announcement to remove Raymond from the lead independent director position is a clear victory for long-term shareholder value and the mitigation of climate risk” (Henn). 90

According to Eli Kasargod-Staub, co-founder and Executive Director of Majority Action, and Jessie Giles, Research Director for Majority Action, “BlackRock and Vanguard, the world’s largest asset managers and largest shareholders of the vast majority of S&P 500 companies, continue to undermine global investor efforts to promote responsible climate action at these critical companies–even as they publicly tout their commitment to addressing the climate crisis”

(Kasargod-Staub, Giles). According to the group's 2020 Asset Manager report, BlackRock voted in support of only 3 out of 36 climate resolutions and Vanguard only 4. Approximately 15 of these votes would have been the deciding vote that would have earned majority of support for the resolutions, should BlackRock and Vanguard have voted in favor of them.

However, other financial institutions are matching their actions to their commitments.

For example, asset managers, PIMCO and LGIM, voted in favor of nearly all of the 36 shareholder resolutions mentioned in the Majority Action report. And half of the banks looked at in this report did support at least 50% of all these 36 climate-related shareholder resolutions in

2020.

Also, 38 banks are members of, perhaps, one of the most ambitious initiatives by the banking sector to combat climate change: The Collective Commitment to Climate Action

(CCCA). All 38 banks in this collective are signatories of the United Nations’ Principles of

Responsible Banking and have committed to being a net-zero company by 2050. According to the United Nations, all 38 banks are on track to meeting this goal (United Nations Environment

Programme Finance Initiative).

The evidence provided up to this point shows that there is a general shift in the direction of pro-climate and ESG investing, despite some banks, asset managers, and financial institutions 91 being slow to implement their newly stated goals. Now it is worth asking, can we attribute this change to an increasingly climate-conscious public and activists? In other words, are investors really responding to the public and activists or are there other reasons why we are seeing these changes?

Like any company, the reasonable assumption could be made is that investors are also dedicated to having a positive public image. And so, when their operations rub the public the wrong way and tarnish their reputation as an environmentally-harmful company, it is likely they will realign their activities and seek out ways to reconcile with the public. It also runs in the opposite direction. Some companies will seek to influence public opinion. For example, what has been called the Climate Change Counter Movement (CCCM) refers to a “deliberate and organized effort to misdirect the public discussion and distort the public’s understanding of climate change,” according to the U.S. National Research Council (Brulle). Often behind this movement are major oil and gas companies, like ExxonMobil.

With that said, there is evidence that reveals at least some of the change we are seeing has come as a direct result of investors responding to public concerns over climate change, activism directed at them, and environmental public demonstrations. And there is even more evidence, as discussed earlier, that a rise in climate activism has been correlated with banks announcing climate-aligned investment changes. Though, this isn’t to say there aren’t other reasons for these developments, beyond public pressure – one of which will be addressed in the following section of this chapter.

In his letter, BlackRock CEO, Larry Fink, directly cited mass climate demonstrations as evidence that attitudes on the climate issue are evolving and that, because of this, we are on the 92 verge of a major financial shift: “Last September, when millions of people took to the streets to demand action on climate change, many of them emphasized the significant and lasting impact that it will have on economic growth and prosperity... awareness is rapidly changing, and I believe we are on the edge of a fundamental reshaping of finance” (Fink). Throughout his letter,

Fink frequently asserted the importance of a company being transparent with and responding to the needs of a broad range of “stakeholders,” which includes the public and anyone else impacted by the operations of a business. Fink said, “Companies and countries that champion transparency and demonstrate their responsiveness to stakeholders, by contrast, will attract investment more effectively, including higher-quality, more patient capital.”

In State Street Global Advisors’ climate expectations report for client companies, the asset manager flagged concerns over companies' public image should they fail to respond to heightened concerns on climate: “[Economic risk] captures the risks of changing consumer habits and a growth in climate consciousness as individuals recognize their role in aiding climate change, and reputational risk stemming from a company’s sustainability practices relative to stakeholder expectations” (State Street Global Advisors).

Most banks, however, are more inclined to directly cite the financial motivations behind their decisions to invest with climate change in mind.

Follow the Money: The Market Knows Best

“Profitability will always matter.”

~ David Solomon, CEO of Goldman Sachs 93

So far, company statements and shareholder resolutions have been used to analyze the changes investors are making in anticipation of a low-carbon economy and gauged the seriousness of their commitments to incorporating climate-risk in their investment strategy. As stated in the previous section, there is a general shift in the direction of pro-climate and ESG investing, despite some investors who are slow to implement their newly stated goals. And part of the reason why we are witnessing this shift is due to the pressure investors are facing from the pro-environment public and activists. However, investors are financial actors, and they seek to enhance profits. Thus, another reason worth exploring is whether ESG and climate-aligned investing presents an attractive financial opportunity, and because of this reason, investors are also making changes to how and where they put their money.

Goldman Sachs, on the eve of 2020, announced that they would be investing $750 million towards sustainable finance projects over the next decade. Why? Because these projects present a major investment and business opportunity. In an article written by CEO David

Solomon on the encouraging prospects of ESG investments, he said “There is not only an urgent need to act, but also a powerful business and investing case to do so…. Profitability will always matter — capital must be deployed to those opportunities that have the greatest potential for success, and we must generate strong returns on invested capital to serve those saving for retirement” (Solomon, “Goldman Sachs' Commercially Driven Plan for Sustainability”).

In JPMorgan’s statement on sustainability, the bank cited financial reasons for embracing a Paris-aligned investment strategy: “...our goal is to help clients navigate the challenges, and capitalize on the long-term economic and environmental benefits of transitioning to a low-carbon world” (JPMorgan Chase, “Sustainability”). 94

In the report titled “Vanguard Investment Stewardship Insights,” Vanguard called on their client companies to consider how the physical risks of climate change will impact their operations and transition risks as consumer behavior drastically shifts. Citing the financial implications of a company that fails to respond to the day’s climate needs, Vanguard said “It is critical that public company boards fully understand and own climate-related risks. Why?

Because the actions—or inaction—of individual companies on this global issue can affect the long-term health of companies and the investable markets” (Vanguard).

And, in the State Street Global Advisors’ report mentioned earlier, they stated three risks associated with a climate and ESG misaligned company. One of these risks included economic risks. The group referred to the risk of allocating money to companies that are not “well-suited for a low-carbon economy.” Avoiding this risk and associated financial pitfalls will inform the asset manager’s investment decisions moving forward.

It is unsurprising that investors and financial institutions are seeking to position their client companies to be as profitable and risk-resistant as possible. It is also unsurprising that investors have identified ESG-aligned practices as the best way to avoid these risks and ensure that their clients are pursuing a smart business strategy. Recent studies and data confirm that

ESG and climate-aligned businesses, in general, have demonstrated a strong performance in the marketplace, even in 2020.

According to one study that analyzed the performance of companies and their ESG scores between 2010 and 2018, companies with higher ESG scores demonstrated lower volatility and higher returns on net (La Torre et al). Similar trends reflecting ESG and clean energy financial resilience continued into 2020, during and throughout the COVID-induced financial crisis. 95

In April 2020, at the beginning of the United States’ initial COVID lockdowns, oil stocks plummeted. And, for the first time in history, oil prices turned negative. For example, Western

Texas Intermediate crude oil prices dropped by 300% in just one week, reaching -$37 per barrel, as shown in Figure 7.1.

Figure 7.1: This chart depicts West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil prices from

April 2020 to March 2021. WTI is considered a specific grade of crude oil and is one of

the three primary benchmarks in oil pricing. This means WTI serves as a reference

price for sellers and buyers of crude oil, particularly in the United States. “Oil

benchmarks” are often used interchangeably with “oil prices.” WTI oil is primarily

sourced from inland Texas, known as the Permian Basin, and is one of the highest

quality oils found globally. (Source: OilPrice.com) 96

By October of 2020, over 100 oil and gas companies had declared bankruptcy after the

COVID-crisis plunged the entire industry into a pitfall seen once in several decades (Takahashi).

While crude oil prices quickly recovered into positive territory, as indicated by Figure 7.1, this was not enough to recover the industry because, for many, capital had begun to dry up as investors lost confidence in fossil fuels investments and were unwilling to provide additional assistance. In the words of Tisha Schuller, former CEO of the Colorado Oil and Gas Association,

“Oil and gas companies could suffer more from lack of investment than lack of demand for oil and gas products” (Schuller). Lack of investment means investors are making an intentional decision to direct their money away from fossil fuels and towards investments that provide more promising and reliable prospects in both an unpredictable and low-carbon market.

Renewable and clean energy, on the other hand, demonstrated a greater capacity for weathering the drastic market and consumer behavior disruptions that had knocked the fossil fuel industry off its feet. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA) report titled

“Renewables 2020 Analysis and Forecast to 2025,” renewable stocks experienced major sell-offs at the beginning of COVID’s initial lockdowns due to uncertainty and concerns about the global economy (IEA). However, shortly after, these stocks rebounded and set course for historic highs.

Several countries reached the highest solar capacity ever achieved up to that point, and China announced plans to double solar module manufacturing. IEA data show that, compared to the energy sector as a whole, clean energy stocks performed the best, hinting to higher investor confidence in the clean energy market.

The IEA’s review and comparison of global stock market prices for traded energy companies over the three-year period spanning January 2018 through October 2020 is shown in

Figure 7.2. As can be seen, while energy stock market prices declined as a whole over this 97 period, the solar, wind and renewable energy independent power producer (IPP) sectors realized substantial growth.

Figure 7.2: This graph shows the index stock prices for traded companies from 2018 to

2020. An index is a measurement or indicator of something. This figure displays the stock

market prices for a variety of companies which investors use to determine market

performance. According to IEA, this chart includes the sector-specific average stock prices

for 19 solar companies, 9 wind companies, 17 renewable energy independent power

producers (RE IPP), and 16 utilities. “All energy sectors” captures the average stock

market price for all energy sectors, which includes fossil fuels (i.e. coal, natural gas, and

oil). 98

Source: This figure is from the International Energy Agency (IEA) report titled

“Renewables 2020: Analysis and Forecast to 2025.” The original figure was labeled

“Indexed stock market prices for traded energy companies and major indices, 2018-20”

and included two, paired charts. The chart not shown here displayed the indexed stock

market prices for major indices.

Beyond clean energy stocks, companies across all sectors that had high ESG scores demonstrated resilience in the face of economic turbulence. According to a research report by

State Street Global Advisors, Bloomberg, S&P, MSCI, FTSE, and Russell, investors that had

ESG-aligned indices or investment standards outperformed the general marketplace and brought, overall, additional value and returns during the first half of 2020 (which is where the study ended) (Rabinovich). In August of 2020, S&P Global confirmed this by releasing another report saying that large investment funds with ESG criteria outperformed the general market

(Whieldon). Out of the 17 ESG-aligned exchange-traded and mutual funds mentioned in the report, 14 documented higher returns than S&P 500 in 2020 through the end of July. In sum, clean energy stocks and stocks associated with high ESG scores outperformed fossil fuel stocks and stocks associated with low ESG scores during the 2020 financial decline.

Given these trends, it makes sense that investors and asset managers see a financial opportunity with ESG and clean energy and are positioning themselves to take advantage of this opportunity by placing pressure on their clients to incorporate ESG in their business models, which includes accounting for climate-risk.

In the middle of the COVID and financial crisis, JP Morgan released a report titled “Why

COVID-19 Could Prove to Be a Major Turning Point for ESG Investing,” in which the bank explored the prospects of ESG in light of the pandemic (JPMorgan and Chase). The report says, 99

“As a result of the radical impact COVID-19 has had on global economies in such a short space of time, many policymakers and investors are viewing the crisis as a wake-up call that accelerates the need for a different approach to investing, as parallels have been drawn between the unforeseen risks of a pandemic and issues such as climate change.” Jean-Xavier Hecker and

Hugo Dubourg, Co-Heads of ESG & Sustainability at JPMorgan, said “Over the long run,

COVID-19 could prove to be a major turning point for ESG investing, or strategies that consider a company’s environmental, social and governance performance alongside traditional financial metrics.”

Whether this prediction will come true, it is not yet known. What is known, however, is that investors are trending towards ESG investing that considers how a business is contributing to our changing climate. There is a real market and financial incentive for investors to transform their investment strategies. The financial opportunities presented by ESG investing is a large carrot. Grassroots activism and public pressure is a small stick.

Republicans and Investors

“It is essential to adapt our financial system to climate-related risks…”

~Senator Marco Rubio (R) and Senator Diane Feinstein (D), 2020

It appears investors, financial institutions, and other major economic actors are gradually taking a pro-climate stance, as the economic and social risks associated with unmitigated climate change become more widely known. This now begs the question as to whether the group in focus, Republicans, are responding to this shift in another important, conservative-oriented, fiscally minded group. 100

In June of 2019, Republican Representative Francis Rooney and Democratic Senator

Chris Coons co-authored an opinion piece titled “75 Executives Lobbied Congress for a National

Carbon Price. We Listened” (Coons, Rooney). In the article, Rooney and Coons referred to the dozens of business executives who came to Congress in 2019 due to concerns over the costs their companies would bear as a result of climate change: “...These business leaders spoke forcefully on the risk climate change poses to their operations, their employees, and their customers.”

The opinion piece continued to elaborate on the business risk posed by an unstable climate and how investors are paying close attention to costs being incurred by their clients:

“Businesses know all about the risks of climate change. Companies are increasingly experiencing disruptions to their supply chains and damages to their assets from floods, droughts, wildfires, storms, and other climate-driven extreme weather, and investors see it reflected in their portfolios. Businesses’ bottom lines show that climate change isn’t a far-off risk, it’s a cost that’s already racking up damages to our economy...which is only expected to grow.”

Rooney and Coons said, most importantly, “Now, it is our responsibility, as members of

Congress, regardless of our party affiliation, to respond to the businesses who drive our economy.” Rooney and Coons’ preferred response? A market-based, business-friendly policy in the form of a carbon tax.

In February of 2020, Republican Representative Brian Fitzpatrick and Senator Coons co- authored an opinion piece on the overlap of climate change and the economy (Fitzpatrick,

Coons). The article read, “Climate change is already costing our economy through increased flooding, more severe storms, and devastating droughts.” Directly citing the advice of the 101 business, financial, and economic community, Fitzpatrick and Coons also called for the implementation of a carbon tax: “Business leaders, economists, and a growing number of

Republicans and Democrats agree that placing a price on carbon is the most efficient, market- based approach to fighting climate change while growing the economy and creating jobs.” It is worth noting that Fitzpatrick and Coons are not advocating for merely any kind of emission reducing climate policy, such as regulations. They are listening to and responding to the concerns of the financial and business community by pushing forward policies that allow for market predictability, long-term financial planning, and growth.

As another bipartisan message on the economic effects of climate change, in mid-2020,

Republican Senator Marco Rubio and Democratic Senator Diane Feinstein co-authored a letter calling on the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) to provide clear recommendations on how to address the financial risks posed by climate change: “We appreciate that the CFTC recognizes the importance of climate change risk, and we encourage you to produce robust and specific recommendations for understanding and mitigating the risks of climate change to the U.S. financial system” (Feinstein, Rubio). In the letter, they cite the financial costs incurred from a range of increasingly severe, and more frequent, natural disasters over the last decades. As the first financial federal regulator to create a subcommittee dedicated specifically to climate change, Rubio and Feinstein state that the CTFC will have the ability to guide and inform other agencies that begin to respond to financial climate risk.

There is some evidence that Republicans are demonstrating an awareness of and desire to listen directly to the financial, investor, and business community on mitigating climate risks.

However, there is evidence that the overwhelming majority of Republicans in Congress not only 102 aren’t responding to the advice, guidance, and efforts of the financial community, but they are outwardly opposing and making attempts to reverse the changes that have already occurred.

In March 2020, when the United States economy first entered the COVID-induced crisis, the Federal Reserve selected BlackRock to shepherd billions of dollars worth of purchases of securities requested under the CARES Act, the first COVID relief package. However, several

Republicans became concerned that BlackRock’s new climate investment standards would sway how they made recommendations for these security purchases and, in effect, would bar fossil fuel companies from receiving financial support.

In April, 17 Republicans in the Senate sent a letter to Secretary of the Treasury, Steve

Mnuchin, and Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Jerome Powell, expressing concerns over how

BlackRock’s privately decided investment priorities would influence how it implemented the

CARES Act (Cruz et al). The letter reads, “BlackRock must act without regard to...investment policies BlackRock has adopted for its own funds.”

Even before the pandemic, Republicans were urging the Federal Reserve to avoid regulations that sought to incorporate climate risk into the financial system. In December of

2020, 47 Republicans in Congress wrote a letter to Jerome Powell expressing their disapproval:

“We write to you with concerns about the Federal Reserve Board potentially introducing climate change scenarios into its supervisory stress tests of regulated banks” (Barr et al). The letter directly cites attempts by banks and investors to consider climate change in their investment decisions, saying “those suggested paths forward are plagued with speculation, inconsistencies, and reliance on long-term projections that may not adequately account for shifting market dynamics.” The letter also called into question the cause of severe natural disasters and 103 mischaracterized them as events not associated with climate instability: “It is worth noting that enhanced risks from wildfires in the West or hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico or East Coast are cited as reasons for imposing additional climate-focused standards by financial institutions. Yet, these enhanced risks to insured property could also be attributable to poor local zoning standards and building policies…”

Most interesting of all, the letter directly referred to the many efforts of banks and investors to reshape their investment portfolios in the direction of sustainability. Calling these efforts “ill-advised” and casting doubt on the legality of them, the letter says, “we are also concerned that introducing climate change scenarios into stress tests could accelerate the ill- advised pattern of “de-banking” legally operating businesses in industries, such as coal and oil and gas, that are politically unpopular to certain vocal policymakers.” The letter ended by categorizing climate-risk incorporation into financial strategies as “politicizing access to capital.”

Conclusion

Like the previous section, this chapter sought to explore any potential shifts in an often overlooked, yet influential, faction in the Republican world – in this case, investors and financial institutions. This analysis has shown that, first, there has been rising pressure on banks and investors to respond to the changing climate by environmental activists, divestment movements, faith institutions, the United Nations, and other groups.

Second, in 2020, banks and investors began to take on a more aggressive, activist role by fundamentally reshaping their investment standards so that client companies had climate-aligned goals, supporting climate-related resolutions more often than years prior, and calling on elected officials to create a policy landscape that is complementary to pro-climate investing – despite 104 some major banks making commitments to change their investment strategies so that they were aligned with climate progress and failing to uphold those commitments when actually faced with opportunities to reallocate funds and vote in favor of a shareholder resolutions.

Third, there is strong evidence that despite encountering public pressure from multiple directions, another reason pushing investors to become climate and ESG-aligned is simply the financial opportunities and stability offered by investments in clean energy and companies that have taken serious steps to insulate themselves from the various risks (social, economic, and political) associated with climate change. Changing their investment strategies is not merely an act of altruism. It is also a rational act in investor’s self-interest.

And, lastly, some Republicans are responding to the signal being sent by the investor and financial community to mitigate the economic risks posed by an unstable climate, particularly

Republicans which already had a history of engaging with the climate issue. But the overwhelming majority of Republicans, particularly Republicans in Congress, have demonstrated not only an unwillingness to take to heart the advice of financial experts, but are pitching arguments that run counter to the economic expert and business consensus on allowing climate-risk to guide our investment decisions moving forward.

This chapter, overall, has shown how there is a meaningful shift within the investor community towards sustainable, climate-friendly practices, whether that is a result of activism or financial incentives. However, the oppositional response by most Republicans in Congress directly towards this change casts strong doubt on the ability of prominent financial actors to sway the Republican Party and bring them to a place where it, too, acknowledges the seriousness of climate-risk and embraces legislative actions that respond to those risks. 105

Chapter Eight: Discussion and Conclusion

This paper has provided evidence that young conservatives and investors are moving on climate, with or without the Republican Party. To summarize, first, the Republican Party, as whole, has not demonstrated a willingness to lead on climate change and become a voice at the table fighting for the solutions they think are best. Overall, the Party is not interested in pushing climate change to the top of the political agenda. Instead, it is most interested in doing the opposite. This stance has put them at odds with two key Republican groups: young conservatives and investors.

Young conservatives are not only more concerned about anthropomorphic climate change and supportive of action by the government than an older generation of conservatives, but are strongly in favor of policies that are explicitly opposed by a climate-hostile Republican Party, such as carbon taxes, reduction in offshore drilling, and more. Young conservatives, however, are not merely a constituency of GOP voters that is passively concerned about a changing climate. In recent years, multiple Gen Z and Millennial-led climate organizations have emerged as prominent players in the climate movement that are actively seeking to advance solutions to this issue. And, confirming the assumption that the radical flank effect is demonstrable, the kinds of solutions that are being advanced by young conservative environmentalists not only enjoy support from Democrats and Republicans, but they are explicitly being proposed as middle- grounded, bipartisan alternatives to strongly progressive climate proposals, such as the Green

New Deal.

Investors, too, have a growing role in influencing the climate agenda. For several years, investors have been the target of climate activists and related campaigns as a part of an effort to 106 push investors, banks, and other financial institutions to halt their funding of fossil fuel projects, to support climate-aligned shareholder resolutions, and to engage in responsible, climate- conscious investing with an eye towards sustainability. Only recently has it appeared that these grassroots efforts have produced positive effects. Up until a couple years ago, the world’s largest investors and asset managers failed to decrease their amount of capital flowing to fossil fuel companies and to commit to re-envisioning finance in light of climate change. However, most recently, more (though not all) investors have taken a different tone. Today, investors, in general, are not only incorporating climate-risk into their own investment strategies, demanding that client companies embrace ESG-aligned practices, and supporting more climate-based shareholder resolutions, they are also encouraging elected officials to adopt market-based policies that support a low-carbon economy aligned with ambitious climate goals. While some investors directly cite public concern over climate change, activism, and proper stakeholder engagement as reasons for making these changes, there is also a clear financial incentive for investors to favor ESG and climate-aligned businesses due to their demonstrated resilience in volatile markets and potential for high returns.

As Kingdon states, when three events occur at once – a problem is widely acknowledged and has captured the attention of the public, politically feasible solutions are on the table, and there is a political shift conducive to policy implementation – an issue will rise on the political agenda and be more likely to result in a policy outcome. Using John Kindgon’s agenda-setting model, it is now worth returning to the primary question at hand: How likely does it appear that climate policy will rise on the federal political agenda following the 2020 elections, what factors are involved in shaping that political agenda, and how are those factors shaping the political agenda? 107

We have already identified two often underestimated and overlooked factors that are shaping the modern climate agenda by helping to poke the side of the Republican Party: young conservatives and investors. These are neither random nor insignificant subsets of the Party. The former enjoys substantial political clout within the Party and the latter often serves as a guide for

Republicans’ economically oriented policy decisions. These two groups are both engaging in public, policy-directed, organized efforts to bring climate change and politically palatable solutions to the fore, whether that is the fore of the Republican Party, the investment world, or both.

An adequate analysis of climate policy today using the agenda-setting model requires that we identify and isolate key groups, such as these, that have the potential to shift the Republican

Party – the well-known wall and barrier to meaningful climate legislation. It is not enough to ask,

“Is the public, in general, aware of and concerned about climate change?” or “Are politically feasible solutions being considered?” Though, in general, these questions remain relevant and important. We must also ask specifically in this context, “Are young conservatives and investors aware of and concerned about climate change?” We now know they are. “Are young conservatives and investors the ones actively promoting bipartisan, politically feasible climate solutions?” We now know they are and have increasingly over the years. And, while not the focus of this analysis because the answer is clear, “Are we operating in the midst of a political change?” In light of the tumultuous 2020 elections and start of the new Biden administration, we are. And so, it appears that the problem, solution, and political streams illustrated by Kingdon’s model are, leading up to the state of the Biden Administration, beginning to converge when we look specifically at key, influential subsets of the Republican Party. 108

Elevating these findings, moving into the Biden Administration, are potential policy entrepreneurs – individuals who will take advantage of the window of opportunity provided by these three streams converging and propelling a successful policy outcome. In other words, we are looking for confluence, but we need a policy entrepreneur to act on that confluence. Who that policy entrepreneur will be, we do not yet know. Though, it is worth speculating whether some of the Republicans who, in recent years, have tested the waters by pushing the Party boundaries on climate change will be that person. Perhaps Senator Lisa Murkowski or Senator Mitt Romney will seize the opportunity to push Republicans into the climate space. Both have demonstrated not only deep concern over climate change and have softly waved the possibility of getting behind more ambitious climate proposals, such as a carbon tax, but a willingness to challenge the

Republican Party status quo when they feel it is politically and morally necessary – both are known for publicly challenging former President Donald Trump, taking heat from other establishment Republicans. Or, perhaps, a new Republican climate champion will enter the scene in the coming year(s). As pressure mounts from key conservative bases and the Republican Party attempts to respond to this pressure, it is not unreasonable to assume some Republicans will be more inclined to take a stronger stance on climate change and other environmental issues.

Looking to the future, this pressure is still mounting after the start of the Biden administration, which is where this paper’s core analysis ended. Since Biden’s inauguration, several meaningful developments have occurred that hint to not only a complimentary extension of the trends revealed in this analysis, but, perhaps, an acceleration of them.

Within his first week, President Biden issued a series of climate-oriented executive orders. Most notably, Biden reversed the Trump administration’s decision to exit the Paris

Climate Agreement and cancelled the construction of the controversial Keystone XL Pipeline 109

(White House). On January 26th, less than one week after Biden’s inauguration, the Federal

Reserve announced the creation of their Supervision Climate Committee aimed at assessing the impacts of climate change on the financial system – the first committee of its kind at the Federal

Reserve (Ellfeldt). Vice Chair Randal Quarles said, "The SCC will build on our climate change work already underway across the Federal Reserve System, and help us take a careful, thoughtful, and transparent approach to analyzing these potential risks.”

On February 24th, in an interview with the New York Times, Republican Senator Mitt

Romney made another strong and unapologetic statement of support for a carbon tax, making waves throughout the climate movement and eco-right (New York Times, “Senator Mitt Romney

Talks Economic Relief, Donald Trump, and Unity”). He said, “I'm very open to a carbon tax, carbon dividend, where there's a tax on oil companies and coal companies and so forth…And the funds that are raised then go to individual taxpayers so they can meet the costs of the higher price of energy." Romney said shortly after that his office was actively evaluating the proposal. He also expressed support for federal investments to spur the development of nuclear energy and carbon capture technologies.

On March 1st, Citigroup announced a new commitment to become net-zero by 2050

(Fraser). CEO Jane Fraser said, “Net zero means rethinking our business and helping our clients rethink theirs. For banks, what some don't realize is that net zero includes not just our own operations but also our core business impacts – in other words, our financing.” She continued to say, “As the world's most global bank, we are interconnected with many carbon-intensive sectors that continue to help drive global economic development. We are committed to bringing as many clients as we can along with us on this journey and working with them relentlessly to get it right.” 110

Two days later, on March 3rd, Goldman Sachs announced their own commitment to become a net-zero bank by 2030 (Solomon, “Goldman Sachs Update on Our 2030 Sustainable

Finance Commitment”). Chairman and CEO David Solomon said in a statement, “Today, we are expanding our operational carbon commitment to include our supply chain, targeting net zero carbon emissions by 2030.” He continued to say, “We encourage business leaders from all industries to join these collective efforts. After all, it’s the gains we make in the short term that will make our success in the long term possible.”

And, on March 9th, Benji Backer, the President of the American Conservation Coalition, co-authored an opinion piece in the Washington Examiner with Republican House members

Bruce Westerman, Dan Crenshaw, and Kevin McCarthy, the House Minority Leader. The piece was titled “Put conservatives back in conservation.” The article reads, “We believe, now more than ever, it’s time for conservatives to lead on environmental issues. We reject the idea that the public has to choose between a strong economy and a healthy environment. We know that harnessing innovative technologies and acting as good environmental stewards will strengthen our economy and create new jobs.” They ended with, “We are building a movement of conservatives, young activists, and established leaders alike to show that conservation is conservative by proposing market-based solutions to improve our economy and our environment simultaneously” (Backer et al).

All eyes are on the 117th Congress. Will Democrats cram climate policy through the budget reconciliation process along partisan lines or will Republicans take a seat at the table to influence which climate solutions are included? Will clean energy standards, cap-and-trade, or a carbon tax come out on top? Will Senator Mitt Romney turn his words into actions and support a carbon dividend bill? Will Republicans compromise with President Biden, in hopes of avoiding 111 any more climate-oriented executive orders? Will the Republican Party take the lead of investors and the financial community? Will the Republican Party re-envision their priorities in light of the emerging generation of climate-conscious GOP voters?

Time will tell. However, it’s not a misguided hope to think climate policy is already rising or will very soon rise on the political agenda, with some Republicans on board. This shift is attributable not only to the fact the Republican Party is operating in a tumultuous political atmosphere that is forcing Party leaders to reconsider how to best appeal to their constituency, including pro-climate young conservatives, it is also attributable to key groups within the

Republican Party which are (1) increasingly concerned about climate change, (2) identifying bipartisan and politically palatable policies they favor, and (3) actively seeking out ways to advance those solutions.

Another analysis, following the conclusion of 117th Congress, will be important not only to test the future-looking speculations made in the discussion of this paper’s analysis, but to further develop our understanding of how well John Kingdon’s agenda-setting model allows us to make sense of why and how climate policy is shaping up in, perhaps, one of the most significant periods for climate action in history.

112

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