Practical Philosophy

Home , Absence of good, Practical philosophy

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Part III

Introduction

Practical philosophy deals with our fundamental normative and evaluative principles, especially with regard to human action and character. Accordingly, in medieval philosophy it comprises philosophical ethics and moral theology (given their inextricable theoretical connections), as well as foundational issues in political and legal thought. The vast medieval literature is represented in this part by four major, “perennial” aspects of medieval thought on the subject, i.e., such considerations that are still quite directly relevant to our thinking on the same issues. The first section presents the characteristic medieval conception of the metaphysical foundation of objective value (and thus of objective value-judgments), which can be briefly referred to as “the idea of the convertibility of being and goodness.” The second section deals with issues of the freedom of the will, insofar as it is principally free acts of the will that embody moral goodness or evil. The third section presents two competing conceptions on the issue of the ultimate human good, i.e., human happiness. Finally, the fourth section deals with the foundational issues of legal theory, insofar as laws of human society are supposed to regulate human conduct in the interest of the com- mon good. The first section begins with two selections from Augustine. The first, from his Enchiri- dion (literally, “Handbook” – a brief summary of the basic tenets of the Catholic faith), explains the fundamental idea of the convertibility of being and goodness: everything there is, insofar as it is, is good (and, of course, everything that is good, insofar as it is good, is). This is the Neoplatonic idea that rescued the young Augustine’s thought from the clutches of Manicheism (a dualistic religion founded by the prophet Mani in the third century, teaching that everything in the world is the result of the battle between two equally powerful ultimate principles of good and evil, light and darkness, which in some form or other was very influential among Christians of Augustine’s time), and made him realize how it can provide an answer to the problem of evil. For although Manicheism provides an easy answer to the question of the origin of evil in the world (as resulting from the intrusion of darkness into the realm of light), it obviously goes against the orthodox Christian idea of divine omnipotence (identifying God with light, and Satan with darkness). But if one embraces MP_C35.qxd 11/23/062:38AMPage304

PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 304 effect (as,forexample,abirthdefectistheresultofsomegeneticdeficiency). hence goodness);theycanonlyhavea Defects cannotdirectlybecausedbyan by God,indeed,asAugustineargues,theyarenotcausedproperlyspeakinganything. perfection thattheycouldandoughttohavebytheirnature.Butthesedefectsarenotcaused such asillness,orsomeothernaturaldefect,ingeneral, falling shortoftheirpossibleperfection,i.e.,theymaybecomeplaguedbysomenaturalevil, by theirnatureallthetime.Hence,necessarily,timeandagaintheycanbecomedefective, perfection Since creaturesarenecessarilyoflimitedperfection,theycannothavetheabsolute human intelligence,andanantorabeingcannothavetheperfectionofdivinenature.) perfections thatarenotallowedbytheirnature:arockcannothavelife,plant with theperfectionsallowedanddemandedbyitsnature.(Ofcourse,creaturescannotreceive then, bytheverysameact,Heprovideseachcreaturewithitsowngoodness,endowingit of theproblem.ForifGodbringsHiscreationoutnothingbygivingbeingtoeverything, evil inthecreationofanomnipotent,omniscient,andlovingGod? the orthodoxChristianideaofGod,thenprobleminevitablyarises:howcantherebe Although naturaldefectscannotbeblamedonanyone, creation, asAugustineexplainsinthenextselectionfromhis of itstreatisesintogroupsseven(inGreek, the thesesofalargerwork,nowlost,called and disciple,JohntheDeacon(whowastobecomePope I),inconnectionwithoneof they arenotsubstantiallygood? its subtitle(oralternativetitle): here infull,isaratherenigmaticshorttreatiseseekingthesolutiontoproblemraised apparatus ofAristotelianlogicandmetaphysics.Boethius’ of beingandgoodnessthattheseauthorsapproachalreadyarmedwiththeconceptual provide amoredetailed,sophisticatedanalysisofthesamefundamentalideaconvertibility direction ofthewill. metaphysical evilandgoodness,namely,thelacking( and itsopposite,moralgoodness,inthisframeworksimplyturnouttobespecificcasesof and choosingwhatitoughttodesirechooseaccordingrightreason.So,moralevil, the will,whichisrealizedwhenavoluntary,rationalagentactingrationally,desiring not tochoose.Bycontrast,therefore,moralgoodnessconsistsintheproperdirectionof they deliberatelysubjectthemselvestosomeinordinatedesire,choosingwhatought sort ofdefect,namely,thedefectiveuse,orratherabuse,theirGod-givenfreewill,when Thus, moralevil,forwhichvoluntaryagentsaredulyheldresponsible,originatesinaspecific on thoseagentswhoareabletochoosebetweengoodandevilaccountoftheirfreewill. treatises ofwhichwereorganizedintogroupsnine(in Greek, simplicity, tobea“perfectmatch”hisownideasonthesame issue.(Althoughitisdebated (in particular,thecompositionoftheiressencewith existence) asopposedtodivine tinguishing Godfromcreaturesonthebasisofmetaphysical compositionofcreatures disciple, Porphyry(theauthorof This, however,doesnotmeanthat The ideaoftheconvertibilitybeingandgoodnessprovidesatleastpartsolution The subsequenttwoselectionsinthissectionfromBoethiusandAquinas,respectively, In anycase,AquinascertainlyfoundBoethius’answerto the question,intermsofdis- of divinenature,andsotheycannothaveallpossibleperfectionsalloweddemanded According toonetradition,thequestionwasraisedbyafriend How isitpossiblethatsubstancesaregoodintheyare,although Isagoge deficient nobody , referredtointhefirstpartofthisvolume). efficient is responsiblefor hebodmades Hebdomades cause, i.e.,onethatfailstoproduceitsproper cause (thatbyitsactivitygivesbeingand privatio voluntary ), imitatingPlotinus’ , socalledafterthearrangement ) orhaving( De CivitateDei De Hebdomadibus any privation defects evil occurringinGod’s enneades habitus , thelackofsome are (“City ofGod”). ), byPlotinus’ ) oftheproper to beblamed , reproduced Enneades immutable , the MP_C35.qxd 11/23/062:38AMPage305 with somequalification,namely,insofarasitexists. University Press,1991). Goodness: TheConceptoftheGoodinMetaphysicsandPhilosophical Theology tions areamplydiscussedinanexcellentcollectionofmodernessays: ScottMacDonald(ed.), Thefurtherintricaciesoftheidea,alongwithitsprofoundmetaphysical andtheologicalimplica- 2 The CatholicUniversityofAmericaPress,1990). ForadetaileddiscussionoftheissueseeRalphMcInerny, 1 specifically moralgoodandevil,namely, in themodernliteraturewhetherBoethiusactuallydidmeanwhatAquinastakeshimtomean. anything thatexistsisgood,it in it,namely,atleastitsexistence.Asaresult,evenifitisnottrue,absolutelyspeaking,that speaking, itdoesnotmeanthatisgood,absolutelyevenifhassomegoodness of theperfectionsitactuallyhas.However,justbecausesomethinghasexistence,absolutely only withrespecttoitssubstantialbeing,i.e.,insofarasitexistsatallorsome goodness, absolutelyspeaking.Withoutthoseperfections,thethingcanbesaidtogood called goodonlyifithasallthosesuperaddedperfectionsinactualitythatareneededforits absolutely speaking,merelyforthereasonthatitexists,canbe be somehowonaccountofitsfurther,accidentalactualities.)Butitcannotcalledgood, substantial being.(Anditcanbesaidtoabeingincertainrespector therefore, canbecalledabeingabsolutelyspeakingmerelyonaccountoftheactualityits actuality ofallthosesuperaddedqualitiesthatmakethethingperfectinitskind.Thething, of thething,i.e.,itsignifiesnotonlyactualityitssubstantialbeing,butalso the thingofwhichitistrue.Theconceptgoodness,however,connotesperfection of theirdifferenceinconnotation.Theconceptbeingmerelysignifiestheactuality of thething,fromconditionstheirpredicabilitywithoutqualification,onaccount what theseterms–orrathertheconceptstheyexpresssignify,namely,actofexistence and “good”donotseemtobeconvertibleterms.Aquinas’responsecarefullydistinguishes and anotherforitbegood.ForobviouslynoteverythingthatexistsisTherefore,“being” the convertibilityofbeingandgoodness. concern thatquitenaturallyarisesinconnectionwiththeinterpretationofveryidea explicitly drawsonBoethius’doctrine,providesaveryclear,succinctdiscussionofthemain work. Butthatcommentarywouldhavebeentoolongforthepurposesofthisanthology. It isnowonder,therefore,thatAquinaswroteadetailedrunningcommentaryonBoethius’ mankind asawhole(asitwasfirstsketchedoutinAugustine’smonumental vidence, predestination,andgraceinthesalvationhistoryofindividualhumans on thefreedomofwill,andespeciallyitsrelationtotheologicalissuesdivinepro- often referredtoasAugustine’sdiscussionofthe“divided will” or“twowills,”onaccount medieval philosophyarealmostalwaysinextricablyboundup withtheologicalconsiderations. be obviousevenfromtheseshortselections,thephilosophical considerationsinthisarea thought onthemoredirectlyphilosophicalaspectsofissuefreewill,although,aswill tions arethereforemerelymeanttocallattentionsomedistinctivefeaturesofmedieval can hardlyevenbetouchedoninthisintroductorysurveyofmedievalphilosophy.Theseselec- The secondsectionofthispartisdevotedtoconsiderationstheprimarysource The issuecanbeputinthefollowingway.Itseemstoonethingforsomethingexist However, thebriefquestionfromAquinas’ The firstselectionisAugustine’sfamousdescriptionofhisagony rightbeforehisconversion, is true thatanythingexistsabsolutelyspeaking free will . Again,theenormousmedievalliterature Summa Theologiae 2 Boethius andAquinas presented here,which (Ithaca, NY:Cornell (Washington, DC: De CivitateDei Being and is good 1 ) ) 305

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PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 306 itself towhatitoughtdowiththeaidofgraceGod. possessed ifthemindregainsitsintegrity,whenitiscuredofthissicknessbycommitting genuine, intrinsichindrancetothefreedomofwill,whichthereforecanonlybefully being abletofullycommitwhatitseesoughtdo.This“sickness”isinfacttheonly for this“bizarresituation”ina“sicknessofthemind,”whenitisdividedagainstitself,not the mindcommandsitself,andmeetswithresistance,”ashesays.Hefindsexplanation to chastityandreligiouslifeingeneral):“Themindcommandsthebodyisinstantlyobeyed; unable towantsomethingthathewantshimself(namely,hisfullcommitment disturbs him,therefore,isratherwhenhefindshimselfunabletowantsomething,indeed, influenced, butisneverfullydetermined,byexternalcauses.Whatpuzzlesanddeeply for him,thehumansoulbyitsverynatureisanautonomousagent,whichcertainly is notaquestionforAugustine;heneverbotheredbyissuesofcausaldeterminism: of hisphilosophicalpuzzlementoverstatemindatthattime.Whetherthewillisfree endowed withthissortofautonomywouldbecalled“theholywill”byImmanuelKant. wonder thatseveralcenturieslater,eveninaradicallydifferentphilosophicalsetting,thewill of makingasinfulchoice.Thisisthefreedomsaints,goodangels,andGod.Soitno when itcanonlychoosewhatoughttochoose,forismorally(notphysically)incapable ing whatoneoughttodo.Indeed,theperfectfreedomofwillisexercisedprecisely free, providedthatchoosingthisonepossiblechoiceisstilltheresultofautonomouslychoos- conception, evenifthewillcannotchooseanythingexceptwhatitactuallydoes,isstill not requireseveralalternativepossibilitiesamongwhichthewillcouldchoose.Onthis present inAugustine,butmostfullyexpoundedhere,thatthefreedomofwilldoes the mostpeculiarthingaboutAnselm’sdiscussiontomodernreaderisidea,already divine eternity,servedasthestartingpointforalllaterdiscussionsofproblem. terms ofdistinguishingabsoluteandconditionalnecessity,aswellhissubtlediscussion have to His omniscience,thentomorrowIcannotbutdowhatHenowknowswilldo.Butif very briefly,isthis:ifGodforeknowswhatIwilldotomorrow,asHecertainlydoes,given divine providence,anotherpotentialconstraintonthefreedomofwill.Theproblem, ously influentialdiscussionoftheissuecompatibilityfreedomwilland An AnalysisofAnselm’sAccountFreeWill,” Foramoredetaileddiscussionoftheissuealongtheselines,see GergelyKlima,“ThePrimalChoice: 3 vision, throughtheselectedarticlesofAquinas’ the theologians’conceptionof“transcendent”happiness achievable onlyinthebeatific achievable inthislifethroughBoethiusofDacia’sshorttreatise onthesupremegoodwith Aristotelians, contrastingtheAverroistphilosophers’view of“immanent”happiness “intellectualism.” “voluntaristic” position,asopposedtotheAristotelians’ (especially, Aquinas’)perceived Henry ofGhent’snegativeanswertothisquestion,carefully arguingfortheAugustinian other words,isreasonapowersuperiortothewill?Thelastselectionofthispartpresents should thismean,then,thatitisreasondetermineswhatthewilloughttochoose?In fully exercisedwhenthewillchooseswhatitoughttochooseaccordingrightreason.But The selectionfrom The nextselectionreproducesinfullAnselm’sshorttreatise“OnFreeWill.”Perhaps The selectionsofthenextsectionaremeanttoillustrate the“internal”debateof So, thefreedomofwillconsistsinitsautonomy,orself-determination,whichis do it,thenIhavenochoice,somywillisnotfree.Boethius’ingenioussolution,in Consolatione Philosophiae Sapientia etDoctrina contains Boethius’equallyfamousandenorm- Summa Theologiae 1/2 (2004),pp.5–13. . Itistobenoted,though, 3 MP_C35.qxd 11/23/062:38AMPage307 and supernaturalaspectsofhumanlife. harmonious continuityandbalancebetweenimmanencetranscendence,thenatural highest achievementsoftypicallymedievalthought,whichwasalwaysinsearcha a supreme,absolutemonarch.However,thatconceptionalreadypointsawayfromthe which wouldseeinthedivinelawnothingbutpossiblyarbitrarycommandmentsof Commandments canberegardedaspertainingtonaturallaw,instarkcontrastlaterviews, Doctor’s highlynuancedviewontheissue,arguingthatinsomesenseevenTen Thelastselection,fromJohnDunsScotus,presentstheSubtle Charity: cf.Matthew22:37–40). (including, forexample,thepreceptsofTenCommandmentsorTwoPrecepts ernatural sourcesoftheunchangingnormsjustice,namely,naturallawanddivine a theologicalcontexttheclarificationofrelationshipsbetweennaturalandsup- legislation preciselyonaccountoftheunchangingdemandsjusticeinachangingsociety. is certainlynotarevolutionary,hedefinitelycommittedtotheideaofrevisingpositive one situationmaybecomeunjustsimplyonaccountofthechangesinsociety.AlthoughAquinas in accordancewiththechangingsocialcircumstances.Forwhatisajustpositivenorm of naturallaw,positivelawcannotremainstaticinachangingsociety,butneedstobeadjusted Precisely becausepositivelawismerelythetemporalimplementationofunchangingnorms in contemporarydiscussionsofnaturallaw(asthefoundationbasichumanrights). by humannatureassuch. of theflourishingindividualhumansinsociety,needswhichturnaredetermined securing thecommongoodofhumansociety.Andthisisprecondition the legalityorjusticeofthispositivelegislationisnaturallaw,inherentindemands law, i.e.,thelawspositedbylegislativeauthorityofsociety.However,whatjustifies Theologiae the actualsocialcircumstances.AswecanseefromselectionsAquinas’ actual implementationoftheirobjectivestandardsinasocietyisalwaysdependenton legality, orlegaljustice,justlikemorality,isinnowayamatterofconvention,evenifthe dealing withsomefoundationalissuesinmedievallegalthought.Forthinkers, thought –betweenimmanenceandtranscendencecanbeobservedinthelasttwoselections, be achievableinthislife. object, namely,thecontemplationofdivineessence,butinawaythatisthoughtto that thephilosophers’“immanent”conceptionultimatelytargetssametranscendent But alloftheseconsiderationsconcerningnaturallawandpositivepresupposein It isquiteimportanttonoticeherethedynamicaspectofAquinas’thought,oftenignored A similarbalancingact–which,aswecouldsee,istypicalinpracticallyallaspectsofmedieval , theimplementationofnormslegalitythroughlegislationresultsinpositive Summa 307

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Goodness and Being

Augustine on Evil as the Privation of Goodness

Chapter 10. The Supremely Good Creator Made All Things Good By the Trinity, thus supremely and equally and unchangeably good, all things were created; and these are not supremely and equally and unchangeably good, but yet they are good, even taken separately. Taken as a whole, however, they are very good, because their ensemble constitutes the universe in all its wonderful order and beauty.

Chapter 11. What is Called Evil in the Universe is But the Absence of Good And in the universe, even that which is called evil, when it is regulated and put in its own place, only enhances our admiration of the good; for we enjoy and value the good more when we compare it with the evil. For the Almighty God, who, as even the heathen acknowledge, has supreme power over all things, being Himself supremely good, would never permit the existence of anything evil among His works, if He were not so omnipotent and good that He can bring good even out of evil. For what is that which we call evil but the absence of good? In the bodies of animals, disease and wounds mean nothing but the absence of health; for when a cure is effected, that does not mean that the evils which were present – namely, the diseases and wounds – go away from the body and dwell elsewhere: they alto- gether cease to exist; for the wound or disease is not a substance, but a defect in the ﬂeshly substance, – the ﬂesh itself being a substance, and therefore something good, of which those evils – that is, privations of the good which we call health – are accidents. Just in the same way, what are called vices in the soul are nothing but privations of natural good. And when they are cured, they are not transferred elsewhere: when they cease to exist in the healthy soul, they cannot exist anywhere else.

Chapter 12. All Beings Were Made Good, But Not Being Made Perfectly Good, are Liable to Corruption All things that exist, therefore, seeing that the Creator of them all is supremely good, are themselves good. But because they are not, like their Creator, supremely and unchangeably MP_C35.qxd 11/23/062:38AMPage310

PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 310 Luke6:45. 2 Isa.5:20. 1 left inwhichitcandwell. consumed bycorruption,thenthecorruptionitselfmustceasetoexist,asthereisnobeing but inanycase,onlythefoolishorignorantwilldenythatitisagood.Andifbewholly being, therefore,isagood;greatgood,ifitcannotbecorrupted;littlecan: no being.WhereforecorruptioncanconsumethegoodonlybyconsumingEvery completely consumedbycorruption,therewillthenbenogoodleft,because cease topossessgoodofwhichcorruptionmaydepriveit.Butifitshouldbethoroughlyand in themanifestationofthisgreatgood.Butifitdonotceasetobecorrupted,neithercan will certainlybeanincorruptiblebeing,andaccordinglytheprocessofcorruptionresult it isbeingdeprived;andifapartoftheshouldremainwhichcannotbecorrupted,this Therefore, solongasabeingisinprocessofcorruption,thereitsomegoodwhich of nogood,itreceivesinjury;butdoesreceiveinjury,thereforeisdeprivedgood. ever, itscorruptionisanevil,becauseitdeprivedofsomesortgood.Forifbe incorruptible, itisundoubtedlyconsideredofstillhighervalue.Whencorrupted,how- ing thebeingitself.Anuncorruptednatureisjustlyheldinesteem.Butif,stillfurther,itbe kind thebeingmaybe,goodwhichmakesitacannotbedestroyedwithoutdestroy- that somegoodshouldremaintoconstitutethebeing.Forhoweversmallorofwhatever although, howevermuchitmaybediminished,isnecessary,ifthebeingtocontinue, good, theirgoodmaybediminishedandincreased.Butfortoisanevil, says: “Anevilmanoutofthetreasurehisheartbringethforththatwhichisevil.” as itisabeinggood,andinsofardefectiveevil. man, whichisthewickedness.Thereforeeverybeing,even ifitbeadefectiveone,insofar good evil!”ForhecondemnstheworkofGod,whichis man,andpraisesthedefectof unto themthatcallevilgood,and is agood,”fallsunderthepropheticdenunciation:“Woe evil becauseheiswicked.Whoever,then,says,“Tobeaman isanevil,”or,“Tobewicked because heiswickedthatagood;butgood becauseheisaman,andan tinguish thesetwothings,weﬁndthatitisnotbecausehe isamanthatheanevil,or because heisabeing,whatanevilmanbutgood? Yet,whenweaccuratelydis- Now, whatisevilmanbutanbeing?forabeing.ifgoodthing and lightfordarkness:thatputbittersweet,sweetbitter.” condemnation: “Woeuntothemthatcallevilgood,andgoodevil:putdarknessforlight, us noescapefromtheconclusion.Wemust,however,bewareofincurringprophetic although this,whenstated,seemstobeacontradiction,yetthestrictnessofreasoningleaves can existexceptinabeing.Nothing,then,beevilsomethingwhichisgood.And that nothingbutwhatisgoodcanbeevil,seeingeverybeinggood,andnoevil we saythatafaultybeingisanevilbeing,justseemtowhatgoodevil,and we arriveatthecuriousresult:thatsinceeverybeing,sofarasitisagood,when a faultyorimperfectgood;andtherecanbenoevilwhereisgood.Fromallthis is whollywithoutevilaperfectgood.Agood,ontheotherhand,whichcontains Accordingly, thereisnothingofwhatwecallevil,ifbegood.Butagoodwhich And anEvilManisGood Chapter 13.ThereCanBeNoEvilWhereisGood; 1 And yetourLord 2