Which interests dominate environmental policy, economic or environmental interests?

The case of plastic packaging waste disposal and recovery in Germany

MSc International Business and Politics

Copenhagen Business School

Master Thesis, 30 ECTS

Written by: Jana Marliese Mandel Student number: 115663 Hand-in-date: 15-05-2019

Supervisor: Verena C. Girschik

Number of characters: 160.818 Number of pages: 60 (excl. front page, references and appendices)

Abstract The European Union regards the circular economy concept as the solution to several environmental problems generated by the production and disposal of plastic packaging. The concept aims to move from the perception of ‘waste as a problem’ to ‘waste as a resource’, thus reconciling environmental and economic interests. Germany has a relatively well- functioning waste infrastructure and belongs to the EU´s frontrunners in the recycling of plastic packaging, although it has not yet reached a closed loop.

This thesis examines how the practical progress in plastic packaging waste recovery in Germany, in the sense of environmental objectives, came about in view of the traditionally strong position of economic associations in German waste politics. To do so, policy processes leading to relevant regulations in the German plastic packaging waste management between 1986 and 2019 were analysed on the basis of a comprehensive collection of information gathered through documentary analysis and complementing expert interviews. In order to explain the results of these policy processes, hypotheses were developed referring to assumptions of regulation theories and public choice theories.

The thesis concludes that due to the government´s great dependency on private industry to provide solutions for combating and avoiding negative externalities of waste disposal, economic associations have had a strong influence on the shape of plastic waste policies. Nevertheless, the respective governments were identified as the main actor triggering the practical progress in the recycling of household plastic packaging in Germany since the 1980s. It is further argued that government policy was not primarily motivated by public welfare, but by the self-interest to avoid the political costs of inaction in the form of voter losses, given the increasing importance of environmental issues in public opinion. It is assumed that environmental associations had only a minor and indirect influence on regulations. The strong contrasts between economic and ecological interests, which prevailed particularly in the 1980s and 1990s, blurred in the 2010s. All stakeholders accepted the objective of reaching a circular economy. However, the policies and instruments, with which this goal is to be achieved in the future, remain controversial. Furthermore, the central building block for "closing the loop" lies in the further development of the secondary raw materials market, which is heavily dependent on the price of crude oil on international markets. This pushes national environmental policy to its limits.

1

Table of Contents

1. Introduction ...... 3 1.1. Plastic packaging as an environmental problem ...... 3 1.2. Research structure ...... 4 1.3. Research question ...... 5 2. Context of analysis ...... 7 2.1. Regulations of waste disposal management from 1986 till 2019 ...... 8 2.2. Germany - a frontrunner in plastic waste recycling...... 9 3. Actors in the German environmental politics ...... 9 4. Empirical strategy, approach and research methods ...... 11 4.1. Empirical strategy ...... 11 4.2. Empirical approach: Process Tracing ...... 11 4.4. Content analysis ...... 14 4.5. Limitations ...... 14 5. Theoretical framework ...... 15 5.1. The analytical concept of environmental governance ...... 15 5.2. Theories of regulation ...... 18 5.3. Public Choice theories ...... 20 5.4. Hypotheses ...... 22 6. The case studies ...... 22 6.1 Waste Disposal Act of 1986 ...... 22 6.2. Ordinance on the Avoidance of Packaging Waste (VerpackV) 1991 ...... 26 6.3. Revised Packaging Ordinance of 1998 and amendments ...... 30 6.4. Act to Promote Circular Economy and Ensure Environmentally Sound Waste Management of 2012 ...... 34 6.5. Packaging Act (2019)...... 37 7. Interviews with representatives of important interest groups ...... 42 8. Discussion ...... 45 8.1. What has provoked the regulations of household plastic waste management? ...... 45 8.2. What was the influence of economic and environmental interest groups on the regulatory process? ...... 48 9. Conclusion ...... 57 10. Outlook ...... 58 References ...... Appendices ......

2

1. Introduction

1.1. Plastic packaging as an environmental problem

The waste problem through excessive plastic packaging is the most tangible symptom of an economy that largely ignores the limitations of our ecosystem as a resource supplier and waste receiving medium (Dyas, 2013). The production, as well as the disposal of plastic packaging are associated with a number of environmental problems. The production of plastics requires above all non-renewable raw materials, derived primarily from the fossil fuel crude oil. It also consumes a lot of water and energy and results in the emission of the climate-damaging greenhouse gas carbon dioxide. So far, natural resources were able to provide the required quantities for the production of plastics, however, fossil resources will be exhausted in a few decades. When it comes to the disposal of plastics, one of its most desirable traits, its durability and resistance, becomes a problem. Conventional plastics are non-biodegradable and can thus last for centuries. In a society which has hardly moved their resource consumption beyond the linear model that follows the pattern of ‘take, make and dispose’ (World Economic Forum, 2014), the disposal of waste becomes a key challenge. The decades of careless handling of plastic waste has led to one of the biggest global environmental problems of today: plastics in the oceans. In Germany, used packaging was traditionally disposed of together with the rest of the household waste either to landfills or incineration plants of municipalities, or exported. The deposition through landfills carries the risk of releasing toxic substances into the air, soil and water. Furthermore, landfilling requires large areas of land and impact the natural landscape. At the same time, waste incineration produces unhealthy gases, climate-damaging methane and carbon dioxide, which have to be filtered out at great expense. Small amounts of toxic substances remain in the slag from incineration and have to be treated as hazardous waste. Lastly, the export of plastic waste, particularly to countries with low environmental standards and weak enforcement of environmental regulation, if such exist at all, may result in a great quantity of waste being disposed of into nature without pre-treatment. In the last decades, technologies have been developed to recycle used plastics into raw materials that can be reused. The concept of recycling to conserve resources is based on the assumption that recycling requires fewer raw materials and less energy, and generates fewer emissions into the environment than manufacturing new material. In terms of resource protection but also in terms of reduced dependency on raw material imports, it thus makes economic and ecological sense to replace the use of primary raw materials with recyclates.

3

The European Union (EU) has recognized the growing problems Europe is facing through plastic waste. This is evidenced by the European Commission (2017) aiming for all plastic packaging to be recyclable by 2030. The Commission (2015) also opted for an ‘Action Plan for a Circular Economy‘, according to which the central challenge of plastic packaging can only be tackled if ecological and economic interests are combined. However, Germany and the other EU countries are still a long way from achieving the long-term goal of a recycling economy. This is reflected in the fact that only 30% of plastic packaging is recycled and packaging production is further increasing (Plastics Europe, 2018).

1.2. Research structure

This thesis wonders, how the progress in Germany in plastic packaging recycling, which can be observed in practice came about, considering the traditionally strong position of economic interests in the field industrial policy. In order to answer this question relevant policy processes leading to regulations1 in the German plastic packaging waste management were reconstructed and examined. The structure of this thesis is as follows: In chapter 1, after an introduction to the ecological problem of plastic waste was given, a brief outline of the object of investigation leads to the research question. This is followed by a short presentation of the research process and a delimitation of the work. Chapter 2 presents the context of analysis, including a brief summary of the regulations under examination, which present the case studies of this work, and relevant facts and numbers concerning the German waste management situation. Influential actors in German environmental politics will be presented in chapter 3. The empirical approach and methods used are outlined in chapter 4. Chapter 5 introduces the theoretical framework from which five hypotheses are derived, helping to answer the research question. It also expounds a theoretical concept, setting the conceptual framework for the analysis. The sixth chapter contains the main body of the work, the qualitative documentary analysis, presenting for a description of the cases under examination. Findings from the interviews are presented in the seventh chapter. Chapter eight discusses, how far the results of the policy processes, presented in the cases, can be explained by the theory-based hypotheses. Finally, chapter 9 concludes with summing up the empirical findings for answering the research question. It also gives a brief outlook and discusses whether, under a changing economic context, environmental legislation will be necessary in the future.

1 The terms „regulation“ and „legislation“ are used synonymously. 4

1.3. Research question

In German waste policy in the 1980s and the 1990s, the relationship between economic and environmental interests have been rather contradictory. While economic interest groups generally opposed state interventions and stricter regulations, environmental groups demanded effective solutions to environmental problems by state interventions (Böcher & Töller 2012). From a foreign perspective, German environmental policy had been described as positive in terms of results, but relatively one-sided with regard to the influence of economic and public interests on environmental policy. Foreign experts observed a „close co-operation between policy-making elites in industry and government in programme formulation as well as between regulators and regulated at the implementation level, and, as a consequence of these factors, relatively limited opportunities for public participation“ (Weidner, 1995, p. 61). The limited inclusion of environmental interest groups, in environmental policy „could be explained by the extreme inertia of the neo-corporatist power cartel, based on "social partnership" and the avoidance of fundamental conflicts between big business, government, political parties and trade unions” (ibid, p. 54). On the one hand, not only the traditionally strong position of economic interests in the German waste policy but also the private self-regulation of plastic packaging waste recovery since the 1990s suggests that economic associations have continued to exert a dominant influence on waste policies. On the other hand, practical progress in the recycling of used plastic packaging untill 2019 cannot be explained without actors, which influenced plastic waste policies in the sense of environmental objectives.

This leads to the research question of this thesis: How did the practical progress in plastic waste recovery in the sense of environmental objectives come about in view of the traditionally strong position of economic associations in German waste politics?

In order to obtain a comprehensive answer to the central research question, the following theory-based sub-questions will structure the analysis: - What has provoked the regulatory process? - What was the influence of economic and environmental associations on the regulatory process?

5

1.4. Research process It is assumed that the influence of economic and environmental associations on waste policy is subject to a certain dynamic, resulting from changing problem situations and political contexts. In the case of environmental problems, it is above all their perception by political actors, but also by the affected population, that matters. Political actors, however, may disagree as to exactly what the problem is and what possible solutions exist. Whether an environmental problem is moreover integrated into the agenda of the political actors depends not only on their perspective of interest but also on whether dealing with the problem offers opportunities for profiling (Böcher & Töller 2012). The political context can change, particularly through elections. For example, when a political party comes to power that has a different position on environmental issues than the previous government. Policy-making in Germany can be described as marked by a complex network of consultative procedures, in which organized interests are an important component2 (Weidner, 1995). Thereby, the preferred goal of any form of lobbying is not parliaments and parties, but governments, since the detailed preparation of legislation has moved from the legislative to the executive, legislative initiatives come from the ministries (Straßner, 2006). One option to empirically investigate the influence of economic and environmental interest on the shape of policies would be to draw up a detailed case study on one regulatory process. However, this option has the disadvantage, that access to information on the often informal consultations between interest groups and the ministerial bureaucracy or party politicians is difficult to obtain. Therefore, this thesis uses a different approach by examining the research question in five consecutive cases of policy processes to environmental laws and ordinances in Germany, issued between 1986 and 2019. It is expected, that due to this long observation period, structures and patterns on how far and through which mechanisms economic and environmental associations have influenced policies of plastic waste recovery management3 can be better determined. The empirical description of the policy processes leading to the regulations is based on two approaches. First, a reconstruction using relevant scholarly literature, particularly for the historically earlier regulations. Second, a comparison between the political demands of interest groups particularly from parliamentary hearings on drafts of regulations and the definite provisions in the laws and ordinances. Though lobbying often takes place before and during the process of preparing a bill by the ministerial

2 The interweaving of interests and influence between sectors and levels of government and society, a specific feature of the German system of policy-making, is termed „Politikverflechtung“ in German political science (Weidner, 1995, p. 39). 3 Such an approach is considered to be particularly useful for the analysis of environmental policy by Böcher & Töller (2012). 6

bureaucracy, these channels of influence are informal and often secret and therefore usually not accessible for research. In addition, expert interviews were conducted with four of the most important interest associations in plastic waste disposal and recovery. In addition, expert interviews were conducted with four of the most important interest associations in plastic waste disposal and recovery. The area of research must be narrowed down in several respects in order to remain within the scope of the thesis: Firstly, the influence of European environmental policy on German waste policy regulations is only considered with regard to the policy processes involved in transposing EU directives into German law. Secondly, only the national level of environment-related policies is included in the analysis and no regional and local policies. Thirdly, within the different fractions of plastic packaging, only packaging from private consumers is considered for analysis. Regulations for plastic bottles are excluded from the analysis, as a separate disposal system based on a deposit refund has been set up in Germany. Fourthly, though the consumer is a central actor when it comes to producing and avoiding plastic waste, the focus of this analysis is only on regulations aiming to influence industry behaviours and not consumers. Lastly, this research is interested in the outcome of political decision-making processes, and not in the concrete effects of policies in the real world.

2. Context of analysis

Like other western industrialized countries, Germany4 developed into a true "throwaway society" in the second half of the 20th century. Industry and trade adapted to this behaviour of the consumers and produced increasingly packaging-intensive disposable goods that did not conserve resources. Packaging waste had become by far the most important type of waste (Seifert, 2011, p. 89). In 1990, their share of total household waste reached about 30 percent by weight and 50 percent by volume (BR-Drs. 817/90, 1990). In the Federal Republic of Germany the rising amount of waste, especially of voluminous plastic packaging waste, resulted in a „waste crisis“ in the 1980s and 1990s (BT-Drs. 13/10195, 1998). The municipalities were increasingly overburdened by their statutory duty of waste disposal, as disposal capacity had been running short. However, the population became increasingly hostile towards building new landfill sites and incinerating plants for fears of noxious pollution next to their homes.

4 In the years before the reunification of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1990, the thesis refers only to the situation in the Federal Republic of Germany. 7

The established political parties largely failed to capture the environment issue for their agenda. However, „the growing success of the green-alternative party in local and state elections . . . combined with widespread protests and local resistance movements to industrial and infrastructure developments, forced the established parties . . . to attach a good deal more importance to the environment“ (Weidner, 1995, p. 12).

2.1. Regulations of waste disposal management from 1986 till 2019

The plastic waste policy in Germany is proving to be a slow process of several consecutive steps, sometimes back and forth. Laws and ordinances present interim results for the further policy process. Additionally, a certain path dependency can be assumed (Böcher & Töller, 2012). In 1986, the conservative-liberal Government presented the Abfallbeseitigungsgesetz [Waste Disposal Act] which marked a paradigm shift of German waste policy. The act stipulated that waste prevention and recycling should be given priority before disposal through incineration and landfilling. The law was the first in a series of regulations that aimed at reducing the impact of plastic packaging waste on the environment. The Verpackungsverodnung [Packaging Ordinances] of 1991 determined the priority of material recycling over thermal disposal, which was however given up in the revised Packaging Ordinances of 1998. It also obliged producers and retailers to take back and dispose of their used packaging waste in an environmentally sensible way. The ordinance provided for an exemption from the direct take-back obligation if a private waste management system was set up. Besides relieving the burden on municipal waste disposal systems and motivating manufacturers to design their products more disposal-friendly from the outset (BT-Drs. 16/9990, 2008), this “regulatory stroke of genius” (Böcher & Töller, 2012) pressured distributors of plastic packaging to come up with a solution. In the course of this, the household plastic packaging waste disposal management has been transformed from a decentralized tax-based public model to a national management system designed and organized by the private sector. At first, this system of private self-regulation was organized as a non-profit monopoly, which was conferred with quasi-sovereign powers. In 2003, due to antitrust proceedings by antitrust authorities of the EU and Germany, the packaging disposal management has been opened for competition between several profit-oriented system operators. In 2012, the Kreislaufwirtschaftsgesetz (KrWG) [Act to Promote Circular Economy and Ensure Environmentally Sound Waste Management] transposed the new EU five-level waste hierarchy of waste avoidance, re-use, recycling, energy utilization, and disposal, into

8

national law. The Verpackungsgesetz [Packaging Act] of 2019 increased recycling quotas, set monetary incentives for ecological packaging design and created a central organizing and controlling body.

2.2. Germany - a frontrunner in plastic waste recycling

Despite this rather slow and complicated process of shaping waste-related policies, the practical progress achieved in more than three decades since 1986 in the collection, sorting, and recycling of plastic packaging waste is remarkable, also in international comparison. In 2017, in Germany, nearly 100% of all post-consumer plastic waste was collected. Subsequently, 38,9% went into material recycling and just under one percent into raw material recycling5. 60.4% were recycled to generate energy, of which 40.2% was used in waste incineration plants and 20.2% as a substitute fuel. The remaining 0.6% was landfilled (UBA, 2018). As the volume of plastic waste increased6, also volumes for material recycling increased annually by approximately 3.6% in the period from 1994 to 2017 (Conversio Market & Strategy GmbH, 2018). In international comparison, Germany belongs to the frontrunners in plastic packaging recycling in the EU besides Czechia, the Netherlands and Sweden (PlasticsEurope, 2019) However, it must be pointed out that the recycling quotas refer to everything that arrives at the recycling facilities, regardless of what is sorted out and subsequently incinerated or exported. Of the plastic packaging waste pre-sorted by the consumers, in 2017, still, 10,5% was exported, mainly to low-wage countries (UBA, 2019a).

3. Actors in the German environmental politics

The general objective of this thesis is to explain why and how the policies on household plastic packaging waste disposal management in Germany since the mid-1980s7 came about. Besides environmental problems, the thesis draws on political actors as explanatory factors of these policies which took place in the context of the German institutional political structures and traditions of policy-making (polity). The main actors in environmental politics are, besides the Federal Government, federal states, political parties and economic as well as environmental associations.

5 In the case of material recycling, the polymers are retained, melted down and reshaped. In raw material (chemical) recycling, the polymers are converted into monomers or synthesis gas or oil. 6 Since 1995, in Germany plastic packaging increased by 99% from 19 kg up to 37,6 kg per person. Explanations are the trend of to-go consumption, pre-packaged fresh goods, smaller portioning, more plastic bottles and plastic which is increasingly replacing paper and cardboard (NABU, 2018). 7 Before the German reunification only the policies in the Federal Republic of Germany are analyzed. 9

Due to the system of proportional representation for the election of members of the Bundestag [German parliament], it has often been necessary in history to form coalition governments at both the national and on the level of federal states. This can lead to a situation where a majority of federal states are governed by members of a political party that is in opposition to the federal government or the majority in the Bundestag. This has been the case in two policy processes on waste-related laws and regulations, which are examined in this thesis. Thereby the Federal Governments had always been led by the CDU [Christian Democratic Union of Germany] and CSU [Christian Social Union in Bavaria]. The coalition partner had always been the FDP [Free Democratic Party] with exception of the recent Packaging Act 2019, where the coalition partner was the SPD [The Social Democratic Party of Germany]. In the Bundesrat [federal council], SPD-governed federal states dominated the decisions on the revision of the Packaging Ordinance 1998 and the Circular Economy Act 2012 (Schröder, 2019). Since waste management regulations require the approval of the Bundesrat (UBA, 2015), the Bundesrat can become a veto player. It usually decides according to party-political logic, but sometimes also according to other logics, e.g. whether important branches of industry or corporations in a federal state are affected by a regulation (Böcher & Töller, 2012). Although Böcher and Töller (2012) note, that there is a lack of empirical evidence on party differences in environmental policy, political parties are representing basic socio- economic convictions that could be described approximately as follows: The center-right Christian democratic political alliance of the CDU and CSU, associate themselves with the "social market economy". The FDP advocates uncompromisingly free entrepreneurship. The SPD often considers politics against the background of trade union interests. The Left (DIE LINKE) advocates a "democratization of the economy". The green party (Bündnis 90/DIE GRÜNEN) focuses strongly on environmental protection (bpb, n.d.). In legislative procedures or the issue of ordinances, a formal consultation of interest associations is not required but often practiced (UBA, 2019b). The most important economic interest associations in packaging waste politics are The Federation of German Industries (BDI), which is the leading organization of German industry and industry-related service providers, representing 40 industry associations and more than 100,000 companies. Therefore, it has a strong influence on politics and takes a stand in all relevant environmental policy decision-making processes. However, it faces the challenge of having to integrate heterogeneous member interests. The Federal Association of the German Waste Disposal, Water and Raw Materials Industry (BDE) is also a member of the BDI. The Federal

10

Association for Secondary Raw Materials and Waste Disposal (bvse), is the conglomeration of companies, which are active in the area of collecting, processing, marketing, utilization, and ecological disposal of wastes. The Association of Municipal Enterprises (VKU) represents the interests of German municipal companies. Member companies include enterprises from the waste disposal market. The organization of environmental interests only started in the 1970s with the founding of national associations like the German Environmental Aid (DUH) and the Association for the Environment and Nature Conservation (BUND) but also of quite a number of regional and local environmental organizations. The DUH is a politically independent non-profit environmental and consumer protection association, supported by public and private project grants and donations, which has the legal right to represent group claims in court against projects that it considers a threat to the environment. In principle, all environmental associations see themselves as "correctives" in the environmental policy process (Hey, 2008). For the expert interviews, the following interest group associations were chosen: BDI, bvse, VKU, DHU. The interest groups are loosely associated with political parties (Weidner, 1995). In general, economic interest groups have a strong working relationship to the CDU/CSU and FDP, whereas environmental groups have strong ties to DIE GRÜNEN. The environmental convictions of SPD and DIE LINKE are less pronounced than those of DIE GRÜNEN because of their traditional links to trade unions.

4. Empirical strategy, approach and research methods

4.1. Empirical strategy

The research design consists of several case studies, which represent mportant historical steps in the regulation of plastic waste management between 1986 and 2019. Case studies can be either used as a distinct research method or as an “umbrella strategy that combines a range of data” (Webley, 2010, p. 11). This research chooses the second approach, combining a collection of documents and interview insights to reach a well-rounded conclusion. This process of using multiple data sources is also known as triangulation (Webley, 2010). It “seeks convergence, corroboration, correspondence of results from different methods” (Greene et al., 1989, p. 259).

4.2. Empirical approach: Process Tracing

11

To analyse the influence of economic and environmental associations on waste policies, the approach of process tracing will be applied. Process tracing attempts to identify the intervening causal processes and mechanisms, between independent variables and the outcome of the dependent variable (George & Bennett, 2005, 206). The thesis aims to identify the causal process between the assertion of interests by economic and environmental actors (independent variables) and their impact on government waste regulations (dependent variable). To explain these processes, theoretical approaches and mechanisms can be applied (Checkel, 2005). Theoretical frameworks in qualitative studies can be applied as a ‘lens . . . to study phenomena’ (Given, 2008, p. 871). Within this thesis, mechanisms are understood as “a set of hypotheses that could be the explanation for some social phenomenon, the explanation being in terms of interactions between individuals and other individuals, or between individuals and some social aggregate” (Hedstroem & Swedberg, 1998, p. 23). Process tracing “carefully maps the process, exploring the extent to which it coincides with prior, theoretically derived expectations about the workings of the mechanism.” (Checkel, 2005, p. 6). For explaining the influence of economic and environmental stakeholders on waste management regulations, in a first step different hypotheses are derived from theories of regulation and public choice theory. In the subsequent analysis, it will be examined which of them has the greatest explanatory power.

4.3. Research methods Employing process tracing as a general approach requires good empirical material, given the analytical inquiry that needs to be performed. The data for process tracing is normally overwhelmingly qualitative in nature (Checkel, 2005). To collect the empirical information two methods were used: Firstly, a document analysis, and secondly, a qualitative content analysis of interviews, which were conducted with four experts, from economic and environmental interest groups, involved in the German plastic packaging waste disposal.

Document analysis In order to reconstruct important historical cases of German plastic waste management regulations and the process towards them, relevant documents are analysed. This includes particularly official documents of the German legislative bodies Bundestag and Bundesrat, statements of economic and environmental interest groups concerning planned regulations and reports of the Umweltbundesamt [Federal Office for Environment]. Due to the lack of

12

digitalization, access to relevant documents proved difficult for the historically first environmental regulations. As time constraints did not allow for archive visits, scholarly literature was additionally used to reconstruct these cases.

Semi-structured expert interviews Interviews were used to add some value to the documentary research, for instance, to corroborate what has been established from other sources (or not) or getting a view behind the curtain of formal statements (Tansey, 2007, 766). The function of interviewing experts in this thesis is, first, a reconfirmation and a supplement to the information from the preceding document analysis, and secondly, the assessments of regulatory processes by relevant stakeholders. The interviews were semi-structured in order to ask a set of questions whilst still allowing sufficient flexibility during and in between the interviews (Given, 2008). Semi- structured interviews combine the benefits of unexpected responses from the respondents with the structure for later content analysis (ibid). The interview guideline required for this purpose was developed on the basis of assumptions from the preceded literature review. It contains a set of predetermined but open-ended questions, which allowed the interviewees to answer in individual manners as well as me to ask questions, in order to explore the perceptions of participant (ibid). The guideline underwent minor changes in order to extract additional information as well as information specific to the interviewed interest group. The research followed a non-probability purposive sampling technique, based on interview organizations influential in the decision-making processes towards new regulations on plastic packaging waste. The four selected business and environmental associations were present at hearings of the Bundestag or Bundesrat and represented different economic or ecological interests. The selected interview partners are the responsible experts in the organisations for questions of plastic packaging disposal. They serve as surrogates for a broader circle of actors in economic or environmental interest associations. Bruter and Lodge (2013, p. 191) stress, that “[t]he appropriate sample size [for interviews] remains an area of contention […]”. However, the sample size may be determined by “information power”, indicating that the more information a sample holds, the fewer participants are required (Malterud et al., 2016, p. 1753 f.). The selected interest groups have an important position in regulatory processes and thus have the necessary "information power". The document analysis revealed only small, if any, differences in interests within the environmental associations, which is why one interview partner representing environmental interests is deemed sufficient.

13

The selected interview participants were initially contacted by e-mail, of which two were followed up by a phone call. The introductory letter asking for the telephone interview was standardized, clarifying in broad terms what the research project is about and which topics should be covered in the interview. The e-mail also stated how long the interview was expected to take and suggested that the interview would be recorded under the consent of the interviewee. Interviews were conducted by telephone and ranged from between 15 minutes and half an hour in duration. As the interviews were conducted in German. The interview guideline was in German too (see appendix A). All interviews were digitally recorded over the speakers of the telephone and transcribed in clean verbatim (see Appendix B, C, D, E). This means that transcripts have been edited for clarity, deleting meaningless, omit utterances such as ‘you know,’ and ‘um,’, short incomplete sentences and word repetitions.

4.4. Content analysis

In order to systematically describe the meaning of the qualitative data, the method of qualitative content analysis has been applied in the search for relevant information in the accumulated documents and interview transcripts (Schreier, 2014). This was done by assigning successive parts of the material to two guiding questions and thus focusing on aspects related to the overall research question. Those two directing questions, taken from the theory of regulation, were asked throughout the analysis: - What has provoked the regulatory process? - What was the influence of economic and environmental interest groups on the regulatory process? This theory-based analysis framework helped to organize the data into a scheme according to which all data considered was systematically reviewed and analysed. Since experts think less in theories and analytical categories than in practical approaches to solutions, the interviews concentrated on the second guiding question. Accordingly, the interviews were mainly used to elaborate interest perspectives and reconfirm fundamental views elaborated in the preceding documentary analysis. Moreover, regulatory requirements for the future have been identified.

4.5. Limitations

As with every research, there are limitations that require reflection. According to Bernard (2017), validity and reliability are fundamental to social research. While reliability refers to whether the same results are obtained using different methods, validity refers to the

14

reliability of the methods, i.e. whether it actually measures what is to be measured and the generalizability of results. To achieve reliability in qualitative research is certainly more difficult than in quantitative research, in which measures can be taken to confirm the reliability of results. Reliability in this research could be enhanced by documenting the methods used and by attaching the interview guideline as well as transcripts in the Appendix. Since respondents were asked for their assessment or the interest organization to which they belong, assessments based on interest were explicitly intended. The interviews were semi-structured, the questions might not have been posed exactly the same way and the answers given might cover different aspects of the question. In order to enhance validity and avoid misinterpretation of the data gathered, interviews were used to probe and reconfirming information beyond official accounts. While on the other hand, limitations within interviews could be mitigated by the preceding document research. Even so, data was analysed in a systematic way according to the conceptual framework, one can never be fully objective, and an observation bias will always be present.

5. Theoretical framework

5.1. The analytical concept of environmental governance

„Governance is more than government“ (Vatn, 2011, p. 136). The general concept of governance refers to the governing activities of social, political and administrative actors to purposeful guide, steer, control or manage sectors of societies (Koiman, 1993). The structures of governance are specified by the actors involved and the institutional structures defining these actors and facilitating their interactions (Vatn, 2015). The actors involved in governing activities may be economic, political and civil society actors. The types of actors are characterized by their goals, capacities, rights and liabilities. Environmental resources like water and air are represent classical public goods which are typically under open access. Negative effects of their use or negative effects from private activities on their quality and quantity can influence living conditions for others (Vatn, 2011, 131). Economic actors may be private or state companies. The provision of waste collection and disposal services, for example, may be provided by private and/or by public companies. Political actors (governments, parliaments) define the rules for economic actors concerning the access to environmental resources and how such rights can be transferred. Finally, civil society actors such as political parties and NGOs represent the interests of civil society and

15

among business sectors. They are important to legitimize policy processes and to create forums for interaction between different actors (Vatn, 2011; Vatn, 2018). The influence of lobbyists from special interest groups on the state is often referred to as "fifth power" or "shadow politics", whereby the state's loss of control against the economy is feared (Böcher & Töller, 2012). However, this is opposed by the credo of pluralism that the market of interests is the guarantor of the common good (Alemann & Eckert, 2006). Despite the fact that interest organizations want to assert their own interests, almost all interest organizations claim for themselves to serve the common good. There is also a broad segment of associations and federations which are explicitly intended to be charitable and are therefore privileged from a tax point of view. In Germany, these include environmental associations (Alemann & Eckert, 2006). The skeptics of interest-driven politics also often fail to recognize the increasing dependence of a state on the resources and potentials of private actors (Grande, 2008). Furthermore, state actors often tie in with the self-regulating potential of social sectors and economic sectors, i.e. with the (self-)control competencies of non-state actors (Heinze, 2009).

Institutional forms of governance The interaction between the above-mentioned actors may be based on different institutional forms: command, cooperation or markets (Vatn, 2018). Command means the hierarchical power and authority of the state to set standards concerning product quality or rights and responsibilities concerning pollution. Cooperation between public and private actors can have different objectives and forms, ranging from consultation, shared responsibilities for environmental measures, shared responsibilities in forms of public-private partnerships (e.g. in providing public services like waste disposal) or private self-regulation under the control of public authorities. On markets, rights to use certain environmental resources or rights to pollute can be traded. The role of the state as a regulator is crucial in every institutional arrangement of environmental governance. What is obvious in the case of command types of governance, is also true for markets as governance structures. As Vatn (2015) notes, the protection of the environment in any economic instrument, including a market mechanism, is not the trade element, but the command element, the regulation that defines liability or the politically set environmental goal. The market component can only help to increase cost efficiency in order to achieve environmental objectives (Gómez-Baggethun & Muradianc). For cooperative arrangements, an institutional basis of governance has to be guaranteed by the state, since the

16

'obstruction power' of each actor could lead to the obstruction of environmental objectives (Kooiman & Van Vliet, 1993, p. 108). The complexity of environmental problems limits the capacity of unilateral governmental intervention and thus suggests that a part of governing capacity may be found within the target groups of public intervention, mainly the regulated industry and its associations. Effective management of environmental problems may therefore require forms of cooperation between economic actors and public authorities (Kooiman & Van Vliet, 1993). The aim of involving business representatives in the development and implementation of environmental policy is not only to mobilise expertise but also to hope that the practical implementation at the company level will be voluntary or that the legitimacy of the obligations will be acknowledged (Kooiman & Van Vliet, 1993). However, such a form of cooperative governance may not be appropriate for solving problems where public environmental interests and private business interests are highly conflicting. In these cases, the search for consensus may only lead to a delay in decision-making (ibid.).

Reasons for government intervention Governments intervene in the markets for various reasons. In the case of environmental policy, important reasons are “the prevention or correction of market failures, which can arise from the presence of externalities and public goods, excessive market power, the existence of natural monopolies“ (Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional Growth, 2017, p. 9). Externalities are effects caused by some actors on the well-being of others that are not mediated by market transactions. Externalities, which may be negative (e.g. pollution) or positive (e.g. ecosystem services) can be repaired by internalising social costs into private costs, which should ultimately be reflected in prices. According to the „polluter pays principle“ negative externalities can be internalized by obliging economic actors to carry the costs of the external effects produced by their private activity (Gómez-Baggethun & Muradianc, 2015). Another reason for intervention may occur under imperfect competition resulting from the dominant position of one or a few firms. Much of the economic regulation relates to the situation of a so-called natural monopoly or oligopoly. Examples are industries such as electricity or waste disposal management where the production process requires a great deal of sunk capital to build a service network. Average costs are minimized if the production is concentrated in one or a few companies. Natural monopolies and oligopolies may either be placed under state control or heavily regulated. In order to maintain or establish an efficient

17

market between several companies with the same production, anti-monopoly legislation may introduce merger control or prohibit anti-competitive agreements or practices such as predatory pricing. In the case of a natural oligopoly, overcapacity and price wars may occur. Regulatory instruments such as restrictions on commercial licensing or capacity rationing, also in combination with minimum price regime, may be used in situations of excessive competition (Den Hertog, 2010). With goods and services having public goods characteristics it is difficult for the supplier to exclude others from consumption who fail to pay for the good. When it is difficult to avoid free-riding, goods and services are often not produced in the required quantity. Therefore, state regulation is necessary to enforce the payment of these goods and services (Den Hertog, 2010). The core of environmental policy is the choice of the institutional arrangement that best controls the use of environmental resources in order to achieve the goals of sustainability. (Brewer & Stern, 2005). However, the decision-making of environmental policy on the strategies and instruments of governance are complex policy processes, where „legitimate public welfare goals are mixed with the interests of various powerful groups and organisations“ (Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional Growth, 2017, p. 9). Since the concept of environmental governance is just an analytical concept, helping to structure the thesis, the explanations as to why and how environmental policy decision- making takes place must be derived from the theory. Theories of regulation offer more general explanations of what provokes policy processes and whether they are dominated by certain interest groups. Theories of regulation overlap with public-choice theories that pay particular attention to the influence of self-interested actors, including politicians.

5.2. Theories of regulation

According to the objectives of regulation in the literature, a distinction is often made between social and economic regulation. Social regulation deals with "the externalities and social impact of economic activity." (Vogel, 1988, p. 569). It therefore comprises regulation in areas such as environment or consumer protection and dealing, for example, with the discharge of environmentally harmful substances. The application of rules and standards is the dominant form in social regulation. Economic regulation is mainly applied to the above-mentioned natural monopolies and market structures with imperfect or excessive competition in order to counteract the negative welfare effects of dominant corporate behaviour and to stabilize market processes (Den

18

Hertog, 2010). Two types of economic regulations can be distinguished: structural regulation and conduct regulation: Structural regulation concerns the regulation of the market structure, such as restrictions on entry or exit, and rules mandating firms not to supply professional services in the absence of a recognized qualification. Conduct regulation serves to regulate the behaviour of producers and consumers on the market through price controls, product labelling, rules against advertising and minimum quality standards. (Kay and Vickers, 1990). For policies related to plastic waste management, both economic and social types of regulation may be relevant. For example, a natural monopoly in waste recovery can lead to a market failure that compromises environmental objectives.

Theoretical assumptions on what provokes regulation and on the influences of organized interest groups on the regulatory processes In a literature review on social regulation theory, Williams and Matheny (2004, p. 429 ff.8) map out conflicting assumption about the reason for regulations and the influence of organized interest groups on the regulatory processes. Most often scholars are interpreting regulations as a response to market failure, which leads to negative externalities. Some scholars see regulation as a political response to popular demand and not a reaction to combat market failure. Thus resulting in ill-designed regulations, producing more harm than those practices it is intended to stop. Scholarly opinions on the influence of regulated industries vary. Those arguing that industries have little influence over the regulatory process warn of dramatic and extreme claims about the dangers of market failure, which would lead to exaggerated, economically irresponsible regulations that would incur high costs for regulated industries. Others point to mechanisms through which the regulated industries will dominate the regulatory process, particularly an inherently resistance of market-oriented societies to government interference in the private sector, a business-friendly ideology of government officials, or a direct political influence of business on government officials. As regards the influence of public interest groups, some scholars argue that their influence is limited, as strong and well-organised economic interest groups dominate the regulatory process. Others assume that public interest groups that locate where the negative externalities of private market production are clearly visible and serious are an effective counterforce for economic interest groups.

8 In their literature review on social regulation theory Williams and Matheny (2004) compile assumptions of various scholars, which will not be named. 19

5.3. Public Choice theories

The basic assumption of public choice theory is that politicians are rational, self-interested actors. It is hypothesized that the main interest of politicians is to maximise votes. In order to be re-elected, they must take into account the interests of voters. Special interest groups are anxious to gain political support for their specific interest in order to meet the expectations of their members (Gawel et. al. 2016, p 4 ff.). Olson's “The Logic of Collective Action” (1965) postulates that concentrated groups (e.g. business associations) enjoy a comparative advantage compared to diffuse, broad-based groups (e.g. environmental advocacy groups), with respect to their ability to advance group interests. Stigler, an early public choice theorist, tied in with Olson's postulate and argued that government regulation is thus dominated by concentrated economic interests (Stigler, 1971). There are a number of reasons why traditional business associations might be better able to achieve their self-interested goals or to lobby policymakers more successfully than environmental advocacy groups. These include sufficient financial support, homogenous preferences among their group members, substantial information asymmetries, market power, particularly in the labour market, stronger personal representation in parliaments (Schneider & Volkert, 1999; Gawel et.al., 2016). Especially the numerous preliminary decisions on questions of regulatory design and details, which have to be resolved prior to the enactment of a regulation, seem to be vulnerable to the influence of economic interests (Schröder 2009). Schröder (20099) however points to the fact, that Olson’s collective action theory does not suggest that diffuse groups can never succeed in organizing an effective opposite position. Indeed, empirical evidence shows that large, broad-based environmental groups can achieve common goals and sometimes assert themselves against concentrated economic interests. To this end, environmental groups often use voters as an effective resource, as voter preferences and public opinion represent a significant constraint on political decision-making. In addition, coalitions between environmentalists and certain sub-groups of the industry that benefit from environmental legislation (e.g. the recycling industry) can increase the influence of environmental stakeholders (Schröder, 2009; Schneider & Volkert, 1999). Nevertheless, it can be assumed that environmental decision making “becomes a process in which different interests interact, with the balance of influence shifting according to their strength, the institutional structure of the public choice being made and other factors” (Schröder, 2009, p. 13). Instead of priori theoretical assumptions that politicians will pursue

9 In his literature research on public choice theory, Schröder (2009) bases his statements and arguments on a wide spectrum of literature that cannot be listed in this brief presentation of assumptions of public choice theorist's. 20

the public interest or their material self-interest, the question of their preferences should be considered empirically (ibid.). „Sometimes this may mean supplying public policy that narrow economic interests want, but at other times it will be achieved by serving one’s constituents or by acting to advance principled commitments, including commitments to the general welfare“ (Schröder, 2009, p. 16). The assumption that the legislator is ultimately not fully under the control of interest groups leads to the presumption that there is scope for them to either act in the public, environmental interest or in their own interests, including gaining the acceptance for topics and measures among the electorate, maximizing votes or realizing own ideologies. Thus unlike traditional assumptions, politics cannot simply be explained as a "problem-solving activity" (Lasswell, 1968, p. 182). This leeway for legislators may, however, decrease drastically when topics are put on the public agenda, e.g. through political competition or the news media (Den Hertog, 2010).

Choice of instrument As regards the choice of instruments to achieve environmental objectives, public choice literature suggests that command and control instruments (e.g. environmental standards) have a better chance to be enacted than incentive-based instruments (taxes, tradeable permits), as they are more in the interest of industry, environmental interest groups and politicians, however for different reasons. Environmental standards often offer the industries concerned considerable scope for circumventing environmental policy measures. Environmental legislation often requires a great deal of technical information about technical processes and costs, which can only be obtained with the help of industry. If the polluting industries cannot successfully avoid regulation, they can at least use their information advantage to achieve less stringent regulations. Furthermore, (higher) standards may lead to market entry barriers from which established companies can benefit. Finally, the stricter the standards, the more difficult it may be for authorities to monitor and sanction industry violations (Schneider & Volkert, 1999). The concern of environmental groups could be that monetary incentives such as taxes may be misinterpreted by the polluters as “licenses to pollute,” and may be difficult to change in the light of new evidence of pollution damage. Finally, politicians may find it politically difficult to support taxes on polluting activities, as this creates visible costs that are not incurred by hidden costs of direct regulation (Schröder 2009, p. 29). In public choice theory, scenarios where special interests were able to successfully lobby for presumably inefficient government policies, are referred to as “government failure”. Gawel et. al. (2016, p. 20) argue, however, that instead of decrying “government failure” and

21

praising the virtues of private action in the provision of public goods, economic analysis should understand the interest-related nature of policy formulation as unavoidable restriction, forming the basis of any meaningful policy analysis.

5.4. Hypotheses

With regard to the research question, the following hypotheses are formulated on the basis of the above-mentioned different assumptions of scholars about what provokes regulation and what influence organized interest groups have on regulatory processes. The discussion of the empirical results (Chapter 8) examines which hypotheses can best explain plastics waste policy in Germany between 1985 and 2019.

1. What has provoked the regulatory process?

H1: Regulations are a response to severe market failures which lead to negative externalities

H2: Regulations are not a reaction to severe market failures but a response to popular demand.

2. What was the influence of economic and environmental interest groups on the regulatory process?

H3: The political parties pursue environmental objectives due to self-interests (maximizing votes, realizing own ideologies)

H4: Economic interest associations dominate the regulatory process

H5: Environmental advocacy groups are an effective countervailing force to economic interest associations in the regulatory process.

6. The case studies

Along these two guiding questions, relevant information was collected on the basis of comprehensive document analysis in order to reconstruct the processes leading to important waste regulations.

6.1 Waste Disposal Act of 1986

22

What has provoked the legislative process? A first important trigger for the Abfallbeseitigungsgesetz [Waste Disposal Act] was the constantly rising quantities of waste, whereas the disposal capacities were limited (Seifert, 2011). The municipalities were increasingly overburdened by their statutory duty to dispose of the waste. Against the background of the disposal situation of household waste in 1987, the Federal Government urged that the majority of waste was still disposed of without pre-treatment. Furthermore, there were bottlenecks at disposal facilities which were intensifying regionally for the household and commercial garbage (BT-Drs. 11/756, 1987). Therefore the waste disposal capacity could not any longer be considered as an almost "free good", but as a good that has to be managed intensively through environmental policy (BT-Drs. 11/8493, 1990). As the scarcity of the disposal capacity would have led to increased costs of waste disposal and finally to increased fees for the citizens, municipalities, as well as the local and regional politicians, were interested in a sustainable reduction of the amount of waste. Accordingly, the municipalities were incited to introduce efficient systems of waste collection like the separate collection of different fractions of household waste. However, their influence on the total quantity of waste was limited. In addition, for the private companies along the value chain of plastic packing (producers, retailers, disposal companies, commissioned by the municipalities) there weren't any economic incentives to reduce the plastic packaging waste, as the costs of the waste disposal were borne by the fees of the citizens. A second important trigger for the legislation was a rising awareness in the population about the negative environmental effects of the existing forms of waste disposal. Environmental issues became increasingly important in the competition between political parties on the voter market (Böcher & Töller, 2012). The state elections in Hesse in 1985 led to the first government participation of the political party DIE GRÜNEN in a federal state. Thus, the party obtained seat and voice in the Bundesrat and could intervene in the policy processes to environmental regulations. In view of the growing resentment over the waste problem, the conservative-liberal government was forced to act (Seifert, 2011). The policy process which led to the Waste Disposal Act of 1986 was thus provoked by a combination of market failure and political pressure.

What was the influence of economic and environmental interest groups on the regulatory process? The regulatory process to the Waste Disposal Act fell into a time when a phase of a fierce polarization in environmental politics gradually came to an end but was still present. The 23

polarization had begun during the heavy conflicts about the use of atomic power for energy production in the mid-1970s. In this phase, the environmental associations could not fulfill their function as an intermediate organization because they had been excluded from the debate about environmental policy by the government (BT-Drs. 13/4108, 1996). The policy process was characterized by the demand of municipalities for effective containment of waste production on the one side and the interests of industry and trade to avoid state regulatory interventions on the other side. The federal states positioned themselves according to their ecological and economic interests, which in individual cases depended on the concrete effects of proposed regulatory measures on companies located in their territory (Seifert, 2011). The Federal Government faced the cross-party demand by the municipalities to solve the “waste problem”, and could not take account of the industry's reservations about a state intervention any longer (Seifert, 2011, p. 90). The legislative process was initiated by a conservative-liberal coalition government. Despite the governing parties CDU/CSU and FDP took an industry-friendly position, they had to develop a solution, which could be accepted both by the industry and the municipalities. Against the background that effective successes in waste avoidance and recycling were hard to be reached against the resistance of actors involved (producers, trade, consumers), the government described its credo for environmental politics as follows: Instead of state commandments and prohibition, the principle of cooperation shall be applied. This principle was supposed to only find its limits if individual interests were blocking the progress. Thus unnecessary interventions into the market process and competition contortions should be avoided (BT-Drs. 11/756, 1987). A broad societal consensus was meant to be developed, leading to a new understanding of production, consumption and disposal by all societal groups (ibid.). According to its political line, the government opted for an "instrument to indirectly influence behaviour” which gave the regulator and the regulated more leeway than a statuary regulation (BT-Drs. 817/90, 1990, p.56). In paragraph 14,2 of the Waste Disposal Act the government proposed to develop non-binding objectives in terms of prevention, reduction or recycling of waste of certain products10. The objectives and implementation arrangements were to be developed in accordance with the principle of cooperation, consulting enterprises and sectors involved. This was supposed to ensure that the industry's capacity to achieve the

10 In 1990 the "Announcement of the objectives set by the federal government for the avoidance, reduction or recycling of waste from plastic sales packaging for food and beverage products luxury foods and consumer goods" was published („Bekanntmachung der Zielfestlegung der Bundesregierung zur Vermeidung, Verringerung oder Verwertung von Abfällen aus Verkaufsverpackungen aus Kunststoff für Nahrungs- und Genußmittel sowie Konsumgüter“ vom 17.1.1990, BAnz 42 I, S.51). 24

objectives is taken into account. The economy-friendly regulatory instrument had been justified by the government with the argument that stricter product regulations could hamper the competition between different products or packaging’s, the market entry of new products and the structural change in commerce (BT-Drs. 817/90, 1990). However, in order to demonstrate its determination to combat the "waste problem" to the municipalities and citizens, the government included in the law (§ 14,1) the option to label certain products - in particular packaging - with regard to their take-back obligation and deposit obligation (BT-Drs. 11/756, 1987). Though the government emphasized its preference for cooperation with the industry, it kept up leverage by announcing that it would „if necessary“ issue ordinances (ibid., p. 5). Referring to the precautionary principle, the government demands that in future manufacturers have to answer the question concerning the whereabouts of their products at the end of their useful life (BT-Drs. 11/756, 1987). But the Waste Disposal Act foresaw an intervention only retrospectively in the event of a corresponding problem pressure. It did not attempt to influence entrepreneurial action in such a way that the manufacturing process and the products, associated with waste problems, are not developed in the first place or at least resulting environmental pollution is taken into account by the entrepreneurial decisions (BT- Drs. 817/90, 1990). To sum up, in view of the exhaustion of the capacities of waste disposal and the resistance of the population against new waste dumps and incineration plants, the business associations had to accept that the government initiated a legislative process aiming at the reduction and recycling of waste. However, their objective to avoid an ordinance, which would have implied costly obligations for industry and trade, had been reached, at least for the time being. In view of the economy-friendly basic position of the government, the business associations could also expect that they could avoid too ambitious agreements on objectives to the prevention, reduction or recovery of waste of certain products. As the environmental associations had been excluded from a direct influence on the legislative process, they only could exert an indirect influence via the public opinion on environmental issues. On the one hand, the federal government formulated far-reaching goals for an environmentally oriented waste policy under pressure from the municipalities and an increasingly critical public. On the other hand, due to the policy instrument chosen, to reach these objectives it remained completely dependent on the goodwill of the industry. to achieve these goals.

25

6.2. Ordinance on the Avoidance of Packaging Waste (VerpackV) 1991

What has provoked the regulatory process? Packaging consumption in Germany continued to rise in the 1980s and reached 976,9 kilotons of used post-consumer plastic packaging in 1991 (gmv, 2018) leading to an increased scarcity of disposal capacity. The problem pressure was particularly precarious in the five new federal states after the German reunification. The changed range of goods and consumer behaviour of the former GDR citizens resulted in a volume of packaging that the existing waste disposal infrastructure was unable to cope with (BR-Drs. 817/90 1990). In a press release (BMU, 1990), the Federal Ministry for Environment demanded a drastic reduction of packaging waste to avert a “waste disposal infarction”, as many municipalities declared a Müllnotstand [waste emergency] (Petersen et. al., 1999). The cooperative approach of the government's waste policy that included agreements with non-binding objectives obviously did not meet the expectations (BT-Drs. 11/8493, 1990). The government was confronted with worsening environmental problems on the one side and the un-cooperative behaviour of the industry on the other side. Against the backdrop of increasing importance of environmental concerns in the voter competition between political parties, the opposition parties SPD and DIE GRÜNEN accused the CDU/CSU-FDP government of inactivity. Finally, the government felt compelled to act, after Bavaria, ruled by the CSU, applied for an amendment to the Waste Disposal Act in the Bundesrat, demanding a major reorientation towards recovery-oriented waste management. The Bundesrat, which was dominated by the CDU/CSU-governed federal states at that time, adopted the motion by a majority (Timmermeister, 1998; Seifert, 2011). The Environmental Advisory Council recommended to the government to shift the disposal of household waste to private disposal companies which, due to their market orientation, should have more incentives to recycle waste than municipal disposal companies. Because of their stronger market orientation, they would, on the one hand, offer more cost- effective solutions for waste disposal and thus promote the collection of recyclable materials and, on the other hand, exert pressure on suppliers to avoid poorly recyclable products (BT- Drs. 11/8493, 1990).

What was the influence of economic and environmental interest groups on the regulatory process? In informal discussions with the leading business associations, the Minister of Environment threatened, to enact take-back and recycling obligations for packaging, if they would not find

26

a better solution themselves. Contrary to the non-binding target agreements, such obligations should be incorporated in an ordinance which would interfere considerably with the freedom of entrepreneurial decisions. Industry and trade had to acknowledge the problem pressure but wanted to prevent intervention of the state. As a result, the private-sector organized itself by forming AGVU11, an association with members from companies and interest associations all along the value chain of product packaging. Its aim was to effectively act as a homogeneous economic lobby representing interests vis-à-vis the state (Seifert, 2011). In 1989, it commissioned a University to develop a proposal for a system of packaging disposal in the self-organization of the private economy. This proposal had been operationalized and realized in 1990 through the establishment of a dual waste system (Timmermeister, 1998). The system is called „dual“ because the household waste management is based on two pillars: a public disposal system for residual waste and a private collection system for recyclable packaging materials, amongst them household plastic packaging which is collected through a yellow bin or sack.

Draft ordinance and decision-making in the Bundesrat In 1990 the government published a draft for the Verordnung über die Vermeidung und Verwertung von Verpackungsabfällen [Packaging Ordinance; VerpackV12], which basic institutional provisions were incorporated into the final Packaging Ordinance adopted in 1991. The ordinance obliged manufacturers and distributors to take back sales packaging disposed of by final consumers and to reuse or recycle it separately from the public disposal system (§ 5,1 VerpackV). However, the ordinance provided for an exemption from the direct take-back obligation if a private waste management system was set up. Through this flexibility clause in the Packaging Ordinance, the state linked a regulation with the explicit possibility of its suspension through private-sector self-organization. This option led to privatization of waste management for recyclable materials and a shift of responsibility and competencies from the state to the private sector. The draft of the Packaging Ordinance had been submitted directly to the Bundesrat for approval, as the Waste Disposal Act of 1986 did not foresee formal participation of the Bundestag if the government wanted to enact ordinances. During the formal consultation phase with the Bundesrat, the leading business associations pursued a more defensive

11 The Working Group Packaging+Environment e.V. (AGVU) was founded in order to bundle "the interests of the entire value chain of the product packaging - from raw material to all finishing and distribution stages to recycling" and to act effectively vis-à-vis the state. (AGVU 2009). 12 Ordinances are not issued by parliamentary legislators but by the government on the basis of an authorisation granted by formal law, in this case, the Waste Disposal Act of 1985. 27

strategy. It seemed as if they had already achieved their most important goal: the avoidance of rigid state intervention (Seifert, 2011). The Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland e. V. [Federation for the Environment and Nature Conservation; BUND] criticized that the draft did not provide for any incentives for manufacturers and trade to avoid packaging material and demanded a prioritization of material recycling over thermal disposal (Seifert, 2011). A decisive point of conflict in all disputes over the Packaging Ordinance was the extent to which the decision-making processes of private companies could be interfered with (Timmermeister, 1998). After long negotiations between the SPD-dominated Bundesrat (predominantly advocating limitations to the industry) and the CDU-led Ministry of Environment (favouring market-driven solutions), a cross-party compromise was finally reached. It has to be mentioned that some federal states with a CDU-led government were also open to a more ambitious regulation in favour of the environment. The government's willingness to compromise was encouraged by the danger that the ordinance might be rejected by the majority of the federal states. The compromise foresaw both the flexibility clause, allowing for self-organization as demanded by the business associations and the priority of material recycling over thermal disposal, as demanded by environmental associations and municipalities. A characteristic feature of the consultation phase in the Bundesrat was that the SPD did not veto the business-friendly flexibility clause. This might be attributed to the high problem pressure and the lack of alternative concepts. The mere blockade of the Packaging Ordinance, without presenting voters with a supposedly better solution to the waste problem, would have been risky for the SPD (Seifert, 2011; Timmermeister, 1998). For the first time in German waste policy, the polluters, packaging manufacturers and retailers, were held responsible for the problem of packaging waste. They had to bear the costs of their packaging's disposal according to the "polluter pays" principle. Moreover, the ordinance determined a target hierarchy giving priority to avoidance over recycling13, thermal disposal and landfilling of packaging waste. Only heavily soiled sales packaging for which recycling is not possible are to be sent to the public waste disposal. For the collection and recovery of the different waste factions, minimum quotas were to be reached after January 1993 (30%) and considerably increased after July 1995 (80%). The generous transitional arrangement for plastic packaging provides that until mid-1995 only 30% by weight of all

13 Material recycling includes „the substitution of raw materials by the extraction of substances from waste (secondary raw materials) or the use of the material properties of the waste for the initial purpose or for other purposes than direct energy recovery"(§4(3) KrW-G).

28

packaging sold will have to be collected in yellow bags, of which 30% needs to be sorted out as recyclable. This provided for a recycling rate of only 9%, which in practice had already reached 29%. However, this rate can only be explained by the high export rate of plastic packaging waste of 60% in 1993, which was included in the general rate (Emslander, 1995). The export of waste had become an alternative means to reduce the pressure especially for those municipalities which did not enlarge their disposal capacities in time. This prompted the Environmental Advisory Council to warn that export as a strategy for solving the waste problem would put the credibility of the disposal policy of a wealthy country such as Germany up for discussion (BT-Drs. 11/8493, 1990).

The dual system For the compliance with their take-back obligation, 95 partners from industry and commerce founded the Duales System Deutschland GmbH (DSD) in 1990 for the organization of a nationwide collection and recycling of packaging. The system was financed by distributors (manufacturers, retail companies) acquiring a license for their packaging. The DSD awarded the so-called Green Dot as a sign, that the packaging had been licensed. The collection and sorting was carried out by private or municipal companies, selected from a competitive tender. The sorted packaging was subsequently free of charge to recycling companies. In contrast to other materials that were easily recyclable, and where the secondary raw materials could be sold profitably, the recycling process of plastic packaging did not cover the costs. The recycling process therefore had to be subsidized by the DSD with parts of the license fees from the Green Dot (Emslander, 1995). The DSD documented and proved its collection and recovery services by means of so-called volume flow certificates. Federal states were entitled to revoke the exemption from the obligation of the manufacturers to take back the packaging if the quotas were not achieved. According to the will of industry and commerce, the DSD was conceived as a non-profit monopoly (Bundeskartellamt, 2012), since the existence of a natural monopoly was assumed (Schulz & Straubhaar, 2010). In the initial phase, expensive investments had to be made in order to develop a new disposal system14 (Straubhaar et al., 2007), as hardly any recycling infrastructure for plastic packaging had existed to date (Emslander, 1995). Due to the deposit and take-back obligations of the retail chains stipulated in the Packaging Ordinance, the retail sector probably had the greatest interest in a functioning

14 The Monopolkommission [monopoly commission] (1994, p. 23) calculated that the waste management industry had so far (1993) invested around DM 7 billion in the construction of the dual private sector disposal system. 29

waste disposal system in order not to become the "garbage dump of the nation"15. The threat by retailers to remove packaging from their range without removing the Green Dot puts massive pressure on the packaging industry to participate in the dual waste system (Emslander, 1995; Timmermeister, 1998).

6.3. Revised Packaging Ordinance of 1998 and amendments

The Packaging Ordinance of 1991 was revised in 1998 and amended seven times until it was replaced by the Packaging Act in 2019. In the following, only the revised Packaging Ordinance (1998) and the fifth (2008) and seventh (2014) amendment will be analysed, as these were associated with important changes in the area of household plastics disposal16.

What has provoked the revision and the amendments of the Packaging Ordinance of 1991? The Federal Government had hoped that the DSD, as a self-governing system of the private economy, would provide noticeable relief for the chronically overcrowded municipal landfills and waste incineration plants (Seifert, 2011). However, in the first years of its existence, the stability and functionality of the DSD was at stake. Particularly, the incentives and willingness of all stakeholders to participate in the system were not sufficient (Michaelis, 1993). At first, the DSD did not achieve full corporatist support. The associations of the chemical and plastic-producing industry, which should reuse recovered materials, had kept their distance to the DSD (Timmermeister, 1998). Moreover, the volume of plastic waste was underestimated. As there was no sufficient recycling capacity, the recyclable materials were often temporarily stored and partly exported (Schmidt, 1995). Finally, the provisions of the Packaging Ordinance had provided various incentives for evasive behaviour (Schulze & Straubhaar, 2010). A particular problem was a widespread "freeriding", which resulted in considerable financial deficits for DSD (Petersen et.al., 1999). The European Commission and the Bundeskartellamt [Federal Cartel Office] had an important influence on the institutional structure of the plastic waste management system. In several proceedings, they have succeeded in opening up the DSD monopoly to competition between several system operators. This made several adjustments to the Packaging Ordinance

15 The words of Hans Christian Bremme, Managing Director of the Tengelmann Group, on the occasion of the presentation of the dual system on 14.12.1990 in Bonn (Timmermeister, 1998). 16 Amendments 1, 2, 4 and 6 of the revised Packaging Ordinance above all ensure its conformity with amendments of the higher-ranking EU law. Overall, the EU Packaging Directive, which applies to all EU states, gives those involved more leeway than the German Packaging Ordinance, which interprets this framework more narrowly (Cantener et al., 2011, p. 125). The 3rd amendment introduced the exemption for biodegradable materials. 30

necessary. In 2001, the European Commission (2001/837/EC) prohibited DSD from entering into exclusive contracts with waste disposal companies in order to facilitate market access for other dual systems. At the same time, the Bundeskartellamt has succeeded in ensuring the shared use of the DSD collection system with other dual systems and in shortening the duration of existing waste disposal contracts. As a consequence, the non-profit monopoly DSD had to be opened to competition between several profit-oriented system operators. Since the performance characteristics that a new dual system had to demonstrate under the Packaging Ordinance (e.g. the comprehensive installation of the system for the entire federal state17) represented a high barrier to market entry. This is why it took the first DSD competitors several years to obtain approval in one or more federal states (Bundeskartellamt, 2012) and thus kept smaller suppliers out of the market18. The fifth (2008) and seventh (2014) amendments to the Packaging Ordinance were primarily triggered by the free rider problem. An increasing proportion of sales packaging was not disposed of according to the rules of the ordinance. The fact that more packaging was collected and recycled than registered and paid for by the dual systems (under licensing), put the financing of the nationwide waste collection at risk. The standard-compliant manufacturers thus co-financed the disposal of packaging from free riders (BT-Drs. 18/11274, 2017). Also, dual systems contributed to under-licensing by redefining packaging, which is subject to compulsory system participation, into transport or commercial sales packaging which was not obliged to be licensed. Affected license customers usually were not informed of this (ibid.). As a result of the deviations in the quantity reports from the actual packaging accumulated, the cost burden was not fairly distributed among the dual systems. The Federal Government justified the seventh amendment by the need to close these loopholes in order to ensure fair competition and stabilise the system as a whole (BMU, 2014). An additional problem was that the federal states responsible for implementing the Packaging Ordinance were unable to efficiently monitor the complex processes and creative practices of the dual systems (Brandt, 2017). In view of the numerous amendments to the Packaging Ordinance, Cantner et al. (2011) stated in a report to the Federal Environment Agency that the regulations of the Packaging Ordinance must be continually improved in view of the sheer hopelessness of a "watertight" regulation. Due to competitive pressure, many retailers would try to use the entire scope of

17 The Flächendeckungsgebot [requirement for area coverage] (§ 6 Abs. 3 VerpackV) requires that waste collectors cannot concentrate on certain cost-effective areas when collecting waste. 18 Nine system operators were active in 2011 (Bundeskartellamt, 2012, p. 26f.). 31

interpretation in the regulatory complex to reduce their own costs. The legislator thus would never be able to close all gaps.

What was the influence of economic and environmental interest groups on the regulatory process? One of the main controversies in the policy process to revise the 1991 Packaging Ordinance were the recycling quotas of plastic packaging and whether these should be reduced and whether the deadline for meeting the quota should be extended. In addition, the retention of the priority of material recycling over incineration was questioned. Controversies emerged not only between economic and ecological interest groups but also between different industries. Although the concept of the dual system was developed by an association with members from industry and commerce, chemical and plastics producers were against the Packaging Ordinance, in particular against the specification of recycling quotas and the priority of recycling over incineration. In the first years, they refused to contribute to the development of necessary capacities for material recycling and thus to the success of DSD (Timmermeister, 1998). They further made clear that they would oppose any idea of state intervention in the plastics manufacturing market that might be necessary to promote the ambitious goal of a "circular economy for packaging" (Timmermeister, 1998, p. 99, 107). The Association of Plastics Manufacturers (VKE) also argued that due to technical problems in the recycling of plastic packaging, thermal incineration in municipal plants would be a better solution from both an economic and environmental point of view. Altogether, there were not enough strong advocates in the camp of the economic associations for building up the necessary capacities for material recycling, as demanded by the Ministry of the Environment (ibid.). Due to the passive behaviour of the industry and the resulting capacity bottlenecks for material recycling, the environment minister had to accept the DSD's change of strategy in favour of feedstock recycling (raw material recycling)19, as demanded in particular by the chemical industry and disposal companies linked to the energy supply companies, which started investing in the domestic capacities for plastics recovery. This was remarkable in so far as the chemical industry was initially among the decisive opponents of the Packaging Ordinance and a dual disposal system (Emslander, 1995). Old coal liquefaction plants and gasification plants were intended to be converted and reanimated for use in plastics recycling.

19 In this process, under energy supply, the starting products of the supplied plastic fraction are to be broken down into their starting materials and thereby recovered. The costly process, however, is questioned economically and ecologically, as the recovered materials are considered harmful to health and the environment and can therefore only be reused to a limited extent (Timmermeister, 1998). 32

This large-scale technology with its strong implementation partners seemed to offer the prospect of a rapid solution to the insufficient recycling capacities. At the same time, another method emerged which, due to its low price, posed a danger not only for material recycling but also for raw material recycling, i.e. recovery in the blast furnace. Those forms of recycling contradicted the waste hierarchy of the Packaging Ordinance and its original intention to achieve the required recycling by returning the collected materials to the economic cycle (Timmermeister, 1998). In its draft of a revision of the 1993 Ordinance, the Ministry of the Environment responded to its solution pressure and the main criticisms of key industry circles with a paradigm shift towards abandoning the priority of material recycling over raw material recycling and incineration. In addition, the draft reduced recycling quotas and extended deadlines (Timmermeister, 1998). The main critique of environmental associations of the draft was that it would create incentives for the development and use of large-scale disposal technologies for feedstock recycling and incineration in the steel industry, instead of technologies and capacities for material recycling which would have been more compatible with the environmental objectives of the regulation (Timmermeister, 1998). The SPD-led federal states interpreted the Environment Ministry's proposals for the amendment as proof of the surrender of the state before the rejectionist attitude of the economy. However, fearing the impact on the voters in a number of elections in 1994, the SPD refrained from its own proposals (Timmermeister, 1998). After several years of debate, the SPD-dominated Bundesrat finally adopted a compromise for the revision of the ordinance in 1998 between the demands of economic associations and environmental associations in. On the one hand, the priority of material recycling over thermal recycling was abandoned, although thermal recycling cannot be regarded as equivalent from an ecological point of view. (Cantner et al., 2011). On the other side, the quota for material recycling prescribed in the Packaging Ordinance of 1991 was not reduced. For plastic packaging, a total recovery rate of 60% was set from January 1, 1999, with at least 36% to be material recycled. A further 24% shall be recycled either materially, raw materially or energetically (BMU, 1998a; BMU, 1998b). As the advantages of material recycling became visible and companies in the plastics industry started to use recycled materials20, the GKV later changed in line with its member companies the sides and spoke, against its previous view, for the strengthening of material

20 The reassessment of the situation also concealed the need to represent the interests of member companies that had invested in material recycling or benefited from the cost advantages of recovered materials. 33

recycling (Timmermeister, 1998). Due to uncertain economic prospects, chemical companies ultimately also refrained from investing in large-scale industrial plants for the recycling of raw materials, which is reflected in the market share of raw material recycling of less than one percent in 2017 (Conversio Market & Strategy GmbH, 2018). As far as the policy process of the fifth and seventh amendments was concerned, all interest groups agreed that the rules abused for freeriding should be stricter. According to stakeholder surveys, large sections of the groups "Industry and Trade", "Dual Systems/Disposal Companies" and "Environmental Associations" called for more consistent implementation of the regulation, for example, to counter the sub-licensing of sales packaging. The aim of the 5th Amendment issued by the Government was to regulate market behaviour so that the objectives of waste management are achieved and market participants are protected from unfair competition such as "license dumping". The initial distributors were obliged to submit an annual declaration of completeness on the sales packaging placed on the market. In order to open up the possibility of a competition between several dual systems, the revised Packaging Ordinance of 1998 introduced the quantity of packaging covered by a dual system as the reference value for quotas, instead of the total consumption of packaging. As an unintended side-effect, this provision allows for the possibility of under-licensing by the dual systems themselves. The 5th Amendment determined, that all dual systems had to participate in a so-called Zentralen Stelle [central office], which was created as a self-regulating mechanism for the dual systems (Schulze, & Straubhaar, 2010). Its main task was to determine the market shares of the dual systems operating in the respective federal states, on which the distribution of the costs for the use of the collection infrastructure of the municipalities and the implementation of a tender for waste disposal services is based. According to the requirements of the economic associations, the central office should ensure the financing of the packaging disposal in a sustainable way and put an end to distortions of competition. However, the forced cooperation of competitors proofed to be complicated (Cantner et al., 2011). In the 7th amendment, regulations that had previously been abused to circumvent the license obligation were repealed (the self-return of sales packaging) or tightened (the obligation to participate in an industry-specific take-back system).

6.4. Act to Promote Circular Economy and Ensure Environmentally Sound Waste Management of 2012

34

What has provoked the regulatory process? The main cause for the legislation21 was the requirement to transpose the EU Directive 2008/98/EC (Waste Framework Directive) into German law. The Waste Framework Directive introduced a five-level waste hierarchy: waste avoidance, re-use, recycling, other utilization (in particular energy utilization), and disposal. On the basis of the new order of priority, the measure that delivers the best overall environmental outcome should be chosen. The EU waste hierarchy contradicted the regulation in the revised Packaging Ordinance of 1998 in which thermic recovery was considered equivalent to material recycling. Furthermore, the situation of waste disposal in Germany had changed considerably since the mid-1990s. As a result of dual systems taking over the disposal of packaging waste, the household waste collected by the municipalities could be reduced by almost one third by 2011 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2018). Initially overburdened with the amount of waste, municipalities operating incineration plants were now facing problems with their capacity utilisation. Increased competition for the insufficient supply of waste among plant operators depressed prices. As a result, low incineration costs led to the incineration of waste that could have been recycled instead (Bataille & Steinmetz, 2014).

What was the influence of economic and environmental interest groups on the regulatory process? According to the new waste hierarchy, producers or owners of waste would have been obliged to prefer recycling to energy recovery (incineration) when treating waste in Germany. This hierarchy was however watered down by introducing an exception into the draft of the new act, the so-called Heizwertklausel [Calorific Value Clause]. Thus, energy recovery was deemed as being equivalent to material recycling if the calorific value of the waste is at least 11,000 kilojoules per kilogram (kJ/kg) (§ 8 draft law, BT-Drucksache 17/6052). The Verband Chemischer Industrie [Association of Chemical Industries; VCI] (2010) welcomed the introduction of the Calorific Value Clause and emphasized that the use of carbon-rich waste, such as plastics, as reducing agents in blast furnace processes should be recognized as recycling. Also the VKU was in favour of this provision. Thereupon, the BDE, whose member companies operate several modern recycling facilities, accused the municipalities of only being concerned with the occupancy of their underutilized waste incineration plants. The

21 In connection with the implementation of EU law, the existing 1994 Kreislaufwirtschafts- und Abfallgesetz [Circular Economy and Waste Management Act] was amended (whose predecessor law was the Abfallgesetz (Waste Disposal Act) of 1986. 35

VKU defended itself against the reproach. The municipalities had invested massively in flue gas cleaning. Thus the incineration plants would guarantee safe, environmentally friendly and efficient energy recovery from waste (Neitzsch, 2012). In the view of the DUH (2010), the equal treatment of energy recovery and material recycling provided for in the Calorific Value Clause fundamentally contradicts the priority of recycling in the five-stage waste hierarchy. Furthermore, the DUH criticized that the draft did not provide for concrete objectives and measures for waste prevention, the first stage of the waste hierarchy. The opposition parties in the Bundestag (SPD, DIE GRÜNEN) was sharing largely the views of the DHU. DIE GRÜNEN criticized that too many valuable secondary materials would still be incinerated. The criterion of the Calorific Value Clause, would not be suitable for defining the best recycling option for a material category. The FDP defended the interest position of the municipalities. Without the Calorific Value Clause, practically no waste incineration would have taken place and many municipalities would have stood at the financial ruin, because of their participation in thermal heating and power stations (BT-Drs. 17/7505, 2011). Despite criticism, the calorific value clause was included in the final law of 2012, as a transitional provision to reduce the complexity of applying the new waste hierarchy. The clause was supposed to be reviewed by December 2016. In 2012, DUH (2012) together with other environmental associations, lodged thereupon an official complaint against Germany with the EU Commission for failure to implement the EU waste hierarchy, in particular with regard to the Calorific Value Clause. The EU Commission shared the assessment and initiated a formal infringement proceeding (No. 2014/2003) against Germany in 2014 (BT-Drs. 494/16, 2016). In an amendment of the law in 2017, the Calorific Value Clause had been deleted, despite the arguments of the Federal Organisation of Central Municipal Organisations (2016) and the VCI (2016) that the consequence would be substantial additional costs, for the industry and the municipalities or citizens in the form of higher waste fees. The environmental organisation BUND (2016) conversely argued that the calorific value would be inappropriate for checking the equivalence of thermal recovery and material recycling. Especially with plastics, material recycling would save more energy than thermal recovery can generate. If compliance with the waste hierarchy would lead to higher private costs, the overall economic benefit of resource conservation would have to be compared with this (BT-Drs. 18/1002, 2014).

36

6.5. Packaging Act (2019)

What has provoked the legislative process? The packaging act was provoked by a number of issues, including misthrows, outdated recycling quotas, the ongoing problem of under-licensing and a lack of control mechanisms. Dual systems have to struggle with the problem that tons of misthrows land in their yellow containers or bags. In 2017, the number of misthrows is estimated to range between 40 and 60 percent (bvse, 2017). Conversely, a lot of recyclable material potential ends up in residual waste and thus in incineration. A solution, discussed between all stakeholders was a Wertstofftonne [uniform recycling bin], which extends the separate collection of household packaging through the dual systems to so-called "non-packaging of the same material", e.g. plastic or metal. This should help to collect valuable waste from private households in a more efficient and citizen-friendly way as well as to recycle it in a high-quality in order to more sustainably use the resource potential of household waste (BT-Drs. 17/6052, 2011). After model projects had already been carried out in 2004/2005, the fifth amendment of the Packaging Ordinance in 2009 introduced the possibility of a joint management of a recycling bin by municipalities and dual systems. After a uniform bin for recyclable materials has already been introduced in many regions22, a nationwide regulation and even a recyclables law were debated in the succeeding years. Furthermore, the recovery requirements of the Packaging Ordinance have not been substantially changed since their adoption in 1991. As a result, the prescribed recycling rate for plastic packaging had been significantly exceeded. However, this has also eliminated the original incentives for further investment in new plant technology which could have provided better recycling results (BT-Drs. 18/11274, 2017). Although the seventh amendment to the Packaging Ordinance in 2014 abolished the possibility of distributors of packaging to establish an own take back outside a dual system, and tightened the conditions for so-called industry solutions, the proportion of "free riders" on the part of manufacturers and retailers was still estimated at up to 30% in 2017 (BT-Drs.. 18/11274, 2017). Also the dual systems continued to compete by illegally redefining packaging into packaging not obliged to be licensed, resulting in unfair cost allocation between systems. Finally, the lack of control mechanisms and the decentralization of data at the federal states are among the reasons why quantities were not or only insufficiently reported by

22 Here the collection of the bin is carried out either by the dual systems while the municipalities participate in the costs or the collection takes place in public bins, for which the dual systems have to reimburse the municipalities for the shared use. 37

obligated distributors (Cantner et al., 2011; BT-Drs. 18/11274. 2017; BT-Drs. 18/13281, 2017). The establishment of a new state-run authority "Zentrale Stelle Verpackungsregister" (ZSVR) with sovereign tasks as the central control and organisational body for the legally compliant sale and return of packaging and its high-quality recycling was the reason why the legislator did not consider an eighth amendment to the Packaging Ordinance but enacted a law (BT-Drs. 18/11274. 2017).

What was the influence of economic and environmental interest groups on the regulatory process? In line with the above-mentioned issues which provoked the initiative to review existing packaging waste legislation, controversial stakeholder positions were raised during the policy process. Those concerned the following issues: a nationwide recycling bin, recycling quotas and the promotion of particularly recyclable packaging and a central organizational and monitoring institution.

Nationwide uniform recycling bin, a failed legislative project In the first working draft of a Wertstoffgesetz [recyclables law] published in 2015 by the Federal Ministry for the Environment, a competitively organized disposal model for non- packaging of the same material was proposed, which extends the existing product responsibility of manufacturers and distributors to non-packaging made of plastic, metal and composite materials. In this proposal, the dual systems should remain responsible for the collection, sorting and recycling of recyclable materials. The Ministry justified the allocation of responsibility to the private sector by stating that companies would lose interest in recyclable product design if they were exempted from their producer responsibility (BT-Drs. 18/127605, 2015). Even so there was a broad consensus among all stakeholders that waste recycling should be optimized through a uniform recycling bin, a dispute arose over the organizational responsibility, mainly between the association of municipal companies (VKU) and the associations of the waste management industry. The VKU (2016) demanded that the responsibility for the waste collection service should lie with the municipalities. Among others, the VKU argued that the previous implementation of the principle of product responsibility by the Packaging Ordinance had missed all ecological targets, as the volume of the packaging had not been reduced. The German industry (BDI, 2016) and private waste disposal companies (bvse, 2016; BDE, 2016) argued, in contrast, that the collection of recyclable materials by the municipalities would counteract the success of the existing system, 38

making it inefficient, expensive and non-ecological. The innovative power of the entire industry would erode because only fair competition would make investments in research, development and innovative plants worthwhile. The DUH (2017) demanded the introduction of a nationwide uniform recycling bin in the collection system without taking asides in the question of the organizational responsibility. Before even the working draft by the Ministry was published. The opposition parliamentary group DIE GRÜNEN called in a motion the government to immediately present a recycling law. The proposal clearly aimed at abolishing the dual systems. It and argued that the collection and recycling of waste was an essential part of services of general interest which thus should be subject to municipal responsibility (BT-Drs.17/11161, 2012). The other opposition parties, the SPD and DIE LINKE supported the proposal of DIE GRÜNEN (Plenarprotokoll 17/201). The governing parties CDU/CSU and FDP reacted by calling for an objective and well-founded discussion on the question of responsibility and a robust compromise. However, they advocated an extended product responsibility as an element of the polluter-pays principle. The FDP took an indirect position by noting that private companies have a high level of competence in the field of recycling, i.e. high-quality reutilisation (Plenarprotokoll 17/201). Due to incompatible interest positions of the municipalities and the private waste management industry, on August 2016 the Ministry withdraw the draft of the recyclables law and presented the draft of a Packaging Act. The new act did not touch the system question23. In its draft the government states as the aim of the law high ecological standards, functioning competition between systems and legally compliant behaviour of all market participants (BT- Drs.18/11274, 2017).

Increased recycling quotas The draft for a packaging law foresaw a substantial increase of the recycling quotas. In the legislative process, the interest associations representing recycling companies (bvse, 2016) and the environmental interest group involved (DUH, 2014) both welcomed higher quotas. The bvse had long demanded higher quotas, as did the environmental association DHU, arguing that thus incentives for technological improvements and for returning more recyclables to the cycle are created. While the DUH proposed even higher, self-learning recycling quotas (DUH, 2016), trade and industry association, the chemical industry and the

23 As in the past, municipalities and dual systems still could agree on a joint collection of non-packaging of the same materials and packaging waste in their region.

39

Federal Association for Product Responsibility for Sales Packaging (an interdisciplinary working group of all actors connected by product responsibility) positioned themselves not against higher quotas, but critically noted that recycling quotas must be technically feasible and economically reasonable. It was argued that recycling is only considered meaningful if it is used to obtain high-quality secondary raw materials (HDE, 2016; BDI, 2016; BPVV, 2016; VCI, 2016). The Bundestag and the Bundesrat confirmed the quota already provided for in the bill. At least 90% of plastic packaging must be recycled measured by mass. In a first stage, the recycling quota for material recycling of plastic packaging was increased from 36% to 58.5% by mass and from 2022 to 63% (§ 16 VerpackG). In addition, the Packaging Act contains a second national recycling quota, which applies to all waste covered by the dual systems. On an annual average, the systems must recycle at least 50% of the total waste collected (§ 16 Abs. 4 VerpackG). The dual systems must prove annually that they meet the required quotas.

Ecological design of participation fees The draft law proposed that system participation fees for manufacturers are no longer to be calculated predominantly on the basis of the mass of packaging, but on the basis of recyclability (recoverability and sorting properties), the proportion of recycled materials used (instead of primary plastics) or the promotion of renewable raw materials. In a statement to the draft, the DUH (2014; 2016) saw in this instrument a possibility for ecological steering in order to create incentives for sustainable packaging design and for the use of secondary raw materials that conserve resources and are suitable for recycling. Also the bvse (2016) supported differentiated fees, arguing that for the objective of a sustainable recycling economy, recyclability should become an important criterion in product development. However, environmental and economic interest associations were both pessimistic with regard to the implementation, arguing that it is hardly possible to realize differentiated participation fees in the competitive situation of the dual systems. Due to the joint collection of packaging waste, the systems do not get back for disposal the packaging that they had licensed, but the average mixture of all dual systems. Thus, they cannot gain individual profits through ecological licensing. The DUH (2016) therefore called for the establishment of effective rules and sanctions in the event of non-compliance with minimum standards for measuring the recyclability of packaging. In addition, there should be an obligation for the dual systems to publish annual reports on ecologically oriented participation fees. The industry associations refused this demand for practical, competitive and

40

constitutional reasons (BDI, 2016). In addition, they reject any intervention by the state into the license fees negotiated under private law. Politicians could set targets for the ecological design of license fees or minimum standards for measuring the recyclability of packaging. However, until the legislator has not ensured specific criteria, these should only be introduced as an appeal, not as a provision (ibid). The packaging industry feared in the regulation a discrimination by subsidizing certain packaging fractions (BPVV, 2016). In the final legislation, both economic and environmental interests were taken into account to some extent. Accordingly, the dual systems are called upon to provide incentives for recyclable materials. As proof, they have to provide a report on their implementation of differentiated participation fees. They may also publish the report as a decision-making tool to assist manufacturers in their choice of a dual system. Minimum standards for the assessment of recyclability are to be defined annually in agreement with the Federal Environment Agency, however without threats of sanctions. On the basis of an evaluation of the application of the law, a new decision on the ecological design of participation fees is to be made in 2022 (§ 21 VerpackG).

Enforcement of the obligations to register Against critical voices on the part of the interest association of the municipalities, environmental associations and the bvse, the "Zentrale Stelle Verpackungsregister" (ZSVR) was set up as a public body to monitor compliance with the registration obligation by all distributors (§ 9 VerpackG). The public institution shall close loopholes for packaging subject to system participation and establish fair conditions of competition among dual systems. The VKU (2016) noted critically that the basic cause of misuse cannot be solved with a central office. Due to largely identical waste disposal services, individual competitive advantages of the dual systems could almost always only be achieved at the expense of the financial basis of the overall system. The necessary conclusion from this would be to overcome the dual systems and not to expand the control powers of a central body, which itself is dominated by manufacturers and distributors. The DUH (2016) further criticized the fact that the board of trustees is made up mainly of representatives of manufacturers and distributors which leads to a one-sided representation of interests. The bvse (2016) demanded that all organs of the ZVSR should be staffed with representatives of the private waste disposal industry instead. Only collectors, sorters and recyclers together could ensure that high-quality and economically viable recycling is carried out. Therefore, the disposal companies, sorting the material, should be responsible for recovery instead of dual systems.

41

The current rules on responsibilities would not take account of the fact that there are long- established, medium-sized recycling companies for which free market access must be guaranteed.

7. Interviews with representatives of important interest groups

As already indicated in the methods section, the interviews were not structured according to the analytical framework, which was used for the documentary analysis. Nevertheless, the interviews provided assessments of key stakeholders on the environmental impact of regulations (rather in the recent past), and on the second guiding question whether they were dominated by environmental or economic interests. In addition, regulatory requirements for the future were expressed.

How does the German system of plastic waste disposal and recovery, shaped by waste politics since the 1980s, impact on environmental objectives? All interest organizations interviewed agree that the unregulated competition of dual systems entails ecological disadvantages. In particular, DUH and VKU emphasize that the low license fees resulting from the competition do not motivate companies to produce less or better recyclable packaging. The VKU emphasizes that the reason why packaging volumes have continued to rise is that manufacturers have always found someone taking care of their waste at low costs. According to DUH and VKU, the competition between the systems is a “Strukturfehler“ [“structural error"] or “Webfehler” ["weaving fault”] of the German waste management legislation. VKU's conclusion is correspondingly negative: „wir stehen eigentlich fast ganz am Anfang einer Entwicklung, die bereits in den 90er Jahren eingeleitet worden sein sollte.“ ["We are actually almost at the very beginning of a development that should have already been initiated in the 1990s"]. The DUH also criticizes that the system still, yesterday as well as today, does not correspond to the 5-step waste hierarchy, because it is not designed for waste prevention, the top tier of the waste hierarchy, but accepts waste as given. This is due to the fact, that waste recycling is not in the interest of dual systems. „Der Business-Case von dualen Systemen ist es Abfälle zu sammeln, sortieren und recyceln. Abfallvermeidung ist nicht in ihrem Interesse.“ [The business case of dual systems is to collect, sort and recycle waste. Waste prevention is not in their interest.] The principle of producer responsibility is supported by all respondents. DUH and BDI however consider a valid legal framework and enforcement to be a necessary prerequisite for

42

the functioning of the principle. The BDI argues: „Neben anderen Schlupflöchern in der Verpackungsverordnung, haben die Konkurrenz und der gegenseitige ruinöse Wettbewerb der Dualen Systeme immer wieder dazu geführt, dass das System an seine Stabilitätsgrenzen gekommen ist . . . die das grundsätzlich sinnvolle Anreizsysteme über die Herstellerverantwortung attackiert haben “ ["In addition to other loopholes in the Packaging Ordinance, the mutual ruinous competition between the dual systems has repeatedly led the system to its stability limits . . . which endangered the fundamentally reasonable incentive system through manufacturer responsibility."].

Did economic or environmental interests dominate the policy processes to laws and ordinances in waste policies? The DUH argues that the legislator often did not choose the right instruments in order to foster environmental objectives. For example, in the new Packaging Act the legislator had transferred the responsibility for the ecological design of license fees to the dual systems, which compete with each other on license fees and therefore will not consistently enforce the ecological objective of this instrument. The DUH finds that the interests of the economy have been given too much attention and the interests of the environment too little. The BDI believes that both economic and ecological interests have been taken into account in the past regulatory processes. However, the respondent emphasises that the disposal of plastic packaging is an economic activity like any other where competition is necessary. “Das Ziel der modernen Kreislaufwirtschaftsgedanken ist ein System welches Rohstoffe produziert und sich ökonomisch selbst trägt, sonst wäre es nicht attraktiv.“ ["The goal of the modern circular economy concept is a system which produces raw materials and is economically self-sustaining, otherwise it would not be attractive"]. By the provision in the Packaging Law, to differentiate the license fee according to ecological criteria, it would be still to be seen how this is actually practiced by the systems. The VKU suspects serious ecological ambitions behind the regulations of the new packaging law. The introduction of differentiated license fees would go in the right direction, but would ultimately fail because of competition between the dual systems. Otherwise, there is not yet much of ecological interest to be seen: "Die Zunahme des Verpackungsvolumens, der Downcycling und Export von Abfällen hat nichts mit Ökologie zu tun." ["The increase in packaging volume, downcycling and export of waste has nothing to do with ecology".] The opinion of the bvse on the first regulations in recycling is somewhat more neutral: “Das ökologische Interesse bestand daraus die vielen Kunststoffe, und zwar diese schnell umlaufenden Kunststoffe aka Verpackungskunststoffe, so zu entsorgen, dass die Deponierung 43

nicht weiter anwächst.” [“The ecological interest consisted of disposing of the many plastics, namely these fast-flowing plastics aka packaging plastics, in such a way that the landfill does not increase any further.”]. The business with waste had not been economically profitable at first. However today, plastics recycling would be a major business field for the private waste disposal industry in Germany.

What are the main regulatory demands for the future? According to DUH, the new packaging law urgently needs to be revised with regard to framework conditions that keep license fees high and reward the use of recyclable materials, but also waste avoidance and resource conservation. “Man brächte ein Abfallvermeidungsziel, man bräuchte Wiederverwendungsquoten auch für Verkaufsverpackungen und man muss dafür sorgen, dass das Inverkehrbringen von Verpackungen aus Neumaterial deutlich teurer wird. Die Dualen Systeme werden das vermutlich aus eigener Kraft nicht schaffen.“ ["We need a waste avoidance target, we also need reuse quotas for sales packaging and we must ensure that the placing of packaging made of virgin material on the market becomes significantly more expensive. The dual systems will probably not be able to do this on their own."]. Possible approaches would be a resource tax or plastic levies through a fund model, whereby financial incentives would be created for those who behave in an environmentally friendly manner and accordingly get more out of the fund.. The BDI hopes that the Packaging Act will stabilise the market and that there will be no more political discussions about the sense and purpose of the big picture. Particularly important would be a lever for ecological packaging design, clarity about packaging subject to licensing and punishment in the event of misuse, and measures to reduce plastic packaging. “Wenn das nicht funktioniert, dann verliert das System an Legitimation durch diejenigen, die es eigentlich wollen” ["If this does not work, then the system loses legitimacy through those who actually want it"]. The BDI also appeals to the EU to more strictly prohibit the landfilling of municipal waste and waste exports to Asia. The VKU claims: „Es ist ein Trauerspiel, dass, obwohl wir unglaublich viel Geld einsetzten, immer noch nicht Konkurrenzfähige Produkte entstehen.“. [“It is a "tragedy that so much money is spent on disposal without producing any competitive products.”]. The VKU, therefore, has doubts about the ecological and economic sense of recycling small-scale consumer waste. If plastics recycling will continue to be considered in the future, manufacturers will have to take even greater responsibility. „Wir fordern eine Substitutionsquote, die das Verhältnis von eingesetzten Sekundärrohstoffen bezogen auf die

44

eingesetzten Primärrohstoffe angibt. Nur so kann man auch Abnehmer und einen Nachfragemarkt generieren.“. The VKU is "calling for a substitution rate, indicating the ratio of secondary raw materials used to the primary raw materials used. This will be the only way to generate customers and a demand market [for secondary raw material]". The bvse notes with regret that the question of fostering the market for recycled products has remained open in the Packaging Act. The successful processing of plastic waste into recyclates needs a corresponding demand. PET is the only plastic with food approval. Also manufacturers of cosmetics and cleaning agents adhere to the specifications for food of the European Food and Drug Administration. In order to increase the share of recyclates in plastic production, however, one would have to change the EU specifications. So far, the application of recycled materials has only been worthwhile according to life cycle assessment or for image enhancement. The BDI points to the price of crude oil which would be still too low for recycled plastic being more attractive than new raw material.

8. Discussion

The reconstruction of regulations on household plastic waste management in Germany in the document analysis was structured according to two basic questions: What has provoked the regulation? What was the influence of economic and of environmental interest groups on the policy process? The interviews with representatives of relevant interest groups focused on the second question.

In respect to the research question, five hypotheses have been formulated in chapter 5.4. In the following, it will be discussed to what extent these hypotheses can explain the shape of plastics waste policy in Germany since the mid-1980s.

8.1. What has provoked the regulations of household plastic waste management?

H1: Regulations were a response to severe market failures which lead to negative externalities

H2: Regulations were not a reaction to severe market failures but a response to popular demand.

45

The Waste Management Act of 1986 was triggered by the so-called "waste crisis" in the 1980s. Municipalities were confronted with the situation that waste disposal capacities became scarce due to constantly increasing waste quantities. Thus they were required to build new landfills and incineration plants. However, the expected negative externalities from such investments provoked resistance of the local population. Since the decentralised responsibility system for waste disposal policy was increasingly overburdened, responsibility was transferred to the federal level. In 1986, the Federal Government passed the Waste Disposal Act, which aimed to reduce household waste. Therefore, the legislation can be interpreted as a reaction to a serious market failure, which in turn led to negative externalities, as formulated in Hypothesis 1. Although there was a certain political pressure from the resistance against new wastes dumps and incineration plants, the law cannot be seen as the subject of popular demand, because the resistance took place at the local level and not through a broad protest movement among the population. Hypothesis 2, therefore does not seem to apply. The “waste crisis” threatened to become a “waste infarction”, especially in the new federal states after the German Reunification. The government approach of cooperative environmental governance in the form of non-binding target agreements with the industry proved ineffective. The government was thus under heavy pressure to achieve a drastic reduction in packaging waste. Therefore, also the Packaging Ordinance of 1991 can be explained by hypothesis 1. Since the introduction of a dual system of waste disposal and recycling did not contribute to rapid relief of the chronically overcrowded municipal landfills and waste incineration plants in the first few years, a revision of the Packaging Ordinance became necessary. The policy process leading to this revision of the Regulation, which lasted several years until 1998, was therefore primarily triggered by market failure and can therefore best be explained by Hypotheses 1. The development of the most important amendments to the Packaging Ordinance up to 2014, the fifth and seventh amendments, can also be explained as a reaction to a market failure. However, they were not triggered by negative externalities of waste disposal, but by inadequate regulation of a natural monopoly. The provisions in the Ordinance for the functioning of the DSD led to abuse and circumvention, particularly in the form of free- riding. The transformation of the DSD non-profit monopoly for household plastic waste management into a competition between several profit-oriented dual systems was forced by European and German cartel authorities and not by the legislator. Thus, the necessary

46

amendments to the Packaging Ordinance were provoked by market failure, due to excessive market power (hypothesis 1). The Act to Promote Circular Economy and Ensure Environmentally Sound Waste Management of 2012 was first of all prompted by the obligation to transpose the EU Waste Framework Directive into German law. The Packaging Act of 2019 was also not triggered by the need to address urgent environmental problems, as the "waste crises" at the local level had been mitigated since the mid-1990s by the dual systems. The legislative initiative was aimed at preventing future negative externalities from plastic waste and at combating market failures caused by functional problems of the competition between the dual systems. All in all, hypothesis 1, which assumes that environmental regulations are triggered by market failure, seems to be a good explanation for what caused plastic waste policies in Germany in the 1980s and 1990s. In the 2000s and 2010s, the need to combat urgent environmental problems receded into the background. The main aim of the amendments of the Packaging Ordinance and the waste legislation was to avoid future environmental problems and in particular to correct market failures resulting from the functional problem of a natural monopoly (DSD) and later from market competition between several dual systems. Hypothesis 2 does not apply to the period of waste policy analysed in this thesis. Public pressure was an important trigger for the regulations in times of the “waste crisis”. However, this pressure arose mainly in the local areas affected by pollution from waste disposal and recovery. It did not develop into a broad environmental protest campaign. The environmental threat posed by plastic packaging was not sufficiently emotionally charged in the population at that time (as, for example, in the conflict over the use of nuclear energy in the 1970s). Neither were the most recent regulations accompanied by a popular debate, which has only recently been triggered by the media distribution of images illustrating the effects of our consumption habits. This has been confirmed by the interview with a representative of the BDI who noted that the public debate on the subject of plastic packaging only arose after the Packaging Act of 2019 had already been passed. The real debate in the population was, according to him, triggered by the European level through the EU plastics strategy and Ellen MacArthur case studies, providing best practice examples of the successful implementation of the circular economy concept in businesses. Thus, there was no danger that popular demands, as some theorists argue (Williams & Matheny, 2004), would have led to poorly designed regulations that caused more harm than those practices they intended to end. One could rather argue that the resistance of the economic associations against an effective environmentally

47

oriented plastics waste policy led to delayed and poorly thought-out regulations especially in the 1980s and 1990s. This situation ultimately contributed to the fact that the state did not solve the problems of negative externalities in waste disposal.

8.2. What was the influence of economic and environmental interest groups on the regulatory process?

H3: The political parties pursue environmental objectives due to self-interests (maximizing votes, realizing own ideologies)

H4: Economic interest associations dominate the regulatory processes

H5: Environmental advocacy groups are an effective countervailing force to economic interest associations in the regulatory process.

The Waste Disposal Act of 1985 The Waste Disposal Act of 1985 clearly shows the handwriting of economic interest groups, which largely confirms hypothesis 4. Looking at the mechanisms described in the literature by which the regulated industry can influence the political process, the business-friendly ideology of the conservative-liberal government seems to provide the best explanation for the fact that the government initially opted for a cooperative approach to regulating waste disposal and recycling. The possibility of the law to issue regulations was not enforced by the government due to the resistance of the trade and industry associations, whose main interest was to avoid state intervention into the decision-making of plastics producers and distributors. This legal provision therefore appears to have been, above all, a gesture of symbolic government policy towards the municipalities and environmentally conscious part of the population in order to demonstrate their determination to resolve the "waste crisis". The government obviously hoped that the involvement of industry representatives in setting recovery targets would contribute to their acceptance at the company level or that the mere threat of regulation would be sufficient to encourage industry and trade to contribute voluntarily to the reduction and increased recovery of plastic waste. In fact, however, neither the packaging industry nor the manufacturers of consumer goods have voluntarily assumed greater responsibility. This is not surprising in a market where private companies are guided by expected profits. Compliance with the target agreements on the reduction and recovery of

48

plastic waste would have resulted in higher costs for the companies. Obviously this approach of cooperative governance failed because public environmental interests and private business interests were conflicting. However, the economic associations reached a delay, before the government enacted an ordinance in 1991. The assumption of Olson (1965), that concentrated groups (e.g. business associations) enjoy a comparative advantage compared to diffuse, broad-based groups (e.g. environmental advocacy groups), with respect to their ability to promote group interests, does not explain the weak influence of the environmental associations on the legislative process. The government had excluded these groups from the policy debate, probably because of ideological objections. Even so environmental groups exerted pressure through their influence on public opinion, in regions where landfills and waste incineration plants were operated or planned (Fietkau & Weidner, 1995), they cannot be assessed as an effective countervailing force to economic interest associations on national level. Therefore hypothesis 5 does not apply. According to public choice theory, politicians are self-interested actors. From the perspective of the ruling political parties, the political cost of inactivity could have been a significant loss of voters, at least in regions with potential pollution from waste dumps and incineration plants. That the government enacted the Waste Disposal Act, against the resistance of economic interest groups, can be explained by hypothesis 3, which states that the government pursues environmental objectives out of self-interest.

Packaging Ordinance of 1991 In the political process to the Packaging Ordinance of 1991, the business associations again exerted a strong influence on the shape of the ordinance (as stipulated by hypothesis 4). However, despite the resistance of trade companies and the plastic packaging industry to accept a costly responsibility for the packaging they placed on the market, business associations were no longer able to prevent a legal binding take-back obligation. Due to the evident environmental problems of waste disposal, the government was under pressure to act. The government's determination to intervene in the decision-making of private companies through an ordinance, presumably against the economic policy convictions of the CDU/CSU and particularly the FDP24, can be interpreted as the self-interest of the ruling political parties to avoid the risk of political costs through inaction (hypothesis 3). The privatisation of the plastics waste industry may be explained by the complexity of environmental problems. The government may have hoped that using the government

24 See chapter 3 49

capacity of the regulated industry and its associations could reduce the risk of government failure that could arise if the traditional instruments of governance were used as a regulation. However, the government appeared to be cautious as it did not rely solely on the economic argument that privatisation would make waste management more efficient. A clause in the Packaging Ordinance authorised the government to repeal the exemption from the direct take- back obligation if the private system could not reach the minimum quotas. The strong influence of economic interest associations on the Federal Government is also shown by the fact that draft ordinance of the Ministry of the Environment accepted the demand of the economic associations for an equal priority of material recycling and the thermal disposal of used sales packaging. However, the SPD, the opposition party at the federal level, used its majority position in the Bundesrat to intervene in favour of environmental objectives. This was supported by some federal states with conservative governments, which were, however, open to a more demanding environmental policy. Although the Bundesrat accepted the privatisation of the disposal of recyclable materials, it succeeded in restoring the priority of material recycling over thermal disposal demanded by the environmental associations. In view of the "waste emergency" declared by many municipalities on the one hand and the resistance of the population to new landfills and incineration plants on the other, the majority of the federal states had a strong interest in an effective strategy for reducing and recycling plastic waste. Therefore, it could have been the self-interest of governing parties in the federal states rather than the result of effective lobbying by environmental advocacy groups that economic interests were at least partially restricted by the Bundesrat in favour of environmental goals. The assumption of H3 is substantiated by the fact that not all federal states have voted at the Bundesrat according to the demarcation between government and opposition parties in the Bundestag, but partly according to own environmental convictions. Thus hypothesis 5, which describes environmental interest groups as effective compensatory power, does not seem to apply to the political process towards the Packaging Ordinance either.

Revised Packaging Ordinance of 1998 In the political process to revise the 1991 Packaging Ordinance, economic interest groups used their strong position in the cooperative governance structure of the plastics waste sector to influence the federal government's waste policy (hypothesis 4). In the first years after the Packaging Ordinance came into force, interest groups of the chemical industry and plastics manufacturers in particular rejected the environmental goals (priority for material recycling)

50

and the legal instrument (quotas for recycling), provided by the ordinance from 1991, and were not prepared to participate in the development of material recycling capacities. The passive behaviour on the part of industry widened the gap between existing and necessary recycling capacities. As the recycling quotas set by the Packaging Ordinance of 1991 could only be achieved with the active contribution of industry, the government seemed to be forced to accept the demands of these powerful industries. In its draft for the revision of the Packaging Ordinance, the Ministry of Environment abandoned the priority of recycling and the recycling rates to be reached in 1996 were reduced. After the bill had been submitted to the Bundesrat for approval in 1993, it took several years for a decision to be taken. It is interesting to see, that in the meantime the association of the Plastics Converters GKV, which was initially one of the main opponents of the 1991 Packaging Ordinance, had changed its position with regard to material recycling because companies in the plastics industry had begun to use recycled materials. This shows that economic interest groups need to respond to the changing interests of their members, which in this case indirectly promoted environmental objectives. Again the SPD used its dominant position in the Bundesrat to at least partially counteract the interest positions of the private economy, laid down in the draft. In 1998, the Bundesrat adopted a compromise. On the one hand, thermal recycling was accepted as equivalent to material recycling. On the other hand, the quotas for material recycling laid down in the Packaging Ordinance of 1991 were not reduced. Also in this case, one can assume a certain self-interest of the SPD as a governing party in the federal states (hypothesis 3). However, this may have less to do with solving waste problems and their effects on the elections, as it was the case with the Packaging Ordinance of 1991 in times of the "waste crisis". It seems more plausible to explain the behaviour by the SPD´s the self-interest to present a strong political opposition shortly before the next Bundestag elections. Thus the SPD became the ally for environmental associations and their demands, as the influence of DIE GRÜNEN on the political process, as a "natural" alliance of environmental advocacy groups, was still relatively weak at that time (Weidner, 1995). Again, they needed an ally who would adopt their position in order to have an influence on the political process. Therefore, hypothesis 5 does not apply, which would assume that environmental associations were strong enough to directly influence government policies in the regulatory process. With regard to the free-riding problem, both industry and environmental associations called for regulations to curb abuse. The interest of the trade associations was to ensure solid financing of the DSD in order not to have to take back packaging waste themselves.

51

Environmental associations, on the other hand, suspected that free-riding was a way of circumventing ecologically desirable recycling of materials. For the first time, environmental and economic interests had the same goal, albeit for different reasons. Therefore both welcomed the fifth (2008) and the seventh amendment (2014) to the Packaging Ordinance.

Act to Promote Circular Economy and Ensure Environmentally Sound Waste Management 2012 With the EU Waste Framework Directive, which had to be transposed into German law, a waste hierarchy was introduced which contradicted the then applicable German law, which equated thermal recovery with material recycling. The EU waste hierarchy also contradicted the business interests that had successfully called on the Ministry of Environment to renounce the priority of material recycling in the political process surrounding the Packaging Ordinance of 1998. However, the new law, which was intended to transpose the EU into German law, was also successfully influenced by trade associations. With the introduction of a "calorific value clause", the equality of material recycling and thermal recovery was de facto maintained. For the federal government, it was obviously not a question of implementing European law in the sense of "compliance", but rather of "saving" the actual regulatory approach against the background of strong pressure from business associations and municipal associations. For the coalition of industry and municipalities, the issue was the economic interest in using the capacities of the incineration plants. The introduction of the exemption clause reconfirms hypothesis 4. Environmental associations were unable to assert themselves against the strong economic interests in the legislative process, even though the parliamentary opposition had taken up their positions. However, the Bundesrat was no longer a means of opposing the federal government in a party-political logic. In 2017, ‘the year of the vote’, votes were no longer clearly distributed between a government camp and an opposition camp, due to coalition governments in all federal states, except Bavaria. The Bundesrat counted 26 votes from the government camp, 25 from the opposition camp and 15 "neutral" votes (Schröder, 2019). The environmental associations thus needed a detour through a complaint to the EU Commission in order to represent their interests effectively. After the EU Commission initiated formal infringement proceedings against Germany in 2014, the EU waste hierarchy came into full force in Germany with an amendment to the Act in

52

2017. The environmental associations were thus able to counteract the economic interest groups, but not on the basis of their own lobbying power. Here, too, they needed an external actor as an ally. Hypothesis 5 therefore does not apply.

Recyclables law draft of 2015 and Packaging Act 2019 With the drafting of a law on recyclable materials and finally the packaging law 2019, the federal government, composed of CDU/CSU and SPD, has expressed its will to promote the recyclability of packaging and the usability of recyclates. This determination seems to be explained only conditionally by the self-interest of the governing parties. Public choice theories recognise that politicians can also be motivated to act to realize general welfare obligations. In this case, changed convictions about the need for an effective environmental policy to prevent future negative externalities may have played a role. Thus, hypothesis 3, which presumes self-interest, at least does not fully apply. As far as the introduction of a nationwide waste bin is concerned, in which valuable recyclables from household waste are collected together, all major interest groups from business, environmental and local authorities were in favour. The municipalities, however, insisted that the organisational responsibility for this new collection system should lie with them and not with the dual systems. The German industry and private waste disposal companies however argued in favour of the existing private system. Environmental associations kept a neutral position in this debate. The dispute between municipalities and trade associations was triggered by a changed situation with regard to the disposal of household waste. While the municipalities suffered from a "waste crisis" (i.e. too much waste) until the 1990s, a "battle for waste" developed since the 2000s in order to be able to continue operating the expensive incineration plants economically. The government ultimately had to withdraw the law because of an incompatible conflict of economic interest between municipalities and German industry and private waste disposal companies. Instead of a recycling law, the government presented a draft for the Packaging Act in 2016, which included among other environmental-friendly provisions, a significant increase in recycling rates. This was supported by an informal alliance of environmental interest groups and interest associations of the recycling industry, whereby the latter were interested in higher recycling quotas primarily for economic reasons. Although motivated by economic interests, for the first time in German plastic packaging waste policy, an industrial interest group had explicitly supported environmental goals. The other economic interest groups

53

involved in the political process of the law were also no longer strictly opposed to an increase in quotas but merely referred to technical and economic feasibility. Furthermore, the draft law provided that the dual systems should differentiate the license fees of plastic packaging according to ecological criteria in order to encourage better recyclable products. The basic idea of ecological design of the license fees was welcomed by environmental associations and was not completely rejected by trade associations either. However, the practicability of these concepts was questioned by all those involved. The Packaging Act therefore provides for minimum standards for the assessment of different degrees of recycling, but only as an appeal to the dual systems, as demanded by the industry associations, and not as a regulation with sanctions, as demanded by the environmental interest groups. Thus the traditional economic interest groups achieved a less strict regulation for the ecological design of license fees, which rejects hypothesis 5 and confirms hypothesis 4. In the political process surrounding the Packaging Act, the traditional front line in environmental policy between economic and ecological interests became blurred. Due to diverging interests within the camp of economic interest groups, there was an informal merger between the recycling industry and environmental associations. According to public choice theories, such coalitions between environmental interest groups and subgroups of industry, which profit economically from stricter environmental requirements, can increase the influence of environmental interests on the legislative process. Environmental associations no longer had to position themselves fundamentally against economic interest groups. Although the trade associations were able to achieve less stringent environmental requirements in the final law that initially provided for in the government draft, the ecological substance of the draft was largely preserved. Therefore, provisions of the Packaging Act cannot be fully explained in the sense of hypotheses 4 and 5. For the first time, an important law on household waste policy was drafted by a so-called "grand coalition" at the federal level. The CDU/CSU and SPD coalition was determined to advance the long-term goal of a circular economy. The ecological orientation of the government's plastics waste policy can be explained by both, political and economic factors. For the first time, the SPD was part of a government coalition working on a draft for an important law on packaging waste policy. In the former government coalitions, the FDP had always taken the side of economic interests. Although the popular parties CDU/CSU and SPD both have a strong position in the traditional economic interest, they also want to integrate ecologically sensitive voters. Therefore also self-interest as set out in hypothesis 3 appears to

54

be conditionally applicable. As far as the economic explanation is concerned, the pressure of economic associations on the government not to enact strict environmental regulations had diminished. The camp of economic interest groups cracked. In particular, interest groups representing the recycling industry called for stricter environmental regulations to increase the turnover of its member companies. Also, the resistance of the traditional economic interest groups became weaker, e.g. with regard to recycling quotas. They were willing to accept higher material recycling quotas as long as the secondary raw materials market enables the profitable sale of recyclates. This was explicitly confirmed by the respondent from the BDI. As a result, also the proponents of economic interests in the ranks of the people's parties CDU/CSU and SPD became more open to environmental issues. Therefore one could argue, that in the policy process to the Packaging Act it has become easier for the government to pursue the public interest at an effective policy to protect the environment.

The analysis of the cases suggests the following assumptions with regard to the hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1, which states that regulations are a response to market failure, can be confirmed for all case studies considered. However, the objectives of the waste policies changed. While in the 1980s and 1990s, they mainly combated market failures. The amendments to the Packaging Ordinance dealt particularly with market failures coming from the excessive market power of a natural oligopoly and from side effects of deficient market regulations. The laws passed in the 2010s served particularly to prevent future negative externalities from plastic waste. Hypothesis 2, claiming that regulations have been a response to popular demand and not a reaction to combat negative externalities cannot be confirmed for the cases under investigation. The resistance of the population against potential pollution from waste disposal never reached the force of an environmental movement. Hypothesis 3, stipulating that government pursued environmental objectives due to self- interest can be confirmed tendentially for all cases. The main motivation of the governing parties for environmental regulations can be assumed to be the avoidance of political costs, especially in the form of voter losses. Political-economic ideologies of market liberalism on the part of the CDU/CSU and particularly of the FDP may have also played a certain role, especially in the decision-making on regulations in the 1980s and 1990s. In the policy process to the Packaging Act 2019, an assumed environmental awareness of the population may have influenced the environmental policy of the governing parties CDU/CSU and SPD. However, the motivation for the environmental oriented provisions in the Act does not seem to be

55

explainable by a self-interest of political parties alone. A changing conviction of politicians on the importance of environment protection may have also contributed to a certain reorientation of plastic waste policy. Which might also have been stimulated by a changing attitude of the German industry towards recycling. Hypothesis 4, stating that economic interest associations are dominating regulatory processes, can be largely confirmed. Economic interest groups exerted a strong influence on the federal government's plastics waste policy. Their influence seems to have prevailed also under the changing political and economic context in the 2010s. However, as they started to accept the long-term objective of a circular economy, they are no longer strictly opposed to a waste policy, that fosters environmental objectives as long as their interests are respected at the same time. As far as Hypothesis 5 is concerned, hardly any evidence could be found that environmental associations have been an effective counterforce against economic associations in the policy processes. Even after their ideologically motivated exclusion from waste policy came to an end in the 1980s, they still needed allies to represent their interests in the negotiations on drafted regulations.

This paper raises the question of how the progress in the practice of plastics waste recovery can be explained in terms of environmental goals in view of the traditionally strong position of the trade associations in German waste policy. To sum up the discussion of the results, the following hypothesis is formulated: The main actors for practical progress in the recycling of household plastic packaging in Germany since the 1980s have not been environmental associations, but governments. The motivation of the governments to pursue environmental objectives in waste policies was not primarily to assert the public interest in environmental protection, but to prevent the political cost of inactivity in form of losses of voters, in view of the rising importance of environmental issues in the public opinion. The economic associations were able to delay and weaken what they considered to be excessively strict and costly regulations. However, they were not able to fully determine the policy. Since the Packaging Ordinance of 1991, they could no longer avoid regulations which forced the manufacturers and distributors of plastic packaging to increasingly assume responsibility for the packaging they placed on the market. Environmental associations have influenced plastic waste policies rather indirectly. They may have contributed to raising public awareness of the environmental risks of industrial production. However, they were always dependent on allies who were able to bring their

56

interests into the policy processes and, in some cases, corrected individual provisions in laws and regulations in favour of environmental objectives.

9. Conclusion

The assessment of the German environmental policy between 1970 and 1995 came to the general result that policies had been formulated in a close co-operation between policy- making elites in industry and government (Weidner, 1995). This statements seem to be confirmed, at least partially, by the empirical findings from the case studies of this paper for the area of plastics waste policy and also for the period up to 2019. The well-organised economic associations have demonstrated their ability to influence the policy process in the long term. Accordingly, the private dual system for the part of recyclable packaging waste was designed by the economic interest groups. So, the industries, responsible for the negative externalities of plastic packaging, were practically in the driver´s seat of the disposal management. The government's plastic waste policy thus had to take into account the profit interests of private companies while at the same time combating negative externalities of plastic waste disposal. In view of the objections of the economic associations, it proved to be quite difficult and protracted to impose costs on important industries according to the polluter-pays principle. Due to the strong position of the private sector in the waste disposal and recovery management, the government took a rather cooperative stance towards the private sector throughout the investigated period of plastic waste policy. However, ignoring environmental concerns or giving them merely symbolic attention would have born the risks of losing votes and legitimacy. Therefore the self-interest of the governing parties seems to explain much of the plastic waste policy, initiated by the Federal Governments, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s. An increasingly critical public opinion on the risks of pollution from industrial production has become an obstacle to overly close cooperation between government and industry associations in shaping plastics waste policy. Environmental associations may have contributed to the critical public opinion on pollution from industrial production. But they could hardly use voters as leverage to increase their influence on policy-making. Since the 1990s, environmental associations have become an accepted interlocutor in the political processes of shaping waste policies. to protect economic interests from interference by environmental associations. In none of the cases analysed they reached an influential position from which they could have stood up against economic interests when it came to amending draft laws and regulations. They had to rely on

57

political allies to make their positions heard in the policy process. One such ally was the SPD in the phases when the party was in opposition in the Bundestag, yet controlled the majority of votes in the Bundesrat. The green party has also become a "natural" ally, but its influence on politics in the cases analysed has been rather weak. In two cases there was an unspoken coalition between environmental associations and subgroups of industry, the recycling industry, which benefits from stricter environmental standards. All in all, environmental associations seem to have had little effect on the regulatory burden imposed on private industry.

Compared to the situation in the 1980s and 1990s, the strong boundaries between economic and environmental interests became more blurred in the 2010s. Since then both, environmental and economic interest groups generally accept the long-term goal of establishing a circular economy in the field of plastic packaging. The differences lie rather in the question of how this objective can be achieved. Environmental interest associations are calling for a stricter application of command and control instruments by the state. The choice of the right policy instruments is therefore crucial for them. Economic interest groups, on the other hand, prefer market forces as a governance instrument. They believe that environmental objectives can only be achieved in a market economy if there are appropriate market opportunities for private companies. For them, the role of the state should be to ensure fair market conditions.

10. Outlook

This position of German economic associations leads to the question of whether market forces alone can lead to environmentally friendly behaviour on the part of the industry and thus make regulations superfluous. The public demand for corporate environmental responsibility as well as a forecasted rise in commodity prices (World Bank, 2019) suggests this assumption. Leading chemical and consumer goods groups are increasingly taking action themselves against plastic waste. Thus, in 2017 the multinational manufacturer Unilever committed itself to 100% recyclable plastic packaging by 2025, followed by similar commitments and initiatives from other international companies. However, they are accused of showing goodwill only in order to avoid binding regulations (Corporate Europe Observatory, 2018). Since plastics are the business of a prospering European plastics industry, raking seventh in Europe’s industrial value-added contribution (Plastics Europe, 2018), of which Germany is

58

the largest manufacturer of plastic parts and components (Germany Trade and Invest, 2017), it remains to be seen how and whether the goal of avoidance will be achieved in the future. The central building block for "closing the loop" lies however in the further development of the secondary raw material market, which is heavily dependent on the price of crude oil on international markets. This pushes national environmental policy to its limits. The increasing scarcity of primary raw materials and the continuing rise in demand for raw materials from emerging countries indicate that prices will rise in the future (Mancini et al., 2013). In principle, high secondary raw material prices create important incentives to recover recyclable materials. Accordingly, some argue (e.g. Schulz & Straubhaar, 2010) that in the medium term, competitive and reliable framework conditions should be sufficient to establish a circular economy for plastic substances. Thus, legal regulations on return obligations and recycling quotas could then become obsolete. However, the hypothesis that secondary commodity prices make regulations superfluous is contradicted by current figures. According to the Conversion study (2018), the plastic production will further increase in future. Correspondingly, the production volumes of the German plastics industry and the volumes processed were higher in 2017 than in 2015. Around 12.6 million tonnes of plastics were processed from primary raw materials and only 1.8 million tonnes of recycled materials. This can be explained by primary plastic still having a significant price advantage. The production costs of secondary goods are higher than those of primary goods. This applies in particular to high-quality recyclates from household plastic packaging. Primary plastic benefits from economies of scale, low oil prices and tax improvements are leading to a price difference of more than 25% (BT-Drs. 19(16)186-A, 2019). The low demand for recycled plastics, low raw material prices and market uncertainties have so far hampered the development of the plastics recycling sector in the EU (Leal Filho, 2019). In order to develop Europe into a recycling economy regulations still appear necessary, such as a European statutory minimum quota for the use of secondary raw materials in the production of plastic packaging. A start was recently made with the EU directive on the ‘reduction of the impact of certain plastic products on the environment’. All member states have agreed on a quota for the use of secondary raw material for PET bottles of 25% (European Commission, 2018). With regards to globalized value chains waste is shipped to those parts of the world where the raw materials for our consumer goods are produced. As a result, national recycling quotas and environmental standards are becoming less important. In fact, high-quality

59

recovery of raw materials is relevant wherever they ultimately end up as waste. This calls for innovative approaches to individual producer responsibility that do not end at the German or EU external border as it has been the case to date. First concepts of civil law agreements on recycling management have been developed for this purpose (see Wilts et al., 2010) but the challenge will be to integrate them into a legal framework, which has until now been geared exclusively to domestic recycling (Wilts, 2018).

60

References Alemann, U. V. & Eckert, F. (2006). Lobbyismus als Schattenpolitik. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 15 – 16/2006, 3-9. Bataille, M., & Steinmetz, A. (2014). Kommunale Monopole in der Hausmüllentsorgung (No. 63). DICE Ordnungspolitische Perspektiven. Bernard, H. R. (2017). Research methods in anthropology: Qualitative and quantitative approaches. Rowman & Littlefield. Böcher, M., & Töller, A. E. (2012). Umweltpolitik in Deutschland: eine politikfeldanalytische Einführung (Vol. 50). Springer-Verlag. Brewer, G. D., & Stern, P. C. (Eds.). (2005). Decision making for the environment: Social and behavioral science research priorities (pp. p-33). Washington, DC: National Academies Press. Bruter, M., & Lodge, M. (Eds.). (2013). Political science research methods in action. Springer. BUND (2016). Stellungnahme zum Referentenentwurf für ein Zweites Gesetz zur Änderung des Kreislaufwirtschaftsgesetzes. Retrieved from https://www.bmu.de/fileadmin/Daten_BMU/Download_PDF/Glaeserne_Gesetze/18._ Lp/krwg_160503/stellungnahmen/krwg_160503_stn_bund_bf.pdf Bundeskartellamt (2012). Sektoruntersuchung duale Systeme. Zwischenbilanz der Wettbewerbsöffnung, Bericht gemäß § 32e GWB. Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und nukleare Sicherheit (BMU) (1998a). Bundesgesetzblatt Jahrgang 1998. Teil I Nr. 56, ausgegeben zu Bonn am 27. August 1998. Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und nukleare Sicherheit (BMU) (1998b). Novelle der Verpackungsverordnung tritt am Freitag in Kraft. Press Release 54/98, 27.08.1998. Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und nukleare Sicherheit (BMU) (1990). Drastische Reduzierung von Verpackungsabfällen zur Abwendung des Entsorgungsinfarkts unerlässlich, Pressemitteilung 74/90, 17.05.1990. Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und nukleare Sicherheit (BMU) (2014). Bundesgesetzblatt Jahrgang 2014 Teil I Nr. 32, ausgegeben zu Bonn am 23. Juli 2014. Bundestag Drucksache 11/756 (1987). Bericht der Bundesregierung über den Vollzug des Abfallgesetzes vom 27. August 1986. Bundesrat Drucksache 817/90 (1990). Verordnung der Bundesregierung über die Vermeidung von Verpackungsabfällen. Bundestag Drucksache 11/8493 (1990). Sondergutachten des Rates von Sachverständigen für Umweltfragen vom September 1990 „Abfallwirtschaft". Bundestag Drucksache 12/8323 (1994). Zehntes Hauptgutachten der Monopolkommission 1992/1993. Bundestag Drucksache 13/4108 (1996). Umweltgutachten 1996 des Rates von Sachverständigen für Umweltfragen. Zur Umsetzung einer dauerhaft-umweltgerechten Entwicklung.

Bundestag Drucksache 13/10195 (1998). Sachverständigenrat für Umweltfragen (SRU): Umweltgutachten des Rates von Sachverständigen für Umweltfragen. Umweltschutz: Erreichtes sichern - Neue Wege gehen. Bundestag Drucksache 16/9990 (2008). Sachverständigenrat für Umweltfragen (SRU): Umweltgutachten 2008 des Sachverständigenrates für Umweltfragen Umweltschutz im Zeichen des Klimawandels. Bundestag Drucksache 17/7505 (2011). Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des Ausschusses für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit (16. Ausschuss). Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Neuordnung des Kreislaufwirtschafts- und Abfallrechts. Bundestag Drucksache 17/6052 (2011). Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Neuordnung des Kreislaufwirtschafts- und Abfallrechts. Bundestag Drucksache 17/11161 (2012). Antrag der Abgeordneten Dorothea Steiner, Hans- Josef Fell, Bärbel Höhn, Sylvia Kotting-Uhl, Oliver Krischer, Undine Kurth (Quedlinburg), Nicole Maisch, Dr. Hermann E. Ott, Cornelia Behm, Harald Ebner, Britta Haßelmann, Bettina Herlitzius, Dr. Anton Hofreiter, Sven-Christian Kindler, Stephan Kühn, Friedrich Ostendorff, Markus Tressel, Daniela Wagner, Dr. Valerie Wilms und der Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN Wertstoffsammlung verbessern – Mehr Ressourcen aus Abfällen zurückgewinnen. Bundestag Drucksache 18/1002 (2014). Beschlussempfehlung des Haushaltsausschusses (8. Ausschuss) zu dem Entwurf eines Gesetzes über die Feststellung des Bundeshaushaltsplans für das Haushaltsjahr 2014 (Haushaltsgesetz 2014). Bundestag Drucksache 494/16 (2016). Entwurf eines Zweiten Gesetzes zur Änderung des Kreislaufwirtschaftsgesetzes. Bundestag Drucksache 18/11274 (2017). Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Fortentwicklung der haushaltsnahen Getrennterfassung von wertstoffhaltigen Abfällen. Bundestag Drucksache 18/13281 (2017). Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Peter Meiwald, Bärbel Höhn, Oliver Krischer, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN. Systemgefährdung der dualen Systeme durch Missbrauch von Meldepflichten an die Clearingstelle und mangelnder Rechtsvollzug. BT-Drucksache 19(16)186-A (2019). Ausschuss für Umwelt, Naturschutz und nukleare Sicherheit (2019). Öffentliches Fachgespräch. „Wie können wir Recyclate aus Kunststoffverpackverstärkt im Kreislauf führen?“. Bundesverband Produktverantwortung für Verkaufsverpackungen e.V. (BPVV). Anhörung zum Entwurf eines Gesetztes zur Fortentwicklung der haushaltsnahen Getrennterfasung von wertstoffhaltigen Abfällen. Retrieved from https://www.bpvv.de/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Stellungnahme-BPVV- VerpackG_160902.pdf Bundesverband Sekundärrohstoffe und Entsorgung (bvse) (2016). Stellungnahme zum Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Fortentwicklung der haushaltsnahen Getrennterfassung von wertstoffhaltigen Abfällen, 05.09.2016. Retrieved from https://www.bmu.de/fileadmin/Daten_BMU/Download_PDF/Glaeserne_Gesetze/18._ Lp/verpackg/stellungnahmen/verpackg_160810_stn_bvse_bf.pdf Bundesverband Sekundärrohstoffe und Entsorgung (bvse) (2017). Recycling braucht bessere Mülltrennung. Pressemitteilung, 17. April 2018. Retrieved from

https://www.bvse.de/recycling/pressemitteilungen/2990-recycling-braucht- verbesserte-muelltrennung.html Bundesverband Sekundärrohstoffe und Entsorgung e.V. (2018). Sekundärrohstoff Marktbericht März 2018. Marktberichte, Preislisten, Außenhandel, Firmenberichte, Technische Verfahren, u.v.a.m.. Retrieved from: http://www.bvse.de/images/pdf/Marktberichte/2018/2018- 03_Sekund%C3%A4rrohstoff_Marktbericht_M%C3%A4rz.pdf Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie e. V. (BDI) (2016). Stellungnahme BMUB- Referentenentwurf für ein Gesetz über das Inverkehrbringen, die Rücknahme und die hochwertige Verwertung von Verpackungen (Verpackungsgesetz – VerpackG), 05.09.2016. Retrieved from https://www.bmu.de/fileadmin/Daten_BMU/Download_PDF/Glaeserne_Gesetze/18._ Lp/verpackg/stellungnahmen/verpackg_160810_stn_bdi_bf.pdf Bundesverband der Deutschen Entsorgungs-, Wasser- und Rohstoffwirtschaft e.V. (BDE) (2016). Stellungnahme zum Entwurf für ein mögliches Verpackungsgesetz, 05.09.2016. Retrieved from https://www.bmu.de/fileadmin/Daten_BMU/Download_PDF/Glaeserne_Gesetze/18._ Lp/verpackg/stellungnahmen/verpackg_160810_stn_bde_bf.pdf Bundesvereinigung der kommunalen Spitzenverbände (2016). Referentenentwurf eines zweites Gesetzes zur Änderung des Kreislaufwirtschaftsgesetzes (KrWG) – Streichung der Heizwertregelung in § 8 Abs. 3 KrWG. Stellungnahme der Bundesvereinigung der kommunalen Spitzenverbände. Retrieved from https://www.bmu.de/fileadmin/Daten_BMU/Download_PDF/Glaeserne_Gesetze/18._ Lp/krwg_160503/stellungnahmen/krwg_160503_stn_komm_spitzenverbaende_bf.pdf Bundeszentrale für Üolitische Bildung (bpb) (n.d.) Parteien in Deutschland. Retrieved from https://www.bpb.de/politik/grundfragen/parteien-in-deutschland/ Cantner, J., Gerstmayr, B., Pitschke, T., & Kreibe, S. (2011). Evaluierung der Verpackungsverordnung. Umweltbundesamt, Dessau. Checkel, J. T. (2005). It’s the process stupid! Process tracing in the study of European and international politics (No. 26). Arena. Conversio Market & Strategy GmbH (2018). Stoffstrombild Kunststoffe in Deutschland 2017. Corporate Europe Observatory (2018). Plastic pressure. Industry turns up the heat to avoid plastics regulation spurred by public demand, 26.11.2018. Retrieved from https://corporateeurope.org/en/power-lobbies/2018/11/plastic-pressure Den Hertog, J. A. (2010). Review of economic theories of regulation. Discussion Paper Series/Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute, 10(18). Deutscher Bundestag (2012). Stenografischer Bericht 201. Sitzung. Plenarprotokoll 17/201. Deutsche Umwelthilfe e.V. (2010). Arbeitsentwurf eines Gesetzes zur Neuordnung des Kreislaufwirtschafts- und Abfallrechts. Retrieved from http://www.duh.de/uploads/media/BMU-Brief_KrWAbfG_310310.pdf Deutsche Umwelthilfe e.V. (2012). Deutsche Umweltverbände (DNR, NABU, BUND, DUH, bfub). Folgebrief zum gemeinsamen Schreiben deutscher Umweltverbände vom 30.05.2011. Retrieved from

https://www.nabu.de/imperia/md/content/nabude/konsumressourcenmuell/120427_gre enngo_letter_dgenvi_wfd_germany.pdf Deutsche Umwelthilfe e.V. (2014). Mehr Kreislauf bitte! Kernpunkte zur Einführung eines Wertstoffgesetzes. Retrieved from http://wertstoffgesetz-fakten.de/wp-content/uploads/Deutsche-Umwelthilfe- Kernpunkte-zue-Einf%C3%BChrung-eines-Wertstoffgesetzes.pdf Deutsche Umwelthilfe e.V. (2017). Stellungnahme der Deutschen Umwelthilfe zum Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Fortentwicklung der haushaltsnahen Getrennterfassung von wertstoffhaltigen Abfällen (Kabinettsentwurf vom 21.12.2016). Zur Anhörung am 20.03.2017. Retrieved from https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/498592/6b5a4cf6aceecaff61d479c3a69dc3b4 /18-16-533-C_AnhoerungVerpackungsG_DUH-data.pdf Dyas, S. (2013). Nachhaltiges Verwendungs-und Entsorgungsverhalten privater Haushalte: Realisationschancen eines neuen Konsumleitbildes in Deutschland. Springer-Verlag. Emslander, T. (1995). Das duale Entsorgungssystem für Verpackungsabfall. European Commission (2015). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Closing the loop – An EU action plan for the Circular Economy. COM(2017) 650. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2015/EN/1-2015-614-EN-F1-1.PDF European Commission (2017). Commission Work Programme 2018 - COM(2017) 650. Fietkau, H. J., & Weidner, H. (1995). Environmental mediation: The mediation procedure on the waste management plan in the district of Neuss, North Rhine-Westphalia-Initial results of the companion social science research (No. FS II 95-303). WZB Discussion Paper. Gawel, E., Lehmann, P., Strunz, S., & Heuson, C. (2016). A public choice framework for climate adaptation-barriers to efficient adaptation and lessons learned from German flood disasters. UFZ Discussion Papers, 3/2016). Leipzig: Helmholtz- Zentrum für Umweltforschung – UFZ. Retrieved from https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-46487-7 European Commission (2018). Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the reduction of the impact of certain plastic products on the environment COM/2018/340 final - 2018/0172 (COD). Retrieved from https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A52018PC0340 George, Alexander & Bennett, Andrew (2005) “Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences” Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Given, L. M. (Ed.). (2008). The Sage encyclopedia of qualitative research methods. Sage publications. Germany Trade, Invest (2017). The Plastics industry in Germany. Germany. Retrieved from https://www.gtai.de/GTAI/Content/EN/Invest/_SharedDocs/Downloads/ GTAI/Industry-overviews/industry-overview-plastics-industry-in-germany-en. pdf?v.12

Gesellschaft für Verpackungsmarktforschung (Gmv) (2018). Recycling-Bilanz für Verpackungen. Berichtsjahr 2017 – Zusammenfassung der Ergebnisse. Retrieved from https://plasticker.de/news/docs/Recycling_2017_Zusammenfassung%20Ergebnisse.pd f Gómez-Baggethun, E., & Muradian, R. (2015). In markets we trust? Setting the boundaries of market-based instruments in ecosystem services governance. Grande, E. (2008). Reflexive Modernisierung des Staates. der moderne staat–dms: Zeitschrift für Public Policy, Recht und Management, 1(1). Greene, J. C., Caracelli, V. J., & Graham, W. F. (1989). Toward a conceptual framework for mixed method evaluation designs. Educational evaluation and policy analysis, 11(3), 255-274. Handelsverband Deutschland e. V. (HDE) (2016). Stellungnahme. Gesetz zur Fortentwicklung der haushaltsnahen Getrennterfassung von wertstoffhaltigen Abfällen. Art. 1 Gesetz über das Inverkehrbringen, die Rücknahme und die hochwertige Verwertung von Verpackungen, 05.09.2016. Retrieved from https://www.bmu.de/fileadmin/Daten_BMU/Download_PDF/Glaeserne_Gesetze/18._ Lp/verpackg/stellungnahmen/verpackg_160810_stn_hde_bf.pdf Hedström, P., Swedberg, R., & Hernes, G. (Eds.). (1998). Social mechanisms: An analytical approach to social theory. Cambridge University Press. Heinze, R. G. (2009). Staat und Lobbyismus: Vom Wandel der Politikberatung in Deutschland. Zeitschrift für Politikberatung, 2(1), 5-25. Hey, C. (2008). Umweltverbände als politische Akteure. Voneinander Lernen–von Umweltkonflikten zu Lösungen, (10), 25-30. Kay, J., & Vickers, J. (1990). Regulatory Reform: An Appraisal in: Majone, Giandomenico Deregulation or Re-regulation? Regulatory Reform in Europe and the United States. Kommunale Spitzenverbände (2016). Referentenentwurf eines zweites Gesetzes zur Änderung des Kreislaufwirtschaftsgesetzes (KrWG) – Streichung der Heizwertregelung in § 8 Abs. 3 KrWG. Retrieved from https://www.bmu.de/fileadmin/Daten_BMU/Download_PDF/Glaeserne_Gesetze/18._ Lp/krwg_160503/stellungnahmen/krwg_160503_stn_komm_spitzenverbaende_bf.pdf LassweIl, Harold D. 1968. Policy Sciences, Intenational Encyclopedia of the Soeial Seiences. 12, 181-189. cited from Böttcher & Töller 2012, p. 183. Leal Filho, W., Saari, U., Fedoruk, M., Iital, A., Moora, H., Klöga, M., & Voronova, V. (2019). An overview of the problems posed by plastic products and the role of extended producer responsibility in Europe. Journal of Cleaner Production, 214, 550- 558. Michaelis, P. (1993), Ökonomische Aspekte der Abfallgesetzgebung, Kieler Studien Nr. 254, Tübingen. Malterud, K., Siersma, V. D., & Guassora, A. D. (2016). Sample size in qualitative interview studies: guided by information power. Qualitative health research, 26(13), 1753-1760. Mancini, L., De Camillis, C., & Pennington, D. (2013). Security of supply and scarcity of raw materials. Towards a Methodological Framework for Sustainability Assessment. Mayring, P. (2003). Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse. Grundlagen und Techniken (wyd. 8).

Naturschutzbund Deutschland e. V. (NABU) (2018). Kunststoffabfälle in Deutschland - Aufkommen, Steigerung, Trends. Retrieved from https://www.nabu.de/imperia/md/content/nabude/abfallpolitik/180927_nabu_kunststof fabfaelle.pdf Neitzsch (2012, Janurary 30). Milliardengeschäft Müll. Der Kampf um die Wertstofftonne. Retrieved from https://www.stern.de/wirtschaft/news/milliardengeschaeft-muell-der-kampf-um-die- wertstofftonne-3522622.html Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action Harvard University Press. Cambridge, MA. Petersen, T., Faber, M., & Herrmann, B. (1999). Vom" Müllnotstand" zum" Müllmangel": die neuere Entwicklung in der deutschen Abfallwirtschaft. Department of Economics, Universität Heidelberg. Plastics Europe, 2018. Plastics - the Facts 2017. An Analysis of European Plastics Production, Demand and Waste Data. Brussels, Belgium. Retrieved from https://www.plasticseurope.org/application/files/5715/1717/4180/Plastics_the_facts_2 017_FINAL_for_website_one_page.pdf PlasticsEurope (2019). Plastics – the Facts 2018. An analysis of European plastics production, demand and waste data. Retrieved from https://www.plasticseurope.org/application/files/6315/4510/9658/Plastics_the_facts_2 018_AF_web.pdf Schneider, F., & Volkert, J. (1999). No chance for incentive-oriented environmental policies in representative democracies? A Public Choice analysis. Ecological Economics, 31(1), 123-138. Schreier, M. (2014). Qualitative content analysis. In Flick, U. The SAGE handbook of qualitative data analysis (pp. 170-183). London: SAGE Publications Ltd. Schröder, V. (2019). Deutschland seit 1945. Bundesrat. Stimmenverteilung und Mehrheitsverhältnisse. Retrieved from http://www.wahlen-in-deutschland.de/bBundesrat.htm Schroeder, C. H. (2009). Public Choice and Environmental Policy: A Review of the Literature. Schulze, S., & Straubhaar, T. (2010). Der Markt für die Entsorgung von Verpackungen in Deutschland: Situation und Reformoptionen (No. 1-34). HWWI Policy Paper. Seifert, D. (2011). Die Geburtsstunde des Grünen Punktes. Die Verpackungsverordnung von 1991 und die Einführung des Dualen Abfallwirtschaftssystems in Deutschland. der moderne staat–dms: Zeitschrift für Public Policy, Recht und Management, 4(1). Statistisches Bundesamt (Destatis) (2018). Umwelt - Abfallbilanz (Abfallaufkommen/- verbleib, Abfallintensität, Abfallaufkommen nach Wirtschaftszweigen) 2016. Retrieved from https://www.destatis.de/DE/Themen/Gesellschaft- Umwelt/Umwelt/Abfallwirtschaft/Publikationen/Downloads- Abfallwirtschaft/abfallbilanz-pdf-5321001.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=5 Stigler, George J. (1971). The Theory of Economic Regulation, Bell Journal. 2: 3–21.

Straubhaar, T., Ehrmann H., Geyer G., Schulze S., Tegner H. (2007). Volkswirtschaftliche Effizienzsteigerungen durch mehr Wettbewerb im Bereich der Entsorgung gebrauchter Verkaufsverpackungen: Möglichkeiten und Politikimplikationen. Gutachten der HWWI gGmbH im Auftrag des Bundesverbandes Wettbewerb, Produktverantwortung und Innovation (BWPI), Hamburg, März 2007. Straßner, A. (2006). Funktionen von Verbänden in der modernen Gesellschaft. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 15 – 16/2006, 3-9. Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional Growth (2017). Regulation and Competition – a literature review. Tillväxtverket, Stockholm. Tansey, O. (2007). Process tracing and elite interviewing: a case for non-probability sampling. PS: Political Science & Politics, 40(4), 765-772. Umweltbundesamt (UBA) (2015). Deutsches Umweltverfassungsrecht. Retrieved from https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/themen/nachhaltigkeit-strategien- internationales/umweltrecht/umweltverfassungsrecht/deutsches- umweltverfassungsrecht Umweltbundesamt (UBA) (2018). Schwerpunkt Recycling. Retrieved from https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/sites/default/files/medien/2546/publikationen/uba_s p_recycling_01-2018_web.pdf Umweltbundesamt (UBA) (2019a). Recycling: Verbesserungsbedarf bei Kunststoffabfällen. Retrieved from https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/themen/recycling-verbesserungsbedarf-bei Umweltbundesamt (UBA) (2019b). Beteiligung. Retrieved from https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/themen/nachhaltigkeit-strategien- internationales/umweltrecht/beteiligung Weidner, H. (1995). 25 years of modern environmental policy in Germany: Treading a well- worn path to the top of the international field (No. FS II 95-301). WZB Discussion Paper. Kooiman, J. (Ed.). (1993). Modern governance: new government-society interactions. Sage. Kooiman, J., & Van Vliet, M. (1993). Governance and public management In: Eliassen, K.–J. Kooiman (eds.): Managing public organisation. Vatn, A. (2011). Environmental governance–a conceptualization. The Political Economy of Environment and Development in a Globalized World. Exploring the Frontiers, 131- 152. Vatn, A. (2015). Environmental governance: institutions, policies and actions. Edward Elgar Publishing. Vatn, A. (2018). Environmental governance–from public to private?. Ecological economics, 148, 170-177. Verband Chemischer Industrie (2010). VCI-Position zum ersten Arbeitsentwurf eines Gesetzes zur Neuordnung des Kreislaufwirtschafts- und Abfallrechts. Retrieved from https://www.vci.de/langfassungen-pdf/vci-position-zum-ersten-arbeitsentwurf-eines- gesetzes-zur-neuordnung-des-kreislaufwirtschafts-und-abfallrechts.pdf

Verband Chemischer Industrie (2016). VCI-Stellungnahme zum Referentenentwurf eines Zweiten Gesetzes zur Änderung des Kreislaufwirtschaftsgesetzes (KrWG). Retrieved from https://www.bmu.de/fileadmin/Daten_BMU/Download_PDF/Glaeserne_Gesetze/18._ Lp/krwg_160503/stellungnahmen/krwg_160503_stn_vci_bf.pdf Verband kommunaler Unternehmen (VKU) (2016). Stellungnahme zu einem Gesetz über das Inverkehrbringen, die Rücknahme und die hochwertige Verwertung von Verpackungen (Verpackungsgesetz – VerpackG), 29.08.2016. Retrieved from https://www.vku.de/vku-positionen/kommunale-abfallwirtschaft/stellungnahme-zum- verpackungsgesetz/ Vogel, D. (1988). The ‘new’social regulation in historical and comparative perspective. In: Friedman, L. M., & Scheiber, H. N. (Eds.). (1988). American law and the constitutional order: historical perspectives. Harvard University Press. Timmermeister, M. (1998). Entstehung und Gestaltung eines neuen Politikfelds: die Abfallpolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in den neunziger Jahren. Webley, L. (2010). Qualitative approaches to empirical legal research. The Oxford handbook of empirical legal research, 926-950. Williams, B. A., & Matheny, A. R. (1984). Testing theories of social regulation: Hazardous waste regulation in the American states. The Journal of Politics, 46(2), 428-458. Wilts, C. H., Bleischwitz, R., & Sanden, J. (2010). Ein Covenant zur Schließung internationaler Stoffkreisläufe im Bereich Altautorecycling: Meilenstein zu AS 3.2" Maßnahmen zur Ressourcenpolitik zur Gestaltung der Rahmenbedingungen"; Paper zu Arbeitspaket 3 des Projekts" Materialeffizienz und Ressourcenschonung"(MaRess). Wilts, C. H. (2018). Was passiert mit unserem Müll?: Nationaler Müllkreislauf und internationale Müllökonomie. World Bank (2019). Commodity Markets. Retrieved from http://www.worldbank.org/en/research/commodity-markets World Economic Forum (2014). Towards the circular economy: accelerating the scale-up across global supply chains. Geneva: World Economic Forum.

Appendices

Appendix A – Interview Guideline (translated from German into English)

Thank you so much for taking the time.

In my master thesis I am concerned with the development of the household disposal system for plastic packaging in Germany. In particular, how the respective regulations were triggered and to what extent stakeholders exert and have exerted influence on regulations. As already announced in my e-mail, I would like to look back at the development of today's system and then talk about the future of the plastics disposal market. If it's okay with you, I'll record the conversation.

1.) First of all very general. How do you retrospectively assess the development of the previous disposal system for plastic packaging in Germany since the 1980s?

2.) Were the regulations implemented able to make an ecological contribution?

3.) Where would you have liked to see other regulations?

4.) Looking back, it can be seen that in the regulatory and legislative process there is an interplay between ecological and economic interests. In your opinion, were economic or ecological interests more likely to prevail in the individual regulatory processes?

5.) The public welfare is traditionally organised by the state. In the case of the disposal of household plastic packaging, this task was transferred to the economy. In your opinion, what speaks for or against this self-organisation by industry?

6.) In general, how do you see the future development of the system of household packaging disposal?

Are there any other materials from your association on the subject which cannot be found on the Internet and which you can send me?

Appendix B: Interview transcript - Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie e. V. (BDI) [The Federation of German Industries]

I: Erst einmal ganz allgemein. Wie schätzen Sie, also aus Sicht der Industrie, die Entwicklung des bisherigen Entsorgungssystems für Kunststoffverpackungen ein?

Seit Erschaffung des Dualen Systems und dem DSD Monopol hat sich natürlich der Markt aus Industriesicht sehr dynamisch entwickelt. Mit sehr vielen Herausforderungen über die letzten 25 Jahre. Erstmal die Zerschlagung des Monopols durch das Kartellamt, hat zu dem Wettbewerb auf der Ebene der Dualen Systeme geführt. Da kann ich schon sagen, im Grunde die zweite Wettbewerbsebene, der Preis auf dem Entsorgungsdienstleistungsmarkt hat das System nicht unbedingt stabiler gemacht. Neben anderen Schlupflöchern in der Verpackungsverordnung, haben die Konkurrenz und der gegenseitige ruinöse Wettbewerb der dualen Systeme immer wieder dazu geführt, dass das System an seine Stabilitätsgrenzen gekommen ist. Und das ist sicherlich bis heute in gewisser Weise so. Man muss offen damit umgehen, dass ein weiteres zentrales Problem darin besteht, dass die Abdeckung der registrierten und Litzenzentgeld zahlenden Unternehmen sicherlich höher seinen könnte als sie war. Die Trittbrettfahrerei in dem Beriech (muss man nicht bis zum Onlinehandel gehen, aber ist sicherlich auch ein Punkt) die ist sehr verbreitet gewesen und das hat natürlich dauerhaft dazu geführt, dass es eine finanzielle Unterdeckung für das System gab. Mit dem Ergebnis der Konkursen von zwei Dualer Systemen. Dies hat immer wieder zu Instabilitäten geführt, die das grundsätzlich (das ist auch BDI Überzeugung) sinnvolle Anreizsysteme über die Herstellerverantwortung attackiert haben. Daher hatten wir immer wieder große Diskussionen, ob das System das richtige ist. Obwohl wir grundsätzlich sagen, dass die Herstellerverantwortung definitiv das Richtige ist. Man brauch allerdings einen validen Rechtsrahmen und einen Vollzug, der das ermöglicht. Wir hoffen, dass durch das Verpackungsgesetz der Markt stabilisiert wird und sich Routinen mit dem System einspielen, die es ermöglichen, dass sich die neuen Regelungen im Verpackungsgesetz in Ruhe entfalten können und dann im Laufe auf ihre Wirksamkeit überprüft werden können. Ohne dass man gleich wieder politische Diskussionen zum Sinn und Zweck des großen Ganzen führt.

I: An welcher Stelle hätten sich BDI sich andere Regulierungen gewünscht?

Wir haben sicherlich die Situation in unserer Mitgliedschaft, dass wir da sehr diverse Interessen haben. Die private Entsorgungswirtschaft ist Mitglied, aber auch Inverkehrbringer, die Vereinigung von Kunststoffverpackungen als Hersteller. Sodass auch bei uns die Interessensaggregation nicht immer ganz leicht ist. Wir haben aber uns aber immer dafür ausgesprochen im Rahmen des Gesetzgebungsverahren und auch schon davor ein größeres Werststoffgesetz umzusetzten und auch die Stoffgleichen Nichtverpackungen im Kunststoffbereich mit zu erfassen. Das hat jetzt aus vielerlei Gründen nicht geklappt: Uneinigkeit mit kommunalen Akteuren, ohne da irgendwem die Schuld zu geben. Jetzt haben wir das so bezeichnet, das Verpackungsgesetz ist besser als nichts und das ist sicherlich ein Punkt der hätte anders ausgehen können, aber jetzt müssen wir damit erstmal arbeiten.

I: Wenn man zurückblickt, ist im Verordnungs- und Gesetzgebungsprozess eine Auseinandersetzung zwischen ökologischen und ökonomischen Interessen zu beobachten. Konnten sich Ihrer Meinung nach in den einzelnen Regulierungsprozessen eher wirtschaftliche oder ökologischen Interessen durchsetzen?

Wie soll eine Kreislaufwirtschaft etabliert werden, wenn die Wirtschaft nicht dabei sein soll?

Ich finde eigentlich für beides Argumente. Das Ziel der modernen Kreislaufwirtschaftsgedanken ist ein System welches Rohstoffe produziert und sich ökonomisch selbst trägt, sonst wäre es nicht attraktiv. Das ist ja auch der Sinn und Zweck warum keine Gebührenfinanzierung für Verpackung beim Bürger erfolgt. Sondern wir ein Selbstgetragenes System anbieten, was ja auch letztlich im modernen Kreislaufwirtschaftsgedanken Rohstoffe produzieren soll. Und da brauch man auch ein wirtschaftliches Modell dahinter, weil subventionieren in einem Rohstoffmarkt durch die Hintertür, das wollen wir nun wirklich nicht und ich glaub auch sonst niemand. Von daher war es wichtig erstmal das System als solches zu erhalten und die Herstellerverantwortung in Form von Lizenzentgeldsysteme muss aus unserer Sicht das zentrale Fundament bleiben. An der Stelle würde ich sagen, grundsätzliche Satus Quo vom Systemgedanken ist ja erhalten geblieben. Da gab es ja auch andere Vorstellungen. Von daher würde ich jetzt nicht von Durchsetzen, sondern von Erhalten sprechen. Würde aber sagen, dass wir schon eine Ökologisierung im Verpackungsgesetz angelegt haben von der wir noch abwarten müssen, wie sie tatsächlich gelebt wird. So haben wir im Paragraph 21 mit der Ökomodellierung der Lizenzentgelder und der Staffelung der Lietzenentgelder nach Recyclingfähigkeit eine Anreizwirkung für ökologische Verpackungen geschaffen. Das ist mal rein von der Theorie her ein ganz wesentlicher ökologischer Driver, wenn er denn funktioniert. Was man aber ehrlicherweise sagen muss, das sich diese Pflicht ja an die Dualen Systeme richtet diese Stafflung durchzuführen und die konkrete Art und Weise der Umsetzung ist den Systemen überlassen. Was die Systeme daraus machen, das vermag ich jetzt mal nicht zu prognostizieren. Glaube aber dass er Weg und der Gedanke der richtige ist es so zu tun. Das wäre jetzt wieder Beides, auf der einen Seite ein ökologischer Pluspunkt, aber sicherlich haben wir weiterhin es auch in Zukunft mit einem ökonomisch angelegten System zu tun.

I: Hatten Sie das Gefühl, dass da die Umweltverbände schon auch mitgemischt haben oder Wählerstimmen, die die Bundesregierung beeinflusst haben?

Wir hatten es in der letzten Legislaturperiode, da kochte es mal so ein bisschen hoch mit dem Wertstoffgesetz und Verpackungsgesetz. Ich finde aber (persönliche Meinung), dass die wirkliche Debatte über das Thema Kunststoff/Kunststoffverpackungen erst nach Verabschiedung des Verpackungsgesetz hochgekommen ist. Die Öffentlichkeit war gegen Ende des Gesetzgebungsverfahren da, aber nicht über die Maße. Die wirkliche Debatte in der Bevölkerung wurde von der europäischen Eben durch die EU-Kunststoffstrategie ausgelöst und Ellen MacArthur Studien. Das hat wirklich etwas bewegt, rein von der Mobilisierung her. Das Verpackungsgesetz war aus meiner Sicht nicht vernommen. Habe aber schon das Gefühl, dass zumindest im regulären Betrieb der Verbändebeteiligung, sei es Umwelt- oder Wirtschaftsverbände. Da haben alle ihre Meinung gesagt. Ich erinnere mich auch noch an eine Anhörung im Bundestag, da war es politischer Alltag, dass jeder seine Punkte gemacht hat und ich glaube dass jeder da, wie es in dem Bereich üblich ist, stark ideologisiert Einfluss genommen hat.

I: Systeme der Daseinsfürsorge, werden traditionell durch den Staat organisiert. Im Fall der Entsorgung von haushaltsnahmen Kunststoffverpackungen wurde diese Aufgabe der Wirtschaft übertragen. Was spricht Ihrer Meinung nach für diese Selbstorganisation der Wirtschaft?

Als BDI würden wir sagen, die Entsorgung von Kunststoffverpackungen ist keine Daseinsfürsorge. Daseinsfürsorge ist die Restmülltonne, diese speisen sich aus dem seuchenbefallenen Abfall und da muss der Staat handeln, sodass hier eine geordnete

Entsorgung sattfindet. Wir sagen, dass Bewirtschaftung von Wertstoffen und die Rohstoffentsorgung ist keine Daseinsfürsorge mehr. Sondern das ist eine wirtschaftliche Aktivität, wie jede andere und daher gehört das auch in den Wettbewerb (das wäre jetzt mal die reine Lehre). Wir haben da jetzt seit Jahre ja Papier, Glas und Metall sind ja funktionierende stabile Märkte, wo auch niemand auf die Idee kommen würde, dass sie nicht funktionieren würden. Es speist sich da allein die Diskussion aus dem Bereich Kunststoffe und das ist die Emotionalisierungen Komponente. Es würde ja niemand auf die Idee kommen, die Glasentsorgung und -recycling wieder zu kommunalisieren. Da würde ich immer für eine Differenzierung zwischen den Strömen plädieren. Kunststoff hat eine besondere Herausforderung durch seine ökologische Belastung und erhält daher besondere Aufmerksamkeit.

I: Meinen Sie, dass eine (Re)kommunalisierung der Entsorgung von haushaltsnahem Plastikmüll die ersten zwei Punkte in der Zielhierarchie im KrWG - Vermeidung und wertstoffliche Verwertung - fördern oder gefährden?

Wir würden auch sagen Kommunalisierung, nicht „Re“, weil die Verpackungsentsorgung war noch nie Kommunal, außer früher in der Restmülltonne. Ich glaube bei der Vermeidung hätte es keinen Effekt, weil ich nicht sehe was das für einen Unterschied macht, wer am Ende den Müll abfährt. Die Vorbereitung fürs Recycling (in Hierarchie Stufe 2/3), da sehe ich jetzt direkt auch keinen Effekt, weil die Recyclinganlagen, die sind natürlich zum überwiegenden Teil nicht kommunal und müsste nach wie vor in die private Anlage. Es wäre eine Sammelübertragung zurück auf die Kommune und das die dann einen direkten Effekt darauf hätte, dass da recycelt würde, das würde ich nicht erwarten, weil die Kommune selber gar keine Anlage hat. Also ich könnte mir vorstellen, dass das eine Kommunalisierung der haushaltsnahen Verpackungsentsorgung den Kommunen mehr Flexibilität geben würde, die Entsorgungsdienstleitung aus einer Hand zu bieten. Mit allen Vor- und Nachteilen. Die Kommune könnte besser gestalten, wie sie Vorort vorgeht. Das ist ja immer ein sehr harter Kampf im Moment, durch wen und wie die Abfuhr organsiert wird. Mitbenutzung und so weiter. Könnte mir aber auch vorstellen, dass das positive Effekte hat. Je nach kommunalen Engagement, aber auch negative Effekte. Wenn ich z.B. sage ich habe eine schöne Müllverbrennungsanlage und daher eher verbrannt als recycelt wird.

I: Das macht ja für die Industrie dann keinen Unterschied, ob die Entsorgung kommunal oder privatwirtschaftlich organisiert wird?

Genau, es wäre nur die Frage. Das wäre ein Abrücken von dem Prinzip der Herstellerverantwortung. Wenn ich als Hersteller die Idee der Herstellerverantwortung für eine Entsorgung plane, habe ich somit auch wieder Zugriff auf Stoffströme. Deswegen mache ich das und deswegen habe ich als Hersteller einen Anreiz auch mein Design der Verpackung so zu gestalten, dass sie recyclingfähig ist. Weil ich hinten wieder einen Rohstoff heraushaben möchte. Wenn ich sage, ich hab keinen Zugriff mehr auf den Stoffstrom, zahle aber eine Lizenzgebühr, dann werde ich eventuell als Hersteller sagen „so what“, ich komme ja eh nie wieder an die Stoffe ran, dann lasse ich es halt mit dem ökologischen Produktdesign und geben mir keine Mühe. (das ist jetzt auch reine Lehre). Meine persönliche Meinung ist, dass die Verpackungslizenzentgelder sind natürlich im Verhältnis zum beinhalteten Produkt sehr gering und wie hoch der Hebel dann bei Verpackungen sowieso ist durch die Lizenzentgelder, darüber kann man sich streiten.

I: Ganz allgemein gefragt, wie sehen Sie die zukünftige Weiterentwicklung des Systems der haushaltsnahen Verpackungsentsorgung?

Ganz grundsätzliche würde ich sagen, wir müssen jetzt erstmal zusehen, dass das Verpackungsgesetz vollzogen und umgesetzt wird. Da gibt es in den nächsten Jahren viele Aufgaben. Erstens: muss bei Ökomodularisierung dafür gesorgt werden, dass diese auch einen Hebel hat. Da bin ich mal gespannt was in 2-3 Jahren bei der Evaluierung dieser Regelung herauskommt. Zweiter Punkt: Es muss Klarheit herrschen, wer Systembeteiligungspflichtig ist und wer nicht, Stichwort: die aktuelle Katalogentwicklung der Zentralen Stelle/Verpackungsregister. Und dann muss das auch vollzogen werden, es muss geahndet werden wer nicht registriert und eigentlich müsste. Ansonsten ist das System früher oder später kaputt, wenn Hersteller meinen sie könnten auf Kosten anderer Dinge in den Verkehr bringen. Wenn das nicht funktioniert, dann verliert das System an Legitimation durch die die es eigentlich wollen. Ganz wichtiger Punkt: wenn es der Industrie für Kunststoffverpackungen nicht gelingt ernsthafte, glaubwürde und nachvollziehbare Maßnahmen einzuleiten, um Kunststoffverpackung zu reduzieren. Wenn Handel und Industrie da nicht in der Lage sind Innovative Konzepte anzubieten, die auch zu einer Reduzierung von Kunstoffen führt, die man gar nicht recyceln kann, dann wird es auch hier ein großes Legitimationsproblem geben. Also der Handel und die Hersteller sind da wirklich gefragt auch mal zu realisieren, dass man bestimmte Dinge selbst auch angehen muss. Ich mach mal ein Beispiel, ein ganz klassisches, ich kann wirklich nicht verstehen wie man als Hersteller Mischverpackungen in Verkehr bringe, die man gar nicht recyceln kann. Wie z.B. schwarze Verpackungen oder irrsinnige Mischkunststoffe aus fossilen und biologischen Fasern, die ich weder im einen noch im anderen System haben möchte. Und dann da auch noch auf die Verpackung schreibe wie grün das alles ist. Solange sowas passiert, habe ich auch ein Legitimitätsproblem. Eher Apellpunkt: Das Gesamtsystem wird nur funktionieren, wenn Hersteller und Entsorgungsakteure zusammen arbeiten. Wegwerfmentalitäten kann ich nur über Aufklärung und Bildung verhindern und wenn ich da nicht reininvestiere, auch als Hersteller, dann habe ich meine Verantwortung nicht verstanden. Das waren jetzt eher so nationale Herausforderungen. Ich glaube aber das wir in Europa noch viel größere Herausforderungen haben, nämlich solange wir meinen in Europe noch über 30% unserer Siedlungsabfälle auf eine Deponie zu karren, und zwar nicht vorbehandelt, brauchen wir als Europäer überhaupt nicht als Vorbildfunktion sprechen. Das ist absurd. Ich verstehe auch nicht die Kommission nicht, die in der letzten Verhandlung zu Deponierichtlinie eine Übergangsfrist bis 2035 reingeschrieben hat. Das sind so Punkte die leuchten mir nicht ein, weil man könnte da schon progressiver herangehen. Das ist technologisch kein Hexenwerk. Zudem muss man sicherlich sehr gut überlegen, ob man sich Abfalltransporte nach Vietnam oder Malaysia leisten will, wenn ich weiß, dass in solchen Staaten die Behandlungsinfrastruktur nicht da ist. Dann ist das sicherlich kein Verantwortungsvolles Handeln.

I: In der Stellungnahme des BDI zum Entwurf Verpackungsgesetzes 2016 befürchten Sie einen wachsenden staatlichen Einfluss. Woran denken Sie dabei hauptsächlich?

Ich nehme an, dass es da tatsächlich in die tiefgreifenden Eingriffe der Herstellerverantwortung ging. Ich will mal noch ein Beispiel machen: wir haben im neuen Verpackungsgesetz einen sehr starken Eingriff, dass die Kommune ein sehr starkes Mitspracherecht hat über Abholrhythmen und der Gestaltung des Abholsystems und auch die Möglichkeit zu sagen, der Dienstleister der Abholung und auch die Stellung der Tonnen jeweils in getrennten Ausschreibung ausgeschrieben werden. Da war die Befürchtung, das dies zu einer Zerstückelung des Systems führt mit unterschiedlichsten Anbietern und Eingriffsmöglichkeiten die es sehr kompliziert machen. Und da war die Befürchtung, je komplizierte ich diese Ausschreibungsdetails durch die unterschiedlichen Dienstleister mache,

desto weniger, insbesondere kleine und mittelständige Unternehmen werde ich finden, die Lust auf sowas haben. Das war ein Punkt wo man gesagt hat, jetzt ist auch mal gut mit Einflussmöglichkeiten. Ansonsten ist das auch ein sehr pauschaler Satz (persönliche Meinung)

I: Warum wird noch reguliert, der Markt wird’s schon richten?

Ich glaube diese Sichtweise hat selbst beim BDI nicht mehr so viele Anhänger

I: Es lassen sich Tendenzen zur vertikalen Integration von Seiten der Entsorger, aber auch des Handels erkennen. Dient das nur rein wirtschaftlichen Zielen oder auch Umweltzielen? (Könnte das das System erodieren?)

Ich glaube das hängt miteinander zusammen. Wenn wir jetzt solche Übernahmen sehen, was mit Sicherheit nicht die letzte dieser Art war. Dann glaube ich dass das zwei Punkte hat. Einerseits habe ich meine Stoffströme unter Kontrolle, kann alles aus einer Hand anbieten. Kann ja sogar Verpackungen so designen, dass ich wieder gut was heraus recyceln kann, weil alles bei mir bleibt. Kann eigene Rücknahmesysteme entwickeln und hab damit sicherlich einen ökonomischen Vorteil. Der Punkt ist aber ein zweiter, ich kann als Handelskonzern ökologischen Anforderungen, die vielleicht von Stakeholdern an mich gerichtet werden, viel leichter bedienen. Ich kann viel einfacher gesellschaftliche Anforderungen als Handelskonzern aufgreifen, da ich eine Durchgriffsmöglichkeit auf meine Wertschöpfungskette habe. In die Überlegungen einer vertikalen Integration spielt das genauso mit rein, wie ich komme schneller an meine Rohstoffe zurück. Das ist im Zweifelsfall so, aber der Rohölpreis ist immer noch zu sehr im Keller, sodass das recyceln von Kunststoff immer noch nicht besonders viel Spaß macht, sondern Neuware immer noch attraktiver ist. Von daher sind es zwei Dimensionen, die ich da sehe. Ökologisch hat das sicherlich keine negativen Auswirkungen, es gibt auch Potenziale, die man erheben kann und gerade für einfache Kreisläufe. Z.B. bei Lidls Einwegpfand Flaschen, da kommen super Quoten bei Recycling zusammen. Die Frage ist natürlich, und danach muss man immer gehen, was ist ökobilanziell die beste Variante. Und vielleicht gibt es ja bei dem ein oder anderen Verpackungssystem auch ökologisch noch schönere Dinge als Einwegpfandsysteme, aber das kann ich nur über Ökobilanzen nachweisen. Zur Mehrweg-/Einweg-Diskussion fehlen uns noch wissenschaftliche Erkenntnisse. Wir sitzen auch im Verwaltungsrat der Zentralen Stelle, und von daher ist das ein wenig abgefedert, weil der BDI lange sehr kritisch zur Organisationsstruktur der Zentralen Stelle stand. Aber wenn man dort mit drin sitzt, kann man schwer dauert herumkritisieren. Kritisiert, dass eine neue Riesenbehörde geschaffen wird, die Mittel verschlingt, die vielleicht nicht unbedingt erforderlich wären. Es ist ja so, dass ganz viele aus der BDI Mitgliedshaft auch in den Gremien der Zentralen Stelle sitzen. Das ist einfach intelligent von der Zentralen Stelle gemacht, von daher gibt es auch keine Positionierungen zu dem Thema mehr, sondern interne Mitarbeit. Vielleicht nicht nur gut für die Transparenz.

Appendix C: Interview transcript - Verband kommunaler Unternehmen e.V. (VKU) [The Association of Municipal Companies]

I: Erstmal ganz allgemein. Wie schätzen Sie, also aus Sicht des VKUs, retrospektiv die Entwicklung des bisherigen Entsorgungssystems für Kunststoffverpackungen ein?

Das Thema ist sehr komplex und das war auch bei uns ein Prozess, über den wir auch immer wieder neu nachgedacht haben und überlegt haben, was man da machen kann.

Wir haben immer gesagt es ist ein sehr kompliziertes System geworden. Das auch auf kommunaler Seite sehr viele Ressourcen bindet. Kraft, Zeit und Personal in Anspruch nimmt. Wenn man sich überlegt in welcher Relation der ökologische Mehrwert zu dem Gesamtaufwand steht, der volkswirtschaftlich in diesem System betrieben wird, ist das eine sehr ernüchternde Bilanz. Weil wir sagen, wenn man sich die einzelnen Verpackungsfraktionen anschaut, dann haben wir bei einem Großteil der Verpackungen keinen Regulierungsbedarf , sondern schon funktionierende Kreisläufe (Glas, Papier, Metalle). Teilweise haben Kommunen schon vor VerpackV getrennt organisiert. Der einzige Bereich, wo wir nach wie vor große Defizite haben, das sind die Kunststoffe. Obwohl die wachsenden Kunststoffberge Anfang der 90er Jahre der Ausgangspunkt war für den Gesetzgeber zu handeln, hat die VerpackV im Kern nichts dran geändert. Kunststoffverpackungen haben sich seither noch mal verdoppelt. Wir haben im Kern auch für das Recycling keine richtigen Lösungen gefunden. Sodass auch das Recycling von Kunststoffverpackungen ein absolutes Nischendasein fristet, sodass sich jetzt sogar die EU aufgemacht hat sich den Thema anzunehmen. Mit der Single-Use Plastic Richtlinie. Wo auch neue gute Regelungen geschaffen werden. Dies zeigt ein Stück weit an, dass das was man bisher getan hat nicht so richtig zufriedenstellend ist und insoweit ein sehr hoher Aufwand. Von der ökologischen Bilanz (Spiegel Artikel). Es ist außerdem ein Armutszeugnis, dass immer noch Kunststoffverpackungen nach Asien exportiert werden. Wie kann es sein, eigentlich hätten wir doch schon längst funktionierende Kreisläufe implementieren sowie funktionierende Recyclinganlagen für diese Abfälle haben müssen. Offenkundig ist das noch nicht so richtig passiert und wir stehen eigentlich fast ganz am Anfang einer Entwicklung, die bereits in den 90er Jahren eingeleitet worden sein sollte. Das ist so das eine, dass wir sagen ein sehr aufwendiges System mit einer bescheidenen ökologischen Bilanz. Und was uns dann auch immer besonders immer gestört hat ist, dass es ein System ist neben dem kommunalen System was für den Bürger und auch für uns nicht greifbar ist. Zum Gesetzgebungsverfahren: Es war schon eins der zentralen Themen zum einen das Wertstoffgesetz. Sozusagen der Nachteil des Verpackungsrechts ist der falsche Anknüpfungspunk, nämlich an einem Produkt, der Verpackung. Aber so denkt der Bürger ja nicht. Unser Recyclings funktioniert ja stoffspezifisch. Also eigentlich müsste man das ändern und man müsste zu einer Wertstofftonne kommen. Am besten wäre eigentlich eine Kunststofftonne, denn Metalle kann man wunderbar im Restmüll entsorgen, denn die werden immer wieder rausgefischt (da kann man selbst aus der Asche Metalle vernünftig zurückgewinnen). Was man hätte tun können, wäre eine Art Kunststofferfassung, da hätte der Bürger erkannt, alles was aus Kunststoff ist (egal ob Verpackung oder nicht), das packe ich jetzt hier in die Gelbe Tonne. Und dann haben wir gesagt, dann würden wir auch gerne die Sammlung machen, weil wir sind ja eh am dichtesten am Bürger dran und wir verantworten ja auch die anderen Systeme und können das am besten koordinieren und organisieren. Im Zweifelsfall verhaftet uns der Bürger sowieso, wenn etwas schief geht. Dem Bürger ist der Unterschied zwischen Dualer und Kommunaler Sammlung sowieso nicht verständlich zu machen. Und dann haben wir gesagt, lass uns doch eine Wertstofftonne mit dem Schwerpunkt Kunststoffe machen und dann übernehmen wir die Sammlung. Und dann muss eben seitens der Systeme und der Produktverantwortlichen wirklich versucht werden das Recycling deutlich zu verbessern, weil die bisherige Recyclingbilanz ist sehr ernüchternd. Das hat der Gesetzgeber jetzt nicht, Wertstofftonnen gibt es nicht flächendeckend, sondern nur freiwillig. Die Systemlogik ist nach wie vor die Gleiche geblieben. Auch mit allen Schwierigkeiten. Die Abstimmungen zischen Kommunen und dualen Systemen sind unglaublich aufwendig. Das Problem ist auch, dass die Systeme jegliche Veränderung blockieren. Allein was viele Kommunen wünschen, der Wechsel von Sack auf Tonne. Der Gesetzgeber wollte das ermöglichen. Der Gesetzgeber hat uns ja durch VerpackG dieses Instrument der Rahmenvorgabe gegeben, durch das wir Sammelsystem vorschreiben können.

Das ist im Prinzip gut. Auf der anderen Seite heißt das, dass kann auch alles beklagt werden. Ich hab die Befürchtung, das all die Vorgaben der Kommunen beklagt werden. Wir streiten dann Land auf Land ab über diese Sammelvorgaben. Aber so zeichnet sich das schon ein Stück weit ab.

I: Waren die Kommunen damals einverstanden mit der Übertragung der öffentlichen Verantwortung für Kunststoff-Verpackungsmüll auf die Privatwirtschaft?

Anfang 90/91? Die Frage ist berechtigt. Das war ein bisschen so eine Nothandlung auch von der Politik. Weil damals wurden die Abfälle noch zu eine Großteil deponiert. Und dann kam eben doch sehr stark diese Kunststoffverpackungen auf. Kunststoffgetränkeflaschen und sowas. Worauf man ja, als Teil des Gesetzes mit der Pfandreglung reagiert hat. Die Kommunen haben gesagt, wenn das so weiter geht, dann laufen die Deponien über. Da muss was passieren. Da hat sich die Zusammensetzung auch deutlich gewandelt, Kunststoff hat ein hohes Volumen und viel Deponieraum eingenommen. Die Kommunen wussten sich da nicht mehr zu helfen und forderten die Politik auf zu handeln. Der Ausgangpunkt von Töpfer und anderen war ja nicht so blöd, die gesagt haben, wir müssen die Hersteller verpflichten selber Rücknahmesysteme aufzubauen, weil dann werden die sich schon Gedanken machen wie es besser gehen kann, wie man Ressourcen einspart, wie man Mehrweg fördert und weniger Verpackungen benötigt. Der Gedanke war im Prinzip gut, es hat nur nicht funktioniert. Die Mehrwegquote ist nicht stabil gehalten worden (war damals auf 72% fixiert, die ist jetzt bei Anfang 40%) Die Mehrwegsysteme sind keineswegs auch durch das Pflichtpfand für Einweg gestützt worden. Der Bürger kann das gar nicht mehr unterscheiden zwischen Einweg und Mehrweg-Pfand. Die Verpackungsmengen sind weiter gestiegen, nicht gesunken, weil man im System immer jemand gefunden hat, der gesagt hat ich organsiert das. Die Hersteller haben sich dann auch nicht mehr veranlasst gefühlt sich um ihre Verpackungen zu kümmern. Die müssen nur eine gewisse Gebühr bezahlen, wenn sie eine Tonne Kunststoff in den Markt bringen. Mit der Ökologie hat das nichts zu tun. Da gibt es halt den Paragraph 21 im VerpackG der sagt wir wollen Lenkungseffekte erzielen, wobei man feststellt das passiert zurzeit gar nicht. Wir sehen auch nicht, dass das jetzt passieren würde. Also im Kern hat man das Problem nur verlagert. Man hat jetzt vielfach das Material exportiert oder man guckt jetzt das man das irgendwie los wird oder in irgendwelche Produkte umwandelt, aber nur über Downcycling und ähnliches. Also es war eigentlich der Hilferuf der Kommunen auf der einen Seite und dann der Versuch der Politik über die Herstellerverantwortung das Problem abzugeben. Nur herausgekommen ist ein System was eigentlich kein Problem wirklich gelöst hat.

I: Und jetzt wollen die Kommunen die Organisationsverantwortung zurück haben?

Jetzt gibt es zwei Punkte: Es gibt zum einen die Sammlung. Das Gesicht zum Bürger sind wir. Hausmüllentsorgung sollte man aus einer Hand organisieren, das macht am meisten Sinn, wenn wirklich einer konkret vor Ort für die Abfallsammlung verantwortlich ist. Das andere ist die Frage was macht man mit den Kunstoffen auf der Verwertungsschiene. Da gibt es auch in der Wissenschaft sehr unterschiedliche Stimmen. Wobei auch sehr starke Stimmen sagen, dass es eigentlich Quatsch (da gab es vor Kurzem einen Aufsatz von dem Herrn Prof. Bunge aus der Schweiz) ist zu Recyceln. Recycling sei nicht ökologisch effizient, es braucht viel Energie. Das Kunststoffrecycling macht bei den kleinteiligen Post-Consumer Abfällen wenig Sinn, wegen viel Verschmutzung, viele Mischfraktionen, da habe ich einen hohen Aufwand und der ökologische gewinn ist sehr schlecht. Wenn man mit Wissenschaftlern spricht (und das sind viele), dann wird gesagt, das was ihr in Deutschland da mit dem Kunststoffrecycling macht, das ist eigentlich nicht zielführend. Wir verausgaben uns da an der falschen Stelle. Es

gibt einige die sagen wir müssen uns bei Recycling auf kritische Metalle/Rohstoffe fokussieren, da geht noch viel zu viel verloren. Das sind die Kunststoffe keinesfalls, das sind eher die Metalle und seltene Erden. Soweit haben wir mit den Kunstoffen einen Stoffstrom, der eigentlich nicht kritisch ist. Es gibt auch Stimmen die sagen, dass der Recyclinghype erst dazu geführt, dass wir exportieren. Wenn wir Kunststoff energetisch nutzen würden, dann würde davon nicht so viel in Asien rumliegen. Weil erst mit Recyclingquote hat man bewirkt, dass der Großteil nach Asien exportiert wird, mit der Behauptung dort wird es dann recycelt. Das ist sicherlich eine Provokante These, aber befürchte sie ist nicht ganz falsch. Also insofern auf der anderen Seite die Politik offenkundig (auch von der EU-Ebene) der Meinung es muss mehr recycelt werden, dann muss man das zur Kenntnis nehmen und das ist dann auch legitim, wenn es politisch entschieden wird. Sollte in Zukunft weiterhin auf Kunststoffrecycling gesetzt werden, müssen die Hersteller noch Stärker in Verpflichtung genommen werden. Wir fordern eine Substitutionsquote, die das Verhältnis von eingesetzten Sekundärrohstoffen bezogen auf die eingesetzten Primärrohstoffe angibt. Rezyklate müssen auch am Markt absetzten können und eine Verpflichtung z.B. der Hersteller von Neuprodukten einen bestimmten Anteil an Rezyklate einzusetzen. Nur so kann man auch Abnehmer und einen Nachfragemarkt generieren. Das haben wir ja jetzt in der Kunststoffrichtlinie bei den PET Flaschen mit 25% Einsatzpflicht von Rezyklat. Das ist dann auch konsequent, wenn man sagt man will recyceln, dann geht das nicht ohne die Verpflichtung derjenigen, die neue Produkte auf den Markt bringen und dann muss man den auch Vorgaben machen, dass die auch Rezyklate erschaffen und einsetzten. Weil von der Abfallwirtschaft kann das nicht kommen. Wir können quasi (egal wer kommunal oder privat) wir können nur sammeln, aufbereiten und sortieren, aber nicht recyceln. Recyceln können nur die Hersteller von neuen Produkten und insofern, wenn sie das nicht freiwillig tun, dann muss man sie verpflichten. Die Diskussion wird ja jetzt immer intensiver geführt, zu sagen ihr müssen einen bestimmen Rezyklatanteil einsetzten. Dann kann das auch funktionieren. Dann werden sie natürlich schon das Material nachfragen und dann wird da auch ein Markt entstehen. Die Recyclingquoten waren in Vergangenheit leicht manipulierbar, daher müssen wir erst gucken, ob neue Quoten machbar sind. Besser wäre es gewesen, den Produzenten vorzuschreiben, dass sie eine gewisse Quote von recyceltem Material verwenden müssen und recycelfähiges Material herstellen sollen

I: Das ist ja gerade noch mit den niedrigen Rohölpreisen ein wenig rentables Geschäft?!

Es ist ein Trauerspiel, dass, obwohl wir unglaublich viel Geld einsetzten, immer noch nicht Konkurrenzfähige Produkte entstehen. Aber da müsste man an der Stelle mit den Substitutionsquoten nachhelfen

I: Wenn man zurückblickt, ist im Regulierungsprozess eine Außeinaneindersetzung zwischen ökologischen und ökonomischen Interessen zu beobachten. Haben nach Ihrer Meinung in den einzelnen Regulierungsprozessen eher die Interessen der Wirtschaft oder eher Umweltinteressen eine Rolle gespielt?

So ein Gesetzgebungsprozess ist ja doch sehr komplex. Da spielen unterschiedliche Interessen eine Rolle und die Politik muss am Ende des Tages da irgendein Ausgleich finden. Also ich glaube, diejenigen die das im Ministerium und Bundestag vorangebracht haben, die haben da schon sehr ernsthafte ökologische Ambitionen. Und die waren da bestimmt auch überzeugt, dass da diese Logik der Produktverantwortung der richtige Weg ist. Schätzen aber manche Sachen vielleicht auch nicht so ein, wie wir und auch andere Fachleute. Sie haben ja schon gesehen, das System funktioniert nicht richtig. Dieser Gedanke man muss steuerliche Anreize schaffen, da ist man ausgegangen die Verpackungsordnung würde das alleine über

die Lizenzentgelte schaffen. Das hat nicht funktioniert, deshalb haben sie den Paragraph 21 geschaffen, um die Systeme zu zwingen ökologische Anreize zu schaffen. Nur da sagen wir jetzt, das kann nicht funktionieren, weil die Systeme stehen ja im Wettbewerb. Das System hat ein Strukturfehler, es kann im Wettbewerb nicht funktionieren. Auch Paragraph 21 kann nicht funktionieren. Wenn ein System sagen würde ich werde nur noch gute Verpackungen lizensieren zu günstigen Konditionen, dann ist der sofort pleite. Denn der bekommt ja immer nur das Durchschnittsgemisch zur Entsorgung, der bekommt ja nicht die Verpackung zurück, die er lizensiert hat. Systeme können sich nicht über ökologisches Lizensieren profilieren. Der Grundgedanke ist ja gut, aber man stellt jetzt fest, dass es ein Insturment ist, bei dem man große Zweifel haben muss, ob es auch greift. Es geht also nicht darum, welches Interesse setzt sich durch, sondern ergreift der Gesetzgeber die richtigen Instrumente.

I: Deshalb gibt es ja auch den Trend zur vertikalen Integration?! Die vertikale Integration ist ein Instrument mit dem ich meine Marktmacht deutlich vergrößern kann, aber da haben wir ja gerade diese Woche erfahren, dass das wettbewerbsrechtlich hochproblematisch ist. Das Kartellamt hat gerade das Modell aufgrund der Größe der Akteure unterbinden wird.

I: Sie meine aufgrund des Wettbewerbs der Dualen Systeme wäre eine kommunale Entsorgung dann doch sinnvoller? Also ich sag jetzt nicht in allen Bereichen. Kunststoffrecycling können wir auch nicht leisten. Wir können einen Sammelstruktur etablieren, die gut den Bürger erreicht. Beim Recycling muss man sich halt Anreizsysteme überlegen. Das funktioniert in der Tat nur, wenn ich auch stärker auf den Herstellungsprozess von neuen Produkten abziele. Das ist dann auch jenseits von der Entsorgungswirtschaft anzusiedeln. Da muss ich eben mit anderen Instrumenten arbeiten, um eine Nachfrage nach Rezyklaten zu schaffen.

Appendix D: Interview transcript - Bundesverband Sekundärrohstoffe und Entsorgung e. V. (bvse) [The Federal Association for Secondary Raw Materials and Waste Disposal]

I: Erstmal ganz allgemein. Wie schätzen Sie, also aus Sicht des Bundesverband Sekundärrohstoffe und Entsorgung, die Entwicklung des bisherigen Entsorgungssystems für Kunststoffverpackungen seit den 1980er Jahren ein?

1993 ging es los. In einigen deutschen Städten gab es eine Bürgerinitiative das sog. „Bessere Müllkonzept“. Man wollte in den Bürgerbegehren gehen. Dass die Deponien nicht weiter anwachsen und Überhand nehmen. Das hat sich die bayrische Staatsregierung z.B. zu eigen gemacht. Man hat das Konzept aufgenommen und überlegt was kann man machen um vor allem die Kunststoffe zu sammeln. Das ist relativ schnell vom Bundesumweltministerium unter Töpfer aufgenommen worden. Töpfer kam auf die Idee ein Duales System zu gründen. Ein zweites System, weil es erstmalig die Herstellerverantwortung hat. Das ist in die VerpackV gegossen worden und weil man nicht nur eine reine Kunststoffverordnung machen wollte, hat man gesagt man sammelt nicht nur Kunststoffe sondern Leichtverpackungen im gleichen Sammelsystem. Das wurde dann zwei Jahre später zu einer europäischen Richtlinie, der Verpackungsrichtlinie. Diese waren am Anfang sogar überraschenderweise relativ wortgleich. Dann hat man Strukturen erstmal aufgebaut, um Kunststoffe entsprechend zu sammeln. Dann wurde Sortierkriterien und Sortieranlagen entwickelt (anfangs wurde noch viel von der Hand sortiert). Dann hat man geschaut, ob man in Deutschland Leute findet, die aus sortierten Fraktionen (Damals 3 Kunststofffraktionen (später 4 Fraktionen)) etwas anfertigen können. Neben der wertstofflichen Verwertung hat man dann auch noch

rohstoffliche Verfahren versucht weiterzuentwickeln (da gab´s dann ein paar Verwerfungen, ums mal freundlich auszudrücken). Dann ab 2002 war das System dann relativ etabliert.

I: An welcher Stelle hätten Sie sich andere Regulierungen gewünscht?

Es gab auch am Anfang schwere Verwerfungen in dem System. Dann war eben die politische Diskussion, anstatt der Lizensierung eine Verpackungsabgabe einzurichten. Eine Verpackungsabgabe hin davon ab für was das eingesetzt wird. Ist die Abgabe eine echte Abgabe oder eine Steuer. Das ist auch nie so ganz entschieden worden bzw. hatten verschiedene Stakeholder verschiedene Ideen. Bei Steuer wäre diese Abgaben in den allgemeinen Steuerhaushalt geflossen. Bei einer echten Abgabe wäre es zweckgebunden gewesen. Letztendlich ist von Seiten der Privatwirtschaft nur ein begrenztes Vertrauen in den Staat da. Außerdem will man ja keine Überregulierung. Und es war ja auch das Zweite System und dann hat man gesagt, wir wollen die Privatwirtschaft stärken und belassen es bei der Lizensierung.

I: Wenn man zurückblickt, ist im Verordnungs- und Gesetzgebungsprozess eine Auseinandersetzung zwischen ökologischen und ökonomischen Interessen zu beobachten. Konnten sich Ihrer Meinung nach in den einzelnen Regulierungsprozessen eher wirtschaftliche oder ökologischen Interessen durchsetzen?

Es ist ein bisschen gefährlich, das so zu verkürzen. Das ökologische Interesse bestand daraus die vielen Kunststoffe, und zwar diese schnell umlaufenden Kunststoffe aka Verpackungskunststoffe, so zu entsorgen, dass die Deponierung nicht weiter anwächst. Für die Entsorgung damals gab es drei große Modelle: wertstofflich, rohstofflich und energetisch. Die ökonomischen Interessen... das ist gefährlich damit zu argumentierten. Wenn Sie nämlich wüssten was damals für die Tonne sortierter Kunststoff bezahlt wurden ist, damit sie irgendwie verwertet werden, dann war das am Anfang der Kette volkswirtschaftlich betrachtet nicht ökonomisch darzustellen. Sondern das war dann vielleicht ökonomisch für den Recycler, der das Geld bekommen hat, aber nicht für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland.

I: Im Fall der Entsorgung von haushaltsnahmen Kunststoffverpackungen wurde diese Aufgabe der Wirtschaft übertragen. Was spricht Ihrer Meinung nach für oder gegen diese Selbstorganisation der Wirtschaft?

Die Kosten und die Rücknahme sollten von der privaten Wirtschaft organisiert werden. Die Lizensierung läuft rein privat-rechtlich. Die Entsorgungsleistungen (Sammeln und Sortieren) wurden schon damals öffentlich ausgeschrieben, wobei sich sowohl öffentlich-rechtlichen wie privaten Entsorger bewerben konnten.

Wir finden Selbstorganisation der Wirtschaft gut. Das hat sich durchgesetzt, siehe Elektrogeräte-Rücknahme, die fällt mittlerweile auch unter die Herstellerverantwortung. Was wir heute beobachten ist ein Ausbau der Herstellerverantwortung.

I: Also finden Sie das System, so wie es heute ist gut?

Ja und nein. Es gab in den letzten Jahren so viele Verwerfungen. Es könnte natürlich alles besser laufen, aber uns als privat-rechtlicher Entsorgungsverband ist es natürlich lieber, wenn das System bei der Privatwirtschaft bleibt, als dass es bei der öffentlich-rechtlichen ist.

I: Warum?

Wenn Sie sich die Abfallwirtschaft in Deutschland anschauen. Da gibt es drei Parteien: Die öffentlich-rechtlichen Entsorger, die privat-rechtlichen Entsorger und die Sozialen Entsorger. Wenn Sie diese drei Parteien nehmen, dann sind die Abfälle und auch die rechtliche Strecke so aufgebaut, dass die Siedlungsabfälle mehr oder minder den öffentlich- rechtlichen gehören. Die Gewerbe- und Industrieabfälle gehören den Privaten. Da gibt es Schnittstellen dazwischen und diese ist wunderbarer Weise VerpackV oder VerpackG in der Entsorgung. D.h. beim Sammeln und Sortieren können sich bei den Leichtverpackungen eben beide bewerben. Wir haben dort sicherlich einen Überhang von den privatrechtlichen Entsorgern fürs Sammeln und Sortieren. Und die Kunststoffverwertung, die ist ausschließlich in privater Hand. Es ist ein großes Geschäftsfeld für die Privatrechtliche Entsorgung in Deutschland.

I: Ganz allgemein gefragt, wie sehen Sie die zukünftige Weiterentwicklung des Systems der haushaltsnahen Verpackungsentsorgung?

Fangen wir mal von den Fakten heran: Seite dem 1.1. gelten die 85,5%. Es wäre schön, wenn wir die 2025 erfüllen würden. Die wertstofflichen Verwertungsquoten werden zukünftig ansteigen und sind zu erfüllen und das ist schon mal schwierig genug. Wenn Sie die Quoten erfüllen, dann haben Sie Kunststoff recycelt, aber dann ist die Frage was Sie aus diesen Rezyklaten machen. Die müssen ja in den Märkten in Produkte aufgenommen werden. Wir haben Erfolgsdinge, wie z.B. die Froschfalsche und das wird zunehmen. Wenn ich in die Zukunft schaue, wird das Kunststoffrecycling weiter zunehmen. Vor allem durch die gesetzlichen Vorgaben wird das Kunststoffrecycling weiter boomen. Es wird auch deswegen zunehmen, weil die gesetzlichen Vorgaben, vor allem aus dem VerpackG, es notwendig machen, dass das Kunststoffrecycling weiter steigt. Es gibt den Vorschlag, dass zukünftig in einer Vielzahl von Kunststoffprodukten ein Rezyklatanteil festgeschrieben wird, um Rezyklate unterzubringen und Anwendungen in Deutschland zu haben. Wir haben nämlich drei Ebenen des Kunststoffrecyclings. Wir haben die werkstoffliche Ebene und untergliedert sich wieder in Neuware Ebene (d.h. Rezyklate haben die Güte von Neuware) und dann haben wir Rezyklate die Holzbeton und Stahl ersetzen. Da gibt es eine ganze Reihe wunderschöne Produkte, die sich im Ausland wunderbar verkaufen. Im Inland haben sie auch einen guten Absatz, aber manchmal verweist man ihnen bestimmte Gütesiegel. Und die Verweigerung von Gütesiegeln ist schlimm, weil ich sie dann nicht so ohne weiteres im Baumarkt unterbringe. Die Anwendungen müssen erweitert werden, es müssen anerkannte Produkte sein. Dann haben wir noch eine weitere Stellschraube, Design for Recyling. Wir optimieren unsere Verpackungen nicht nur hinsichtlich dessen, dass das Füllgut entsprechend geschützt ist, sondern auch, dass es gut recycelbar sind. Dann wollen wir den Anteil an Rezyklaten in Flaschen entsprechend weiter hochsetzten. Ähnlich wie das Frosch gemacht hat.

I: Quoten für Rezyklatanteile müssten dann in einer Novellierung vom VerpackG festgeschrieben werden?

Ja, das ist ein Vorschlag von uns. Das Problem ist allerdings, dass PET der einzige Kunststoff ist, der eine Lebensmittelzulassung hat. Der Markt für Bottle-to-Bottle ist schon recht groß. Hersteller von Kosmetika und Reinigungsmittel halten sich an die Vorgaben für Lebensmittel nach der Europäischen Food and Drug Administration. Die Froschfalsche kann nur zu 5% wieder zu Froschflasche werden. Um den Anteil zu erhöhen müsste man Vorgaben der Europäischen Behörde verändern. Kunststoffrecycling sehe ich in den nächsten zwei-drei

Jahren in einem absoluten boom. Die Konjunktur kann uns hier jedoch ein bisschen in die Suppe spucken. Wenn die Kunststoffpreise verfallen, wenn Kriege oder Rezension kommen. Da gibt es Vorhersagen der Wirtschaftsinstitute. Dann könnte sich das auch das Aufkommen an Kunstoffen vermindern. Das sehen wir schon in der Automobilindustrie. Und dann ist unter Umständen natürlich auch weniger geeigneter Input da.

I: Abfallvermeidung ist ja eigentlich auch das erste Ziel in der EU-Abfallhierachie

Okay, nochmal, das Kunststoffrecycling boomt, weil relativ viele Kunststoffe da sind. Lass uns die Konjunktur schlechter werden, dann wirkt sich dies auch auf die Kunststoffabfallmärkte aus. Und wenn weniger Abfallmärkte da sind oder wenn die Wirtschaftliche Situation für die Recycler schwieriger sind, weil die Konjunktur schlecht ist, dann kann es sein, dass die Recycler sterben oder dass sie ihr Zeug nicht mehr abgenommen bekommen. Stellgröße für das Kunststoffrecycling ist die eigentliche wirtschaftliche Entwicklung.

I: Inwieweit trägt der Erlös aus Sekundärrohstoffmarkt Kosten des Recyclings? Es kommt drauf an. Wenn Sie die kurze Strecke abbilden. Sammeln und Müllverbrennungsanlage und stellen dies Sammeln, Sortieren, Aufbereiten und recyceln entgegen. Die Sammelkosten, ob in Restmüll oder Gelben Tonne ist gleich. Wenn man die Sortierkosten den Müllverbrennungskosten gegenüberstellt, dann lohnt sich das Kunststoffrecycling in jedem Fall. Wenn ich aber die Sammel- und Sortierkosten, dem Kunststoffrecycling noch aufbürde, dann wird’s spannend. Dann sagen manche es lohnt sich nicht. Ich würde sagen es lohnt sich zumindest bei bestimmten Fraktionen. Wir sehen nämlich es gibt auch ein Kunststoffrecycling, das nicht an LVP/ Duale Systeme gekoppelt sind im Recycling und die können es auch darstellen. Es hängt aber immer davon ab, was nehme ich als Input und was mache ich für Produkt hinten raus.

I: Angenommen die Preise auf dem Sekundärrohstoffmarkt würden steigen

Die Preise bleiben so. Wenn es so bleibt wie jetzt, und wie gesagt unter der Voraussetzung, dass das Sammeln von Restmüll dem Sammeln von LVP ungefähr entspricht Und Müllverbrennung zu sortieren. Dann lohnt sich das Kunststoffrecycling.

I: würden dann - aufgrund der Anreize für die Wirtschaft Wertstoffe zurückzuholen- Regulierung überflüssig werden?

Nein. Dieses Lohnen ist auch eine ganz interessante Sache auf welcher Ebene Sie das sehen. Wenn Sie eine wirtschaftliche Berechnung machen – unter Berücksichtigung von Inputkosten, Anlagenkosten, Output, Erlös – dann müsste man noch überlegen, was ist der Umweltbonus den ich habe: CO2 – oder Wasserersparnis. Oder ich muss nicht mehr so viel Rohöl importieren, weil ich ja meine Kunststoffe hier aufbereite. Für jedes Kunststoffprodukt müssen sie mindestens die doppelte Menge im Gewicht an Rohöl importieren. Weil Sie ja nicht die ganze Fraktion aus dem Rohöl zu Kunststoff machen können. Das hängt dann eben davon ab, welche Bilanzierung sie machen. Machen sie Ökobilanzierung, Carbon-Footprint oder schauen Sie sich rein die Unternehmenskosten an. Und dann haben Sie natürlich auch noch, was Frosch nutzt, diesen Imagegewinn. Für Frosch ist das entsprechend ein Marktvorteil.

I: Es lassen sich Tendenzen zur vertikalen Integration von Seiten der Entsorger, aber auch des Handels erkennen. Gibt es dadurch noch genügend Anreiz für Innovationen?

Lidl will ein Duales System einrichten. Erst lizensiert es die Verpackungen, dann verkauft es diese, dann bringt es die Verpackungen in die eigene Sammel- und Sortieranlagen und dann gewinnen sie teile der Kunststoffe zurück. D.h. Lidl bildet die gesamte Strecke vom Inverkehrbringen bis zur Rückgewinnung der Rohstoffe ab. Warum? Weil es sich lohnt. Wenn sie das Ganze in der Hand haben, sind unter Umständen die Magen höher, als wenn Sie andere Produkte herstellen. Wenn man es geschickt macht und horizontales sowie vertikal integriert ist, ist es kein uninteressantes Geschäft. Lidl holt sich so die Wertschöpfung ins Haus. Sie kennen die gesamten Märkte in Deutschland und Europa und Lidl ist sogar weltweit aktiv.

I: Bedeutet das eine Konkurrenz für Ihre Mitglieder?

Circa 100 Kunststoffrecycler in Deutschland, davon 60 im Verband. Unsere Unternehmen sind mittelständisch integriert und das Kunststoffrecycling, weil es ja so viele Kunststoffarten gibt, mit so vielen verschiedenen Inputs und so viele verschiedenen Produkte (Outputs) ist das Kunststoffrecycling sehr heterogen und daher mittelständisch geprägt. Jetzt kann sich Lidl oder Remondis darein setzten, aber es kann nicht diese Mengen auflösen. Wir sprechen beim Kunststoffrecycling von der 100.000 Tonnen Grenze. Wenn Sie dieses mit der Kunststoffneuproduktion vergleichen, dann ist das nichts. Das heißt es ist ein Nischenmarkt (diese sind fast immer mittelständisch geprägt). Die Großkonzerne holen sich diese Nischen in den Konzern, aber diese Nischen bestehen als eigenständige Unternehmensteile weiterhin. Borrealis hat sich andere Entsorger geholt, aber die bestehen als unabhängige Unternehmensteile fort. Hoffnung, dass sich das Kunststoffrecycling in den nächsten 4-5 Jahren nicht auflöst.

Appendix E: Interview transcript - Deutsche Umwelthilfe e. V. (DUH) [The German Environmental Aid]

I: Erstmal ganz allgemein. Wie schätzen Sie, also aus Sicht aus Sicht der Umweltverbände, die Entwicklung des bisherigen Entsorgungssystems für Kunststoffverpackungen seit den 1980er Jahren ein?

Im Monopol konnten die Litzenzentgelder noch hoch gehalten werden, das war gut. Die Wettbewerbsöffnung war dahingehend kontraproduktiv. Im Litzenzentgeld werden reinen Entsorgungspreise abgebildet, aber eigentliche Lenkungswirkung würde erst entstehen, wenn On-Top noch etwas drauf kommt. Aber wenn die Dualen Systeme das tun und recyclingfähige Verpackungen oder zu viel Verpackungen die unnötig sind finanziell benachteiligen würden und der Konkurrent macht das nicht, dann wissen die Unternehmen was sie tun. Dann werden sie einfach den Systemanbieter wechseln. Deshalb beäugen sich die Dualen Systeme untereinander. Der Gesetzgeber hat sich das zu einfach gemacht, die Verantwortung für eine ökologische Ausgestaltung der Litzenzentgelder auf die Dualen Systeme zu übertragen, die sich in einen Preiskampf untereinander befinden und es daher nicht auf die Reihe bekommen werden. Deshalb brauchen wir, wenn das System weiterentwickelt werden soll einen gesetzlichen Rahmen. Duale Systeme dürfen sich ja unter den jetzigen Voraussetzungen (verbietet das Kartellamt) nicht untereinander absprechen. Also Lizenzgeldpreise hochhalten. Das heißt hier muss der Gesetzgeber die entsprechenden gesetzlichen Rahmenbedingungen schaffen. Wie er das macht, ob er das, durch eine Ressourcensteuer, Plastikabgaben, durch ein Fondmodell, wo finanzielle Anreize für diejenigen entstehen, die aus dem Fondmodell (Fond

in den Gelder eingezahlt werden) mehr Mittel rausbekommen, wenn sie sich umweltfreundlich verhalten bzw. ihre Kunden. Das wären dann Dinge, die die haushaltsnahe Wertstoffsammlung weiterentwickeln könnten. Nur so wie es jetzt läuft, macht es eigentlich keinen Sinn, dies bis alle Ewigkeit weiterlaufen zu lassen. Durch den ruinösen Wettbewerb der Systeme sind die Lizenzentgelte viel zu günstig und die Entsorgungspreise gesunken. Durch das Ausscheiden von zwei Systemen, sind nur noch sieben Systeme im Markt.

I: Meinen Sie, dass eine Kommunalisierung der Entsorgung von haushaltsnahem Plastikmüll die ersten zwei Punkte in der Zielhierarchie im KrWG - Vermeidung und wertstoffliche Verwertung - fördern oder gefährden?

Das ist nicht die zentrale Frage. DUH beschäftigt sich weniger mit der Debatte – kommunale oder private Entsorgung – für uns gilt am Ende das Ergebnis: weniger Abfälle, qualitativ hochwertiges Recycling, Recyclingfähigkeit von Verpackungen. Wer am Ende dafür sorgt, dass das umgesetzt wird, das ist uns als Umweltschutzverband total egal, Hauptsache es wird gemacht. So wie es momentan funktioniert mit dem Wettbewerbsmodell der Dualen Systeme untereinander funktioniert es nicht und es wird auch nicht funktionieren. Die Rahmenbedingungen müssen vom Gesetzgeber anders gestaltet werden und dazu muss der Gesetzgeber aber die Initiative ergreifen. Solange er sich einen schlanken Schuh macht und sagt: ich übertrage die Verantwortung für Recyclingfähigkeit / Einsatz von Recyklaten einfach auf die Dualen Systeme (die sollen das mal machen). Das ist zwar einfach, aber sehr schwierig und kontraproduktiv. Und deshalb müssen die Gesetzgeber (ok. Es hört sich ein bisschen komisch an) das neue Verpackungsgesetz dringend überarbeiten. Das sind Webfehler.

I: Wenn man zurückblickt, ist im Verordnungs- und Gesetzgebungsprozess eine Auseinandersetzung zwischen ökologischen und ökonomischen Interessen zu beobachten. Konnten sich Ihrer Meinung nach in den einzelnen Regulierungsprozessen eher wirtschaftliche oder ökologischen Interessen durchsetzen?

Kommt darauf an worauf ich mich fokussiere: Fokussiere ich mich auf Recycling der als gegeben angenommene Abfälle, das Entspricht aber nicht der 5-stufigen Abfallhierachie, sondern das nimmt Abfälle als gegeben an. Duale Systeme haben kein Interesse an Abfallvermeidung. Sie werden also die Abfallhierachie nicht umsetzten. Der Business-Case von dualen Systemen ist es Abfälle zu sammeln, sortieren und recyceln. Abfallvermeidung ist nicht in ihrem Interesse. Ich würde es den dualen Systemen auch nicht vorwerden, dafür sind die da und damit verdienen sie ihr Geld. D.h. wenn es die Aufgabe des Verpackungsgesetzes wäre Abfälle zu vermeiden, dann brauchen Duale Systeme gesetzliche Anreize. Aber Abfallvermeidung werden die Dualen Systeme nicht umsetzen, weil es nicht zu ihrem Kerngeschäft gehört. Und beim Thema Recyclingfähigkeit und Verpackungen haben sie ein Eigeninteresse. Da haben sie möglichweise größere Ambitionen Dinge in die Umsetzung zu bringen und auch den Einsatz von Rezyklaten, wie z.B. das DSD, die haben mit der Marke „Systalen“ ihre Tochterunternehmen wo sie Rezyklate produzieren und herstellen und forschen. Da kann ich mir vorstellen, dass sie da ein Eigeninteresse haben und es dort Verbesserungen geben wird. (Aber da ist nur die Frage, ob das ausreicht am Ende, wenn die im Wettbewerb miteinander stehen.). Aber am Ende geht das ja komplett an der Sache vorbei (Abfallvermeidung). Deshalb brauch man da gesetzliche Rahmengebung wie ein Abfallvermeidungsziel. Dies gibt es in Österreich für Plastikverpackungen. Bis 2025 sollen 20% weniger Plastikverpackungen in den Verkehr gebracht werden.

Und man brächte ein Abfallvermeidungsziel, man bräuchte Wiederverwendungsquoten auch für Verkaufsverpackungen und man muss dafür sorgen, dass das Inverkehrbringen von Verpackungen aus Neumaterial deutlich teurer wird. Die Dualen Systeme werden das vermutlich aus eigener Kraft nicht schaffen. Das heißt nicht, dass wir zwangsläufig eine Rekommunalisierung brauchen, aber wir brauchen gesetzliche Rahmengesetzgebungen/ Regeln. Das haben wir ja momentan nicht.

I: Es lassen sich Tendenzen zur vertikalen Integration von Seiten der Entsorger, aber auch des Handels erkennen. Dient das nur rein wirtschaftlichen Zielen oder auch Umweltzielen?

Das macht Dinge effizienter. Hat eher marktwirtschaftliche Hintergründe. Die lassen die Stufe eines zwischengeschalteten Dualen Systems aus. Das bleibt bei ihnen und arbeiten quasi zum Selbstkostenpreis. Sie können Dinge besser steuern und Arbeiten kann durchaus effizienter sein. Trögt dazu bei, dass Effizienten ausgeschöpft werden, aber am Ende kann dadurch auch nicht sichergestellt werden, dass weniger Verpackungen in Verkehr gebracht werden. Es kann durchaus einen kleinen Beitrag leisten, aber es ist kein Modell, welches auf jeden Händler angewandt werden kann, auf die Mittelständler schon mal gar nicht. Es ist auch nicht zu erwarten, dass jeder Einzelhändler anfängt sein Duales System aufzumachen. Ich glaube das kann nicht die Lösung sein. Um das System zu verändern brauchen wir eine Rahmengebung, welche den Einsatz von Recyclingmaterialien, aber auch Abfallvermeidung und Ressourceneinsparung viel stärker als bislang honoriert.