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THE ANSO REPORT Page 1 CONFIDENTIAL— NGO use only No copy, forward or sale © INSO 2012 Issue 94 REPORT 16‐31 March 2012 Index COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 1-4 Whereas the AOG attack rates in the South recruit murdered nine of his colleagues 5-8 Northern Region surpassed all other regions (for the distri- whereas on another occasion, an ALP Western Region 9-11 bution of AOG attack rates this cycle, con- guard engaged an approaching IMF patrol sult the graph on p.11), the eastern net- with SAF, likely as a result of poor judge- Eastern Region 12-16 works authored this period’s sole NGO ment, and caused three IMF casualties. incident when a rocket hit an NGO struc- The IMF casualty account grew with an- Southern Region 17-20 ture during a comprehensive AOG assault other case of a ‘green-on-blue’ shooting at 21 ANSO Info Page on the provincial capital in Laghman. the PRT base in Lashkar Gah. In the East, IEA advanced their govern- In the West, the eradication campaign ance ambitions in eastern Nuristan with the stimulated a growth in conflict escalations HIGHLIGHTS introduction of a new formation, ‘the men in Herat, with Shindand remaining the Rocket impacting NGO in black’, in Kamdesh. A simultaneous main conflict hub for the province. It facility in Laghman push to oust a local powerful HIG affiliate came as no surprise that Farah and Badghis further attests to IEA confidence. None- continued to witness an aggressive AOG IEA consolidation in theless, the cohesion of the IEA campaign campaign, with the stakes in both provinc- Nuristan and dissonance in Kunar came into question in Kunar where local es converging on the Ring Road. commanders opposed the leadership’s at- Faryab maintained its position as the main Steep growth of AOG tempts at appointing a non-local figure as attack rates in the South conflict area in the North, with Badghis- the Provincial Shadow Governor. This Faryab representing a contiguous and im- transpired into a lull in the opposition’s Sustained growth of AOG portant auxiliary front for the AOG cam- attack rates in the West attack rates, a surprising feature in this cru- paign this year, an effort which effectively cial area of operations. In counterpoint, drags a part of IMF & ANSF resources AOG maintained their momentum in away from the primary areas of operations Nangarhar where the operations in the in the South & East. The dynamics in the ANSO is supported by south-east coincided with the governments northeast emphasized the level of fragmen- poppy eradication efforts whereas in tation and conflict among the militias mo- Khost, AOG redeployment in the rural bilized in the GOA camp. areas underlined the return to the kinetic patterns established earlier this quarter. In Central, ANSF internecine shootings were recorded in Parwan and Wardak, with During March, AOG activity volumes in both cases highlighting the vulnerabilities the South surpassed the East and contin- of ALP and ANP forces to AOG infiltra- ued the steep growth after a slow start this tion. Overall, incident volumes remained year. Besides the significant amount of low, with Logar and Kapisa absorbing the kinetic attacks, ANSF & IMF weapons majority of AOG escalations. The periph- seizures in Kandahar highlighted the scope eral areas in the central highlands also not- of AOG logistical efforts in anticipation of ed isolated escalations, typical for AOG the summer season. On the battlefield, migrations in the beginning of the fighting AOG shifted a degree of attention to eradi- season. cation teams and the ALP. The latter dom- inated the events in Paktika where an ALP ANSO is a project of the International NGO Safety Organisation (INSO), a registered charity in England & Wales no.1140276 and a company limited by guarantee no.7496737 THE ANSO REPORT Page 1 C ENTRAL REGION NGO Incidents ABUL KABUL K Year to Date 3 50 This Report Period 0 The IMF contingent in the capital 40 recorded a significant loss on the units are expected to be deployed 30 16th when a Turkish military heli- during April. 20 copter crashed into a residential Towards the end of this cycle, 10 area in Husain Khel, Bagrami, speculation arouse surrounding an 0 killing 12 onboard as well as two ANSF seizure of BBIED materiel female civilians inside a dwelling and interdicting a planned AOG at the crash site. A young boy was strike inside the Ministry of De- also injured and trapped in the fense, PD 2. The accounts remain KABUL AOG KABUL Crime ruins. The accident most likely unconfirmed at this stage as the Akbar Khan and Darulaman. The latest strike resulted from a technical failure. Ministry placed an effort into em- on the 10th of Muharram (the 6th of Decem- Otherwise, this cycle changed lit- bargoing the information and ber) sticks out against the established trends as tle, with the fact that conflict- denying any such accounts in for- it included a deliberate targeting of civilians. related developments remain ex- mal communication. Nonethe- Nevertheless, the attack remains an outlier and tremely rare in the province. less, it is a fact that stability is the the leadership of the main AOG parties denied ANSF stayed busy dealing with norm in Kabul City and that the their approval of such undertaking. main conflict stakes lie elsewhere. crime, whilst the conflict features Projecting forward into the year, the current remained limited to a handful of Looking back into 2010 and 2011, calm in Kabul City will certainly change at ANP and NDS arrest operations opposition networks were rather some point when the opposition network rein- in Kabul City, namely in Arzan consistent in applying an state their command & logistical chains in the Qimat (PD 12) and Charahi Qam- ‘economy of force’ approach in region and the opportunities arise to discredit bar (PD 5). The sole conflict en- the capital. Including the first GOA/ANSF control of the capital. Taking gagement was recorded from quarter of 2012, with blank rec- into consideration the consistent AOG attack Surobi, where IMF carried out a ords so far, AOG carried out 25 rates over the last two years, a return to suicide night raid in Ghazi Awlya, killing coordinated attacks with a suicide activity in the capital is likely although the two and detaining an additional strike over the last 27 months. ’economy of force’ on AOG side, which has two opposition fighters. Whilst The attacks concentrated for the proved effective so far, and the need to chan- the French IMF contingent con- most on IMF, ANSF and GOA nel critical AOG resources to more important tinues to reduce its footprint, the associated elements in ‘target-rich’ areas, will likely continue to prevail over the district is heading towards the and easily accessible locations willingness to match the attack rates of the last roll-out of the ALP and the first such as Jalalabad Road, Wazir two years. NOTICE: The graphs provided in the report are accurate as of the 28th of March 2012. The NGO incident tracker includes only direct NGO incidents authored by AOG or ACG. THE ANSO REPORT Page 2 NGO Incidents KAPISA K APISA Year to Date 0 50 This Report Period 0 40 Ever since the IMF-ANSF shap- ing operation in Alasay and Ta- another, and seizing four AK-47 30 gab, which also triggered an up- rifles. 20 scale in AOG attacks in late Janu- The ANSF countered with multi- 10 ary, the incident volumes in Ka- ple arrests of suspected AOG 0 pisa have exhibited a downwards sympathizers during two separate trend. This cycle, Tagab once operations in Mullayan and Shina again monopolized conflict devel- villages, whereas an ANP patrol KAPISA AOG KAPISA Crime opments with the six escalations also neutralized an RCIED in recorded as of the time of writing Jalokhel, an ANSF & IMF hub imity to security targets remains a critical factor were largely driven by AOG will- which sits on the intersection of to mitigate. Out of 35 incidents authored by ingness to harass expanding the main roads in Tagab. AOG so far this year, nearly 90% were clearly ANSF infrastructure. The reactive nature of kinetic op- directed against ANSF & IMF, incl. 3 IDF The opposition carried out three erations on both sides transpires against the DACs, the remaining 10% being SAF attacks on ANSF elements against the context of a conflict premature IED detonations most likely des- on the main roads. On the 16th, stalemate. Whilst ANSF & IMF tined to the same target group. A similar pro- an AOG unit set up an RCIED continue to place an effort on portion also applies for IMF (7) and ANSF on the access road from Alasay in developing ANSF operational (20) operations. This year’s heavy toll of 20 Tatarkhel and engaged an ANP capability and control of the road civilian fatalities demonstrates the high degree patrol when the policemen pro- network, the current achieve- of exposure along the roads and in the popula- ceeded to defuse the device. On ments - despite being visible in tion hubs. Of note, two thirds of the victims the 26th, an ANA soldier received terms of expanded ANSF pres- were killed in operations initiated by ANSF or injuries when his convoy came ence - continue to fall short from IMF. Alongside victim-operated IEDs, indi- under SAF in Mobikhel. Two interdicting AOG freedom of rect fire (rocket and mortar attacks by all con- days later, AOG over-ran an ANP movement. flict parties) and IMF air-strikes constitute the checkpoint in Beni Warsak killing From an NGO perspective, prox- main threats for civilians.
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