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Home , Ali Khamenei, Naser Makarem Shirazi

Ideas and Ideologies

Supreme Leader Khamenei delivering Friday sermon. Photo: Khamenei.ir , the Shia, and the Arab Upheaval: The Ideological Response Meir Litvak The deepening rift in the Middle East between the Sunni majority and the Shii minority has harmed Iran’s efforts to consolidate its status as the leader of the Islamic world. To mitigate the rift, Iran has worked on several ideological levels: the first is the effort to prove that the rift has no deep ideological or historical roots, and that all Muslims, Sunnis and Shiis, must unite against the real enemies of —the and . As part of this endeavor, Iran has sought to abolish various Shii practices that arouse Sunni anger, particularly the curses against the first three caliphs, who are admired by all Sunnis. The second effort was to create a united front of the Shia and the moderate mainstream Sunni Islam against both the Saudi Wahhabis and the Salafi-jihadi camp, by presenting these two groups as deviants that have completely distorted the essence of “correct” Islam, and in fact operate in the service of the United States and Israel. This article analyzes Iran’s ideological activity and the difficulties it faces. Keywords: Iran, Shia, Islam, Sunni, Wahhabi, Salafi-jihadi, Israel, United States Meir Litvak | Iran, the Shia, and the Arab Upheaval: The Ideological Response 75

Introduction The upheaval that engulfed the Arab world According to the Iranian regime, the list of Islam's starting in late December 2010 and erroneously enemies is headed by the United States and Israel, labeled the put an end to a decade who are to blame for the intra-Islamic strife. of political and strategic achievements for Iran and Shii organizations in the Middle East, and Among the most prominent schisms was presented some of the Shii communities in the the strategic enmity between Saudi Arabia region with challenges that for a while were and Iran, which is beyond the scope of this perceived as existential threats. The wave of article, but one of its basic elements is the protest, deriving from the social, economic, and doctrinal hostility between Saudi Wahhabi cultural crisis that plagued and still plagues Islam and Shii Islam. Consequently, framing some Arab states, was originally directed the various conflicts as a Sunni-Shii struggle against failing Arab regimes. However, a number severely damaged Iran’s efforts to establish of concurrent processes lent the upheaval the itself as the leader of the Islamic world with nature of a violent sectarian clash between the consent of the Sunni majority. It was clear the Sunni majority and the Shii minority. to Iran and its Shii allies that the demographic The cruel suppression of the civil protest in reality of a Sunni majority and Shii minority changed the nature of the uprising to in the region cannot be changed, and thus a violent struggle led by Salafi-jihadi Sunni a military solution to sectarian hostilities organizations, who placed the Shiis at the head was not realistic. The Shiis, with Iran at their of their list of enemies to be destroyed. The helm, therefore adopted two complementary policy of exclusion of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri courses of action, intended to weaken or blur al-Maliki toward the Sunni minority pushed the sectarian nature of the conflicts and build them into the arms of the local branch of al- bridges to the Sunni mainstream. The first move Qaeda, which later assumed the name the raised the banner of Islamic unity—Sunni and in and Syria (ISIS), and which Shiis—against the external and internal enemies adopted an extreme anti-Shii line. Hostilities of Islam. According to the Iranian regime, this in Syria threatened to spill over into Lebanon list is headed by the United States and Israel, and undermine the fragile political balance who are to blame for the intra-Islamic strife. there, which benefited , arousing The second course of action was to present the fear of an outbreak of violence between it Wahhabis and the Salafi-jihadi organizations and Sunni organizations, mainly in Tripoli. as responsible for the bloodshed within Islam, The protests in were presented by the and as the common enemy of correct Islam, rulers of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia as part of practiced by moderate Sunnis and Shiis alike, the Shii struggle against the Sunnis and not as acting in the service of the external enemies. the protest of an oppressed majority against an The Salafi-jihadi groups were presented as oppressive minority regime—a depiction that deviants that distorted Islam, and were declared helped to maintain United States support for heretics against whom must be waged. the Sunni government. Added to these were These two moves preceded the outbreak of the growing hostilities in between the Arab Spring, but were accelerated by the the Houthis (who are part of the Zaydi Shii regional upheaval and its aftermath. stream) and the government, as well as the terror activities by Sunni extremists against Bringing Sunnis and Shiis together the Shii minority in Pakistan, which have taken Iranian the lives of thousands since the start of the Ali Khamenei led both moves. In numerous current century. speeches he argued that the divisions in the 76 Strategic Assessment | Volume 24 | No. 1 | January 2021

Muslim world are not natural, and were, rather, that are now less important, particularly in imposed and fostered by imperialism led by light of the broad common ground between the United States and Israel. These enemies the two groups on a wide range of issues. This knew that if the Islamic umma were united, effort demands a re-evaluation of a number “it would have conquered the world” (Office of basic Shii principles, as well as action to of the Supreme Leader, 2015a). Therefore they abolish some popular religious practices that founded al-Qaeda and ISIS and fomented civil have aroused the anger of Sunnis for hundreds wars in Islamic countries, in order to deflect the of years. Iranian President Islamic umma’s attention from the real threat it declared at the Islamic Unity Conference in faces, that is, . Khamenei criticized the 2016 that Sunnis and Shiis lived side by side Western media for describing the violence in Iraq and respected each other for many centuries. as a conflict between Sunna and Shia, whereas The Shii did not harm core elements sacred it actually was a struggle between “humanity to the Sunnis, and all Muslims respected the and barbarity” (“Khamenei: No Sword between companions of the Prophet (aṣ-ṣaḥābah) and Sunna and Shia,” 2014). the Prophet’s family. Like Khamenei, he rejected Iran presented itself as driven by faith in the sectarian nature of the conflict and defined it Islamic solidarity and revolutionary commitment as a struggle between “American Islam” (that is, “to support the oppressed” wherever they may Saudi and Salafi Islam) and “pure Muhammadan be, and counter the efforts of the United States, Islam” (Rouhani, 2016). which in Iranian eyes sows discord between Former President Muslims. Thus Khamenei took pride in the went further in seeking to minimize the heavy fact that in its support for the oppressed, Iran legacy of early Islamic history on modern does “not look at [their] religious denomination political reality. At the Sunni-Shii unity and we have offered the same support that we conference in January 2014 he asked, with a provided to our Shii brethren in Lebanon to our certain degree of despair, “Until when will we Sunni brethren in Gaza” (Office of the Supreme continue killing each other over the question Leader, 2015b). of who should have been the first caliph?” As part of this policy, each year since the Arab (the successor of the Prophet Muhammad), upheaval, Iran has hosted Islamic conferences and added that “the questions of how they to bring together the various streams in Islam. wash their hands and feet before prayer and The conferences are attended by hundreds how they pray cannot be a logical cause of of clerics, mostly Sunni, from forty different conflict.” Rafsanjani recognized the historical countries. The three principal messages that quarrel between the Sunnis and Shiis and their have emerged from these conferences and from respective development with different religious the hundreds of official publications in Iran insist texts, traditions, and doctrines. However, he was that the gaps in beliefs and religious conduct ready to challenge the symbolic and emotional between the Salafi-jihadi movement and the weight of these differences and to focus instead Sunni mainstream are far wider than the gaps on the present and future, by emphasizing that between the main Sunni and Shii streams; the quarrels over the past should not be allowed to Salafi-jihadi movement is a threat to all Muslims, become a source of violent rifts in the present and not only the Shiis; and the United States (Savion et al., 2014). and Israel are behind this movement, and they Considering the historic centrality of these are the beneficiaries of its murderous activities. disputes to the Sunni-Shii division, it appears The Iranian spokesmen have thus tried to that Rafsanjani sought to change the nature of present the theological differences between the relationship between the two sects—from the Sunnis and the Shiis as historical issues a sectarian dispute based on animosity and Meir Litvak | Iran, the Shia, and the Arab Upheaval: The Ideological Response 77

mutual exclusion, to a situation resembling nature of these religious rulings, rather than the various denominations in contemporary a significant ideological change. Western Christianity, a situation of peaceful Another popular custom that the Iranian co-existence between groups that share major authorities wished to abolish was the celebration tenets of belief and tolerate their differences. on the 9th of the month of Rabī‘ al-Awwal, However, his words aroused strong criticism marking the date of the assassination in 634 of from conservative clerics, who argued that Caliph Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, who is particularly yielding on the question of the Prophet’s detested by the Shiis. The assassin was the successor would undermine the basic principle Persian slave Piruz Abu-Lulu Nahavandi, who of the Shii world view and the doctrine of according to Iranian tradition fled to the town of the Guardianship of the Jurist, which is the Kashan where he became a popular hero, and foundation of legitimacy for the current Iranian his purported grave has become a pilgrimage regime (“Critique of Mr. Rafsanjani’s Answer to site. After the 1979 revolution the Iranian One Claim,” 2014; “Isn’t it Better for Us Shiis not government banned the celebrations, but the to Judge,” n.d.). ban was not enforced. In 2007, responding to pressure by Sunni clerics, the Iranian authorities Efforts to Appease the Sunnis promised to close the site but did not keep As part of the aim of easing sectarian hostility, their promise. However, in view of the growing Khamenei renewed the effort that he had begun Sunni-Shii hostility since 2012, the authorities years earlier— to ban and revoke the practice decided to increase their publicity campaign of disassociation and cursing of the first three against the festivities and the pilgrimages to caliphs, whom Shiis see as the usurpers who the grave. had deprived Ali, the Prophet Muhammad’s A plethora of statements and publications son-in-law and cousin, of his rightful succession. from clerics of all levels, reflecting the deeply Various spokesmen for the regime argue that the ingrained sense of Shii vulnerability and real “renunciation” should be directed against victimhood vis-à-vis the Sunnis, criticized the the West or the Salafi-jihadi organizations, who celebrations for the harm they have caused are the true enemy, and not the simple Sunni to Shiis in the whole region. They contend believers (”Ninth of Rabi Awwal is the Day,” that the celebrations provoked unnecessary 2015.) sedition (fitna) between Sunnis and Shiis, On January 21, 2013, during Islamic Unity leading to the killings of thousands of Shiis in Week, the official Iranian news agency IRNA Indonesia, Pakistan, Iraq, and Lebanon by Salafi published a collection of religious rulings from organizations (“View of the Sources of Emulation leading Iranian clerics who strongly criticized regarding the Deviation,” 2013). Hujjat al-Islam the “curses and expressions of scorn for the Ali Yunesi, former Minister of Intelligence and sacred values of other religions and ethnic now an advisor to President Rouhani on groups,” increasing tensions and divisions minorities, even declared that any person between Muslims (“View of the Sources of who takes part in such ceremonies against the Emulation regarding Deviationist Activities,” Sunnis should know that they are accomplices 2013). That these rulings were reissued in 2015 to the bloodshed of Shiis in Pakistan and Iraq and 2016 apparently indicates that they did not and are thus assisting the Salafi criminals achieve a broad popular response. Some of the (“ʿAlī Yūnesī,” 2013). Rafsanjani, who was more rulings stressed that it is forbidden to curse brazen in his willingness to undermine religious the Sunni caliphs in public, implying that it is conventions, lamented that activities such as permitted to curse them in the heart. In other the celebrations of Umar’s murder and the words, the reservation reflected the political cursing of the Sunni caliphs contributed to the 78 Strategic Assessment | Volume 24 | No. 1 | January 2021

emergence of organizations such as al-Qaeda, to join the Shia should do so only after study ISIS, and the (“Rafsanjānī,” 2014). and talking with scholars. Moreover, both parties While the celebrations reflected animosity should avoid the whispers (a hint at Satan’s toward Sunni Islam, various clerics tried to whispers that are mentioned in the Qur’an) of change their meaning, arguing that the 9th of the enemies of Islam who are working to stir up the month should actually highlight the unity enmity between Muslims, and cooperate against of all Islamic factions against their common their common enemies (“Unity in the View of enemies, Zionism and the West (“Ninth of Rabi` the Great Leader of the Revolution,” 2014; “View Awwal: the Holiday,” 2013; “Ayatollah’s Bahjat’s of Clerics and Great Sources,” 2015). In other View,” 2014). In September 2013, as the date words, an important feature of the attempt to for the celebrations approached, the Ministry reconcile the Sunni mainstream incorporated of Intelligence ordered the police in several an effort to unite against the shared external towns to forcibly prevent any celebrations. enemy—the West and Zionism. The directive was part of a broader campaign by the Iranian internal security forces against The Propaganda War against religious groups and media bodies that were and Salafi- accused of fomenting hatred of the Sunnis, On a purely religious level, the Shia and against the background of ISIS gains at that Wahhabism, the official religious doctrine in time (“Iran’s Intelligence Ministry Bans anti- Saudi Arabia, are at opposite ends of the Islamic Sunni Celebrations,” 2014). As in other cases, ideological spectrum. The Wahhabis regard the the rulings and bans did not put an end to the Shiis as apostates deserving death, because in custom—illustrating not only the gap between their view various Shii practices detract from the popular Islam and official Islam, but also the unity of God and are tantamount to polytheism. depth of anti-Sunni feelings rooted in broad Therefore, the Wahhabis resorted to extreme sections of the Shii public. violence against them in the early 19th century. The 1979 provided a boost to the Shii communities in the Middle East, and An important feature of the attempt to reconcile positioned Iran and Saudi Arabia as the main the Sunni mainstream incorporated an effort to rivals for leadership of the Islamic world. At the unite against the shared external enemy—the West same time, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Zionism. jolted the Salafi-jihadi organizations into action. They adopted the anti-Shii approach The repeated rhetoric on the need for Islamic of the important Hanbali jurist Taqi ad-Din Ibn unity and the efforts to abolish anti-Sunni Taymiyya (died 1328), who described the Shiis practices did not did not mean, however, that as apostates deserving of death. For the Shiis, the Iranian clerical establishment intended the fanatic Wahhabi worldview is the source to revise the doctrines that distinguish it from and foundation of the murderous ideology of the Sunna, or their basic attitude toward the the Salafi-jihadi movements, and they therefore early Muslims who, in the Shii view, betrayed link these two phenomena. Ali. Khamenei’s office sought to allay Shii fears Since the fall of the Baath regime in Iraq, and, possibly, also to discourage Sunnī hopes the Iraqi branch of al-Qaeda has waged a by making it clear that the ideal of Islamic cruel war of terror on the Shiis, costing the unity did not mean that Shiis or Sunnis had to lives of thousands of civilians . The (short-lived) endorse the beliefs of the other. The various Shii achievements of ISIS, which peaked with the spokesmen stressed that every group should capture of Mosul in 2014 and the announcement maintain its identity, and that any Sunni wishing of the Islamic , increased Shii fears. Meir Litvak | Iran, the Shia, and the Arab Upheaval: The Ideological Response 79

The ISIS threat to settle historical accounts with particularly around the principle that real the Shiis in “Karbala, the filth-ridden city, and in Islamic rule derives only from God. They claimed , the city of polytheism,” was interpreted that there were always different interpretations as the intention to desecrate the two holiest of Islam, and therefore denouncing another Shii sites and to massacre the Shii population Muslim as an apostate is contrary to Islamic in these two holy cities (“Baghdad Launches tradition. Therefore not only were the Wahhabi Air Strikes on Insurgents in Mosul,” 2014). The and Salafi concepts without foundation in Iranian government apparently also feared Islam; they also dragged Muslims into a vicious the potential appeal of Salafi-jihadi ideology cycle of violence (“What are the Similarities to local Sunnis in Iran, many of whom lived in and Differences between the Thought of ISIS the country’s poorest regions of Baluchistan and Wahhabism?” 2014). Significantly, the Shii and Kurdistan, and harbor a deep sense of propaganda did not use the word Salafi to refer deprivation. to Sunni jihadist organizations, since this term In addition to military measures against also has positive significance for mainstream ISIS, primarily the establishment of the Shii Sunnis, who revere the “righteous forefathers” Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq and active (al-salaf al-salih) of the first generations. support for the Assad regime in Syria and the Instead, they used the term Wahhabis to link Houthis in Yemen, Iran launched a massive them to Saudi Arabia, and particularly used campaign of polemics and propaganda the derogatory term , meaning someone against the Saudi Wahhabis and the Salafi- who declares other Muslims as apostates. The jihadi organizations, primarily to drive a wedge description of the Wahhabis and Salafi-jihadi between them and the Sunni mainstream. The streams as deviating from the Islamic path propaganda war against the Wahhabis was automatically made the Shiis integral members, not a new phenomenon in Shii history, but in if not the main representatives, of “true” Islam. recent years there has been a significant change. Thus Ayatollah , then-head In the past, Shii polemical literature bore a of the Iranian judiciary authority at the time, defensive character, intended to prove that Shii argued that Wahhabism was the driving force religious beliefs and practices did not deviate behind the takfiri groups, since true Islam from the laws or spirit of Islam, and there was could not create “garbage (zebalahha) like therefore no basis for Wahhabi denunciation ISIS.” According to the official website of the of them as apostates. As Shii self-confidence seminary, it was enough to look at their increased since the start of the current century, attitude to Muslims in general and at their crimes and in particular since the Arab upheaval, Shii to see that ISIS is a Wahhabi terrorist group polemics began to attack Wahhabism itself as “Impossible that True Islam could Produce such a distortion from normative Islam. Rubbish like ISIS,” 2015; “ISIS is Wahhabism’s The central Shii argument, which to a large Other Face,” n.d.). extent targeted mainstream Sunnīs, attacked The most striking resemblance between Wahhabi and Salafi-jihadi extremism, according the two streams, according to Shii spokesmen, to which any Muslim who did not accept their is their intolerance and the rejection of the distorted perceptions was an apostate to be beliefs of most Muslims, but mainly the Shiis. killed. The Shiis claimed that this approach The emphasis on this theme was aimed contradicted the Qur’an and the consensus particularly at the strong aversion among accepted by all Sunni scholars. In the face of this mainstream Sunnis to the condemnation of fanaticism, the Shiis presented themselves as ordinary Muslims as apostates, even if they have the standard-bearers for pluralism in Islam and violated Islamic laws. The Salafi-jihadis consider stressed the precepts that apply to all Muslims, themselves superior to all other Muslims, and 80 Strategic Assessment | Volume 24 | No. 1 | January 2021

they are determined to impose their views with to many internal contradictions. Therefore, the “sword of ” (Mustafa & Mustafa, 2016). Wahhabi propaganda is unable to persuade The 2014 International Conference on anyone through rational arguments, and it Radical and Takfiri Movements compared the only succeeds among the ignorant, who are conduct of the Salafi-jihadis to the behavior intellectually inferior and attracted to money of the Khawarij sect, which has been reviled (“Stagnation in Wahhabism’s Thought,” 2013). since the early days of Islam and is hated by Internal contradictions are also widespread mainstream Sunni because they focus on their among the Salafi-jihadis. Although they claim Muslim enemies instead of external enemies. to be returning to original Islam, their teaching Two senior clerics, Naser Makarem Shirazi and is actually a reprehensible innovation (bid`a) Ja`far Sobhani, claimed that the modern and deviation from the path of the Prophet, were worse than the Khawarij, since the latter for whom no Muslim who had uttered the were acting out of ignorance and mistaken declaration of faith (shahada) could never be beliefs, while the modern takfiris are the product declared an apostate (“Scholarly Charter,” 2012). of plotting by the enemies of Islam. Moreover, The meaning is clear: not only have the Salafi- their crimes such as the mass killings of non- jihadis invented new practices that have no combatants, selling of women as sex slaves, precedent in normative Islam; they are also liars and the destruction of holy sites, are far worse and hypocrites who pretend to be following than the crimes of the Khawarij. Other speakers the early Muslims. Contrary to Salafi-jihadi compared the takfiris to the Mongols—the fanaticism, the Shii spokesmen present their symbol of cruelty in Muslim history “ Look at movement as the flag bearers of tolerance and the Various Dimensions,” 2014). pluralism in Islam. Another striking rhetorical motif presented A blatant expression of Salafi-jihadi ignorance and distortion of Islamic law is, according to the Shii writers , their encouragement and For Khamenei, the unforgivable crime of the takfiri practice of “sexual jihād” (jihādal-nikāḥ) in movement was shifting the frontline of the Islamic other words the ISIS propaganda encouraging struggle from the borders of occupied to Muslim women to travel to Syria in order to the streets of Iraq, Syria, Pakistan, and . marry ISIS members fighting the Assad regime and grant them sexual favors before they leave the Wahhabis and the Salafi-jihadis as ignorant for battle (“How was Wahhabism Formed,” people guided by obscurantist thinking, in 2014). According to the Shii spokesmen, not complete contrast to the logic and rationalism just this custom, but ISIS criminal treatment of that guide Islam in general and Shiism in women in its entirety is contrary to the Qur’an particular. Wahhabism sprouted in the Najd and the spirit of Islam, and proves that their region in Eastern Arabia, which was “devoid of main motivation is not Islam but pure egoism civilization and lacking culture,” and had never (Mustafa & Mustafa, 2016; “Scholarly Charter,” known the wealth and depth of Islamic culture 2012). (Qazvini, 2013, p. 76). It is not surprising that One of the worst Salafi-jihadi sins, according the founder of the sect, Muhammad ibn-Abd to the Shii narrative, is deflecting the popular al-Wahhab (died 1792) lacked any knowledge of uprising in Arab countries, which was essentially theology, philosophy, or the principles of Muslim an Islamic and anti-American uprising, to violent law (Rajayi Borujni, 2016). The simplistic world hostility between Sunnis and Shiis, at a time view of Wahhabism led its followers to reject when the Islamic umma faced extremely serious scientific discoveries and improvements that threats from the external enemy. Ayatollah Islam had always welcomed, and exposed them Sobhani even accused the jihadists of causing Meir Litvak | Iran, the Shia, and the Arab Upheaval: The Ideological Response 81

rifts in Muslim countries in order to pave the to explain a complex and hard-to-accept reality way for a (Western) crusader and Zionist attack by attributing it to powerful hidden forces. on Muslims (Sobhani, 2009, pp. 8-9, 111-113). For Khamenei, the unforgivable crime of the Conflating the historical enemies Wahhabis takfiri movement was shifting the frontline and Jews aims to highlight their evil nature and of the Islamic struggle from the borders of explain their hatred for the Shiis as a kind of late occupied Palestine to the streets of Iraq, Syria, revenge for past defeats suffered by the Jews. It Pakistan, and Libya. Other spokesmen criticized also heightens the belief that the fate of Zionism the Salafi-jihadis for avoiding attacks on Israel will be like the fate of those Jews from the days of while fighting the Shiis. (“Takfiris are the the Prophet. Objective Symbol of Sufyani’s Deviation,” 2014; Supreme Leader’s full speech, 2014). Senior clerics complained that the takfiris created a According to the Shii narrative, the British distorted image of Islam as violent in nature, implanted the Wahhabi “cancerous tumor” in while Islam is “known for its mercy, wisdom the region as part of their broader imperialist and logic.” Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi accused design against Islam. A central element of the them of tarnishing the image of Islam all over British plan to take control of the the world, and of thereby aiding the Zionists, was to break Islamic unity by encouraging while Ayatollah Husayni Bushari accused them revolts in the Ottoman Empire and undermining of deliberately encouraging Islamophobia the harmonious coexistence between Sunna worldwide (“Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi,” 2016). and Shia, and their agents found in Muhammad ibn-Abd al-Wahhab a partner and tool to realize The Enemies of Shiism: The Jews their plot (“Wahhabism in the Service of the and the West Enemies of Islam,” n.d.; “English Goals in One of the most effective rhetorical tools in intra- Creating the Wahhabi sect,” n.d.). The British- Islamic polemics has always been to identify Wahhabi cooperation peaked during the period the internal opponent with an external enemy, of the founder of the modern Saudi kingdom, principally the Jews, and in modern times, also Abd el-Aziz ibn Saud (died 1954), and his consent the West. According to Steven Wasserstrom, it to hand over Palestine to the Zionists in 1948, is hard to find any deviating Muslim sect that while in return the British helped him to conquer has not been accused at one time or another the entire Arabian Peninsula (“Sa’ud Family of having Jewish origins (Wasserstrom, 2014, Strategy regarding the Zionist Regime,” 2015;” p. 154). The attribution of a Jewish source to “Sa’ud Family Betrayal of Palestine and the non-orthodox sects absolves the “true” Muslims Muslims,” n.d.). Even worse, the Shii spokesmen from responsibility for the internal disputes in discovered that the origin of Muhammad ibn- Islam. At the same time it shames the “deviants” Abd al-Wahhab and the Saudi dynasty was in by linking them with a despised external “other” fact Jewish. In one version, the Saud family is — it Judaizes them and vilifies the Jews as the descended from a Jewish tribe, Banu Qaynuqa, enemies of Islam. The Shiis have themselves that fought the Prophet Muhammad in Medina, been the victims of such charges by the Sunnis and according to another version, their ancestors (Wasserstrom, 2014, p. 158), and now level were among the residents of the Khaybar oasis similar accusations against the Wahhabi and who were defeated by Ali, father of the Shia, in Salafi-jihadi opponents. This attitude also feeds 628 (“The Sa`ud Family are Jews,” n.d.; “Fars: into the widespread attraction of conspiracy The Ancestors of the Sa`ud Family are the Jews theories in the Arab and Iranian political culture, of Khaybar,” 2015). The Jewish connection was also expressed in the popular call “O the Saud 82 Strategic Assessment | Volume 24 | No. 1 | January 2021

family, O the family of Jews,” that was heard or any other religion, derives from the Jewish at many anti-Wahhabi conferences, and also Torah and Talmud. ISIS is implementing ideas in the moniker Sahyun that links the name that the Zionists dictated but have not yet been Saud with Zion (Qasemi, 2016). Conflating the able to carry out, they concluded (“Is ISIS the historical enemies Wahhabis and Jews aims Black-Clothed Flagbearer?” 2014; “What were to highlight their evil nature and explain their the Goals of the Zionist Project?” 2017). The hatred for the Shiis as a kind of late revenge Mashreq News Agency, which is affiliated with for past defeats suffered by the Jews. It also the Revolutionary Guards, adopted the claim heightens the belief that the fate of Zionism that ISIS leader Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi was in fact will be like the fate of those Jews from the days an officer in the Israeli Mossad named Shimon of the Prophet. Eilot (“Veterans Today,” 2014). On the basis of Presenting the takfiri organizations as the this story, the ISNA News Agency, using a play product of a Western plot was a common motif in on words in , gave new meaning to the Khamenei’s speeches. He argued that although ISIS acronym: “The Israeli State of Iraq and the takfiri approach was not new and had a long Syria” ("ISIS are the Guardians of Israel,” 2014). history, nevertheless “criminal organizations Invoking the Salafi, Zionist, and Western such as al-Qaeda and ISIS were created” by the triangle exposed conflicting views among the imperialist enemies—America, Great Britain, various Shii spokesmen regarding the identity and the Zionist regime—in order to divide of the biggest threat to Islam. The official the peoples. The takfiri movements have an questions and answers website on Islamic Islamic facade, but in fact these organizations practices, Islamquest, admitted that the Jews and the regimes that support them (that is, were Islam’s worst enemies in its early days, but the Saudis) are working in the service of the now the Wahhabis are a greater danger (“Who Americans, the European imperialists, and the is the Greatest Ideological Enemy of Islam?” Zionists. Spokesmen for the regime explain that 2014). Meanwhile, the final statement from the purpose behind the West’s establishment the conference against extremists ranked the of the takfiri groups was “to destroy the real takfiris together with external enemies, namely image of Islam,” to weaken the Islamic umma, the United States and the Zionists (“Scholarly and to fight the “Islamic awakening.” ISIS was Charter,” 2012). Khamenei for his part placed the used to distract the world’s attention from the takfiri stream in the broader context of historical crimes of the Americans and the Zionists against threats that Islam faces. He therefore reached Muslims (Masalkhazada, 2014; “What is the a different conclusion, claiming that although Reason for ISIS Attack on Iraq?” 2014). These the takfiris and the Wahhabis are both fighting accusations enabled Khamenei to present Iran Iran and the Shia and have committed serious and the Shia as the positive polar opposite of crimes, they are not Islam’s “main enemy.” This the takfiri stream, and this also explained the enemy is the one who conceived, sustained, and takfiri hostility toward them. incite them and who created the rift between While Khamenei accused the United States these “ignorant and uninformed groups and of being behind ISIS, several clerics charged the oppressed Iranian nation,” and this enemy Israel with similar crimes, and called ISIS a is above all the West, led by the United States “Zionist project.” Other spokesmen pointed (“Warning of the Supreme Leader,” 2014). The to the “American-Zionist nature” of the takfiri logic guiding Khamenei was clear. The Wahhabis groups, which aligns with the Zionist approach and the Salafi-jihadis are killing Shiis, but they of damaging Iran’s efforts to promote Muslim cannot defeat the Shiis or Iran, and their ideas unity. The cruelty of ISIS toward Muslims, which do not appeal to young people in Iran. On the has no basis in the tradition of Islam, Christianity, other hand, although Khamenei believed that Meir Litvak | Iran, the Shia, and the Arab Upheaval: The Ideological Response 83

the historical defeat of the West in the long run example, the “idolaters of Mecca “ refrained was inevitable, he was far more worried by the from warfare in the holy month of , allure of Western culture among young people while their modern heirs even breached this and its inherent danger to the very existence fundamental principle (“Modern Barbarity,” of the Islamic idea and regime. 2015). The comparison between the Salafi-jihadi Excluding the Takfiris from Islam stream and the pagan and the claim that The presentation of the takfiris as the handiwork their conduct removed them from boundaries of the West and the Zionists served to justify a of Islam were the equivalent of defining them more serious judgment removing them entirely as heretics, which justifies declaring holy war from the boundaries of Islam. Makarem Shirazi, (jihad) against them. The newspaper Jomhuriye for example, contrasted true genuine Islam Eslami, which is associated with the religious based on “prayer and submission to Allah seminaries in Qom, even urged clerics from the Merciful” and the takfiri religion based various Islamic streams to issue a joint fatwa on bloodshed, destruction, and terror. This defining the takfiri stream as heretical and religion, he determined, is not Islam. During specifying the penalty for those who “turn to the conference against religious fanaticism in the takfiri weapon” (Savion et al., 2014). 2016 he declared that the takfiris were neither Nevertheless, senior clerics refrained Sunnis nor Shiis, but a political movement with from issuing such a fatwa, apparently due to no connection to either of the important schools past experience. Shii clerics have historically in Islam. In this context he added that all Islamic avoided declaring Sunnis to be apostates, since clerics must stand together and confirm that they understood it would be a mistake for a Wahhabis are not Muslims and have nothing in minority to arouse the anger of the majority common with Islam (“Appropriate Instruments,” by such a confrontationist way. Instead they 2016). presented the Sunnis as Muslims who have Khamenei made use of another rhetorical erred and should be drawn back into the Shii tool to exclude the takfiris when he adopted the fold through propagation . Apparently they were term “the new jahiliyyah,” which was introduced also apprehensive that a declaration of heresy by the Sunni-Pakistani thinker Abu A’la Moududi based on conduct could be used as a weapon and popularized by the Egyptian Salafi thinker against Shiism itself, as indeed happened with , and applied it to the conduct of the Wahhabis. the takfiris. Originally this term referred to Since the Salafi jihadis did not deny the Muslim societies that no longer lived according Qur’an or the principal tenets of Islamic belief, to the laws of Islam and had therefore returned senior Sunni clerics, led by al-Azhar University to the period of barbarism and ignorance in , refused to declare them apostates, that preceded Islam. Khamenei highlighted although they criticized their actions (Gabra, the original meaning of the term jahiliyyah 2016). Shii clerics acted in the same way, (barbarism) when he spoke of the spread apparently fearing that such a declaration of “cruelty” and “brutality” and “unbridled would harm their efforts to form an alliance killing” by the takfiris. He presented the with the central Sunni stream against these modern jahiliyyah as worse than the historical organizations, leaving them alone in their fight. phenomenon, not only because of the use of They preferred to use the less binding term modern weapons for mass murder but also “non-Muslims,” that is, people who were never because the Salafi-jihadi organizations lacked Muslims and are placed outside the boundaries any moral inhibitions, when even “the idolaters of Islam—an approach that enabled the Shiis to of Mecca” respected the life of the Prophet. For call for jihad against them. They took a similar 84 Strategic Assessment | Volume 24 | No. 1 | January 2021

line against Saddam Hussein after Iraq invaded due to the sense of the threat posed by ISIS, to Iran in 1981, when they defined him astaghut , a great extent marked the closing of a historical an idolatrous tyrant, thus sidestepping the circle, when the Shii religious discourse that Islamic ban on declaring jihad against other was originally driven by Shii fear of exclusion Muslims (Gieling, 1999, pp. 44, 76). from Islam ended with their declaration of their Wahhabi-Salafi opponents as an anti-Islamic enemy to be fought and destroyed. The growing strength of the Shii-Iranian was a serious factor in the decision by the and Bahrain in the Conclusion summer of 2020 to normalize relations with Israel, The increasing importance of the Sunni-Shii as a way of improving the regional balance of conflict within the Arab Spring has severely power, particularly in the Persian Gulf. undermined Iran’s ambitions to establish itself, with the consent of the Sunni majority, as the leader of the Muslim world. The need Ayatollah Kazem Ha’iri was the first to issue to contain the harm of the Sunni-Shii rift has a fatwa, when on November 18, 2013 he defined obligated the Shii leadership, with Iran at the the war of the Lebanese Hezbollah against the helm, to sharpen their ideological and political Sunni rebels in Syria as a conflict between responses. Some of the responses, mainly the the defense of Islam and heresy, or in other revoking of anti-Sunni practices, required efforts words, as a religious commandment (“Ruling against deeply rooted popular customs, and of Ayatollah Kazem Haʾiri,” 2013). In June 2014, were not entirely successful. They also revealed after ISIS conquered Mosul, Ayatollah Ali al- the gap between the doctrine and policy of the Sistani, one of the leading Shii scholars in Iraq, regime and popular undercurrents of Islam issued a fatwa calling on all fit men to enlist in in Iran. the struggle against the ISIS “terrorists” in order The other type of response, namely the to defend the soil of Iraq, the Islamic umma, and attack on the doctrines and conduct of the the religious sanctities. His fatwa stated that Wahhabi and Salafi-jihadi groups, reflect on in accordance with the laws of jihad, anyone the one hand the sense of dread in view of the killed fighting ISIS will be deemed a martyr physical threat posed by these movements to (shahid). Muqtada al-Sadr, an Iraqi Shii leader the Shiis in Iraq, Lebanon, and Pakistan. On the whose religious status was far below that of al- other hand, the nature of the attack also reflects Sistani, followed him and issued a similar fatwa confidence, particularly among the Iranians, a few months later (“Ayatollah Sistani Issued a replacing the defensive Shii line of the past. A Ruling of Jihad,” 2014; “Muqtada Sadr’s Jihad central motif of this line of action places the Ruling,” 2014). While Khamenei did not publish responsibility for sectarian hostility in Islam on an official fatwa declaring a jihad against the external enemies, led by the United States and Salafi-jihadis, he continued to call for an all-out Zionism, and attempts to create a united Muslim struggle against them. Khamenei defined ISIS as front against them. The second motif stresses “a cancerous tumor” created by the enemies—a the proximity between mainstream Sunna and metaphor he used against Israel, indicating not Shiism, while the Wahhabi and Salafi-jihadi only the resemblance between the two enemies movements are characterized as deviants and of Shiism, but also, taking into account the the enemies of all Muslims. This approach also only effective treatment of cancerous tumors, positions the Shiis as the ultimate representative the proper end of both of them (“Bringing the of “pure Islam.” Here too there is a major effort U.S. to its Knees,” 2017). These declarations, to identify the internal enemy with external which deviated from the traditional Shii line enemies, to present it as their handiwork and Meir Litvak | Iran, the Shia, and the Arab Upheaval: The Ideological Response 85

as serving their interests. In this context there the various Iranian spokesmen did not specify is a notable attempt to attribute a Jewish origin what Iran intended to do in order to thwart to the internal enemy of Islam. The pinnacle of normalization, in line with Khamenei’s cautious this effort is the presentation of these enemies approach to foreign policy. as apostates, which justifies the declaration Ultimately, Iran’s open support for the Syrian of jihad to defeat and eliminate them. In this regime’s cruel suppression of its mainly Sunni way the Shiis close a historical circle, evolving population, and its support for both the Shii from a minority defending themselves against militias in Iraq, who have dealt harshly with charges of heresy to presenting themselves as Iraqis, and for the Houthis in Yemen who fire the upholders of pure Islam, and leaders of the rockets at Saudi Arabia, will have a greater military and ideological effort to fight Islam’s impact on the religious rift between Sunnis internal enemies. and Shii in the Arab world for the foreseeable The growing strength of the Shii-Iranian future than Iran’s self-righteous proclamations axis of resistance was a serious factor in the of Islamic unity. decision by the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain in the summer of 2020 to normalize Prof. Meir Litvak is a senior research associate at relations with Israel, as a way of improving the Alliance Center for Iranian Studies at Tel Aviv the regional balance of power, particularly University. This chapter draws heavily from his in the Persian Gulf. They were careful not to book Know Thy Enemy: Evolving Attitudes towards “Others” in Modern Shi i Thought and Practice present the move in public as directed against ʻ (Leiden: Brill, 2021). Iran and the Shiis, but their intention was clear to Iran, which therefore responded strongly, although it was careful not to refer to the Sunni- References Shii enmity but to present itself as defending ʿAlī Yūnesī: Minorities should become provincial governors, military commanders and ministers. (2013, October the interests of the Palestinians and Muslims 13). http://www.entekhab.ir/fa/news/132846 [in in general. In a September 2020 speech, Persian]. Khamenei criticized the decision as “treason Appropriate instruments in confronting the takfiri against the Islamic world” and expressed his streams, the opinion of the source [of emulation] Makarem Shirazi. (2016, September 17). https://www. certainty that it would not survive long (al- makarem.ir/main.aspx?lid=2&typeinfo=1&catid= Monitor, 2020). The Iranian Foreign Ministry 45227&pageindex=0&mid=394969 [in Persian]. was more scathing and criticized the accords Asharq al-Awsat. Iran’s intelligence ministry bans anti- with Israel as “strategic stupidity” that would Sunni celebrations. (2014, September 5). Asharq al- Awsat. https://bit.ly/3qVNGC2 only strengthen opposition to Israel. A Foreign Ayatollah’s Bahjat’s view regarding the deviations of the Office spokesman even predicted that “the ninth of Rabiʿ al-Awwal. (2014, January 11). http:// unjust shedding of Palestinian blood over aghigh.ir/fa/news/19525 [in Persian]. the past seven decades of Israeli occupation Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi: The clerics of Islam should seek disassociation from the takfir in a loud voice. [i.e., since 1948] will sooner or later catch up (2016, January 28). http://hajj.ir/84/65199 [in Persian]. with those who betrayed the Palestinians” Ayatollah Sistani issued a ruling of jihad. (2014, June 13). (“Israel Agreement,” 2020). The head of the https://hawzah.net/fa/News/View/97209 [in Persian]. Armed Forces HQ General Muhammad Bakri Baghdad launches air strikes on insurgents in Mosul (2014, June 12). Financial Times. https://on.ft.com/37K6pJe exposed some of the Iranian fears when he Bringing the U.S. to its knees, in the region, is a miracle warned the UAE that Iran would not tolerate of the Islamic revolution. (2017, November 22). even the slightest damage to its security as a Khanmanei.ir. https://bit.ly/3pNRZOA result of this move and that it would hold the Chief of general staff of the Iranian armed forces explicitly threatened the UAE. (2020, August 16). https://www. UAE fully responsible (“Chief of General Staff رئیس-ستاد-کل-نیروهای-مسلح-ایران-آشکارا-/dw.com/fa-ir .[a-54586755 [in Persian/امارات-را-تهدید-کرد ,of the Iranian Armed Forces” 2020). However 86 Strategic Assessment | Volume 24 | No. 1 | January 2021

Critique of Mr. Rafsanjani’s answer to one claim. (2014, Ninth of Rabi Awwal is the day of the second pledge of February 17). http://ravanbakhsh.blogfa.com/post-42. allegiance to the of the age. (2015, December 22). نهم--/aspx [in Persian]. https://www.farsnews.ir/news/13931010001385 .[in Persian] ربیعاالول-روز-بیعتی-دوباره-با-امام-زمان-عج-است English goals in creating the Wahhabi sect. (n.d.). Political Studies Research Institute, . http://bcir.pchi. Ninth of Rabi Awwal: the holiday of the beginning of the ir/show.php?page=contents&id=9619 [in Persian]. Imamite of the Imam of the age, or the holiday of al- Fars: The ancestors of the Sa`ud family are the Jews of Zahrāʾ? (2013, January 30). Bahman 11, 1391/. ttps:// بخش-مناسبت-های-مذهبی-97/023832-نهم-ربیع-/Khaybar. (2015, March 29). http://www.parsine.com/ www.ilna.ir .[in Persian] االول-جشن-آغاز-امامت-امام-زمان-یا-جشن-عیدالزهرا .[fa/news/232655/ [in Persian Gabra, M. (2016). The ideological extremism of al-Azhar. 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