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Who Public Interest Lawyers Are.Pdf DRAFT–Chen & Cummings, Chapter 1: Defining Public Interest Lawyering–August 9, 2012 ©Alan K. Chen, Scott L. Cummings, Aspen Publishers--Do Not Cite or Reproduce Without Authors’ Written Permission. PART I WHO PUBLIC INTEREST LAWYERS ARE Chapter 1: Defining Public Interest Lawyering Chapter 2: American Public Interest Lawyering: From Past to Present Chapter 3: Political Ideology and Public Interest Lawyering CHAPTER 1 DEFINING PUBLIC INTEREST LAWYERING “After decades of pro bono practice, no one yet has a sharp or clean definition of public interest law.” Patricia M. Wald (former judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit), Whose Public Interest Is it Anyway?: Advice for Altruistic Young Lawyers, 47 ME. L. REV. 3, 5 (1995). I. Introduction This book is about the practice, pitfalls, and possibilities of public interest lawyering. In it, we examine who does it and why, the challenges they face, and the successes they have achieved. To do so requires that we define the subject of analysis. This, it turns out, is no easy task. Indeed, what exactly it means to be a “public interest lawyer” or engage in “public interest lawyering” is a question that has generated debate and disagreement since the very beginning of the public interest law movement nearly a half-century ago. The discussion has focused on whether it is possible to adequately define lawyering in the “public interest,” and if so, precisely what that definition is. Many attempts at definition have been made, and an equal number have foundered, leaving some scholars to jettison the concept altogether as hopelessly indeterminate. DRAFT–Chen & Cummings, Chapter 1: Defining Public Interest Lawyering–August 9, 2012 ©Alan K. Chen, Scott L. Cummings, Aspen Publishers--Do Not Cite or Reproduce Without Author’s Written Permission. STUART A. SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN: POLITICS, PROFESSIONALISM, AND CAUSE LAWYERING 5-6 (2004). This chapter confronts public interest law’s definitional problem as a threshold matter. What it reveals is that the concept of public interest lawyering is—like all concepts—deeply contested. See Ann Southworth, Conservative Lawyers and the Contest over the Meaning of “Public Interest Law,” 52 UCLA L. REV. 1223, 1236-37 (2005). Our goal is to clarify the terms of the debate and offer a means for analyzing it. In the end, we conclude that no definition is unassailable; all raise boundary questions and pose tradeoffs. We adopt public interest lawyering precisely because it has framed the boundary questions since the movement’s inception and does so in a rubric that is both historically grounded and consistent with the term-of-art that contemporary American practitioners generally adopt. As we will see later, the term is also a vector of change—and controversy—around the world. See generally Scott L. Cummings & Louise G. Trubek, Globalizing Public Interest Law, 13 UCLA J. OF INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 1 (2008). Despite the disagreement over terminology, there have long been lawyers who have devoted their careers to promoting some version of the public good, through their representation of individual clients, the pursuit of specific causes—or both. See Robert W. Gordon, Are Lawyers Friends of Democracy?, in THE PARADOX OF PROFESSIONALISM: LAWYERS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 31, 38-39 (Scott L. Cummings ed., Cambridge University Press, 2011). These lawyers have played critical roles in defending and extending American democratic institutions, Laura Beth Nielsen & Catherine R. Albiston, The Organization of Public Interest Practice: 1975-2004, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1591, 1595-96 (2006), providing access to justice for those unable to afford it, DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE (2004), and advancing the causes of marginalized groups unable to influence politics by other means, RICHARD L. ABEL, POLITICS BY OTHER MEANS: LAW IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST APARTHEID, 1980-1994 (1995). They have made significant contributions to foundational civil rights and antipoverty struggles, MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1960-1973 (1993); MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (2d ed. 2004), thus embodying the highest ideals of a profession that aspires to serve the public good. Although they are a relatively small fraction of the total lawyer population, public interest lawyers have thus had an outsized role in making good on the profession’s promise of “equal justice under law.” The most prominent of these lawyers have become national icons who represent the highest aspirations of the legal profession. There are many notable examples, which include: Thurgood Marshall, and other lawyers for the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. (LDF) during the civil rights movement; Clarence Darrow, famous for his pro bono representation of unpopular and controversial clients, such as the 1925 defense of John Scopes against the charge of illegally teaching human evolution in Tennessee schools; Reginald Heber Smith, a lawyer in a private Boston law firm in the early 1900s, who first called the profession’s attention to the severely unmet legal needs of the poor; and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who, before she was a U.S. Supreme Court Justice, was a leading women’s rights lawyer for the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) in the 1970s. But, as we will see throughout this book, public interest lawyering extends far beyond these canonical cases to encompass a broad range of advocacy techniques (not just litigation) across various practice sites (not just nonprofit organizations) undertaken by different types of 2 DRAFT–Chen & Cummings, Chapter 1: Defining Public Interest Lawyering–August 9, 2012 ©Alan K. Chen, Scott L. Cummings, Aspen Publishers--Do Not Cite or Reproduce Without Author’s Written Permission. lawyers with distinct goals. This book is about these public interest lawyers and their efforts to create what they envision as a more just and equitable society. It seeks to understand their professional heritage, their personal choices, their most ambitious aspirations, and the practical limits on their achievement. It also seeks to present a picture of their day-to-day practice: the financial choices they face, the ethical problems they confront, and the strategies they deploy. In the end, we aim to present a comprehensive picture of contemporary public interest lawyering, assessing what it has achieved so far and what the future holds. Before we do, we begin with a preliminary, yet important, inquiry: What precisely do we mean by public interest lawyering? Does it represent a distinctive model of advocacy that contrasts with conventional lawyering? Does it encompass a distinct set of motivations? Does it refer to a particular set of clients or causes? Scholars have long struggled to answer these questions. The goal of this chapter is to provide a framework for thinking about the aspects of public interest lawyering that are most central to the concept and those that are more peripheral, while focusing on the always contested boundary cases and suggesting how the definitional debate has real world lawyering consequences. Ultimately, these materials point to an understanding of public interest law as a terrain upon which competing social interests do battle in order to define the very meaning of a just society. II. Terminology: What’s In a Name? At bottom, all lawyering affects the rules that guide our behavior as members of society. Every time lawyers act on behalf of clients to enforce, evade, reinterpret, distinguish, modify, repeal, or comply with law, they influence the basic terms of social interaction in ways that shape our collective experience of freedom and fairness. This is true whether we are talking about a plaintiff’s lawyer representing an employee in a wrongful termination case, an in-house lawyer counseling her company on legal compliance, or a solo practitioner advising her client on forming a small business venture. A threshold question, therefore, is what separates these acts of day-to-day lawyering designed to advance client interests from lawyering that aspires to make society better. Of course, framing the question in this way reveals the heart of the problem: that one person’s vision of the just society will be another’s vision of a society gone wrong. And there are so many visions—all of which are deeply contested—that choosing among them is ultimately an exercise in political judgment. How we make that judgment will, in the end, determine what counts as lawyering in the public interest. For at least the last century, lawyers have sought to deploy their legal skill to advance the interests of certain types of individual clients or social groups: legal aid lawyers from the early twentieth century who dispensed free legal services to aid the urban poor, JOEL F. HANDLER ET AL., LAWYERS AND THE PURSUIT OF LEGAL RIGHTS 18-19 (1978); so-called “country lawyers” who provided professional charity in order to help their less fortunate neighbors, JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 15 (1976); and activist lawyers who defended war protesters, labor organizers, and racial minorities suffering discrimination, HANDLER ET AL., THE PURSUIT OF LEGAL RIGHTS, supra, at 22-24. 3 DRAFT–Chen & Cummings, Chapter 1: Defining Public Interest Lawyering–August 9, 2012 ©Alan K. Chen, Scott L. Cummings, Aspen Publishers--Do Not Cite or Reproduce Without Author’s Written Permission. Yet it was not until the 1960s that the term “public interest law” was coined in a self- conscious effort to describe a nascent movement to use legal advocacy, primarily litigation, to advance a political agenda associated primarily with the protection and expansion of rights for racial minorities, the poor, women, and other disadvantaged groups, while also providing collective goods, like a clean environment. Louise G. Trubek, Public Interest Law: Facing the Problems of Maturity, 33 U.
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