Militias, Rebels and Islamist Militants Human Insecurity and State Crises in

Edited by Wafula Okumu and Augustine Ikelegbe , Rebels and Islamist Militants Human Insecurity and State Crises in Africa

Edited by Wafula Okumu and Augustine Ikelegbe Contents As a leading African human security research institution, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) works towards a stable and peaceful Africa characterised by sustainable development, human rights, the rule of law, democracy, Acknowledgements ...... iv collaborative security and gender mainstreaming. The ISS realises this vision by: About the book ...... vi Q Undertaking applied research, training and capacity building About the editors ...... vii Q Working collaboratively with others

Q Facilitating and supporting policy formulation About the contributors ...... viii

Q Monitoring trends and policy implementation Foreword ...... xii Q Collecting, interpreting and disseminating information List of tables ...... xiv Q Networking on national, regional and international levels List of maps ...... xv

© 2010, Institute for Security Studies List of acronyms and abbreviations ...... xvi

Copyright in the volume as a whole is vested in the Institute for Security Chapter 1 Studies, and no part may be reproduced in whole or in part without the express Introduction: towards conceptualisation and understanding of the permission, in writing, of both the authors and the publishers. threats of armed non-state groups to human security and the state The opinions expressed do not necessarily re ect those of the Institute, its trustees, members in Africa ...... 1 of the Council or donors. Authors contribute to ISS publications in their personal capacity. Augustine Ikelegbe and Wafula Okumu ISBN 978-1-920422-10-3 PART I: ISSUES AND DIMENSIONS First published by the Institute for Security Studies, PO Box 1787, Brooklyn Square 0075 Chapter 2 Tshwane (Pretoria), South Africa Historical and cultural dimensions of and rebel groups in Africa . . .45 Anne Kubai www.issafrica.org

Cover photographs Chapter 3 People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) soldiers. AP Photo/Jean-Marc Bouju. Mapping the phenomenon of militias and rebels in Africa ...... 69 Hundreds of thousands of refugees stream out of Mugunga refugee camp Bettina Engels and head toward the Rwanda border as Zairian rebels move in to occupy what was the largest refugee camp in the world. AP Photo/Enric Marti. Chapter 4

Production, typesetting and layout Image Design + 27 11 469 3029 Armed non-state entities in international law: status and challenges Cover design Janice Kuhler of accountability ...... 89 Printing Remata iNathi Godfrey Musila

MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA i CONTENTS WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE

Chapter 5 PART III: RESPONSES Crises of the state and governance and armed non-state groups in Africa ...... 119 Chapter 14 Augustine Ikelegbe Local communities, militias and rebel movements: the case of the Revolutionary United Front in ...... 389 Krijn Peters PART II: CASE STUDIES Chapter 15 Chapter 6 State, regional and international responses to militia and rebel Marginalisation and the rise of militia groups in : the Mungiki activities in Africa ...... 417 and the Sabaot Land Defence Force ...... 147 Macharia Munene Adams Oloo Chapter 16 Chapter 7 Confronting the threats of armed non-state groups to human security Rebels and militias in resource conflict in the eastern Democratic and the state in Africa ...... 437 Republic of Congo ...... 183 Wafula Okumu and Augustine Ikelegbe Phillip Kasaija Appendix ...... 469 Chapter 8 Militias, pirates and oil in the Delta ...... 219 Bibliography ...... 481 Ibaba Samuel Ibaba and Augustine Ikelegbe Index ...... 524

Chapter 9 Rebels, militias and governance in Sudan ...... 255 Samson S Wassara

Chapter 10 Regionalisation of rebel activities: the case of the Lord’s Resistance Army ...... 287 Paul Omach

Chapter 11 Militant Islamist groups in northern Nigeria ...... 313 Muhammed Kabir Isa

Chapter 12 Armed Islamist groups in , Algeria and Morocco ...... 341 Eric George and Aleksi Ylönen

Chapter 13 From to opposition: UNITA in Angola and RENAMO in Mozambique ...... 365 Justin Pearce ii INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA iii WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE

for providing research assistance, and Marinkie Maluleke for taking care of all the administrative matters. Last, but not least, we owe our families immeasurable gratitude for enduring our absences during the periods we sneaked out to libraries during weekends or Acknowledgements stayed late at the office to work on the book. We will forever be indebted to our spouses, C aroline a nd On ovughe, f or co ntinually b eing t he s ources o f o ur Militias, rebels and Islamist militants has b een in t he works since 2006 a nd is a intellectual curiosity and scholarly endeavours. culmination of t he a uthors’ a ssiduousness, f ervour a nd fortitude t o make Wafula Okumu and Augustine Ikelegbe contributions t hat in crease un derstanding o f o ne o f A frica’s m ost unf ortunate Pretoria phenomena; that of armed non-state groups undermining human security and the October 2010 state capacity to provide it. After Musa Abutudu had introduced us to each other, we t ook t he f irst s tep o f p reparing a co ncept n ote t hat wa s en dorsed b y t he Institute f or S ecurity S tudies (ISS) a nd s upported w ith f unds p rovided b y t he government o f Fin land. I n t his r egard, w e w ould li ke t o exp ress o ur de epest appreciation to the ISS Executive Director, Jakkie Cilliers, the ISS Pretoria Office Director, Cheryl Frank, and the African C onflict Prevention Programme Head, Paul-Simon Handy. All continued to offer words of encouragement and useful tips on content, concepts and historical facts. This b ook is an expression of our desire to unpack a p henomenon that has become a prominent feature of African politics. It is also an outcome of hard work by all of the contributors who made many sacrifices to research and write superb chapters, as well as to review each other’s work. Bettina Engels, Eric George, Ibaba S Ib aba, M uhammad K abir, P hillip K asaija, A nne K ubai, M acharia M unene, Godfrey Musila, Adams Oloo, Paul Omach, Justin Pearce, Krijn Peters, Samson Wassara, and Aleksi Ylönen should also be thanked for providing us with a wealth of knowledge that we heavily relied on to compile and edit the volume. This book would not have been completed in t ime without the professional support we received from the ISS p ublications office. Iolandi Pool, Publications Coordinator, and Tsakani Shipalana, Assistant Publications Coordinator, devoted immense en ergies t o en sure t hat w e h ad t he n ecessary m aps a nd co pyright permissions, typesetting and copy-editing. We w ere s upported a nd en couraged b y o ur co lleagues t hrough w ords a nd reviewing of the chapters. In particular we should extend our special thanks to Judy Smith-Höhn, Paula Roque, David Zounmenou, Martin Ewi, Musa Abutudu and Osumah Oarhe. We also owe a mountain of gratitude to Namhla Matshanda iv INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA v About the book About the editors

Militias, rebels and Islamist militants: human insecurity and state crises in Africa Wafula Okumu holds a P hD from Atlanta University in t he US. H e is a S enior explores h ow a rmed n on-state g roups h ave em erged a s k ey p layers in A frican Research F ellow a t t he I nstitute f or S ecurity S tudies (ISS), w here h e h as a lso politics a nd a rmed co nflicts sin ce t he 1990s. Th e b ook i s a cr itical, served a s t he H ead o f A frican S ecurity A nalysis P rogramme (A SAP). B efore multidisciplinary and comprehensive study of the threats that militias, rebels and joining the ISS in 2006, Dr O kumu taught at McMaster University’s Centre for Islamist militants pose to human security and the state in A frica. Through case Peace Studies, Prescott College, Mississippi University for Women and Chapman studies utilising multidisciplinary approaches and concepts, analytical frameworks University. He also served as a co nflict analyst for the and as an and p erspectives c utting acr oss t he s ocial s ciences a nd h umanities, t he b ook Academic P rogramme A ssociate a t t he U nited N ations U niversity, Tokyo. H is conceptualises armed non-state groups in A frica through their links to the state. research work and publications have been on a variety of topics ranging from the After contextualising these groups in history, culture, economics, politics, law and use of child soldiers to human rights, democracy, , the African Union, other factors, a sys tematic effort is made to locate their roots in g roup identity, African boundaries, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance. In addition to his social dep rivation, r esource co mpetition, e lite m anipulations, t he y outh many publications in refereed journals, Dr Okumu has also co-edited (with Paul problématique, economic decline, poor political leadership and governance crisis. Kaiser) Democratic t ransitions i n Eas t A frica and (w ith A nneli B otha) t he Differentiating mi litias f rom in surgents, r ebel g roups a nd ext remist r eligious Understanding terrorism in Africa series. He i s t he author (w ith Professor Sam movements, t he b ook i llustrates h ow s ome o f t he g roups h ave s ustained Makinda) of African Union: challenges of gl obalisation, s ecurity and governance themselves, undermining both human security and the state capacity to provide it. and is currently working on two forthcoming titles on African boundaries and the The responses to their threats by local communities, states, regional mechanisms African Union’s peace and security architecture. and ini tiatives, a nd t he in ternational co mmunities a re a nalysed. Th e f indings provide a co nceptual r eference f or s cholars a nd p ractical r ecommendations f or Augustine O vuoronye I kelegbe obtained a P hD in P olitical S cience f rom t he policymakers. University of Ibadan, Nigeria. He is a Professor of Comparative Politics and Public Policy at t he University of B enin a nd Adjunct R esearch Associate P rofessor of Conflict Studies at the Centre for Population and Environmental Development, Benin Ci ty, N igeria. H e wa s V isiting F ellow, U niversity o f W olverhampton, Wolverhampton 1999–2000; Visiting Fellow, the African Studies Centre, Leiden, 2004; a nd H ead o f t he D epartment o f P olitical S cience, U niversity o f B enin, 2006–2008. Dr Ik elegbe has researched, published and consulted extensively on resource conflicts and the roles of militias, youth and civil society in the conflicts and p olitics o f A frica. H is o ther w orks in clude Intergovernmental r elations i n Nigeria (PEFS – co-authored); Oil, resource conflicts and the post conflict transition in the Niger Delta region: beyond the amnesty (CPED); and Oil, environment and resource conflicts in Nigeria (LIT Verlag – forthcoming). vi INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA vii WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE

of Nigeria. His work h as b een published in t he Journal of R esearch in National Development, J ournal o f S ocial a nd P olicy I ssues, A frican J ournal o f C onflict Resolution, I nternational J ournal o f D evelopment I ssues, J ournal o f P eace a nd About the contributors Conflict S tudies, a nd Nigerian J ournal o f O il a nd P olitics. (E-m ail: [email protected])

Kasaija P hillip Apuuli holds a do ctoral deg ree in I nternational L aw f rom t he Augustine I kelegbe lectures in t he D epartment o f Political S cience a nd Pu blic University of Sussex in the United Kingdom. He is a lecturer in the Department Administration at t he University o f B enin in B enin Ci ty in E do S tate, Nigeria. of Political Science and Public Administration at Makerere University, in (E-mail: [email protected]) . He has done research for the Africa Peace Forum, the Conflict, Security and D evelopment G roup at K ings C ollege in L ondon, a nd t he A frica S ecurity Mohammed K abir I sa lectures in t he D epartment o f L ocal G overnment a nd Sector Network on sm all a rms a nd lig ht w eapons in U ganda, on t he n orthern Development Studies at Ahmadu Bello University in Zaria, Nigeria. He has more Uganda conflict and on security in t he Great L akes region. His work has been than a decade’s teaching and research experience in the fields of local government published a s b ook c hapters a nd in t he African Journal o f International Affairs, administration, youth studies, ethnic conflict and social transformation. He is a Criminal L aw F orum, J ournal o f I nternational C riminal J ustice, Eas t A frican member of the UNESCO-MOST Ethno-Net Africa at the University of Yaoundé in Cameroon and has published extensively. (E-mail: [email protected]) Journal of Human Rights and Democracy, and Journal of Genocide Research. (E- mail: [email protected] / [email protected]) Anne Kubai is a n a ssociate p rofessor o f World C hristianity a nd I nterreligious Relations in t he Department of Theology at Uppsala University in S weden. She Bettina Engels is a post-doctoral research associate at the research unit for peace worked a s t he r esearch dir ector f or t he L ife a nd P eace I nstitute in U ppsala in and conflict studies at Freie Universität in Berlin, Germany. She studied political Sweden, s enior s ocial s cientist a t t he D epartment o f Pu blic H ealth S ciences, science and rural development, and wrote her PhD thesis on the motives of non- Division o f I nternational H ealth C are R esearch (IH CAR) a t t he K arolinska state violent actors, focusing on the Forces Nouvelles in Côte d’Ivoire. Her current Institutet in Stockholm in Sweden, and head of the Department of Religion at the research in terests a re en vironmental s ecurity, f ood cr ises a nd lo cal co nflict in Kigali Institute of E ducation in R wanda. Her research interests include religion Niger and Ethiopia. (E-mail: [email protected]) and conflict, religion and international migration, religion and health, and gender- based violence in p ost-conflict societies and post-conflict social reconstruction. Eric George is the UNESCO Chair of Philosophy for Peace and lecturer in Peace, (E-mail: [email protected]) Conflict a nd D evelopment S tudies a t t he Universidad J aume I in C astellon in Spain. H e r eceived hi s do ctorate in I nternational S tudies (P eace, C onflict a nd Macharia Munene is a p rofessor o f H istory a nd I nternational R elations a t t he Development) from the Universidad Jaume I. His research focuses on peace and United S tates I nternational U niversity (US IU) in N airobi. H e h as t aught a t security issues such as piracy, private security companies and religious militancy universities in Kenya, the United States and Spain, and is a regular columnist for in Africa. (E-mail: [email protected]) Business D aily in Kenya a nd a m edia co mmentator o n t opical i ssues. P rofessor Munene has been consulted by Kenya’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Parliamentary Ibaba Samuel Ibaba lectures in the Department of Political Science of the Niger Committee o n D efence a nd F oreign R elations, a nd t he C onstitution o f K enya Delta University on Wilberforce Island in Bayelsa State, Nigeria. He holds a PhD Review C ommission. H e h as p ublished w idely o n t opics r elated t o di plomatic in Development Studies from the University of Port Harcourt. He has carried out history, African history and politics, peace and conflict, Kenyan history, politics extensive research on youth and armed non-state groups in the Niger Delta region and foreign relations. (E-mail: [email protected]) viii INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA ix ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE

Godfrey M Musila holds a P hD in International Criminal Law and Justice from Krijn P eters is c urrently a le cturer a nd h ead o f t eaching a t t he C entre f or the U niversity o f t he W itwatersrand in J ohannesburg, S outh A frica. H e wa s a Development S tudies a t S wansea U niversity in W ales. H e h olds a P hD in senior researcher at the International Crimes in Africa Programme of the Institute Technology and Agrarian Development from the University of Wageningen in the for Security Studies before taking up his current position as Director of Research Netherlands. He has been consulted by the World Bank, the , the with Kenya’s Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission. He has written and Royal I nstitute o f t he T ropics, t he S pecial C ourt f or S ierra L eone a nd n on- published widely in t he fields of international law, international criminal justice governmental organisations such as Save the Children on issues related to armed and transitional justice. (E-mail: [email protected]) conflict a nd p ost-war r econstruction. H is r esearch, f ocusing o n di sarmament, demobilisation a nd r eintegration o f ex-co mbatants, c hild s oldiers, t ransitional justice, a nd y outh m arginalisation and ex clusion, h as b een published in b ooks, Adams Oloo holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of Delaware and monographs a nd j ournals s uch a s International M igration, J ournal o f P eace, is c urrently a s enior le cturer in t he D epartment of Political S cience and Public Conflict a nd D evelopment, a nd Cultural S urvival Q uarterly. (E-m ail: Administration at the University of Nairobi, Kenya. He has published articles on [email protected]) democratisation, leg islative a nd electoral p olitics, ci vil s ociety p olitics a nd devolution. His c urrent research interests are party p olitics, p olicy and s ecurity Samson S Wassara is the vice-chancellor of University. He has issues in Kenya. (E-mail: [email protected]) served as the dean of the College of Social and Economic Studies and director of the C entre f or P eace a nd D evelopment S tudies a t t he U niversity o f J uba in Wafula Okumu is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Security Studies in in S udan. He holds a D octorat en Dr oit, Nouveau Régime (PhD) in Pretoria, South Africa. (E-mail: [email protected]) Public International Law (Hydro-politics and International Water Legal Regimes) from t he U niversity o f P aris XI. P rofessor W assara h as co nducted ext ensive Paul Omach is a senior lecturer in the Department of Political Science and Public research on peace, conflict, governance and development in Sudan. His work has Administration a t M akerere U niversity in U ganda. H e h olds a P hD f rom t he been published as reports, book chapters and in the Journal of Scientific Research University o f t he W itwatersrand in S outh A frica. H e wa s a N ational S ecurity of Science and Arts, Journal of Peace and Development Research, Dirasat Ifriqiyya, Fellow at the Institute on Global C onflict and C ooperation at the University of and African Journal of Political Science. (E-mail: [email protected]) California a nd a B arrat-Rotary V isiting R esearch F ellow a t t he S outh A frican Institute o f I nternational A ffairs in J ohannesburg. H is r esearch o n co nflict, Aleksi Y lönen is c urrently t eaching at B ayreuth International G raduate S chool security, t he s tate a nd in ternational r elations in A frica h as b een p ublished of A frican S tudies. H e i s a do ctoral c andidate in t he I nternational R elations and A frican S tudies p rogramme a t t he A utonomous U niversity o f M adrid. in t he International E ncyclopaedia o f t he S ocial S ciences, A frican A ffairs a nd His r esearch o n m arginalisation, ex clusion, in surgencies a nd co nflict h as South A frican Yearbook o f International A ffairs, a nd a s b ook c hapters. (E-m ail: been p ublished a s b ook c hapters a nd in j ournals s uch a s New P erspectives o n [email protected]) Political E conomy, a nd Revista d e R elaciones I nternacionales. (E-m ail: [email protected]) Justin P earce is co mpleting hi s do ctoral s tudies in A frican S tudies a t O xford University in t he U nited K ingdom. H e i s a co ntributor t o Oxford A nalytica, a freelance j ournalist a nd co nsultant, a nd p reviously s erved a s t he B BC’s Southern A frica co rrespondent. H e h as b een co nducting r esearch o n i ssues o f conflict a nd s ociety, h uman r ights a nd s ocial p olicy sin ce 2003. (E-m ail: [email protected]) x INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA xi WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE

struggles for political space and access to resources, power struggles, activities to crime and vigilantism. Second, the book proposes a new framework for understanding these groups. Foreword One of the intriguing findings is the fact that some of the groups have proliferated in reaction to poor state formations and stunted democratic transitions. In several instances, these groups have constituted themselves into major civil armed forces, Although armed non-state groups have been major players in a lmost all African alternative p olice o r a nti-crime f orces, s tanding et hnic, r eligious a nd r egional armed conflicts since 1960, a nalysis of their participation in t hese conflicts has armies, a morphous b ands, a nd a rmed w ings o f p olitical p arties, in surgency often b een limited t o fac tors s uch a s g reed a nd g rievance. G enerally, t here h as movements and movements fighting for self-determination. In several ways, the been a lack of a deeper analysis of the impact of these groups’ activities on human groups are specific responses to the multiple and deep crises of the state and to the security and the capacity of the state to provide it. challenges of development, democratisation and governance in A frica as a result Militias, rebels and Islamist militants: human insecurity and state crises in Africa of centralised, patrimonial, privatised and hegemonised state power, exclusionary is b eing p ublished at a cr itical m oment o f a ssessing t he cos ts o f t he ac tions o f politics, co rruption, s tate m alformation, de-co nstitutionalism, t runcated armed n on-state g roups a nd exp loring a venues f or addr essing s ome o f t he transitions and successions, inequitable distribution and redistribution of public longstanding conflicts in w hich t hey a re involved. In a r eport released in 2007 goods, inter-group tensions, poor leadership, and misuse and abuse of the state. entitled Africa’s missing billions: international arms f lows and the cost of conflict, Hence it is important for both researchers and practitioners to be conversant with Oxfam International, the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) the fact that remedies for addressing the threats of these groups do not lie solely in and Sa ferworld es timated t hat b etween 1990 a nd 2005, co nflicts cos t A frica state responses such as action or use of brute force by the police, but in US$300 billion. This is equivalent to the amount of international aid the continent building the capacity of states to govern well. received during the same period. The formation of the African Union in 2002 was Third, t he b ook w ill s erve a s a u seful r esource f or b oth ac ademics a nd influenced by the realisation that ‘the scourge of conflicts in A frica constitutes a practitioners in t he sense that it seeks to establish a t heoretical f ramework that major impediment to the socioeconomic development of the continent and of the links the formation and sustenance of armed non-state groups to how the state is need to promote peace, security and stability’. Since then many concerted efforts governed and its capacity to guarantee human security. It also makes far-reaching have been made to minimise or eliminate these debilitating conflicts. proposals on how to effectively combat and prevent threats posed by these groups. This book is a timely contribution for a number of other reasons. Indeed, if A frica h as t o address t he cr isis of t he s tate a nd t he t hreats p osed t o First, i t i s b e b eing r eleased a t a t ime w hen a rmed n on-state g roups a re human s ecurity b y a rmed n on-state g roups, i t w ill r equire w ell-researched becoming increasingly involved in A frican politics, particularly during and after information such as that contained in this volume. elections o r a s r epresentatives o f m arginalised a nd ex cluded g roups s eeking The ISS i s p roud t o b e a ssociated w ith t his p roject t hat a ims t o co ntribute redress of their grievances. Even though militias, rebels and Islamist militants are knowledge t hat w ould b ring a bout a de eper un derstanding t o o ne o f t he m ost key players in African armed conflicts, no previous studies had been conducted to serious threats to human security on the continent, as it relates to its mission of determine how they directly threaten human security and the state, or to critically generating knowledge that empowers Africa. analyse t he va rious a pproaches t o p reventing a nd co mbating t he a ssociated threats. A rmed n on-state g roups in A frica a re q uite w idespread, m anifesting Dr Jakkie Cilliers themselves in dif ferent f orms. Th e co ntributors t o t his v olume hig hlight t hese Executive Director groups' different identities – ranging from ethnic clan/community, religious, youth Institute for Security Studies and cultural to political and economic. They also discuss the groups’ motivations. These va ry f rom et hnic, r eligious a nd r egional a ssertions t o co ntestations a nd xii INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA xiii List of tables List of maps

Table 1–1: Types of militia in Africa ...... 8 Map 7–1: DRC's natural resources ...... 189

Table 1–2: Types of rebel movements in Africa ...... 10 Map 7–2: Natural resources in eastern DRC ...... 198

Table 1–3: Comparisons of militias, Islamist militants and rebel Map 7–3: Map of natural resources and conflict areas ...... 201 movements ...... 13 Map 8–1: Niger Delta region ...... 234 Table 6–1: Criminal gangs in Kenya ...... 151 Map 9–1: Oil exploration and conflict areas ...... 261 Table 7–1: Rebel groups in the eastern DRC ...... 194 Map 9–2: Rebel-controlled areas in , 2001 ...... 268 Table 7–2: Natural resources in the DRC ...... 197 Map 10–1: LRA activities, December 2008 – April 2010 ...... 302 Table 8–1: Trend of conflicts in the Niger Delta ...... 224 Map 11–1: Nigerian map of states with Shariah laws and principles ...... 321 Table 8–2: Changes in the derivation component of revenue allocation . .236

Table 8–3: Actors in Niger Delta conflicts ...... 238

Table 9–1: Main rebel groups in Sudan ...... 263

Table 9–2: Main rebel factions after the Darfur Peace Agreement . .271

Table 9–3: Sample of militia groups according to the three regions of Southern Sudan ...... 276

xiv INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA xv CAR List of acronyms and CDF Civil Defence Force CDU Civil Defence Unit abbreviations CNDD-FDD Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie / Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie CNDP Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple ADF CNL Conseil Nationale de Libération (National Liberation Council) ADLF Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre CNT Concorde Nationale Tchadienne AENF Alliance of Eritrean National Forces COMA Coalition for Militant Action AFD Alliance de Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo CP Conservative Party AFRICOM United States African Command CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement AFRC Armed Forces Revolutionary Council CSNPD Comité de Sursaut National de la Paix et de la Démocratie AIAI Al-Ittihad al-Islami CSOs Civil society organisations AIDS Acquired immunodeficiency Syndrome DDR Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration AIS Armée Islamique du Salut DDRR Disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation and reintegration AK-47 Avtomat Kalashnikova 47 DIF/A Darfur Independence Front/Army ALiR Armée pour la Libération du Rwanda DP Democratic Party ALS/ARS Alliance for the Liberation of Somalia / Alliance for the Reliberation DPA Darfur Peace Agreement of Somalia DRC Democratic Republic of Congo AMIS African Union Mission in Sudan EBA Egbesu Boys of Africa AMP Alliance pour la Majorité Présidentielle ECOMOG Economic Community of West African States Monitoring and ANR Armée Nationale de Résistance Observation Group ANC African National Congress ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States ANSGs Armed non-state groups EIJ Egyptian Islamic Jihad APC Arewa People’s Congress ELF Eritrean Liberation Front APCP All Peoples’ Congress Party EPRDF Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front APRM African Peer Review Mechanism EPLF Eritrea People’s Liberation Front AQIM Al-Qaeda in t he Islamic M aghreb ( L’organisation A l-Qaïda a u FAC Forces d’Armées Congolais Maghreb Islamique) FAN Forces Armées du Nord APC All People’s Congress FARDC Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo APCLS Alliances des Patriotes pour un Congo Libre et Souverain FARF Forces Armées de la République Fédérale APRD Armée P opulaire p our l a R estauration d e l a R épublique e t l a FAR Forces Armées Rwandaises (Rwanda Armed Forces) Démocratie (Army f or t he R estoration o f t he R epublic a nd o f FARS Forces Armées Révolutionnaires du Sahara Democracy) FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation ATNM Alliance Touareg du Niger et du FDLR Forces Démocratique pour la Libération du Rwanda AU African Union FDLR Forces Démocratique pour la Libération du Rwanda BAMOSD Bakassi Movement for Self-Determination FDPC Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain BOFF Biafran Organisation of Freedom Fighters FERA February 18 Revolutionary Army xvi INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA xvii ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE

FII Finnish Institute of International Affairs IDPs Internally displaced persons FIPI Front pour l’Intégration et la Paix en Ituri IDMC Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre FIS Front Islamique du Salut IGAD Inter-governmental Authority on Development FLAA Front pour la Libération de l’Air et de l’ IHL International Humanitarian Law FLEC Frente de Libertação do Estado de Cabinda IHRL International Human Rights Law FLN Front National de Libération (National Liberation Front) IMF International Monetary Fund FLNC Front de Libération Nationale Congolais IMN Islamic Movement in Nigeria FLGO Forces de Libération du Grand Ouest (Forces for the Liberation of IPF IGAD Partners Forum the Great West) IRC International Rescue Committee FNDIC Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities JEM Justice and Equality Movement FNI Front des Nationalistes et Intégrationnistes JIBWIS Jama’atul Izalatul Bid’ah Wa Ikamatus Sunnah FNL Forces Nationales de Libération JIG Jihadi Islamic Group FNLA Frente Nacional da Libertação de Angola JIUs Joint integrated units FPR Front Patriotique Rwandaise KAIPTC Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre FRELIMO Frente de Libertação de Moçambique KANU Kenya African National Union FRF Forces Républicaines Fédéralistes KNCHR Kenya National Commission on Human Rights FROLINAT Front de Libération Nationale du Tchad KNYA Kenya National Youth Alliance FRPI Forces de Résistance Patriotique d’Ituri KPA Khartoum Peace Agreement FUC Front Uni pour le Changement Démocratique KPU Kenya People’s Union G3 Gewehr 3 rifle LDUs Local defence units GIA Groupes Islamiques Armés LPC Peace Council GICM Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain LRA Lord’s Resistance Army GLORIA Global Research in International Affairs LURD Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy GoSS Government of Southern Sudan MAP Mass awareness and participation GPP Groupe Patriotique pour la Paix MASSOB Movement for the Realisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra GSPC Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat MDJT Mouvement pour la Démocratie et la Justice au Tchad GWOT Global on Terror MEND Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus MFDC Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance HRW Human Rights Watch MLC Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo HSMF Holy Spirit Mobile Forces MK Umkhonto we Sizwe ICC International Criminal Court MNC Mouvement National Congolais ICG International Crisis Group MNJ Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice ICGLR International C onference o n P eace, S ecurity, D emocracy a nd MODEL Movement for Democracy in Liberia Development in the Great Lakes region MONUC Mission d es N ations U nies en R épublique D émocratique d u ICJ International Court of Justice Congo ICL International criminal law MONUSCO Mission d e l’Organisation d es Nations Unies p our l a S tabilisation ICT International Criminal Tribunals en République Démocratique du Congo ICTR International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda MPCI Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire xviii INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA xix ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE

MPRC Mouvement P atriotique po ur la R estauration de la Rép ublique PRA Popular Resistance Army Centrafricaine PRISM Project for the Research of Islamist Movements MPRD Mouvement pour la Paix, la Reconstruction et le Développement PUSIC Parti pour l’Unité et la Sauvegarde de l’Intégrité du Congo MPLA Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola RCD Rassemblement C ongolais p our l a D émocratie (Congolese R ally MRC Mouvement Révolutionnaire Congolaise for Democracy) MSS Muslim Students’ Society of Nigeria RCD-ML Rassemblement C ongolais p our l a D émocratie – M ouvement d e MTNMC Mouvement Touareg Nord Mali pour le Changement Libération NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation RENAMO Resistência Nacional de Moçambique NDMFS Niger Delta Militant Force Squad RFC Rassemblement des Forces pour le Changement NDPSF Niger Delta People’s Salvation Front RPF/A Rwanda Patriotic Front/Army (Front Patriotique Rwandais) NDPVF Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force RPR Rassemblement Populaire Rwandaise NDVF Niger Delta Volunteer Force RoC Republic of Congo NDVS Niger Delta Volunteer Service RSLMF Republic of Sierra Leone Military Force NDV Niger Delta Vigilante RUD Ralliement pour l`Unité et la Démocratie NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development RUF Revolutionary United Front NFDLF Northern Frontier District Liberation Front SADR Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic NGOs Non-governmental organisations SAF Sudan Alliance Forces NIF National Islamic Front SBU Small Boys Unit NLMs National liberation movements SCSL Special Court for Sierra Leone NMRD National Movement for Reform and Development SCUD Socle pour le Changement, l’Unité et la Démocratie NPFL National Patriotic Front of Liberia SLDF Sabaot Land Defence Force NRA/M National Resistance Army/Movement SLM/A Sudan Liberation Movement/Army OAU Organisation of African Unity SNA Somali National Alliance ODM Orange Democratic Movement SNF Somali National Front OLF Oromo Liberation Front SNM Somali National Movement ONGC Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited SPDC Shell Petroleum Development Company ONLF Ogaden National Liberation Front/Army SPLM/A Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army OPC O’odua People’s Congress SPM Somali Patriotic Movement PAC Pan-Africanist Congress SSDF Somali Salvation Democratic Front PAIGC Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde SSDF Southern Sudan Defence Force PALIPEHUTU Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu (Party for the Liberation SWAPO South People’s Organisation of the Hutu People) TJRC Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission PANAFU Pan-African Union TNCs Transnational corporations PARECO Patriotes Résistants Congolais TPLF Tigray People’s Liberation Front PDF Popular Defence Force TSCTI Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative PDP People’s Democratic Party UCDA Uganda Christian Democratic Army PNU Party of National Unity UFDD Union des Forces pour la Démocratie et le Développement Polisario Frente Popular de Liberación de Seguía el Hamra y Río de Oro UFDG Union des Forces Démocratiques de Guinée xx INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA xxi ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

UFDN Union des Forces pour une Guinée Nouvelle UFDR Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement UFF Uganda Freedom Fighters UFR Union des Forces Républicaines UIC Union of Islamic Courts ULIMO United Liberian Movement for Democracy UNAMID United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur UNDP United Nations Development Programme CHAPTER 1 UNESCO-MOST United N ations E ducational, S cientific a nd C ultural Organisation - Management of Social Transformations UNIMIS United Nations Mission in the Sudan Introduction: UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund UNITA União para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union towards conceptualisation and for the Total Independence of Angola) UNLA Uganda National Liberation Army understanding of the threats UNRF Uganda National Rescue Front UNSC United Nations Security Council of armed non-state groups UPC Uganda People’s Congress UPC Union des Patriotes Congolais to human security and the state UPDA Uganda People’s Democratic Army UPDF Uganda Peoples’ Defence Force in Africa UPLTCI Union d es P atriotes p our l a L ibération T otale d e l a C ôte

d’Ivoire AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE AND WAFULA OKUMU UPM Uganda Patriotic Movement USGAO United States Government Accountability Office WKHRW Western Kenya Human Rights Watch WNBF West Bank Front INTRODUCTION WSB West Side Boys WSLF Western Somali Liberation Front A m ajor p resence in t he A frican s tates i s t he m ultiplicity o f a rmed n on-state ZANU Zimbabwe African National Union groups (ANSGs) t hat range from armed bands, vigilantes, cultist groups, private ZAPU Zimbabwe African People’s Union security companies, criminal bands, community/ethnic/religious/regional armies, ZIF Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze armed wings of political parties and private armies to militias, Islamist militants ZSVS Zamfara State Vigilante Service and rebel groups. These groups have been key players in the political violence that has s everely un dermined h uman s ecurity a nd t he s tate c apacity n eeded t o guarantee it. Particularly militias, rebel groups and Islamist militant groups have been major actors in the ethnic, regional, religious and political conflicts, resource conflicts a nd in surgency m ovements in A lgeria, A ngola, B urundi, t he C entral African R epublic (CAR), C had, t he R epublic of C ongo (R oC), t he D emocratic xxii INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 1 Introduction WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE

Republic of Congo (DRC), Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia, Mozambique, Nigeria, groups and ext remist r eligious m ovements? How do t hese g roups sustain Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. Apart from the 19 civil themselves? How do t hese groups undermine both human security and the state and one interstate war in 16 African countries between 1990 and 2000,1 there have capacity to provide it? How are these groups dealt with at different levels, ranging been numerous internal conflicts in w hich militias, militant Islamist movements from lo cal t o in ternational? Thi s b ook i s a n a ttempt t o a nswer s ome o f t hese and sm aller r ebel g roups w ere in volved. Th ese a re s et o ut b y B ettina En gels questions. (chapter 3 and appendix). Particularly, the book seeks to analyse and understand ANSGs as institutions The activities of these groups in national and regional conflicts have exerted a of s truggle, o pposition, r esistance a nd v iolence in A frican p olitics; a s p art o f a huge toll on the stability, development and security of Africa. Human insecurity broad and larger politics of the struggles by identity groups and counter-elite for has been a major casualty in terms of massive internal displacements, disruption power and resources and h ow t hese s truggles are m ediated by t he s tate, r uling of livelihoods, violations of human rights, heightened criminality, loss of lives and classes, p olitical e lite, ci vil s ociety, n eighbouring co untries, a nd in ternational humanitarian crises. organisations a nd ac tors. Th e b ook f urther in vestigates h ow ANSGs a re Although ANSGs h ave exi sted in A frica in t he p re-colonial, co lonial a nd transformed from civil struggle groups into militant and violent movements and immediate p ost-independence p eriods, t here h as b een a r esurgence sin ce t he how t hey a re t ransformed in to n on-violent p olitical ac tors. Fin ally, t he b ook 1990s, w ith g roups b eing f ormed f or di ssent, r esistance, ci vil def ence, a nd makes a concerted effort to provide knowledge that could inform policy related to struggles f or s elf-determination, p olitical r eforms a nd r esource co ntrol. A lso ANSGs in Africa. notable has been the persistence and seeming entrenchment of this phenomenon This book is composed of case studies that utilise multidisciplinary approaches in some countries such as the DRC, Somalia and Sudan. and co ncepts, a nalytical f rameworks a nd p erspectives dra wn m ainly f rom t he The increased incidence and activities of these ANSGs raise serious concerns social s ciences a nd h umanities. Th e s pecific c ase s tudies dra w o n hi storical, about the institutionalisation of violence as a m eans of redressing grievances, its cultural, s patial a nd r elated co ntexts, a nd o n co ntemporary de velopments widespread u se a nd a buse b y s tate a nd n on-state ac tors, t he exp osure o f t he (incidences a nd ac tual o ccurrences, p erceptions a nd a ttitudes). B eyond t he citizenry t o v icious v iolence, a nd t he los s o f s tate m onopoly o ver t he u se o f enunciated q uestions a nd co ncerns, t he w ork cr itically in terrogates t he violence. Violence also weakens the capacity of the state to provide the res publica phenomenon of ANSGs in Africa, particularly the narratives of grievances and the (particularly democracy, public security and general welfare), and an environment discourse of struggles, the philosophical and ideological platforms of mobilisation, that allows basic needs to be met. These and the possible linkages with human and the interfaces with culture and religion as well as international law. insecurity, h umanitarian cr ises, de velopment a nd g overnance cr ises, in stability The b ook hig hlights t he g rowing r ole o f ANSGs in t he p olitical a nd and co nflicts, a re a mong t he r easons f or a g rowing in terest in cr itically socioeconomic landscape and the conflicts in Africa and their growing use of arms interrogating and understanding the phenomenon of ANSGs in Africa. and violence, which traditionally were the monopoly of the state. The work also A cr itical exa mination o f t he p henomenon o f ANSGs ra ises n umerous identifies the interfaces between the state, the nature of governance and politics questions: How can we conceptualise militias, Islamic militants and rebel groups with the emergence, activities and methods of ANSGs a s well as with how they in Africa? Is it enough to regard them as groups arising from frustration, engaged impact on the multiple crises of the state, governance and development in Africa. in conflicts and that apply violence or merely as armed civil organisations with a Further, the impact of ANSGs’ activities and engagements is examined, as well as high propensity for violence? From what perspectives can we seek explanations? the effect of internal conflicts, and civil wars on human security and How do g roup iden tities, s ocial dep rivation, r esource co mpetition, e lite progress in A frica. Th e b ook co ncludes w ith a cr itical lo ok a t t he n ature a nd manipulations, t he p roblem o f t he y outh, e conomic de cline, p oor p olitical effectiveness of responses at the local, state, regional and international levels to the leadership a nd g overnance cr ises co ntribute t o t he un derstanding o f t he ANSG ac tivities a nd p osits a s et o f p olicy p roposals t hat h ave implications f or phenomenon? H ow do w e dif ferentiate b etween mi litias a nd in surgents, r ebel conflict resolution and peace-building efforts.

2 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 3 Introduction WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE

This chapter captures the major findings of the contributors in nine sections. Western countries, the militia was either a reserve army or an emergency force of The first section is an overview of the three types of ANSGs – militias, rebels and the p aramilitary t ype t hat wa s es tablished b y a g overnment o r co mmunities. Islamist mi litants – t hat form t he m ain t opic of t his s tudy. The s econd s ection Militias of the resistance, rebellion, liberation and self-defence persuasion existed contextualises ANSGs in Africa. The third to fifth sections explore the social bases in and America until the mid-20th century in co untries such as , of militias and rebel movements, the causality and sustainment of armed conflicts during the World War II German occupation, and Austria, after World War I. The and ANSGs a nd the nexuses between ANSGs, p ower, politics and violence. The reserve, special duty or emergency paramilitary type is the quintessential militia sixth and seventh sections are exposés of how ANSGs t hreaten human security identified by G odfrey Musila (c hapter 4), w ho ado pts a s tate-centrist a nd lega l and undermine the state in A frica. The last two sections focus on the emerging conception of militia as an extension, and volunteer corps, of a regular army that regional d ynamics a nd ra mifications o f ANSG ac tivities, a nd dra w s ome conforms to the law. conclusions. The m ore co ntemporary f orm, p articularly in A frica, i s t hat o f sm all a nd mobile bands, usually youths, who are voluntarily and selectively recruited, poorly MILITIAS, REBEL MOVEMENTS AND ISLAMIST MILITANT trained and moderately armed, and organised to respond to immediate challenges GROUPS IN AFRICA: CONCEPTS AND TYPES that may be national, regional, sectional, ethnic, religious and communal and that Militias may relate to issues of power, resources, self-determination, freedom, or co unterinsurgency. Th ey m ay b e f ormed b y r etired o r c urrent s ecurity A mi litia is an armed force of ordinary p ersons or, as Z ahar puts it, ‘an armed personnel o r b y t hose w ith t he r elevant t raining a nd exp erience, a nd u sually faction’ engaged in combat or fighting or that resorts to violence to attain certain revolve a round cer tain p rominent co mmanders o r wa rlords. Th ey a re o ften objectives.2 This presupposes first that it is a ci vil force or a p rivately organised militant w ings o r e ven a rmed w ings o f s ome ci vil a gitation o r s truggles, s elf- group of armed persons and second that it is largely an informally organised force determination movements, political parties, or informal armed wings of factions whose structures, hierarchies, commands, procedures and processes are usually of the ruling class and political elite. not fixed and rigid. Third, it is generally mobilised voluntarily on the basis of some There are essentially two forms of militias in history: statist and non-statist or common identity challenges or general concerns and threats. private militias. State militias are ‘paramilitary formations that organise in defence Drawing o n c haracterisation b y Z ahar, o ne c an iden tify t he es sential of the political order’ and proxies set up or cultivated as ‘adjuncts of state power’ characteristics o f mi litias a s ir regular f orces (o utside r egular mi litary f orces), and w hich f ight f or, o n b ehalf o f o r a t t he b ehest o f t he s tate a nd s tate informal (n ot u sually f ormal s tate mi litaries o r p aramilitaries), p rivate f orces functionaries.4 Each o f t hese c an b e c ategorised in to o ne o f t hree t ypes: (established and commanded by private persons), illegal (not sanctioned by law), quasimilitary or p aramilitary mi litias, government mi litias and state-patronised illegitimate (even though they may be adjuncts of or connected to regimes and militias.5 recognised p olitical g roups) a nd c landestine (s upport, f unding, a rms a nd 3 The quasimilitary or paramilitary militia is constructed as the populist, large- management are often secret and outside the public view). The purpose or goals of militias usually relate to projecting or protecting, and fighting for and defending scale, p eriodic, short-term complement to a s tanding army in n eighbourhoods, certain private, group, communal, ethnic, religious, sectional, regional, national, communities and provinces of countries where the standard army is not widely regime o r r elated in terests t hat m ay co ncern p ower a nd r esource s truggles, present a nd ac tive. I t i s a p art-time, a uxiliary a nd r eserve mi litary f orce w ith security and safety. occasional duties that is established for particular public purposes and peculiar Historically, t he mi litia i s a n o rganisation o f lo cal def ence s ervice o r d uty, circumstances s uch a s em ergencies, di sasters, in ternal co nflicts a nd wa r a nd which acts in response to challenges of war, disaster and security. In the advanced consists of those who are by law available for call-up or service. As a public force

45INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA Introduction WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE

constituted by law, its mobilisation, organisation, training, discipline, equipment, Community, ethnic and regional mi litias are armed g roups mobilised a long funding and deployment are regulated by the state. The reserve militia and the less identity lin es a nd co nstitute iden tity-based lo cal a rmies o r f oot s oldiers o f formally organised state militias and alternative forces that existed in Europe and primordial co ncerns. I n co nflict-ridden, cr ime-infested a nd in secure America b etween t he 17t h and 19t h centuries f it into t his mould. The modern environments, citizens are sometimes constituted into local armed organisations, version is the reserve army and standby forces of some states.6 usually b y co mmunity, et hnic a nd r egional c hieftains o r en trepreneurs, in State or regime militias are civil armed groups constituted by governments to response to certain common threats and enemies. In the eastern DRC there are a combat cer tain t hreats o r s ecurity si tuations. Th e mi litia m ay b e a f ormal multiplicity of ethnic militias such as the Mouvement R évolutionnaire C ongolais (Congolese Revolutionary Movement, MRC) in the Ituri region, the Mai-Mai, the quasimilitary organisation or a privately armed group of a top government leader. Interahamwe, t he Union d es P atriotes C ongolais (Union o f C ongolese P atriots, The former may be remunerated and equipped with public funds but its existence UPC) and t he L endu. In Kenya, et hnic mi litias include t he Rift Valley Kalenjin and sustainment is tied to a particular regime rather than constitutional provisions , M ungiki, Ch inkororo, A machuma, J eshi l a K ayole and Sa baot L and and en actments. P residential, p alace or private s ecurity gu ards a re exa mples of Defence Force (SLDF). 7 non-military armed forces. Youth mi litias a re a rmed g roups t hat m ay c ut acr oss co mmunities, et hnic There a re g overnment m obilised, p atronised, s upported a nd gu aranteed groups and regions, but are composed mainly of youths driven by opposition to, private mi litias o f co mmunities, et hnic g roups, wa rlords, y ouths a nd p olitical rebellion and resistance against state policies and practices, elite behaviour, and movements. Here governments may directly or surreptitiously make use of militias national and regional problems and conditions. Warlord mi litias are sm all-arm on the basis of utility and expedience and may discreetly fund, equip and protect bands a nd c ult g roups t hat a re co nstructed a round in dividual mi litant le aders. a militia group for purposes of crime control and counterinsurgency. In Sudan, They may be part of larger groups, but usually tend to freelance and are available Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire and the DRC, governments have legitimised, supported or for diverse commercial violence and may be involved in resource plundering and patronised some militia groups.8 In Sudan, the el-Bashir government has used the criminal violence. Janjaweed militias to fight rebel groups in the Darfur region. In Côte d’Ivoire the Apart f rom t he a bove c ategories, mi litias c an a lso b e c lassified u sing o ther government has used the Jeunes Patriotes (Young Patriots) in the civil war to target variables. F or exa mple, t he co re r easons f or t he mi litia g roup f ormation co uld northerners, immigrants and the French.9 underpin i ts s tructure, r oles, d ynamics a nd m ethods a nd t herefore o ne co uld Non-state mi litias a re p rivately o rganised a rmed ci tizen g roups, u sually categorise mi litias in t erms o f o bjectives o r p urposes. Th us t here a re p olitical militias, in surgent mi litias, v igilante mi litias a nd s elf-determination mi litias. constituted b y v olunteers r ecruited f rom lo cal a reas, n eighbourhoods, Insurgent mi litias a re f ormed t o r esist s tate p olitics, p olicies a nd p ractices a nd communities and provinces. Such militias sometimes support the state and state particularly i ssues o f m arginality, co rruption a nd r epression t hrough a rmed causes and wars, but more often are engaged in s ectional and primordial causes. insurrection. G overnments o r r uling e lites m ay a lso f orm o r s ponsor The non-state militias may take the form of political, community, ethnic, regional counterinsurgent militias to silence or intimidate opponents of governments in the and youth militias. form of individuals, groups, political parties or insurgent rebels. Vigilante militias Political militias are ‘private armies of pro-regime strongmen’ or armed wings can em erge f rom a rmed a nti-crime a nd s ecurity co ntrol ef forts, a nd t hen of political parties, sociopolitical movements and sometimes civil groups, that are sometimes t ransform t hemselves in to in surgent o r co unterinsurgent g roups. sometimes m obilised t o m aintain in ternal o rder, co mbat o pposing g roups a nd Criminal militia groups are armed bandits that engage in cr iminal acts such as perform cer tain c landestine p olitical r oles s uch a s co mmitting o r co untering piracy, extortion, kidnapping and political intimidation. electoral a nd p olitical v iolence.10 Examples a re t he Mambas, C obras, Z olou and One c an f urther dif ferentiate mi litias b y t heir s ocial b ase, a ge a nd iden tity Ninja militias in the civil strife and power struggles in the RoC during the 1990s. (ethnic, regional and religious). In terms of the breadth or extent of mobilisation

6 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 7 Introduction WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE

Table 1–1: Types of militia in Africa community-, et hnic- a nd y outh-based. Th e Kamajor militias in S ierra L eone, though ini tially f ormed a nd s upervised b y g overnment o fficials, b ecame a Types Goals Cases grassroots p opular co mmunity m ovement o rganised, s upported a nd e ven State Reserve army / Complement state National Guard (Nigeria) sponsored by community leaders and members.11 The Interahamwe in Rwanda was militias auxiliaries of both a state militia and an ethnic militia. national armies Government- Counterinsurgency Popular Defence Force / supported/ Janjaweed (Sudan) Rebel movements -patronised Kamajor (Sierra Leone) Fifth Brigade (Zimbabwe) Rebel movements are organisations that essentially engage in a rmed opposition Arrow Group (Uganda) and resistance, and particularly insurrection or insurgency against governments Jeunes Patriotes (Côte d’Ivoire) and ruling regimes. It is the latter that defines the movement as rebel or creates the Non- Political militias Political objectives Mambas, Cobras and Ninjas (RoC) rebel t ag. A s H arbom a nd W allensteen n ote, r ebel m ovements a re a rmed state/ Struggle for private political domination opposition or insurgent organisations t hat are incompatible w ith, disagree w ith militias and c hallenge exi sting n ational g overnments.12 The cen tral g oal o f a r ebel Community/ Identity rights Egbesu/Oduduwa People’s movement i s c hange in t erms o f di splacement a nd r eplacement o f exi sting ethnic militias Struggle for Congress (Nigeria) inclusion, resources Mungiki (Kenya) governments, the change of existing frameworks to enable their participation in and justice Militias under Southern Defence and p ossibly co ntrol o f g overnments, t he de volution o f a uthority t o g rant Force (Sudan) autonomy t o r egional g overnments o r t he r edesign o r r edrawing o f n ational Interahamwe (Rwanda) boundaries to grant separate existence to some regional or ethnic homeland. Youth militias Identity Niger Delta Volunteer Force / Resource access Movement for the Emancipation of The co ncepts o f r ebel a nd r ebellion a re ac tually r elative a s t hey a re m erely Insurgency the Niger Delta (Nigeria) labels that are based on perceptions and opinion. Further, the designations ignore Vigilante Security Bakassi Boys (Nigeria) the other side that is being violently challenged, usually the government or regime, militias Crime control in terms of character, legality and legitimacy. 13 Warlord militias Struggle for power Armed bands and cult groups in There are different types of rebel movements. The liberation rebel movement and resources the Niger Delta (Nigeria) resists co lonisation a nd f oreign r ule a nd s eeks in dependence, w hereas t he Commercial violence insurgent r ebel m ovement s eeks p olitical c hange a nd p olitical p ower. A s Source: compiled by authors. Thompson n otes, in surgent m ovements a re co mmitted t o t he n ation-state, b ut seek to ‘overthrow the existing state’ and replace it with a new political order and to ‘build alternative political authority’.14 The separatist, secessionist or irredentist and recruitment, there can also be social movement or broad-based militias and rebel m ovement s eeks a s eparate exi stence f rom a n exi sting co untry o r h as warlord-based militias. secessionist o bjectives. Th e r eformist r ebel m ovement s eeks t o es tablish a n ew There i s co nsiderable f luidity in co louration a nd r oles a nd in fac t mi litias political system based on an ideology such as communism. Warlord insurgencies could, and do, wear different tags at different times. Community, ethnic and youth are closely knit groups built around leaders that seek to overthrow regimes/regime militias, for example, could be insurgent or counterinsurgent, political and pro- leaders but create ‘personal territorial fiefdoms’.15 government or e ven v igilante mi litias. Vigilante mi litias could b ecome p olitical Rebel m ovements t hat h ave b een en gaged in li beration s truggles a gainst and pro-government mi litias and cr iminal mi litias could h ave p olitical or e ven colonial a nd f oreign do mination in clude t he Mau Ma u (Kenya), Front d e insurgent m otives. C ounter-insurgent a nd s tatist mi litias co uld a lso b e Libération N ationale (National L iberation F ront, FLN – A lgeria), Movimento

8 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 9 Introduction WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE

Table 1–2: Types of rebel movements in Africa Popular de Liberteção de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, MPLA – A ngola), Frente de L ibertação de M oçambique (Liberation F ront o f Rebel Liberation Insurgent rebel Separatist rebel Islamist rebel movements movements movements movements movements Mozambique, FRELIM O – M ozambique), S outh W est A frica P eople’s Organisation (SWAPO – Namibia), Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) Purpose Decolonisation Resistance Autonomy Islamic law/rule Independence from Reform struggles Self-existence and Z imbabwe A frican P eople’s Union (Z APU) (Z imbabwe), Partido A fricano foreign Overthrow of para a Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (African Party for the Independence government regimes/ of G uinea a nd C ape Verde, P AIGC – C ape Verde) a nd t he A frican N ational governments Congress (ANC) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC – South Africa). Some of Grievance Oppression Marginalisation Ethnic/regional Unbelief the liberation movements, for example the União para a I ndependência Total de narrative Exploitative foreign Exclusion marginalisation Corruption of rule Ethnic and regional Islamic practices Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, UNITA), as Pearce hegemony and rules of notes in c hapter 13, s tarted a s li beration m ovements a nd t hen b ecame r eform Misgovernance governance insurgencies, w hile t he Resistência N acional d e M oçambique (Mozambican Organisation Popular Armed wing of Ethnoregional Fundamentalist National Resistance, RENAMO) was a r eform insurgency. Both had elements of movements driven political movement movements Puritan warlordism, however. by militant Reform nationalist A distinguishing feature of t he liberation movement as discussed by Musila organisations (chapter 4), i s t hat it is recognised in in ternational l aw and subject to it. S ome Ideology Nationalist and Political Political insurgent rebel movements grew out of grievances and agitation associated with liberation ideals programmes/ identity-based ex clusion a nd a lienation b y co rrupt a nd a utocratic r egimes t hat arrangements of abused a nd r epressed t he o pposition a nd m arginalised g roups. A ccording t o inclusion/reform Clapham the earliest versions of this group are anti-colonial insurgencies that grew Leadership Militant nationalist Excluded Militant Militant Islamic out o f g rievances a gainst r epressive a nd exp loitative co lonial p olicies a nd leaders politicians/youths/ ethnoregional leaders 16 opposition leaders practices. Anti-colonial g rievances un derpinned in surgency m ovements in Ethiopia (Er itrea P eople’s L iberation F ront, EPLF) a nd A lgeria (t he Front d e Dominant Guerrilla warfare Guerrilla warfare Bloody methods of Pitched battles Pitched battles from Pitched battles Riots Libération Nationale, FLN). engagement from controlled controlled territories from controlled Terror attacks Post-colonial insurgencies have occurred in, among others, Uganda (National territories territories Guerrilla warfare Resistance A rmy, NR A), C had (Forces A rmées d u N ord / A rmed F orces o f t he Examples Mau Mau (Kenya) National Redemption Rebel groups in Armed religious North, F AN), E thiopia (E thiopian P eople’s R evolutionary D emocratic F ront, African Party for the Front/Army (Sudan) Sudan, Mali, groups in EPRDF) and the DRC (Alliance des Forces D émocratiques pour la Libération du Independence of Revolutionary United Nigeria (1967– Algeria, Somalia Guinea and Cape Front (Sierra Leone) 1970), , Congo-Zaïre / Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo/Zaire, Verde (Guinea- Lord’s Resistance Ethiopia ADLF).17 In Burundi, rebel groups such as the Conseil National pour la Défense de Bissau) Army (Uganda) African National la Démocratie / Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (National Council for the Congress (South Defence of Democracy / Forces for the Defence of Democracy, CNDD-FDD) and Africa) the Forces Nationales de Libération (National Forces of Liberation, FNL), formerly known as the Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu (Party for the Liberation of the H utu P eople, P ALIPEHUTU), h ave f ought a gainst m arginalisation b y t he Tutsis in t he government and military for over a de cade. In , the Union d es Source: Compiled by authors. Forces pour la Démocratie et le Développement (Union of Forces for Democracy

10 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 111 Introduction WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE

and Development, UFDD) has been fighting government forces in t he east in a Table 1–3: Comparisons of militias, Islamist militants and rebel movements struggle to topple the government of Idriss Deby. Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance Army Militias Armed religious groups Rebel movements (LRA) i s p erhaps o ne o f t he o ldest r ebel m ovements in A frica a nd t he m ost regionalised. It has been fighting the Museveni government for over two decades. Goals Limited sociopolitical Clear religious objectives Clear and larger socio- goals and more specific such as Islamic basis and political goals such as Bad g overnance b ased o n et hnic a nd r egional h egemonic r ule, m arginalisation local/community/ethnic reform of the state/ change of governments and exclusion, fermented separatist rebel movements such as the Sudan People’s issues government and secession Liberation M ovement/Army (S PLM/A) in S outhern S udan a nd t he EP LF in Motivation Identity-based socio- Religious and socio- Larger political grievances Ethiopia. Th e Tuareg rebellion in t he n orthern p arts o f Mali, Niger a nd S outh political grievances and political grievances and struggles for power Algeria seeks an Azawad independent state. In the Casamance region of Senegal, challenges with a mix of and access to resources opportunism the Mouvement d es F orces D émocratiques d e l a C asamance (Movement o f Democratic Forces of Casamance, MFDC) has been waging a self-determination Scope and Small groups constructed Larger groups founded Larger groups struggle sin ce t he 1980s. I n E thiopia, a s eparatist g roup, t he Ogaden N ational size around commanders/ on Islamic leaderships constructed as fighting leaders and cells that operate units that operate in or Liberation Front (ONLF), is fighting the Ethiopian government for the control of Operate in limited among the population seek extensive territorial the oil- and gas-rich Ogaden region. geographic space in control dispersed small enclaves Generally do not hold Militant Islamist groups territories Methods Armed , violent Violent protests and Larger-scale organised Militant Islamist groups are a reflection of the resurgence of political Islam, radical attacks and guerrilla attacks fighting through guerrilla a nd t he g lobal jihad. Th e g roups, acco rding t o K abir (c hapter 11) warfare, but often may and conventional warfare manifest t hemselves in p olitically ext remist f orms o f v iolent r esistance a nd not hold territory from controlled territories dissidence against regimes, policies and society branded as impious, unIslamic, or Engage- Low-intensity conflicts Violent attacks against Intensive conflicts against tainted by modernising and Western influences. George and Ylönen (chapter 12) ments/ Engage security agents, civil population and the government/pro- targets rival militias and security agencies, government groups and as well as Kabir (chapter 11) iden tify several of these groups in E gypt, Algeria, perceived enemies/ perceived infidels and military over extensive Morocco a nd N igeria, s uch a s al-Jihad, t he Armée I slamique du S alut (AIS), enemy groups deviant religious groups territory Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (Salafist Group for Preaching and Full-scale war 19 Combat, GSPC), Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Boko Haram and Taleban. In Somalia, Social base Community and ethnic Religious and youth Larger social basis, which religious militias such as the Al-Ittihad al-Islami (Union of Islamic Courts, UIC), groups and youths volunteers may comprise identity/ Rarely spread beyond non-identity and youths Al-Shabaab and ahlu Sun na, which co ntrol m ost o f t he co untryside, h ave f or identity territorial base May conscript child several years made the country ungovernable.20 The strategy of militant Islamist Rarely conscript soldiers and women groups to target Westerners, Western allies and Western interests has earned them Funding Local extortions/levies/ Tolls/levies/taxes Extensive toll collections membership on the ‘terrorist list’ compiled by the US State Department. Because tolls Elite funding Imposed levies of their perceived links to the global jihad, al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, these Low-level resource External support Extensive resource plundering exploitation/plundering/ groups h ave dra wn k een in terest f rom W estern s ecurity in stitutions s uch a s Local and ethnic elite trading AFRICOM. The chapters by Kubai, Kabir, George and Ylonen provide an African funding perspective for understanding these groups and propose far-reaching measures of addressing the threats that they pose to the state and human security. Source: compiled by authors.

12 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 13 Introduction WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE

The nature and character of ANSGs in Africa relations, treatment of communities and civilians and behaviour.23 Militias that are well-structured and organised with regard to chains of command and control, Most ANSGs a re ei ther un structured o r lo osely s tructured hiera rchical sanctions p rocesses a nd di scipline a re a ble t o enf orce s tandards o f co nduct, organisations, whose members, usually between a hundred and some thousands, attribute r esponsibility, de velop enf orcement a nd r etribution m echanisms a nd are trained in the use of modern light by retired and disengaged military, ensure co mpliance w ith r ules. Th ese c haracteristics en sure di sciplined f orces, police a nd o ther s ecurity a gencies. Th eir a rsenal u sually co mprises t raditional reasonable conduct, control of operations and better relations with communities.24 weapons, assault rifles (the most popular being the AK-47), machine guns, rocket- Peters (c hapter 14) n otes t hat ANSG r elations w ith co mmunities a nd t o s ome propelled grenades, bazookas, hand grenades and explosives. extent t heir le vel o f s uccess in a ttaining a ims, dep end o n t he exi stence o f a ANSGs have a variety of characteristics and peculiarities. Some have been well meaningful ideology that attracts combatants and non-combatants, a low risk to organised, co hesive a nd di sciplined, w ith a c lear hiera rchy a nd co mmand a nd communities because of the conduct of fighters and a low level of predation on or control s tructures, c losely k nit ce lls, w ell-coordinated sys tems, s trict r ules a nd exploitation of communities. decentralised o perations. S ome h ave c lear o bjectives, a s trong ide ological Exemplary le adership a nd t he le vel o f e ducation, a nd t hus k nowledge a nd foundation, p olitical e ducation a nd a f ramework o f r ules a nd r egulations t hat personal c apacity o f t he le adership, a re a lso cr ucial. C lapham n otes t hat guides operations and behaviour of followers as well as visionary, clear-headed and uneducated insurgent leaders such as Foday Sankoh of the Revolutionary United effective leaderships who weld the groups together, and inspire and sustain them. Front (R UF) a nd J oseph K ony o f t he LR A w ere un able t o ‘create di sciplined 25 Among these are the NRA in Uganda and the EPLF in Eritrea. Clapham has noted movements with clearly defined political projects’. that groups exhibiting these organisational and leadership characteristics were able The environment in which ANSGs operate determines specific organisational structures, strategies, operations and behaviours of members. For example, there to achieve success in the battlefield, a fair level of governance in the territories they exist more brutal methods of social control and more disjuncture in aspirations, controlled, p ositive relations with communities and lo cal p eople and e ventually values and goals in a symmetrical environments. Peters (c hapter 14) p oints out attained their objectives.21 that ANSGs that are challenged by unfavourable environments, such as restriction However, the majority of ANSGs are disorganised and undisciplined with loose to jungle camps in inaccessible forests as in the case of the RUF in Sierra Leone, control over operations and activities, poor leadership, organisational problems, and s parsely p opulated v illages a s in t he c ase of t he LR A in U ganda, resort t o control and co mmand p roblems and factional fighting, a nd are p rone t o forced conscriptions, abductions, forced labour, harsh punishments for escapees, fragmentation o r f racturing in to di verse a rmed b ands. Th ese p roblems o ften confiscation o f m aterials a nd de adly r eprisals. ANSGs t hat h ave in dependent manifest in cr iminal ac tivities, v iolent inf ighting, in discriminate a nd g ratuitous economic r esources o r t hat h ave sy mbiotic ra ther t han p arasitic o r p redatory violence, exp loitation a nd a buse o f lo cal co mmunities, f orceful co nscription o f economic relations with locals and who depend on locals for critical support, tend children, abuse of drugs and plundering of community resources. to show greater concern for and sensitivity to locals.26 Insurgent movements that In A frica m any ANSGs des cend f rom in surgency a nd o ther r esistance a nd operate in unfamiliar areas and among unfriendly communities usually use brutal sociopolitical objectives into criminal and severely destructive movements. This methods t o p revent co nspiracy a nd b etrayal.27 Groups t hat s eek in clusion, has been evident in ANSG ac tivities in L iberia, Sierra Leone, the DRC, the RoC, acceptance, recognition and legitimacy from national, regional and international Uganda, Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi and Nigeria. A critical question then is, how and audiences and actors tend towards more moderate behaviour and relations with why has this transformation taken place? inhabitants of the controlled territories.28 The internal dynamics and behaviour of ANSGs could be explained by factors such as the levels of training, ideological leanings, dedication to goals, the quality The social bases of militias and rebel movements of leadership, the nature of relations with host communities, the nature of threats faced and the nature of the environment.22 Zahar asserts that militia membership, The p articipation in ANSGs i s do minated b y f oot s oldiers w ho a re m ale a nd objectives, s tructures a nd r esource b ase det ermine t he n ature o f mi litia-civil young, un employed a nd un deremployed, s chool dr opouts o r p oorly e ducated,

14 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 15 Introduction WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE

apprentices, artisans, street urchins and the urban and rural poor. They are largely Mano a nd G io g roups in C harles Taylor’s N ational P atriotic F ront o f L iberia marginalised, a lienated a nd f rustrated y ouths, w hose a spirations h ave b een (NPFL), and the Mende in Foday Sankoh’s RUF in Sierra Leone. blocked a nd w ho a re o ften s ubmerged in m oral cr ises, s ocially di slocated a nd At the early stages of development, membership is mainly voluntary and based suffer material hardship and misery. George and Ylönen (chapter 12) a nd Kabir on identity patriotism, mobilisation and solidarity and particularly the depth of (chapter 11) a rgue t hat a lienated, f rustrated a nd di senchanted y ouths, w ho a re feelings about perceived identity-based grievances.32 In some cases recruitment is mostly urban and unemployed, together with poverty, are at the root of militant restrained by space, arms and maintenance resources. However, as engagements Islamist groups. Adams Oloo (chapter 6) locates the social base of the militias in Kenya in t he lower class, among the unemployed youths, artisans, small traders, broaden a nd co nfrontations b ecome m ore ext ensive a nd s tressful, a nd a s t hey landless squatters, street children, hawkers, urban poor and slum dwellers. begin to los e contact w ith communities, ANSGs m ay turn to conscription and Marginalised and alienated youths such as the Moryham youths in Somalia, the forced recruitment from within and outside their identity base. Juveniles, young Raray boys in Sierra Leone, Bayaye in Kenya and Uganda, Machicha in Tanzania, girls and children are sometimes captured, conscripted and used as fighters, spies, Hittiste in Algeria, Tsotsis in South Africa, Area Boys in Lagos and Yan D aba in ordnance carriers, sex slaves and cannon fodder. In Sierra Leone, drugs were used Kano, Nigeria, have made up the core membership of several ANSGs.29 In Nigeria, to psy chologically p repare m embers f or ac tion.33 Examples o f c hild r ebel the O ’odua P eople’s C ongress (O PC) a ttracted a rtisans, t raders, un employed, subgroups in clude C harles Taylor’s Small B oys Unit (SBU), t he Gronna B oys in peasants and the underclass in the densely populated areas of Lagos. However, at Liberia, Museveni’s Kidogos in Uganda,34 and the Green Bombers in Zimbabwe.35 the t op e chelons o f m any mi litias a nd r ebel m ovements a re a s prinkling o f The u se of child rebels i s quite prevalent in A frica. In A ngola for example, educated and partly educated elements and activists who provide intellectual and about 8 000 children registered for demobilisation in 2002, while in Mozambique general le adership, r elate t o o r li aise w ith t he o utside w orld a nd, in p articular, there were about 300 000 c hildren used during t he war.36 The recruitment and speak for the groups. This has been especially the case with the ethnic militias in 30 circulation of youths and child rebels across b orders were main features of t he Nigeria. The p lace o f w omen in ANSGs h as b een n eglected in t he li terature. conflict in t he M ano R iver a nd C ôte d ’Ivoire. Th ey w ere r ecruited f rom C ôte Furthermore, women have on t he w hole b een presented merely as victims. But d’Ivoire into Liberia, from Liberia into Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire, and from they perform important roles, such as carrying fetish items, ferrying arms, acting Guinea into Côte d’Ivoire.37 In northern Uganda, the LRA abducted or forcefully as spies or informants and providing such services as cooking, social welfare and conscripted more than 60 000 y ouths, mainly young adolescents between 13 and health care. Women also act as local moderators of behaviour and peace-builders. 15 years of age. The LRA, like other rebel groups, prefers child rebels because of They also act as a moderating influence, and in the Niger Delta resource conflicts, their n et b enefits in t erms o f in doctrination a nd ef fectiveness.38 Children a nd for example, community women g roups have s ought to restrain youth v iolence youths also form almost half of the militias and rebels in the DRC. As at February and h ave p rotested t he ef fects o f v iolence o n t heir co mmunities, li velihoods, 2007, about 54 000 c hildren h ad b een di sarmed and dem obilised compared to 31 children and local economies. Although Alice Lakwena remains the most famous 115 000 adult combatants, while an estimated 15 000 – 20 000 children compared rebel leader in recent times, rebel groups such as ONLF, EPLF and RPF are known to 85 000 adults were awaiting demobilisation.39 to have women in their rank and file. ANSGs also draw members from migrants and fighters across borders. Bettina As far as identity is concerned, ANSGs t end to share identity commonalities Engels (c hapter 3) in troduces t he co ncepts o f r egional r ecruits (mig rants) a nd such as community, ethnicity, region and religion. Even when ANSGs have broad membership or a p an-identity spread, t hey b egin w ith a co re identity and may regional warriors (recruited fighters) to explore this phenomenon and asserts that have identity-based structures at a subgroup and cell level. As Peters notes (chapter most ANSGs are regionally embedded. In West Africa, there has been a high level 14), the point of entry and initial base of mobilisation and recruitment in ANSGs of mobility of f ighters across b orders b etween countries such as L iberia, Sierra and insurgencies are often marginalised and oppressed ethnic groups, such as the Leone and Côte d’Ivoire.

16 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 17 Introduction WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE

CAUSALITY AND SUSTAINMENT OF ARMED The thesis is based on evidence of the association between mineral wealth and CONFLICTS AND ANSGs the o ccurrence and duration of conflicts; t he existence of v iolent s crambles for resources in conflict regions; the concentration of conflicts in resource-rich zones Several explanatory perspectives and findings can be used to decipher the issues of conflict regions; t he profiteering f rom wa r a nd conflicts by r ulers, wa rlords, of causality and sustainment of armed conflicts and ANSGs in A frica. The point traders a nd f ighters; t he hig h le vels o f e conomic cr imes a nd un derground of dep arture f or a n a nalysis i s a n exa mination o f a nalytical p erspectives t hat economies; the involvement of mercantilists, syndicates and black marketeering provide exp lanations f or co nflict, b ecause ANSGs g row o ut o f m obilisations, companies in r esource-rich zo nes o f co nflict r egions, a nd t he in terference o f collective actions and engagements in intense conflict situations. neighbouring co untries t hat t end t o b e m otivated b y s truggles f or p rivileged resource access. Between grievances and opportunism However, in spite of some evidence from the cases of Liberia, Sierra Leone and the DRC, the greed thesis is simplistic, one-sided and weak in s everal respects. Perhaps t he m ost p opular exp lanation in r ecent t imes i s t he ‘grievance v ersus First, the larger issues such as the character of the state, regimes and governance, greed’ discourse. The former predicates causality or conflict ‘initiation or onset’ on hegemonic struggles, the roles of politics and state failures and economic decline grievances and the drive for redress or justice around issues.40 The latter predicates on which the causation and dynamics of civil wars are situated, are neglected in incentives for conflicts and rebellion on struggles over resource appropriation and this t hesis. S econd, a s em erging e vidence s uggests, t he en gagement in ANSG control o pportunities a nd s pecifically t he s truggle f or lo otable r esources. Thi s activities, violence and terrorism is not simply the result of the motives of people discourse is highlighted in t he chapters by Kasaija, Wassara, Ibaba and Ikelegbe, with a low level of education and low market opportunities, but a complex matrix and Kabir. of issues such as ideology, identity, localised and mundane reasons and personal 47 According to Collier and Hoeffler, most are either pure loot-seeking motivations s uch a s h ate, v engeance a nd p restige. Third, t he t hesis ig nores or combine justice-seeking and loot-seeking.41 In the latter, grievances could be a conflict histories and exonerates regimes and governments from greed. Alao and Olonisakin h ave n oted t hat t he g reed a nalysis t ends t o a pply a ‘ broad b rush start-up m otivation f or v iable m obilisation, b ut g roups t urn t o lo oting f or explanation’ that ignores complex sociopolitical issues and political motivations sustainment and p redation. Thus g rievance i s m erely a starting p oint, a that are ‘at the root of many contemporary civil wars’.48 For example, while focusing justificatory a nd leg itimising n arrative a nd a s upport-building a nd -m obilising only o n t he r ebel-based c auses o f co nflict a nd v iolence, t he t hesis ig nores t he platform for conflicts and ANSGs. Though grievances exist and are articulated as corruption, n eo-patrimony, ex clusion a nd m arginalisation t hat c haracterise a platform for agitation, it is merely a short-term smokescreen for larger and long- distributive politics, as well as the repression, abuses and legitimacy problems of term interests and objectives of resource appropriation.42 regimes. The later works of Collier and Sambanis push the issue of the availability of Besides, t o a rgue t hat g rievances a re m ere s hort-term, j ustificatory a nd lootable resources or ‘extortable economic rents’ beyond mere motivation to that mobilisation p latforms t hat a re a p relude t o o pportunism a nd lo oting i s n ot 43 of opportunities that make rebellion profitable. As Elbadawi and Sambanis have realistic. In s everal countries in A frica, g rievances are genuine and do s erve to found, there is a positive and significant association between natural resources and mobilise g roups in o rder t o ac tualise iden tity g oals. Th e Egbesu militias in t he violent co nflicts a nd ci vil wa rs, w ith r esources p roviding o pportunities a nd Niger D elta, f or exa mple, hin ge o n g rievances a bout a n et hnic min ority s tatus 44 ‘convenient sources of support’ for rebels. Resources are not only strongly linked associated w ith m arginalisation, n egative ext ernalities o f o il exp loitation, to both grievance and greed-based conflicts, but are more difficult to terminate developmental n eglect, e conomic dep rivation, in equitable r esource f low, unjust 45 and tend to have ‘shorter term post conflict peace durations’. Thus grievance and laws and repression.49 Ikelegbe has noted that greed or economic opportunism in greed tend to have a symbiotic relationship with rebellion. To get started, rebellion this instance is not causal to the conflict and the militias, but is an aspect that arose needs grievance, whereas to be sustained, it needs greed.46 almost two decades later and unfortunately hijacked some of the militia groups.50

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In fact, Guichaoua has noted that the greed-based analysis is ahistorical and a decisive factor in the creation and use of tribal militias’. In chapter 8, Ibaba and not co mprehensive.51 Mkandawire h as f urther p ointed o ut t hat in s pite o f t he Ikelegbe state that oil theft syndicates in the Niger Delta armed, funded and used catalogue of cases usually packaged as evidence of greed in Africa’s resource wars, militias as guards and were instrumental in turning the militias into opportunistic, nowhere in A frica h as a b and o f cr iminals g rown in to a r ebel m ovement.52 criminal and resource-theft elements. Therefore a m ore co mprehensive a nalytical p erspective h as t o b e s ought a nd applied in the analysis of conflict and ANSG causality. Identity crisis

The struggle for resources Identity a nd iden tity-based di visions a nd m obilisations a long et hnic lin es, a s Elbadawi and Sambanis have noted, is positively, robustly and non-monotonically 56 The r esource co mpetition m odel si tuates co nflicts in t he m obilisation, associated w ith t he p robability o f wa r. Many A frican co untries a re de eply organisation and collective actions in pursuance of valued resources, particularly divided, p olarised a nd f ractionalised a long et hnic, lin guistic, religious, regional where iden tity i s a ssociated w ith c lear ad vantages in r esource di stribution a nd and s ectional lin es. A s n oted in m any o f t he c hapters, s truggles a gainst benefits.53 However, though the politics and competition for resources are present marginality, ex clusion a nd r epression h ave p rovided p latforms f or ANSG in iden tity-based m obilisation a nd t hus co uld es calate di sputes in to co nflicts,54 emergence and activities in s uch countries as Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, Nigeria, conflicts are not pervasively and proportionally related to inequalities of resource Kenya, Senegal, Mali, Ethiopia and Côte d’Ivoire. endowment and distribution.55 Often a sieg e m entality i s co nstructed a round t he iden tity g roup, w hich becomes the basis of actions for survival and other struggles. Militants then are Rather, co nflicts a nd ANSG ac tivities a re r ooted in t he cr isis o f r esource fighters of the identity cause and interests and guarantors of the identity group management and distribution, and especially the issues of who owns, controls and survival in the face of perceived threats. This is why ANSGs are often the informal, benefits f rom t he e conomy o f n atural r esources. P articularly, g rievances a nd protection, defending or offensive agent of sub-national groups. In Burundi, rebels rebellion are fermented in the struggles for access to resources by diverse claimants based in t he majority et hnic Hutu fought exclusion and marginalisation by t he – t he s tate, et hnic g roups, regions, communities, p olitical e lites, fac tions of t he Tutsis, who constitute about 15 p er cent of the population. In northern Mali, a ruling c lass, n eighbouring co untries a nd in ternational b usiness g roups a nd Tuareg r ebellion dr iven b y et hnic a nd I slamic in surgents a nd b ased o n et hnic syndicates. It is therefore not surprising that most of the resource-rich regions in marginalisation and de velopmental neglect, pursued regional autonomy and an Africa, s uch a s A ngola, L iberia, S ierra L eone, N igeria, t he D RC, t he R oC, Azawad independent state for the Tuareg population through hostilities against Equatorial Guinea, Chad, Mali, the CAR, Sudan and Ethiopia have been embroiled the Malian government. Indeed, the issues of marginalisation and discrimination in conflicts and ANSG activities. against ethnic, religious and regional groups resonate in most of the case studies In m ost o f t hese r egions, r ebels, mi litias, r enegade s oldiers a nd intervening and particularly those on Kenya, Nigeria and Sudan. countries h ave exp loited a nd t raded in min erals t hrough minin g o perations, extortion, taxes and sharing schemes with miners and traders. A combination of forces, w hich includes t ransnational companies, international black market and The state and governance crises underground syndicates, states in the region and even host governments, supports The state-centred thesis places causality in the nature, character and behaviour of and sustains regimes and the ANSGs and accordingly conflicts in resource plunder the s tate, t he u se t o w hich i t i s p ut a nd t he n ature o f i ts p olitics. B eing l arge, and t rading in A frica’s resource-rich regions. Wassara (c hapter 9) n otes t hat in bloated, authoritarian, repressive, violent and run by neo-patrimonial networks, Sudan, tribal militias and Sudanese military forces burned villages and killed or the post-colonial state is an instrument of domination, exploitation, subordination forced in digenous p opulations a way f rom o il-rich l and, t o m ake wa y f or o il and exclusion. Y et, its poor c apacity, leg itimacy and g overnance r ender i t companies and oil exploration. He notes that the ‘desire to control oilfields became ineffective, irrelevant and susceptible to challenge. The post-colonial state spawns

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politics that make violence a prime means of engagement and resistance, just as its The elites further hijack conflict situations for personal interests. Chabal and proneness to excessive coercion and abusive violence constructs a vicious terrain Daloz h ave n oted t hat ‘ politicians b ent o n a sserting t hemselves’, l atch o n t o for violent challenges.57 Further, the post-colonial states provoke what Clapham ‘legitimate p opular g rievances a nd di ssatisfaction’ a nd s ometimes cr iminalise calls ‘ reactive des peration’ b y b locking a ll a venues o f ci vil a nd p eaceful political conflicts and deploy criminal terror.64 In chapter 6, Oloo asserts that the engagements and change, and t he ‘political aspirations’ of marginalised g roups, militia phenomenon in K enya can be partly attributed to the manipulation and 58 alienated elite and opposition groups. mobilisation o f y ouths b elonging t o p olitical p arties a nd o f urb an y ouths in As Norlen has found, ‘political variables especially political marginalisation are general by p olitical e lites. In t he Niger D elta, mi litancy and t he h eightening of important in inf luencing the probability of observing a war event’ and inevitably militia activities have been partly founded on political elite power struggles. As engender secessionist ethno-territorial conflicts.59 This is particularly true where Ibaba and Ikelegbe note in chapter 8, the political elite hire, arm and use militant differences in m odernisation a nd de velopment, en suing di sparities a nd youths and militias to intimidate opponents and perpetuate electoral abuses and inequalities a nd co nsequent t ensions a nd di sagreements a mong g roups a re violence. reinforced by ethnic and regional hegemony.60 Ikelegbe (chapter 5) a sserts that profound, extensive and prolonged state and governance cr ises, a nd p articularly t he in cidence o f w eak a nd f ragile s tates in Economic decline and social ferment Africa, have generated growing inequalities, mass social discontent and alienation, violent and mi litarised p olitics, e conomic de cline, de epening identity divisions, In their chapters, Ikelegbe, Ibaba and Ikelegbe, Oloo, Omach, Kabir and Wassara social service and governance vacuums, extra-constitutional actions, challenges of highlight t he r elationship b etween t he p henomenon o f ANSGs a nd e conomic state authority, conflicts – and the phenomenon of the ANSG. Paradoxically, while decline, de epening p overty, un employment, j ob los ses, s ocial de cay, co llapse o f creating a f ertile ground for ANSGs, t he African states and governance systems social services, urban congestion and decay, decline of social welfare, rising school have become a major casualty of ANSG activities. George and Ylönen (chapter 12) dropout le vels, w idespread s ocial h ardships a nd mi sery, de clining real in comes and Kabir (chapter 11) have also found that corrupt and impious regimes, despised and r ising cos ts. Th ese co nditions h ave f ermented a s ocial di scontent in m any government a nd p olitical e lites, s tate fa ilures t o p rovide cr itical n eeds a nd African countries since the 1980s that has radicalised the youth and turned them opportunities, a nd s tate w ithdrawal f rom im poverished n eighbourhoods a nd into a massive youth and urban under-class that is available for mobilisation and slums, h ave lef t vac ant s paces t hat h ave p rovided o pportunities f or mi litant recruitment for diverse projects. In these circumstances violence and involvement Islamist groups to mobilise poor, marginalised and vulnerable groups. in ANSG ac tivities a re in s ome wa ys a s trong p rotest a gainst s ociety, a v iable survival alternative and a form of employment.65 As many of the case studies show, Elite construction unemployment, p overty, co llapsed inf rastructure a nd s ervices, co llapsed aspirations, lack of opportunities, social crises and scarcity created by economic Elite manipulation is a m ajor factor in co mmunity and ethnic conflicts and the decline have created a l arge population of frustrated and vulnerable youths who funding, r ecruitment, a rming a nd co ntrol o f mi litant m ovements.61 In s everal are amenable to diverse mobilisations and recruitment by the ANSGs a nd even instances, a s p ointed o ut in t he c hapters b y O loo (c hapter 6) a nd Ib aba a nd Ikelegbe (c hapter 8), ANSGs a re f ormed f or in tra-elite p ower a nd r esource government counterinsurgency forces. struggles a nd t o in timidate p olitical r ivals a nd o pponents. I n N igeria, et hnic, regional a nd p olitical e lites h ave b een m ajor fac tors in t he f ormation, f unding, The youth problem arming, protection and use of diverse armed bands, ethnic and political militias and cult groups.62 In examining political militias in Kenya, Oloo came to the same Another k ey f inding b y En gels, Kubai, O loo, K abir, Ib aba a nd Ik elegbe i s t hat conclusion as Reno, namely that there are ‘numerous informal linkages between youths have been the dominant base of recruitment and participation in ANSGs. armed opposition groups and elite political networks’.63 This finding mirrors that of Abdullah and Muana, who point out that in S ierra

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Leone, youths who were unemployed, poorly educated, school dropouts, or drug Conflicts and ANSGs’ activities have largely contributed to the smuggling and addicts who exhibited antisocial behaviour, social disaffection and rebelliousness, proliferation of and the propensity to use guns in p olitical violence and criminal were critical participants in ANSGs. 66 It is not difficult to understand the youth activities. Africa has become a dumping ground for light weapons manufactured dominance in conflicts and ANSG activities, because of the ‘youth bulge’ and the in Western and Eastern Europe and purchased from former conflict regions across ease with which they can be recruited, indoctrinated and utilised for violence, as the world. It was estimated that in 2004, o f the 500 million illicit weapons in the well as manipulated and mobilised for diverse purposes. This is actually a question world, 100 million were in sub-Saharan Africa and 8 – 10 million in West Africa.73 of social vulnerability. Economically diminished employment opportunities and Indeed, t he p roliferation o f lig ht w eapons, a s t he EC OWAS C onvention o n rising impoverishment create disaffection, alienation and unruliness, which fuel Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons74 of crime, violence and rebellion. As Ikelegbe notes, these conditions have turned the October 1998 has rightly stated, is a major ‘destabilising factor’ and a ‘major threat youth o n s ociety in o utrage, def iance, s ubversion a nd r esistance a nd cr eated a to the peace and security’ in Africa.75 youth culture with elements of nihilism, fatalism, deviance, populism, resentment, impunity and violence.67 To t he y outh, p articipation in co nflicts a nd v iolence ac tually r epresents a n Religion, culture and traditions ‘expression o f p ower a nd s earch f or r ecognition a nd iden tity’, a m eans o f While historical and cultural orientations as well as heritage and religious deities registering dissent and frustration, and of challenging the practices and conduct of and practices do not per se generate conflicts and violence, they could constitute state officials and local elites.68 Reno has also noted that some youths in ANSGs the f ramework o f di sposition a nd j udgement a nd w hat i s accep table a nd ’seek personal opportunity and safety with insurgents’.69 The youth has therefore sanctioned o r r ejected a nd v ilified, a s w ell a s s ome un derlying p rinciples o f been victims and agents, or rather objects and subjects, of the diverse conflicts in organisation and strength. In chapter 2, Anne Kubai argues that there are histories Africa. of violent resistance to oppressive and exploitative rule in certain societies, which have been used to mobilise modern resistance to state domination and exclusion. Globalisation and arms proliferation The heroic past of rebellion has become a predisposition to armed resistance. This, according to Kabir (chapter 11) and Ibaba and Ikelegbe (chapter 8), is manifest in Another key factor fuelling ANSG activities is the ready availability of weapons. It Islamist militancy in n orthern Nigeria and among some minority groups of the is quite common to see in African armed conflicts images of young men proudly Niger D elta, w here a hi story o f v iolent wa rs a gainst co lonial m ercantilist brandishing AK-47 r ifles a nd o ther s ophisticated w eapons. According t o Ib aba and Ikelegbe, the easy access to and supply of arms to ANSGs a re critical to the displacement in the palm oil trade and gun boat diplomacy predisposed the people onset and sustainment of violent conflicts. Furthermore, Michael Klare argues that to r esistance a gainst s tate a ppropriation o f t heir o il a nd ga s r esources a nd small a rms a vailability faci litates co nflict ini tiation a nd in tensification.70 Small marginalisation in the oil economy. arms can further be a status symbol and means of expressing power that attract the Some r itualistic a nd r eligious-cultural p ractices h ave t ended t o s upport youth t o r esistance m ovements a nd cr ime.71 Small a rms p roliferation h as b een ANSGs’ activities. Several ANSGs in S ierra Leone, Nigeria and Kenya have been linked directly to violence in Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Nigeria.72 In many associated with fetish items, initiation into cults, the worship or consultation of of the conflict regions there is a sizeable arms flow from other conflict regions and deities of war and justice, the invocation of invincibility, wearing of amulets and arms smuggling and trafficking across borders and along the coast, as well as on related symbols and practices, which are used to identify, motivate and strengthen the high seas and in international waters. The theft, smuggling and sale of minerals the w ill o f t he f ighters. Kubai (c hapter 2) a sserts t hat t he o ath t akings, r ituals, and o il resources h ave p rovided a bundant f unds f or t he acq uisition o f a rms in sacrifices, in ductions in to s ecret s ocieties a nd ac ts o f t raditional w orship t hat resource-rich regions. symbolise a r eturn t o A frican c ulture a nd a r e-traditionalisation o f s ociety a re

224 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 25 Introduction WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE actually n ot o nly f orms o f exp ression o f di ssent b ut p rovide ide ological a nd POWER POLITICS, VIOLENCE AND structural platforms for mobilisation and legitimisation. Oloo, in chapter 6, adds THE PHENOMENON OF ANSGs that in the case of the SLDF, charms and oaths bound members to a common cause and were said to give them mystic protection that imbued them with supernatural The struggles for power powers and made them invincible. A key finding of this book is that the ANSG p henomenon can be linked to the In a m ore contemporary sense, there has emerged in A frica new, globalised struggles for power through the groups’ affiliations to some larger political groups, perceptions and conceptions of living, livelihoods, lifestyles and social relations, in b oth t he g overnment a nd o pposition, o n b ehalf o f w hich t hey ac t.80 The particularly among the youth, in which domination, control, impunity, perversion, phenomenon s ometimes r eflects t he co nstruction o f a lternative p aths t o t he abuse, crime and violence are associated with peer acceptance, power, influence acquisition of power and means to claim political and economic rights. This is why and s ocial m obility. It i s t hese n ew c ultures t hat p rize t he p hysical ex ercise o f there i s a l arge p articipation in ANSGs ’ ac tivities b y p ersons w ho h ave los t power, machismo, nihilism and narratives of suppression and abuse, and promote confidence in p ublic institutions, are disgruntled and discontented with existing and acco mmodate t he s ocial a nd cr iminal v iolence, s treet cr ime, b anditry a nd power configurations and patrimonial networks, and who feel disadvantaged and cultism to which many youths have been drawn and which constitute some broad precluded from existing pathways to power.81 framework for recruitment to ANSGs. According to Ikelegbe (chapter 5), ANSGs flow from the nature of politics, the dynamics of power and its challenges, and particularly the politics of violence and Motivations and sustaining factors the v iolence in p olitics t hat do minate t he A frican p olitical l andscape. Th e phenomenon is further rooted in the politics of the zero-sum game, and the cut- With regard to what motivates the ANSGs and what keeps them fighting, Herbst throat pursuit for control of the state that utilises all means available, including has identified economic incentives, p olitical indoctrination, ethnic mobilisation fanning co mmunity, c lan, et hnic, r eligious a nd r egional acr imony. Thi s i s w hy 76 and coercion. On their own and in co mbination, these variables constitute the some o f t he ANSGs in s everal co untries de veloped f rom t he y outh w ings o f nucleus o f t he r ecruitment p latforms o f m ost ANSGs. A s C ollier, Hoeffler a nd political p arties, s upport g roups o f e lectoral c andidates, a nd o utfits f ormed t o Söderbom note, while greed fuels onset and initiation, the prolonged conflicts and intimidate opponents during election campaigns. With time, as Oloo (chapter 6) wars tend to be underpinned by ethnic, religious and regional heterogeneity or and Ib aba and Ik elegbe (c hapter 8) point o ut, t he g roups b ecame m ore 77 diversity and particularly identity polarisation and fractionalisation. Beyond the autonomous agents of violence and mayhem. This is what happened in the case of ethnic basis, in the cases of political rebellion and conflicts and particularly those some cult and militia groups in the Niger Delta in Nigeria since the 2003 elections that h ave a n ide ological le aning, i s p olitical in doctrination. Th e s truggles f or and of the community bands and political militias in Kenya since the multiparty independence by movements in Z imbabwe, Namibia, Angola, Mozambique and elections of 1992. Equatorial Guinea, and to some extent the rebel movements in Uganda and Sierra The ANSG p henomenon is also a r esponse from below, albeit a mi litant and Leone, contained elements of political indoctrination that were sometimes tinged violent one. It represents an extreme response to and challenge of persisting group with s ocialism. H owever, m ost r ebel m ovements in A frica h ave n ot b een inequality a nd m arginality, a s w ell a s di ssent, r evolt a nd r esistance t o exi sting ideologically oriented, and some claims to this effect were merely disjointed and structures and systems of power and governance. It is a p latform constructed by haphazard thoughts provided by half-baked ideologues.78 marginalised persons who are deeply aggrieved and desperate enough to engage in The existence of a positive perception of rebellion, or predisposing conditions armed en gagements a s ei ther a r esistance o r co unterforce. It m ay t herefore b e for successful rebellion, is furthermore crucial for achievement of its objectives. viewed as the only instrument available to the frustrated, endangered, excluded These conditions include the presence of charismatic leaders, the availability of and repressed victims of state power and identity hegemony. According to Justin funds and the weakness of state military and security agencies.79 Pearce (chapter 13), quoting Vines, this is indeed what happened in Mozambique,

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where RENAMO drew its support from the aggrieved and discontented who saw More importantly, violence has become a commodity that is sold and bought. it as an alternative method of taking power. The utility of violence as a political tool has created conflict entrepreneurs who are In fact, Osaghae et al, drawing on Tarrow and Medearis, posit that conflict and patronised by state officials and opposition political parties and candidates. These the ANSG p henomenon em erge f rom a nd a re f ounded o n s ocial m ovements entrepreneurs p refer si tuations o f co nflict a nd s ocial di sorder t o o ffer t heir 82 engaged in contentious collective action. These movements, which are the main services in t he m uddled p olitical m arket. W hat h as b een cr eated, t hen, i s a n channels o f exp ression o f di sadvantaged, m arginal a nd o pposition g roups a nd expansion o f t he t errain o f t error, v iolence a nd cr iminality a nd a n em ergent ordinary p eople in co untries w ith do minant p ower s tructures a nd p owerful culture of violence that is empowering, economically prospering and p olitically regimes a nd s tates, b ecome radic alised a nd mi litant b ecause of t he s tates’ influential.85 proneness to repressive violence, constriction of the opportunities and space for It is the nature of the African state and leadership that has made violence a effective p olitical ac tion a nd s tructuring of t heir s trategies t owards v iolent factor in t he p olitical t errain. M ost p ost-colonial s tates co nstrict acces s a nd contentions. A n ANSG m ay t hen b e a f orm o f s truggle o f a b road m ovement opportunities f or di alogue a nd w hen c hallenged, r eact w ith m assive f orce t hat rooted in s ociopolitical tensions and divisions and constructed around p opular strengthens cycles of violence when their victims react in a similar manner. Using grievances a nd a spirations, a nd t he m obilisation a nd co ntestation f or p olitical the historical claim to monopoly of violence by state bodies, African states usually space, resources, state reforms and change. In Nigeria, for example, t he Egbesu overreact to vanquish and deter future opposition challenges to their legitimacy. militia g roups are anchored in a y outh movement, w hile t he OPC mi litia is an The terrain of politics (even legitimate struggles) has inescapably become a theatre ‘armed, o rganised a nd et hnically b ased m ass m ovement dem anding s elf in w hich t hose w ho w ield s tate p ower u se s tate in stitutions t o co erce t heir determination’.83 opponents. What h as h appened t hen i s t he em ergence o f co unter-violence a nd The dialectics of violence institutionalisation of violence as a m eans of controlling and seeking power and economic opportunities. While the ruling elite uses instruments of state violence, Ikelegbe (c hapter 5), O loo (c hapter 6) a nd K abir (c hapter 11) a rgue t hat t he its rivals and those who have been excluded and marginalised create their own activities o f s ome r egimes, p olitical e lites a nd ANSGs h ave ra ised v iolence in Africa to a new level, by making it the main vehicle for furthering the objectives of institutions of counter-violence. ANSGs a re products of this culture of p olitical acquiring power, accumulating resources and making resource claims. Violence violence, and are the instruments and platforms of counter-violence. has been reconstructed as a highly prized commodity that is associated with power In t he en d, A frican p olitical a rena h as g enerally b ecome a t heatre o f s tate and resources. Regime, political elite and ANSGs’ activities have raised the profile violence versus private violence; violence of state officials and political elite versus of violence, the importance and need to acquire, own, control and use it as well as violence of t he aggrieved, marginalised and excluded; state-sanctioned v iolence its centrality to the diverse power, political, economic and sociocultural struggles versus v iolence o f co ntenders, c laimants, co unter-elites a nd p owerless p ersons; of African societies. violence of state institutions and regime officials versus non-state institutions of Neo-patrimony, which is dominant in African politics, particularly constructs violence; a nd v iolence in p ursuance o f s tate g overnance v ersus p rivate, s elf- and reinforces the politics of violence. As also noted by Chabal and Daloz, patrons interested and commercialised violence. can ‘access or restrain official violence’ as they can ‘count on the local police or Further, while ANSGs have been considerably castigated for their horrendous military co mmander’, to p rotect t heir c lients, a nd t o t hreaten ‘coercion a gainst and a trocious v iolence, t he do minant m ainstream s cholarship, in ternational competitors’. They f urther m aintain ‘ their o wn co rps o f a rmed m en’ a nd ‘can community a nd lega l sys tems h ave t rivialised n ot o nly t he s tate-orchestrated unleash unseen mi litias’ to ‘protect clients’, ‘counter t he v iolence of competitive politics of violence, which conditioned ANSG methods and responses, but also the networks’ or to ‘enforce compliance’.84 brutal counter-violence that the states have unleashed against them.

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In some instances, it was the states’ extreme brutality and excessive force that state officials and institutions. According to Pearce (chapter 13), quoting Cohen, gave rise to the extreme counter-violence of militants and rebels. Indiscriminate RENAMO wa s, f or exa mple a v oice f or a va riety o f s ocial e lements a nd and retaliatory violence, whether by the state or ANSGs, have compelled youths in communities, a ‘ sort o f co alition o f m arginals, w hich h ave b een ex cluded Sierra Leone, Liberia, Mozambique, the DRC and other countries to join militant politically a nd s ocially f rom t he s tate, f rom t he m arket a nd f rom de velopment and r ebel g roups a s a m eans o f s urvival, p rotection o f r elations a nd f ellow during and even before FRELIMO came to power’. members of ethnic and other identity groups on the one hand, and as a means of In cer tain si tuations ANSGs ’ ac tivities co uld b e s een a s t he l ast r esort f or revenge against abuses and atrocities on the other. As Kwesi Aning and Angela necessary p olitical c hange, just a s v iolence s ometimes b ecomes accepted a s t he McIntyre h ave n oted, g overnments – li ke r ebel f orces – h ave u sed f orceful only means to reform a political order with which they are dissatisfied. As Chabal recruitment strategies (including terror and abduction) in civil wars in for example and Daloz have noted, the war by the NRA against the Obote regime in Uganda Sierra Leone.86 Peters (chapter 14), Oloo (chapter 6) and Wassara (chapter 9) also and by the attack of Laurent Kabila’s forces against the Mobutu regime in Z aire note t hat s tate co unterinsurgency t actics a re s ometimes b rutal, in cluding was, t o a l arge ext ent, w elcomed a s a leg itimate m eans o f p olitical c hange b y 87 summary ex ecutions o f f ighters a nd e ven r elatives, s acking o f co mmunities, citizens. indiscriminate killings, torture and detentions, and destruction of property. ANSGs may also be part of the search for alternatives; discourse or spaces for governance, and expressions of identity. It is, in a wa y, a search for meaning, self worth and empowerment by ordinary people. The phenomenon may therefore be Between functionality and dysfunctionality at o nce b e a s uccour f or t he a lienated a nd f rustrated; a h ope f or t he p oor, underclass, deprived, unemployed and idle; an opportunity for the marginalised ANSGs a re often dem onised a nd branded by g overnments a s b unches o f and ex cluded; a nd a n a venue f or t he a bused, s uppressed a nd r epressed. I t i s, criminals, mi screants, va gabonds a nd o pportunists. Th e m ain p urpose o f s uch further, a form of empowerment to those who have been alienated, disempowered branding is to delegitimise the groups and deprive them of sympathy. However, we and disenfranchised by a l ack of political and citizenship rights, political choices would mi ss cer tain fac ts a nd in sights if w e side line t he o rigin, o bjectives, and actual participation. narratives and dynamics of t he g roups and if w e assume t hat t hey are purely a symptom o f t he m alfunctioning o f (a nd t hreats t o) A frican s tates. Th erefore questions need to be asked about the functionality of the phenomenon. ANSGs AND HUMAN INSECURITY IN AFRICA ANSGs usually seek to attain certain goals, which often pertain to a change in The incidence of rebellions, insurrections, secessionist attempts, insurgencies and the status quo with regard to equity, justice, sociopolitical rights, citizenship rights wars in e ach o f t he co nflict c lusters in w est, cen tral a nd n ortheastern/eastern and inclusion, and the issues of the national question, restructuring arrangements Africa h as b een a ssociated w ith w idespread human in security and c atastrophic and s tate r eforms s uch a s de centralisation. I t o ften a lso co ncerns i ssues o f humanitarian crises. The crises in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa regions are governance such as corruption, collapse of social services and lack of discipline currently the most serious on the continent. The culture of political violence and among the regime elite. Some of the issues at stake are critical to eventual progress, the p revalence o f ANSGs h ave im pacted n egatively o n m ost p olitical a nd stability, integration and development of the African state in question. economic sys tems in A frica, a s i llustrated by t heir low ra nkings on t he United ANSGs are therefore in a sense a form of social action – defiance, opposition, Nations D evelopment P rogramme’s (UND P) T ransparency I nternational a nd challenge, resistance and protest – against the form and nature of the state and how Foreign Policy indexes.88 The core areas of impact are the construction of a terrain it is governed. In fact, in some ways, though regime-based labels often play down of l awlessness, in discriminate v iolence, ext ortion, p lundering a nd cr ime; t he this dim ension, t he p henomenon i s a n ext reme f orm o f o pposition t o a nd disruption of economies and the deepening of poverty; the generation of internal challenge o f c urrent r egimes t hat r esults f rom b locked a venues f or g enuine displacements, refugees and humanitarian crises; and the accentuation of state and participation and influence, the deprivation of citizenship rights and the abuse by governance crises.

30 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 31 Introduction WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE

Regime of indiscriminate violence, crime and terror poverty. Human mi sery de epens w ith s oaring li ving cos ts a nd un employment. Using t he c ase o f K enya t o i llustrate hi s a rguments, A dams O loo (c hapter 6) In several countries the activities of ANSGs a nd government counterinsurgency asserts t hat t he ac tivities o f ANSGs h ave s tunted e conomic g rowth, des troyed organisations as well as the conduct of conflicts have caused a severe breakdown livelihoods a nd c aused f ood in security t hrough t he c losure o f b usinesses a nd in public law and order. There is often a r eign of harassment, intimidation, fear markets and the abandonment of farms. and terror, leading to general uncertainty. Civilians and local communities live in fear of attacks, punishments and retaliations. In the CAR, there have been reprisal A regime of extortion and plundering attacks and mass punishments against civilians and communities.89 Most ANSG and counterinsurgency activities have been characterised by extensive, arbitrary ANSGs in co nflict situations in m ost cases engage in ac tivities such as extortion and horrendous v iolence, physical abuses and atrocities, torture, indiscriminate and plundering to generate resources that are used to profit their leaders and to killings a nd ex ecutions. R ebel m ovements li ke t he LR A a nd R UF h ave u sed sustain the group’s activities. Usually, conflict and war economies are constructed brutalities such as mutilations (amputations of arms and legs, s licing off of ears, through illegal taxes, levies and forceful contributions by workers, traders, shop chopping off of fingers), and indiscriminate killings of civilians by hanging them owners, transporters, miners and farmers, who are forced to pay a s urcharge fee from t rees a nd b urying v ictims a live in t he p resence o f h orrified cr owds, a s based on an arbitrary calculation of their earnings. Locals are also subjected to strategies to intimidate the population and compel governments to negotiate with forced p ayments a nd le vies f or s ervices s uch a s p rotection a nd s ecurity o f 90 them. economic production, trade routes and markets. In some cases, local people are With regard to Sierra L eone, Peters (chapter 14) n otes t hat RUF rebels and forced to pay a ‘tax’, compelled to hand over their produce or used as labourers and renegade soldiers raped, mutilated and burned alive hundreds, if not thousands, in carriers of equipment. According to Oloo (chapter 6), mi litias in K enya have an their failed attempt to capture Freetown in 1998. Territories where groups such as elaborate m achinery a nd sys tem o f t ax co llection a nd ext ortion t hat in clude a the LRA operate are highly insecure and also prone to criminal activities such as route or transporter’s levy, protection fees and levies on shops, farms and small armed robberies, assassinations, murders and rape. It is this terrible toll that makes businesses. I n c hapter 7, K asaija a lso p rovides exa mples o f h ow g overnment wars in A frica s eem li ke wa rs o n ci vilians, a s t hey s uffer dir ect a nd in direct soldiers, r ebels a nd mi litias in t he D RC h ave u sed ‘ methods s uch a s dir ect violence and loss of livelihood.91 extraction, extortion/confiscation, “taxation”, and coercion of the local population to extract the minerals’. Socio-economic disruptions and deepening poverty In co nflict en vironments, t he g roups sim ply h elp t hemselves t o lo otable resources. Ib aba a nd Ik elegbe p oint o ut t hat s ome mi litias in t he N iger D elta ANSG activities mainly disrupt socioeconomic systems, and destroy property and region o f N igeria de veloped f rom s ecurity gu ards t o o il-theft sy ndicates t o food stores through looting and burning. This strategy to undermine the state also autonomous operators, e ach w ith a desig nated t erritory for operations and t oll aims at disrupting commerce and agriculture, creating unemployment and causing collections. Rebel movements in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola and the DRC have food in security. In g eneral, human in security i s exp erienced t hrough s piralling been involved in exploitation, trading and export of resources and some have had living cos ts, s evere s carcities, w idespread h unger a nd mi sery in m ost co nflict arrangements with extractive industry companies, syndicates and smugglers. regions. At the individual level, members of ANSGs have accepted violence as a form The di sruption o f p roductive ac tivities a nd co mmerce, t he f orceful of employment and survival. Oloo and Kabir point out that the youth in poverty- appropriation of private properties and the resultant effects on living conditions, stricken areas are attracted to ANSGs, which can support distorted lifestyles that availability o f g oods a nd s ervices a nd in comes p roduce de ep a nd w idespread are sustained through looting, extortion, smuggling and other illegal activities.

32 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 33 Introduction WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE

Internal displacement, refugee and humanitarian crises state capacity to provide public safety and security to the population. As conflict intensifies, the state becomes incapable of providing security as a public good due Overall, ANSG a nd co unterinsurgency ac tivities h ave c aused c atastrophic to t he dep loyment o f t he s ecurity r esources t o p rotect t he in terests o f t he humanitarian crises through widespread infrastructural devastation, and massive governing e lite, u sually co ncentrated in t he c apital ci ty. Th e v iolent m ethods dislocations and losses of human life. ANSGs’ activities and government responses employed t o c lamp do wn o n ANSG ac tivities a lso w eaken i ts r elations w ith have f orced lo cal p eople t o f lee t heir h omes w ith f ew p ersonal b elongings t o civilians, some of whom sympathise with ANSGs or provide them with food and forests, g overnment- o r r ebel-held a reas, a nd b order r egions o f n eighbouring intelligence (s ee c hapter 14). M ilitias a nd r ebels u sually r eact t o g overnment’s countries. In Sierra Leone, about half of the population was displaced within six heavy-handed responses by targeting infrastructure that serves the public, which 92 years of the RUF rebellion. All over the conflict zones in A frica, huge internal further w eakens t he g overnment a nd a lienates i t f rom t he p opulation. A s displacements a nd r efugee c amps do t t he b order r egions o f co untries c lose t o government officials flee, government facilities and services such as schools and conflict epicentres. LRA activities in Uganda, Sudan, the CAR and the DRC have health care are abandoned and a power vacuum is created that attracts militias and resulted in a h umanitarian cr isis in t he r egion b y di splacing o ver t wo mi llion rebels t o f ill i t. Th e un governed o r mi sgoverned s paces t hat em erge a re people. P eters co nfirms in c hapter 14 t hat b oth ANSG a nd g overnment characterised by a H obbesian state of nature: brutality, insolence, impunity and counterinsurgency activities have caused huge humanitarian crises. He notes that mayhem. in U ganda, f or exa mple, ci vilians h ave b een f orced in to in ternally di splaced While s tate g overnments h ave t o s ome ext ent co ntributed t o t he g rowth o f persons c amps by t he government or forced t o f lee v illages b ecause of LR A or ANSG ac tivities in A frica, t hey have a lso b een one of t he major v ictims of t he government attacks and confrontations. These camps have also been attacked by conflicts that accompany these activities. Many governments in countries such as both ANSGs and government troops or government-supported militias. the CAR, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC and Sudan have been seriously weakened In Rwanda, the ANSGs are held partly responsible for triggering violence that and r endered in capable o f m anaging co nflicts, p roviding s ocial s ervices a nd claimed about 800 000 persons in 1994. In Sierra Leone, about 300 000 people died asserting t heir s overeignty o ver t heir t erritories. K asaija (c hapter 7), Ib aba a nd in t he f irst six y ears o f t he co nflict t hat s tarted in 1991. 93 In A ngola’s renewed Ikelegbe (chapter 8) and Kabir (chapter 11) argue that ANSGs t ake advantage of fighting between the government and UNITA rebels in 1992, about 400 000 people weak and fragile states such as the DRC and Nigeria. Others that collapsed at some were killed, 1,5 mi llion were displaced and 330 000 b ecame refugees. In the 16- point, through the activities of ANSGs, such as Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia, year ci vil wa r in M ozambique, a bout t hree mi llion p eople w ere in ternally became havens in which ANSGs and anarchical conditions flourished. displaced a nd o ver 1 mi llion t ook r efuge in M alawi a nd o ther n eighbouring In countries such as the DRC, ANSG ac tivities have accelerated state decline countries, w hile in t he Er itrea–Ethiopia wa r, a bout 1,5 mi llion p eople w ere and exposed its weaknesses with regard to the provision of human security. State displaced.94 Kabir (c hapter 11) p oints o ut t hat in n ortheastern N igeria, fragility i s u sually dem onstrated in i ts s ecurity a pparatuses’ l ack o f di scipline, confrontations between security agencies and the Boko Haram in July 2009 lef t tendency t o lo oting, ex cessive u se o f f orce, in discriminate v iolence a nd over 750 p eople de ad and over 5 000 di splaced. In chapter 6, O loo claims t hat retaliations, operational deficiencies and combat failures vis-à-vis ANSG t hreats. SLDF ac tivities in K enya r esulted in a bout 615 de aths a nd 66 000 in ternally The behaviour of state security apparatuses has contributed to regime collapses in displaced persons. In general, armed conflicts in Africa have claimed millions of Uganda (M ilton O bote / T ito O kello), S ierra L eone ( Joseph M omoh), L iberia lives and destroyed properties worth billions of dollars over the past 40 years. (Samuel Doe), the DRC (Mobutu Sese Seko), Rwanda (Juvénal Habyarimana), and Ethiopia (Mengistu Haile Mariam). ANSGs, STATE WEAKNESS AND COLLAPSE Some rebel movements that gained more legitimacy due to effective leadership and o rganisation accen tuated t he co llapses o f r egimes. I nstability a nd p olitical Ikelegbe (c hapter 5) a nd Wassara (c hapter 9) p oint o ut t hat o ne o f t he e arly crises have also dogged countries such as Burundi, the CAR, Chad, the RoC, Côte casualties in conflict situations plagued by ANSG activities is the weakening of the d’Ivoire, t he D RC, N igeria, U ganda, S omalia a nd S udan t hat h ave h ad ac tive

34 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 35 Introduction WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE

militia and rebel groups, some operating for decades without being vanquished by the LRA; incursions of Uganda, Rwanda and Angola into Zaire, and interventions government forces. of Uganda, Rwanda, Zimbabwe and Angola in the DRC (see chapters by Kasaija, Omach a nd Wassara). S ome g overnments h ave u sed r ebels a s in struments o f Impact and ramifications of ANSGs on regional foreign policy, as in the case of Sudan, which has supported the LRA in retaliation and international dynamics of the Museveni government’s backing of the SPLA. The Rwandan and Ugandan governments have supported rebel groups in t he DRC, apart from sending their The impact of ANSG ac tivities is felt far beyond the borders of the states within forces to pursue rebel groups using the DRC as operational bases. According to which t hey o riginated. ANSGs h ave r egionalised h uman in security a nd p ose Kasaija (chapter 7), these countries have had a hand in the founding, arming and serious challenges to regional mechanisms for preventing, managing and resolving assisting rebel groups such as the MLC (Uganda) and the CNDP (Rwanda) in the conflicts. Regional trends that dovetail with ANSG activities include humanitarian DRC. crises, human rights violations and use of violence as a tool for conflict resolution. As M unene (c hapter 15) a nd O kumu a nd Ik elegbe (c hapter 16) p oint o ut, Regionalisation o f ANSGs a nd mi litary in trusions o r in terventions s uch a s addressing ANSGs r equires a pproaches t hat in clude r egional m echanisms, a s Rwanda’s, Burundi’s and Uganda’s support of rebels in the DRC and Angola’s and national measures are constricted by international boundaries. Using the concept Zimbabwe’s support of the DRC government were often resource motivated. These of a r egional co nflict co mplex, P aul Om ach (c hapter 10) iden tifies t he cen tral interventions h ave b een acco mpanied b y r esource exp loitation b y a gents a nd characteristics o f r egionalisation in t he G reat L akes r egion a s, a mong o thers, government-authorised companies from Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and military, economic, social and political linkages and networks, the movement of Zimbabwe.97 Kasaija co rroborates t his in c hapter 7, n oting t hat t he co untries ANSGs acr oss b orders, t he ext ensions o f t he f rontiers o f f ighting, in ter-state, involved in supporting either rebels or government have helped themselves to the multinational a nd in ternational in terventions t hrough, a mong o thers, mi litary country’s mineral resources, while Munene (chapter 15) states that countries that support and brokerage of agreements, and security interdependence. intervened in the DRC became large exporters of minerals that were not produced There is a growing regionalisation of ANSG activities and operations in terms in their countries. In other situations, too, neighbouring countries have benefited of cross-border operations, the recruitment of personnel/members across borders, from the illegal exploitation and theft of and trading in r esources. In the Sierra counterinsurgency o perations acr oss b orders, mi litary in terventions a nd Leone a nd L iberian ci vil wa rs, n eighbouring co untries s uch a s C ôte d ’Ivoire, operations w ithin o ther s tates a nd co llaborative a nd j oint mi litary o perations Guinea and Liberia benefited from illegal trading and commercial networks.98 In between states to contain ANSGs. 95 ANSGs are increasingly transforming into a Nigeria, stolen crude oil and refined products are smuggled and marketed along major source of interstate conflicts. In fact, the major difference in t he activities the coastal regions of West Africa.99 and operations of ANSGs in t he last two decades has been their transborder and Ibaba and Ikelegbe point out that the cross-border activities of ANSGs are fast transnational o perations. ANSG-o rchestrated in trastate co nflicts a re c hanging spreading in W est Africa. In February 2009, E quatorial Guinea alleged that the into interstate disputes or regional conflicts. For example, the activities of rebel groups struggling for independence in Angola, Namibia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe Movement f or t he Em ancipation o f t he N iger D elta (MEND) mi litants h ad 100 and South Africa attracted the involvement not only of states in the region but also mounted a s eaborne t errorist a ttack o n t he p residential p alace in M alabo. of the apartheid regime in South Africa, which carried out transborder raids and Although the attack was repulsed by the country’s armed forces, it posed a serious destabilisation ac tivities in t he s tates t hat p rovided s anctuary t o t he f reedom security t hreat, a s c an b e de duced f rom t he p ost-attack mi litary a nd p olice fighters.96 deployments, er ection o f r oadblocks a nd c hecks, c losure o f b anks, o ffices a nd ANSG ac tivities a nd s tate r esponses in t he D RC, U ganda a nd S udan h ave shops, a nd des ertion o f t he ci ty cen tre. I n C ameroon, a rmed g roups a llegedly resulted in military operations across the borders by, among others, Uganda into linked t o t he N iger D elta h ave b een in volved in a s eries o f a ttacks o n v essels, Sudan; joint military operations between Uganda, the DRC and Sudan to contain military posts and military personnel in the Nigerian border regions.101

36 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 37 Introduction WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE

In their chapters, Engels, Omach and Peters all note that it is not only ANSGs’ and the presidency in 2005 and successfully negotiated with other rebel groups to activities and state responses in terms of cross-border activities that have become end the country’s armed conflict. In chapter 13, the question of how former rebel characterised by emerging regionalisation, but also the fighters, particularly the groups fa red in p ost-conflict p olitics i s de alt w ith by Pearce u sing UNITA a nd youth a nd c hildren. Th us Taylor’s NP FL r ecruited y oung f ighters f rom S ierra RENAMO as case studies. Leone a nd C ôte d ’Ivoire, w hile C ôte d ’Ivoire a ssisted t he M ovement f or Democracy in L iberia (MODEL) with recruiting youths and child fighters from CONCLUSION the r efugee c amps in t he r egion. C ôte d ’Ivoire f urther b enefited f rom y outh recruitments in to t he Forces d e L ibération d u G rand O uest (Forces f or t he An un derstanding o f t he p henomenon o f mi litias, r ebel g roups a nd mi litant Liberation o f t he G reat W est, FL GO), w hich f ought a longside g overnment Islamist g roups i s cr itical n ot o nly b ecause t he i ssues o f c ausality, s ustainment, 102 forces. The LR A i s a lso k nown t o h ave f orcefully r ecruited a nd co nscripted social b asis a nd in ternal d ynamics a re cen tral t o t he ef forts f or m anaging a nd children from Sudan, the CAR and the DRC. resolving conflicts, but because they pose huge threats to the states’ capabilities to As t he co nflict a reas exp and acr oss b orders, s o do t he co mplexities a nd be governed well and to provide their populations with security. Underlying some changing dynamics of alliances, pacts and support across borders, between states, aspects o f s tate f ragility a nd co llapse, a nd t he ac ute h uman in security a nd between s tates a nd ANSGs, a nd b etween t he international co mmunity a nd t he humanitarian cr ises in A frica t oday, i s t he p henomenon o f ANSGs a nd t heir states. I n t he M ano R iver co nflict co mplex, B urkina F aso a nd C ôte d ’Ivoire engagement in v iolent co nflicts. H owever, s uch a n un derstanding h as t o b e supported rebels in L iberia, which in t urn supported rebels in S ierra Leone and embedded in a broad analysis, in which the phenomenon is situated and interfaced government forces in C ôte d’Ivoire. In Rwanda, Uganda supported the Rwandan with t he n ature o f p olitics, t he d ynamics o f p ower s truggles, t he s truggles f or Patriotic Front (RPF, Front Patriotique Rwandais), and later fought with it to oust resources and the dialectics of violence as an instrument of politics. Zaire’s Mobutu f rom p ower f or b acking Rwandan r ebels. I nterestingly, Rwanda The armed conflicts and the political violence, in which ANSGs are key players, and Uganda turned against Laurent Kabila, whom they had installed in power, and are closely correlated with the nature, character and governance of African states supported a r ebellion against his government t hat was t hen propped up by t he and t heir p olicies. P aradoxically, t he s tates w hose p rimary r esponsibility i s t he Angolan, N amibian a nd Z imbabwean g overnments. U ganda a nd R wanda l ater provision of human security, contributes to the emergence of ANSGs – which then turned against each other and used rebels as proxies to enhance their interests in threatens and accentuates insecurity. The ANSG phenomenon not only poses the the DRC. Apart from using the LRA as a proxy against the Ugandan government, Sudan also supported rebels in Chad and the CAR, which in turn supported rebels greatest threat to statehood in A frica by accelerating its decline and collapse but in Darfur. has also contributed to some of the greatest human tragedies in the world. Some rebel groups have formed the governments of post-independence, post- But t he p henomenon i tself i s co mplex b oth in co louration, ac tivities, war and post-conflict states or shared power by participating in g overnments or engagements and effects. It has a complex relationship with community, ethnic and transforming in to p olitical p arties. I n A ngola, M ozambique, N amibia, Uganda, regional elites, political elites, state officials and state institutions, the opposition Sudan, Sierra Leone, the DRC, Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia, rebel movements have and r esource-based co mpanies a nd sy ndicates. E lements o f i ts m otivation a re been incorporated into governments of national unity or been transformed into based o n g rievances a nd t he fa ilure o f t he s tate t o addr ess s ocioeconomic political p arties f or s uch p urposes. I n t he D RC, B urundi, S ierra L eone, C ôte problems, y et i t a lso co ntains m any cr iminal e lements a nd i s dr iven b y d’Ivoire and Sudan, rebel movements have participated in g overnments through opportunism. I t i s t o s ome ext ent a n a malgam o f f orces t hat a re p opular, various p ower s haring, p eace a greement a nd t ransitional a rrangements. I n grassroots-based and oppositional, yet some also work for the elite and prey on the Burundi, following a s eries of ceasefire and power-sharing arrangements, largely people. brokered b y S outh A frica, m ajor r ebel g roups h ave b ecome p art o f t he It is these complexities that complicate any attempt at analysis. Therefore it is government. The major rebel group, CNDD-FDD, won parliamentary elections not surprising that the phenomenon can best be understood by detailed, in-depth

38 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 39 Introduction WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE

studies of specific cases while bearing in mind the general characteristics, internal 18 The m ost do minant r ebel g roup i s t he Alliance T ouareg d u N iger e t d u M (Tuareg dynamics, driving forces, linkages with local and external forces, its politics and Alliance of Niger and Mali, ATNM) 19 This g roup h as n ow r enamed i tself L’Organisation A l-Qaïda a u M aghreb I slamique (A l- economics a nd t he co mplex r elations w ith lo cal p opulations, y ouths, Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, AQIM). communities, t he p olitical e lites a nd t he di aspora, a nd t he et hnic lin ks acr oss 20 For details on goals, motivations, methods, social bases, funding and other characteristics of borders. Out of these, some general, systematic and analytically based conclusions Islamist militants, see chapters 11 and 12. can b e dra wn t hat w ould a id f irst in a n un derstanding a nd s econd in t he 21 Clapham, Introduction: analysing African insurgencies, 1–18. management of ANSGs. 22 Ibid; T Mkandawire, The terrible toll of post-colonial rebel movements in Africa: toward an explanation of the violence against the peasantry, Journal of Modern African Studies 40(2) (2002), 181–121. NOTES 23 Zahar, Protégés, clients, canon fodders, 110–128. 24 Ibid, 120–121. 1 See T ony A ddison, Africa’s r ecovery f rom c onflicts: m aking p eace w ork f or t he p oor, 25 Clapham, Introduction: analysing African insurgencies, 9. Helsinki: United Nations University/World Institute for Development Economics Research, 26 Zahar, Protégés, clients, canon fodders, 110–128. 2003, 1. 27 Mkandawire, The terrible toll of post-colonial rebel movements in Africa, 181–215. 2 Marie-Joelle Zahar, Protégés, clients, canon fodders: civilians in t he calculus of militias, in 28 Zahar, Protégés, clients, canon fodders, 119. Adekeye Adebayo and Chandra Lekha (eds), Managing armed conflicts in the 21st century, 29 Augustine Ik elegbe a nd D auda Ga ruba, Youth c onflicts i n West A frica: r egional s ecurity : Frank Cass, 2006, 108. threats a nd p otentials, Research r eport o f t he C onsortium f or D evelopment P artnership 3 Zahar, Protégés, clients, canon fodders, 108. Project 6 on ECOWAS and Conflict and Peace Building in West Africa, 2007, 124–147. 4 Ibid, 108–109. 30 Augustine Ikelegbe, Beyond the threshold of civil struggle: youth militancy and the militia- 5 Gani J Yoroms, Militias as a social phenomenon: towards a theoretical construction, in David isation o f t he r esource co nflict in t he N iger D elta R egion o f N igeria, African S tudy J Francis (ed), Civil militia; Africa’s intractable security menace? Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005, Monographs 27(3) (2006), 87–122; Y Guichaoua, The making of an ethnic militia: the O’odua 31–50. People’s Congress in Nigeria, CRISE Working Paper 26, 2006. 6 Ibid, 41–42. 31 Augustine Ikelegbe, Engendering civil society: oil, women groups and the resource conflict 7 The National Guards during the Nigerian military regimes of the 1990s is an example. in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, Journal of Modern Africa Studies 43(2). 8 In Liberia, there was Charlie’s Angels, a private force of President Charles Taylor. See William 32 Ikelegbe, Beyond the threshold of civil struggle, 90–95. Reno, The politics of insurgency in collapsing states, Development and Change 33(5) (2002), 33 Abdullah and Muana, The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, 180. 837–858. 34 Ikelegbe and Garuba, Youth conflicts in West Africa, 124–147. 9 Boas Morten, Economic indicators and ethno-national rebellion. The case for secessionist 35 Angela McIntyre, Giving back the future: a di scourse on the dilemma of child soldiers, in and n on-secessionist g roups, P aper p resented a t t he a nnual m eeting o f t he I nternational Festus B A boagye (ed), Complex emergencies in the 21st century: challenges of new Africa’s Studies Association, 48th annual convention, Chicago, Illinois, 28 February 2007. strategic peace and security policy issues, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2007, 22. 10 Zahar, Protégés, clients, canon fodders, 108. 36 McIntyre, Giving back the future, 13, 18. 11 Ibrahim Abdullah and Patrick Muana, The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone: a 37 Ikelegbe and Garuba, Youth conflicts in West Africa, 124–147; M cIntyre, Giving back the revolt of the Lumpen-proletariat, in C hristopher Clapham (ed), African guerrillas, Oxford: future, 23. James Currey, 1998, 185. 38 Christopher Blattman, The causes of child soldiering: evidence from northern Nigeria, Paper 12 Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen, Patterns of major armed conflicts 1997–2006, in Lofta presented at the 48th annual convention of the International Studies Association, Chicago, Harbom (e d), States i n a rmed c onflict 2006, Uppsala: Uppsala University, D epartment o f Illinois, 28 February 2007. Peace and Conflict Research, 2006. 39 Monika Thakur, Demilitarising militias in the Kivus (eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, 13 Christopher C lapham, I ntroduction: a nalysing A frican in surgencies, in C hristopher African Security Review 17(1) (2008), 52–62. Clapham (e d), African g uerrillas, Oxford: James Currey, 1998, 1–18; A lex Thompson, An 40 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, On economic causes of war, Oxford Economic Papers, introduction to African politics, London: Routledge, 2000, 198. October, 563–573. 14 Thompson, An introduction to African politics, 198. 41 Ibid. 15 Clapham, Introduction: analysing African insurgencies, 7. 42 Ibid; Paul Collier, Doing well out of war: an economy perspective, in M B erdal and D M 16 Ibid, 1–18. Malone (eds), Economic agenda in civil wars, Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner, 2000, 91–111; 17 Ibid. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Greed and grievance in civil war, World Bank Working Paper

40 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 411 Introduction WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE

2355, May 2000; I de Soysa, The resource curse: are civil wars driven by rapacity or paucity? 63 Reno, The politics of insurgency in collapsing states, 845. in M B erdal and D M M alone (eds), Economic agenda in civil wars, Boulder, Colo: Lynne 64 Patrick C habal a nd J ean-Pascal D aloz, Africa w orks: d isorder as p olitical i nstrument, Rienner, 2000, 113–135; W illiam R eno, Th e p olitics o f in surgency in co llapsing s tates, Oxford, Bloomington and Indianapolis: The International African Institute, James Currey Development and Change 33(5) (2003). and Indiana University Press, 1999, 29. 43 Paul C ollier a nd N icholas Sa mbanis, U nderstanding ci vil wa r: a n ew a genda, Journal of 65 Abdullah and Muana, The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, 172. Conflict Resolution 46(3) (2002), 3. 66 Ibid, 173–185. 44 Ibrahim E lbadawi a nd N icholas Sa mbanis, How m uch w ar w ill w e s ee? E stimating t he 67 Ikelegbe, Beyond the threshold of civil struggle, 89–90. incidence of civil war in 161 countries, World Bank Policy Research Paper 2533, January 2001, 68 Ikelegbe and Garuba, Youth conflicts in West Africa, 124–147. 1–32. 69 Reno, The politics of insurgency in collapsing states, 843. 45 Helga Malmin Binningsbø and Siri Rustad, Resource conflicts, resource management and 70 Michael T Klare, The international trade in light weapons: what have we learned? In Jeffrey post-conflict p eace, P aper p resented a t t he a nnual m eeting o f t he I nternational S tudies Boutwell and Michael T Klare (eds), Light weapons and civil conflict, Lanham, Md: Rowman Association 48t h A nnual C onvention, C hicago, Il linois, 28 F ebruary 2007, and Littlefield, 1999. http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p178653_index.html (accessed 3 August 2010). 71 Georges N zongola-Ntalaja, E thnicity and s tate p olitics in A frica, African J ournal o f 46 Paul Collier, Doing well out of war, World Bank Working Paper, April 1999, 8. International Affairs 2(1) (1999), 30–59. 47 Guichaoua, The making of an ethnic militia. 72 Osita Agbu, Ethnic militias and the threat to democracy in post-transition Nigeria, Research 48 Abiodun Alao and Funmi Olonisakin, Economic fragility and political fluidity: explaining Report 127, Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2004, 12. natural r esources a nd co nflicts, in A dekeye A debayo a nd C handra L ekha S riram (e ds), 73 Alhaji Bah, Micro-disarmament in West Africa: the ECOWAS moratorium on small arms Managing armed conflicts in the 21st century, London: Frank Cass, 2001, 27. and light weapons, African Security Review 13(3) (2004), 33. 49 Eghosa O saghae, A ugustine Ik elegbe, Om obolaji O larinmoye a nd S teven O khonmina, 74 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Declaration of a moratorium on Youth militias, self determination and resource control struggles in the Niger Delta, Research importation, exportation and manufacture of light weapons in West Africa, signed at the 21st report, C onsortium f or D evelopment P artnership’s P roject 5 o n L ocal C ontexts a nd ordinary session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government, Abuja, 30–31 October Dynamics of Conflicts in West Africa, 2007, 1–87. 1998, http://www.grip.org/bdg/g1649.html (accessed 11 October 2009). 50 Augustine Ikelegbe, The economy of conflict in t he oil rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria, 75 Bah, Micro-disarmament in West Africa, 33. Nordic J ournal of A frican St udies 14(2) (2005), h ttp://www.njas.helsinki.fi/pdf-files/ 76 J Herbst, Economic incentives, natural resources and conflict in A frica, Journal of African vol14num2/ikelegbe.pdf (accessed 26 July 2010). Economies 9 (2000), 270–294. 51 Guichaoua, The making of an ethnic militia. 77 P C ollier, A H oeffler a nd M S öderbom, On t he d uration o f ci vil wa r, Journal o f P eace 52 Mkandawire, The terrible toll of post-colonial rebel movements in Africa, 187. Research 41(3) (2004), 253–273. 53 Augustine Ik elegbe, S tate, et hnic mi litias a nd co nflict in N igeria, Canadian J ournal o f African Studies 39(3) (2005), 490–516. 78 Clapham, Introduction: analysing African insurgencies, 1–18. 54 Kay B W arren, The v iolence w ithin: cu ltural a nd p olitical o pposition i n d ivided n ations, 79 Collier a nd Sa mbanis, U nderstanding ci vil wa r; J eremy Weinstein, Inside r ebellion – t he Boulder: Westview Press, 1993, 6. politics of insurgent violence, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 61–95. 55 Ikelegbe, State, ethnic militias and conflict in Nigeria, 490–516. 80 See in particular the chapters by Kubai, Ikelegbe, Oloo, Ibaba and Ikelegbe, and Wassara. 56 Elbadawi and Sambanis, How much war will we see? 81 Kabir’s chapter deals specifically with this aspect. 57 C Allen, Warfare, endemic violence and state collapse, Review of Africa Political Economy 82 Osaghae et a l, Youth militias, self determination and resource control struggles in the Niger 81 (1999), 381; Ikelegbe, State, ethnic militias and conflict in Nigeria, 151–181. Delta, 1–137; Sydney Tarrow, Power in movement: social movements and contentious politics, 58 Clapham, Introduction: analysing African insurgencies, 5. Cambridge: C ambridge University P ress, 1999, 1–32; J M edearis, S ocial m ovements a nd 59 Tova Norlen, Economic indicators and ethno-national rebellion: the case for secessionist and deliberative democratic theory, British Journal of Political Science 35 (2005), 53–75, 54. non-secessionist groups, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies 83 Guichaoua, The making of an ethnic militia, 2006. Association, 48th annual convention, Chicago, Illinois, 28 February 2007. 84 Chabal and Daloz, Africa works, 80–81. 60 Ikelegbe, State, ethnic militias and conflict in Nigeria, 151–181. 85 For an in-depth analysis of violence committed in ci vil wars, see Stathis Kalyvas, The logic 61 D Ogac hi, E conomic r eform, p olitical li beralisation a nd et hnic co nflict in K enya, Africa of violence in civil war, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Development 24(1&2) (1999); John Muella, The banality of ethnic war, International Security 86 Kwesi Aning and Angela McIntyre, From youth to rebellion to abduction: the anatomy of 25(1) (2000). recruitment in Sierra Leone, in Angela McIntyre (ed), Invisible stakeholders: children and war 62 Osaghae et a l, Youth militias, self-determination and resource control struggles in the Niger in Africa, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2005, 71. Delta, 1–87. 87 Chabal and Daloz, Africa works, 83.

42 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 43 Introduction

88 See U nited N ations D evelopment P rogramme (UND P), Human D evelopment R eports, http://hdr.undp.org/en/ (acces sed 23 J une 2010), T ransparency I nternational, Global Part I Corruption R eports, http://www.transparency.org/publications/publications (acces sed 23 June 2010), F ailed s tates in dexes, Foreign P olicy, h ttp://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/ 2010/06/21/2010_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_rankings (acces sed 23 J une Issues and dimensions 2010). 89 Alain-Guy T Sipowo, Peace and security in : the role of international justice, in Chrysantus A yangafac (e d), The p olitical e conomy o f r egionalisation i n C entral A frica, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2008. CHAPTER 2 90 Wafula Okumu, Domestic terrorism in Uganda, in Wafula Okumu and Anneli Botha (eds), Domestic terrorism in Africa: d efining, addressing and understanding its impact on human security, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2007, 79–80. 91 McIntyre, Giving back the future, 13. Historical and cultural 92 Abdullah and Muana, The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, 172. 93 Ibid. 94 Addison, Africa’s recovery from conflicts: making peace work for the poor, 2. dimensions of militia and 95 See a lso I dean Sa lehyan, Rebels w ithout b orders – t ransnational i nsurgencies i n w orld politics, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2009, 26–54. rebel groups in Africa 96 See G Cawthra, Brutal force: the apartheid war machine, London: International Defence and Aid Fund, 1986; and William Minter, Apartheid’s contras: an inquiry into the roots of war in ANNE N KUBAI Angola a nd M ozambique, J ohannesburg: W itwatersrand U niversity P ress, 1994; P hyllis Johnson a nd D avid M artin, Destructive en gagement: S outhern A frica a t w ar, H arare: Zimbabwe Publishing House for the Southern African Research and Documentation Centre, 1986. 97 R D oom a nd K V lassenroot, Violent c ulture o r c ulture o f v iolence? Th e c ase o f E astern INTRODUCTION Congo, in F Columbus (ed), Politics and conflict in Africa, New York: Nova, 2001, 57–82. 98 Stephen Ellis, Liberia’s warlord insurgency, in Christopher Clapham (ed), African guerrillas, The African continent is vast and the militia and rebel groups are numerous and Oxford: James Currey, 1998, 164. varied, and therefore I have set pragmatic limits on the scope of this chapter. This 99 Ibid. 100 Ikelegbe, The economy of conflict in the oil rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria. is a g eneral o verview o f t he hi storical a nd c ultural dim ensions t o h elp r eaders 101 The Punch, 18 February 2009. better understand the case studies treated in subsequent chapters. 102 International Crisis Group, Nigeria: seizing the moment in the Niger Delta, Policy briefing With over 250 wars1 around the world, the last century may have been the most (Africa) 60, 30 April 2009, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/nigeria/ B060-nigeria-seizing-the-moment-in-the-niger-delta.aspx (accessed 15 April 2010). brutal in human history, measured not only in terms of the number of casualties 103 Ikelegbe and Dauda, Youth conflicts in West Africa, 124–146. but also in terms of the changing nature of warfare, where 85–90 p er cent of the casualties were civilians. Admittedly, ‘the magnitude of this violence is staggering’2 and A frica i s b y fa r t he co ntinent m ost a ffected b y co llective v iolence.3 It i s indisputable that most of this violence has been perpetrated by various factions and g roups, t hat c hallenge t he a uthority o f t he c haracteristically o ppressive regimes and resist the legitimate exercise of authority by governments, including those that are democratically elected across the continent. This has generated low- and high-intensity intrastate conflicts, which have become one of the hallmarks of our time.

44 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 45 HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF MILITIA AND REBEL GROUPS IN AFRICA ANNE N KUBAI

Wars and conflicts raging in Africa are complex and need to be understood in the establish g ood g overnance a nd eradic ate p overty. H owever, e ven a fter t hey light of historical and globalisation processes, which have unleashed competition established themselves in power, the political ills of their predecessors did not over an unequal sharing of resources.4 These conflicts, supported by small arms evaporate. I f a nything, t hey b ecame j ust a s o ppressive a nd co rrupt a nd t he and light weapons,5 have utilised cultural resources especially for the recruitment citizens sank deeper into poverty and despair. It is this situation that has largely into and mobilisation of militia and rebel groups. Cultural explanations include contributed to the emergence of militia and rebel movements in t he current the A frican co nceptions o f a uthority a nd t he r ole o f r eligious n arratives a nd phase. symbols. In an attempt to sketch t he history of resistance in A frica, one c an identify There are contrasting opinions on how to deal with the challenge of militia and several phases: rebel groups on the continent. Some attribute this phenomenon to the aggregate effect of that is manifest in the dysfunctional states. The process of the I The f irst p hase i s t he p eriod b efore co lonialism w hen r eformers m obilised establishment o f n ation-states in A frica b y t he co lonial a uthorities wa s resistance a gainst o ppressive t raditional r ulers in s ocieties w ith cen tralised accompanied by violence6 and it has been blamed partly for the current woes of the sources of authority. continent. It has been suggested that the colonial social and political institutions I The s econd p hase i s t he p eriod o f t he s cramble f or A frica w hen co lonial that w ere bequeathed t o the in dependent A frican le aders w ere weak a nd powers moved into Africa to annex their spheres of influence. Resistance to the underdeveloped, which did not auger well for future political stability of the newly imposition o f E uropean co lonialism in A frica wa s in m any c ases r uthlessly created African states.7 The way power was transferred to the new African leaders crushed and many lives were lost, since African warriors were no match for at in dependence wa s t o s hape t he f uture ide ological t rends a nd u ltimately t he European armies with modern weaponry. This violence, one can argue, set the political and economic development of the citizenry of these new states. They had stage f or t he b loody r esistance t hat wa s t o b ecome t he h allmark o f A frica’s high exp ectations f or de velopment, b ut w ere c hallenged b y a va riety o f history. vulnerabilities. Instability was an in herent p art of t he new state systems, w hich I The third phase is the liberation struggle, which pitted Africans against their soon b ecame m anifest in in security a nd v iolence. Thi s b ackground p artially colonial masters who they were determined to drive out of newly created states shaped the environment that became a fertile breeding ground for the growth of so t hat t hey co uld reclaim t he l and a nd, m ore importantly, t he dig nity a nd militia and rebel groups within a few decades after independence in many African freedom that the colonised peoples believed would be the products of self-rule countries. Thi s lin ks m y a nalysis t o t he t heory o f t he ‘ failed s tates’, w hich i s and political independence. presented by its proponents as the major factor for the proliferation of militia and I The f ourth p hase f ollowed t he r ealisation t hat t he m uch-sought-after rebel groups. But obviously there are other important historical factors, such as the independence did not fulfil the expectations of the masses. Resentment began and its aftermath – which changed the nature of conflict appreciably – to b uild u p a s t he ci tizens o f t he n ewly in dependent n ations wa tched t heir as well as an increased population and the degradation of the environment, both former f reedom f ighter-presidents t urn in to dic tators, p lundering n ational of which have put tremendous pressure on African political regimes and generated resources. The sense of frustration with oppressive governments during this the n eed f or a lternative s ources o f s upport t o mi tigate t he p revailing period gave rise to the phenomenon of revolutionaries who led armed rebel circumstances. movements. Of course, many of them were influenced by the ideologies of the In the African ‘traditional’ world view(s), most basic authority was vested in time, particularly Marxism and socialism. Resistance during this period was the head of the family, who enjoyed undisputed power as the family head and was seen as the second liberation struggle, and therefore the idea of ‘going back to the mediator with the world in matters of the family. The elders also were accorded the bush’ – as had been the case in the first liberation struggle – often gained high social status and its attendant respect and power. Next in t his hierarchical the s upport o f t he p eople. S ome r evolutionaries acr oss A frica s uccessfully order of power were the clans and finally the chiefs, who held their positions for fought t heir way to p ower and formed new governments with a p romise to life. Despite the dynamic influences of other cultures, particularly the process that

46 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 47 HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF MILITIA AND REBEL GROUPS IN AFRICA ANNE N KUBAI

bears s uch co ntested l abels a s ‘ Westernisation’ a nd ‘ modernisation’, there i s n o Islam and African traditional religion, have become so prominent in many militia doubt that elements of African cultures are still vibrant and continue to shape the and rebel groups. This chapter will address these questions. way p eople p erceive a nd a ppropriate n ew ide as a nd in terpret t heir d aily experiences, in b oth the urban and rural areas. Particularly matters such as the HISTORIES OF REBELLION AND RESISTANCE TO meaning o f lif e, in dividual a nd co mmunal iden tity, a nd t he ga mut o f h uman OPPRESSION AND FOREIGN INTRUSION relations, d uties a nd obligations, a re un derstood within t he framework of traditional social norms. In this section, I w ill cite examples of resistance against oppression and foreign However, fa r les s a ttention h as b een p aid t o t he c ultural dim ension o f intrusion t o i llustrate t hat v iolent r esistance h as b een exp erienced in A frica in militarism in A frica. A ccording t o F alola ‘ it i s im possible t o un derstand varying degrees in the last two centuries. Thus I agree with Kastfelt that to explain contemporary p olitics w ithout understanding p ast and present c ultures in s uch the brutal wars that Africa has experienced in recent years, one has to look at the areas a s beliefs a nd conventions of A fricans, t heir religions, p hilosophy, ‘long hi story o f co lonial v iolence’ a nd a lso a t t he co nflicts ‘ in a w ider g lobal 10 established p ractices f or p ower r elations, s ocial s tratifications a nd co ncepts o f context, though they have African local context’. power and the “big man”’.8 In t he 19t h century a nd t he e arlier p art o f t he 20t h cen tury, m any A frican societies put up strong resistance to European intrusion in Africa. A number of the The role of t he ‘ big man’ in t he c ase of presidents in in dependent Africa is rebellions were inspired by African traditional religion and culture, such as the informed by precolonial centralised political systems where the old African kings practice o f u sing p rotective m agic p otions a nd s pells t o m ake t he f ighters and chiefs w ielded immense p ower and authority, and controlled t he means of invincible to bullets. In West and Central Africa, the 19th century was expected to government. H ere contradictions a rise when m odern s tates, w ith e lected mark I slam’s v ictory o ver t he n on-Muslim w orld. Thi s wa s t o b e t he a ge t he governments based upon written constitutions, function more or less like the old Mujaddid, the reformer, who comes once every century.11 It is not surprising that chiefdoms. Thi s, I a rgue, i s o ne o f t he fac tors t hat h as co ntributed t o t he this coincided with the advent of colonialism and its attendant violence. emergence of militia groups in Africa. Therefore cultural factors, whether latent or Since ‘Islamic discourse is also above all a m eans of resisting the state’,12 the manifest, lie beneath the emergence of rebel and militia groups in Africa. Islamic jihad provided a rallying call for resistance and rebellion against oppressive In t he in troduction t o hi s b ook o n t he ci vil mi litia, F rancis di scusses t he and corrupt lo cal r ulers as well as foreign intrusion, particularly by Europeans. various fac tors t hat co ntribute t o t he em ergence o f mi litias acr oss A frica. H e During the 19th century, in a number of states in West Africa had various emphasises t hat t he w eakness o f t he ‘Africa s tate’ a s a cr eation o f E uropean grievances against t he aristocracy, such as conscription into t he armies to f ight colonialism a nd w hat h e c alls ‘ complex p olitical em ergencies’ cr eates t he fellow Muslims, slavery, upholding traditional religious practices, heavy taxation 9 conditions that produce militias. However, there are other dimensions that should and o ther in justices, a ll o f w hich w ere co nsidered unI slamic. M ilitant jihad be acco rded sig nificance in t he p rocess o f a nalysing t he fac tors b ehind t he movements u sed t hese g rievances t o m obilise r esistance b y b oth M uslims a nd mobilisation of the youth into militia groups. At the collective level, militias need non-Muslims. The best known of these was the jihad of Uthman dan Fodio who, to gather together for their activities and they need to overcome opposition and inspired by his deep knowledge of Islamic law and mystical visions, declared war logistical b arriers t o t heir o rganisation. Th e q uestion i s w hat ex cites t hem a nd against t he co rrupt a nd un just g overnment o f G obir in 1804. 13 The lo ng-term provides sufficient motivation for recruitment and mobilisation? More precisely impact of the jihad was to shape the future of the West African societies. with regard to this chapter, from what historical and cultural resources do t hey In 1881 M uhammad A hmad, b elieving t hat G od h ad c alled him, de clared draw inspiration? How can the confounding nature of violence be explained from himself the Mahdi or ‘the guided one who would come during the troubled times a c ultural p erspective? I n e valuating t he r ole o f c ultural o r o ther m otives f or at the end of the world’ and accepted an oath of allegiance from local communities, violent political mobilisation, what needs to be investigated is why some cultural gathering a l arge f ollowing t hat wa s m obilised a gainst t he T urko-Egyptian- practices, particularly the use of religious rituals and teachings from Christianity, European in trusion in S udan. H e b ased hi s r ebellion o n I slam, c alling t he

48 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 49 HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF MILITIA AND REBEL GROUPS IN AFRICA ANNE N KUBAI

intruders apostates and therefore worse than unbelievers. From his position as the if o ne t akes in to acco unt t hat t he co untries w here t here w ere m ovements t hat Mahdi he attacked the oppressors and won the support of the Sudanese people, could be called precursors of the present rebel movements, are now haunted by who resented the Turko-Egyptian administration.14 Not only did the Mahdi put up their past histories. One can say that the current militia and rebel movements are a formidable resistance to the British, but the history of the Mahadiyya had an an embodiment of the indigenous resistance to oppression and the imposition of enormous influence upon the geopolitics of present-day Sudan. colonial rule. There is no historical or scientific evidence to suggest that African East African countries such as Kenya have a history of resistance dating back societies are violent by nature, which means that the long experience of violence to t he s truggle a gainst t he es tablishment o f co lonial r ule. Th e Nandi r ebellion, should b e a scribed t o ext raneous fac tors. Thi s m eans t hat t he s lave t rade, t he which s tarted in 1890 a nd l asted f or 11 y ears, wa s o ne o f t he e arliest r ebel establishment o f co lonial r ule, t he C old W ar, w hich wa s f ought p artly b y movements in Kenya to oppose foreign intrusion. By 1900, the Nandi warriors had sustaining African dictatorships as buffer zones, and effects of globalisation such destroyed an important telegraph communications centre at Kitoto, in the Nandi as structural adjustment programmes, which further weakened and impoverished valley, t hus c utting o ff co mmunications b etween t he B ritish g overnment in African states, provide the historical context for the political trends and events, London and its soldiers and the railway workers in Kenya and Uganda. Even after particularly those of the 20th century – the most bloody in human history. the British soldiers had mounted a massive attack on the Nandi fighters, the Nandi leaders de clined t o sig n a p eace a greement. Fi ve de cades l ater, t he Mau Ma u freedom f ighters m obilised w idespread r esistance a gainst t he B ritain’s co lonial THE POST-COLONIAL SITUATION: THE STATE, administration. The Mau Mau was the most serious crisis British colonial rule had GOVERNANCE AND CONFLICT to face in A frica.15 The Mau Ma u mobilised p eople a t g rassroots le vel a nd At independence the status quo was maintained, particularly because the change administered t raditional o aths t o s ecure lo yalty t o t he m ovement a nd t hus a entailed substitution of a European authority holder with an African, but both the commitment t o t he li beration s truggle. Th ose w ho w ere co nsidered t o b e core structure and the underpinning ideology of the system were retained. Gordon unsympathetic or traitors to the Mau Mau, especially if their reluctance was based and Gordon summed it up thus: on their adherence to the Christian faith (the ‘white man’s religion’ as it was being portrayed), were subjected to cruel torture and even death. The repressive German regime in what is now Tanzania bred discontent among The r eal p olitical in heritances o f A frican s tates a t in dependence w ere t he the people and by 1905, a ntipathy to oppression, coupled with a dr ought in t he authoritarian structures of the colonial state, an accompanying political culture and region, reached breaking point. A prophet named Kinjikitile Ngwale said he had an environment of politically relevant circumstances tied heavily to the nature of 16 sacred water, called maji, which could make the warriors invincible to German colonial rule. bullets. This helped start the Mai-Mai rebellion, which spread rapidly throughout the colony and eventually involved 20 dif ferent ethnic groups, all of which were Though the implications of the nature of this change may have been lost on the united b y t he desir e t o dr ive o ut t he G ermans. Th e Mai-Mai rebellion f orced people in t he euphoric celebration of victories of independence, it did n ot take Kaiser Wilhelm’s government in Berlin to consider the implementation of reforms long for the f laws inherent in t his changeover to become clear. Within the first in German African colonies. It is worth noting that both the Mai-Mai and Mau decade, many of the leaders proved to be dictators and resentment of the system Mau stand out in their use of traditional African religious rituals not only to bind was beginning to develop among the general population in t he newly ‘liberated’ the rebels together, but also to appeal to the familiar cultural realm to inspire them countries. What could have gone wrong with the ‘heroes’ of the liberation struggle, to stand up against colonial rule. who had been hailed as the saviours of their people? The answer is simple: they These historical examples of organised and violent resistance to oppressive rule were heirs to the colonial heritage at the dawn of a new era – the post-colonial era. and foreign intrusion make it possible to situate the phenomenon of militia and Some of them succeeded in es tablishing regimes and others failed. However, rebel groups within the history of resistance in Africa. This is particularly evident even t hose t hat p roclaimed t hemselves t o b e h arbingers o f c hange w ere s oon

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fitting in to t he s hoes o f t hose t hat t hey h ad r eplaced. F ollowing t his hi storical Adjustment policies and neo-liberal reforms in general are so severe in their impact trajectory, the next scene of African politics was to be dominated by the emergence that they have tended to undermine the basis of the nation-state project in p ost- of all manner of civil groups in many of the countries, which claimed to be acting colonial Africa, compounding the weakness of the state, engendering mass hostility on behalf of the people. Some of these groups were self-help women and youth to it and underpinning its legitimacy.18 groups, w elfare g roups a nd c hurch o rganisations w orking o utside a nd b eyond government inf luence a nd co ntrol. G radually t hese cr ystallised in to w hat h as As t he C ommission on Human S ecurity p ut it, p overty a nd ‘the ex clusion a nd become generally known as civil society, but for the purpose of my discussion this deprivation of w hole communities of p eople f rom t he b enefits of de velopment, is one of the processes that served as a midwife for the birth of, among others, the naturally contributes to t he tensions, v iolence and conflict w ithin countries’19 – civil militia. and there can be no doubt that deprivation contributes to conflicts and violence in Many of those that developed into militia did not have a clear agenda to begin Africa. The situation t hat has proved to b e fertile g round for t he emergence of with, and as mentioned earlier on, they emerged as well-intentioned village and militia and rebel movements in Africa is summed up as follows by Abutudu: neighbourhood vigilante groups and youth clubs. In due course, the character of the g roups e volved a nd g radually s ome o f t hem m etamorphosed in to v iolent Over the last two decades, various forms of communal and religious violence have armed groups, made up largely of young people who were willing to offer their been the hallmark of many an African country. Civil wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, services f or hir e t o p owerful in dividuals f or p ersonal p rotection o r a ny o ther Somalia, Burundi, Rwanda etc, have been the more extreme expressions of a process services. that h as s een e conomic cr isis a nd IMF/World B ank r eforms p itching t he s tate The question is why this situation arose. The answer lies in t he fact that the against its citizens and community against community, in shooting wars.20 independent leaders who took over power failed to forge strong states out of the diverse co mmunities t hat w ere b rought t ogether, s ometimes h urriedly, w ithin When people are deprived and are struggling to fulfil basic needs, they tend to be national b orders o f t he n ewly cr eated s tates. M cCalpin’s s tatement a bout t he more prone to violence and crime rates increase and the youth tend to be drawn Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which could apply to many other countries to delinquency. In such cases there is no peace and security for the individual or on the continent, serves as a useful illustration: the society. Inextricably linked with the issue of peace and security, is the question of j ustice. I t i s co mmon k nowledge t hat a s ense o f f rustration a nd des pair, The co nfiguration o f t he co ntemporary C ongolese p olity i s n ot t o b e v iewed a s simply the general disorder that has come to characterise African states but rather injustice, in equality a nd di scrimination in s ociety c an a nd o ften do es le ad t o as a dir ect result of crosscutting inf luences in i ts p articular hi story. The c urrent disgruntlement among the population. Apparently these ills are prevalent in those situation r epresents t he s uperimposition o f a n o verdeveloped, ext ractive a nd countries that are characterised by ‘misgovernance’ and human rights abuses. It is predatory state upon the vestiges of traditional societies and the ethnic mosaic.17 the g rotesque in justices in m any A frican s ocieties t oday t hat h ave co ntributed largely t o t he im poverishment o f t he g reater m ajority o f t he p eople a nd t he Another important factor should be borne in mind, namely the nexus between an emergence of militia and rebel movements all over the continent. economic cr isis a nd s ecurity. A s a lluded t o a bove, n ation b uilding r emained a Furthermore, fa ilure t o m eet t he a spirations o f t he s ociety u sually le ads t o mirage a s le aders spent n ational r esources o n n on-viable in stitutions that social upheavals, which in turn threaten the state. Where the national elites are not continued t o de bilitate t he s ocial a nd e conomic de velopment o f t hese s tates, accountable to t he p eople, t he p attern is t hat w hen p eople b egin to interrogate making p overty a p ersistent t hreat f or A frican s ocieties. P overty wa s f urther their r elationship w ith t he s tate, a s ocial t ime b omb b egins t o t ick a way a nd entrenched b y t he in troduction o f s tructural ad justment b y m eans o f t he eventually explodes. Hence I s tate that the emergence of militias in A frica could International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank for, as Abutudu observes: well be characterised as one form of social explosion.

52 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 53 HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF MILITIA AND REBEL GROUPS IN AFRICA ANNE N KUBAI

TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF AUTHORITY AND were attained through various rites of passage, particularly in communities where CONTEMPORARY POLITICS councils o f e lders f unctioned a s s ources o f a uthority. A lthough in s ome communities, political organisation was based on kinship and clan and therefore For the purpose of this chapter, I es pouse the view of culture as dynamic, aptly segmented, in o thers a uthority wa s cen tralised a nd t he hiera rchical o rder wa s summed up as ‘the meanings, changing over time, that are generally attributed in clearly defined for the various office holders, from the highest to the lowest level. a given community to repertoires of action’ by Ellis.21 A more expanded view is Social control was exercised through the notions of shame and guilt. A code of provided by Ali A Mazrui, who posits seven functions of culture in society, namely rules and t aboos regulated b oth t he individual and g roup p olitical ac tivities, as that it provides lenses of perception and cognition, motives for human behaviour, Magesa reports: criteria o f e valuation, a b asis o f identity, a m ode o f co mmunication, a b asis o f stratification a nd t he sys tem o f p roduction a nd co nsumption.22 From t his Social co ntrol t hrough s hame a nd f ear o f t ransgressing t aboos o r u pholding o f perspective both the emergence and actions (behaviour) of the rebel groups and dignity i s a lso t he reason b ehind t he f ormation a nd m aintenance of t he va rious militia can be situated within a cultural context. sodalities … blood friendships, secret societies, age grades and joking relationships Needless t o s ay, t raditional a nd m odern p olitical ide als h ave in teracted t o play a conspicuous political role, each one at its own level in African societies.26 contribute t o t he s haping o f p olitical s cenes in A frica. On t he o ne h and t he colonial sys tem a nd t he Westphalian s tate p roject, w hich i s s aid t o h ave b een The p oint h ere i s t hat in dif ferent t ypes o f p olitical a nd admini strative imposed on Africans, can be blamed for laying the foundations for the structures organisations across the African continent, authority was generally concentrated and the political culture that ultimately nurtured the growth of militia and rebel in the person of the head of family at the family level, the king where kingdoms groups.23 On t he o ther h and, h owever, i t i s un deniable t hat t he A frican existed, or chief at community level. Magesa uses the case of Bunyoro to illustrate contribution has been shaped to a l arge extent by its peoples’ worldview(s) and the role of the traditional ruler, who was the ‘pinnacle of power and all authority particularly c ultural va lues a nd n orms. W ithout en tering in to a de bate o n t he 27 persistence of African culture in m odern times, one can agree with Gordon and [flowed] f rom him’. He co uld t ake a way c hieftainships e ven f rom h ereditary Gordon that: holders and give them to persons loyal to him, a nd therefore more deserving of those p ositions. H owever, m y a im i s n ot t o p rovide a det ailed acco unt o f t he African cultures remain vibrant and are playing a leading role in the efforts to cope traditional political systems, but to illustrate how the cultural values and political with t he f orces a ffecting A frican s ocieties. Q uestions o f p ersonal a nd co llective ethos c ame t o inf luence p olitical p ractice in co ntemporary A frica, a nd h ence identity and meaning frequently come to the fore as well as discontent with political posed a challenge to the Western character of the state. oppression, foreign exploitation, and economic inequality and poverty.24 In line with this point of departure, I suggest that the personalised rule, with a high concentration of power and the practice of patronage relationships – which The appropriation of the African concept of authority serves well to illustrate the were soon to become the defining characteristics of the new African leaders – were cultural dim ension. I n t he t raditional A frican co mmunal lif e, a uthority f igures informed by the traditional concept of authority based on ethnicity and kinship. beyond t he fa mily le vel w ere ‘ political le aders’ t oo a nd t here wa s n o p olitical The authority and power of the father in a family are reproduced in the role of ‘the structure that was ‘distinct from the social religious structures of the society’.25 The founding fa ther o f t he n ation’, w hich wa s f illed b y le aders s uch a s K wame chief was closest to God and the ancestors. The political and ritual offices of the Nkrumah of Ghana, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, Mobutu S ese S eko of the former leaders reinforced each other to safeguard their power and the wellbeing of the Zaire, Hastings Kamuzu Banda of Malawi, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and even community. B ut le adership a nd p olitical p atterns w ere n ot t he s ame in a ll t he more recently, Robert Mugabe of Z imbabwe. These le aders b ecame, as was t he communities: s ome p ositions o f a uthority w ere h ereditary, w hile o thers w ere case with the traditional kings and chiefs, invested with absolute power over their acquired through individual merit or attributes such as wisdom and integrity or parliaments and citizens. They became the ubiquitous presidents as heads of the

54 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 55 HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF MILITIA AND REBEL GROUPS IN AFRICA ANNE N KUBAI

military, uni versity c hancellors a nd watukufu (Swahili t erm m eaning g lorious, Nigerian state’ during the B abanginda and Abacha military regimes, created an exalted) f igures a fter w hom in stitutions o f hig her le arning, r oads, s chools, environment co nducive t o t he em ergence o f et hnic mi litia a nd o ther mi litant hospitals and key intuitions in their states were named. Hence, not only does the groups.29 These in clude t he E gbesu B oys o f A frica, I jaw Youths M ovement, a traditional m odel f or t he ex ercise o f a uthority b ecome in compatible w ith t he movement f or t he ac tualisation o f a s overeign s tate o f B iafra, O ’odua P eople’s Western norms of democratic governance, but it a lso reinforces mi litarism and Congress, Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force, Chicoco Movement and Arewa promotes primordial loyalties, which are the fodder for militiarism in A frica. In People’s C ongress. L ike t he o thers, t he B akassi B oys in t he A nambra a nd Abia Somalia, for instance, a warlord is viewed in terms of traditional leadership based states emerged as a resistance army in response to insecurity emanating from the on the clan system. He (it is usually a m an) not only receives, but also ‘deserves’ ‘threat of armed robbers’ with the financial support of the traders who had been allegiance and support from members of his clan. targeted by the robbers.30 The contrivance of the public sphere for social expression and political action could not be more explicit than in the practice of sacking government ministers at IN SEARCH OF IDENTITY will and expelling non-conformist and disloyal members from the ruling parties. These actions reflect the traditional exercise of authority and control of political Perceived or real s ocial dif ferences in t he et hnic, co mmunal a nd religious organisation b y a k ing o r c hief. Thi s s tyle o f le adership b ecame en trenched in dimensions are responsible for shaping a people’s world view. Hence, in the past, post-colonial Africa, too, and has largely shaped the current political and social African c ultural n orms a nd va lues h ave inf ormed a nd, t o s ome ext ent, s till trends in m any African countries. It has become practice to quell the dissenting continue to shape the formation and maintenance of social and political structures voices, often by using violence through the ‘arms of government’ such as the police that h ave cr eated t he c limate f or t he em ergence a nd p roliferation o f mi litia. and paramilitary forces. The unintended outcome of this practice is to strengthen African cultural norms and values have been turned into a useful resource, aiding the resolve of t hose w ho h old di ssenting o pinions a nd t hose w ho f eel t hey a re the formation of and recruitment for militia groups and rebel movements. Culture being strangled by the hold on power of the all-powerful president. Hence this is is the basis of identity, both individual and communal. one of the factors that has engendered dissention, which has in turn nurtured the growth o f r ebel g roups a nd mi litia – t heirs i s a r eaction, o ne c an s ay, t o t he [It] s hapes p erception o f s elf a nd t he in teraction b etween p eople a nd t heir unyielding a nd un accommodating p olitical s tructures p erpetuated b y a nd environment. It exp lains h abits s uch a s w hy p eople r espect o ld a ge, h ave m any personified in the contemporary African leaders. Hence, as Bøås and Dunn rightly children, take care of their children, work hard, take to polygamy and support male observe: dominance ... i t defines norms of behaviour, such as inter- and intragenerational relations, co des o f co nduct f or h olders o f p olitical o ffices a nd t he dif ference [A]lmost a ll co ntemporary a rmed m ovements o n t he A frican co ntinent s hare between gift-giving and corruption.31 commonalities which are rooted in exp eriences and narratives about corruption, violence (p olitical and e conomic) and p overty. These common exp eriences h ave Normally young people are concerned about their identity, who they are and what over time contributed to the creation of deeply entrenched sentiments about social they will become in t he future. For answers to these questions they turn to the exclusion and marginality, especially among the young … A s hared experience of society: p eers a nd le aders w ho a re n ot o nly v ested w ith a cer tain a mount o f brutalisation, abuse and maginalisation informs the worldview of those fighting for authority, but also considered to be knowledgeable. In the traditional social set-up, these movements.28 this process was facilitated by agents of socialisation functioning within a socially controlled framework founded on age-old institutions. Thus the society was able To ci te N igeria a s a n exa mple, t he p olitical c limate a nd t he g eneral s ocial to provide a s afety net for individuals and members of communities. However, conditions, s ummed u p b y A dejumobi a s t he ‘contradictions a nd cr isis o f t he with the social changes that the African societies have undergone in t he last five

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decades, there is a p lethora of agents that compete for influence and the choices Laurent Nkunda, leader of the National Congress for the Defence of the People, a the y ouths face a re ra ther b ewildering a nd fa r b eyond t he limi ts o f t he rebel group, was interviewed by the BBC in 2008 and asked why he was ‘fighting a conventional social checks and balances. The cultural turbulence of our times is democratically elected government’, his response was that ‘we are protecting our reflected in the behaviour and activities of the youth. people’. This statement implies that the people that he was purporting to protect In the midst of these social changes, young people cannot easily resolve their are identifiable as a particular group that feels either threatened or insecure. attendant iden tity cr ises. Thi s i s f urther co mplicated b y t he fac t t hat et hnic From statements such as these, it is clear that the rise of some rebel groups is identities in Africa have been manipulated by leaders to serve selfish ends, with the associated with a perceived or real threat to security, and takes place to secure the result that they have become one of the causes of conflict. There is no doubt that self-preservation of the group. At present the Democratic Forces for the Liberation questions of identity are related to both the history and culture of a group. A belief of Rwanda – a g roup f ighting against t he Kinshasa government – i s one of t he in a shared historical origin provides a heritage of values, norms and symbols and prominent mi litant r ebel g roups t hat p oses a s erious t hreat t o t he p eace a nd confirms t he dic hotomies b etween t hose w ho b elong a nd t hose w ho do n ot security in Africa’s Great Lakes region. Though there are several factors, including belong. This link is the essence of the myths of origin, which aim at explaining the ineffective government, impunity and the struggle for the vast natural resources in origins and history of a p eople, and at answering questions on who are they and this part of the country, which triggered the current crisis in the DRC, the cultural where they come f rom. The trend is that in p olitical situations where there are and hi storical q uestions o f iden tity a re a pparently s ome o f t he co ntentious contested histories and identities, the aggrieved groups are inclined to defend their underlying issues of the crisis. cause, be it the right to citizenship or land, and they will be willing to fight for it. The ideological underpinnings of the conflict are established by ‘identity’ groups, many of which consider the historical and cultural aspect to be the most important USE OF RELIGION of all. The point is that this background is the precursor to the militarisation of One of the salient characteristics of militia and rebel groups is the use of religion groups that can be classified as part of the civil society in its broadest sense, which in the recruitment and initiation of members, and as a means of sustaining their gradually distinguish themselves as militias. activities. Religious do ctrines, r ituals and symbols f rom Islam, C hristianity and Thakur identifies three factors leading to the emergence of various militias in the case of the Kivu region of the DRC, namely personal enrichment; the power African traditional religion are used by these groups. As Kastfelt notes: and security vacuum that generates the need to provide security for their people, reinforced by t he et hnic configuration; and t he c urrent p ost-transition p olitical In some cases, such as northern Uganda, established religious traditions are applied climate that makes it possible for militant groups to emerge and thrive in this part to n ew s ocial co nditions r esulting in inn ovations b eing cr eated o n t he b asis o f of the country.32 However, in the case of the Kinyarwanda-speaking communities existing t raditions. I n o ther c ases, a s in t he S outhern S udan, wa rs p roduce of the eastern DRC, the question of identity and citizenship came to the fore quite fundamental changes, which in turn erode the whole social context of religion and early during Mobutu’s regime a nd l ater b ecame t he central i ssue of t he s econd lead p eople t o a bandon t heir es tablished r eligion a nd t urn t o n ew b eliefs a nd Congolese war. Their Tutsi origin was configured by espousing a version of history rituals.33 that is based on Hutu–Tutsi primordial dichotomy, and the gravity of the situation was exacerbated by the presence and activities of the Hutu militia in t he region Innovative use of religious rituals and interpretations of scriptures and doctrines after the of 1994. This situation, which is characterised by two create a s ense o f n ovelty, o f c hange in t he s tatus q uo a nd h ence p rovide s ome stances, namely an ethnic reading of the political situation and recourse to the use credibility t o t he r ebel g roups in t he e yes o f s ociety. B y a ttacking t he exi sting of force both to interrogate their relationship with the state and to claim what they corrupt g overnments o r unI slamic p ractices, t he mi litants p rovide n ot o nly a n consider t o b e t heir leg itimate s ocial-political s pace, i s ra ther co mplex. W hen alternative, but also a sense of legitimacy to their cause.

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In hi s b rief o verview o f w hat h e c alls ‘an im portant f eature o f mi litiarism’, more acces s t o s tate p ower, t he les s p olitical im portance o f r eligion a nd v ice Francis posits that there is a link between the activities and modus operandi of the versa.’38 militias and the belief in supernatural powers and occult practice … The hallmark It i s n ot o nly t rue t hat ‘ for A frica in g eneral, c hange, es pecially a brupt and driving force for the putative efficacy of civil militias in security provision is transition, is mediated through that aspect of culture known as religion’, but also their claim to supernatural powers through the use of oracular deities and secret faith-based loyalties have an unchallenged ability to mobilise energies and tap into societies and also their claims of ‘invincibility’ or being ‘inoculated’ against bullets human spiritual and material resources.39 Among faith loyalties I include African and light weapons.34 traditional religious, Islamic and Christian spiritual resources. The militias in the His analysis leads him to the conclusion that ‘the use of oracular deities, juju Horn o f A frica a nd t he D RC s erve w ell a s i llustrations: t he n otorious L ord’s warriors a nd t he s pirit w orld b y co ntemporary ci vil mi litias s hould a lso b e Resistance A rmy (LR A), w hich b egan in n orthern U ganda, t he va rious understood from the perspective of the military and the psychological dimension clan/lineage a nd r eligious-based S omali mi litias a nd t he Mungiki of K enya of asymmetrical warfare’.35 appropriate religious-cultural resources in different ways and in different political However, Francis’s perspective has one notable drawback in that he sees merely circumstances. Alice Lakwena’s Holy Spirit Movement (which became the LRA) a link between the way the militias operate and the belief in supernatural powers. initially b orrowed f rom b oth t raditional a nd C hristian r eligious p ractices a nd His f ramework o f a nalysis o f t he a ppropriation o f r eligious r esources b y t he appropriated the rituals of purification for the soldiers (as was the custom among militias does not take into consideration the centrality of religion in t he African the Acholi, to w hich A lice b elonged) as well a s C hristian ide as about t he Holy public space. This idea is aptly summed up by Kalu: Spirit. Recently small bands of LRA militia have started to move into the most southerly part of Southern Sudan, the Central African Republic (CAR) a nd the In Africa, the political realm is sacralised or enchanted and politics is a r eligious bordering areas of the DRC.40 matter precisely because it is a m oral performance … Th e world view in A frican Al S habaab (which m eans y outh) i s a n I slamic mi litant g roup t hat p oses a communities is charismatic as gods operate in t he sky, land, water and ancestral serious challenge to the fragile transitional government in Somalia. According to world. Th ey des troy t he b oundaries b etween t he p rofane a nd s acred: s acralise De Waal, ‘Islamic ideology can b e important in m obilising forces and instilling reality a nd g ives r eligious va lue t o e veryday ac tivities. R eligion, c ulture a nd t he discipline in t he context of a w eak state’41 and in t he present lawless situation in modern public space are constantly villagised through the use of cultic elements Somalia, Al Shabaab initially used the notion of the Islamic jihad to mobilise the acquired f rom t he p rimal s ector o f c ulture a nd et hnicity b ecome t he o rganising support of the lo cal p eople. However, it s oon b egan to use extreme violence to frameworks of human lives.36 secure co nformity t o i ts b rand o f Islam: Al S habaab, among o thers, imposed a burdensome co de o f dr ess a nd b ehaviour a nd t ightened i ts g rip o n t he p eople Therefore, a s F alola a rgues, t he im portance o f r eligion in a ny a ttempt t o living in the areas under its control. Failure to conform is punished by beheading understand African life in all its social, economic and political aspects cannot be and other cr uel f orms of ex ecution. It a lso p erpetrates other atrocities, s uch a s overestimated.37 Many militia groups use some or other form of ritual and many abduction and rape of women and girls, to intimidate the population. draw u pon c ultural p ractices t o leg itimise w hat t hey do. I n addi tion, t here a re Unlike t he Al S habaab movement, t he Mungiki is a les s o rganised a nd those w ho t arget cer tain s ocial in structions a nd t herefore a ssume a c ultural clandestine g roup t hat m akes u se o f A frican t raditional r eligious r esources b y approach for their activities. To understand the function of ritual, particularly in presenting itself as advocate for the return to African culture. Ritual occupies a the recruitment into militia groups and the role of secret societies in s ustaining central place in its tenets and new members are initiated through rituals that are them, t here i s acco rdingly a n eed t o exa mine t he a ppropriation o f r eligious inspired b y A frican t raditional r eligion. Th e o ath-taking cer emony in ducts t he resources b y s ome mi litia f or, a s K astfelt p ut i t: ‘ There i s a dir ect co rrelation members into a secret society and other practices, such as circumcision of women between people’s access to state power and the political significance of religion: the and the use of certain traditional symbols and items, are considered to symbolise

60 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 61 HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF MILITIA AND REBEL GROUPS IN AFRICA ANNE N KUBAI

a return to African culture or a ‘re-traditionalisation’ of modern society. It is also but t hrough t he r egional a nd s ubregional di sputes w hose o rigins a re in t he known to offer sacrifices and perform acts of traditional worship. This particular complexities of local political history and cultural practices’.43 militia group has distinguished itself as a r eligious movement, though there are social, political and economic reasons for its emergence. It uses culture as a means A twofold argument is offered, which presupposes the notion of continuity and of expression of political dissent. However, it should be noted that one of the latest change in the cultural arena in which the communities today are confronted by the developments is the conversion of the Mungiki leader and a group of his followers challenge o f h armonising a nd b lending t he o ld a nd t he em erging c ultural practices. Th e m ost s alient a spect acr oss t he b road s pectrum o f t he mi litias in to C hristianity. Th ey j oined t he J esus i s A live M inistry in O ctober 2009. Th e Africa i s t he o rgy o f v iolence t hat i s v isited u pon inn ocent w omen, m en a nd implications of this conversion and identification with a Christian church for the children. If t he mi litia g roups, a s wa s s uggested above, are reacting t o p olitical Mungiki are not yet clear. oppression, m arginalisation o r ex clusion, w hy do t hey t urn t heir w rath o n In t he c ase o f Al S habaab, t he LR A a nd t he Mungiki, r eligion (I slam, ordinary people who are in n o way responsible for the state of affairs? Why is it Christianity and African traditional religion) provided both the ideological and that o ne o f t he def ining c haracteristics o f mi litia g roups i s p lunder, w reaking structural framework for their activities. havoc on societies of which they are members? Antony Block provides an astute response t o t his q uestion w ith hi s s uggestion t hat v iolence c an b e s een ‘ as a UNDERSTANDING MILITIA VIOLENCE AND ATROCITIES changing form of meaningful action’.44 He advocates for the study of violence ‘as a historically developed cultural form or construction’.45 Various explanations have been offered for the atrocious violence perpetrated by In recent decades the world has witnessed unprecedented rapid social changes, militias and rebels. Sall, for example, states that whereas some explanations focus the effects and ambiguities of which have been felt by African societies, too. The on: competing influences are vast and the choices that the youth of today have to face are bewildering. In the past African societies were bound together by adherence to … structural factors, others, of a more or less essentialist kind, [invoke] the cultural such n orms a s r espect f or t he e lderly a nd a s ense o f co mmunity t hat en sured peculiarities of African societies. Others still relate the violence to the collapse of strong affinity for one’s relatives, clan and community. A sense of shame and fear the very mechanisms or ideologies that constituted part of the cement that, until of transgressing taboos served as means of social control. However, in the present- then, kept the nations together and societies in conflict together. In some strands of day world, these values are used selectively to initiate youths into militia groups and the values are manipulated and the rites extended to include the commission literature, i t i s e ven a rgued t hat t he p erpetration o f v iolence i s a m ode o f of atrocities against even their own kin. Child soldiers who have either been re- development, a way of producing modernity.42 integrated into t heir co mmunities o r w ho h ave es caped f rom mi litia g roups in Liberia, Sudan, the DRC and Mozambique and many other countries have told At issue here is the link between violence and culture. Whether any culture, or the stories of these cruel experiences. African cultures in particular, are especially more inclined toward violence is not On the one hand, this would seem to signify not only a loss of respect for age the first question that needs to be asked, but rather the urgent issue is to establish and kin, but ultimately loss of value for human life. It was a taboo, a curse, to hurt the historical and cultural dimensions of the violence that is perpetrated by the one’s parents, brothers and sisters and even those who were related through lineage groups under scrutiny. Ellis’s endorsement of Neil’s suggestion is instructive here: and clan, let alone to shed their blood. On the other hand, while violence can be a mode o f co mmunication, i t c an b e s uggested t hat sin ce c ulture i s n ot s tatic, … it is persuasive to argue as Neil Whitehead … does, that ‘thinking of violence as ‘globalisation is changing other world views’46 and hence shaping the appropriation a cultural form reveals that violence is often engendered not simply by adherence to of t he old c ultural va lues to produce a n ew c ultural understanding of violence. globalised ideologies such as Christianity, liberal democracy, communism or Islam, After all, the militia is as much a social as a political and economic phenomenon.

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If o ne a grees w ith M azrui’s t hesis, c ulture i s a lso a m ode o f p roduction a nd frustration of the youth who are exploited by both the elite and the elders at the consumption, n ot o nly o f g oods b ut a lso o f ide as. Th erefore, if t he s ocial community level. This is illustrated in t he December 2007 g eneral elections and safeguards a s def ined b y t he o lder c ultural n orms h ave los t t heir ef ficacy, i t i s the subsequent post-election violence in K enya, in w hich militia groups, among perhaps b ecause new ones are emerging t hat blend and continue to shape new others, r eceived s upport f rom t he p olitical e lite w ho m obilised t hem a s attitudes. ‘supporters’. Another exa mple i s t he e lders in t he R ift Valley, w ho e levated t he The question is, how can gender violence, which is the trademark of militia youth t o t he r ole o f def enders o f t heir co mmunity in terests. F or s ome o f t he violence, b e o therwise un derstood? W hile wa rs a nd co nflicts in A frica a re communities a lso, it s eems as if t he practice of t raditional c attle raiding or t he complex a nd exhi bit a m ultiplicity o f hi storical a nd g lobal fac tors, in cluding ‘ c ulture’ m ay h ave b een r eincarnated in mi litia ac tivities, t hough t he sharing o f r esources, t he g ender v iolence a gainst a nd ra pe o f w omen h ave a difference is that in t raditional societies the practice was subject to well-defined cultural dimension. My argument is that it is a reflection of the prevailing gender rules t hat en sured ci vility d uring ra ids. T oday mi litia g roups s eize e very power disparities within feminine and masculine constructions, as well as roles opportunity to raid villages and visit untold suffering and abominable atrocities on allocated to and expectations of women and men. The purpose of the widespread the ci vilian p opulations – ac ts t hat p reviously w ould h ave b een co nsidered a infliction of physical harm on the members of the ‘other group’ or ‘enemies’ – such breach of taboos and punishable through prescribed social and political sanctions. as mass rape of women and g irls and t he amputation of limbs, w hich was f irst applied in L iberia – i s t o h umiliate, in timidate a nd t raumatise, a nd u ltimately CONCLUSION destroy, entire communities. Apparently, women and girls are raped not only to humiliate t heir m ale fa mily m embers, o f w hom t he t raditional m asculine In this chapter I have traced the current militia and rebel movement phenomena expectation is that they should protect their womenfolk, but also because women to the resistance to corrupt and oppressive local rulers and violent resistance to the are perceived to be the guardians of culture. From this perspective the violence establishment of colonial rule. I h ave argued that as a r esult of a lo ng history of that targets women is logical, because in this way the very core of the community, fighting f or f reedom, t he c ulture o f r esistance t ook r oot in s ociety a nd in which is its cultural identity, is attacked. Furthermore, in the age of AIDS and HIV, subsequent years manifested itself in r esistance to misrule in m any countries of rape (which has been classified as a w eapon of war by the United Nations) is a post-independence Africa. lethal , as it spreads the virus to thousands of women. In this way, rape is It has been argued that the ‘failed state’ in Africa has largely contributed to the total and long term in its effect. And that is the objective. emergence of rebel movements and militia groups in Africa. The seed of violence As s uggested a bove, t he co nstructs o f m asculinity a nd p ower r elations in was sown by leaders who built their leadership upon ethnic and regional support, traditional societies determine the gender role distribution at both the family and and ex cluded t hose w ho did n ot f ind fa vour w ith t he g overnment. Thi s s eed community levels. At the family level, children are socialised and raised to be brave sprouted in the form of ‘tribalism’ during the first decade after independence and men o r wa rriors t o p rotect t heir w omen a nd c hildren. A n exa mple o f t he soon b ecame t he vehicle for expressing discontent for t hose excluded f rom t he economic and social practices associated with warrior mentality is raiding other system. Thi s p rovided t he c limate f or t he em ergence o f g roups a nd t he communities t o ‘ bring h ome c attle’. C attle w ere a nd s till a re f or m any establishment o f in stitutions o utside t he leg itimate s tate authority. As h as b een communities, such as the Murle of Southern Sudan, the Karamajong of northern seen in W est a nd C entral A frica a nd in t he H orn o f A frica, t here i s s ufficient Uganda a nd t he Maasai of Kenya a nd Tanzania, a va luable e conomic resource, evidence to suggest that the emergence of militia and militant rebel movements acquisition of which was not only an economic imperative, but also an important can b e p artly a ttributed t o a b reakdown o f l aw a nd o rder in m any A frican cultural practice. It was an expression of masculinity and courage, virtues all men countries. should p ossess. Th e e asy acces s t o t he u ser-friendly AK-47 r ifle h as n ot o nly This chapter has drawn on examples from several countries to illustrate the revolutionised this age-old practice, but also provided a means of venting pent-up historical and cultural dimensions of the phenomenon of militia and rebel groups

64 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 65 HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF MILITIA AND REBEL GROUPS IN AFRICA ANNE N KUBAI

on the continent. It has been argued that resistance to oppression and intrusion 22 A Ali Mazrui, Cultural forces in world politics, London: James Carrey, 1990, 8. has become embedded in African societies and that it is usually buttressed by the 23 Francis, Civil militia. use of cultural resources. The argument was further made that the emergence of 24 Gordon and Gordon, Understanding contemporary Africa, 4. 25 L Magesa, African religion, Nairobi: Paulines Publications, 1997, 216. the militia and rebel movements must be understood in the context of the dynamic 26 Ibid, 231. historical processes and events of the last 150 years. 27 Ibid, 222. 28 Bøås and Dunn (eds), African guerrillas, 14–15. 29 S A dejumobi, E thnic mi litia g roups a nd t he n ational q uestion in N igeria, S ocial S cience NOTES Research C ouncil, h ttp://programs.ssrc.org/gsc/gsc_quarterly/newsletter8/content/ 1 M Donohoe, War, rape, and genocide: never again? Medscape Ob/Gyn and Women’s Health adejumobi/printable (accessed 12 August 2009). See chapters 8 and 11 for details on how the 9(2), 2004, http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/491147 (accessed 25 March 2009). state created conditions conducive to the emergence of militant groups in Nigeria. 2 M Mamdani, Good Muslim, bad Muslim, New York, Pantheon Books, 2004, 3. 30 Tunde Babawale, The rise of ethnic militias, de-legitimisation of the state, and the threat to 3 L Harbom (ed), States in armed conflict 2003, Report 70, Uppsala University: Department of Nigerian f ederalism, West A frica R eview 3(1 (2001), 6, h ttp://www.westafricareview.com/ Peace and Conflict Research, 2004. vol3.1/babawale.html (accessed 28 March 2008). S ee chapter 6 for another example of how 4 K Mbugua, Kenya’s crisis: elite and factional conflict in historical context, Conflict trends, 1, the Sabaot Land Defence Force in Kenya emerged in r eaction to both marginalisation and 2008; A M ama and M O kazawa-Rey, Militarism, conflict and women’s activism, Feminist deprivation. Africa 10, August 2008. 31 Toyin Falola, The power of African cultures, 50–51. 5 J L eatherman, M ilitarized m asculinity a nd r unaway n orms: 1325 a nd t he c hallenge o f 32 M Th akur, D emilitarising mi litias in t he Kivus (e astern D emocratic R epublic of C ongo), overcoming extreme violence, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International African Security Review 17(1), 52–67. Studies Association, Honolulu, Hawaii, 5 March 2005. 33 Kastfelt, Religion and Africa’s civil wars, 12. 6 Mamdani, Good Muslim, bad Muslim. 34 Francis, Civil militia, 17. 7 David Francis (ed), Civil militia, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005. 35 Ibid, 18. 8 Toyin Falola, The power of African cultures, Suffolk: Rochester University Press, 2003, 99. 36 Ogbu O K alu, Faith and p olitics in A frica: em ergent p olitical t heology of engagement in 9 Francis, Civil militia, 14. Nigeria, P aul B H enry le cture, 2003, 1–2, p resented a t t he P aul H enry I nstitute, C alvin 10 N Kastfelt (ed), Religion and Africa’s civil wars, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. College, M ichigan, h ttp://www.calvin.edu/henry/archives/lectures/kalu.pdf (acces sed 28 11 I M Lapidus, A history of Islamic societies, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. March 2009). 12 F Burgat and W D owell, The Islamic movement in , Austin: Center for Middle 37 Falola, The power of African cultures, 299. Eastern Studies, 1993, 77. 38 Kastfelt, Religion and Africa’s civil wars, 6. 13 D R obinson, Muslim s ocieties i n A frican h istory, N ew York: C ambridge University P ress, 39 B K nighton, M ultireligious r esponses t o g lobalization in E ast A frica: K aramajong a nd 2004. Agikuyu compares, Transformation: An International Journal of Holistic Mission Studies 23(2) 14 Ibid. (2006), 71. 15 R B Edgerton, Mau Mau: an African crucible, London: Collier Macmillan, 1989. 40 Heike Behrend, Alice Lakwena and the Holy Spirits, Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1999. 16 A Gordon and D G ordon (eds), Understanding contemporary Africa, Boulder, Colo: Lynne 41 A de W aal (ed), Introduction, in Islamism and its enemies in the Horn of Africa, Indiana: Rienner, 2001, 60. Indiana University Press, 2004, 9. 17 J O M cCalpin, Historicity of a cr isis: the origins of the Congo war, in J F C lark (ed), The 42 E Sall, The perpetration and survival of violence: with examples from Sierra Leone, Identity, African stakes of the Congo war, New York: Palgrave, 2002, 33. 18 M I M A butudu, Human security in A frica: challenges and prospects, in A B oron and G Culture and Politics 5(1&2) (2004), 87–104, 89. Lechini (eds), Politics and social movements in an hegemonic world, Buenos Aires: Clacso, 43 Ellis, Violence and history, 470. 2005, 207. 44 Antony Block, cited by Ellis, Violence and history, 464. 19 Commission on Human Security (CHS), Human security now: protecting and empowering 45 Ibid. people, New York: United Nations, 2003, 5. 46 Kalu, Faith and politics in Africa, 4. 20 Abutudu, Human security in Africa, 212. 21 S Ellis, Violence and history: a response to Mkandawire, Journal of Modern African Studies 41(3) (2003), 457–475.

66 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 67 CHAPTER 3 Mapping the phenomenon of militias and rebels in Africa

BETTINA ENGELS

INTRODUCTION

Rebel m ovements, in surgencies, wa rlord o rganisations, ‘African guer rillas’, civil, religious o r et hnic mi litia – t hese a re s ome o f t he t erms u sed t o r efer t o contemporary armed non-state groups in Africa.1 Frequently, these terms are used in a n ormative way, having ‘descriptive, rather than analytic, value’.2 There is no doubt that armed non-state groups are not a new phenomenon, yet it is difficult to determine to what extent intrastate armed conflicts (that is, conflict where armed non-state groups take part in a relevant manner) in Africa have changed since the end of the Cold War. There are two ‘hotspots’ of armed conflict in western and Central Africa. The former includes Sierra Leone, Guinea, Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire, while the latter includes Chad, Sudan and the Central African Republic (CAR) as well as the Great Lakes region of Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Owing to insufficient data on non-state armed actors, and perhaps definitional vagueness, i t i s dif ficult t o p rovide r eliable n umbers o f co ntemporary a rmed groups in Africa, and how many members each one has.

MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 69 MAPPING THE PHENOMENON OF MILITIAS AND REBELS IN AFRICA BETTINA ENGELS

The aim of t his chapter is not to offer f urther def initions and t ypologies of of armed non-state groups specifically for the African context.4 Clapham suggests armed n on-state g roups. S ome b lind s pots in t he c urrent li terature3 on a rmed four c ategories f or dif ferentiating A frican in surgencies b y t heir g oals. Th ese groups seem to emerge from the fact that different strands of research (for example categories reflect more or less a chronology of rebellion in Africa since the 1950s. on ‘war economies’, identity, or the privatisation of security and violence) focus The first category comprises liberation movements against colonial and white exclusively on specific types of actors without locating them in the broader scenery minority rule, encompassing in particular the de-colonialisation era in t he 1950s of state and non-state violence in Africa. However, this chapter emphasises some up to the mid-1970s, such as armed insurgencies in Kenya and Cameroon in the factors t hat a re cr ucial if w e wa nt t o ac hieve t he a im o f un derstanding t he 1950s, liberation movements in S outh Africa, Guinea-Bissau and Namibia since phenomenon o f co ntemporary a rmed n on-state g roups in A frica in a the first half of 1960s, and in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe in the late 1960s comprehensive way. and 1970s. Taking Christopher Clapham’s work on African guerrillas as a s tarting point, The second category covers revolts of territorial liberation and secession such this c hapter a rgues t hat a m apping o f v iolent ac tors c annot b e co nducted in a as in Eritrea from the early 1960s onwards, the Shifta guerrillas in northern Kenya historical manner but it has to be linked to historical conditions on the national in the mid-1960s, t he Biafran war (Nigeria) in 1967–1970, a nd the struggle for and international level. Furthermore, the analysis of the overall political aims of autonomy in C asamance (S enegal) and S outhern Sudan in t he 1960s a nd e arly rebellion as liberation, secession or the change of government has to be completed 1980s. by inquiry into the motives and recruitment of armed groups. These encompass Clapham’s t hird c ategory, t he ‘ reform in surgencies’, denotes m ovements t o four k ey f eatures, n amely ide ology, iden tity, r esources a nd s ocial r elationships. which t he co mmon def inition o f a r ebel o rganisation a pplies. Th ey a im a t Without doubt, aims and motives are also highly relevant for analysis and policy overthrowing a g overnment and creating a dif ferent kind of state, but challenge recommendations, b ut t hey fa il t o f unction a s a c ategory o f def inition a nd neither territorial borders nor the state as an ordering principle in g eneral. Such classification of armed non-state groups. groups in clude t he T igray P eople’s L iberation F ront f rom t he mid-1970s, t he Therefore, I suggest building a comprehensive framework of analysis of armed Ugandan National Resistance Army in the early 1980s, and the Alliance des Forces non-state groups upon their relationship vis-à-vis the state and society based on Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo established in 1996. two dim ensions: a rmed g roups’ r elationship w ith t he g overnment a nd a ttitude Clapham’s l ast g roup, t he ‘ warlord in surgencies’, is ‘something o f a r esidual towards s tate m onopoly o f v iolence. I s ubsequently a rgue t hat n ational a rmies category into w hich to lump t hose movements t hat failed to f it into any of t he occupy a crucial role in the emergence of armed non-state groups. With regard to other t hree’.5 ‘Warlord in surgencies’ l ack di scipline a nd ide ology a nd f eature a an a rmed g roup’s r elationship w ith s ociety, i t i s in structive t o co nsider w hich populations they claim to f ight for and w ho are the p eople joining them. With highly personalised leadership. Often drawing on spiritual or religious beliefs or regard to the level of social structures, two categories of social inequality entangled on et hnic lo yalty, t hese in surgencies m ostly b enefit a sm all g roup o f p olitical with each other are critical for explaining why people, in p articular young men, entrepreneurs or an individual. They include Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic join militia and rebel groups: generation and class. Front of Liberia established in 1989, F oday Sankoh’s Revolutionary United Front The chapter concludes by emphasising that comprehensive analysis demands in S ierra L eone (1991) a nd M ohamed F arah A idid’s S omali N ational A lliance comprehensive p olitical s olutions: mi litia a nd r ebel ac tivities in A frica a re a (1992). Th ey em erged at t he en d of t he C old War, w hile m ovements following complex phenomenon and cannot be countered with blueprint programmes. relatively coherent Marxist ideology, like the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front or the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, declined. THE HISTORICITY OF NON-STATE VIOLENT ACTORS Clapham’s t ypology hig hlights t wo a spects t hat a re cr ucial t o m apping contemporary rebels and militias in Africa. His chronological approach shows that Christopher Clapham’s work on African guerrillas is ground breaking as it is not a mapping of violent ac tors cannot b e conducted in a hi storical manner and is only the first but still among the very few attempts to elaborate a broad typology incomplete if it is restricted to the overall aims of rebellion.

70 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 71 MAPPING THE PHENOMENON OF MILITIAS AND REBELS IN AFRICA BETTINA ENGELS

The p anorama o f a rmed in surgencies h as c hanged un der t he inf luence o f leaders affects the level of individuals within armed groups and is discussed in the international political and economic conditions. This is not to say that while in the last section of this chapter. Four issues are fundamental in o rder to capture the 1960s a nd 1970s a rmed m ovements h ad f ought f or t he (leg itimate) c ause o f motives a nd m obilisation o f n on-state a rmed ac tors, n amely ide ology, identity, national li beration, co ntemporary in surgencies w ere ‘ barbaric’, profit-orientated resources and social relationships. criminals as suggested by the ‘new wars’ discourse.6 Rather, one may observe shifts Armed groups declaring their aim to be a coherent Marxist state project have in t he wa y a rmed n on-state g roups r hetorically f rame t heir ac tions a nd in t he declined a fter t he en d o f t he C old W ar, a nd s ome o bservers t herefore h ave nature of their adversaries. Although colonial and white minority regimes have concluded a loss of ideological motives of rebellion in general.9 But a restriction of lost t heir r ole a s t he m ain o pponents o f a rmed in surgencies in A frica, s ome ideological m otives t o t he C old War im plies t oo n arrow a n un derstanding o f governments that emerged from former liberation movements became targets of ideology as such. If we define ideology as a s et of beliefs and norms shared by a armed n on-state g roups t hemselves (s uch a s t he Partido A fricano p ara a large group of people, fulfilling a political function and implying action-oriented Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde in Guinea-Bissau). political t houghts,10 ideological m otives m ay a lso der ive f rom n ationalism o r With n eo-liberal c apitalist g lobalisation ga ining g round a t t he exp ense o f religion. F rom t his p erspective, ide ological m otives s till p lay a cen tral r ole f or broad sections of impoverished rural populations and urban sub-classes since the armed non-state groups in Africa. Ideology particularly affects the cohesion of an 1980s, multinational corporations increasingly became targets of armed groups. armed g roup. I f m embers a re b ound b y co mmon ide ologies a nd a ims, t he National liberation is no longer the dominant rhetoric frame for fighting against a organisation is less likely to break up when leaders are killed or arrested.11 regime or government, but h as b een replaced by references t hat are suitable to Most militia and rebel groups are identity based in o ne way or another, with contemporary international discourses (such as human rights, minority rights and ethnicity a nd r eligion b eing t he m ost co mmon iden tity f eatures (f or in stance, environmental p rotection, o f f or in stance t he N iger D elta). A ctors in volved in ethnic militias in the Niger Delta or the ‘Beti’ militia at the University of Yaoundé armed conflict (state and non-state alike) have always framed their activities into in C ameroon). S ome groups are basically constituted b ecause of their common a broader international context in order to achieve military, diplomatic or financial religious iden tity a nd p urposes (mi litant r eligious g roups). O thers m obilise support.7 Whereas in t he 1970s a nd 1980s t his context was defined by the Cold around religious elements, but at t he s ame t ime b ecome et hnic mi litia or rebel War, in recent times some state actors rhetorically refer to the ‘war against terror’ groups (such as the Egbesu Boys in Nigeria or the Holy Spirit Movement and the to o btain s upport (s uch a s Uganda’s President in hi s co mbat Lord’s R esistance A rmy in U ganda).12 Many s piritually b ased a rmed g roups against t he L ord’s R esistance A rmy o r t he E thiopian g overnment f ighting t he originate in t raditions f rom p re-colonial t imes, f or exa mple t he ‘ traditional Oromo opposition).8 The emergence of non-state armed actors and their activities hunters’ (the Kamajores in Sierra Leone and the Dozo in Côte d’Ivoire).13 are closely linked to local and international conditions. Therefore, a m apping of Ethnicity i s t he m ost co mmon r eference o f iden tity-based m obilisation. I n these actors has to refer to specific historical contexts. several conflicts, it has become a resource for elites in order to stabilise their power claims and a f rame for distributive struggles. Such distributive struggles emerge MOTIVES, MOBILISATION AND RECRUITMENT from discords on the allocation of economic resources (for example oil revenues in Nigeria and Sudan) or land entitlements (such as in the DRC and Côte d’Ivoire). Clapham’s ‘ residual c ategory’ s hows t hat t he f ocus o f o verall p olitical a ims Ethnic militias recruit strictly from one ethnic group and claim a common identity (liberation, secession, overthrowing a government or regime) fails to capture the based on tradition and history. They often emerge from ethnic youth groups or range o f r ebel a nd mi litia ac tivity in A frica. He hig hlights t hree a spects t hat a local vigilantes. In other cases, rebel groups refer to ethnicity when they complain comprehensive a pproach s hould addi tionally co ver: t he r ole o f r eligion a nd about a part of the population being excluded from social, political and economic ethnicity, ide ology, a nd le adership. R eligion, et hnicity a nd ide ology a re c losely participation (f or exa mple in t he c ase o f t he Mouvement P atriotique d e C ôte linked t o t he q uestion o f m otives, m obilisation a nd r ecruitment. Th e r ole o f d’Ivoire and the Tuareg rebellions in Mali and Niger).

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Obviously, a ll a rmed g roups h ave t o g enerate s ome e conomic r esources t o to the practice of forced recruitment. High numbers of forced recruitments are sustain t heir ac tivities and b asic exi stence. For s ome of t hem – in a ny c ase for known to occur in armed non-state groups in Mozambique,23 Uganda24 and Sierra and s ecurity contractors – g enerating profit is t he core purpose of Leone.25 A t hird o f L iberian f ormer mi litia m embers in terviewed f or a s tudy their activities. Mercenaries and security contractors are not a new phenomenon conducted by Morton Bøås and Anne Hatløy stated they had been abducted or on the African continent, but highlight the continuity of profit-oriented private forcefully recruited.26 military a nd s ecurity f irms b eing en gaged in t he exp loitation o f r esources in 14 Africa. Nevertheless, t he s pread o f p rivate s ecurity co ntractors h as c learly THE STATE, THE MILITARY, AND NON-STATE increased in n umbers a nd s cales sin ce t he e arly 1990s. Th e p rivatisation a nd ARMED GROUPS commercialisation of security are part of the general process of privatising state authority in t he course of globalisation and neo-liberalism.15 Economic motives The dic hotomy o f t he c ategories ‘ state’ v ersus ‘non-state’ i s f undamental in have b een w idely de bated, a lso b eyond exp licitly co mmercial ac tors s uch a s contemporary r esearch o n a rmed co nflict. T ypologies o f wa r b uild o n t he mercenaries a nd p rivate s ecurity co mpanies. A part f rom t he de bate o n p rofit differentiation of the warring actors’ societal status.27 Although peace and conflict orientation (‘greed’) as a cause of rebellion,16 a wide range of economic motives can research l acks a w idely accep ted def inition a nd co nceptual f ramework f or t he be identified. The existence or non-existence of natural resources is not a motive analysis o f n on-state a rmed ac tors, t wo dif ferent a pproaches c an g enerally b e for violence. But grievances emerge from the way resources are distributed and the identified: concepts that build upon aims and motives, and others that focus on question of w ho h as acces s t o t hem.17 Economic opportunity s tructures do n ot armed groups’ relationships vis-à-vis the state and society. While the question of explain a rmed co nflicts in r esource-rich a reas. B ut t he ext raction a nd aims and motives is highly relevant for analysis and policy likewise, it is less helpful transformation o f n atural r esources p roduce p olitical co nflicts o n o wnership, as a category of definition and classification of armed groups. Definitions of armed distribution of revenues, organisation of work and bearing the costs of ecological non-state groups frequently build upon the characteristic of ‘the use of violence for destruction and damages to health.18 specifically p olitical en ds’ in co ntrast t o ‘ the desir e f or p rivate ga in’.28 As a In addi tion t o ideology, et hnic lo yalty a nd economic in centives, s ocial consequence, t ypologies o f a rmed n on-state g roups s tate t hat wa rlords a nd relationships and peer pressure are crucial factors for explaining the recruitment criminals h ad e conomic o bjectives, w hereas r ebels a nd t errorists h ad p olitical of armed g roups. In a s tudy by Yvan Guichaoua, more t han 80 p er cent of t he ones.29 This m otive-based a pproach i s n ormatively lo aded a nd t ends t o interviewed members of the O’odua People’s Congress in Nigeria said they joined (re)produce a ‘ rebels v ersus b andits’ dic hotomy h aving a nalytical a nd p olitical the g roup v ia fa mily o r p eer co ntacts.19 Relations o f p atronage a re li kewise consequences. Assuming armed non-state groups to be either politically motivated influential. Furthermore, people feel pressured by family members or peers to join rebels or loot-seeking bandits, analytically we fail to acknowledge the diversity of a militia or rebel group.20 Empirically, we can hardly distinguish to what extent non-state armed actors, their genealogy and their social base. Politically, labelling families and peer groups function as entryways to armed groups or put pressure non-state a rmed ac tors t o b e e conomically m otivated ‘ bandits’ s erves a s a on potential recruits to join. The idea of joining a rebel group rarely arises out of knockout argument: ‘criminal’ warlords and t heir mi litias are n ot acceptable a s the b lue, b ut s ocialisation i s cr ucial f or p articipation in a rmed g roups. S ome political o r s ocial ac tors w ith w hom t o n egotiate o r li sten t o. C onsequently, people ci te ‘ family t raditions o f r esistance,’21 others b ecome s ocialised w ithin governments ado pt mi litary f orce a s t he o ne a nd o nly a ppropriate r esponse t o radical student groups during their studies (that is, the pro-government militias in rebel activities.30 Sudan a nd C ôte d ’Ivoire).22 Students a ssociations in g eneral a re o ne o f t he In contrast, defining and mapping armed groups based on their relationship elemental milieus from which militia and rebel groups originate. vis-à-vis t he s tate a nd s ociety a void t hese co nceptual p roblems a nd p rovide a While most members of militia and rebel groups join more or less voluntarily, promising b ase f rom w hich t o e laborate o n a co mprehensive f ramework o f others are abducted and recruited forcefully. Armed groups vary vastly with regard analysis of violent actors. As a working definition, armed non-state groups can be

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described a s ‘challengers t o t he s tate’s m onopoly o f leg itimate co ercive f orce’.31 example in S udan a nd t he Ga mbia). W hen g overnments es tablish mi litia a nd Being a theoretical point of reference, this does not assume that the state possesses make use of them to threaten and fight civil opposition, oppositional groups (in a de facto monopoly of violence or that the majority of the population sees it as particular s tudent a nd y outh g roups) w ill p ossibly s tart t aking u p a rms o r legitimate. R ather, w e c an di stinguish a rmed n on-state g roups a s r eplacing t he collaborating w ith exi sting a rmed g roups. Th ese d ynamics m ay q uickly s tart a state’s monopoly of violence (as a whole or in certain regions) or coexisting with vicious circle of violent action and reaction. In other cases politicians pay local it.32 In numerous cases, warlords wield authority and thereby do n ot simply take armed groups to act as personal protectors as well as to commit attacks on their over s tate p ower b ut s ubstitute i t.33 Similarly, mi litia a nd v igilantes m ay b e adversaries (f or exa mple d uring t he 2003 e lections in N igeria).38 Misleadingly, established to protect the population in a certain region (or village, quarter etc) or armed non-state groups frequently are presented as if they were all directed against specific population groups when the state’s security forces are not able or willing the state or a government. to guarantee security or become a threat to citizens.34 This is not to say vigilantes With r egard t o a rmed n on-state g roups’ r elationships w ith t he s tate, t wo are sim ply s ubstituting p ublic s ecurity f orces w here t he l atter a re a bsent o r dimensions can be identified: their relationship towards the state’s monopoly of ineffective: violence (r eplacement v ersus co existence) a nd t heir r elationship t owards t he government of the state where they operate (support versus overthrow). Vigilantism is a category of non-state or self-policing. It not only acts independently Figure 3–1: The relationship of armed non-state groups to the state and the of national police agencies, but often does not co-operate with them and is prepared government to break national law to achieve its goals of protection and investigation (or even trials a nd s entencing). I t i s c haracterised b y r eactive, ad h oc a nd o ften v iolent Coexist with monopoly on violence methods of control.35

Nonetheless, a uthorities s ometimes en courage t he es tablishment o f v igilante groups. W hen t he m arket in Oni tsha (lo cated in A nambra s tate in s outheast Nigeria) s uffered f rom ext ensive v iolent r obberies in 2000, t raders ur ged t he Support Overthrow governor to invite the Bakassi Boys to intervene and protect the market and local government government population f rom t he a ttacks.36 The Bakassi B oys thus p artly r eplaced t he s tate’s monopoly o n v iolence (n otably t he p olice). Th e People’s Militia in T anzania i s formally regulated by national law and recognised as an integral part of Tanzanian security g overnance. Th e I vorian g overnment a lso t ried t o r egulate n on-state Replace monopoly security p roviders b ut a imed a t co ntaining t hem. Th e Dozo became p opular on violence fighting against crime and reconstructing ‘public order’ in the 1990s. Fearing the hunters may become a paramilitary force similar to the Kamajores in Sierra Leone, In a q uest to determine who the state and non-state actors are that are fighting Ivorian president Henri Konan B édié and hi s mini ster of t he interior l aunched against each other in contemporary Africa, one cannot but focus the analysis on several ac tions t o s eize co ntrol o ver t he Dozo in 1999. 37 These co ntainment the military, which usually is the main state actor of violence. National armies have measures were among the reasons why several hundred hunters joined the 2002 been a main source of insecurity and armed conflict, taking into consideration the rebellion in Côte d’Ivoire. fact t hat b etween 1956 a nd 2001, 80 s uccessful coups d ’état, 108 fa iled co up Numerous a rmed n on-state g roups in A frica a re e laborated, co ntrolled o r attempts and 139 reported coup plots were documented in sub-Saharan Africa.39 A sponsored b y g overnments t o f ight a gainst o pposition a nd radic al g roups (f or high n umber o f in trastate wa rs in A frica b egan a s mi litary co ups. R ebel

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movements that originated from military coups might start with a relatively small transport), medical supplies and education. Militias in t he Niger Delta have, for group of (former) militaries and grow as people who did not belong to the military example, provided scholarships for local youths to study in Ghana. previously join them as ‘volunteers’ (this happened in, f or example, Chad, Côte All armed groups refer to societal bases in that they claim to fight for a specific d’Ivoire, Liberia and Sierra Leone). (Former) members of the national armies who population defined by markers like region, ethnicity or religion. They accuse the participate in armed non-state groups range from demobilised soldiers from other government o f ex cluding cer tain s ocial g roups p olitically, c ulturally a nd states to the phenomenon of ‘sobels’. The central role national armies play in t he economically, o r t hey c laim a s hare o f r evenue r esources f or t he g roups t hey formation and advancement of non-state armed actors is plausible, because the represent. It is instructive to note to what extent a rebel group or militia relies on latter need weapons and military know-how that the former can provide. the support of those populations for whom they claim to fight. In many cases, the The m ain r eason w hy s oldiers (n otably lo wer ra nks) l aunch w hat J immy social base for rebellion is located in dif ferent nation-states. This is unsurprising Kandeh40 calls ‘coups from below’ or ‘subaltern coups’, is based in the relationship in view of the fact that borders (all over the world, not only in Africa) are artificial. between the military and the political powers. Whereas some armies, as in the case Furthermore, diasporas play a central role for several armed groups as a means of 43 of Togo, were ethnically based from the start, others have been instrumentalised mobilising resources and as a recruitment base. Although some members come and split up in t he course of political power struggles. Soldiers launch rebellions from far-off diaspora communities, the vast majority of fighters come from the country in conflict itself or from the region, notably from neighbouring countries. because t hey f eel t hey a re ex cluded, dem obilised o r denie d p romotion, o ften People migrating across territorial borders to another state to join an armed group because members of the president’s ethnic group, region or clan are favoured. This are sometimes presented as having a profit motive and not attracted by the rebel has been the case in, f or instance, the Kivu provinces of the DRC41 and in C ôte group’s p olitical a ims. Th ey a re m ore li kely t o ac t w ith cr uelty a gainst lo cal d’Ivoire.42 On the individual level, ‘being a military’ is at the same time a category populations.44 of identity and profession. The division of the national armed forces may signify One c an di stinguish dif ferent c ategories o f p eople w ho mig rate t o j oin a n for t hose co ncerned a t hreat t o t heir iden tity a nd s ocial s tatus, t heir m aterial armed group based on their reasons. ‘Regional recruits’ are persons who did not livelihood, a nd in s ome c ases t o t heir p hysical li velihood, t oo. F rom t his belong to armed non-state groups previously but migrated to a conflict area for the perspective, t he (p erceived) division of t he armed forces i s a s trong m otive for purpose of joining such a group. ‘Regional warriors’ are combatants who have not rebellion f or p eople w ho f eel t hey a re b eing m arginalised w ithin t he mi litary. yet been socialised within a non-state armed group and who migrate individually Furthermore, within the military hierarchy of a r ebel group, former members of or as a group within a sub-region from one armed conflict to another. At least in the national armed forces may occupy a higher rank than the one they held before. their own view, participating in armed conflicts seems to offer them their best and Therefore joining a r ebellion could often be equivalent to receiving a p romotion possibly only chance of survival.45 (that may have been withheld from them previously). Conflict-induced migration is not only a humanitarian catastrophe but also a two-way process. Some people flee areas of armed conflict, but at the same time SOCIAL EMBEDDINGS, IDENTITY AND MIGRATION some migrate into a conflict zone to join the warring factions. They may likewise come f rom w ithin t he co untry in co nflict o r f rom o ther, m ostly n eighbouring Armed groups do not emerge from or operate in a social vacuum: they mostly are countries. The analysis of which local youths and which regional recruits join a socially embedded in o ne way or another. They frequently make use of cultural militia or rebel movement sheds light on how ethnic and religious identities are symbols and traditions (such as traditional initiation rituals, religious and spiritual mobilised by armed groups. The mobilisation of collective identity constructions practices and symbols). And they replace not only the state functions of security, is without doubt an important factor explaining the recruitment, mobilisation and protection and v iolence but a lso t ake over other g overnance f unctions t hat t he cohesion o f a rmed g roups. B ut a s s cholars, o ne s hould r emain c areful n ot t o state do es n ot f ulfil in t he f ields o f, a mong o thers, inf rastructure (f or in stance reproduce existing and seemingly ‘reliable’ categories just because it is simple and

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easy to do. The construction of identity in African armed conflicts is not restricted social n etworks a nd r efugee/internally di splaced p ersons (ID P) c amps m ay to colonially shaped categories of ethnicity and religion. By focusing an analysis become places of recruitment, too. Flig ht and displacement are p ossible fac tors exclusively on these categories, one would be prone to systematic blind spots in explaining why some regions in the world experience more violent conflicts than research on armed groups. others.51 The r egional fac tor – en compassing g eneral r egional em beddings, t he Neither alleged ethnic loyalties nor s ocioeconomic factors suffice to explain ‘experience of conflict’ and refugee dynamics – may also explain the occurrence of where the ‘regional recruits’ come from. Most often, people who migrate across ‘conflict clusters’ in A frica (the Mano River region, the Great L akes region, the territorial borders to join a militia or rebel group come from countries that have Horn of Africa, as well as Chad, Sudan and the CAR). multiple a nd co mplex r elationships o f mig ration a nd co lonial hi story. F or t he ‘regional warriors’ (such as t he Sierra L eonean f ighters in C ôte d’Ivoire) s ocial, THE YOUTH CRISIS AND MILITANCY IN AFRICA cultural and historical relationships are less relevant. They themselves state that poverty and lack of opportunities are their motives for joining a militia group.46 In The question of why so many people and especially young men are willing to join West A frica, m ost regional warriors b egan t heir ‘careers’ a s forcefully recruited militia and rebel groups is crucial for academic analysis, peace and development children or youths in S ierra Leone or Liberia. Several hundred fighters were, for policy. Cr iticising t he ide as o f ‘lo ose m olecules’52 and ‘ lumpen youth’,53 social example, recruited in Liberia for the warring factions in Côte d’Ivoire, rebels and anthropologists in r ecent y ears h ave f ocused o n t he ‘ youth cr isis’ in A frica. armed groups loyal to the government alike.47 Some did not even know for which Economic crises and increasing poverty contribute to the growth of armed groups’ side they were fighting.48 When fighting in Côte d’Ivoire stopped, some moved on recruitment potential. But assuming a causal relationship between marginalisation to Niger and joined the Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice. There is a dearth and militia membership seems too simple: rank and file members of militia and in reliable data on regional warriors, which could possibly be ascribed to the fact rebel groups are indeed frequently marginalised in multiple ways, but usually they that this category forms a small minority of the total militia and rebel fighters in are no more marginalised than their peers.54 The introduction of the concept of Africa even though it has received relatively major attention from the media and ‘youth’ as a social category closes this analytical gap.55 Generational categories are non-governmental organisation (NGO) observers. It is furthermore important to neither fixed nor stable but continuously produced and reproduced in social and note that regional warriors are hardly those who start an armed conflict but will cultural n egotiation and c hange.56 Therefore, youth c annot b e def ined b ased on join it only temporarily.49 chronological age or as a fixed demographic cohort: The occurrence of regional recruits and regional warriors indicate that there is a ‘regional factor’ that plays an important role in t he emergence of armed non- The concept ‘youth’ is, to adopt Durham’s phrase, a ‘social shifter’: it is a relational state groups and intrastate conflict (for example in Uganda, Sudan and the DRC).50 concept si tuated in a d ynamic co ntext, a s ocial l andscape o f p ower, k nowledge, Most militia and rebel groups are regionally embedded. The war in Liberia started rights, and cultural notions of agency and personhood … Such social and cultural with fighters crossing the border from Côte d’Ivoire; ten years later, Liberian and variables as gender, religion, class, responsibilities, expectations, race and ethnicity Sierra Leonean combatants went to Côte d’Ivoire to join both the government and play im portant p arts in def ining w ho a re r egarded o r co nsider t hemselves a s the r ebel f orces. R ebellion i s le arnt, t oo: t he s uccess o f mi litary r ebellion in a children or youth – a nd the ways young persons are perceived do n ot necessarily nearby area seems to make violence an attractive option in another state or region. coincide with their self-definitions.57 Armed conflicts in a sub-region facilitate recruitment even in countries that have been relatively stable for a long time, like Kenya or Côte d’Ivoire. In A frican co ntexts, b eing y oung o ften im plies p otentially b eing ex cluded, Once a rebellion has started, there is a need for fighters: the most common and exploited and marginalised. Consequently, youth is not desirable but a social status efficient way of recruiting is through word of mouth. Refugee flows increase the one tries to escape.58 Resulting from the socioeconomic crisis, low levels of formal risk of conflict in host and origin countries as population movements expand rebel education, and lack of access to land and other sufficient means to earn a living,

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young men are excluded from the social status of adulthood. They blame those They are frequently supported and sometimes even controlled by outside actors, who have reached s ocial adulthood t hemselves for t his exclusion: ‘Many young no least of which are the governments and militaries from neighbouring countries. men locate their inability to ensure a f uture for themselves in t he greed of their The mi lieu le aders, t he hig her a nd lo wer ra nks f rom w hich a rmed n on-state elders.’59 groups o riginate, a lso r eflect t he wa y mi litia a nd r ebel g roups a re em bedded Generation is a category of social cleavages and conflicts. Originating from the within s ociety. L eaders a nd hig her-ranking o fficers h ave b een a ffiliated m ainly material conditions of life, it is closely linked to the category of class: class-based with the military and student organisations, whereas lower ranks originate from 66 social inequalities induce the gap between youth and elders (see Richards on the the s tudent a nd t he r ural mi lieu. The l atter o bservation r ejects Mka ndawire’s Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone).60 thesis o f p ost-colonial A frican r ebels ‘h aving li ttle in co mmon w ith t he 67 In the generation conflict, youth feels less threatened by physical than by ‘social peasantry’. The f ormer s upports t he a ssumption t hat n ational a rmies p lay a death’.61 Typical wa ys f or t he y outh t o es cape a re mig ration o r t he s earch f or a crucial r ole in t he f ormation o f a rmed n on-state g roups (a s in t he c ase o f, f or patron (warlords can be patrons, too). From this perspective, joining an armed instance, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Niger and Sierra Leone). group is a balancing act between ’social death and violent life chances’, as Henrik Vigh put it,62 and an opportunity to escape the social status of youth. Non-state CONCLUSION armed groups create some sort of order and social organisation in co nflict torn In this chapter, I identified four key factors in order to construct a comprehensive societies, and they offer a basis for social identity, integration and mobility. Being framework of analysis of militia and rebel movements in Africa. The first referred a rebel is a p ossible entrance to social adulthood: leaving the parental house or to motives, mobilisation and recruitment of armed non-state groups. I have argued village, becoming economically independent and able to build up an own family.63 that four types of motives and entryways play a role: ideology, identity, resources In t his r egard i t i s h ardly s urprising t hat h ouses, w omen a nd c ars a re cen tral and social relationships. Arguing that motives are essential but not sufficient for symbols in t he narratives of the youth when describing the social status of rebel the analysis of armed groups, I n ext suggested mapping militia and rebel groups group members. As Morten Bøås has shown, using the biography of Sam Bockarie along t heir r elationship t o t he s tate. Th e r elationship t o t he s tate h as t wo as an example, ‘being a rebel’ can represent a desirable social identity: dimensions: a n a rmed g roup’s r elationship w ith t he g overnment (a lliance o r opposition) and with the monopoly of violence (replacement or coexistence). The For m any a ngry a nd m arginalised y oung m en, h e n o do ubt h ad b ecome a r ole relationship b etween r ebel g roups a nd t he s tate i s a lso s haped b y t he fac t t hat model as well. The full tragedy of the situation is exposed only when we take into national armies play a cr ucial role in t he emergence of armed non-state groups. consideration that by Sierra Leonean standards, Bockarie lived a successful life … With r egard t o t he r elationship b etween a rmed g roups a nd t he s ociety t hey whereas t he o rdinary S ierra L eonean dies a s a p oor m an w hom n obody k nows operate in, emphasis is put on the social embeddings of militia and rebel groups. 64 about or pays much attention to, Bockarie died as a rich and famous man. These em beddings a re n ot s o m uch t erritorially def ined a s t hat t hey r ely o n sociocultural a nd s ocio-spatial s ettings. M ost a rmed g roups c laim t o f ight f or The function of the leaders of armed groups as role models is crucial. Most rebel specific social groups. These social groups are not bound by territorial borders, for leaders are less Weber’s ‘charismatic leaders’ than they are a basis for young men’s membership is based rather on cultural and social bonds. This is not surprising, aspirations t o w ealth a nd s ocial r ecognition. E ven if le aders a nd hig h-ranking taking in to co nsideration co lonially im posed co nstructions o f n ationality a nd rebels have academic or military training,65 they do not necessarily originate from statehood as well as artificial borders. Finally, the fourth factor comprised social social or political elites. They are rather ’small men in big offices’ for whom the role structures of inequality, notably class and generation. as a r ebel leader is an option for a p ersonal career (for example Charles Taylor, Complex s ocial p henomena s uch a s a rmed non-state groups dem and Foday Sa nkoh or Guillaume S oro). C ertainly, t hey p lay a n es sential role in t he comprehensive p olitical s olutions. I t herefore co nclude b y s tressing t he inner dynamics of most armed groups, but they mostly do not act autonomously. importance of mapping rebel groups in conflict resolution and management. The

82 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 83 MAPPING THE PHENOMENON OF MILITIAS AND REBELS IN AFRICA BETTINA ENGELS

features o f a rmed n on-state g roups a nalysed in t his c hapter t herefore p resent 10 W C arlsnaes, Ideology a nd f oreign p olicy: p roblems o f c omparative c onceptualization, specific challenges. Oxford: Blackwell, 1986, 150–154. 11 Clapham, Introduction: analysing African insurgencies, 9. However, co nflict m anagement s hould n ot b uild o n o verall a ims o f a rmed 12 H Behrend, Alice Lakwena and the Holy Spirits: war in northern Uganda, 1985–97, Oxford: groups alone. The relationship with the state and society and the different social J Currey, 1999; A Sesay, C Ukeje, O Aina and A Odebiyi (eds), Ethnic militias and the future contexts of the different members of armed groups are also highly relevant for a of democracy in Nigeria, Ile-Ife, Nigeria: Obafemi Awolowo University Press, 2003. comprehensive approach to conflict management. An armed group’s relationship 13 T J Bassett, Containing the Donzow: the politics of scale in Côte d’Ivoire, Africa Today 50(4) with t he m onopoly o f v iolence (r eplacement o r co existence) i s o f p articular (2004), 31–49; C Ero, Vigilantes, civil defence forces and militia groups: the other side of the privatisation of security in Africa, Conflict Trends 1 (2000), 25–29, 27. importance d uring t he f irst s tage o f p eace b uilding, w hen s ecurity h as t o b e 14 B Muthien and I T aylor, The return of the Dogs of War? The privatization of s ecurity in restored in a country of conflict. The relationship between an armed group and the Africa, in T J H B iersteker and Bruce Rodney (eds), The emergence of private authority in government (a lliance o r opposition) i s es pecially r elevant w ith r egard t o global governance, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002, 189, 194. determining mediation and negotiation strategies. 15 Ibid, 183. 16 Cf P C ollier, Economic causes of civil conflict and their implications for politics, World Bank In order to be sustainable in the long run, conflict management must address Papers, Washington, DC: World Bank; P Collier and A Hoeffler, On the incidence of civil war social inequality, in particular generational and class structures. Accordingly, the in Africa, Journal of Conflict Resolution 46(1) (2002), 13–28, 13. resolution of the ‘youth crisis’ is currently one of the most urgent tasks of crisis 17 M Mamdani, A frican s tates, citizenship and war: a c ase s tudy, International A ffairs 78(3) prevention in Africa. (2002), 493–506, 505. 18 D Keen, The e conomic f unction of v iolence in civil w ars, Adelphi Paper 320, O xford/New York: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998, 41. NOTES 19 Y G uichaoua, Who jo ins e thnic m ilitias? A s urvey o f t he O ’odua P eople’s C ongress i n southwestern N igeria, CRISE W orking P aper 44, 2007, O xford: C entre f or R esearch o n 1 M Bøås and K C D unn (eds), African guerrillas: raging against the machine, Boulder, Colo: Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, 2007, 23. Lynne Rienner, 2007; C C lapham (ed), African guerrillas, Oxford: James Currey, 1998; D J 20 T M M cKenna, Muslim r ulers a nd r ebels: e veryday p olitics a nd a rmed s eparatism i n t he Francis, Civil militia: Africa’s intractable security menace? Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005. southern Philippines, Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press, 1998, 24, 189–190. 2 A Hills, Warlords, militia and conflict in co ntemporary Africa: a r e-examination of terms, 21 K K ampwirth, Women a nd g uerrilla m ovements: N icaragua, E l S alvador, Ch iapas, C uba, Small Wars a nd Insurgencies 8(1) (1997), 35–51, 48; M V B hatia (e d), Terrorism a nd t he University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002, 11. politics of naming, London: Routledge, 2008. 22 Y K onaté, L es enfa nts de l a b alle: de l a F esci a ux m ouvements de p atriotes, Politique 3 Bøås and Dunn, African guerrillas; T Mka ndawire, The terrible toll of post-colonial ‘rebel Africaine 89 (2003), 50–70, 50. movements’ in A frica: t owards a n exp lanation o f t he v iolence a gainst t he p easantry, The 23 Weinstein, Resources and the information problem in rebel recruitment, 621. Journal of Modern African Studies 40(2) (2002), 181–215; J M Weinstein, Resources and the 24 J B evan, Th e m yth o f m adness: co ld ra tionality a nd ‘ resource’ p lunder b y t he L ord’s information p roblem in r ebel r ecruitment, Journal o f C onflict R esolution 49(4) (2005), Resistance Army, Civil Wars 9(4) (2007), 343–358, 343. 598–624. 25 L Stovel, There’s no bad bush to throw away a bad child: ‘tradition’-inspired reintegration in 4 C C lapham, I ntroduction: a nalysing A frican in surgencies, in C C lapham (e d), African post-war Sierra Leone, The Journal of Modern African Studies 46(2) (2008), 305–324, 310. guerrillas, Oxford: James Currey, 1998, 1–18; Bøås and Dunn, African guerrillas. 26 M B øås and A H atløy, ‘Getting in, g etting out’: militia membership and prospects for re- 5 C Clapham, African guerrillas revisited, in Bøås and Dunn (eds), African guerrillas. integration in post-war Liberia, The Journal of Modern African Studies 46(1) (2008), 33–55, 6 H Münkler, The new wars, Cambridge, Mass: Polity, 2005; for a criticism of these ideas, see 45. S N K alyvas, ‘ New’ a nd ‘old’ ci vil wa rs: a va lid di stinction? World P olitics 54(1) (2001), 27 N P G leditsch, P W allensteen, M Er iksson, M S ollenberg a nd H S trand, A rmed co nflict 99–118. 1945–2001: a new dataset, Journal of Peace Research 39(5) (2002), 615–637, 619; L H arbom 7 Bhatia, Terrorism and the politics of naming; C B ob, The marketing of rebellion: insurgents, and P Wallensteen, Armed conflict and its international dimensions, 1946–2004, Journal of media, and international activism, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Peace Research 42(5) (2005), 623–635, 624. 8 M Bøås and C K D unn, African guerrilla politics: raging against the machine? In Bøås and 28 P P oliczer, Neither t errorists n or f reedom f ighters: a rmed g roups, W orking P aper 5, Dunn (eds), African guerrillas, 20. University of Calgary: The Armed Groups Project, March 2005, 6. 9 S M air, Th e n ew w orld o f p rivatised v iolence, Internationale P olitik u nd G esellschaft 2 29 See f or exa mple M air, Th e n ew w orld o f p rivatised v iolence; U M enzel, F rom t he r ent (2003), 1–28; Münkler, The new wars. economy to the violence economy, Development and Cooperation 1 (2003), 31–33, 32.

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30 M Bhatia, Fighting words: naming terrorists, bandits, rebels and other violent actors, Third 52 Robert D Kaplan, The coming anarchy: how scarcity, crime, overpopulation, tribalism and World Quarterly 26(1) (2005), 5–22, 5; Policzer, Neither terrorists nor freedom fighters, 8. disease a re ra pidly des troying t he s ocial fa bric o f o ur p lanet, Atlantic M onthly, Fe bruary 31 Policzer, Neither terrorists nor freedom fighters, 8. 1994, 44–76, 44, h ttp://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1994/02/the-coming- 32 Mair, The new world of privatised violence, 12. anarchy/4670/ (accessed 3 August 2010). 33 P Jackson, Warlords as alternative forms of governance, Small Wars and Insurgencies 14(2) 53 I Abdullah, Bush path to destruction: the origin and character of the Revolutionary United Front/Sierra Leone, The Journal of Modern African Studies 36(2) (1998), 203–235, 207–208. (2003), 131–150, 144. 54 Bøås and Hatløy, Getting in, getting out, 34. 34 Sesay et al, Ethnic militias and the future of democracy in Nigeria, 23–24. 55 M Bøås, Marginalised youth, in Bøås and Dunn (eds), African guerrillas, 39; C Christiansen, 35 B B aker, W hen t he B akassi B oys c ame: e astern N igeria co nfronts v igilantism, Journal of M Utas and H Vigh, Youth (e)scapes, in C Christiansen, M Utas and H Vigh (eds), Navigating Contemporary African Studies 20(2) (2002), 223–244, 223. youth – gen erating a dulthood: s ocial b ecoming i n a n A frican c ontext, U ppsala: N ordiska 36 Ibid, 226. Afrikainstitutet, 2006. 37 Bassett, Containing the Donzow, 43, 41; cf J H ellweg, Encompassing the state: sacrifice and 56 C C hristiansen, M U tas and H V igh, Introduction, in C hristiansen, Utas and Vigh (e ds), security in the Hunters’ Movement in Côte d’Ivoire, Africa Today 50(4) (2004), 3–28. Navigating youth – generating adulthood, 10. 38 Human R ights Watch (HR W), Rivers a nd b lood: g uns, o il a nd p ower i n N igeria’s R ivers 57 F de Boeck and A Honwana, Children and youth in Africa: agency, identity and place, in A State, Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, Human Rights Watch, 2005, 17. Honwana a nd F de B oeck (e ds), Makers a nd b reakers: c hildren a nd y outh i n p ostcolonial 39 P J McGowan, African military coups d’état, 1956–2001: frequency, trends and distribution, Africa, Oxford: James Currey, 2005. The Journal of Modern African Studies 41(3), (2003), 339–370, 339. 58 J Comaroff and J L C omaroff, Reflections on youth from the past to the postcolony, in A 40 J D Kandeh, Coups from below: armed sulbalterns and state power in West Africa, New York: Honwana a nd F de B oeck (e ds), Makers a nd b reakers: c hildren a nd y outh i n p ostcolonial Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. Africa, Oxford: James Currey, 2005, 19–30, 22; H Vigh, Social death and violent life chances, in Christiansen, Utas and Vigh (eds), Navigating youth – generating adulthood, 36. 41 K Vlassenroot, A societal view on violence and war: conflict and militia formation in eastern 59 Vigh, S ocial de ath a nd v iolent lif e c hances, 38; cf J C omaroff, a nd J L C omaroff, O ccult Congo, in P K aarsholm (ed), States of failure, societies in collapse? Understandings of violent economies a nd t he v iolence o f a bstraction: n otes f rom t he S outh A frican p ostcolony, conflicts in Africa, Oxford: James Currey, 2006, 49. American Ethnologist 26(2) (1999), 297–303, 289. 42 A L anger, Horizontal i nequalities a nd v iolent c onflict: t he c ase o f C ôte d ’Ivoire, CRIS E 60 P Richards, Forced labour and civil war: agrarian underpinnings of the Sierra Leone conflict, Working P aper 13, O xford: C entre f or R esearch o n I nequality, H uman S ecurity a nd in P Kaarsholm (ed), States of failure, societies in collapse? Understandings of violent conflicts Ethnicity, 2004, 32. in Africa, Oxford: James Currey, 2006. 43 K Om eje, Th e di aspora a nd do mestic in surgencies in A frica, African S ociological R eview 61 Vigh, Social death and violent life chances, 31. 11(2) (2007), 94–197. 62 Ibid. 44 Human Rights Watch, Youth, poverty and blood: the lethal legacy of West Africa’s regional 63 Cf B øås, M arginalised y outh, 39; P R ichards, Fighting f or t he r ain f orest: w ar, y outh a nd warriors, Report 17(5), 2005, 1, New York: Human Rights Watch. resources in Sierra Leone, Oxford: James Currey, 1996; Richards, Forced labour and civil war. 45 Human R ights W atch, Youth, p overty a nd b lood, 2; I nternal Di splacement M onitoring 64 Bøås, Marginalised youth, 52. Centre (IDMC), Côte d’Ivoire: IDPs face deepening protection crisis as p olitical tensions rise 65 K Schlichte, In the shadow of violence: the politics of armed groups, Frankfurt am Main / New York: Campus, 2009, 35–36. again, Geneva: IDMC, 27 66 Ibid. 46 IDMC, Côte d’Ivoire, 27. 67 Mkandawire, The terrible toll of post-colonial ‘rebel movements’ in Africa, 181. 47 C Ero and A Marshall, L’ouest de la Côte d’Ivoire: un conflit libérien? Politique Africaine (89) (2003), 88–101, 99–100; L Gb erie and P A ddo, Challenges of peace implementation in Côte d’Ivoire: report of an expert workshop by KAIPTC and ZIF, ISS M onograph 105, P retoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2004, 16. 48 HRW, Youth, poverty and blood, 41f. 49 Cf Bøås and Dunn, African guerrilla politics, 30–31. 50 G P runier, R ebel m ovements a nd p roxy wa rfare: Uganda, Sudan a nd t he C ongo, African Affairs 103(412) (2004), 359–383, 359. 51 I Sa lehyan a nd K S G leditsch, R efugees a nd t he s pread o f ci vil wa r, International Organization 60(2) (2006), 335–366, 355.

86 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 87 CHAPTER 4 Armed non-state entities in international law: status and challenges of accountability

GODFREY MUSILA

INTRODUCTION

From Western Sa hara in t he n orth t o S outh A frica a t t he s outhern t ip o f t he continent and from the Gulf of Guinea in t he west to the Horn in t he east, the recent history of the continent seems inseparable from that of armed non-state groups. In S outh Africa, t he armed struggle waged by Umkhonto we Sizwe, t he military wing of the African National Congress (ANC), and other groups put paid to t he oppressive apartheid regime w ith t he inauguration of democracy in t hat country. In many other African countries, independence was won on the edge of the sw ord w ielded b y simi lar g roups: t he Frente de L ibertação de M oçambique (FRELIMO) in M ozambique, t he Mau Ma u in K enya, t he S outh West A frica People’s Organisation (SWAPO) in Namibia, and the Front de Libération Nationale in Algeria – among others. Current African experience demonstrates that the activities of armed non-state groups did n ot ce ase w ith t he h oisting o f in dependence f lags. F or va rious historical reasons, new struggles emerged in many countries not long after these celebrations had ended. S ome of these conflicts can b e explained by oppressive dictatorships, ethnic and religious struggles for power and resources and abortive

MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 89 ARMED NON-STATE ENTITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: STATUS AND CHALLENGES OF ACCOUNTABILITY GODFREY MUSILA

attempts at democratisation. There are quite a f ew countries on this list, among categories, the response of international law and its various branches has not been them t he D emocratic R epublic o f C ongo (D RC) (t hen Z aire), M ozambique, uniform. Angola, Sudan, the Comoros and Nigeria. While the activities of some of these This c hapter h as f our m ain o bjectives. Fir st, i t a ttempts t o di stinguish t he movements h ave n ot y ielded q uick s uccess, t hus p rovoking en dless s pirals o f various categories of actors – national liberation movements, rebels and militia as violence, elsewhere they have resulted in decisive conclusions. In some countries well as other relevant groups – in legal context. Second, it reviews international law the endeavours of these non-state groups have resulted in a t ake-over of power, and the branches that are relevant to these groups – in particular rebel movements thus catapulting them into government: Uganda’s National Resistance Movement and militia groups. Third, it outlines the legislative responses by the African Union (NRM), the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), the Alliance of Democratic Forces for and United Nations to rebels and militia activities win the African context. Fourth, the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL) and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia it provides an overview of the breaches of international law committed by these (NPFL) a re g ood exa mples. I n o ther co untries, r ebel ac tivities h ave r esulted in groups a nd h ow in ternational a nd n ational lega l r egimes h ave h eld t hem fragmentation a nd s ecession, a s wa s t he c ase o f Er itrea, a nd p ossibly S outhern accountable, a nd s ome o f t he c hallenges o f h olding p erpetrators acco untable Sudan. Experience from some African countries also shows that some armed non- under international law. state groups may not necessarily have grand political objectives, as in the case of The chapter has three parts. The first part provides the theoretical framework national liberation movements and rebel movements whose ultimate goal is either and c larifies s ome o f t he b asic co ncepts. It a lso o utlines t he p lace o f n on-state to take power or reach an accommodation for a new political dispensation. While actors in international law generally. The second part deals with issues related to this category may be appropriated by political organisations for their own ends, it legal responses by states and the international community of states to rebels and remains founded in either criminal (petty or organised and mafia-like) motives or militia un der va rious b ranches o f in ternational l aw. I t t hen addr esses t he espouses pseudo-religious messages. The Mungiki in Kenya and similar criminal modalities and challenges related to establishing the accountability of members of gangs and sects are a good example (see chapter 6). these g roups. Th e l ast p art co ncludes t he c hapter w ith f indings a nd The fact that the activities of armed non-state actors in general have invariably recommendations. been r egarded a s cr iminal (o r t errorist) in t he va rious n ational sys tems h as coloured responses by the relevant authorities. The question here is whether it also THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND BASIC CONCEPTS influenced, o r wa s inf luenced b y, in ternational l aw. W hat i s t he p lace o f t hese groups under the various branches of international law? It is true that by their very Locating non-state actors in international law existence, t hese entities – r ebel m ovements, mi litias and other armed g roups – operate against or threaten to overturn existing social, economic and legal orders, The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 i s often pinpointed as the starting date of the not least the international legal order. For instance, as shown later in this chapter, modern s overeign s tate a nd t he f oundation o f a n in ternational co mmunity o f some o f t he m ost eg regious cr imes co mmitted d uring t he co ntinent’s m any states in a h orizontal, co-e qual r elationship w ith e ach o ther.1 The ne w conflicts have been attributed to these armed groups. As noted already, activities international legal order so created – the Westphalian model of international law of such entities have in a number of cases resulted in redrawing the boundaries of – established the state as the central actor and sole subject of international law. The states, touching on a central pillar of the international legal order. Further, armed establishment of the League of Nations and later the United Nations in 1945 did conflicts in va rious parts of the continent have had far-reaching socioeconomic not change t he p osition of t he state as t he dominant ac tor in in ternational life. effects o n in dividuals a nd en tire co mmunities. F or a t le ast t hese r easons, a nd Today, while there are some exceptions due to developments in the last 60 years as because their actions often have international ramifications, international law – discussed in the following sections, contemporary international law is still built on hitherto unresponsive to non-state entities – has attempted to deal with these new this b asic p remise. Th e in ternational co mmunity’s co nstitutive s et-up i s actors. S ince t he va rious n on-state ac tors des cribed a bove m ay f orm s eparate dominated by it.2

90 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 91 ARMED NON-STATE ENTITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: STATUS AND CHALLENGES OF ACCOUNTABILITY GODFREY MUSILA

There are many instances where the state-centric structure of international law Crowding out the state? A variety of non-state actors is w ell i llustrated. Th e c lassical s ources o f in ternational l aw dep end o n t he interaction of states in the form of treaties and other agreements of a similar nature This section contextualises rebel movements and militias within international law, as well as customary law as the practice of states. In other words, only states can particularly African international law. In particular, it explores whether and how conclude treaties with each other. While churches, international organisations and rebel movements and militias are recognised and defined by law and under what other en tities m ay s end ‘ envoys’ t o o ther t erritories, di plomatic r elations a re legal circumstances they can be justified. It is crucial to understand the meaning conducted only between states.3 Emphasising further that the state is still the main of and distinguish various terms used with reference to armed non-state actors, actor in the international sphere, official forums such as international courts and which commentators are apt to confuse, namely national liberation movements, international organisations are largely reserved for states. However, international rebel movements, insurgents, belligerents and militias. organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are routinely granted special or observer status at state and intergovernmental forums such as the AU Militias and the UN.4 International law, too, has yielded in a number of areas, in particular in the realm of human rights, to allow non-state entities – individuals – to stand A militia group is in essence a group of armed citizens recruited – often on an ad before international courts and commissions either as beneficiaries of procedures hoc basis – to supplement the regular armed force engaged in active hostilities. The of petition against states5 or as subjects of punishment for crimes committed.6 militia, a lthough co mposed o f m embers w ho m ay n ot r eceive a r egular While these recent developments in international law have altered the notion remuneration, i s a n ext ension o f t he r egular a rmy. I n t erms o f Th e H ague of sovereignty by limiting states’ freedom of lawful action, these have been slight Regulations o f 1907, t he r ights a nd d uties o f t he r egular a rmy a lso a pply t o and h ave lef t t he b asic s tructure o f in ternational l aw un changed.7 Although members of militia and volunteer corps associated with such army. In countries individuals c an enf orce h uman r ights a gainst t heir s tate o f n ationality b efore where militia or volunteer corps constitute the army, or form part of it, they are 9 international tribunals such as the African Court as well as the Commission on included under the denomination of ‘army’. As a category in international law, this Human and Peoples’ Rights, the protection of individual rights for the most part is the strict sense in which the term ‘militia’ is used in international humanitarian still depends on diplomatic protection through state representatives when rights of law (IHL). The Janjaweed fighters in Darfur, who are suspected of having links to a n ational a re v iolated b y a nother s tate. A s K oskenniemi h as n oted, cen tral regular , fit the tag of militia group active in one of the main 10 concepts in in ternational l aw s uch a s s overeignty, t erritorial in tegrity, n on- armed co nflicts in A frica. The Interahamwe, w ho f ought a longside R wandan intervention, self-defence or permanent sovereignty over natural resources all still armed f orces ( Forces A rmées R wandaises, F AR) d uring t he 1994 g enocide, i s rely on the exclusive or dominant role of the state.8 another good example of a mi litia group. IHL r equires that such a mi litia fulfil For p urposes o f t his c hapter, i t i s cr ucial t o co mprehend t his s tate-centric certain co nditions: t o b e co mmanded b y a p erson r esponsible f or hi s/her structure of international law for at least three reasons to be expounded upon later: subordinates; t o h ave a f ixed di stinctive em blem r ecognisable a t a di stance; t o carry arms openly; and to conduct its operations in accordance with the laws and 11 I This s tructure o f in ternational l aw s erves n ot o nly a s a t heoretical a nd customs of war. intellectual framework for discussion but also explains the place of the relevant The term militia is not always used in t his strict sense, but tends to be used non-state en tities un der g eneral in ternational l aw w ith t he ef fect t hat e ven loosely t o r efer t o a ny g roup o f f ighters o perating a longside t he m ain wa rring where such non-state actors are recognised, they have limited rights only parties in an intrastate conflict – governmental and rebel forces – whether such a I It ra tionalises r esponses t o t hese a rmed groups b y s tates a nd r egional group of fighters is affiliated with the government forces or not. In the DRC, for organisations such as the AU instance, groups such as the Mai-Mai are consistently referred to in li terature as 12 13 I It s heds lig ht o n t he c hallenges o f es tablishing acco untability f or cr imes the ‘Mai-Mai militia’. With respect to Al S habaab fighters in S omalia and the committed by these entities or their members Lord’s R esistance A rmy (LR A) in U ganda,14 which a re b oth a rmed o pposition

92 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 93 ARMED NON-STATE ENTITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: STATUS AND CHALLENGES OF ACCOUNTABILITY GODFREY MUSILA

groups involved in a rmed conflict against government forces in t heir respective long armed struggles, these NLMs installed themselves as legitimate governments. countries, references to them as ‘militia’ are not consistent. While there is proof In cer tain c ases a n NLM m ay a lready b e r ecognised a s a s tate in wa iting b y that t he Mai-Mai and o ther simi lar g roups h ave f rom t ime t o t ime f ought regional b odies.18 As n oted, a n NLM m ay b e a ble t o c laim r ights, a nd w ill b e alongside government forces, the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du subject to international obligations, even in the absence of control of territory or Congo (FARDC) o r a ffiliated t hemselves w ith i ts o bjectives, t he Mai-Mai has express recognition by its adversary (two conditions applicable to rebels).19 This is generally operated independently. Further, t here is no e vidence t hat other t han one m ain dif ference b etween NLMs a nd t he r ecognised b elligerents a nd arms a nd log istical a ssistance, t he Mai-Mai fighters h ad r eceived a ny f inancial insurgents discussed in the next section. recompense or salaries from the government. The Mai-Mai does therefore not fit Until 1977 w hen t wo A dditional P rotocols20 were adde d t o t he G eneva into the strict category of militia recognised under IHL. Conventions of 1949, 21 only interstate conflicts were recognised in in ternational As w ill b e s een l ater, t he dif ficulty in fac tually es tablishing t he iden tity o r law, w ith wa rring s tates g ranted cer tain r ights.22 A co nflict t hat p itted a s tate category o f a g roup en gaged in a rmed co nflict p oses s erious c hallenges f or against another was an international armed conflict. Non-state entities, even those establishing the accountability of perpetrators of crimes. In general, the ease with engaged in the ‘wars of liberation’ during the days of decolonisation in Africa, were which individuals can be held accountable depends on what set of rules applies, systematically ignored or generally labelled as criminals and terrorists by the states which in t urn may depend on the category of the group to which the individual concerned. belongs – w hether to a r egular armed force and associated militia or to a r ebel Additional Protocol I t o the Geneva Conventions changed the legal position 15 group. For o ur p urposes – ex cept w hen di scussing s pecific r ules a pplying t o relating t o NLMs. I t a pplied t he l aw o f a rmed co nflict r elevant t o in terstate recognised categories of fighters under international law – the term ‘militia’ is used conflicts to armed conflicts between a state and an NLM. In other words, an armed in t he s econd co lloquial s ense t o r efer t o a ny n on-governmental a rmed g roup, conflict between a state and an NLM would from that time onward be considered whether affiliated to a regular army or opposed to such an army. to be an international conflict to which the rules of IHL (Geneva Conventions of 1949, Additional Protocol I t o the Geneva Conventions) apply. For instance, an National liberation movements NLM fighter who was captured was to be regarded as a prisoner of war and could While national liberation movements (NLMs) are not the focus of this study, one thus not be prosecuted merely for taking up arms, but only for breaching the laws cannot f ully g rasp t he p osition o f r elevant n on-state ac tors, in p articular r ebel of war by for example targeting civilians. movements, w ithout lo oking t o NLMs, in a s ense a n a ntecedent o f l atter-day More specifically, article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I classifies three types of rebels, and the first non-state entities with which the hitherto heavily state-centric wars o f n ational li beration a s in ternational a rmed co nflict: a rmed co nflicts in model of international law had to grapple. Unlike the fairly problematic position which peoples are fighting against colonial domination (the majority of wars of relating t o r ebel m ovements di scussed a bove, in ternational l aw – t hen decolonisation in Africa, Latin America and Asia); alien occupation (such as the transforming itself in the years following World War II and the founding of the UN Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y R ío de Oro [POLISARIO] Front in in 1945 – responded to the new phenomenon of NLMs by recognising them when Western Sahara and and Fatah in Palestine); and against racist regimes (the the wars of de colonisation er upted.16 This recognition of NLMs c ame complete ANC and the Pan-Africanist Congress in apartheid South Africa) in the exercise with pre-existing rights and duties that were not conditional on recognition by the of t heir r ight t o s elf-determination.23 Further, un der a rticle 96(3) o f Additional relevant state. Clapham has pointed out the paradox of referring to NLMs as non- Protocol I, the leadership or authority representing the people struggling against a state actors. NLMs are in essence state-like entities that many times end up taking colonial, alien or racist state that is a party to the Protocol can undertake to apply over the state.17 There are several examples of such NLMs in Africa in recent times, the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocol by making a declaration to including FRELIM O (M ozambique), t he Movimento P opular d e L ibertação d e the depository (the Swiss Federal Council). In Africa, the ANC, SWAPO and the Angola (MPLA) (Angola), SWAPO (Namibia) and the ANC (South Africa). After Eritrean Peoples’ Liberation Front are known to have made declarations to uphold

94 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 95 ARMED NON-STATE ENTITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: STATUS AND CHALLENGES OF ACCOUNTABILITY GODFREY MUSILA the relevant provisions of IHL during their armed struggles in South Africa, South General responses to rebels and militias by states West A frica (N amibia) a nd E thiopia r espectively.24 These NLMs a re t herefore and communities of states bound b y IHL b y v irtue o f in ternational t reaties t hat g rant t hem r ights w hile imposing duties normally due and applicable to states.25 At the UN, AU and state levels, responses have been both legal (new norms and legislation, enf orcement ac tion) a nd p olitical, m anifesting in va rious wa ys: Belligerents, insurgents and rebels diplomatic demarches, boycotts and informal embargoes. These are examined in turn. Belligerents a re p arties in volved in wa r o r a rmed co nflict. B efore g ranting t he status t o cer tain n on-state ac tors in IHL, b elligerents w ere in variably s tates. Norm generation, legislation and enforcement action However, rebels engaged in war with a state could be regarded as belligerents – and thus have rights and duties under international law – if they received recognition. When faced with new phenomena, society has often come up with ways to adapt It is noteworthy that in co ntemporary international law, all parties to an armed and respond to them. In a society of laws, the response is often to promulgate new conflict are bound by the laws of war irrespective of whether they are recognised laws, if those in existence are found to be inadequate. With the state established as or n ot.26 This i s p articularly im portant in v iew o f t he fac t t hat s tates ra rely the m ain ac tor in t he in ternational s phere, t he em ergence o f a rmed n on-state acknowledge that there is a group waging a legitimate armed struggle against them actors d uring t he ‘ wars o f li beration’ a nd b eyond p osed a c hallenge f or t he and a re k nown t o c haracterise s uch a g roup(s) a s ‘ criminals’ a nd ‘ terrorists’, international legal order. By 1949, only wars between states were recognised and suggesting that the conflict is regulated by national rather than international law. regulated b y in ternational l aw. Th e f our G eneva C onventions, w hich p rovided Insurgents are armed elements that rise up in r ebellion against a co nstituted extensive rules on the conduct of parties during armed conflict and means and authority, but are not recognised as belligerents. Where there is no recognition of methods of waging war, reflect this reality. Only a singular identical article in a ll insurgency o r b elligerency, a nd t he g roup in q uestion i s n ot a NLM t hat h as the f our co nventions r elates t o ‘ conflicts n ot o f a n in ternational c haracter’ o r successfully triggered the application of the rules of international armed conflict, internal armed conflicts (‘civil wars’).28 one is left with an internal armed conflict involving rebels.27 In common parlance With the emergence of new actors, the international community responded by rebels are sometimes referred to as ‘armed opposition groups’. generating n ew n orms. A r ecently exp anded co mmunity o f s tates w ith n ewly As will become clear in the next section, it does not matter whether an armed independent states adopted, under the auspices of the International Committee of group is recognised or not. Neither does it matter to what category of non-state the Red Cross, two new instruments in 1977. Additional Protocol I to the Geneva actors the group b elongs. The laws of war bind all without exception where an Conventions of 1949 exp anded the scope of international armed conflicts f rom armed conflict exists. There are also certain human rights obligations, although interstate wars to cover conflicts in which NLMs were involved. As noted already different rules may apply to different groups. in the discussion on NLMs, armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination, a lien o ccupation or raci st regimes in t he exercise of t heir 29 LEGAL RESPONSES AND ISSUES OF ACCOUNTABILITY right to self-determination were now to be governed by international law. NLMs would have rights and duties under this new regime, a fa r cry from the position In t his p art I w ill f irst exa mine t he g eneral (lega l) r esponses b y s tates (w ithin held by authorities at the national level (such as Israel and South Africa) that what states) and communities of states (un der t he relevant branches of international they faced at home was not a g roup bearing such rights but a g roup of common law) to rebel movements and militia phenomena in A frica; second, consider the criminals and terrorists. After this point, the position of the UN and the then OAU acts of rebel movements and militias that violate international and national laws; with respect to these territories was guided by this new dispensation. and t hird, co nsider t he a ppropriateness o f lega l r esponses a nd c hallenges t o Additional Protocol II t o the Geneva Conventions effectively recognised that establishing accountability under national and international legal regimes. rebels f ighting g overnments in va rious in ternal a rmed co nflicts h ad r ights a nd

96 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 97 ARMED NON-STATE ENTITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: STATUS AND CHALLENGES OF ACCOUNTABILITY GODFREY MUSILA

duties. However, there was reluctance on the part of states to grant any status to opinion by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on Western Sahara in 1975 is a groups fighting established governmental authorities. Clapham has noted that at good African example. In this case the UN General Assembly had approached the the t ime o f t he dra fting o f A dditional P rotocol II, s everal s tates s tated t heir ICJ to determine the status of claims by Morocco and Mauritania over the Western conviction that insurgents engaged in a ci vil war were simply criminals, and that Sahara a nd w hether s uch c laims co uld b e es tablished w ithout a r eferendum o f 30 the protocol conferred no international legal personality on them. This stance has Western Saharans. The ICJ confirmed the view held by many members of the UN not changed among states faced with armed groups. However, the fact that this that t hese c laims w ere t enuous at b est a nd t hat in a ny c ase, a r eferendum wa s treaty contains obligations for rebels, even when not recognised by the states, is no necessary in view of the Saharans’ right to self-determination. Another recent case, longer in doubt. This is discussed further below. in which the General Assembly acted like this, though beyond African shores, is At national level, states have responded by legislating against armed groups. the advisory opinion it requested from the ICJ relating to a wa ll constructed by Almost invariably, states in Africa and elsewhere have refused to recognise armed Israel in the occupied Palestinian territories.36 groups even when their struggle is based on well-articulated political objectives. Although selective in its approach, the UNSC has acted to create tribunals to The result h as b een proliferation of s ecurity l aws t hat regard t hose involved a s punish p erpetrators o f in ternational cr imes f rom, a mong o thers, t he ra nks o f criminals and terrorists.31 Such action at the national level has been coupled with rebels a nd mi litia g roups. Th e S pecial C ourt f or S ierra L eone (SCS L) h as a refusal to ratify or apply international treaties that grant status to, or are in any way favourable to, armed non-state actors.32 prosecuted in dividuals b earing t he g reatest r esponsibility, in cluding f rom r ebel groups, for crimes committed during the war in S ierra Leone.37 For its part, the Enforcement action at international (UN), continental (AU) and International Cr iminal T ribunal f or R wanda (I CTR) h as s o fa r p rosecuted national levels members of the Rwandan government in 1994 or those associated with it and none from the rebel RPF.38 This shortcoming has been one of the main criticisms of the To reinforce its stance on non-state actors (NLMs a nd rebels), the international international j udicial r esponse t o t he R wandan g enocide.39 The I nternational community – in t he f orm o f t he UN a nd A U – h as o ften t aken va rious Criminal C ourt (ICC) i s a lready prosecuting va rious in dividuals w ho le d rebel ‘enforcement actions’ to reiterate its stand. The support by international players for groups in the eastern part of the DRC for war crimes and crimes against humanity. NLMs h as b een m ore o vert t han t hat f or r ebels/armed o pposition g roups. ICC arrest warrants have been issued against LRA leaders in Uganda. International bodies are known to have imposed embargoes and other sanctions In lin e w ith t he s tance ado pted b y s tates t hat o pposing a rmed g roups a re on states in which or against which NLMs are fighting (for example on apartheid terrorists a nd co mmon cr iminals, t he g eneral t rend a t t he n ational le vel i s t o South Africa) to express disapproval of actions taken by those states. Support for exclude, dem onise, p rosecute un der s ecurity a nd t errorism l aws a nd o therwise rebels in certain cases has been forthcoming, but has been less overt. For example, eliminate r ebels/armed o pposition g roups w henever p ossible. M any o f t hese certain countries supported the Rwandan Patriotic Front rebels before and during armed co nflicts h ave, h owever, en ded o utside t he j udicial p rocess t hrough the genocide in 1994. 33 Similarly, Uganda, Cyrus Reed points out, supported the negotiated peace agreements. Some of these agreements in turn provided for the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in S outhern Sudan, with Khartoum backing the LRA in return.34 More often than not, rebel activity is met establishment o f t ribunals o r a f oundation f or p rosecutions o f in dividuals (f or with o pen co ndemnation, em bargoes a nd o ther s anctions. Th e UN S ecurity example the Lomé Peace Agreement for Sierra Leone and ANC-National Party in Council (UNSC) r esolutions, w hich im posed t ravel b ans a nd a sset f reezes o n South Africa), while other agreements operate effectively as blanket amnesties (for certain rebel leaders in t he DRC (including Thomas Lubanga, Germain Katanga example FRELIM O-RENAMO in M ozambique a nd t he C omprehensive P eace and Ngudjolo Chui), is a case in point.35 Agreement for Southern Sudan). However, the starting point is always denial and In some cases, states or a collection of states have adopted the judicial route to demonisation of armed opposition groups followed by some form of compromise enforce lega l norms and p ositions in fa vour of rebels and NLMs. Th e advisory and accommodation.

98 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 99 ARMED NON-STATE ENTITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: STATUS AND CHALLENGES OF ACCOUNTABILITY GODFREY MUSILA

Political responses of international (UN) and groups have been as varied as the existing political priorities and interests of the continental (AU) actors two in ternational o rganisations a s o f t he m ajor g lobal a nd r egional p owers. However, an outline of relevant cases in t his regard is beyond the scope of this Apart f rom the legal responses discussed above, other more significant ways in chapter. which states have supported or opposed the activities of non-state actors are for the most part political. Legal responses cannot be delinked entirely from political Establishing accountability for acts of rebels and militias responses. L egal a pproaches n ecessarily in volve p olitical a nd di plomatic demarches a t t he UN, A U a nd n ational le vels. S ome co untries h ave o penly o r It was noted above that one of the main legal responses by both the international secretly s upported di plomatically a nd m aterially t he c ause o f r ebels a nd o ther community a nd n ational a uthorities t o r ebels, mi litias a nd a rmed o pposition armed opposition groups. Examples abound on the continent: Algeria has openly groups has been to establish tribunals to try perpetrators of international crimes supported the POLISARIO Front for many years, while Morocco withdrew from such as genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. However, establishing the OAU in protest following the OAU’s decision to admit the exiled Sahrawi Arab accountability f or t he ac ts o f r ebels a nd mi litias un der va rious b ranches o f 40 Democratic Republic (SADR) as a m ember state. Several African countries are international law has posed and will continue to pose serious challenges. said t o h ave s upported t he AN C a nd others in t heir s truggle a gainst apartheid The co mplexity o f co nflicts h as r endered t he a pplication o f t hese o ften- 41 South Africa. In Sudan, support for the SPLM/A struggle against Khartoum by unknown rules even more difficult. While understanding and applying these rules 42 Libya, Uganda and Kenya has been documented. More recently, Eritrea has been are today more important than ever, with conflicts in places like the DRC, Darfur 43 44 linked with the Oromo Liberation Front rebels in Ethiopia and Somalia. For its and Uganda, various factors have resulted in mi sapprehension and confusion in part, Sudan has been mentioned in connection with Sudanese and Chadian rebels the de bate o n acco untability o f t hese entities. Th ese in clude t he multiplicity o f 45 in C had as well as t he LR A in U ganda, while C had is s aid to have supported wrongful ac ts t hat m ay b e co mmitted b y mi litias a nd r ebel m ovements, t he 46 rebels in Darfur. complexity of relationships these entities may have with states and multinational While the UN and AU have been guided generally by UN C harter principles companies, and the differences in rules of responsibility under various branches of on sovereignty and non-intervention as well as resolutions on friendly relations international l aw (h uman r ights, h umanitarian l aw a nd in ternational cr iminal 47 between states and non-fragmentation of territory, the two bodies have not shied law). away from positions that have proved to be controversial. With respect to Western With r ecourse t o exa mples f rom t he co ntinent, t his p art iden tifies a nd Sahara, the UN and OAU championed the elaboration of the 1970 Settlement Plan discusses s ome o f t he p roblems t hat h ave b een exp erienced in a pplying t hese 48 that wa s accep ted b y b oth M auritania a nd M orocco. Later in 1975, t he UN current regimes, and identifies and discusses the gaps in t hese legal responses to General A ssembly r equested t he I CJ ad visory o pinion di scussed a bove, c learly militias a nd r ebel m ovements a t n ational a nd in ternational le vels. Fir st, t he taking a stand on the issue after Morocco appeared to go back on its commitments. following section provides a broad overview of the nature and scope of some of the For the most part, however, there are many examples where states choose not to breaches attributable to rebels and militia. take a s tand o n co ntentious i ssues, p referring t o let m atters p lay o ut w ithout interference. S ome r esolutions ado pted b y t he A U h ave b een p re-emptive o f Sampling the wrongs: breaches of international law opposition ac tivity, s uch a s i ts c harter o n dem ocracy, w hich p rohibits t he by rebels and militia unconstitutional seizure of power on the continent and urges states to take ‘all legal and regulatory measures’ to deal with individuals involved.49 This indicates a firm Within t he co ntext o f in ternational l aw, w rongs o r a trocities co mmitted b y position against rebel or armed opposition group activity. militias, rebels and armed opposition groups can be categorised as human rights It is noteworthy that irrespective of firm normative positions by both the UN violations (under human rights law, irrespective of the debate on whether or not and AU, political or diplomatic responses to rebels, militia and armed opposition rebel m ovements a re b ound b y h uman r ights t reaties); b reaches un der IHL,

100 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 101 ARMED NON-STATE ENTITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: STATUS AND CHALLENGES OF ACCOUNTABILITY GODFREY MUSILA

including war crimes, where the wrongs are committed within an armed conflict all others on their territories from violations by private entities. Within this state (war) a s p rohibited b y t he G eneva C onventions a nd Additional P rotocols; a nd responsibility framework, responsibility for human rights violations by non-state international crimes such as crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide entities such as rebels and militia ultimately lies with the state. It is, therefore, up under va rious international in struments in cluding t he Torture C onvention, t he to the state to ensure that these rights are not violated or when violated, individuals Genocide C onvention, t he G eneva C onventions a nd P rotocols a nd t he R ome have acces s t o ef fective r emedies. W hen a n in dividual b rings a p etition t o a n Statute o f t he I CC. I ssues o f acco untability w ill b e di scussed in t erms o f t hese international tribunal such as the African Commission or Court on Human and instruments a s w ell a s va rious m echanisms (t ribunals) es tablished t o p unish Peoples’ Rights, complaining of human rights violations, it will be against the state perpetrators. and not a rebel formation or militia. The list of atrocities committed during many of Africa’s conflicts is endless. It i s c lear, t herefore, t hat t he co nceptual f ramework w ithin w hich IHRL This section, therefore, gives only a snapshot of some of these. In Rwanda, while operates is t he f irst challenge – o r obstacle – in a ny attempt to enforce human the s laughter o f c lose t o a mi llion p eople in t hat co untry’s g enocide h as b een rights a gainst a rmed n on-state ac tors. W hile i t s eems p aradoxical t hat s tates attributed largely to the government and Interahamwe, a militia group affiliated to weakened by war or those unable to exercise practical sovereignty over territory the government, the RPF was active during that period, too.50 In northern Uganda, under r ebel co ntrol s hould b e r equired t o b ear r esponsibility f or v iolations b y abductions o f c hildren, en slavement o f g irls, m urder, t orture, m utilation a nd rebels or militia, conceptually, the international human rights framework admits destruction of property by the LRA are well documented.51 In the DRC, atrocities only s tate r esponsibility.56 The Forces N ouvelles in C ôte d ’Ivoire, w hich h ave have b een co mmitted b y va rious a rmed g roups, in cluding t he Mai-Mai, Forces controlled virtually the entire northern half of that country for several years now, Démocratiques d e L ibération d u R wanda, C ongrès N ational p our l a D éfense d u have n o in ternational r esponsibility f or h uman r ights, b ut c an b e b rought t o Peuple and other groups active in t he eastern part of the country.52 Murder, rape account in national courts. and o ther f orms o f s exual v iolence s tand o ut a s s ome o f t he m ost co mmon Some commentators57 have suggested that certain non-state actors have human crimes.53 Apart from violations against individuals and private property, reports rights o bligations, w hether t hey h ave co nsented t o t hem o r n ot. T omuschat have linked a number of armed groups to the plunder of Congo’s natural wealth, suggests that NLMs – a n essentially government-like formation – a re bound by which has in t urn occasioned numerous atrocities.54 Many companies and some IHRL, noting that ‘a movement struggling to become the legitimate government of regional governments have been linked to what has been aptly termed Congo’s war the nation concerned is treated by the international community as an actor who, economy. 55 Comprehensive acco untability must addr ess a ll t hese dim ensions o f already a t hi s em bryonic s tage, is s ubject t o t he es sential o bligations a nd the conflict. responsibilities e very s tate m ust s houlder in t he in terest o f a ci vilised s tate o f affairs a mong n ations’.58 However, t he ide a t hat n on-state en tities h ave h uman Accountability under international human rights law rights obligations through international law has no universal appeal.59 Apart from the state-centric conceptual framework in terms of which only states have human International human rights law (IHRL) – contained in numerous treaties adopted rights obligations, even when rebels or militias have control of some territory, they since 1945, at both the global and regional level – confers upon individuals certain often lack the capacity to fulfil the human rights obligations in question. rights a nd im poses o bligations o n s tates in t hat r egard. Th e s pectrum o f Another c hallenge in es tablishing acco untability o f r ebels a nd mi litia a rises individual, a nd t o a limi ted ext ent co llective, r ights in cludes ci vil a nd p olitical from the involvement of multinational/transnational companies in the theatres of rights as well as socioeconomic and cultural rights. Conceptually, IHRL en gages war. Within the human rights framework states have the ultimate responsibility for state responsibility at the international plane such that final responsibility for the protecting citizens and others from violations attributable to such companies. The respect and fulfilment of human rights obligations lies with the state. Accordingly, fact that action against them could jeopardise investment, coupled with the fact apart from refraining from infringing on these rights and taking positive measures that some of these companies are ‘stronger’ and richer than the states from which to promote the enjoyment of rights, states are required to protect their citizens and they o perate, p ose s erious c hallenges f or acco untability. S uch s tates l ack t he

102 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 103 ARMED NON-STATE ENTITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: STATUS AND CHALLENGES OF ACCOUNTABILITY GODFREY MUSILA

capacity t o enf orce t heir o wn l aws, in p articular in a co nflict si tuation. Th e noted t hat in t erms o f IHL, ‘ internal di sturbances a nd t ensions, s uch a s r iots, ‘merging’ of multinational/transnational company interests with those of armed isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature’ fall below non-state ac tors co mpounds t he p roblem f urther. I n a n utshell, IHRL i s n ot the threshold for the application of the laws of war. However, once an international sufficiently adapted to deal with some of the more difficult issues alluded to here. tribunal i s es tablished, t he fac t t hat t he exi stence of an armed conflict wa s n ot Attempts to deal with accountability for multinational/transnational companies in recognised is irrelevant. such cir cumstances h ave s o fa r y ielded o nly n on-binding n orms a nd inf ormal Second, there is no independent international tribunal established under IHL commitments.60 treaties that relies on states to prosecute serious (grave) breaches of the Geneva Conventions.61 Not many states, having denied that there is an armed conflict on Accountability under international humanitarian law their territory, have in practice prosecuted perpetrators. Neither has the principle of universal jurisdiction provided for in t he Geneva C onvention b een regularly It has already been noted that IHL or the laws of war regulate the conduct of armed used to this end. Prosecutions of perpetrators in A frican conflicts have, for the conflict: the means of waging war, protection of certain groups of people and what most p art, b een c arried o ut b y E uropean a nd N orth A merican co urts62 or forms leg itimate o bjects f or a ttack. N on-state ac tors w ho m ay n ot b e h eld international tribunals such as the ICTR and SCSL. accountable under IHRL do not escape responsibility entirely because IHL, unlike Third, co nflicts m ay n ot a ttain t hresholds f or a pplication o f IHL, a lthough IHRL, recognises cer tain non-state actors. Further, since rebels and militias are there may be serious violations going on. Under Additional Protocol II, it must be most active in times of armed conflict, IHL is perhaps the most relevant body of shown that the armed group is under responsible command and exercises control law. The activities of militia in terms of IHL (that is civilian fighters and volunteers over a p art of its territory, which enables it to carry out sustained and concerted forming p art o f g overnmental f orces) a s des cribed in t he in troductory s ection military operations, and to enforce the rules of IHL. This is a very high threshold, above, are governed by rules of IHL applicable to the regular armed forces, which although common article 3 does not seem to require these conditions to be met. in turn depend on whether the conflict is international or internal in c haracter. Fourth, the command structures of rebel movements, militia and other armed Additional P rotocol I a nd o ther s pecialised r ules g overn NLMs o r in surgents groups a re s ometimes f luid a nd p ose p roblems in p inpointing r esponsible operating within the context of an international armed conflict, while common ‘commanders’, hence issues for enforcement of laws of war. article 3 o f t he G eneva C onventions a nd A dditional P rotocol II g overn t he Fifth, prosecutions before international criminal tribunals such as the ICTR in activities of rebels and ‘militia’ active in an internal armed conflict (civil war). Rwanda and SCSL and national courts have proven to give inadequate responses in v iew of l arge numbers of p erpetrators, limited resources to conduct t rials at Challenges to establishing accountability under international international a nd n ational le vel, t he in ability t o addr ess i ssues o f v ictims a nd humanitarian law reparations and broader reconciliation. Sixth, criminal sanction against commanders of rebel movements and militia There are a n umber of challenges to establishing accountability for breaches of in international courts cannot extend to corporations that finance the activities of IHL. First, since IHL applies only in times of conflict, initial problems arise from such non-state actors, leaving one with many ‘impunity gaps’. the c haracterisation o f a si tuation w here a rmed f orce i s u sed. A rticle 1(2) o f Additional Protocol II excludes ‘internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, Accountability under international criminal law isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature’ from the definition of internal armed conflict. The refusal of states to accept that there is a International criminal law (ICL) is the branch of public international law that is problem in their territory, or that an existing conflict situation involving the use of concerned w ith t he p rohibition a nd p rocesses o f p unishment o f in ternational arms between state security forces and rebels does not meet the threshold for the crimes. Cassese observes that it is the body of international rules that proscribes application of IHL, means that these rules do not apply to non-state actors. It was international crimes, requires states to prosecute and punish at least some of those

104 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 105 ARMED NON-STATE ENTITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: STATUS AND CHALLENGES OF ACCOUNTABILITY GODFREY MUSILA

crimes a nd r egulates in ternational p roceedings r elated t o t his.63 In a s ense, t he with states and multinationals and the fluidity of command structures, render this history o f I CL i s o ne o f in ternational cr iminal t ribunals, s tarting w ith t he body of law inadequate in dealing with militias and rebel movements. It is further International M ilitary T ribunal a t N uremberg in 1945 t hrough t he ad ho c inadequate f or de aling w ith r esponsibility o f t he g roups, o rganisations a nd international tribunals in Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia and Sierra Leone, to the corporations that have been active in Africa’s war theatres. ICC of 2002. ICL draws heavily from IHL and IHRL in terms of both the conduct The question of s electivity continues to dog t he operation of ICL. To b egin prohibited (war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide) and protections with, t he UNSC de cisions t o es tablish t ribunals s uch a s t he I CTR h ave b een guaranteed for suspected perpetrators (that is, fair trial guarantees) and victims. selective, and not entirely driven by a principled and consistent pursuit of justice. By r equiring t hat cer tain cr imes b e p unished ei ther in do mestic o r As a result, militia and other armed actors in a n umber of African conflicts have international courts, ICL established benchmark principles for dealing with rebels escaped justice for some of the most egregious crimes. At the operational level of and militia. Peace negotiations must be built on this understanding. The granting the tribunals, various factors have conspired to ensure that some actors are not of an absolute and unconditional amnesty by the Lomé Peace Accord to Foday brought to account. The role of the RPF during the genocide and the failure by the Sankoh (t he R UF le ader), o ther R UF m embers a nd co mbatants f rom va rious ICTR to prosecute any member of the RPF remain highly contested and have cast groups such as the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and civil defence forces, doubt on the impartiality of the tribunal. elicited strenuous opposition from the UN, v ictims and human rights activists.64 In the absence of ready and effective domestic justice mechanisms, action by The UN Secretary-General intervened in the Lomé Peace Accord to insist that no international tribunals more often than not arrives late and is often caught in the amnesty could apply for war crimes and crimes against humanity. The warning trap of international politics. The current work of the ICC in A frica is a c ase in opened t he p ossibility f or t he e ventual in dictment a nd t rial o f va rious r ebel point. Politicisation of the work of international tribunals affects efforts by such leaders, including Foday Sankoh, by the SCSL. courts to establish accountability for crimes committed by armed groups. The foundation of ICL is the principle of individual criminal responsibility. A If establishment of accountability must include restorative justice for victims, suspect m ay b e a h ead o f s tate, o r t he le ader o f a r ebel m ovement, b ut ICL is handicapped. Until the establishment of the ICC, ICL has for the most part responsibility f or cr imes i s b orne only in in dividual c apacity a nd n ot a s excluded victims of international crimes such as genocide, war crimes and crimes organisations or state agencies. While national law may provide for some form of against humanity, reserving for t hem only t he role of w itnesses.66 Although t he criminal responsibility for corporate entities and organisations, ICL does not do ICC now provides for the possibility that victims may participate in t he process so. and have a right to reparations, victims still face serious challenges in their pursuit It wa s n oted e arlier t hat one of t he m ain responses of t he UNSC t o cr imes of j ustice.67 Even w hen a n o pportunity t o c laim r eparations i s p resented, t he committed by armed non-state actors has been to create ad hoc tribunals, as in the indigence of those accused ensures that victims cannot claim reparations directly case of Sierra Leone where the RUF is said to have been responsible for the largest from them. In the DRC all the rebel leaders facing prosecution – Thomas Lubanga, number crimes and human rights violations in the conflict.65 On their part, states Matheu Ngudjolo and Germain Katanga – have claimed indigence and are in need decided to create the ICC that has already indicted or is trying rebels and militia of lega l a id t hemselves.68 Further, r eluctance b y s tates t o co ntribute t o leaders f rom U ganda, t he D RC a nd S udan. Th ese t ribunals face n umerous compensation funds produces the same result – incomplete justice for victims. challenges in their quest to establish accountability for international crimes. Measures of accountability under national law Challenges related to applying international criminal law to rebels, militias and armed groups The typical response by states in A frica – a s elsewhere – w hen faced by armed threats or opposition from within has been to deny the armed groups’ existence or While the rule on individual criminal responsibility as the basis of action is settled, to refuse totally to recognise such groups by labelling their members as common various dynamics, such as the composition of armed groups, their relationships criminals, subversive elements or terrorists. The last label has gained particular

106 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 107 ARMED NON-STATE ENTITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: STATUS AND CHALLENGES OF ACCOUNTABILITY GODFREY MUSILA

currency in r ecent y ears, in tensifying w ith t he m uch-reviled a nd co ntroversial starkest illustration in c urrent African experience. Yet states such as Sudan and ‘’. In fact, it seems the labelling of even legitimate political opponents others continue to rely on the military approach. and other dissidents as terrorists is one of the most potent weapons wielded by Even when states, as the case of Uganda illustrates, come to the realisation that challenged African regimes. The reason is not difficult to find. This strategy tends the mi litary a pproach c annot w ork a nd t hat a n accep table lega l a pproach i s a to secure international partners for the regime’s cause more readily than accepting necessity, they have for the most part taken half-hearted and incoherent measures. some of these groups for what they really are – leg itimate opposition trying its Incoherence a nd l ack o f unif ormity – i tself inf ormed b y t he mi sguided y et hand at what seems a more persuasive method. Governments have reacted in an ineffective over-reliance on military options – is clear in the sense that the threat almost knee-jerk fashion to deny and refuse to recognise these armed opposition and n on-state a rmed g roup do n ot m atch t he p rescriptions f or r esponse. I n groups. Uganda, f or in stance, w hile t he g overnment h as m aintained t hat t he LR A i s a Experience shows that even when recognition, rights and duties are accorded terrorist entity (that should be treated and dealt with as a cr iminal outfit), it has unequivocally b y in ternational l aw t o s uch a g roup a s di scussed a bove,69 no acceded through the Peace Agreement to a position that seems at odds with government would admit that it is a co lonial or racist outfit or that it is in a lien the t errorist l abel. Th e p rosecution r esponse f or wa r cr imes w ould in herently occupation of territory.70 In recent times, it was no surprise that apartheid South accept that IHL applies and that the LRA is entitled to fight and thus its fighters Africa consistently labelled the ANC and other armed groups in S outh Africa as have co mbatant o r co mbatant-like s tatus a nd c annot b e p rosecuted m erely f or criminals, s aboteurs, co mmunists (co nnoting s ubversives) a nd t errorists. W hile taking up arms but only for committing international crimes.75 this label had no significance whatsoever in t erms of international law (IHL, in particular Additional Protocol I, as set out above), which by application of the law CONCLUSION recognised t he AN C a nd SW APO fighters in S outh A frica and N amibia respectively as combatants and t hus prisoners of war w hen c aptured, apartheid This chapter showed that while international law – h uman rights, humanitarian South Africa treated them as terrorists and prosecuted them under state security and cr iminal l aw – h as c lear def initions o n n ational li beration m ovements, laws.71 The recent prosecution and sentencing to death of numerous members of insurgents, rebels and militias and their status, this is not always so in co mmon the J ustice a nd E quality M ovement in K hartoum a nd t he M ahamat N ouri-led parlance, w here r eferences t o va rious a rmed n on-state ac tors a re s omewhat United Force for Democracy and Development rebels in Chad72 (some in absentia) confused. It was noted t hat w hile in co mmon usage rebel or armed opposition is consistent with this approach.73 group i s s ometimes u sed in terchangeably w ith mi litia, t he l atter h as a s pecific This refusal to acknowledge and recognise armed opposition by states has had meaning in IHL. Th e distinctions are important in view of the fact that different a far-reaching effect with respect to rebels and other opposition groups, towards rules apply to the conduct of different armed groups and this has implications for whom IHL i s les s g enerous a nd m ore s tringent in i ts p rescriptions, b earing in accountability issues. mind the requirement that rebels must control territory and that the violence must Legal a nd, b y ext ension, p olitical r esponses b y s tates a nd in ternational be o f p articular in tensity (n ot m erely r iots o r s poradic a nd s hort-lived ac ts o f organisations to the activities of armed non-state actors have been varied. Political violence).74 This means that IHL, and the protections that come with it, will apply responses range from covert support to outright condemnation and sanction, and only if a cer tain threshold of violence is reached and that in the absence of these are o ften co loured b y co ntextual co nsiderations, in p articular t he in terests o f conditions national law applies, which often affords more leeway to states in their regional and global hegemons. dealings with rebels. The apparent confusion in references to various armed non-state actors is not Denying lega l status to rebels and other armed opposition, e ven w hen t hey problematic f rom the p oint of view of applicable r ules of international law and represent a legitimate cause, has been coupled with the belief – mostly misguided their implementation. However, the bundling of various groups in the media and – t hat t he r ebels c an b e o bliterated w ith mi litary p ower. Th e fa ilure b y t he other non-academic literature complicates a general understanding of the nature Ugandan government to defeat the LRA, despite affirmations to the contrary, is the of t hese g roups a nd va rious r ules a pplicable t o t hem un der h uman r ights l aw,

108 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 109 ARMED NON-STATE ENTITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: STATUS AND CHALLENGES OF ACCOUNTABILITY GODFREY MUSILA

humanitarian law and ICL. There is merit in clarity, not only in nomenclature but curricula, i t m akes s ense t hat t he ci tizenry s hould b e inf ormed o n a co ntinent also in t erms o f applicable r ules, p articularly if t he p ublic a nd v ictims wa nt t o accustomed to armed conflict. Incorporating relevant aspects of IHL in schools, in pursue remedies for violations attributable to a specific group. particular in vulnerable societies, should be encouraged. The possibility exists that In v iew o f s hortcomings in t he va rious lega l r egimes, es tablishing knowledge o f t he r ules a nd co nsequences o f b reaching t hem co uld h ave a accountability for wrongs committed by armed non-state actors such as rebels and favourable effect on the behaviour of non-state actors. militia requires the use of a combination of approaches at the national as well as States also undertake to respect and ensure respect for the rules of IHL. This international level. However, there is lack of coherence among the multiplicity of would be in line with the requirements of ICL, in particular the Statute of actors w ho h ave a ttempted t o g rapple w ith t he ac tivities o f a rmed n on-state the I CC, t hat s tates s hould t ake m easures t o do mesticate t he s tatute a nd t o entities at the international and national levels. investigate and prosecute perpetrators. States have the primary responsibility in Where the UN and the AU do adopt a legal response, attention should be paid this regard.77 Questions c an b e raised w ith respect t o t he w illingness of various to how these approaches fit in w ith approaches at the national level in o rder to African g overnments t o p rosecute p erpetrators o f cr imes b y b oth r ebels a nd ensure t hat a ll t he im portant a spects a re addr essed. I n p articular, n ational government forces. tribunals and other mechanisms at that level, which have an important role but are However, t he w illingness o f g overnments t o ac t de cisively in p rosecuting rarely well considered, should be integrated in the response. perpetrators may depend on an assessment of their ability to do so, which in turn Governments, w hich b ear t he p rimary a nd p erhaps ex clusive r esponsibility depends on the availability of necessary criminal justice infrastructure. In debates under human rights treaties, should ensure that mechanisms exist at the national around the contested role of the ICC in Africa, the AU has conceded as much.78 For level un der cr iminal a nd ci vil l aw t o addr ess t he ac tivities o f a rmed n on-state instance, in co untries s uch a s t he D RC a nd K enya, t he in dependence o f t he actors that violate human rights. While the record of African countries in ratifying judiciary and capacity of existing systems have raised concerns.79 To address these and acce ding t o international human r ights t reaties i s hig h, compliance in t his problems, a mini sterial meeting of African states party to the Rome Statute has regard as well as with rulings of international oversight bodies remains rather low. recommended that the capacity of African states to prosecute international crimes For instance, although many countries have ratified t he C ovenant on Civil and by themselves should be improved.80 Political Rights as well as the Torture Convention, few have effective implementing legislation. Th e s ame applies t o IHL t reaties a nd t he R ome Statute of t he ICC. Moreover, African states have shown themselves even less willing to comply with NOTES 76 decisions of oversight bodies. In general, compliance is an area that needs work 1 See C hristoph S chreuer, W aning o f t he s overeign s tate: t owards a n ew p aradigm o f from states, otherwise they make a mockery of international commitments. international law?, European Journal of International Law 4 (1993), 447–471, 447; R Falk, The IHL r egulates t he co nduct o f a rmed n on-state ac tors. H owever, t his fac t i s interplay of Westphalia and charter conceptions of international legal order, in R Falk and C often lost to these actors. The fact that states often deny that a particular situation Black (eds), The Future of the International Legal Order, 1, 1969, 43. 2 See Martti Koskenniemi, The future of statehood, Harvard International Law Journal 32(2) is an armed conflict, and the debate over particular crimes being committed, does (1991), 397–410, 406. not help. International actors and others engaged in r esolving conflicts need to 3 Schreuer, Waning of the sovereign state, 448. communicate to b elligerents t hat t he conflict in w hich t hey are involved is not 4 See African Union, Decision AHG Dec 160 (XXXII), taken by the Assembly of Heads of State unregulated by international law, and that they will be individually accountable for and Government in Lusaka in July 2001. The African Union made history on 29 March 2005 crimes committed. when i t l aunched t he in terim E conomic, S ocial a nd C ultural C ouncil in A ddis A bba, Ethiopia. The Council is an advisory organ of the AU consisting of a variety of civil society The fac t t hat IHL – t he l aws o f wa r – i s un known t o m any n eeds t o b e organisations from member states. remedied. Th e G eneva C onventions a nd A dditional P rotocols co ntain a n 5 Individuals can bring petitions concerning human rights violations against states for redress. obligation for s tates t o di sseminate t he information and ensure t hat t hose w ho Examples at r egional le vel in clude t he A frican C ommission (a nd C ourt) o n Human a nd may need to apply it, are informed. Apart from incorporation in the security forces Peoples’ R ights, E uropean C ourt o f H uman R ights a nd I nter-American C ourt (a nd

110 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 111 ARMED NON-STATE ENTITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: STATUS AND CHALLENGES OF ACCOUNTABILITY GODFREY MUSILA

Commission) on Human Rights. At the United Nations level it includes the Human Rights 18 At t he le vel o f t he Or ganisation o f A frican U nity (O AU), g roups s uch a s t he AN C, Committee. POLISARIO Front (Western Sahara), SWAPO, FRELIMO, and Zimbabwe African National 6 Individuals are subject to punishment before international tribunals for the commission of Union – Patriotic Front (Zimbabwe) were recognised. international cr imes. C urrent t ribunals in clude t he I nternational Cr iminal T ribunal f or 19 Clapham, Human rights obligations of non-state actors in conflict situations. Rwanda, International M ilitary Tribunal for t he former Yugoslavia, t he Special C ourt for 20 Additional Protocol I, P rotocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 A ugust 1949, Sierra Leone and the International Criminal Court. and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977; and 7 Scheuer, Waning of the sovereign state, 448. Additional Protocol II, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 8 See Martti Koskenniemi, The future of statehood, 406. and R elating t o t he P rotection o f Victims o f Non-International A rmed C onflicts, 8 J une 9 The Hague Convention, (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, article 1 of 1977. the regulations annexed to the Convention, 18 October 1907. 21 Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 10 See for instance Alhagi Marong, Outlaws on camelback: state and individual responsibility Armed Forces in t he Field; Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Wounded, for serious violations of international law in Darfur, ISS Occasional Paper 136, Pretoria: ISS, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea; Geneva Convention (III) relative to 2007. the Treatment of Prisoners of War and; Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection to 11 Ibid. Civilian Persons in Time of War [including in occupied territory]. 12 Noel K ing, C ongo’s a rmy v ows t o di sarm Mai-Mai militia, 22 O ctober 2007, 22 The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols (I and II) are international treaties http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2007/10/mil-071022-voa04.htm that co ntain t he m ost im portant r ules t hat r egulate t he co nduct o f a rmed co nflict. Th ey protect people who do not take part in the fighting (civilians, medics, aid workers) and those (accessed 10 F ebruary 2010). S ee a lso H uman R ights W atch, M ilitia le ader gui lty in who c an n o lo nger f ight (w ounded, sic k a nd s hipwrecked t roops, p risoners o f wa r). A ll landmark trial, 10 M arch 2009, h ttp://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/03/10/dr-congo-militia- available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/genevaconventions (accessed 18 leader-guilty-landmark-trial (accessed 10 February 2010). December 2009). 13 See f or in stance A bdulkarim J imale, Al-shabaab militia s eized s trategic t own in cen tral 23 See also United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution 3103 (X XVIII): Basic principles of Somalia, The P alestine T elegraph, 22 J anuary 2010, h ttp://www.paltelegraph.com/ the legal status of the combatants struggling against colonial and alien domination and racist world/africa/3726-al-shabab-militias-seized-strategic-town-in-central-somalia (acces sed 9 régimes, 12 D ecember 1973. Thi s r esolution p receded t he ado ption o f t he A partheid February 2010). Convention that declared the crime of apartheid to be a crime against humanity. 14 Some commentators refer to the LRA as militia while others prefer the label ‘rebel group’. See 24 See Clapham, Human rights obligations of non-state actors in co nflict situations, 494; s ee for in stance H uman R ights W atch, Th ere i s n o p rotection, 12 O ctober 2009, also t he other examples g iven by Michel Veuthey, Guerrilla e t dr oit h umanitaire, G eneva: http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/02/12/there-no-protection (acces sed 1 M arch 2010); International Committee of the Red Cross, 1983, xxvi. SPLA s oldiers dep loyed in W estern E quatoria t o f ight LR A mi litia, 9 S eptember 2009, 25 Note that even in this case, the traditional state-centric structure of international law is left http://pachodo.org/General-News-South-Sudan-News/spla-soldiers-deployed-to-western- intact. NLMs a re regarded as states for purposes of imposing duties and bestowing rights. equatoria-to-fight-lra-militia.html (accessed 1 March 2010). One could thus say that international law does not create a new category of actors but rather 15 See discussion under the section on accountability. Under IHRL the identity of a perpetrator accords state-like attributes to NLMs for those purposes. may m atter in t erms o f w ho p ays co mpensation – t he s tate o r t he in dividual – un der 26 See G eneva C onventions, a rticles 1 a nd 3; A dditional P rotocol I, a rticles 3 a nd 4; a nd domestic l aw. I n t erms o f in ternational cr iminal l aw, dif ferent r ules (f or exa mple o n Additional Protocol II, article 1. command responsibility) may apply to a government army (and affiliate militia) to those that 27 Clapham, Human rights obligations of non-state actors in conflict situations, 495. apply to rebel movements. 28 See Geneva Conventions, common article 3. 16 On NLMs g enerally, s ee G eorges A bi-Saab, W ars o f n ational li beration in t he G eneva 29 See a lso UN R esolution 3103. Thi s r esolution p receded t he ado ption o f t he A partheid Conventions and Protocols, Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International de la Haye Convention that declared the crime of apartheid a crime against humanity. 165 (1979), 357–455; Antonio Cassese, Wars of national liberation, in Christophe Swinarski 30 Clapham, Human rights obligations of non-state actors in conflict situations, 498. (ed), Studies and essays in international humanitarian law and Red Cross principles: essays in 31 See in the case of South Africa various security and pass laws (totalling 150 different statutes honour o f J ean P ictet, Th e H ague: M artinus N ijhoff, 1984, 314–324; L iesbeth Z egveld, that co nstituted t he lega l inf rastructure o f a partheid). F or a di scussion o f t hese l aws s ee Accountability of armed opposition groups in international law, Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge Roger Beck, The history of South Africa, Westport, Conn: Greenwood, 2000, 127–129. University Press, 2002. 32 For instance, apartheid South Africa rejected Additional Protocol I in terms of which those 17 Andrew C lapham, H uman r ights o bligations o f n on-state ac tors in co nflict si tuations, fighting the regime would qualify as prisoners of war who could not be prosecuted merely International Review of the Red Cross, 88(863) (2006), 491–523. because they took up arms against the government. By rejecting IHL r ules, the apartheid

112 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 113 ARMED NON-STATE ENTITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: STATUS AND CHALLENGES OF ACCOUNTABILITY GODFREY MUSILA

government was able to apply security laws and to prosecute Nelson Mandela and others for Review of African Political Economy 33 (1985); Babiker Khalifa, Sudan: recent developments, treason. Africa Today 36(3/4) (1989), 5–10. 33 See generally Cyrus Reed, Exile, reform and the rise of the Rwanda Patriotic Front, Journal 43 See Katharine Murison, Africa s outh of t he S ahara, 33rd e d, L ondon: Europa Pu blishing, of Modern African Studies 34(3) (1996), 479–501. 2004, 410–412. 34 Ibid. 44 The UN a nd United S tates o f A merica h ave in t he p ast wa rned Er itrea a bout i ts a lleged 35 On 1 November 2005 a UNSC committee imposed a travel ban and asset freeze on a number support of Islamic fighters opposed to the Transitional Federal Government of Somali. See of rebel leaders in the DRC for violating an arms embargo. See UNSC committee established for in stance UN wa rns Er itrea o n a iding I slamists, R euters, 9 J uly 2009, h ttp://www. pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004) co ncerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 7 nytimes.com/2009/07/10/world/africa/10somalia.html?_r=1 (accessed 3 March 2010). November 2007; UNSC, List of individuals and entities subject to the measures imposed by 45 See f or in stance M artin P laut, B ehind t he LR A’s t error t actics, B BC, 17 F ebruary 2009, paragraphs 13 and 15 of Security Council Resolution 1596, 2005. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7885885.stm (accessed 4 March 2010), quoting the deputy 36 See UN, General Assembly, Resolution requesting an advisory opinion from the ICJ on the governor o f t he S outhern S udan s tate o f Western E quatoria in w hich C ol J oseph N gere legal consequences arising from Israel’s construction of a barrier separating part of the West alleged t hat K hartoum wa s co ntinuing t o g ive c landestine s upport t o t he LR A, a lthough Bank from Israel, Resolution ES-10/14, 8 December 2003. Khartoum strenuously denies t his. However, in LR A rebels seek refuge in S udan’s Darfur, 37 The Special Tribunal for Sierra Leone has tried or is trying the following: Moinina Fofana New Vision, 11 March 2010, http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/10/10/712559 (accessed 4 March and A llieu K ondewa (a lleged le aders o f Ci vil D efence F orce); I ssa H assan S esay, M orris 2010), it is noted that Sudan’s support for LRA ended in 2002. Kallon a nd A ugustine Gb ao (R evolutionary U nited F ront); A lex Tamba B rima, Ib rahim 46 African News A gency, Er itrea, C had acc used o f a iding D arfur r ebels, 9 S eptember 2009, Bazzy K amara a nd Sa ntigie B orbor K anu (A rmed F orces R evolutionary C ouncil); a nd http://www.afrol.com/articles/13898 (accessed 4 March 2010). Charles Taylor. 47 See UN, G eneral A ssembly, R esolution r elating t o t he Declaration on P rinciples o f 38 Since i t b ecame o perational, t he I CTR Of fice o f t he P rosecutor h as i ssued s ome 96 International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance indictments. Of that number, 80 have been arrested. As of February 2010, 35 convictions had with the Charter of the United Nations, Resolution 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970. been s ecured o ut o f 46 co mpleted c ases. S ee h ttp://www.ictr.org (acces sed 15 N ovember 48 Souaré, Ouali and Khadad, Western Sahara, 2. 2009). 49 See African Union, African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, adopted by 39 R L emarchand, Genocide i n t he G reat L akes: W hich gen ocide? W hose gen ocide? Working the eighth ordinary session of the Assembly, held in A ddis Ababa, Ethiopia on 30 J anuary Paper GS 03, Y ale C enter f or I nternational a nd A reas S tudies, 1998, h ttp://se2.isn.ch/ 2007, articles 2(4), 3(10) and 14(2). serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=10&fileid=F84E3402-2312-087C-BA8D-7E93D19E 50 On crimes allegedly committed by the RPF during and after the genocide, see R Degni-Segui, CC20&lng=en (acces sed 29 A pril 2009); P C lark and Z D K aufman, After gen ocide, in P Special rapporteur, Final report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda, Final report Clark and Z D Kaufman (eds), After genocide: transitional justice, post-conflict reconciliation S/1994/1405, August 1996. I n 1994, t he United Nations Impartial Commission of Experts in Rwanda and beyond, London: Hurst, 2008, 6–7, 1. that p receded t he es tablishment o f t he I CTR co ncluded (in i ts p reliminary r eport 40 Issaka K S ouaré, A bdelhamid E l O uali a nd Mh amed K hadad, Western S ahara: understanding the roots of the conflict and suggesting a way out, ISS Situation Report, Pretoria: [S/1994/1125] and final report [S/1994/1405]) that ‘individuals from both sides to the armed ISS, 17 December 2008, 2. conflict in Rwanda during the period from 6 April 1994 to 15 July 1994 perpetrated serious 41 ANC cadres are known to have received refugee, military, financial material assistance and breaches of international humanitarian law and crimes against humanity’. training from several African countries such as Algeria, Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique and 51 See various reports on LRA atrocities: Human Rights Watch, The scars of death: children Tanzania. See generally Mac Maharaj, The ANC and South Africa’s negotiated transition to abducted b y t he L ord’s R esistance A rmy in U ganda, N ew York: H uman R ights Watch, democracy a nd p eace, in V eronique D udouet a nd D avid B loomfield (e ds), Berghof September 1997, h ttp://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/c/crd/uganda979.pdf (accessed 4 M arch transitions s eries: r esistance/liberation m ovements a nd t ransition t o p olitics, 2008, 1–38, 2010); Human Rights Watch, The state of pain: torture in U ganda, 16(4(A)), M arch 2004, http://www.berghof-center.org/uploads/download/transitions_anc.pdf (acces sed 27 http://hrw.org/reports/2004/uganda0404/index.htm (acces sed 4 M arch 2010); H uman February 2010). See also The ANC, Strategy and tactics of the ANC, adopted in 1969 at the Rights Watch, Abducted and abused: renewed conflict in northern Uganda, 15(12(A)), July Morogoro Conference in Tanzania in 1969. The document acknowledges the importance of 2003, h ttp://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/uganda0703/ (acces sed 4 M arch 2010); A mnesty the Southern African region, then still largely under colonial rule and alien occupation, as International, U ganda: ‘ breaking G od’s co mmands’: t he des truction o f c hildhood b y t he crucial to t he s truggle waged b y the ANC a gainst apartheid, h ttp://www.anc.org.za/ Lord’s R esistance A rmy, AFR 59/001/1997, 18 S eptember 1997, h ttp://www.amnesty.org/ ancdocs/history/stratact.html (accessed 3 March 2010). en/library/info/AFR59/001/1997 (accessed 1 2 M arch 2010); Amnesty I nternational, 42 While Ethiopia was the first country of refuge for defecting Southern Sudanese soldiers who Breaking the circle: protecting human rights in the northern war zone, AFR 59/001/1999, 17 later f ormed t he S PLA, L ibya a nd Uganda a lso p rovided s upport. S ee g enerally P hilippa March 1999, h ttp://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR590011999?open&of=ENG- Scott, Th e S udan P eoples’ L iberation M ovement (S PLM) a nd L iberation A rmy (S PLA), UGA (accessed 12 March 2010).

114 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 115 ARMED NON-STATE ENTITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: STATUS AND CHALLENGES OF ACCOUNTABILITY GODFREY MUSILA

52 P Vinck, P Pham and S B Shigekane, Living with fear, New York: Human Rights Center, UC- 67 See generally Godfrey M Musila, Restorative justice in international criminal law: the rights Berkeley Payson Center and International Center for Transitional Justice, 2008; T T urner, of v ictims in t he I nternational Cr iminal C ourt, U npublished P hD t hesis, J ohannesburg: The Congo wars: conflict, myth and reality, London: Zed Books, 2007. University of the Witwatersrand, 2009. 53 See g enerally L B Mb ombo a nd C H B ayolo, Conflicts a rmés en RD C: v iolences s exuelles 68 See the ICC case in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga; and contre les femmes, crimes sans châtiment, 2001–2004, Kinshasa: Editions Concordia, 2004. in the DRC, Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Matheu Ngudjolo Chui. 54 See va rious r eports o n t he ‘ war e conomy’ in t he D RC b y IP IS R esearch, 69 See section on definitions above. http://www.ipisresearch.be (acces sed 8 M arch 2010). S ee a lso Human R ights Watch, The 70 Clapham, Human rights obligations of non-state actors in conflict situations, 495. curse o f go ld: D emocratic R epublic o f t he C ongo, h ttp://www.hrw.org/en/node/11733/ 71 South Africa, Internal Security Act 1950 (Act 44 of 1950); Christina Murray, The status of the section/1 (accessed 11 March 2010). ANC and SWAPO in international humanitarian law, South African Law Journal 100 (1983), 55 See UN, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and 402. Other F orms o f W ealth o f t he D RC, h ttp://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m= 72 The two other groups are the Rally of Forces for Change led by Timane Erdimi, President S/2003/1027 (accessed 1 July 2009). Deby’s uncle and former chief of staff, and Union of Forces for Democracy and Development 56 Dinah S helton, Remedies i n i nternational h uman r ights l aw, L ondon: O xford U niversity (UFDD) – Fondamentale, a splinter group of UFDD, headed by Abdelwahid Aboud. Press, 1999, 55. 73 Beyond t he A frican s hores, I srael co ntinues t o u se simi lar a rguments w ith r espect t o 57 Christian Tomuschat, Th e a pplicability o f h uman r ights l aw t o in surgent m ovements, in Palestinian fighters. See Clapham, Human rights obligations of non-state actors in co nflict Horst Fi scher, U lrika F roissart, Wolff H eintschel v on H einegg a nd C hristian R aap (e ds), situations, 495, w ho n otes t hat ‘ arguments b efore S outh A frican a nd I sraeli j udges t hat Krisensicherung und Humanitärer Schutz – Crisis Management and Humanitarian Protection, liberation movements are entitled to privileges under international law have not met with Festschrift für Dieter Fleck, Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2004, 586. success’. 58 Ibid. 74 Additional Protocol II, article 1. 59 See C lapham, H uman r ights o bligations o f n on-state ac tors in co nflict si tuations, 502; 75 See J uba P eace A greement P rocess, A greement o n A ccountability a nd R econciliation Liesbeth Zegveld, Accountability of armed opposition groups in international law, Cambridge, between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army, 29 June Mass: Cambridge University Press, 2002, 49–51, 152. 2007. 60 See for instance UN, ECOSOC, Norms on the responsibilities of transnational corporations 76 See F rans Viljoen a nd L irette L ouw, S tate co mpliance w ith t he r ecommendations o f t he and other business enterprises with regard to human rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2, 26 African C ommission o n H uman a nd P eoples’ R ights, 1993–2004, American J ournal o f August 2003. International Law 101 (2007), 1–34. 61 Common article 1 of the four Geneva Conventions provides that ‘undertake to respect and 77 According to article 17 of the Rome Statute on the complementarity framework of the ICC, to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances’. the ICC prosecutes only if the state is ‘unable or unwilling’ to do so. 62 , Canada, Switzerland and Spain are good examples of countries that have held trials 78 See AU, Concept note, Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome Statute, Addis Ababa, related t o t he R wandan g enocide. S ee in t his r egard I di Ga parayi, R wanda: G enocide June 2009, r ecommendations 6 a nd 7, h ttp://www.africa-union.org (acces sed 13 M arch prosecutions a t t he do mestic le vel, in G odfrey M M usila, Domestic p rosecutions of 2010). international crimes and the role of African regional bodies in international criminal justice: 79 See G odfrey M M usila, Between r hetoric and a ction: t he p olitics, p rocesses and p ractice o f some African case studies, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, forthcoming in 2010. S ee the ICC’s work in the DRC, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2009, 35–36. also the recent prosecution of Charles McArthur Emmanuel Taylor, the son of the former 80 See AU, Concept, recommendation 7. president of Liberia, who was convicted of torture and sentenced to 97 years in prison by a United States federal court for crimes committed during his father’s bloody reign in Liberia. 63 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, 15. 64 The Lomé Peace Accord, article IX(1)-(3) granted ‘absolute and free pardon’ to combatants. 65 See also Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Report, volume 2, c hapter 2, paragraphs 106 and 107, where the commission found that the RUF was ‘the primary violator of human rights in the conflict’ and responsible for 60,5 per cent of the violations. 66 See with respect to ICTR and ICTY: J R W D Jones, The practice of the international criminal tribunals f or t he f ormer Y ugoslavia a nd R wanda, A rdsley, N ew Y ork: T ransnational Publishers, 1998; A R ydberg Victims in the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, in H K aptein and M Malsch, Crime victims and justice: essays on principles and justice, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004, 126–140, 131.

116 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 117 CHAPTER 5 Crises of the state and governance and armed non-state groups in Africa

AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE

INTRODUCTION

The image of Africa that is beamed to the world is that of vicious radical youths marauding the streets of Mogadishu, miserable victims of the devastating civil war in the western Sudan region of Darfur, genocide and ethnic cleansing in Rwanda and B urundi, b rutal r esource wa rs in L iberia a nd S ierra L eone, mi litants interrupting oil supplies to Western markets in N igeria, prolonged civil wars in Uganda, A ngola, M ozambique, t he D emocratic R epublic o f C ongo (D RC) a nd Côte d’Ivoire, sporadic clan, religious and ethnic wars in Nigeria and Kenya, deep and ext ensive p olitical co nflicts a nd v iolence in t he R epublic o f C ongo (Brazzaville), Zimbabwe, Chad, the Central African Republic (CAR) and Guinea- Bissau, and notorious personal and authoritarian rules in Z aire (now the DRC), Equatorial Guinea and the CAR. In all these conflict situations there are a number of common denominators: weak or failing states, bad governance and armed non- state groups (ANSGs), mainly rebel and militia groups. Conflicts a nd ANSGs h ave co mbined t o de epen t he co ntinent’s s ocial a nd identity di visions a nd in equalities, a nd h ave h eightened s ociocultural disintegration, s ocial u pheavals, ra mpant cr iminality, in security a nd s ocial

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disorder. Internal rebellion, resistance or outright civil wars conducted by militias, A state has legal or juridical and functional or substantive dimensions. With Islamist militant groups and rebel groups have occurred or still exist in Ethiopia, regard to the first, the state is a legal entity that is recognised de jure as a sovereign Senegal, Angola, Mozambique, Sudan, Uganda, the DRC, the CAR, Chad, Algeria, authority while with regard to the second, the state is defined by its de facto or Burundi, Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Mali, Niger, Kenya, empirical attributes, that is, the actual exercise of powers, occupation of roles, and Somalia and the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville). performance o f f unctions o f s tatehood.4 Further, a s tate h as in stitutional a nd It is obvious that as the dominant social force and power formation in Africa, functional a ttributes a nd dim ensions.5 The f ormer r elates t o t he s tructural the structure, conduct and operation of post-colonial states, and their governance apparatus o f g overnance a nd t he ex ercise o f p ublic a uthority, w hile t he l atter systems are strongly linked to the Africa condition and human insecurity. These relates to the critical roles, needs and expectations that are performed or fulfilled. are t herefore cr itical va riables in t he a ttempt t o un derstand a nd exp lain t he The a bility a nd p otential f or t he ac hievement o f iden tified cr itical s tate conflicts, cr ises, v iolence, ci vil s trife a nd wa rs a s w ell a s h uman in security, functions is dependent on capacity. State power and capacity can be measured in humanitarian cr ises a nd t he p roliferation a nd p ervasive ac tivities o f ANSGs in terms of the effectiveness of secured control of territory, the supremacy of laws Africa. over society, the operational capabilities to extract revenues, make and implement The chapter b egins by elaborating t he central concepts and examining state binding rules and regulate society, and the effectiveness of control over resources formation, state cr isis and t he cr ises of governance and de velopment in A frica. and p eople.6 Bräutigam iden tifies ext ractive, r egulatory, admini strative a nd Then the chapter investigates the links between the state and governance crises technical capacities as critical to state execution of its essential roles.7 These relate and the phenomenon of ANSGs a nd violence. It also looks at the reverse side of to the ability to raise revenue, establish and enforce guiding rules in economy and the coin, namely how the state and governance in Africa have been victims of the society, manage manpower, resources and services efficiently and accountably, and non-state institutions of violence. Finally, the chapter concludes by recommending acquire a nd dep loy k nowledge a nd exp ertise r equired t o co nduct i ts a ffairs. that the best approaches to containing the threats of ANSGs to human security will Grindle iden tifies f our t ypes o f c apacity es sential t o s tate f unctioning, n amely entail extensive reconstruction, rehabilitation and reform of state and governance political capacity (responsiveness to demands and social pressures, accountability, institutions. effectiveness of conflict resolution), institutional capacity (the ability to construct effective n ational r egulatory a gencies), t echnical c apacity (a bility t o s et a nd THE NATURE OF THE STATE manage m acro p olicies) a nd admini strative c apacity (ef fective m anagement o f basic public functions).8 The state is a set of interconnected and coordinated institutions that are concerned States can be strong or weak, fragile, in de cline or decadent, failing or failed with t he organisation of p ower and t he structured domination and ordering of and co llapsing o r co llapsed. Th ese de lineations a re f luid a nd o verlapping. F or society.1 Essentially, a s tate m onopolises cer tain p owers a nd r oles, n amely t he example, weak and failing states may be fragile, just as fragile states are often weak making and execution of binding rules, the control and utilisation of institutions and failing. In fac t, s cholars h ave not m arked out any exac t p oints or stages at of o rganised v iolence, t he leg itimate u se o f p hysical f orce, t he ext raction o f which one type progresses into the other. However, as Milliken and Krause have resources, including taxation of citizens, the right to political allegiance of citizens, noted, s tate fa ilure (f unctional fa ilure) p recedes s tate co llapse (in stitutional the right of adjudication and mediation in disputes between citizens and the right collapse) a nd s tate co llapse m ay b e t he ext reme en d o f a co ntinuum o f t he of representation in the international community.2 The state also performs certain weakening of state governance capacity.9 core or critical functions and responsibilities, such as the control of territory and State weakness is indicated by poor capacity to perform critical state roles.10 population, the guarantee of safety, security, public and social order and justice, This occurs because the institutional framework of statehood and governance is the p rovision o f p ublic g oods, s ocial s ervices, inf rastructure a nd e conomic weak, n on-viable a nd in effective, b ecause v ital in stitutions a re s ubverted b y progress, and the promotion of the wellbeing and welfare of citizens.3 hegemony, p ersonalisation, inf ormalisation a nd co rruption o r b ecause p ublic

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institutions are manipulated by privileged groups to perpetuate inequity, injustice, Whatever the case may be, it is obvious that many states are in crisis, although perversion and oppression.11 it s hould b e n oted t hat state weakness or f unctional problems of statehood are State fragility is characterised by susceptibility and vulnerability to internal and more pervasive while incidences of state collapse are rare. As Milliken and Krause external shocks and strains, a t endency towards violent conflicts, civil strife and have noted, whether in weak or even decadent forms, maintenance of the state is violent cr imes, t he p roliferation o f n on-state in stitutions o f v iolence a nd sm all the norm.24 arms, a nd in stability t hat m ay s pill o ver in to n eighbouring co untries.12 The vulnerabilities em anate f rom, a mong o thers, f ractious a nd fac tionalised e lites; Governance and development unequal, di scriminatory a nd co ntested ci tizenship; co nflict-ridden a nd v iolent contestations of state power; perennial challenges to the validity and viability of Governance represents the processes entailed in the exercise and management of the s tate, a nd de clining a uthority a nd co ercive p owers. Th ere m ay a lso b e the collective will of a people.25 It refers to the exercise of political, economic and collapsing p ublic s ervices a nd inf rastructure, de clining e conomies a nd l ack o f administrative a uthority t o m anage a n ation’s a ffairs26 or m ore s pecifically, t he 13 fiscal capacity to discharge basic functions of statehood. Most fragile states are ‘manner in w hich a g overnment ex ercises p olitical p ower’.27 However, t he low income, poor and corrupt and are characterised by low literacy rates, poor components, processes and relations of governance lack specificity with regard to access to health care and other social services, high infant mortality rates and food 28 the measurement and standards of its goodness and effectiveness. shortages.14 Good governance, for example, has been a p opular concept in de velopment, State failure has to do with functional dimensions of statehood.15 It denotes that aid a nd do nor v ocabulary a nd s cholarly t reatment sin ce t he 1980s, a nd h as a s tate h as los t cer tain p owers a nd p rivileges a nd b ecome un able t o p erform remained so in the local and ‘international development agenda’.29 It is often taken certain r oles.16 The cr itical i ssue i s t he co llapse o f t he ext ractive, a llocative, to mean certain qualities and characteristics of rulership, and certain norms that regulatory, social service, security and developmental state functions. A failed state are held to be ideal, appropriate and acceptable.30 is unable to transform society into a m odern industrial one, improve economic There are, however, more specific attributes that characterise good governance. performance, prevent or alleviate poverty and create prosperity.17 These are, among others, the legitimacy of the government; the existence of the State collapse relates to the institutional dimensions of statehood. It refers to a rule of law or systems of constitutional politics; systems of broad participation and situation w here t here i s b reakdown o f t he in stitutions o f g overnance, disintegration of public authority and collapse of public authority over territory accommodation; the accountability to the governed; the existence of defined and and people.18 State institutions, authority and powers fall apart and leave a vacuum predictable systems of rules, procedures and processes; open, clear and transparent of a uthority a nd r oles.19 Government m ay ef fectively ce ase t o exi st a nd t he ways of management of government affairs; collective decision-making, and the 31 functions that define statehood can no longer be performed.20 Public services and recognition of individual and collective rights and freedoms. This list is by no security roles shrink or collapse entirely.21 There is a los s of formal controls over means exhaustive. territory, the citizenry, resources, a lack of economic regulation and internal order, There are clearly t wo dimensions here: t he p olitical and t he institutional or and the reach of the state is severely limited.22 bureaucratic dimensions. The political dimensions are underscored in the political The co llapsing s tate i s m ore j uridical t han s ubstantive b ecause o f t he liberalisation a nd r eforms in A frica. I n lin e w ith t his, t he U nited N ations disintegration of the apparatus of governmental institutions and loss of the power Development P rogramme (UND P) def ines g ood g overnance a s t hat w hich i s and authority of statehood. However, collapse may not equate to the cessation of participatory, transparent, accountable, effective, equitable and promotes the rule existence, b ecause a s B aker h as n oted, j uridical exi stence a nd in ternational of l aw. 32 The b ureaucratic a nd in stitutional dim ension r elates t o ra tional a nd recognition may continue and the state may subsist through informal, militia and impersonal management based on rules and procedures and efficient and effective community structures, as had happened in Somalia.23 systems of public management.

122 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 123 CRISES OF THE STATE AND GOVERNANCE AND ARMED NON-STATE GROUPS IN AFRICA AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE

The nature of governance and governance systems is cr itically important to ... p ut in p roper co ntext a nd d ue p roportion … do n ot wa rrant t he in tellectual growth, de velopment a nd p olitical s tability. I t det ermines t he c apacity a nd fatalism and pathologisation of African politics which have been expressed in Afro- effectiveness o f s tate p ower a nd m anagement a nd t he co nditions t hat f oster pessimism a nd t he acco mpanying do omsday s cenarios f requently p ainted o f 50 investments, economic growth and development.33 Some systems of governance Africa. can b e ‘ growth en hancing a nd de velopmental’.34 In fac t, t echnical s upport f or Africa’s g overnance sys tems h as hin ged o n t he b elief t hat g ood g overnance Whatever t he des criptions a nd c haracterisations, t he fac t i s t hat A frican s tates have abundant legal and juridical forms but are weak and failing with regard to the facilitates effective management of overall progress and specifically achieves direct character, substance, content and empirical existence of statehood. There is more and quick improvements of macroeconomic and overall development.35 external r ecognition t han in ternal s upport o r a ny de ep s ense o f p olitical community and national identity. Furthermore, the post-colonial state in Africa is The crisis of the state in Africa typical a s fa r a s cer tain a ttributes a re co ncerned. S tate p ower i s co ncentrated, centralised and monopolistic, just as the political process is monopolised by the The s tate in A frica h as b een t he s ubject o f di verse, di sparaging a nd n egative executive, p residential p ower a nd r uling c liques. Th e g overnance a pparatus i s descriptions a nd c haracterisations. I t h as b een des cribed a s a uthoritarian, statist, bureaucratised and politicised. The states are converted into a ‘primordial repressive, exploitative and predatory; weak, frail, verging on collapse, in a state of favouring political arrangement … and fountain of privilege, wealth and power’.51 flux, in di sarray, un stable a nd in p rofound de cay;36 neo-patrimonial, co rrupt, The states are actually paradoxical for being powerful but weak, repressive but poorly bureaucratised and institutionalised, informalised, not emancipated from feeble, a bsolutist b ut f ragile, exp ansive b ut co llapsing.52 On t he o ne h and, t he society and immersed in particularistic or ascriptive grounds;37 non-autonomous states are prominent, conspicuous and project upward,53 but on the other hand are and in f ormation;38 wicked, h ostile a nd co ercive b ut ir relevant;39 overdeveloped weak and suspended above society.54 In trying to do too much, the state ends up 55 and a ppropriated f or c lientelist, p rebendal a nd p rimordial p urposes,40 and doing too little and being soft or disengaged. Though seemingly powerful, state unproductive and poorly managed.41 Many African states have been branded as institutions are weak, fragile and ineffective. The states do not have enough power 56 shadowy,42 pseudo or quasi,43 juridical,44 weak or failed45 and collapsed.46 to compel the key elements of society to act as they should. Despite its power and prominence, the state is irrelevant for failing to meet needs and aspirations and not Some of these characterisations were actually inherited from the colonial state. being s ensitive t o, a nd s upportive a nd p rotective o f i ts p eople.57 Though s tate Others are based on nebulous, ambiguous and over-generalised notions. Besides, power is concentrated and consolidated in t he hands of a f ew elite members of the descriptions pertain to ‘a very small proportion of the total and a v ery small ruling p arties, i ts ac tual h old o n p ower i s t enuous, w ith w eak a uthority a nd minority o f A frican lif e’.47 For exa mple, t he c haracterisation o f s hadow s tates i s legitimacy, w hich i t m aintains b y p ushing o ut o r m arginalising s ocial g roups, over-generalised a s i t i s b ased o nly o n S ierra L eone, L iberia a nd Z aire, w here communities and individuals.58 Though monopolistic, it has only a t enuous hold circumstances a nd p eculiar co nditions o f s tate fa ilure r esulted in le aders on power and very little authority and though intensely hegemonic, many groups maintaining t hemselves a nd s tatehood t hrough co ntrol o f t erritorial r esources, are excluded and outside its control.59 48 commercial n etworks a nd co ntracting o ut s ecurity. Olukoshi, in t urn, h as The development of the state crisis relates to precolonial, colonial and post- described the characterisation of African countries as neo-patrimonial and rent colonial experiences. Significantly, it was created by the nature of the struggles for seeking a s o ver-generalised, vac uous, d ubious a nd u biquitous va riables t hat the acq uisition a nd co nsolidation o f s tate p ower a nd t he acco mpanying ultimately explain nothing,49 while Nnoli asserts that these characterisations and transformations t hat s tate le aders b rought a bout in p olitical in stitutions, variables when: governance apparatus and the public arena.

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In fact, the immediate post-independence period was characterised by a statist leaders.63 Further, there was a steady degeneration of the structures and practice of expansion, p enetration a nd do mination o f s ociety, t he co nstruction o f power a nd a uthority f rom f ederalism a nd de volution o f p owers t o uni tarism, developmental states with enormous socioeconomic roles, bureaucratic expansion legislative enactments for rulership to executive decrees and fiats, constitutional particularly through the growth of public corporations and enterprises, and the limitations o f t enure t o lif e p residency a nd le adership p erpetuation a nd f rom expansion of and g rowing reliance on s ecurity agencies for t he maintenance of multiparty to one-party systems. public order. The struggles for power and its consolidation led to a concentration There w ere g rowing in equalities, n arrowing o f t he s ociopolitical b ase o f of p ower in t he s tate, cen tralisation o f p olitical le adership in t he ex ecutive, governance, t he et hnicisation a nd r egionalisation o f p ower a nd g rowing personalised ex ecutive p ower, cr eation o f m onopolistic p olitical p arties a nd corruption a nd in sensitivity t o ci tizen in terests. L egitimacy s hifted f rom t he dismantling of multiparty systems, harassment and weakening of the opposition, people to patronage and primordial networks. Governance became increasingly constriction of inter-elite competition, dismantling of constitutional protections arbitrary, w eak, di sorderly a nd co nflict r idden. W hile s ervice de livery and guarantees, curtailment of personal liberties and suppression of disagreement deteriorated, the states acquired more strength in the number and funding of state and di ssent.60 There wa s f urthermore a p olitical, p artisan a nd ex ecutive military a nd s ecurity a gencies, a nd in t he ex ercise o f ex cessive, a busive a nd penetration of key governance institutional apparatus and the politicisation of the repressive force. State leaders have readily visited excessive and atrocious violence bureaucracy and security agencies; the circumscription, manipulation, defiance or on their own people.64 interference w ith j udicial in stitutions, a nd t he ex clusion o f m ost s ocial g roups Because t he s tate em erged a s t he m ain v ehicle o f c apital f ormation a nd from participation in public affairs. accumulation, the struggle for p ower has b een intense and warlike. There have Within a few years after independence, single-party systems were instituted in been uncertain and conflict-ridden political successions, and flawed and contested Ghana, G uinea, Tanzania, K enya, Tunisia, Z aire, C ameroon a nd C ôte d ’Ivoire. elections in countries such as Kenya, Zimbabwe and Nigeria, which have resulted Elections became farcical and ritualistic as citizens lost any real right to choice. By in large-scale violence, killings and destruction. The constriction or even blocking the mid-1960s, t here had been military interventions in a n umber of states and of ci vil p athways t o p ower h as le d t o t he de velopment o f v iolent a lternatives. some, such as the CAR, Uganda and Equatorial Guinea, were subjected to extreme Military co ups, in surgencies a nd v iolent fac tional co nflicts h ave b ecome t he forms of mi litary-based or -supported dic tatorships. D emocracy was a c asualty instruments by m eans o f w hich r ival c laimants, co ntenders a nd t he o pposition between the mid-1960s and early 1980s, w ith Botswana and Mauritius being the fight their way to power. only s table dem ocracies. P ersonal a utocracy, sustained by p ersonality c ults, Because politics has been a ‘zero-sum game’ and the capture of state power a patronage sys tems a nd a n ext ensive a rray o f f ormal a nd inf ormal a gencies o f matter of life and death, violence – which has been pervasive, extensive, punitive, coercion, violence and repression, dominated m any countries until the wave of brutal, horrendous and destructive – has become a major instrument of politics.65 democratisation in t he 1990s, a lthough t here a re s till s ome v estiges o f t hese In some states, violence has become instrumental and a resource for the creation tendencies in Cameroon, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Zimbabwe and the CAR. As of an environment in which arbitrariness, excessive force, abuse, corruption, and Decalo notes with respect to the CAR, the personal autocracy and control was so accumulation and resource capture flourishes.66 extensive that the president/presidency was the state and public policy and there The nature of politics has been inimical and subversive and has undermined was little distinction between the president, the state and government,61 as is the development. Patronage politics in the context of economic decline has tended to case acco rding t o F rancis Ik ome o f C ameroon, w here P aul B iya s till sin gle- exacerbate co rruption a nd v iolence. R ent-seeking p olitics h as un dermined handedly determines the nature, structure and direction of politics.62 productive activities and created a b ogus, consumptive and ostentatious lifestyle Personal a nd a rbitrary r ule w eakened t he in stitutional a nd co nstitutional and import dependence.67 The centralisation, concentration and personalisation of order, er oded lega l a nd co nstitutional in tegrity a nd m ade t he l aw a nd t he power and the politicisation of governance apparatuses and state institutions have constitution irrelevant to political practice as they were largely ignored by state delegitimised the state, obstructed collective decision-making, constricted citizen

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participation, encouraged corruption and arbitrariness, destroyed the integrity of I Citizen and group disengagement or exit from the state state institutions and weakened t he ef ficient operation of t he e conomy and t he I Closed or narrow constitutional and legal channels of regime change, political social sector. succession or ‘political regeneration’76 The n ature o f s tatehood t hat h as b een co nstructed wa s t herefore w eak, I An in ability t o ef fectively r egulate a nd co ntrol s ociety a s m anifested in t he inappropriate a nd in effective. Th e A frican s tates fa iled t o cr eate p olitical prevalence o f sm uggling, c urrency t rafficking, m oney l aundering a nd 68 institutions t hat en gendered s upport. The r uling a nd g overning e lites w ere proliferation of illegal arms and private armies77 unable to achieve a coherent ideology for development, social reform, political and I A failing capacity to enforce law and order, the rule of law and security social m obilisation, co mpetitive p olitical ac tion, et hnic, r eligious a nd r egional I The co llapse o f p ublic s ervices, b asic s tate f unctions, r esponsibilities a nd integration, a nd ef fective guid ance o f s ocial a nd e conomic p olicy a nd 69 obligations commitment to the future. The consequences of the nature and exercise of power 78 I An inability to effectively implement public policies and i ts co nsolidation w ere e vident e ven b y t he mid-1960s, in t he f orm o f I A growing incapacity to monopolise and control institutions of violence legitimacy cr ises, s ocial unr est a nd t ensions, o ccurrences o f mi litary m utinies, I A decline in the strength, discipline and cohesion of coercive agencies insurrections, military coups and civil wars. I A dep endence o n p rivate mi litary co mpanies, m etropolitan cen tres, neighbouring countries and others for security and troop support79 State weakness, fragility and collapse in Africa 80 I An inability to prevent and manage insurgents and external threats Apart from Botswana and Mauritius, which have had sustained democracies and I Military intrusions and retaliations from neighbouring countries a semblance of stability and prosperity, African states have generally been weak or in decline, fragile or collapsing. In fact, Osaghae’s observation that many states in A major indication of state misgovernance and weakness is the prevalence of a Africa are fragile and distressed70 was reiterated in the World Bank report of 2006 politics o f v iolence a nd o f v iolence in p olitics. Th ere a re s trong lin ks b etween that listed 26 fragile states, of which 14 were in sub-Saharan Africa.71 Sub-Saharan politics, p oliticians, p olitical e lites, t he r uling c lasses a nd t he co nstitution o f African countries also dominated the lowest rungs of the United Nations Human irregular and clandestine private armies, task forces and armed bands. Politicians 72 Development Index in 2006. Foreign Policy’s Failed States Index of 2008 listed 11 and government officials hire armed bands to fight enemies, arm one group to African states (Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, the CAR, the DRC, Guinea, Ethiopia, Nigeria, rout a nother o r u se a rmed p roxy f orces t o cr eate co nflict w ithin a nd b etween Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, Zimbabwe) among the 20 s tates it designated as weak communities and groups. Access to institutions of violence creates a p osition of 73 and failing. strength for which politicians compete either to protect their own positions or to These c lassifications w ere b ased on cr itical in dicators of w eakness, f ragility, 81 intimidate political opponents. failure and collapse, such as the state of stability, security and legitimisation, the There is thus a mi litarisation of politics or the domination of armed politics, levels o f g roup g rievances, fac tionalisation o f t he e lite a nd e venness o f with v iolence b eing t he m ain m ethod f or de aling w ith p olitical a nd fac tional development, t he s tate o f t he e conomy, p ublic s ervices a nd h uman r ights conflicts and elections. Violence is a r esource in A frican politics, which leaders observances, and the levels of external intervention and displacement of persons. offer in the struggles for recognition, resources, inclusion, claims and concessions, The m ajor in dications o f w eakness, de cline, f ragility a nd co llapse o f t he African states include the following: and w hich p olitical contenders purchase in ex change for f unds, protection and positions. Violence has been an effective tool for self-enrichment, the guarantee

I Declining respect for and loss of state authority for political positions, access to strong political leaders and patrons, recognition in 74 I Difficulties in the maintenance of authority over territory and people and the the political landscape and expansion of political power and political victories in inability to secure borders75 factional and electoral struggles.

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The crisis of governance and development in Africa standards, socioeconomic hardships, the collapse of the social service and welfare systems a nd f urther e conomic de cline. Th ese co nditions g enerated p olitical Post-independence regimes were primarily concerned with two projects, namely resignation and social apathy, but also heightened ethnic consciousness, religious nation-building a nd e conomic de velopment. Th e in dependence h opes a nd fanaticism a nd s ocial di slocation a nd f ragmentation, w hich w ere exp ressed in aspirations a nd t herefore t he p ost-colonial s tate-citizenry p act revolved a round conflicts, crises and incidences of unrest.87 social w elfare a nd e conomic p rogress. Th erefore, s tates em barked o n s tate-led There was a second wave of democratisation in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 82 socioeconomic m odernisation p rogrammes. Initially, t here wa s m oderate which saw multiparty elections in G hana, Nigeria, Senegal and . A economic growth, which translated into better social welfare and socioeconomic third wave of democratisation, which was widespread and profound, began in the progress, w ith t he p ublic s ector s howing r emarkable g rowth in t he 1960s a nd late 1980s a nd e arly 1990s a nd wa s dr iven b y ci tizen g roups a nd p rotesters. It 1970s in line with ambitious socioeconomic programmes. generated s o m uch h ope a nd exp ectations t hat s ome c hristened i t t he ‘second However, b y t he l ate 1970s, economic de cline h ad s et in, le ading t o independence’. During t his p eriod, m any A frican co untries em braced p olitical catastrophic economic failure by the 1980s.83 By the 1990s, economic decline had reforms and opened up their political spaces to pluralism by conducting multi- almost wiped out initial progress, manifesting in a co llapse of export commodity party elections. prices, an oil price crisis, exceptionally poor performance and losses in the public However, apart from Botswana, Mauritius and South Africa, where democracy enterprise s ectors, and corruption and mi smanagement t hat consumed t he few and democratic governance have been fairly successful, democracy has remained resources that remained.84 States became debt-ridden and had to depend on credit tenuous a nd un stable a nd dem ocratic co nsolidation h as b een s low. Fragile a nd for the acquisition of essential goods. Industrial capacity utilisation declined and failing democracies are still found in Burundi, Sierra Leone, Mozambique, Angola, states b egan t o fa il in p roviding ci tizen n eeds, w elfare, w ellbeing a nd p rogress, Mali, R wanda, A lgeria, C ongo-Brazzaville, N igeria, T ogo, Z imbabwe, K enya, culminating in a di sintegration o f t he s ocial co ntract b etween s tates a nd t heir Equatorial Guinea, the CAR and São Tomé and Príncipe. Pseudodemocracies with citizens. The fallout of the struggles for power and its consolidation and the ensuing election tags exist in T ogo, C ameroon, Gabon and Uganda. Democratisation in economic downturn was the decline in the leverage of the people, genuine political Niger a nd G uinea h as fa iled b ecause o f mi litary in terventions, w hile t hat o f participation and political representation. These, in addition to the broken social Madagascar, Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau has fallen prey to poor leadership contract, began to translate into crises of legitimacy. The citizens began to react to under t he c hokehold o f g reedy e lites. L ibya a nd E gypt h ave a utocratic, a nd the g rowing t ensions b y m eans o f p rotests, s trikes a nd r iots. W ith t he los s o f Morocco and Swaziland, monarchical regimes. internal leg itimacy, a nd w ith en suing t hreats t o r egime p ower, A frican s tates Africa’s governance cr isis h as r emained p rofound, ext ensive a nd p rolonged. sought and became dependent on and were sustained by the external support from Governments have been insensitive to the interests and aspirations of the citizens, Cold War powers.85 However, the end of the Cold War and globalisation reduced eroding t heir p articipation a nd acco mmodation, di sconnecting t hem f rom t he 88 the support for corrupt, authoritarian and violent regimes, leading to the collapse state a nd g overnmental co ncerns a nd a lienating t hem. Further, g overnments of regimes such as that of Mobutu in Z aire and in g eneral forced economic and have b een c haracterised b y in effective admini stration, in effective co ntrol a nd later political reforms on African states.86 command o f r esources, in consistent a nd p oor m anagement o f e conomies a nd As a r esult of the economic crisis, African countries had to solicit credit and development.89 In the final analysis one could say that human security has been assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The sacrificed for regime survival and security. structural ad justment p rogrammes f orced o n t he co untries w ere h arsh a nd The s tates a re n ot h eld acco untable a nd in fac t, a s B aker n otes, prescribed, a mong o ther t hings, j ob c uts, de valuation, p rivatisation, ‘unaccountability is extensively institutionalised in Africa’, largely because of feeble commercialisation, the institution of market forces and import liberalisation. The legislative oversight, opaque business dealings and corrupt elections and electoral implementation of these programmes led to unemployment, deteriorating living systems, exacerb ated b y t he in ability o f t he j udiciary, ci vil s ociety a nd a nti-

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corruption a gencies t o c all p ublic a uthorities t o acco unt.90 Corruption h as agriculture and the production and export of other minerals declined, leaving the increased the cost of governance, starved and devastated public services, inflated country with an economy, in which oil and gas account for more than 95 per cent recurrent and operating costs, made administration p erverse and c umbersome, of export earnings and 80 p er cent of federal government revenues. In the mid- undermined de velopment ef forts, di verted c apital t o f oreign b anks a nd s cared 1960s, Nigeria was on a p ar with or better than most of the Asian countries, but away investments.91 typical of most African countries, it is very far behind them today. It now occupies The nature of African politics and the public arena it created simply did n ot the unenviable position as one of the poorest and most fragile states of the world. facilitate g ood g overnance a nd de velopment. R ather, a s C hazan et a l n ote, i t The economy has been in de cline since the early 1980s, a nd has grown only prevented any real representation and participation, popular engagement in public marginally since the late 1990s. Th e non-oil sector, particularly agricultural and policy formulation and direction, meaningful access to government, meaningful solid min eral p roduction a nd exp orts, h as s uffered a h uge de cline. I ndustrial deliberations and consultation and consideration of public interests in the public capacity utilisation is less than 30 p er cent and the country remains very import agenda.92 There wa s n o p ublic co nsent, co nstitutional a nd p opular c hecks a nd dependent. Pu blic u tilities a nd s ocial s ervices a re in adequate, in efficient a nd restrains were weakened, decision-making power was limited to a few persons or shoddy a nd p ublic inf rastructure i s co llapsing. Th e c urrency h as b een fa lling groups, diversity of opinion, criticism and dissent were constrained and popular against m ajor w orld c urrencies sin ce t he l ate 1980s. P overty h as de epened a nd influence and pressure on governments were limited. living co nditions a nd m aterial w ellbeing h ave de clined s teeply. Th e p er c apita In addition, governmental capacity and effectiveness were undermined. Larger income in 2002 wa s about a quarter of that in the mid-1970s,95 while the poverty bureaucracies r emained in efficient, in competent a nd w eak, b ut le d t o l arger rate has increased from about 46 per cent in 1976 t o about 76 per cent in 2009. 96 governance cos ts, w hich lef t f ew r esources f or de velopment. Th e p olitics o f Infant and maternal mortality rates are among the highest in the world. accumulation made entrepreneurial endeavours unnecessary for leaders, patrons The le adership h as b een ext remely s elf-interested a nd s elf-seeking, and c lients a nd f utile f or o thers a nd t herefore di sassociated w ealth f rom uncommitted, exploitative, corrupt and oppressive. State officials are some of the entrepreneurial activity.93 The expansion and politicisation of the security agencies best p aid in t he w orld, a nd y et lo ot t he t reasury. P olitical le aders p oliticise generated a mbitions, in creased exp enditure, in troduced di visions a nd co nflicts identities a nd cr eate di visive p latforms t o acq uire p ower a nd r esources t hat and t urned t he mi litary into a n intervention f orce in p olitics, g overnment a nd lubricate p atronage sys tems. Cr itical n ational a nd de velopment i ssues a re society. A s a co nsequence o f t he a bove, m ost s tates in A frica fa iled t o ac hieve addressed through the prism of ethnic interests. Rarely do public institutions work economic progress and wealth or guarantee citizens’ wellbeing and security. effectively o r a re o fficials im partial a nd fa ir, f or e lite g roup in terests t ake precedence and create an environment of arbitrariness and abuse of power.97 Public Case analysis: state, governance, development and human offices and resources are privatised for personal and primordial benefit. security crises in Nigeria The nation’s vast resources have been wasted and mismanaged or stolen and laundered by means of a h ost of s elf-interested, inconsistent, inappropriate and The mi sfortunes a nd s orry si tuation o f A frican s tates, a nd t he g overnance a nd misplaced policies and corruption. Public officials and public sector management development crises can be illustrated with reference to Nigeria. With a population are wa ntonly p rofligate, wa steful a nd os tentatious. Pu blic in stitutions, s ocial of a bout 150 mi llion a nd va st h uman a nd n atural r esources in a rable l and, services, t he e ducational a nd h ealth c are sys tems a nd m ost p ublic a gencies a re minerals and particularly oil and gas, Nigeria is regarded variously as a sleeping, seeking medical treatment abroad (particularly in India and South Africa), while crippled, prostrated or dying African giant.94 many N igerians n ow a ttend uni versities a nd p ostgraduate s chools in E urope, Nigeria is about the seventh largest producer of crude oil in the Organisation South Africa and Ghana. of Petroleum Producing Countries (OPEC) and the largest in Africa. It has earned As the state has failed to perform its critical roles, citizens and communities over US$400 b illion f rom o il exp orts. A s o il a nd ga s r evenues in creased, have r esigned t hemselves t o p roviding b asic s ocial s ervices s uch a s wa ter a nd

132 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 133 CRISES OF THE STATE AND GOVERNANCE AND ARMED NON-STATE GROUPS IN AFRICA AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE

electricity for themselves, at least most of the time. There is huge insecurity of lives for more engagement, for state intervention to alleviate their social problems and and p roperty b ecause o f hig h v iolent cr ime ra tes. N eighbourhoods a nd for s tate-directed de velopment. Th ese h opes b egan t o t urn t o d ust w hen t he communities provide their own security and safety, sometimes by hiring ethnic citizenry was ditched and its participation, relevance and interests rubbished by militia g roup m embers. D eepening p overty a nd l ack o f s tate s upport h ave the r uling c lass in t he s truggle f or co nsolidation o f s tate p ower. I n fac t, t he frustrated ci tizens a nd dr iven s ome t o cr ime. M any h ave a lso j oined s ocial ordinary people were marginalised and excluded from the ‘mainstream of political enclaves b ased o n r eligious f undamentalism, c ultism a nd b anditry, p rimordial power and patronage’.101 enclaves such as communal, ethnic, religious and regional groups, and political As rights were progressively eroded, power became more exclusive and based enclaves such as patronage and violent networks in search of platforms for social on et hnic, r egional a nd r eligious in terests, a nd a s e lections b ecame les s assistance. competitive, courtesy of the monopoly of p olitical institutions by elitist groups, The nation has been devastated by deep ethnic, regional and religious divisions and the state became predatory, courtesy of authoritarianism and repression, the and conflicts.98 The violent and deadly contests for power have produced a regime citizens b ecame f rustrated, a lienated a nd a pathetic. Th e exp ectations o f of assassinations, unresolved murders, electoral violence and violent clashes. Inter- development began to fizzle out by the early 1970s as economic decline and crises and in tra-communal a nd et hnic co nflicts, a nd in ter- a nd in tramilitia, c ult a nd set in a mong t he p oor a nd p easant c lasses a longside t he g rowing m ass o f religious g roup clashes, have le d to a co ndition of p ervasive s ocial strife, s ocial unemployed. A s t he e conomic cr ises w orsened in to t he 1990s, t he vu lnerable unrest a nd y outh r estiveness, w hich h ave c aused n umerous de aths a nd groups w ere n eglected a nd b attered b y in ternal a nd im posed ad justment a nd displacements. About 30 000 people are estimated to have died in community and reform policies. political violence between 1999 and 2009, while about 3 million were displaced.99 Frustration ga ve b irth t o m ass s ocial di scontent a nd t he r esponse o f t he The politics of exclusion and the use of the state mainly to dominate and deprive citizenry was to exit from engagements with the state and direct their activities, excluded g roups o f p olitical p articipation a nd b enefits h ave h eightened et hnic assistance, participation and loyalties to informal and non-state enclaves. When nationalism, s elf-determination s truggles a nd iden tity co nflicts, a nd p roduced the ci tizens los t t heir fa ith in t he s tate, t hey f irst w ithdrew t heir s upport a nd ethnic militias in almost all regions, as well as violent and militia-based insurgency commitment and then began to sabotage and subvert it.102 Thus r eactions were in the Niger Delta region since the late 1990s.100 The Nigerian military struggled to first c haracterised b y a voidance, es cape, p rotective m echanisms a nd t hen contain the insurgency in the Niger Delta until a disarmament, demobilisation and circumvention of the state and its authority, laws, regulations and taxes. Later it rehabilitation programme was accepted by the militias in October 2009. took the form of emigration or the creation of informal parallel systems such as The n ation-state p roject i s s till c hallenged b y t he f orces o f r egionalism, black markets, smuggling and illegal trading.103 ethnicism, religious and struggles for control of state resources. Another response was to search for and create alternative support, assistance Apart from the 1967–1970 secessionist civil war, there are still forces fighting for and s ecurity in stitutions. Thi s le d t o t he em ergence o f co mmunity, et hnic a nd self-determination and separatism in deep south, southeast and southwest Nigeria. religious g roups, s elf-help a nd de velopment a ssociations, n eighbourhood a nd community security groups, and vigilantes. As struggles for power by the ruling Responses of citizens and popular groups class a nd ex cluded e lites h eightened a nd ci tizen s truggles f or s urvival a nd livelihoods intensified, opportunities to profit from crime and violence began to The decolonisation and immediate post-independence eras in Africa were years of emerge, leading to a regime of pervasive crime, violence and violent engagements activism a nd h ope f or t he o rdinary ci tizens a s t hey j oined t he p rotests a gainst and to the proliferation of arms and emergence of ANSGs. colonial rule, responded to the nationalist sentiments and joined the struggle for By t he l ate 1980s, t he p ersistence o f t he e conomic cr ises, acco mpanied b y decolonisation. There were huge aspirations that indigenous rule would accelerate pervasive in ternal co nflicts, co rruption a nd v iolence a nd de epening development and social wellbeing. After independence the citizens sought avenues impoverishment a nd h uman mi sery, b egan t o g enerate r eactions o f a nger a nd

134 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 135 CRISES OF THE STATE AND GOVERNANCE AND ARMED NON-STATE GROUPS IN AFRICA AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE

social r estiveness. G oaded b y in creased s tate a uthoritarianism a nd de clining There a re t wo i ssues h ere. Th e f irst i s h ow t he n ature o f t he s tate a nd fortunes un der ad justment p olicies a nd m otivated b y t he exa mples o f governance constructed a political and public terrain or sphere in which violence democratisation in Latin America and Eastern Europe, ordinary Africans began to and u ltimately ANSGs t hrive. Th e s econd i s h ow t he cr ises o f t he s tate a nd challenge t he s tate, w hich le d t o t he a wakening o f ci vil s ociety in t he f orm o f governance have led to the construction of diverse ANSGs. protest movements, struggles against adjustment policies and for political rights, The n ature a nd p rocesses f or t he co nsolidation o f p ower a fter t he p ost- political liberalisation and democratisation. What swept across Africa and most independence elections were structured in ways that promoted a zero-sum game state c apitals a nd m ajor cities a nd t owns wa s a n unprecedented wave of urb an in p olitics. Thi s in t urn h eightened t he s truggle f or p ower a nd t urned i t in to riots, street protests and popular violence that forced substantial changes in several warfare, deepened and politicised divisiveness, cast inter-elite power struggles in countries and opened up the African states to liberalisation in the public arena. ethnic, r eligious a nd r egional m oulds, a nd p ersonalised p ower. Th e in evitable However, because corruption, self-interested government, abuse of power and outcome o f t his p olitical r eality wa s v iolence, w hich b ecame a t ool f or ei ther civil r ights, a uthoritarianism a nd s tate v iolence h ave p ersisted, s everal ci tizens perpetuating the power of one group or appropriating it for other groups. have remained outside the state and in informal and underground economies and Elite group struggles for consolidating power turned the state into a rapacious primordial havens. This was not helped by t he fac t t hat many of t he t ransition and predatory force. The security agencies became abusive, brutal, suppressive and programmes were truncated, the elections were flawed or annulled, and the old repressive instruments that were used against the opposition, activists, protesters constructions o f p rimordial a nd p oliticised iden tity-based p ower s truggles a nd and ci tizens. I ndividuals a nd g roups t hat d ared t o cr iticise, v ote a gainst t he violent p olitics w ere s ustained. Th ese h ave s oured t he h opes o f t he p ost- government o r s upport o pposition e lements w ere v isited w ith ex cessive a nd democratisation wa ve. To s ome ext ent, t he s tate, g overnance a nd de velopment indiscriminate f orce. P articularly, a s s tate o fficials los t s upport a s a r esult o f crises have persisted. The citizens have remained poor and vulnerable and a new increasing co rruption, in effective g overnance a nd e conomic de cline a nd face d culture o f di senchantment a nd m ass s ocial di scontent h as em erged in s everal growing leg itimacy cr ises, s tate v iolence b ecame t he in strument t o s uppress countries. Thi s i s e videnced b y t he p ersisting emig ration, f requent r ecourse t o dissent, c hallenges a nd r esistance. Apart f rom t he s ecurity a gencies, s tate e lites violent protests, urban and religious riots, the proliferation of arms and ANSGs, began t o u se t hugs a nd a rmed b ands, cr eate mi litant y outh w ings o f p olitical recurring identity wars and persisting insurrections, insurgencies and rebellions. But African citizens are still engaging the states through struggles for relevance parties, es tablish s tate p aramilitary uni ts a nd mi litias a nd s upport a nd u tilise and p olitical p articipation. Th e ci tizens r emain r estive a nd ci vil s ociety a nd private militias. ANSGs r emain p articularly r elevant in t he a reas o f ci tizen en gagements a nd The state thus constructed a t errain of violent p olitics, made violence a k ey empowerments, communal and individual safety and security as misgovernance, resource f or acq uiring a nd acc umulating p ower, cr eated a nd m ade u se o f poverty, cr ime, v iolence, in security a nd iden tity-based t ensions a nd co nflicts entrepreneurs o f v iolence, in stitutionalised v iolence in p olitics, a nd cr eated a persist. public s phere in w hich n on-state ac tors w ere f orced into co unter-violence a s a mode of defence and resistance. ANSGs then emerged from support of state elites, The phenomenon of armed non-state groups the mobilisation of opposition elements against state brutality and repression, the construction of alternative paths to power and resources and as the last resort of Non-state in stitutions o f v iolence r epresent t he m ost p owerful, exp licit a nd excluded, marginalised and discontented elements. compelling challenge to state structures, state authority, state monopoly and state State weakness, failure and irrelevance are clearly indicated in the militia and existence in A frica, a nd a re t he m ost p otent in struments o r v ehicles o f s tate rebel m ovement p henomenon. Fir st, s tate w eakness cr eates t he in capability t o collapse today.104 maintain a m onopoly of institutions of coercion, provide security and maintain

136 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 137 CRISES OF THE STATE AND GOVERNANCE AND ARMED NON-STATE GROUPS IN AFRICA AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE public and social order and peace. Second, the decline of state resources, roles and The state and governance as victims of ANSGs capacity leads to an inability to provide economic opportunities, social services and faci lities, em ployment a nd g ood li ving co nditions. Thir d, s tate w eakness State a nd g overnance cr ises did n ot j ust g enerate ANSGs o r b ecame m anifest creates a g rowing s tate ir relevance a nd t he p romotion o f iden tity g roups a nd through t he phenomenon of ANSGs, n or did t he l atter prove and demonstrate movements t o f ill t he vac uum. F ourth, s tate w eakness h eightens t he q uest f or only s tate a nd g overnance cr ises. R ather, s tate a nd g overnance cr ises a re, in a identity solidarity, assertion and mobilisation, and creates a fertile environment in sense, victims of ANSGs. which non-state actors can thrive. In m any A frican co untries t he p henomenon o f ANSGs h as r evealed de ep Typically, in w eak states the non-state actors, groups and individuals take on divisions, lack of discipline, organisational and infrastructure challenges, the poor state roles and fill the vacuum of social assistance, welfare and security and the condition of the military and security agencies, the tortuous hold on power by the maintenance of social order, but are not moderated, regulated or organised. In the political e lite, t he p oor co nnect o r a ttachment b etween t he p eople a nd t he absence of state control, regulation and any form of lawful deterrence, it is not state/regimes, t he f ragility of state institutions and t he p orosity of b orders. The surprising that the behaviour and practices of these groups become lawless and ease w ith w hich t hese ANSGs o perate o r h ave o perated a nd t he dif ficulties o f disorderly. Th ese em ergent ac tors in g overnance a nd s ecurity t hus in cubate containing them are clear demonstrations of the weakness and fragility of African criminality, excessive and abusive force and violence. states. Further, t he p olitical and constitutional environment and weaknesses of t he However, w hile s tate w eakness a nd de cline h ave r esulted in a g rowth in African states are fertile breeding grounds for extraconstitutional actions, violent ANSGs, state fragility and collapse have been accelerated by their activities. ANSG politics, c hallenges o f s tate a uthority, p olitical co nflicts a nd h ostilities, a nd participation in in surrection, in surgency a nd r ebellion h as cr eated un governed deepening identity-based divisions. Even the reforms since the 1980s, in the form and ungovernable areas from which states have retreated, leaving behind a power of structural adjustment programmes, political liberalisation, state roll-back and vacuum. With time, ANSGs b ecome de facto governments in these communities privatisation, further weakened the states and prevented them from performing and zo nes, cr eating p arallel o r a lternate s tates, w ith o rganised s tructures o f basic and critical functions. policing, cr ime m anagement, r evenue co llection a nd e ven lega l a nd p olicy The state and governance crises generated political alienation and discontent, frameworks. It could in fac t be said that some have created states within states. which cr eated t he s ocial b ases f or o pposition, c hallenge a nd r esistance t o s tate Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Somalia, Rwanda, the DRC, Angola, the CAR authority a nd in stability, s ocial t urmoil a nd s ocial di sorder – co nditions f or and others have all at various times and to a varying extent been victims of state organised cr ime, smuggling, ci vil s trife, urb an r iots, b anditry a nd in security in decline and failure, and ANSGs. The worst case has been Somalia, which has been which non-state institutions operate and thrive. Vulnerable and dominated groups immersed in wa r, internecine conflicts, p ervasive v iolence, a b reakdown of l aw also used and mobilised ethnic identity and non-state institutions to challenge the and order and territorial struggles that continue to this day. state. Thus the state has been more susceptible to challenge. Specifically, ANSGs contribute to state collapse through the following: Weak and deteriorating social services, mass unemployment, poor education systems, economic decline, stagnation and regression, de-industrialisation, urban I Accelerating t he de cline o f s tate c apacity, co llapse o f s tate in stitutions a nd decay, deepening poverty, collapsing and corrupt law enforcement agencies and failure of state authority widespread insecurity, uncontrolled and ungoverned spaces and weak, unstable I Facilitating t he los s o f s tate-controlled t erritory a nd s overeignty a nd t he and v iolent t errains a re t he co nditions in w hich t he mi litias, I slamist mi litant emergence of ungoverned and ungovernable territorial spaces groups and rebel movements are bred. As Clapham put it, misgovernance in states I Filling the institutional and governance vacuum left by fragile and collapsing such as Liberia and Uganda destroyed not only the ‘existing basis of statehood’ but states a nd co nstructing a lternative p olitical in stitutions a nd a uthority in was ‘sufficient to induce resistance’.105 regions outside state control106

138 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 139 CRISES OF THE STATE AND GOVERNANCE AND ARMED NON-STATE GROUPS IN AFRICA AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE

I Contributing t o t he p roliferation o f a rms a nd a mmunition a nd t he created a q uest f or p rimordial iden tities t hrough w hich ci tizens co uld a ssert commercialisation of violence themselves, and opportunities for non-state actors in t he form of diverse groups I Participating in r esource o pportunism b y t he exp loitation, p lundering a nd and even ANSGs to challenge state power and roles. marketing o f n atural r esources a nd s truggles f or co ntrol o f r esource a nd In view of the connection between ANSGs and the state and governance crises, trading sites and routes the b est a pproach t o co ntaining t heir t hreats t o h uman s ecurity w ill en tail I Exacerbating h uman in security a nd h umanitarian cr ises t hrough in ternal extensive r econstruction, r ehabilitation a nd r eform o f s tate a nd g overnance displacements, swelling refugee c amps, loss of property and livelihoods and institutions. This should be the task mainly of African leaders who should put the horrendous violence against civil populations African people at the centre of the state’s existence. While external interventions I Accentuating t he co llapse o f f ormal e conomies b y g rowing un derground, could m ake a p ositive contribution, t heir a im i s primarily t o promote Western informal and illegal economies interests. E ven g overnance p rescriptions b y in ternational f inancial in stitutions I Engaging in violent confrontations with state military forces and other ANSGs have g enerally b een mi sguided a nd ext ernally im posed, a nd in m ost c ases and causing insurrections and civil wars compounded t he s tate a nd e conomic cr ises. Th ough co mmendable, ext ernal support i s a t p resent b eggarly, s elf-interested a nd p roselytising. Autochthonous I Facilitating t he di sintegration o f s tate mi litary f orces, t he co llapse o f governments, and the takeover of territories and even state capitals effort i s s uperior, r eflects ac tual c hallenges a nd a spirations a nd i s fa r m ore sustainable. Africans should therefore reconstruct African states and governance I Facilitating the emergence of diverse enclaves, held either by states or rebels systems by themselves in line with their hopes, needs, realities and existence. and of multiple political authorities and governance systems The challenge is to rebuild the kind of states that the people actually yearn for: states t hat a re r esponsive a nd s ensitive t o ci tizen p ressures, gu arantee h uman ANSGs t hus accen tuate t he in dicators a nd co nsequences o f fa iling a nd f ragile security a nd m anage s tate a ffairs in a t ransparent a nd acco untable m anner. states. Th eir ac tions a nd ac tivities a re dir ectly r elated t o t he em ergence o r African leaders, popular groups and activists have to form state-citizenry pacts, heightening o f t he a bove co nditions, w hich r eflect n ot o nly f ragility a nd build state and institutional legitimacy and credibility, establish new platforms for deterioration, but the steady decline to total collapse. mobilising t he citizenry and build new commitments and followership towards the new Africa envisioned at independence. CONCLUSION African s tates w ould h ave t o do m ore in t erms o f b uilding in clusive a nd integrated political communities, mediating between groups, divesting themselves ANSGs have been closely linked to the nature of African states and how they are of ex cessive f orce a nd a uthoritarian t endencies, b uilding sys tems o f di alogue, governed. Thi s c hapter h as a ttempted t o lin k t he r ise o f t he p henomenon o f negotiating a nd r eaching co nsensus w ith g roups a nd o pposition e lements, ANSGs to the struggles for power and its consolidation and the nature of politics constructing s ecure and s afe terrains de void of t he profits of violence, building and governance in Africa. platforms for mobilisation of common commitments and productive engagements I have shown that both are linked to deficits in leadership, administrative and and building capacity for conflict resolution and the promotion of peace. But the institutional c apability, in ternal a nd p olitical leg itimacy a nd in equitable most important and d aunting challenge i s to build quality le aderships t hat c an distribution o f n ational resources. Th ese h ave t aken t heir t oll o n t he e conomy, move A frica f orward. Th e p resent cr op o f le aders i s s till co rrupt a nd s elf- social and public order and political stability of states and have weakened the very interested; and national, visionary, credible, selfless, committed and transparent fabric of African society – its social existence, social realities and livelihoods, social leaders clearly remain in s hort supply. Present-day African leaders have played a coherence a nd h armony, s ocial co nfidence a nd t rust. W ith li ttle c apacity, major role in weakening the state capacity to govern democratically and justly, and dwindling resources and declining legitimacy, the state could no longer guarantee instead h ave cr eated co nditions le ading t o t he f ormation a nd co ntinuation o f socioeconomic p rogress, ci vil, in dividual a nd g roup r ights, o r s ecurity. Th ese ANSGs.

140 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 141 CRISES OF THE STATE AND GOVERNANCE AND ARMED NON-STATE GROUPS IN AFRICA AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE

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International Development, 2005, 7. 20 Zartman, Collapsed states, 6. 4 Robert Jackson and C Roseberg, Why Africa’s weak states persist: empirical and juridical in 21 World Bank, World development report 1997. statehood, World Politics 35 (1982), 1–24. 22 Bruce Baker, African anarchy: is it the states, regimes or societies that are collapsing? Politics 5 Jennifer M illiken a nd K eith K rause, S tate fa ilure, s tate co llapse a nd s tate r econstruction: 19(3) (1999). concepts, lessons and strategies, Development and Change 33(5) (2002), 762. 23 Baker, African anarchy, 131–132. 6 Chazan et al, Politics and society in contemporary Africa, 40–41. 24 Milliken and Krause, State failure, state collapse and state reconstruction, 765. 7 Deborah Bräutigam, State capacity and effective governance, in B enno Ndulu and Nicolas 25 Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton (eds), Governance and politics in Africa, Boulder, Colo: van de W alle (e ds), Agenda for Africa’s renewal, Washington, D C: O verseas D evelopment Lynne Rienner, 1992. Council, 1996, 83–85. 26 United N ations D evelopment P rogramme (UND P), Governance f or s ustainable h uman 8 M S G rindle, Challenging t he s tate: cr isis a nd i nnovation i n L atin A merica a nd A frica, development: a UNDP policy document, New York: UNDP, January 1997. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 7–9. 27 Karl Wohlmuth, Good governance and economic development in Africa: an introduction, in 9 Milliken and Krause, State failure, state collapse and state reconstruction, 757. Karl Wohlmuth, Hans H B ass and Frank Messner (eds), African Development Perspectives 10 J M Esman, Ethnic politics, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994, 247–249; World Bank, Yearbook, VI, Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2000, 7. World development report 1997: the state in a changing world, New York: Oxford University 28 P M L ewis, Economic reform and political transition in A frica: the quest for a p olitics of Press, 1997; R ichard Joseph, Class, state, and prebendial politics in N igeria, in Peter Lewis development, World Politics 49(1) (1996), 92–129. (ed), Africa: dilemmas of development and change, Boulder, Mass: Westview, 2002. 29 Wohlmuth, Good governance and economic development in Africa, 15. 11 L Ndikumana, International failure and ethnic conflicts in Burundi, African Studies Review 30 Grindle, Challenging the state, 7. 4(1) (1998), 38–41; Joseph, Class, state, and prebendial politics in Nigeria. 31 African D evelopment B ank (AD B), African D evelopment R eport 1994, A bidjan: Th e 12 Benn, Why we need to work more effectively in fragile states, 7; E E O saghae, Fragile states, , 1994,177; Hyden and Bratton (eds), Governance and politics in Development in Practice 17(4–5) (2007), 692–693. Africa; Wohlmuth, Good governance and economic development in Africa, 7. 13 Omololu F agbadebo, N igeria a nd t he p erennial p roblem o f g overnance: exp laining s tate 32 UNDP, Governance f or s ustainable h uman d evelopment, a s ci ted in W olmuth, G ood failure in the midst of abundant resources, Seminar Paper, Department of Political Science, governance and economic development in Africa. University of Benin, Benin City, 2009, 5. 33 Milliken and Krause, State failure, state collapse and state reconstruction, 761. 14 Benn, Why w e n eed to w ork m ore effectively in f ragile states, 7; I R R otberg, Nation-state 34 Wohlmuth, Good governance and economic development in Africa, 8. failure: a recurring phenomenon, Discussion paper of the National Intelligence Council 2020 35 UNDP, Governance for sustainable human development. Project, Washington: NIC, 2003. 36 Midgal, S trong s ocieties a nd w eak s tates; D onald R othchild a nd J ohn W H arbeson, Th e 15 Milliken and Krause, State failure, state collapse and state reconstruction, 154. African state and state system in f lux, in J ohn W H arbeson and Donald Rothchild (eds), 16 Robert I R otberg (ed), When states fail: causes and consequences, Princeton, NJ: P rinceton Africa in world politics: the African state system in flux, Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 2000, University Press, 2004; Williams, State failure in Africa: causes, consequences and response. 3–20. 17 Milliken and Krause, State failure, state collapse and state reconstruction, 754; M M Torres 37 Patrick C habal a nd J ean-Pascal D aloz, Africa w orks: d isorder as p olitical i nstrument, and M A nderson, F ragile s tates: def ining dif ficult en vironments f or p overty r eduction, Oxford, Bloomington and Indianapolis: The International African Institute, James Currey Discussion p aper 1 o f t he P overty R eduction in Dif ficult En vironments T eam, U nited and Indiana University Press, 1999, 1. Kingdom: D epartment of International D evelopment, 2004, 3–7; M ushtaq H K han, State 38 Claude Ake, The state in co ntemporary Africa, in O kwudiba Nnoli (ed), Government and failure in developing countries and institutional reform strategies, in B Tungodden, N Stern politics in Africa, Harare: AAPS Books, 2000, 59–60.

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39 Julius O Ihonvbere, The ‘irrelevant’ state, ethnicity, and the quest for nationhood in Africa, 63 Chabal, Power in Africa, 166. Ethnic and Racial Studies 17(1) (1994), 42–60, 54–55. 64 Ibid, 181. 40 Richard A J oseph, Democracy a nd p rebendial p olitics i n N igeria: t he r ise a nd f all o f t he 65 Nnoli, Introduction, 7–9. Second Republic, African Studies Series 56, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. 66 Chabal and Daloz, Africa works, 1–11. 41 Patrick Chabal, Power in Africa: an essay in political interpretation, New York: St Martin’s 67 World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: from crisis to sustainable growth: a l ong-term perspective Press, 1994. study, Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1989. 42 Williams Reno, Corruption and state politics in Sierra Leone, Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge 68 Clapham, Africa and the international system, 7. University Press, 1995, 109–120. 69 Esman, The politics of developing administration, 75–78. 43 Robert Jackson, Quasi-states: sovereignty, international relations and the Third World, 70 Osaghae, Fragile states, 692–693. Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 71 World B ank, Engaging w ith f ragile s tates: a n IEG r eport o f W orld B ank s upport t o l ow 44 Jackson and Roseberg, Why Africa’s weak states persist, 1–24. income countries under stress, Washington DC: The World Bank, 2006. 45 Milliken and Krause, State failure, state collapse and state reconstruction, 761. 72 United Nations, Human Development Index, New York, 2006. 46 Zartman, Collapsed states. 73 Failed states index 2008, Foreign Policy, http://www.redri.org/new/images/archivos/ failed_ 47 Okwudiba Nnoli, Introduction, in Okwudiba Nnoli (ed), Government and politics in Africa, states_2008.pdf (accessed 30 July 2010). Harare: AAPS Books, 2000, 4. 74 A Thompson, An introduction to African politics, London: Routledge, 2000, 190. 48 Baker, African anarchy, 132–133. 75 Rothchild and Harbeson, The African state and state system in flux, 11. 49 Adebayo Olukoshi, Economic crisis, multipartyism and opposition politics in contemporary 76 Thomson, An introduction to African politics, 199. Africa, in Adebayo Olukoshi (ed), The politics of opposition in contemporary Africa, Uppsala: 77 Rothchild and Harbeson, The African state and state system in flux, 11. Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1998, 17. 78 Ibid, 11. 50 Nnoli, Introduction, 4. 79 Ikome, Personalisation of power, 31. 51 R H J ackson, Q uasi-states, d ual r egimes a nd n eoclassical t heory: in ternational 80 Rothchild and Harbeson, The African state and state system in flux, 11. jurisprudence and the Third World, International Organization 41(4) (1987), 519–549, 526. 81 William R eno, Th e p olitics o f in surgency in co llapsing s tates, Development a nd Ch ange 52 Chazan et al, Politics and society in contemporary Africa, 40. 33(5) (2002), 854. 53 Michael Bratton, Beyond the state: civil society and associational life in Africa, World Politics 82 Olukoshi, Economic crisis, multipartyism and opposition politics in co ntemporary Africa, 41 (1989): 407–430, 410–411. 21. 54 Goran Hyden, No s hort cu ts t o p rogress: A frican d evelopment m anagement i n p erspective, 83 Chabal, Power in Africa, 141. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983. 84 Jeffrey Herbst, The structural adjustment of politics in A frica, in P eter Lewis (ed), Africa: 55 Hyden, No s hort cu ts t o p rogress; Donald R othchild, H egemony a nd s tate s oftness: s ome dilemmas of development and change, Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1998. variations in e lite r esponses, in Z aki Er gas (e d), The A frican s tate i n t ransition, L ondon: 85 Clapham, Africa and the international system, 1997, 21. Macmillan, 1987. 86 Milliken and Krause, State failure, state collapse and state reconstruction, 2002, 754. 56 James S W unsch and Dele Olowu, The failure of the centralised African state, in J ames S 87 Liisa Laakso and Adebayo O Olukoshi, The crisis of the post-colonial nation-state project in Wunsch a nd D ele O lowu (e ds), Th e fa ilure o f t he centralised s tate: in stitutions a nd s elf- Africa, in A debayo O O lukoshi a nd L iisa L aakso (e ds), Challenges t o t he n ation-state i n governance in Africa, Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1990. Africa, Uppsala: N ordiska A frikainstitutet a nd U niversity o f H elsinki, 1996, 10; N noli, 57 Ihonvbere, The ‘irrelevant’ state, ethnicity, and the quest for nationhood in Africa; P P Ekeh, Introduction, 15. The constitution of civil society in African history and politics, in B Caron, A Gboyega, and 88 Bolanle Awe, Conflict and divergence: government and society in N igeria, African Studies E Osaghae (eds), Democratic transition in Africa, Ibadan: CREDU, 1992. Review 43(3) (1999), 1. 58 Chazan et al, Politics and society in contemporary Africa, 54. 89 Tom Forrest, Politics and economic development in Nigeria, Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 59 Ibid, 54–55. 1995. 60 Ibid. 90 Bruce B aker, Th e un accountable s tate, in T unde Z ack-Williams, Di ane F rost a nd A lex 61 S D ecalo, The psychoses of power: African personal dictatorships, B oulder, C olo: Westview Thompson (eds), Africa in crisis: new challenges and possibilities, London: Pluto Press, 2002, Press, 1989, 147–148. 94. 62 Francis N guendi Ik ome, P ersonalisation o f p ower, p ost r egime in stability a nd h uman 91 Ernest Harsch, C orruption and s tate reform: p erspectives f rom a bove and b elow, in K arl (in)security in the Central African Region, in Chrysantus Ayangafac (ed), Political economy Wohlmuth, H ans H B ass a nd F rank M essner (e ds), African de velopment pe rspectives of regionalisation in Central Africa, Monograph 155, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, yearbook, VI, Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2000, 78. 2008, 33. 92 Chazan et al, Politics and society in contemporary Africa, 50.

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93 Ake, The state in contemporary Africa, 61–62. 94 E E Osaghae, Crippled giant: Nigeria since independence, London: Hurst, 1998. Part II 95 Fagbadebo, Nigeria and the perennial problem of governance, 7 96 O Ezigbo, Nigeria: MDGs – poverty rate rises to 76 per cent, This Day, 27 February 2009. 97 Reuben Abati, The sad story of Nigeria, 21 January 2007, http://www.guardiannewsngr.com Case studies (accessed 20 March 2007). 98 Augustine Ik elegbe, S tate, et hnic mi litias a nd co nflict in N igeria, Canadian J ournal o f African Studies 39(3) (2005), 490–516. 99 United N ations H uman R ights C ouncil (UNHR C), World R eport 2009 – N igeria, CHAPTER 6 http://www.un.org/apps/news (accessed 21 April 2009). 100 Ikelegbe, State, ethnic militias and conflict in Nigeria, 87–122; Augustine Ikelegbe, Popular and criminal violence as instruments of struggle: the case of youth militias in the Niger Delta Marginalisation and the rise region, P aper p resented a t t he I nternational Workshop o n Violent C onflict in t he N iger Delta, organised by Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala, Sweden, and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, Norway, held in Oslo, Norway, on 18–19 August 2008, 124–146. of militia groups in Kenya: 101 Laakso and Olukoshi, The crisis of the post-colonial nation-state project in Africa. 102 Ihonvbere, The irrelevant state, ethnicity and the quest for nationhood. the Mungiki and the Sabaot 103 Victor Azarya and Naomi Chazan, Disengagement from the state in Africa: reflections on the experience of Ghana and Guinea, in Peter Lewis (ed), Africa: dilemmas of development and change, Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1998, 119–130. Land Defence Force 104 Christopher C lapham, I ntroduction: a nalysing A frican in surgencies, in C hristopher Clapham (ed), African guerrillas, Oxford: James Currey, 8–11. ADAMS OLOO 105 Clapham, Introduction: analysing African insurgencies, 17. 106 Thompson, An introduction to African politics, 203. INTRODUCTION

In the last four decades there have been increased incidences around the world of the emergence and activities of militias, as well as armed opposition and Islamist militant groups. In Africa, many countries are hosts to such groups, with the most affected being Somalia, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Sudan. In Kenya, militias emerged as a result of bad governance, which has led to the marginalisation of communities, economic disparities, a rise in poverty levels, and the inequitable distribution of national resources and services. In this chapter two, militia groups in Kenya are studied, namely the Mungiki and the Sabaot Land Defence F orce (S LDF), a nd t he f ormation, a gendas, le adership, o rganisation, activities, im pact a nd s tate r esponses t o t hese t wo mi litia g roups in K enya a re addressed.

THE STATE, ETHNICITY AND MILITIAS IN KENYA State policies in Kenya since independence have resulted in horizontal inequalities or sys temic in equalities b etween g roups. Th e in equality b etween g roups h as

146 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 147 MARGINALISATION AND THE RISE OF MILITIA GROUPS IN KENYA ADAMS OLOO

generated powerful grievances that leaders exploit to mobilise people to political groups a ttempt t o m aintain t he s tatus q uo. S uch co nflicts a re n ormally protest by calling on cultural markers (a co mmon history, language or religion), characterised by inequalities in the distribution of power and resources. thus exploiting the masses at group level. Mobilisation is particularly likely where In Kenya t his s tate o f a ffairs h as r esulted in va rious et hnic g roups cr eating there is political as well as economic inequality, not only because group leaders are political parties headed by one of their own in the hope that if they capture power, being excluded from political power but also because most members of the group they will benefit from access to state resources.3 Electoral politics in K enya thus are economically deprived and consequently harbour significant grievances. consists of highly cohesive bloc-voting ethnic groups. Kenyans generally vote for Studies suggest that in K enya, the capture of state power by the Kikuyu and the same party as their ethnic kin, and particularly so if a contending party has a kindred g roups (t he M eru a nd Em bu) sys tematically im proved t he c hances o f representative f rom t heir o wn co mmunity a s a p residential c andidate. access to development resources of these groups, as well as to employment and Consistently, p arties h ave b een f ormed a t t he b ehest o f a sin gle le ader w ho education. All of this created a feeling of marginalisation among other competing provides financial patronage and who draws a co re of founders linked more by ethnic groups. This was especially true of large ethnic groups such as the Luo and personal t ies forged in t he et hnic arena t han by ide ological commitment. Even 1 Luhya, and later the Kalenjin. where co alitions h ave b een formed, t hey h ave b een co alitions of et hnic g roups Subsequent regimes have attempted to rectify this state of affairs, but the end rather than coalitions of parties that share the same ideological commitment. result h as b een t hat p olicies h ave en ded u p b eing m erely a j ustification f or The formation of political parties along ethnic lines has been accompanied by preferential treatment of groups hitherto excluded from such access. Upon coming the f ormation o f mi litant g roups t hat c laim t o s afeguard t he in terests o f t heir to power in 1978, the new president, Daniel arap Moi, slowly but surely introduced specific communities. These groups have been manipulated by the political elites a rectification process t hat w ould, by t he c lose of t he century, s ee t he Kalenjin to f ight a gainst t heir m arginalisation b y v iolent m eans. I ndeed, t hese ex cluded become the successors of the Kikuyu as far as control of the structure of privilege groups are generally severely economically deprived and lack access to political was concerned. The Moi regime, while it lasted, put in p lace mechanisms that it power. B ecause o f t heir e conomic si tuation, t hey h ave li ttle t o los e b y t aking hoped w ould en sure t hat i t w ould n ot b e o usted f rom p ower in a ny f uture violent action – in fact, some gain from it by obtaining some form of employment elections.2 However, this was not to be, as the manoeuvres by the regime in t he in rebel armies, which are likely to sanction looting and other illicit gains.4 While run-up to the third multiparty general elections in 2002 succeeded in galvanising the mi litia g roups ini tially g rew o ut o f t he n eed t o c hampion t he c ause o f a the p olitical o pposition a gainst t he r egime, f inally le ading t o t he exi t o f t he particular et hnic g roup, t hese mi litias h ave over t ime turned a gainst t heir own Moi/Kenya African National Union (KANU) regime on 29 D ecember 2002. Th e communities. This trend has mostly been influenced by the need to survive the national m ulti-ethnic b acking t hat le d t o K ibaki’s assent t o p ower in 2002 h as dissipated, h owever w ith K ibaki b eing acc used o f fa vouring t he M ount K enya harsh economic disparities prevailing in the country. region in b oth p ublic a ppointments a nd e conomic en dowments. Thi s h as This rise in mi litia groups in Kenya has also been linked to the government’s contributed to anti-Kikuyu feelings in t he country, as demonstrated in t he 2005 inability to provide security and deal with criminal gangs. An inadequate security referendum on the constitution as well as the 2007 general elections. and j ustice sys tem a nd w eak s tate p enetration h ave le d t o t he em ergence o f Politicisation of ethnicity often characterises an inequitable access to power. ‘ungovernable a reas’ in s ome p arts o f K enya, n otably urb an s lums. Thi s h as Such a structure gives rise to the emergence of an ‘in group’ and an ‘out group’, with facilitated the expansion of militia and vigilante groups. These outfits draw from a the ‘out group’ attempting to break the structure of inequality. The response of the pool of young, unemployed men and are particularly mobilised by local leaders ‘in group’ is to build barriers to ensure the continuation of its privileged position. during pre- and post-election years. At t he centre o f t his s cenario a re t he e lites w ho, b ecause t hey f eel ex cluded o r threatened w ith ex clusion, b egin t o in voke et hnic ide ology in t he h ope o f THE ORIGIN AND RISE OF MILITIA GROUPS IN KENYA establishing a ‘ reliable’ base of support to fight what are purely personal and/or elite interests. Accordingly, the conflicts in Kenya can take the shape of dominated The history of militias in Kenya can be traced to the war waged by the Mau Mau groups t rying t o li berate t hemselves f rom o ppressive sys tems w hile do minant against the British in the 1950s. The Mau Mau was an armed group of Africans –

148 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 149 MARGINALISATION AND THE RISE OF MILITIA GROUPS IN KENYA ADAMS OLOO

predominantly Kikuyus – t hat rose up in p rotest against white rule. Among the sponsored militias and to provide protection for opposition parties during election grievances t hat le d t o t his r evolt w ere l and s carcity, f orced l abour a nd m eagre campaigns. Some of the opposition-sponsored criminal gangs and militias were wages. The movement was, however, suppressed after a s tate of emergency was the Jeshi la Embakasi, Baghdad Boys and Amachuma. declared. A lthough t he m ovement wa s e ventually s ubdued, i ts co ntribution The r esult h as b een a g rowth o f s elf-styled mi litias, v igilante g roups a nd towards accelerating the pace to independence was immense. organised cr iminal ga ngs in b oth urb an a nd r ural a reas t hat h ave s prouted in In p ost-independence K enya, t he p henomenon o f t he mi litia g roup h as i ts almost e very p art o f t he co untry, p osing a n in creasing c hallenge t o a p oorly roots in t he cr eation o f a y outh w ing b y t he f ormer r uling p arty, K ANU. Th e trained and ill-equipped police force. The most notorious of these gangs were the KANU regime first used its youth wing to harass the first opposition party, the Mungiki (Nairobi/Rift Valley/Central), SLDF (Mount Elgon), Kaya Bombo Youth Kenya A frican D emocratic U nion, w hich exi sted f or o nly o ne y ear a fter t he (Mombasa/Kwale), Sungu Sun gu, C hinkororo and Amachuma (Kisii/Nyamira/ attainment of independence. However, youth-wingers were used more forcefully Gucha/Transmara) and Taleban, Jeshi la Mzee and Jeshi la Embakasi (Nairobi). after a s plit in K ANU s aw t he f ormation o f t he K enya P eople’s Union (KPU). Table 6-1 shows the criminal gangs that are in operation in Kenya and the areas KANU on various occasions deployed the members of its youth wing to intimidate in which they operate. and harass KPU s upporters. The presence of these youth-wingers persisted even after the proscription of the KPU in 1969. Thereafter, all elections during the one- Table 6–1: Criminal gangs in Kenya party era w itnessed v iolence m eted o ut b y y outh-wingers, w ith p rominent Criminal gang Area(s) of operation politicians hiring them to harass and disrupt their opponents’ rallies. The youth- Amachuma Kisii/Nyamira/Gucha wingers served as a b reeding ground for the rise of criminal gangs and militias after the country returned to multipartyism. Angola Musumbiji Western/Nairobi More specifically, the youth-wingers were instrumental in t he formation and Baghdad Boys Nyanza/Nairobi (Kibera) rise o f t he Mungiki in t he p ost-1992 e lection p eriod. Th ey ini tiated mi litant Banyamulenge Nairobi resistance against groups that had been unleashed on the Kikuyus in well thought Charo Shutu Mombasa/Kwale out violent attacks to rid the Rift Valley of ‘outsiders’. The Mungiki was forced to Chinkororo Kisii/Gucha/Transmara use a similar tactic to save its own. Dallas Muslim Youth Nairobi During t he multiparty p eriod and p articularly during t he reign of Moi and Ndombolo ya Yesu Nairobi (Kibera) KANU, these groups transformed themselves into criminal gangs and militias and 42 Brothers Nairobi (Kibera) through their violent acts intimidated and disenfranchised opposition supporters, Jeshi la Embakasi Nairobi (Embakasi) especially in a reas that were designated as ‘KANU zones’. In 1992, t hese groups were o perating m ainly f rom M oi’s p olitical b ase in t he R ift Valley, w here t he Jeshi la King’ole Machakos/Makueni/Kitui/Mwingi Kalenjin Warriors and Maasai Morans attacked rival ethnic groups. In 1997, these Jeshi la Mzee Nairobi groups were being trained and armed in t he Coast province (Kaya Bombo) and Kalenjin Warrriors Rift Valley recruited, trained and organised in t he Shimba hills, Kaya Waa and the Similani Kamjesh Nairobi (Embakasi/Kasarani) caves in the Kwale district, at the instigation of prominent politicians and with the Kaya Bombo Youth Mombasa/Kwale support of the government and the military. They were subsequently deployed to Kosovo Boys Nairobi 5 foment ethnic violence in the run-up to the 1997 elections at the Coast. Kuzacha Boys Nairobi (Kibera) As opposition groups became increasingly vulnerable to these state-sponsored Maasai Morans Rift Valley/Nairobi militias, they resorted to creating their own militia groups to counter the state-

150 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 151 MARGINALISATION AND THE RISE OF MILITIA GROUPS IN KENYA ADAMS OLOO

their h omes in R ift V alley p rovince o wing t o t he p olitical t ensions t hat Mungiki Nairobi/Rift Valley/Central accompanied the re-introduction of pluralism in the early 1990s. Initial disciples Runyenjes Football Club Embu were young people who had lost land that had been their only means of livelihood Sabaot Land Defence Force Mount Elgon in p arts o f t he L aikipia a nd N akuru di stricts. F rom t his s tart a s a q uasi Sakina Youth Mombasa sociocultural religious entity, the Mungiki has grown into a f ormidable militant Sri Lanka Kuria/Transmara group in Nairobi, Central and parts of Rift Valley provinces. This group espouses Sungu Sungu Nairobi (Kibera/Kasarani) pseudo-communist ide als (s uch a s p ooling r esources a nd h olding l and in communal trust) clothed in sociocultural epithets of communal justice and equity. Taleban Nairobi This has enabled it to appeal to many landless, homeless and jobless youths. Its Source: author’s compilation. members s ometimes u se v iolence a nd t hreats o f f orce t o ext ort m oney f rom farmers and traders in areas where it is active.7 By March 2009, t he Mungiki had Most of these groups share a number of characteristics, the most common being become w hat t he t hen P olice C ommissioner, M ajor G eneral H ussein A li, their ethnic orientation. All the militias operating in t he country have an ethnic described as the most serious internal security threat to Kenya.8 composition as a result of the manner in which the regions in Kenya are populated. Each r egion i s a ssociated w ith a cer tain et hnic g roup, a nd co nsequently m ost Origin and composition militias and criminal gangs are formed around a certain ethnic group. Most of the criminal gangs and militias that emerged with the re-introduction of multiparty The term ‘Mungiki’ is derived from the Gikuyu word muing, meaning masses or politics were accordingly mobilised around ethnic identities, just like the political people.9 There is consensus among scholars that the Mungiki movement started in parties that were formed. These gangs often operate on the basis of local political 1987.10 According to its founding leaders, the Mungiki traces its birth to dreams concerns a nd f orms o f m obilisation, w hich m ay in clude l anguage, fa ith a nd experienced by two schoolboys, Maina Njenga and Ndura Waruinge, in t he Rift traditional practices. Valley Province. In these dreams, they claim to have heard God’s voice telling them Thus, t he Mungiki is a ssociated w ith t he K ikuyu, t he Baghdad B oys and to ‘go and liberate my people’. They accordingly decided to form the Mungiki after Taleban with the Luo, the Chinkororo with the Kisii, the Angola-Musumbiji with consultations with elders, including former le aders of t he Mau Ma u movement the Luhya, the Kalenjin Warriors with the Kalenjin, the Maasai Morans with the 11 from o ne o f w hich N dura Waruinge i s des cended. The Mungiki ranks w ere Maasai, the Kaya Bombo with the Coastal tribes, and the SLDF with the Sabaot. swelled by members of the Kikuyu population who were affected by the clashes in Another co mmon f eature o f t hese g roups i s t hat m ost a re co mposed o f Molo, E lburgon, R ongai, N arok a nd E ldoret in 1991 t o 1993 a nd N joro a nd marginalised groups in society, especially the urban and rural poor. Driven by the Laikipia in 1998. The Mungiki traces its roots to this particular period because of sheer need to survive, thousands of marginalised youths in N airobi have drifted the marginalisation of t he Kikuyu p opulation and t he sufferings t hat emanated into t hese mi litant ga ngs. Th e g roups a re o n n umerous o ccasions hir ed b y politicians f or a round 250 K enya s hillings a t ime t o un leash v iolence o n t heir from t he et hnic c lashes in t he co untdown t o t he 1992 g eneral e lections t hat opponents. S ome p rovide v igilante s ecurity in w orking c lass es tates.6 This primarily targeted the Kikuyu population in t he Rift Valley. The Kikuyu saw the underscores the fact that the genesis of these militias and criminal gangs is tied to Mungiki as the saviour of its ethnic group in t imes of adversity as it repulsed its the inability of the government to address its basic welfare responsibilities. attackers. While the movement seemed not to have a clearly spelled out programme and THE MUNGIKI agenda, i ts p lan in t he e arly 1990s wa s t o m obilise i ts m embers a gainst t he government, which it accused of starting and fuelling ethnic clashes. Reminiscent At its inception the Mungiki was basically an outfit whose main agenda was the of the Mau Mau style of mobilisation of the 1950s, the Mungiki reportedly began economic emancipation of Kikuyu families t hat had b een forcibly e victed f rom administering o aths a s a wa y o f uni ting i ts m embers. Th e Mungiki has s everal

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faces: the social cultural face (a sn uff-sniffing, dreadlocked variety that is dying spiritual le ader’s p rojects. Th e def ence uni t i s t he a rmy t hat h as b ases in t he off), a n e conomic face (m ainly s een in t he matatu industry) a nd t he s ecurity Nyandarua district, in U moja, Dandora and Ngara in N airobi, and in K itengela. criminal face.12 The m ovement u ses a rms in r obberies a nd ex ecutions. Th ere i s a lso a p ublic Recruitment t akes p lace in f our ways: p eople w ho just s troll into one of its relations uni t, w hich i ssues s tatements, a f oreign r elations uni t, a co ordination religious meetings out of curiosity, are inspired by its teachings and join the group; unit, a nd a n admini stration w ing. Th e g roup i s di vided in to s ub-organisations those who have heard about the movement from colleagues and friends or in the similar to a ‘cell structure’ called matura, or village units, with each cell composed media and decide to join; those who have been recruited through forceful oath- of 50 m embers who are further subdivided into five platoons. A committee is in taking that binds them to the ideals of the militia; and those who join because they charge of each unit and carries out all sect functions, including oath-taking and have b een en deared t o t he s uccessful s ocial ac tivities o f t he g roup. Th e l atter recruiting. The organisation reportedly has ‘tens of thousands’ of foot soldiers. The activities include restoring security in the slums or along matatu routes.13 Recently, Mungiki’s organisational structure is replicated everywhere, especially in C entral the gang has resorted to brutal methods, which include blackmail, violence and Province. In Maragua, for instance, the sect was said to have had more than 200 death threats, to force young men to join its outfit. In one case it sawed off the arm platoons spread across ten branches and 33 s ub-branches manned by more than of a man in Nyeri when he declined to join, but there are indications that hundreds 2 000 militiamen by the year 2000. A platoon comprises ten militiamen, each with of others have enlisted for fear of being killed. The brutal tactics resemble those of a p ersonal r egistration n umber.17 There a re c urrently a n es timated 2 000 s uch the S LDF, w hich s lashed o ff p eople’s e ars a nd f ingers t o f orce t hem in to units. submission.14 The Mungiki operates with a chilling set of rules and a strict code of conduct. The Mungiki maintains co ntrol o ver i ts f ollowers t hough a s eries o f o aths, Mungiki operatives stick to the 48 rules of the gang, which call for unpredictability starting with the oath of initiation, called kuhagira. Other oaths include an oath for and invisibility. Most of t hese r ules revolve around p ersonal survival, a lertness, repentance, c alled horohio; o ne t o p repare f or co mbat, c alled mbitika; a nd a courage a nd conquering t actics. Th e r ules ur ge m embers t o s py on others a nd continuous o ath c alled exodus, w hich sig nifies t he s ect i s n earing C anaan, o r always be aware of what is happening around then and to be open to possibilities victory. 15 for extortion.18 Its membership cuts across all ages and sexes but draws the bulk of its followers from t he lo wer c lasses, m ostly f ormer s treet c hildren, un employed y ouths, Religious roots hawkers, a rtisans, sm all t raders in t he Jua K ali (the inf ormal s ector), a nd t he alarmingly growing number of urban poor from Nairobi’s slum areas of Githurai, The Mungiki rejects Western customs and has, since its inception, sought to bring Kayole, D andora, K orogocho, K ariobangi, K awangware, K ibera, M athare a nd about the renaissance of the Gikuyu culture as a first step towards the liberation of Kangemi. I t a lso h as a s trong co nstituency a mong t he l andless, s quatters a nd the people. It advocated the return to traditional beliefs and practices and stressed internally displaced persons (IDPs) in a reas in t he Rift Valley such as Londiani, the lost glory and dignity of the Agikuyu, which it sought to re-establish in t he Eldoret, M olo, O lenguruone, E lburgon, S ubukia, N arok, N akuru, L aikipia a nd ‘Kirinyaga Kingdom’. The fundamental principles of the Mungiki are cultural self- Nyahururu. It is estimated that the Mungiki has between 1,5 a nd 2 mi llion due- determination, self-pride and self-reliance. To this end, it has utilised traditional paying members, of whom at least 400 000 are women.16 methods s uch a s p rayers, s ongs, p rophetic u tterances a nd o ath-taking a nd The Mungiki does not have a highly centralised organisational structure but its initiation rites to censor the forces of neo-colonialism. These have been used to leaders h ead va rious ef ficient uni ts. Th ere i s a n o perational uni t co nsisting o f protect a nd u phold s uch b asic va lues a s a b elief in G od ( Ngai), r everence o f spiritual enf orcers w ho fa n t he m ysticism a nd c ultural r omanticism t hat g lue ancestors, belief in the sacredness of land, and respect for moral values. According members together. The unit announces the declaration of oaths, distributes the to Mungiki tenets, the cultural re-engineering of the Agikuyu should apply to the oath-taking p araphernalia, a nd co llects m oney f rom ce lls t o im plement t he whole country irrespective of differences in culture. The meshing of political and

154 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 155 MARGINALISATION AND THE RISE OF MILITIA GROUPS IN KENYA ADAMS OLOO

religious t hemes i s e vident in Mungiki hymns a nd p rayers. M ount K enya motive b ehind t he Mungiki’s Islamisation. Thi s dem onstrated Mungiki’s tactical (Kirinyaga) is believed to be the holy dwelling place of Ngai and members look for use of religion to promote its objectives. signs f rom t he g od, t urning t heir faces t owards t he m ountain in p rayers a nd After b eing exp osed a s a co llaborator w ith t he s tate, N dura Waruinge, t he hymns.19 Mungiki’s n ational co ordinator, a nnounced t hat h e h ad lef t t he m ovement. H e Experts a re s till di vided a s t o w hether t he Mungiki is a r eligiocultural o r a staged a nother co nversion, t his t ime t o C hristianity, a nd c hanged hi s n ame t o political entity. Those who see it as a r eligious entity include Grace Wamue and Ezekiel Waruinge. Maina Njenga found himself at odds with the new government 20 Kwamchetsi M akokha. Wamue’s insightful acco unt r elates t o t he s piritual a nd and was subsequently arrested on murder charges in 2004, but later acquitted. He cultural philosophy surrounding the Mungiki’s activities. The Mungiki calls for a was re-arrested in February 2006 and held in prison on charges of administering return t o A frican t raditions a nd s pirituality a s a m eans o f r esolving s ocial an illegal oath and possession of weapons. In February 2006, w hile in c ustody at problems. I t r ejects C hristianity, s tating t hat i t co rrupts A frican va lues. Th e Kamiti Maximum Prison in Nairobi and awaiting trial, Njenga announced that he Mungiki’s main objective, Wamue argues, is ‘to mobilise Kenyan masses to fight had converted to Christianity and was baptised in a p ublicised ceremony at the 21 against t he y oke o f m ental s lavery.’ The Mungiki sees t he B ible a s a t ool o f prison. In June, he was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment for illegal possession confusion, r eferring t o i t in G ikuyu a s ‘ gikunyo’ (m eaning b inding o r of a gun and marijuana.26 imprisoning). The movement has adopted Gikuyu religious r ituals and c ultural Evidence collected by Ruteere shows that the characterisation of the Mungiki symbols, including the use of tobacco snuff. Members of the movement refer to as a religious movement is a deliberate tactic on its part. This strategy has served themselves as ‘warriors’ in keeping with ancient Gikuyu social structure.22 the m ovement w ell, f or i t h as h elped t o a ttract sy mpathy f rom h uman r ights Makokha argues that the Mungiki has grown out of the mysterious and little organisations. After the government’s initial crackdown on the movement in t he understood ideology and theology of the group. Its members have a god on Mount early 1990s, the Mungiki’s leaders sought protection from human rights groups. In Kenya whom they worship and to whom they pray. In his opinion, the movement fact, for several years, Mungiki members provided reliable information on prison could ac tually b e r eligious a nd m ay j ust b e un certain a bout w hat do ctrine t o conditions a nd gave det ailed des criptions of t he in humane ac tivities in K enya’s follow. 23 prisons t o t he K enyan H uman R ights C ommission.27 This o verture h elped t he However, t he Mungiki’s ad herence t o t raditional K ikuyu r eligion h as b een movement p opularise i ts c ase w ith in ternational h uman r ights g roups s uch a s questioned, particularly because its leaders keep shifting their religious affiliations. Amnesty I nternational a nd H uman R ights Watch. I n i ts a nnual h uman r ights For instance, the conversion of its leaders to Islam and Christianity creates more doubt given their stance against the latter. At some point in mid-2000, the Mungiki reports, the US State Department regularly mentioned the Mungiki as an example 28 started to gravitate towards Islam. Eventually, on 2 September 2000, at a ceremony of religious p ersecution by t he state. The treatment of t he group as one b eing held in M ombasa’s Sa kina M osque, 13 o f i ts le aders (a mong t hem N dura persecuted, as reported by the UN Special Rapporteur, Philip Alston, can also be Waruinge, r enamed Ib rahim), co nverted t o I slam. O thers in cluded f ormer seen in this light. member M ohamed N jenga a nd p rovincial co ordinators H assan W aithaka In t he lig ht o f t hese ac tivities, t he Mungiki could b e r egarded a s h aving a Wagacha, Mohamed Kamau Mwathi (Nairobi), Kimani Ruo Hussein (Rift Valley), political rather than a r eligious mission. This school of thought argues that the and K hadija W angari r epresenting w omen.24 In t he m onths t hat f ollowed, Mungiki’s politics reflects a k een sense of frustration with the political system in hundreds of ordinary Mungiki members, especially from Nakuru in the Rift Valley, which its followers’ voices are barely heard. Mungiki members claim to represent converted t o I slam, enr olled in I slamic c lasses, a nd r eceived b ooks a nd o ther the unf ulfilled a spirations o f t he Mau Ma u, f or a n a lternative p olitical materials on Islamic doctrine from Kenya’s Muslim community.25 This move was dispensation.29 Like the Mau Mau, the land question is central to their politics. The seen largely as a means of camouflage in the face of repression, as most members movement is built on dissatisfaction with marginalisation and deprivation of its of t he s ect t ended t o em phasise t he p olitical ra ther t han t he c ultural/religious constituency. This explains why the movement has been successful in r ecruiting

156 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 157 MARGINALISATION AND THE RISE OF MILITIA GROUPS IN KENYA ADAMS OLOO

members f rom a mong t he s quatters a nd s lum d wellers.30 Thus, a lthough t he transport) routes, charges to small businesses, and donations from politicians and Mungiki is depicted as a religious organisation or as a religio-cultural organisation, businesspeople. it remains t o a l arge ext ent a n entity s earching f or p ower, p articularly p olitical Each Mungiki member pays 3 Kenyan shillings per month, which according to power. the t hen n ational co ordinator, N dura Waruinge, adde d u p t o a t otal m onthly income of 4,5 mi llion Kenyan shillings by the mid-1990s. 35 However, the precise The quest for a living: tactics and strategies income from membership remain as controversial as its operations, with figures mentioned by its leaders ranging from 1,5 million to 2 and lately (December 2009) The Mungiki is the most lethal militia group currently operating in Kenya. To meet 4 million. In reality the figure could be as low as a couple of thousand, particularly its objectives, it has adopted the use of ‘cells’ similar to those used by Al-Qaeda to given the demographic pattern of Kenya. The Kikuyu constitutes 22 p er cent of spread its influence and control over ethnic enclaves in primary market areas.31 In Kenya’s close to 37 million people. For Mungiki to reach a figure of 4 million, close these communities, the Mungiki has taken over the provision of services such as to a h alf the Kikuyu population would have to be members, and that is not the ‘supplying’ water a nd e lectricity, m anagement o f t ransport, le vying i llegal t axes case. and extorting protection money. Organised crime’s tool of choice for infiltrating Collection from the matatu industry is also a major source of funding. Before and t aking o ver co mmunities a nd n eighbourhoods i s f ear: in stilling i t a nd the O ctober 2003 r eforms, t he Mungiki controlled matatu operations o n b usy exploiting it. People are mugged and brutalised, and businesses vandalised. Then routes t o K ayole, D andora, H uruma a nd K ariobangi in N airobi, w hile i t a lso victims are offered a gu arantee of safety for themselves, their families and their controlled and collected le vies f rom routes outside Nairobi.36 At t he p eak of its premises, in exchange for a fee. Those who resist are killed or maimed to serve as influence, the Mungiki is said to have collected at least 10 000 Kenyan shillings per an example for others and to close t he circle of fear. Those w ho comply resign day p er r oute, a mounting t o n early 200 000 K enyan s hillings p er d ay f rom a ll themselves to a life of servitude and exploitation. routes under its control.37 The gangs collect 200 K enyan shillings p er d ay f rom Working in a t ight, di sciplined m anner, t he Mungiki has t aken o ver t he each 14-seater matatu and 250 Kenyan shillings from 25-seater minibuses. Matatu provision o f s uch ‘services’ in C entral P rovince a nd p arts o f N airobi ci ty, a nd crews a lso p ay a f ee t o b e a llowed t o o perate, w ith dr ivers p arting w ith 1 000 replaced administrative chiefs and assistant chiefs who dealt with matters such as Kenyan shillings and conductors paying 400 Kenyan shillings. the arbitration of family disputes.32 In s ome p arts of C entral Province, Mungiki The control of the ‘transport levy’ has led to constant violent confrontations gangs have taken over control of villages. The Mungiki has managed to set up what between the Mungiki and other gangs.38 After the collapse of constitutional reforms can only be described as a parallel government, a so-called Mungiki government, in 2005, the Mungiki reclaimed its control of the matatu industry and tightened its complete with its own elaborate tax collection machinery and a judicial system to grip on the lucrative matatu industry and the low-income residential areas of the boot.33 city and other urban areas. In parts of Nyeri and Kirinyaga, vigilantes have taken on the Mungiki, but in It a lso co llects p rotection f ees f rom s lum r esidents. H ouseholds in Ml ango Murang’a, and especially the South District, bands of organised Mungiki youths Kubwa of Eastleigh, Mathare, Huruma, Huruma Ngei, Kariobangi, Dandora, man the feeder roads, beginning from the main Murang’a–Makutano road. Every Dogo a nd o ther es tates h ave t o p ay b etween 30 a nd 50 K enyan s hillings e ach vehicle le aving t he main road and entering t he interior is stopped at makeshift month, shopkeepers pay 300 K enyan shillings, kiosk and vegetable vendors 150 roadblocks and the driver has to pay 50 Kenyan shillings. In this area villagers are Kenyan shillings. Chang’aa brewers pay 300 Kenyan shillings a week and vehicles charged for any commercial venture, however minimal.34 that de liver v egetables t o K orogocho a nd K ariobangi 400 K enyan s hillings p er The Mungiki obtains f unds f rom m embership d ues, ga rbage co llection, delivery. T rucks t hat de liver s and, b allast, cem ent, s tones a nd o ther b uilding extortion money from residents for protection against theft and property damage, materials to sites in Eastlands also pay a fee. Workers such as masons, electricians fees for the use of public toilets, income from control of matatu (a form of public and casual labourers at construction sites have to pay an ‘access fee’ to be allowed

158 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 159 MARGINALISATION AND THE RISE OF MILITIA GROUPS IN KENYA ADAMS OLOO

into the yards. The gangs also run illegal water collection points where they charge donated money. The movement’s link to the government became evident when its between 10 and 20 Kenyan shillings for a 20-litre jerry can of water tapped from two k nown le aders a ttempted t o r un f or e lections o n t he r uling p arty’s t icket. city council pipes.39 However, at the last minute, the ruling party succumbed to popular pressure and In parts of Central Province, the Mungiki has been able to set up a formidable barred the Mungiki leaders from participation. motorcycle taxi enterprise whose proceeds are used to bankroll its illegal activities. During t he Moi r egime, t he g roup wa s a llowed t o dem onstrate t o s how i ts This, co mbined w ith ext ortion r ings o perated b y t he Mungiki, h as t urned t he support for t he r uling p arty w hile at t he s ame t ime cr iticising t he-then official underground gang into a w ell-moneyed outfit whose kitty runs into millions of leader o f t he o pposition, M wai K ibaki. A t o ne p residential ra lly, f ormer M olo shillings. Wealthy p oliticians a nd s hrewd b usinesspeople in t he p rovince h ave member o f p arliament (MP) K ihika K imani p araded dr eadlocked y ouths in been f inancing t he p urchase o f m otorbikes a nd exp ect p olitical s upport a nd Nakuru town, introducing them as repentant Mungiki followers. protection in return.40 The Mungiki entered t he p olitical f ray in t he r un-up t o t he 2002 e lections, Because o f Mungiki activities, b usinesses h ave co llapsed in m ost o f t he when i ts n ational co ordinator, N dura Waruinge, a nd t he m ovement’s s piritual shopping centres in Central Province, as traders have been forced to give up their leader, J ohn M aina K amunya a lias M aina N jenga, j oined t he F orum f or t he business b ecause t hey w ere un able t o p ay t he p rotection f ees (ra nging f rom Restoration of Democracy – Kenya (FORD-K) political party and unsuccessfully 20 000 to 150 000 K enyan shillings) demanded by the Mungiki. Rural areas have vied for positions as secretary-general and vice-chairman of the party respectively. As the battle for Moi’s successor heated up, the Moi regime sought to bring the suffered too, and tea and coffee farms have been left unattended, for farmers have group in to i ts f old in o rder t o g et t he K ikuyu y outh’s s upport. Th e Mungiki also fled their homes.41 supported KANU’s presidential candidate, Uhuru Kenyatta, and on nomination Another source of funds for the Mungiki is the Kikuyu political and business day, h undreds o f t housands o f Mungiki youths m arched t hrough t he s treets elite. This was evident during the 2002 g eneral elections, when Mungiki leaders wielding machetes, c lubs o r s ticks in hi s s upport. K enyatta wa s l ater f orced t o suddenly started driving cars and owning plots and houses in upmarket areas, all disown the sect as a result of intense public criticism.43 In addition, two legislators without having a p ermanent source of income. During these elections, members (who were staunch Uhuru supporters then), Kihika Kimani and Stephen Ndicho, of the group frequently met with KANU politicians and also received money and threatened to unleash Mungiki on those opposed to Uhuru. other items in return for getting members to vote for KANU in the elections.42 This The Kibaki regime’s interaction with the Mungiki has been double-sided. On also happened in the 2005 referendum and 2007 elections, when politicians paid the one hand, there have been groups that have been sympathetic to the politics of the group to advance their cause. During the post-election crisis, the Kikuyu elites the Mungiki leadership in the Kibaki government and used the Mungiki when the are reported to have paid the group for the reprisals of the killing of Kikuyus. need arose. On the other hand, there are those of the opinion that the group is a threat to state security and ought to be eradicated. For instance, when the state The Mungiki and politics engaged the gang with the aim of curtailing its operations, it used the Mungiki to support i ts p roposals. For exa mple, d uring t he r eferendum c ampaign, t he t hen The Mungiki’s involvement in p olitics d uring t he M oi a nd K ibaki r egimes wa s special p rogramme mini ster, N jenga K arume, a nd t he f ormer Mungiki based on a love-hate relationship. Both regimes tried to seek the Mungiki’s support coordinator, Ndura Waruinge, met in Nairobi to discuss how the youth could be during c ampaign p eriods s uch a s t he 2002 e lections a nd 2005 co nstitutional mobilised t o s upport t he p roposed co nstitution.44 Subsequently, t he Mungiki referendum. H owever, b oth r egimes w ere h ostile t o t he g roup in n on-election openly came out in support of the government position, holding rallies attended years and prescribed it. by well-known politicians.45 This again happened in t he countdown to the 2007 Before 2002, p olice constantly broke up Mungiki meetings, but in t he run-up elections. to the 2002 elections the group was allowed to hold rallies in Nairobi, Thika and During the post-2007 crisis, with the other ethnic militias in turmoil and the other t owns. S ome K ANU o fficials e ven p articipated in t hese m eetings a nd Mungiki in disarray after a crac kdown on its activities, it took some time for the

160 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 161 MARGINALISATION AND THE RISE OF MILITIA GROUPS IN KENYA ADAMS OLOO

militia to regroup. The Mungiki acquired the tag of defender of the beleaguered stoned a nd f orced p ublic t ransport o perators o ff t he r oad. Th ey a lso f orced Kikuyu in t he R ift Valley a nd w ith p olitical a nd f inancial s upport f rom s enior businesses to close in many parts. The worst-affected towns were Nairobi, Kiambu, members of the Kikuyu elite, swung into action and attacked members of the Luo, Nyahururu, Nyeri, Naivasha, Embu, Nakuru and Molo. Luhya and Kalenjin groups in N aivasha and Nakuru. The post-election violence To date t he Mungiki continues t o t hrive, a s t hose w ho h ave s poken o penly may have had the unintended effect of rehabilitating the Mungiki in the eyes of the against them in the recent past are yet to turn rhetoric into action, even as violence Kikuyu p opulation, a s i ts m embers w ere s een t o b e b etter p rotectors o f t he is escalating. In Central Province, politicians appear uncertain over how to contain 46 community than the Kibaki government in face of attacks by ethnic militias. the Mungiki monster. Unable to find the exact cause for Mungiki lawlessness, MPs In April 2008, t he group paralysed public transport and forced businesses in say it is difficult to eradicate the deep-rooted gang. At grassroots level, leaders who parts of Central and Rift Valley provinces to close for four days running; during have s poken a gainst t he g roup a sking r esidents t o r eport i t t o t he p olice, h ave the unrest 14 people were killed. It was only when the prime minister extended an received de ath t hreats. On t he o ther h and, r esidents h ave acc used s enior 47 olive branch to the sect members that they halted their riots. After rejuvenating politicians in t he region of supporting Mungiki activities for political advantage. its image among the Kikuyus in the reprisals after the first round of the post-2007 Some s ay t he s upport Mungiki adherents h ave b een r eceiving f rom p oliticians election violence, the gang has slowly regained its foothold in C entral Province, 50 since the run-up to the 2002 general elections has in fact strengthened the gang. and b etween O ctober a nd D ecember 2008 h ad a lready s et u p t he n ecessary mechanism for charging illegal fees on business premises as well as matatus and boda boda s. D uring t his p eriod t he gang executed ten p eople in t he president’s State response to the Mungiki Othaya constituency, to prove it would maim and intimidate those who attempted Right from the time the Mungiki was formed, relations between it and the state to defy it.48 have oscillated between outright repression and periods of cohabitation. On t he The Mungiki has a lso a ttracted sy mpathy f rom p oliticians. I n April 2008 a one hand, the state has persecuted, intimidated and jailed Mungiki followers: the group o f p oliticians c alling t hemselves ‘ elders’ f rom C entral P rovince a nd state has always considered the Mungiki a clandestine movement that is bent on comprising N jenga K arume (f ormer mini ster o f def ence), J oseph K amotho destabilising the government. On the other hand, government functionaries have (former M athioya MP), E lias Mb au (M aragua MP) a nd J ane K ihara (f ormer made use of the group during elections. Naivasha MP), dem anded t he r elease o f Mungiki leaders a nd t he ini tiation o f dialogue between the sect and the government. During this period, the Mungiki During t he M oi r egime, t he s tate m ade va rious a ttempts t o co ntain t he founded a p olitical w ing c alled t he K enya N ational Youth A lliance un der t he Mungiki, but with little success. The first attempted crackdown by the government chairmanship o f o ne G itau M wangi. I t wa s l ater r enamed t he P rogress P arty took place in December 1994 and resulted in the arrest of 63 suspected members Alliance.49 in L aikipia. S ubsequently, ra ids a nd a rrests a gainst Mungiki adherents b ecame In F ebruary a nd M arch 2009, t he Mungiki, on a n umber o f o ccasions, quite frequent as the government sought to stamp out the group before eventually paralysed transport in C entral, Nairobi and Rift Valley provinces. On 10 M arch, deciding to collaborate with it in t he run-up to the 2002 e lections. In fact, from emboldened b y t he r eport o f t he UN S pecial R apporteur o n E xtrajudicial, early 2000, Mungiki organisers a nd p olitical le aders h ad s uggested t hat Arbitrary or Summary Execution, Phillip Alston, which called for the resignation government s ecurity s ervices w ere inf iltrating t he s ect a nd s etting u p ps eudo- of the attorney-general and the commissioner of police over extra-judicial killings Mungiki to monitor its activities. of its members, the Mungiki held widespread protests, paralysing transport and As a r esult of intermittent state harassment, Mungiki became confrontational shutting down s ome t owns f or lo ng p eriods d uring t he co urse o f t he d ay. S ect from early 2000. For example, in April 2000, n early 3 000 Mungiki men staged a members blocked roads using hijacked long-haul trucks, erected barricades, and raid on Nyahururu police station to free three of their colleagues.51 As a result of

162 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 163 MARGINALISATION AND THE RISE OF MILITIA GROUPS IN KENYA ADAMS OLOO

continuous a trocities p erpetrated b y t he Mungiki and o ther mi litias, t he units, to fight the sect. Reports by the Kenya National C ommission on Human government b anned a ll mi litias in 2002 a nd t hen P resident M oi o rdered a Rights (KNCHR), Phillip Alston and civil society organisations have accused this crackdown on all illegal organisations. In October 2002, 26 m embers of Mungiki police unit of killing between 100 and 500 Mungiki adherents. In November 2007, were jailed for three months, each for criminal activities in Nairobi. However, as the KNCHR released a report suggesting that the police may have executed about the 2002 e lections a pproached, t he M oi r egime r elaxed i ts c lampdown o n t he 500 s uspected Mungiki adherents b etween June a nd O ctober 2007. 58 The s tate’s Mungiki, ostensibly to win its support for the KANU candidate, Uhuru Kenyatta. brutal c lampdown o n t he Mungiki was a r esponse t o a s eries o f b eheadings in However, Uhuru lost to Mwai Kibaki, who inherited the Mungiki problem. Central Province and the killing by the group of three policemen in t he Kosovo Under t he K ibaki r egime, Mungiki adherents w ere h arassed, in timidated, area of Mathare. persecuted, arrested and killed outside the legal system. As soon as Kibaki took In t he p eriod 2002–2008, t he g overnment o n n umerous o ccasions, a nd power, t he g overnment ini tiated a crac kdown o f t he g roup. I n e arly 2003, t he especially in 2003, 2006 a nd 2007, ini tiated crackdowns on the group. However, police destroyed the movement’s headquarters in N g’arua in L aikipia, where the these initiatives resulted mostly in the group going underground only to resurface group had two shrines, at Sheria and Mwenje.52 In reaction and hard on the heels a little later. During these periods of repression, the group kept on changing its of t he t ransport r eforms, o n 8 M arch 2004, t he p ress, ci ting p olice s ources, modus o perandi so a s t o e lude t he p olice crac kdowns. Th e ga ng’s c apacity t o mutate when faced with danger has made it very difficult for the state to destroy announced that a special terror unit known as the ‘bagation’ squad, a contraction it. Initially, Mungiki members used to be the snuff-sniffing, dreadlocked variety. of the words ‘no bargain over death’, had been formed by the Mungiki. The squad When i t b ecame a pparent t hat t his wa s a n e asy wa y f or t he s ecurity f orces t o has sin ce t ransformed in to t he Mungiki Defence C ouncil, o ne o f t he m ost identify and track them down, they changed their image to decently dressed young influential organs in t he movement’s hierarchy.53 Police sources disclosed that at men and women. Recent attempts by the government to curb the matatu extortion least 50 young people joined the hit squad between January and March 2004. The wing have forced them to dress as modern teens, vendors etc. It is this ability to number rose meteorically in the following months.54 camouflage and change tactics and styles that has made it almost impossible to pin The formation of an execution squad was part of a grand effort by the Mungiki down the gang. to reorganise itself to defend its turf. This armed wing was charged with revenge killings o f f ormer m embers a nd m ay h ave b een r esponsible f or t he t rademark beheadings conducted by the group. These beheadings normally targeted either THE SABAOT LAND DEFENCE FORCE those w ho des erted o r p rominent b usinessmen w ho h ad n ot f ulfilled t heir The SLDF operates in t he Mount Elgon and neighbouring Trans-Nzoia districts, 55 promises to the group. which lie close to the border with Uganda on the slopes of Mount Elgon. Members There i s e vidence t hat t he m ovement adopted a ce ll sys tem of m obilisation of the Sabaot community primarily inhabit the area, but other inhabitants include akin t o t hat o f a n in ternational t errorist g roup. It s et u p a n e laborate n etwork the Og iek, B ukusu, Teso, S ebei a nd va rious K alenjin s ubgroups. Th e S LDF, a covering all Nairobi’s shanty areas, with platoons operating in t he Nairobi slums militia g roup, c ame t o t he f ore in 2006 a nd p ortrays i tself a s a n o rganisation and hideouts in Mombasa, Murang’a, Nakuru, Nyeri and Laikipia. Once celebrated fighting against injustice and alleged discrimination in t he allocation of land. It as a s howpiece of efforts by displaced and disinherited Mungiki followers to eke lunched attacks against the Luhya, Kikuyu and other tribes, resulting in 600 deaths out a legitimate living through agriculture,56 the movement’s farm in the Laikipia and close to 60 000 di splaced persons.59 Its hit-and-run attacks from the Mount district became a ‘state house’ from which the training of its fighters out of sight of Elgon forest were a major challenge for the authorities, who were forced in 2008 to security forces was coordinated.57 resort to the army to contain the operations of the group. Before this operation, the In 2006, t his s tate o f a ffairs f orced t he p olice t o f orm Kwekwe, a hi t s quad SLDF was the most powerful and best-armed militia group operating in western comprising 14 o fficers who were sometimes reinforced by colleagues from other Kenya.

164 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 165 MARGINALISATION AND THE RISE OF MILITIA GROUPS IN KENYA ADAMS OLOO

Origin and composition therefore did not expect the land boundaries existing at the time to be substantially altered.62 The belated inclusion of the Mosop as a wa y of punishing the Soy for The Mount Elgon clashes are a result of the Sabaot displacements dating back to voting against the draft constitution in t he 2005 r eferendum and the subsequent the colonial era and the skewed resettlement programmes since independence in allocation to mostly Mosop members, resulted in the Soy mobilising young people 1963. The conflict was heightened by irregular allocation and grabbing of land in to defend their land and resist any evictions, culminated in t he formation of the the s ettlement s chemes, i llegal r esettlement, un healthy co mpetitive p olitics, SLDF. 63 unresolved land claims, and the 2006 evictions by the government. The SLDF is a non-state armed group mostly drawn from the Soy sub-clan of The government has repeatedly failed to effectively resettle the affected groups the Sa baot t hat f irst em erged imm ediately a fter t he 2002 e lections. Th e in a m anner de emed t o b e e quitable t o a ll t he p arties. F ollowing lo bbying b y recruitment and training of fighters began in March 2003, though violent attacks community leaders, the government moved people from Chepkitale in 1971/72 to did not begin in earnest until 2006, in the wake of the implementation of the phase Chebyuk, where it had opened up the Chebyuk Phase I s ettlement scheme. The III resettlement programme. At that time, the SLDF actively resisted attempts to scheme consisted of 1 489 p arcels of five acres of land. In 1974, t he government reallocate land. Violent clashes erupted when the Soy, who had settled in the area further issued a n otice to de-gazette portions of the forest reserve consisting of since 1971, were ordered to make way for new allottees who were mostly from the 3 600 acres for resettlement. Unfortunately, this degazettement was never finalised. Mosop sub-clan. The Mosops were the SLDF’s initial target, as they were perceived Instead, in the same year the landless Soy sub-tribe was added to the scheme and to be favoured by the government in the land allocations. Consequently the SLDF occupied w hat i s n ow k nown a s t he T eremi s ub-location, w hile t he M osop started launching attacks, mainly against the Mosop clan.64 occupied the Emiya sub-location.60 The co nflict, w hich s tarted a s a n in ter-clan co nflict b etween t he S oy a nd In 1979, a g roup o f Sa baot le aders s ent a de legation t o t hen P resident Moi Mosop c lans, s oon s pread a s t he S LDF b egan t argeting m embers o f o ther asking him t o r esettle t he l andless Sa baots. Thi s r esulted in C hebyuk P hase II, communities w ho h ad p urchased l and in t he a rea. I n fac t, o ver t ime i t ac ted known as Cheptoror, consisting of 2 516 parcels of land. The beneficiaries were to against all immigrants who were allocated land in the area. It also targeted corrupt be t he M osop s ub-tribe t hat h ad f ormerly in habited C hepkitale. P art o f t he officials who had presided over the allocation process. Chebyuk was already inhabited by sections of the Sabaot community from the Soy sub-tribe. In 1989, the government settled people in the area, but the exercise was Organisational form not completed. Some of the people were left landless and those who were lucky enough to get land lacked full legal ownership as the government failed to issue The hi story, o rganisation a nd f unding o f S LDF s hows t hat l and g rievances, them w ith t itle de eds. However, t his did n ot det er t he p eople f rom t aking a nd ethnicity, a nd v iolence, w hich w ere m anipulated f or p olitical en ds, a re de ep- cultivating the land. They further started subdividing, leasing and selling it among rooted, with longstanding ef fect on t he Kenyan p olitical process. From 2006 t o themselves and to outsiders.61 2008, the SLDF was in effective control of the whole of the Mount Elgon district. Chebyuk I a nd II w ere n ever co mpleted a nd co nsequently t he g overnment There was virtually no government presence in the area and the militia, as a result, cancelled the existing settlement schemes and embarked on the creation of a third made its own laws that inhabitants were forced to obey. The militia established its scheme, C hebyuk III, in 2002. B y 2006, w hen t he g overnment f inalised l and own administrative system, complete with a m echanism for levying illegal taxes, allocation in C hebyuk III, p eople had a lready de veloped t hese farming p arcels, and informal courts. The SLDF judicial system was used to punish those suspected while o thers h ad s old o r le ased o ut t he l and t o f ellow Sa baots a s w ell a s t o to have corruptly acquired land, discipline wrangling couples, go after bad debts migrants. F urthermore, t he p opulation in t he a rea h ad g rown s ubstantially. and punish thieves and drunks.65 Because t he s cheme h ad ini tially b een cr eated f or t he S oy, a mid g reat p olitical The mi litia h as a c lear o rganisational s tructure a nd c hain o f co mmand. I t fanfare, the Soy, who had already settled in t he area, believed that the process of consists o f t hree s eparate di visions, n amely a mi litary, s piritual a nd a p olitical surveying and allocation would be a m ere formalisation of their ownership and wing. Wycliffe Matakwei (S LDF dep uty le ader) le d t he mi litia w ing a nd D avid

166 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 167 MARGINALISATION AND THE RISE OF MILITIA GROUPS IN KENYA ADAMS OLOO

Siche, a f ormer police officer, was in c harge of training the militiamen with the The SLDF’s mode of operation has made it difficult for the police to combat it. assistance of retired and serving army and police officers. The militia has used hi- Most of its members mix freely with civilians during the day or when not part of tech w eapons in i ts o perations, in cluding m achine gun s, r ocket-propelled a combat squad. Only the militia’s commanders, trainers and elite fighters have grenades, hand grenades, land mines and rocket launchers. The SLDF’s weapons specific hidin g p laces in M ount E lgon f orest, w here t hey m eet t o r eview t he of choice were AK-47 and G3 rifles. By August 2008, the military had recovered a situation a nd r estrategise. Thi s en ables t he g roup t o co ngregate q uickly in t he total of 95 guns and more than 700 rounds of ammunition from the SLDF.66 Other forest, identify targets and disperse into the civilian population. Furthermore, it weapons, w hich t he mi litia u sed t o a sig nificant ext ent, in cluded t raditional makes u se o f c amouflaged ‘anti-personnel c arriers’ t o m ove w eapons, w hich i t weapons such as pangas (machetes), knives, and bows and arrows. delivers to operation squads at designated points near its targets and who, after the 73 The spiritual wing was central to the SLDF military strategy. Jason Psongoywo operation again meet the carriers and return the weapons to designated points. Manyiror, the spiritual leader/prophet also referred to as ‘laibon’, led this wing. He Members of the SLDF have also established kangaroo courts where they handle administered the oath to all combatants and gave them special charms, ostensibly disputes and impose fines on victims. They are the self-appointed judges in cases ranging from petty theft and family conflicts to simple disputes. Perpetrators of to bind them to the SLDF cause and imbue them with supernatural powers that domestic violence are punished by public flogging. In one incident, a villager who would protect them from authorities and make them invincible to enemy bullets had im pregnated a g irl a nd r efused t o m arry h er wa s f orced t o p ay a f ine o f during co mbat. Th e s piritual w ing p layed a cen tral r ole in S LDF o perations, 500 000 Kenyan shillings, half of which went to the militia.74 For their own security, encouraging young men to enrol in the militia and assuring them that they would government administrative officers (chiefs and their assistants) also refer cases and enjoy m ystic p rotection a nd b e in vincible. I t a lso h ad t he d uty o f ra llying t he disputes t o t he S LDF a s w ell a s co llect t axes f or t he mi litia a s a sig n o f t heir community and politicians to the SLDF cause.67 submission to the militia’s authority. Those who do not comply are either killed or The third wing of the SLDF is the political wing. Believed to be the driving forced to flee the area. It is instructive to note that one chief – Bramwell Kiso Kiboi force behind the insurgency, this wing is at the same time the most elusive as it of Chepkube location – was abducted and held by SLDF militiamen for three days. keeps on changing, whether by default or design. Apart from its self-proclaimed He did not report the matter to the police upon his release for fear of reprisal by spokesman, John Kanai, many politicians have been linked to the militia, but there 75 the militia. is no hard evidence as to which politicians or ideologues are behind the SLDF.68 From a sm all group of fewer than a h undred fighters at the beginning of the Source of funds conflict, t he S LDF h as g rown t o a f ormidable f orce. I n M arch 2008, W ycliffe Matakwei claimed to b e commanding a f orce of 35 000 m en, a f igure t hat was The methods that the militia uses to sustain and finance its activities are akin to 69 obviously o verstated. Nevertheless, t he W estern K enya H uman R ights W atch those used by the Mungiki – in fact it seems to have borrowed most of its modus 70 (WKHRW) has estimated the militia to be 3 000 men, by no means a small outfit. operandi from t he Mungiki. Th e S LDF co llects ‘taxes’ f rom t he p opulation a nd Initially, r ecruitment wa s v oluntary, b ut l ater S LDF dem anded t hat e very S oy effectively runs a p arallel administration. These illegal taxes are imposed on the family make at least one son available for training and duty. The SLDF has at least residents of t he area, especially t hose with s ome s ource of income. Initially t he 30 cells of about 100 people each. Most of the cells are manned by retired security group dem anded 1 000 K enyan s hillings f rom e very h ousehold a s a o nce-off officers, foreign mercenaries and child soldiers.71 In 2006, the WKHRW estimated payment, but later it demanded individual monthly payments levied according to that 650 children of schoolgoing age (under 18) had been forcefully recruited by an in dividual’s level o f in come. Teachers a nd ci vil s ervants w ere f orced t o p art the SLDF. It stated that parents either had to pay a fee of Ksh10 000 (US$150) o r with a p ortion of their salaries (between 2 000 a nd 5 000 K enyan shillings) as a give up a child to the cause.72 protection levy, while farmers were forced to remit part of the proceeds from sales

168 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 169 MARGINALISATION AND THE RISE OF MILITIA GROUPS IN KENYA ADAMS OLOO

of produce like livestock, milk and crops to the group. The militia also collected a population, b ut m ost o f t hem o perate f rom t heir h omes. Th ey a ssemble o nly certain amount of food produce for every unit area harvested, for example, each whenever ‘there is a job to be done’ – such as attacking a specific target at a specific household wa s r equired t o s urrender a 90 kg b ag o f m aize f or e very acr e time – after which they merge with the civilian population again. This has made harvested.76 The t ransport s ector, t oo, wa s n ot s pared. I ndeed, p ublic s ervice the security personnel’s hunt for them in the forest futile. When the SLDF attacks, vehicles remit part of their daily income to the militia. Apart from the taxes, the it o rganises i tself in sm all g roups o f 10 t o 12 p eople t hat m ake i ts m ovements group wa s s aid t o h ave b een b ankrolled b y s ome p oliticians a s w ell a s s ome difficult to detect. It is only a small group – mainly the commanders and strategists wealthy families in t he region. The SLDF a lso punished civilians by c utting off – t hat h ave s pecific b ases a nd hidin g p laces (s uch a s c aves o n t he f orested their ears and sewing up their mouths if they defied it. mountain slopes).81 The military established that SLDF was financially stable and had enough food supplies t o l ast i t f or m onths. Thi s em ergent ‘ insurgency e conomy’ b ecame a The SLDF and politics critical factor in ext ending the conflict by sustaining the militia fighters and by making t he S LDF a ttractive t o un employed lo wer-class y ouths. Th e s upport o f Since its formation, the militia’s activities have expanded and become more violent powerful individuals for the SLDF, however, may have had a m oral and political and m ore o vertly p olitical. I n t he r un-up t o a nd f ollowing t he 2007 g eneral rather than a financial dimension.77 elections, the SLDF supported certain political candidates and targeted political opponents and their supporters. The quest for land: tactics and strategies The conflict in Mount Elgon escalated and took on overt political and ethno- nationalist dim ensions. Th e S LDF a llied i tself w ith t he o pposition p arty, t he The SLDF seeks to evict ‘non-indigenous people’ because it considers the region to Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), and was fiercely intolerant of leaders and belong to Sabaots and the Kamatusa78 – a coalition of largely pastoralist tribes from supporters of other p arties, especially t hose f rom t he r uling co alition t hat l ater the R ift V alley t hat s hare a co mmon lin guistic a nd c ultural h eritage. Sa baot became known as the Party of National Unity (PNU). The SLDF went so far as to militants b elieve a f uture R ift V alley s tate w ithin a f ederal K enya w ould b e intimidate a nd e ven ex ecute P NU s upporters. A s a r esult, t wo O DM ci vic incomplete w ithout M ount E lgon. Th e S LDF’s m ain a mbition i s t o det ach t he aspirants, Moses Makoit of Cheptais ward and Nathan Warsama of Sasur ward, agriculturally important Mount Elgon from the Western Province and annex it to were elected unopposed. the R ift Valley. Its v iolent c ampaign s eeks t o c ause m ass di splacement o f n on- At parliamentary level, the SLDF targeted the sitting KANU MP, John Serut, Sabaots a nd n on-Kalenjins in t he h ope t hat a f riendly central g overnment w ill who, although a Soy, was seen as acting against Soy interests. It targeted him and eventually legitimise facts on the ground.79 his family because it claimed he had used his position to secure the inclusion of the The SLDF has employed a number of strategies to achieve its ends, including members of the Mosop clan in t he third phase of the resettlement programme, killings, kidnappings and torture. The SLDF has not only killed persons who they although t hey w ere n ot s upposed t o b e p art o f i t. M embers o f t he B ukusu perceived a s b eing o pposed t o i t a nd i ts o bjectives b ut h as a lso t ortured a nd community were a lso t argeted, as t hey were s een as li kely to vote for t he PNU maimed inhabitants who break its code (by breaking its taboo against the drinking coalition in t he general elections.82 The SLDF also targeted supporters of S erut. of alcohol, for example). It also attacks individuals who have land disputes with Serut survived an assassination attempt when SLDF gunmen opened fire at him as other landowners sympathetic to the SLDF or who hire the SLDF to intimidate. By he gave a speech outside the district commissioner’s office in Kapsokwony in May the c lose o f A pril 2008, S LDF ac tivities h ad r esulted in 615 de aths a nd a bout 2007. He did, however, lose two brothers and a niece later on.83 66 000 internally displaced persons.80 The SLDF promoted its favoured candidates in the 2007 elections in a vicious Contrary t o t he w idely h eld b elief t hat S LDF r ebels li ved in t he f orest, t he campaign that, according to local residents, amounted to a campaign of terror. The military a ssault r evealed t hat n ot o nly do t hey ac tually li ve a mong t he lo cal candidates favoured by the SLDF were all contesting on an ODM ticket. A c hief

170 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 171 MARGINALISATION AND THE RISE OF MILITIA GROUPS IN KENYA ADAMS OLOO

from t he a rea t old a m ember o f H uman R ights W atch t hat t he in cumbent However, since the withdrawal of the military from the area, there have been councillor for Emia ward, Nickson Manyu, has been warned at gunpoint not to reports88 that the ousted members of the gang are returning, as the re-emergence contest against the ODM candidate. He also reported widespread intimidation and of violent incidences attest. There have also been reports of fresh recruitments in electoral violence.84 parts of Mount Elgon. One of the men who is believed to be a major force behind the militia, former police constable John Sichei, has also resurfaced. State response to the SLDF Just like its counterpart, the Mungiki, the group seems to have learned how to survive government crackdowns. Towards the end of 2008, t he group had once The government was initially reluctant to tackle the SLDF menace as it considered again started charging illegal taxes and attacking and maiming those who refused 89 the group to be simply a rag-tag unit that would cease to exist with time. It was in to comply. Nevertheless, the killing of core members of the SLDF has resulted in 2007, w hen t he g roup acquired m ore p ower, t hat t he g overnment t ook a m ore the g roup b ecoming a m uch less p otent force and unable to inf lict t he k ind of serious s tance a nd dep loyed t he p olice, t he G eneral S ervice Unit a nd t he A nti terror and hold it had over the residents of the area. The net effect of this has been Stock-Theft Unit against the SLDF. However, these operations were sporadic and the near disappearance of the organisation. not s ustained, a nd h ence fa iled t o e liminate t he g roup. Th e a rmy f irst b ecame involved in J uly 2007, b ut t he mi litary p resence wa s a t a lo w le vel. Th e ini tial THE MUNGIKI AND THE SLDF: A COMPARISON security response failed to contain the rapidly evolving armed group as it wreaked There are a number of similarities and differences between the Mungiki and SLDF, havoc in Mount Elgon and parts of Trans-Nzoia district. which to s ome extent dem onstrate t he dif ference in im pact t hat t heir ac tivities Furthermore, during one police operation in the middle of 2007 at the Kabero, have had on the societies in w hich they operate. To start with, both the militia Kabkwes and Bukweno locations, 1 877 houses were burnt down and property of groups reflect a keen sense of frustration with the political system, in which their an undisclosed value was destroyed as a result of the operation. The police officers members’ voices have marginal impact. Mungiki members claim to represent the were also accused of being involved in arbitrary killings.85 unfulfilled a spirations o f t he Mau Ma u as a n a lternative p olitical di spensation, After r epeated a ttempts t o co ntain t he g roup fa iled, t he g overnment while the SLDF seeks to amend the historical injustices related to land that was acknowledged that the militia was bigger and better organised than it realised and disinherited from the Sabaot. As with many armed groups in the country, the two then dep loyed t he K enya a rmy in a j oint o peration w ith t he p olice. I t wa s militias have twin purposes, on the one hand land-related objectives, and on the codenamed Operation Okoa Maisha (Operation Save Lives) and was launched in other, furthering the political aims of certain leaders. March 2008, after the December 2007 election, in a b id to regain state control of The two militia groups also subscribe to cultural and religious modes in their the Mount Elgon district. However, once again the military was accused of gross operations. Th e mi litias’ et hnic a ffiliation i s b est un derstood a s a t ool f or human r ights a buses a gainst n ot o nly t he S LDF, b ut m ostly t he lo cals. Th e mobilisation. One tactic employed by both groups is the administration of oaths accusations in cluded m aiming a nd t orture, ra ping o f w omen a nd y oung g irls, and spiritual guidance. The spiritual leaders of the two groups administer oaths to indiscriminate burning of houses and food stores, and killing of suspected SLDF members ostensibly to bind them to the aims and objectives of the groups. The 86 adherents without recourse to judicial processes. SLDF’s spiritual wing has played a cen tral role in i ts operations by encouraging Because of this operation the activities of the SLDF militia almost ground to a young men to enrol into the militia. The young men are assured that they will halt, as most of its leaders had either been arrested or killed while a majority of its enjoy mystic protection a nd b e invincible. Th e Mungiki, on its p art, c alls f or a members h ad either b een k illed or det ained. Human r ights g roups s uch a s t he return t o A frican t raditions a nd s piritualism a s t he m eans o f r esolving s ocial KNCHR and Human Rights Watch put the number of people killed during the problems a fflicting i t. Th e m ovement h as a lso ado pted t raditional G ikuyu operation a t a bout 2 000. B y J une 2008, s ome 758 S LDF s uspects h ad b een religious rituals and cultural symbols in its activities and operations. Culture and arraigned in court on charges of promoting warlike activities.87 religion are thus used by the Mungiki to bind its members together.

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However, the Mungiki differs from the SLDF when it comes to adaptation to report points out that whereas education has been a major form of social capital other r eligions. Th e Mungiki shifts f rom o ne r eligion t o a nother in t imes o f investment, its va lue h as b een minimi sed in t he e yes of youths living in a bject repression by the state. Its leaders have thus at various times converted to Islam poverty. During its heyday, the SLDF was reported to have recruited around 650 and Christianity to escape state persecution. As Ruteere has argued, the Mungiki schoolgoing children. The Mungiki has had an even more ambitious recruitment appears t o h ave em braced a n in strumental v iew o f r eligion a nd c ulture. Thi s programme with regard to school children and teenagers since February 2009. The change of religion when under attack is part of its arsenal for political survival as areas most affected are the Kirinyaga, Murang’a, Nyeri, Nyandarua, Kiambu, Thika well as a protest at what it sees as the failure of Christianity to provide a solution and Laikipia districts in C entral Province and the slums of Mathare, Korogocho, to the country’s problems.90 Kayole and Dandora in Nairobi.92 The modes of operation of the Mungiki and SLDF are similar. They both use The co mmunities t hat s uffer f rom t he v iolence co mmitted b y t hese t wo terrorist organisations’ classic methods of asymmetric warfare, in w hich they do militias have petitioned the government to come to their rescue. The activities of not engage directly with the state’s instruments and war machinery, but strike and the two militias have left a trail of destruction, death and displacement that have then leave the scene. Of the two militias, the Mungiki has the most elaborate cell decimated people’s livelihoods and destroyed their lives. This has led to a situation structure, which allows it to expand its influence, while restricting the possibility where the populations in the affected areas detest those same militias whose initial of exposure of an entire network of gang members to law enforcement infiltration. objective was to safeguard their interests. The SLDF originally defined its goals in This is one of the main reasons why the government has been unable to dismantle terms of protecting the land rights of the Sabaot, while the Mungiki’s objective was, its n etwork. B oth g roups a lso a ssemble o nly w hen t here i s a j ob t o b e do ne, apart f rom r eturning t he K ikuyu co mmunity t o i ts t raditional r oots, t o f ight although the SLDF is more adept at this tactic. Their weapons are also similar, for poverty. H owever, b oth g roups h ave en ded u p inf licting s uffering t o t he v ery both use mainly cr ude weapons such as machetes, clubs, and b ows and arrows. people they had initially sought to benefit. Both effectively employed the use of They do o ccasionally u se gun s in t heir o perations, a lthough t he S LDF i s m ore violence to obtain compliance of local populations, in s ome areas subjugating a likely to do so. Furthermore, both militias have instilled fear into the communities whole district. in which they operate, forcing them to give in to the demands of the militia groups. Both the Mungiki and the SLDF have been subjected to massive crackdown Both kill or maim those who resist them, to serve as examples to others, while operations b y t he g overnment, w ith va rying r esults. I n 2007, t he Mungiki was those who comply resign themselves to a life of servitude and exploitation. suppressed by means of extra-judicial killings that whittled down its members and The activities of the two militia groups have also endangered human security forced it to go underground, while the SLDF was almost exterminated in 2008. in their areas of operation: economic security is under threat as trade, economic However, both militias have since regained lost ground with the Mungiki being the growth and development have been stunted and the socioeconomic infrastructure most effective in this regard. The latest atrocities associated with the Mungiki took destroyed. Most residents of Trans-Nzoia and Central provinces have been forced place o n 20 A pril 2009 w hen t hey a ttacked Ga thaithi v illage in t he Nyeri E ast to close their businesses as they cannot afford to pay the extortions demanded by district of Central Province and killed some 30 people in retaliation for the killing the militias. Markets have shut down and residents and farmers are unable to make of 14 of its members. The SLDF is yet to regain its powerful position. a living as they cannot till their lands and carry on their businesses. The end result The SLDF crackdown was easy to implement since it was in a rural set-up that has been food insecurity in the areas where the two militia groups are most active. made i t p ossible f or t he mi litary t o inf iltrate a nd c arry o ut i ts o perations a s The militia groups have both recruited children of schoolgoing age into their opposed to the crackdown against the Mungiki, which operates mostly in urb an ranks – w illing or unwillingly – h ence interfering with their education. Poverty surroundings and whose members could easily go underground. and t he b enefits associated w ith j oining t hese mi litia g roups have combined to Other vigilante/militias, such as the Taleban in Nairobi and the Bantu, h ave force t he y outh o ut o f s chool. A ccording t o t he 2007 g lobal r eport o n h uman challenged the Mungiki. The Bantu militia is estimated to have between 2 000 and settlements, many boys are abandoning school and joining criminal gangs.91 The 3 000 members and has to date killed about 20 Mungiki gang members.93 Although

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these groups have countered and slowed down the activities of the Mungiki, they The state’s response has been a mixture of sluggishness and brute force. With have b een un able t o des troy i t co mpletely. I n m ore r ecent t imes, a m ore regard to the former, the police force has time and again failed to stop the violence emboldened group has emerged in p arts of the Central Province, known as the committed by the two groups. With regard to the brute force, the police have been Kengakenga, which has dealt with the Mungiki in the same manner that the militia accused of extra-judicial killings in t he case of the Mungiki, while the army was deals with groups opposed to it. It has formed an execution centre (a ka ngaroo accused of torturing residents in its operation to contain the SLDF. In both cases court) k nown a s ‘ The H ague’, where Mungiki adherents a re ex ecuted t hrough the force used did not eliminate the groups. The question that should be asked is hanging, h acking o r b eing s et a blaze. ‘ The H ague’ i s si tuated a t a n a bandoned why the two groups persist despite the efforts by the state to stop or at least contain cattle dip at Kamuiru village, about 3 kilometres from Kagumo town in Kirinyaga them. district. Close to 20 people have so far been executed here.94 Ever since militia groups developed with the return to multiparty politics in The SLDF has faced similar challenges from the Moorland Defence Force and the Political Revenge Movements formed by t he Mosop to defend itself against the run-up to the 1992 elections, the state’s reaction has been one of indifference. SLDF attacks. These two groups helped the military during its operations against The government has taken an unsystematic approach to deal with illegal armed the SLDF. groups. The government’s response to atrocities committed by these militias has to The main differences between the two militia groups can be attributed to the date been largely rhetorical. In the majority of cases, the government has failed to fact that Mungiki is better organised and has a g reater following than the SLDF, act decisively. The proliferation of armed militias can be attributed partly to the even though both of them have organisational structures that consist of military, failure b y t he g overnment t o a rrest, p rosecute a nd p unish m embers o f t hese spiritual a nd p olitical w ings. Th e S LDF o perates m ostly in t he M ount E lgon militias a nd t heir s ponsors. I t c an a lso b e a ttributed t o t he a bject p overty region, w ith a f ew s poradic a ttacks in p arts o f t he T rans-Nzoia di strict. Th e experienced by many unemployed youth in different communities. Mungiki is dominant in t he Central, parts of Nairobi and parts of the Rift Valley It is evident that the rise of the Mungiki and SLDF is to some extent the result provinces. of the marginalisation of the groups, economically and also politically. There is also no doubt that the two groups are linked with elites and politicians from their CONCLUSION areas of operation. A crackdown on the groups must thus address this connection. But m ore importantly, t he s tate must address t he fac tors t hat contribute t o t he The g rand co alition de al t hat h ad b een b rokered b y t he f ormer UN s ecretary- general, Kofi Annan, includes a co mmitment to disband and demobilise Kenya’s marginalisation o f t hese g roups, f or if t his i s n ot t ackled, t hey w ill n ever b e militia g roups, m any o f w hich w ere b lamed f or t he v iolence t hat f ollowed t he eradicated. disputed 2007 presidential elections. The instruments to set in motion this process are yet to be put in place more than a year since the deal was signed and most of NOTES the ga ngs s till r emain ac tive. Th e Mungiki and S LDF, in p articular, a re s lowly regaining their hold on Central and Western provinces respectively. 1 C L eys, Underdevelopment i n K enya: t he p olitical e conomy o f n eo-colonialism, L ondon: The p ersistence o f t he Mungiki and S LDF i s a n in dicator o f h ow de ep t he Heinemann, 1975; W O yugi, Ethnicity and the electoral process: the 1992 general elections culture of impunity has been ingrained in the Kenyan socioeconomic and political in Kenya, African Journal of Political Science, New Series 2(1) (1997), 491–569. 2 J Osamba, Violence and the dynamics of transition: state, ethnicity and governance in Kenya, set-up. The Mungiki and SLDF have developed a parallel revenue collection system African Affairs 26(1&2) (2001); K Kibwana, Constitutionalism and political issues surrounding in their areas of jurisdiction. They have also developed a policing system distinct regionalism i n K enya, Th ought o n D emocracy S eries, N airobi: K enya H uman R ights from that managed by the state. They have killed, intimidated, conscripted and Commission, 1994. harassed their victims into submission. At the peak of their operations, these two 3 S Ndegwa, Citizenship and ethnicity: an examination of two transition moments in Kenyan groups appeared to have overwhelmed even the police. politics, American Political Science Review 91(3) (1997).

176 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 177 MARGINALISATION AND THE RISE OF MILITIA GROUPS IN KENYA ADAMS OLOO

4 F S tewart, Th e r oot c auses o f h umanitarian em ergencies, in W ayne E N afziger, F rances 26 Ruteere, Dilemmas of crime; Sunday Nation, 3 December 2006. Stewart a nd V äyrynen R aimo (e ds), War, h unger a nd d isplacement: t he o rigins o f 27 US D epartment o f S tate, A nnual r eport o n I nternational r eligious f reedom f or 2004 – humanitarian emergencies, Volume 1: Analysis, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Kenya, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/450fb0b228.html (accessed 4 May 2009). 5 A Mazrui, Ethnic voices and transethnic voting: the 1997 elections at the Kenya Coast, in M 28 Ibid. Rutten, A M azrui a nd F G rignon (e ds), Out f or t he c ount: t he 1997 gen eral e lection a nd 29 Ibid. prospects for democracy in Kenya, Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2001. 30 Ruteere, Dilemmas of crime. 6 M K atumanga w ith L C liffe, Nairobi – a ci ty b esieged: t he i mpact o f a rmed v iolence o n 31 Sunday Nation, 4 February 2007. poverty a nd d evelopment, W est : B radford U niversity, C entre f or I nternational 32 Ibid. Cooperation and Security, Department of Peace Studies, 2005. 33 Ibid. 7 Collins W anderi, Mungiki: leg itimate o r cr iminal? The A frican E xecutive, 2008, 34 Standard reporter, Mungiki tax system for business, use of roads, East African Standard, 20 http://www.africanexecutive.com/modules/magazine/articles.php?article=3160 (accessed 12 May 2009. October 2009). 35 Kagwanja, Politics of marionettes; Katumanga, Nairobi – a city besieged. 8 J Ngirachu a nd C W aithaka, How Mungiki became m ost s erious internal s ecurity t hreat, 36 Daily Nation, 5 April 2004. Daily Nation, 12 March 2009. 37 P K agwanja, P ower t o u huru: y outh iden tity a nd g enerational p olitics in K enya’s 2002 9 G Wamue, Revisiting our indigenous shrines through Mungiki, African Af fairs 100 (2001), elections, African Affairs, 105(418), (2005), 51–75. 453–467. 38 Daily Nation, 11 November 2006. 10 Ibid; P K agwanja, P olitics o f m arionettes: ext ra-legal v iolence a nd t he 1997 e lections in 39 Ibid. Kenya, in M R utten, A M azrui, and F G rignon (eds), Out for the count: The 1997 gen eral 40 Standard reporter, Gangs operate thriving taxi business, East African Standard, 19 May 2009. election a nd p rospects f or d emocracy i n K enya, K ampala: F ountain Pu blishers, 2001; D 41 G Munene, Protection fee demands drove away traders, Daily Nation, 3 M ay 2009; N ation Anderson, Vigilantes, violence and the politics of public order in Kenya, African Affairs, 101, correspondent, Traders who fled after Mungiki threats return, Daily Nation, 23 April 2009. (2002); M Ruteere, Dilemmas of crime, human rights and the politics of Mungiki violence in 42 Mutahi, Violence and politics of militias in Kenya. Kenya, Nairobi: Kenya Human Rights Institute, 2008. 43 East African Standard, 26 August 2002. 11 Ruteere, Dilemmas of crime. 44 Daily Nation, 10 November 2005. 12 K Kanyinga, quoted in the Sunday Nation, 4 February 2007. 45 Daily Nation, 2 June 2007. 13 P Mutahi, Violence and politics of militias in Kenya, Journal of the Africa Peace Forum 2(1) 46 International Cr isis G roup, 2008, K enya in cr isis, A frica R eport N o 137, 2008, (2006), 66–94; Wamue, Revisiting our indigenous shrines through Mungiki. http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/horn_of_africa/137_kenya_in_crisis_ 14 Standard team, Gang uses force to get new recruits, East African Standard, 18 May 2009. web.pdf (accessed 9 September 2009). 15 Ngirachu and Waithaka, How Mungiki became most serious internal security threat. 47 N Mburu, Leaders must tackle youth problems to stop militias, East African Standard, 23 16 P Kagwanja, Warlord democracy: the proliferation of militia and pre-election violence in April 2009. Kenya, 1999–2002, K enya H uman R ights C ommission, U npublished r eport, 2003; 48 P M athagani, K ibaki p ledges t ough ac tion t o r ein in Mungiki, East A frican S tandard, 5 Anderson, Vigilantes, violence and the politics of public order in Kenya. December 2008. 17 The First Post, 9 July 2007; East African Standard, Kenya: Mungiki runs deep and wide, 27 49 S Kilonzo, Terror, religion, or socialism? The faces of Mungiki sect in the Kenya public space, April 2008; N girachu and Waithaka, How Mungiki became most s erious internal s ecurity CODESRIA Conference held in Yaoundé, Cameroon, 7–11 December 2008. threat. 50 Standard team, Love-hate relations between politicians, gang, East African Standard, 20 May 18 Standard team, Gang uses force to get new recruits, East African Standard, 18 May 2009. 2009. 19 M G ecaga, R eligious m ovements a nd dem ocratisation in K enya: b etween t he s acred a nd 51 Anderson, Vigilantes, violence and the politics of public order in Kenya. profane, in G Murunga and S Nasong’o (eds), Kenya: the struggle for democracy, London: Zed 52 East African Standard, Kenya: Mungiki runs deep and wide, 27 April 2008. Books, 2007. 53 East African Standard, 8 March 2004. 20 K Makokha, The Mungiki mystique just shattered to pieces, Daily Nation, 27 October 2000; 54 East African Standard, 9 March 2004. Wamue, Revisiting our indigenous shrines through Mungiki. 55 East African Standard, Kenya: Mungiki runs deep and wide. 21 Wamue, Revisiting our indigenous shrines through Mungiki, 459. 56 Daily Nation, 5 April 2004. 22 Wamue, Revisiting our indigenous shrines through Mungiki. 57 Ibid. 23 Makokha, The Mungiki mystique just shattered to pieces. 58 Kenya N ational C ommission o n Human R ights (KN CHR), Preliminary r eport o n a lleged 24 Daily Nation, 3 September 2000. executions and disappearances of persons between June and October 2007, Nairobi: KNCHR, 25 Kagwanja, Warlord democracy. 2007; Kagwanja, Power to uhuru.

178 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 179 MARGINALISATION AND THE RISE OF MILITIA GROUPS IN KENYA ADAMS OLOO

59 ICG, Kenya crisis, Africa Report 137 (2008). 92 W Kigotho and M M uiruri, Child labour and Mungiki sect push boys out of school, East 60 Otsieno N amwaya, W hy t he Sa baot mi litia h as b een a h ard n ut t o crac k, East A frican African Standard, 23 April 2009. Standard, 27 July 2007. 93 J Mugambi, Kenya: massive Mungiki manhunt in Central, Nairobi Star, April 21, 2009. 61 International Crisis Group, Kenya crisis; Human Rights Watch, All the men have gone: war 94 Standard team, Vigilantes who kill with equal force, East African Standard, May 18, 2009. crimes in Kenya’s Mt Elgon conflict, New York: Human Rights Watch, 2008. 62 R R Simiyu, Militianisation of resource conflicts: the case of land-based conflict in the Mount Elgon region of Western Kenya, Monograph No 152, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2008. 63 Saturday N ation, 7 A pril 2007; Daily N ation, 6 J anuary 2007; S imiyu, Militianisation o f resource conflicts. 64 Human Rights Watch, All the men have gone. 65 Ibid. 66 Allan Kisia, Military finally opens up Mt Elgon, East African Standard, 29 June 2008. 67 Namwaya, Why the Sabaot militia has been a h ard nut to crack; Simiyu, Militianisation of resource conflicts. 68 Ibid. 69 Human Rights Watch, All the men have gone; Simiyu, Militianisation of resource conflicts. 70 Ken Opala, ‘Felled SLDF boss a m ere pawn in E lgon problem’, Daily Nation, 20 May 2008; Human Rights Watch, All the men have gone. 71 Human Rights Watch, All the men have gone. 72 Namwaya, Why the Sabaot militia has been a hard nut to crack. 73 Ibid. 74 N Ngaina, Th e d ay Janjaweed came f or my n eck over a b asin, East African S tandard, 31 January 2009. 75 Namwaya, Why the Sabaot militia has been a hard nut to crack. 76 R Wanyonyi, Vigilante demand ‘fee’ from teachers, East African Standard, 15 January 2008; Simiyu, Militianisation of resource conflicts. 77 International Crisis Group, Kenya crisis. 78 Kamatusa is an abbreviation of Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and Samburu tribes. 79 International Crisis Group, Kenya crisis. 80 Human Rights Watch, All the men have gone. 81 Namwaya, Why the Sabaot militia has been a hard nut to crack. 82 Human Rights Watch, All the men have gone. 83 Daily Nation, 14 November 2007; East African Standard, 1 July 2007. 84 Human Rights Watch, All the men have gone. 85 Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, On the brink of the precipice: the KNHCR report on the post-election violence, Nairobi: KNHCR, 2008. 86 Human Rights Watch, All the men have gone. 87 Ibid. 88 R Wanyonyi, Terror returns to Mt Elgon, East African Standard, 25 November 2008. 89 Ibid. 90 Ruteere, Dilemmas of crime. 91 UN Habitat, Global reports on human settlements, 2007, Vol 1: Reducing urban crime and violence: policy directions, Nairobi: UN Centre for Human Settlements, 2007.

180 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 181 CHAPTER 7 Rebels and militias in resource conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo

PHILLIP KASAIJA

INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Rwanda genocide and entry into the Democratic Republic of Congo ( DRC)1 of t he def eated Interahamwe and t he Forces A rmées Rwandaises (Rwanda Armed Forces, FAR) in 1994, the DRC in general, and the eastern DRC in p articular, h ave n ever k nown p eace. R ebels a nd mi litia g roups h ave s prung up in t he country to t he p oint t hat one c annot keep t rack of w ho i s w ho. Th e availability of mineral and other forms of natural wealth in the country has been one reason for the continued instability in the region. In fact, the rebel and militia groups (and at one time the neighbouring countries of Rwanda and Uganda) have transformed t heir mi litary o perations a nd p resence in t he co untry in to s elf- sustaining ac tivities, t hrough t he ext raction a nd s ale o f n atural r esources. Th e instability occasioned by these groups has resulted in mass deaths, displacements and human rights violations. This c hapter di scusses t he c urrent s tate o f t he co nflict in t he e astern D RC, paying due attention to the rebel and militia groups operating there. It sequentially

MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 183 REBELS AND MILITIAS IN RESOURCE CONFLICT IN THE EASTERN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO PHILLIP KASAIJA

presents a s hort hi story o f t he co nflict in t he D RC f rom t he t ime i t b ecame a export t o B elgium.6 Léopold f ondly r eferred t o t he C ongo a s hi s p rivate es tate ‘personal’ possession of King Léopold II to the present, showing how the presence which he ran as a ‘ magnificent African cake’.7 His brutal rule became associated of natural resources in the country has led to it becoming a ‘geological scandal’.2 It with the image of ‘red rubber’, denoting that it was stained by the blood of the then presents t he s truggle f or control of C ongolese resources in t he 1960s a nd Africans w ho w ere f orced t o ga ther i t, a nd in 1908, a n in ternational r eform 1970s, during which Mobutu inter alia adopted the strategy of ‘Zairenising’ foreign movement led by E D Morel forced Léopold to transfer the Congo to the Belgian companies s et u p b y t he B elgians t o ext ract t he r esources. Th e c hapter n ext state.8 discusses the different rebel and militia groups that have existed and continue to The t ransformation o f t he C ongo f rom L éopold’s p ersonal p ossession t o a exist in the eastern DRC, with a key observation that although the majority of the Belgian colony did n ot represent a m ajor advance for the Congolese people, for rebel groups in the eastern DRC were established by the neighbouring countries of Léopold’s r ule wa s r eplaced b y a co lonial r egime t hat wa s j ust a s o ppressive.9 Uganda and Rwanda, other non-Congolese groups have also taken advantage of According to Anstey: the fluid situation to enter the fray. The next section of the chapter deals with the relationship between the different rebel and militia groups in the eastern DRC and [The B elgian C ongo wa s] a va st t erritory w hich h ad n ot b een p roperly the states of the region, with an observation that the relationship between the rebel administered; a system of direct economic exploitation … an unfettered variant of and militia groups and the states of the region follows the maxim of ‘the enemy of … abuse and atrocity. … [This] legacy meant that Belgium had no relevant tradition 10 my enemy is my friend’.3 The following section deals with the international and of policy to invoke, [and] no positive aims regarding it. regional responses to the conflict in the eastern DRC, with a key conclusion that it Belgium’s colonial rule in t he Congo relied on the triple objectives of economic is difficult to hold non-state actors accountable in a n ongoing conflict situation. exploitation and political and cultural repression. Nevertheless, resistance by the The chapter closes with a co nclusion and recommends that the main strategy to Congo natives was fierce and included army mutinies, strikes, and work stoppages defeat the numerous rebel and militia groups should involve three key trajectories: by mining, industrial, transportation and public s ector workers.11 On 4 J anuary first, t he g roups s hould b e confronted mi litarily; s econd, t he DRC government 1959, the Congolese working class staged a rebellion against the Belgians, resulting should be supported to build strong institutions in the eastern DRC to ensure law in the decision to grant independence to the Congo. In his New Year’s address in and order; and third, the DRC should normalise relations with neighbours to the 1960, King Baudouin (the grandson of Léopold II’s nephew and successor, Albert east, particularly Rwanda and Uganda, so that they do not support the rebel and I), a nnounced t hat ‘ Belgium w ould g ive i ts co lony t he g ift o f in dependence militia g roups in t he e astern D RC a nd c an m ove t owards j oint ac tions a gainst without undue haste’.12 these groups to eliminate them. From independence to 1997 HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT IN THE DRC: FROM KING LÉOPOLD II TO JOSEPH KABILA The in dependence o f t he C ongo o n 30 J une 1960 did n ot r esult in t he transformation o f t he s tate in to a p eaceful o ne, a s t he co untry s ubsequently From King Léopold II to independence lurched f rom o ne cr isis t o t he n ext. B elgian co lonisation h ad b locked p olitical development, so when the Congo was suddenly pitched into independence, the In 1885 the DRC, which is more than 80 times the size of Belgium, was ceded by African elite was tiny, inexperienced and angry, which was a recipe for chaos.13 the major world powers to King Léopold II of Belgium as a personal possession.4 On 5 J uly 1960, s everal uni ts in t he C ongolese a rmy, t he Force P ublique, Léopold’s private estate – t he C ongo – wa s then baptised l’État Indépendant du mutinied and demanded promotions, pay rises and the removal of white officers.14 Congo () and Léopold’s colonial representatives embarked on the As r ioting a nd unr est s pread, P rime M inister P atrice L umumba a ttempted t o dual campaign of military pacification and economic exploitation of the region.5 control t he r evolt b y p romoting a ll A frican s oldiers a t o nce, r emoving s ome The exp loitation r evolved p rimarily a round t he h arvesting o f w ild r ubber f or Belgian o fficers, a nd a ppointing a C ongolese, J oseph M obutu, a s t he q uasi-

184 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 185 REBELS AND MILITIAS IN RESOURCE CONFLICT IN THE EASTERN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO PHILLIP KASAIJA

political overseer over t he mi litary structure.15 The B elgians reacted by s ending RPA a gain en tered t he D RC t o p ursue in surgents a nd a t t he s ame t ime a lso more troops, which intensified the violence. By September 1960, President Joseph dismantled the refugee camps. Kasavubu announced the dismissal of Lumumba as prime minister, who in t urn The Rwandans recruited and trained Congolese Tutsis to help them fight the fired the president. This crisis precipitated a takeover by Mobutu Sese Seko on 14 Hutu ext remists a nd t heir C ongolese b ackers.22 Kabila, w ho h ad f ought a gainst September 1960. Mobutu and failed to make any headway, saw his chance to finally deal with his Between 1960 and 1965, the Congo experienced one crisis after the other, for nemesis. According to the International Crisis Group, the AFDL was formed to example, attempts by some parts of the country like Katanga to secede. Lumumba, help the Rwandan, Ugandan, Congolese and, later on, Angolan military forces that the p opularly e lected in dependence p rime mini ster, wa s a rrested, t ortured a nd were fighting against Mobutu to support their efforts. The AFDL thus gave the finally killed early in 1961. On 24 D ecember 1965, Mobutu, then chief of staff of whole campaign a revolutionary or civil war character.23 the Congolese army, staged a second coup d’état and successfully captured power. Sharing Mobutu’s weakness for political control, patrimonialism and ethnic- Mobutu r uled t he C ongo – r enamed Z aire in 1971 – un der a sys tem o f centred politics, Kabila was able to restore the functioning of the state only to a government c haracterised b y co rruption, p ersonal enr ichment a nd et hnic modest level.24 He found himself in charge of a country whose national debt was favouritism.16 Just li ke L éopold m any y ears b efore, h e lo oted t he w ealth o f t he US$9,6 billion, w hose internal c urrency wa s w orthless, a nd w hose g overnment country w ith a bandon. Thi s p rompted a F rench mini ster t o des cribe him a s ‘a was n on-existent.25 Furthermore, K abila did n ot li ve u p t o t he exp ectations o f walking b ank va ult in a le opard s kin c ap’.17 Whilst en dowed w ith g reat n atural Rwanda and Uganda, which had expected him to wipe out the Hutu Interahamwe wealth in the form of, inter alia, copper, gold, diamonds, oil and silver, at the time and the Ugandan rebels (the Allied Democratic Forces) and the National Army for of hi s de ath in S eptember 1997, M obutu lef t a n im poverished p opulation a nd the Liberation of Uganda (which was based in the eastern DRC at the time).26 country indebted to the level of 200 per cent of the gross domestic product.18 Because t he C ongolese A rmed F orces (Forces A rmées de la R épublique Démocratique du Congo, FARDC) were weak organisationally, Kabila appointed a Laurent Kabila to Joseph Kabila Rwandese officer, General James Kabarebe, as chief of staff to reorganise them. Rwanda a nd U ganda, l ater o n j oined b y B urundi, t ook ad vantage o f t he On 17 May 1997, rebels of the Alliance des Forces Démocratique pour la Libération disintegration of the Congolese state and armed forces to create territorial spheres du C ongo (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of C ongo, AFDL)19 of interest from which they could plunder the Congo’s riches.27 with the support of the neighbouring countries of Angola, Rwanda and Uganda, Since Kabila had not lived up to their expectations, Uganda and Rwanda had among others, captured Kinshasa, thus ending the Mobutu dictatorship in Z aire. to f ind a n ew C ongolese puppet. The opportunity presented itself w hen Kabila At the head of the AFDL was Laurent-Désiré Kabila, who was derided for various decided to send the Rwanda troops home at the end of July 1998. Th e rebellion kinds o f t rafficking in w hich h e h ad en gaged o ver a p eriod o f 30 y ears.20 He against t he K abila g overnment t hat b egan o n 2 A ugust 1998 wa s dep icted b y declared him self t he n ew p resident o f Z aire a nd r enamed t he co untry t he Uganda and Rwanda as a civil war in which they were simply providing support to Democratic Republic of Congo, with a n ew flag and national anthem.21 The war Congolese rebels to ensure security along their own borders. Clearly this was not that brought him t o power had started in t he east of the country, mainly in t he true, as fighting initially occurred between Rwanda troops supporting mutinous provinces of North and South Kivu. Congolese troops against Kabila’s loyalists. As soon as the war broke out, Kabila Following the end of the 1994 Rwanda genocide, over a million (mainly Hutu) convinced his eventual allies (Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia and later Chad) that Rwandan refugees took refuge in Z aire, where they established camps along the the DRC had been invaded by her eastern neighbours, so the former entered the border b etween R wanda a nd t he D RC. S ome o f t hem h ad p articipated in t he fray to prop up Kabila’s government. genocide a nd s tarted l aunching a ttacks in to R wanda, t hus p rovoking t he n ew At the time of the outbreak of the rebellion, Rwanda had helped to found a rulers o f R wanda, t he Rwanda P atriotic F ront/Army (RP F/A), t o l aunch movement c alled t he Rassemblement C ongolais p our l a D émocratie (Congolese counterinsurgency operations against t hem, inter a lia in t he DRC. In 1996, t he Rally for Democracy, RCD) led by Professor Ernest Wamba dia Wamba from the

186 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 187 REBELS AND MILITIAS IN RESOURCE CONFLICT IN THE EASTERN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO PHILLIP KASAIJA

University of Dar es Salaam. In mid-1999, the RCD disintegrated into factions and Congo inherited at independence. In order to assert sovereignty over their natural the war was stalemated when neither side wa s able to marshal enough power to resource exp loitation, b oth t he Lumumba a nd Mobutu g overnments b egan t he impose a mi litary v ictory o ver t he o ther. W ith w eak do mestic e conomies, t he process o f di smantling t he s tranglehold t he f oreign co mpanies h ad o ver t he countries involved and t heir C ongolese rebel a llies relied on t he DRC’s natural country’s resources. The attempted secession of Katanga right after independence wealth to fund their continued involvement in t he conflict. It must be observed was s upported b y B elgium, b ecause t his w ould h ave en abled i t t o co ntinue that this policy of exploiting the DRC’s natural resources to support the war effort exploiting Congolese minerals located in the area. According to Lemarchand, the had been initiated by the AFDL, for even before coming to power Kabila signed mineral reserves of Katanga province are so easy to access that they could be called mining concessions with private investors from all over the world to finance the a ‘geological scandal’.34 war against Mobutu. Prunier gives the example of the ‘one billion dollar contract’ Kabila sig ned w ith A merican M ineral F ields I nternational o n 16 A pril 1997, Map 7–1: DRC's natural resources setting a p recedent that was subsequently copied by numerous rebel and militia groups as well as the regional states of the DRC.28 With t he wa r h aving g round t o a s talemate, t he exh austed p arties w ent t o Lusaka in Zambia, where a ceasefire agreement was negotiated and signed in July 1999. The agreement provided for, among others, a ceasefire, disarmament of all the n on-government f orces, t he w ithdrawal of a ll f oreign f orces f rom t he D RC territory and the holding of an Inter-Congolese Dialogue to find a n ew political dispensation for the country. On 16 January 2001, Laurent Kabila was assassinated by one of his bodyguards. He was succeeded by his son, Joseph Kabila.

STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE DRC’S NATURAL RESOURCES

Since the late 1800s, t he Congolese people have suffered at the hands of foreign and indigenous businessmen and political leaders intent on exploiting the DRC’s rubber, ivory, diamonds, gold, copper, cobalt, timber and other resources.29 Under Léopold’s rule, brute force was used to ensure lo cal communities s atisfied hig h rubber q uotas s et b y t he lo cal Force P ublique commanders a nd t heir b usiness Sources: Jeune Afrique and United Nations. associates.30 If a village refused to submit to the rubber regime, everyone in sight was shot so that other villagers would get the message,31 or the right hands of locals Between 1964 a nd 1980, a n umber of rebellions were launched to dismantle the were cut off after they had been killed by local chiefs ‘to show the [colonial] state Congolese neo-colonial state. The Mulele rebellion began in 1964 but by 1968 had how many [had been] killed’.32 fizzled o ut a fter t he a ssassination o f i ts le ader, P ierre M ulele.35 The Conseil After a s teep fall in r ubber prices, Belgium set up companies such as Union Nationale de L ibération (National L iberation C ouncil, CNL), 36 which wa s Minière du Haut-Katanga and Compagnie du Katanga (later renamed the Comité established by Lumumba’s followers after his assassination to liberate the country, Spécial d u K atanga) t o exp loit min eral r esources lo cated b y g eological s urveys did n ot l ast lo ng ei ther. I ts e astern f ront le aders, s uch a s O lenga, Gb enye a nd conducted in the late 1890s.33 These were the companies that the new rulers of the Kanza, were lured out of the rebellion by Mobutu in 1965.37 Laurent Kabila was the

188 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 189 REBELS AND MILITIAS IN RESOURCE CONFLICT IN THE EASTERN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO PHILLIP KASAIJA

only party member who continued to wage a lo w-intensity struggle in t he Fizi- FARDC and General Laurent Nkunda’s Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple Baraka area until the early 1980s, when he, too, retired to the world of business in (National Congress for the Defence of the People, CNDP), which he established in the form of crossborder trading, particularly in gold and ivory. By the time of the 2006 t o f ight a gainst t he r ebel g roup Forces D émocratiques d e L ibération d u formation of the AFDL, Kabila was living in Tanzania on the profits from mineral Rwanda (Democratic F orces f or t he L iberation o f R wanda, FD LR), w hich i s smuggling and extortion. composed mainly of former Interahamwe and ex-FAR and whose aim is to topple In a n ef fort t o w rest co ntrol o f min eral exp loitation f rom f oreign-owned the government of Paul Kagame in Rwanda. mining companies, the Mobutu government enacted the Bakajika Law in 1966, in After s everal r ounds o f t alks in N airobi a nd G oma, t he CND P a nd t he terms of which the state established its rightful claim to all land and mineral rights Congolese government signed a peace agreement on 23 March 2009.42 Earlier on, in the country.38 He also nationalised the giant company Union Minière du Haut- in January 2008, 22 armed groups and the DRC government signed the Goma Acts Katanga in 1967, t ransforming it into a s tate enterprise c alled t he Générale d es of En gagement, w hich, inter a lia, provided f or t hose g roups t o un dergo a Carrières e t d es M ines. Thi s wa s f ollowed in 1973 b y t he ‘ Zairenisation’ o f a ll programme o f di sarmament, dem obilisation, r esettlement a nd r eintegration. foreign-owned co mmercial, in dustrial a nd a gricultural en terprises.39 Mobutu Despite this undertaking and the various peace agreements, the armed non-state encouraged co mpetition b etween r ival en trepreneurs a nd mi litary uni ts b y groups continue to plunder the region’s natural resources, while simultaneously allowing them to guard their own territories and develop their own commercial committing a va riety of mass human rights violations that range from pillaging interests r evolving a round di amonds, g old, co ffee, t imber, co balt a nd a rms. and b urning o f h omes a nd s tores t o t orture, a bduction o f c hildren into mi litia However, Mobutu’s strategies all fostered disorder, insecurity and a general state of groups, displacement of populations and murder.43 impunity, which in turn led to the formation of new and militarised networks for 40 the extraction of economic benefits from the country. THE ROLE OF MILITIAS AND REBEL MOVEMENTS IN THE DRC CONFLICTS CURRENT STATUS OF THE CONFLICT It can be argued that armed non-state groups first gained prominence in the DRC The Inter-Congolese Dialogue was concluded in 2002 a nd all the foreign forces during t he wa r t hat overthrew Mobutu a nd t hat n eighbouring countries withdrew from the DRC in 2003. A t ransitional government incorporating most subsequently s tarted u sing t hese g roups t o f ight t heir p roxy wa rs. W hile t he of the former rebel groups was established at the end of 2003, with Joseph Kabila majority of the rebel and militia groups had been established as a result of external as president. In 2006, general elections were held and Kabila won the presidency forces, others (like the L ord’s Resistance Army, LRA) entered the country f rom and hi s p arty, t he Alliance po ur la M ajorité P résidentielle (Alliance o f t he outside because of the absence of a functioning state. Presidential M ajority, AMP) r eceived t he m ajority in P arliament. However, t he provinces of North and South Kivu, and Ituri continued to experience insecurity Structure, agenda and functioning of the various groups and instability. The main source of the insecurity may be attributed to the presence of n umerous r ebel g roups a nd mi litias t hat co ntinued t o exp loit t he exi sting Apart f rom t he AFD L, w hich wa s es tablished w ith t he h elp o f R wanda a nd mineral and other natural wealth to fund their activities. Uganda, t he s econd m ost important rebel m ovement t o b e es tablished wa s t he The conflict in Ituri Province intensified between 1999 and 2003 as a result of RCD, w hich wa s f ormed in 1998 in R wanda b y C ongolese p oliticians a nd clashes over land between the Hema and Lendu ethnic groups. The situation was intellectuals in cluding r emnants o f M obutu’s r egime a nd f ormer K abila exacerbated by the presence of Ugandan soldiers who used the conflict between supporters. The RCD styled itself as a government in exile, as it was hoped that it the t wo g roups a s a sm okescreen f or t he un bridled exp loitation o f r esources.41 would be jetted into Kinshasa to take over power after the overthrow of Laurent Although the situation in Ituri has since stabilised, North and South Kivu continue Kabila. Having failed to overthrow Kabila, the RCD disintegrated in May 1999 into to s uffer f rom in security. I n August 2008, r enewed co nflict b roke o ut b etween two factions: the RCD-Goma, supported by Rwanda, was based at Goma and was

190 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 191 REBELS AND MILITIAS IN RESOURCE CONFLICT IN THE EASTERN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO PHILLIP KASAIJA

active in North and South Kivu provinces, while the RCD-Kisangani (also called reportedly recruited into the MLC and sent to mines to dig for gold on behalf of RCD-ML), supported by Uganda, was based at Kisangani and controlled parts of the Ugandans and Bemba.49 Ituri and Orientale provinces. After the start of the war in t he east in A ugust 1998, t he Kabila government The di sintegration of t he R CD wa s o ccasioned by, inter alia, the le adership started supporting the Mai-Mai militias based in North and South Kivu provinces style of Wamba and different views on how to pursue the war against the Kabila to f ight t he R wanda o ccupation. Th e Mai-Mai militias considered t hemselves government.44 Although a s ection o f t he RD C-Goma fac tion (w hich in cluded traditional warriors and believed that the use of magic made them invisible.50 The members such as Emile Ilunga, Bizima Karaha, Moise Nyarugabo, Lunda Bululu name Mai-Mai cuts across various ethnic groups in North and South Kivu. These and Alexis Tambwe) favoured a lightening strike on Kinshasa to capture power, the warriors first came to prominence in t he 1960s w hen they allied with the leftist RCD-Kisangani faction (which was led by Wamba) favoured a warlike approach. Mulelist rebellion that tried to topple President Mobutu.51 Between August 1999 a nd May 2000, U gandan and Rwandan troops clashed on Mai-Mai groups t end t o s hift a lliances t o ac hieve t heir p arochial in terests. three occasions in the town of Kisangani for control of taxes or gratuities related During t he 1996–1997 wa r, for example, t hey fought w ith Kabila, but after t he 45 to di amonds. Later o n t he R CD-Kisangani di sintegrated in to o ther fac tions, AFDL came to power, they deserted and returned to their bases in N orth Kivu, including R CD-Nationale le d b y R oger L umbala a nd b ased a t t he t own o f from where they have been able to sow terror among soft civilian targets. Different Bafwasende. actors h ave a lso u sed t hem t o exp loit t he r egion’s va st min eral a nd t imber As the war stalled, Uganda saw the need to create a n ew group and front to resources. The most active Mai-Mai groups today include Mai-Mai-Yakutumba fight t he K abila g overnment. S ince U ganda co ntrolled l arge swa thes o f D RC and Mai-Mai-Zabuloni, named after the areas in the two Kivu provinces in which territory t o t he e ast a nd n ortheast, t he mi litary s trategy t hat U ganda ado pted they are based. involved empowering the Congolese people politically and militarily in t he hope The Parti pour l’Unité et la Sauvegarde de l’Intégrité du Congo (Party for Unity that they would overthrow Kabila themselves. Uganda therefore helped to found and Safeguarding of the Integrity of Congo, PUSIC) was founded in 2002 by Chief the Mouvement p our l a L ibération d u C ongo (Movement f or t he L iberation o f Kaahwa Mandro Kango, who broke away from the Union des Patriotes Congolais Congo, MLC) of Jean-Pierre Bemba. Bemba, a former businessman from , (Union of Congolese Patriots, UPC) of Thomas Lubanga, who had, in turn, broken was introduced to Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni by his Ugandan friends in away from RCD-ML. When Lubanga started collaborating with Rwanda, Kaahwa the military and thereafter underwent military training at a U gandan facility at decided it was time to break ranks with him a nd allied with Uganda to fight the Kyankwazi, after which he was put in a h elicopter by the Ugandan military and flown t o t he e astern D RC.46 There h e wa s in troduced t o t he p opulation a s a UPC. H owever, e ventually, w ith t he p acification o f I turi P rovince, a ll mi litia liberator by his Ugandan handlers, and to buttress his liberator credentials, was groups operating there (including PUSIC) fell apart and disappeared. given a uniform and gun and told to start recruiting supporters, thus giving birth The Patriotes Résistants Congolais (Congolese Resistance Patriots, PARECO) is to the MLC.47 one of the numerous militia groups that have sprung up in the eastern DRC. It is With the help of Uganda, the MLC was able to raise a force of between 15 000 loosely allied to the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda and sometimes and 20 000 m embers who operated in a reas controlled by the Ugandan military. operates with FARDC to fight the UNDP. It was formed in 2007 from former Mai- 52 When President Museveni was asked why he was supporting many rebel groups, Mai elements and is based at Kibua near the FDLR high command. including RCD-Kisangani and the MLC, he replied that ‘a good hunter sends out The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) first entered the DRC in O ctober 2005 in several dogs because he cannot know in advance which one will be the best’.48 MLC Orientale Province.53 In March 2002, t he Uganda army launched ‘Operation Iron rebels and the Ugandan soldiers exploited minerals and other natural resources Fist’ to rout the LRA from its bases in Southern Sudan. This, inter alia, resulted in such a s t imber in t he a reas t hey co ntrolled. P resident M useveni e ven a llowed the r ebels cr ossing t he b order f rom S udan in to Ga ramba N ational P ark in t he Bemba and his group to use the military airport at Entebbe in Uganda to transport DRC. Reports indicate that the LRA was present in the DRC as late as December their ‘goods’ to and from the DRC cheaply. Young men from 12 to 18 years were 2008, when FARDC, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Uganda

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People’s D efence F orces (UP DF) l aunched a j oint o peration c alled ‘Operation Rassemblement Congolais pour la Congolese, Uganda Lightning Th under’ to r out t he LR A f rom i ts b ase in Ga ramba N ational P ark. Démocratie – Kisangani (RCD-Kisangani) May 1999 According to reports, the LRA attacks have resulted in a 32 per cent increase in the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Congolese, Uganda 54 number o f in ternally di splaced p ersons in Or ientale P rovince. Mop-up Démocratie – Mouvement de Libération September 1999 operations named Rudia II against the group were carried out by the UPDF and (RCD-ML) FARDC but have not resulted in its complete eradication. As can be seen from the above, many rebel and militia groups operating in the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Congolese, Uganda Démocratie – Nationale (RCD-Nationale) June 2000 eastern DRC are connected either to each other or to the DRC government and the neighbouring countries. It should be noted that the impact of their activities on Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo Congolese, Uganda human s ecurity h as b een imm ensely n egative. Of t he m ore t han f our mi llion (Movement for the Liberation of Congo, October 1998 deaths that have been recorded since the start of the conflict in 1996, the majority MLC) have o ccurred in t he e astern D RC. I n t heir b road s truggle t o s eize e conomic, Union des Patriotes Congolais (Union of Congolese, Uganda, Rwanda political a nd mi litary p ower, t he mi litias, r ebel m ovements a nd g overnment Congolese Patriots, UPC) June 2002 soldiers (both national and foreign) have been guilty of the most horrific human Parti pour l’Unité et la Sauvegarde de Congolese, Uganda rights abuses, including widespread killings of unarmed civilians, rape, torture and l’Intégrité du Congo (Party for Unity and February 2003 looting, and recruitment of child s oldiers to f ight in t heir ranks, leading to the Safeguarding of the Integrity of Congo, forced displacement of hundreds of thousands of people.55 The following figures PUSIC) will i llustrate t his p oint: b etween J anuary a nd S eptember 2007, P anzi H ospital Front de Libération du Congo (Congolese Congolese, Uganda in S outh K ivu r ecorded 2 0773 c ases o f ra pe, o f w hich 2 0447 w ere a ttributed t o Liberation Front, FLC) January 2001 members o f t he FD LR o r Interahamwe.56 In E quator P rovince, f ighting in a nd around the areas of Dongo in late 2009 caused the displacement of approximately Mouvement des Patriotes Résistants Congolese, FDLR 60 000 people, while another 15 000 sought refuge in the Central African Republic Congolais (Patriots in the Congolese Date not available Resistance, PARECO) (CAR).57 Table 7–1 s hows k nown C ongolese a nd n on-Congolese r ebel a nd mi litia Congres National pour la Défense du Congolese, Rwanda groups and their alliances with states of the region. Peuple (National Congress for the December 2006 Defence of the People, CNDP) Rebel groups in the eastern DRC Table 7–1: Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwandan, DRC, PARECO Rwanda – Forcés Combattantes 1999 Rebel group Nationality, Alliances Abacunguzi (FDLR-FOCA): previously founding date called Armée pour la Libération du Alliance des Forces Démocratique pour Congolese, Uganda, Rwanda, Angola Rwanda (Army for the Liberation of la Libération du Congo (AFDL) October 1996 Rwanda, ALiR) Rassemblement Congolais pour la Congolese, Rwanda, Uganda Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) Ugandan, Sudan Démocratie (Congolese Rally for August 1998 1988/89 Democracy, RCD)

Rassemblement Congolais pour la Congolese, Rwanda National Army for the Liberation of Ugandan, Allegedly receives support Démocratie – Goma (RCD-Goma) August 1998 Uganda (NALU) 1988 from the DRC government

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Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) Ugandan, Allegedly receives support Natural resource wealth: blessing or curse? 1998 from the DRC government The DRC in general, and the eastern part of the country in particular, is incredibly Mai-Mai Congolese, DRC government, FDLR rich in t erms of natural resources, but this has long been described as a c urse.58 Date not available Throughout t he p ast cen tury, ir respective o f t he g overning sys tem o r p olitical Alliances des Patriotes pour un Congo Congolese, FDLR personalities in power, the natural resources have been systematically exploited for Libre et Souverain (Patriotic Alliance for a Date not available the economic benefit of a few at the expense of the vast majority of the Congolese Free and Sovereign Congo, APCLS) people.59 The conflict in the eastern DRC is mainly about access, control and trade Ralliement pour l`Unite et la Démocratie Rwandan, Mai-Mai in minerals such as coltan, gold, cassiterite, diamonds, copper and cobalt, as well (Rally for Unity and Democracy – Urunana, Date not available as timber. The eastern DRC also has deposits of cadmium, silver, zinc, uranium, RUD-Urunana) coal, lead, iron ore and manganese.60 Table 7–2, and maps 7–2 and 7–3 show the Front National de Libération (National Burundian, DRC government location of these minerals in the DRC. Liberation Front, FLN) Date not available

Forces Républicaines Fédéralistes (FRF) Congolese, DRC government Table 7–2: Natural resources in the DRC Date not available Type of mineral Location (provinces) Front pour l’Intégration et la Paix en Ituri Congolese, Uganda Amethyst South Kivu (Front for Integration and Peace in Ituri, 2003 Cadmium Katanga FIPI) Cassiterite (tin) North and South Kivu, Katanga, Maniema Front Révolutionnaire pour l’Ituri Congolese, RCD-ML, DRC government Coltan (columbite-tantalite) North and South Kivu, Maniema (Revolutionary Front for Ituri, FRPI) Date not available Copper and cobalt Katanga Front des Nationalistes et Intégrationnistes Congolese, Uganda Diamonds Kasai, Orientale, Equator, Maniema, Bas-Congo (Nationalist and Integrationist Front, FNI) Date not available Gold South Kivu, Orientale, Katanga Forces Populaires pour la Démocratie au Congolese, Uganda Iron Equator, Katanga Congo (Popular Force for Democracy in Date not available Lead Katanga Congo, FPDC) Manganese Katanga People’s Redemption Army (PRA) Ugandan, Rwanda Pyrochlore North Kivu Date not available Silver Katanga Rassemblement Populaire Rwandaise Rwandan, RPR-Inkeragutabara Tourmaline South Kivu (Popular Rwandese Assembly, RPR) Date not available Uranium Katanga Rassemblement Populaire Rwandaise - Rwandan, RPR Wolframite North and South Kivu Inkeragutabara (RPR- Inkeragutabara) Date not available Zinc Katanga Congres National pour la Défense Rwandan, RPR-Inkeragutabara, (National Congress for Defence, CND) Date not available RPR; RUD Sources: Global Witness, Same old story: a background study on natural resources in the DRC, June 2004; Global Witness, ‘Faced with a gun, what can you do?’ War and Source: compiled by the author from various sources. Note that some of these groups no longer exist. the militarisation of mining in eastern Congo, July 2009.

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In t he e astern DRC, minerals are often mined by unregulated artisans w ho are During their occupation of large parts of the eastern DRC, Rwanda and Uganda susceptible t o exp loitation b y w hoever w ields t he p ower o f t he gun, b e i t created rebel and militia groups to help them exploit the natural resources in the government s oldiers, r ebels o r mi litias. Th e l atter u se m ethods s uch a s dir ect areas under their control. The government of Rwanda reportedly created a special extraction, extortion/confiscation, ‘taxation’ and coercion of the local population ‘Congo D esk’ in t he mini stry o f def ence t hat co ordinated t he exp loitation.61 In to obtain minerals. Uganda, high-ranking government and military officials created companies and proxy rebel groups to carry out exploitation on their behalf.62 The withdrawal of Map 7–2: Natural resources in the eastern DRC these co untries f rom t he D RC did n ot en d t he exp loitation, a s n ew g roups emerged to take their place. Because there are numerous rebel and militia groups operating in the eastern DRC n ow, 63 the activities of only a f ew with regard to the illegal exploitation of natural resources are discussed below.

Collaboration between the DRC government and FDLR and PARECO

As noted above, the FDLR is composed mainly of the Interahamwe and former FAR soldiers w ho f led Rwanda after t he 1994 g enocide. It has b een named t he ‘most powerful and harmful politico-military rebel organisation in Congo’64 and is known f or co mmitting s erious h uman r ights a buses a gainst t he Congolese population and engaging in t he illegal exploitation of natural resources in a reas under its control. The group has changed names a number of times, starting as the Rassemblement Démocratique pour le Rwanda (Rwanda Democratic Rally, RDR), and t hen t he Armée pour la Libération du Rwanda (Army for t he L iberation of Rwanda, ALiR). It changed its name to FDLR in 1999 after the US listed ALiR as a terrorist organisation.65 One o f t he r easons w hy R wanda s ought t o t opple K abila in 1998 wa s hi s putative support to the people who allegedly carried out the Rwanda genocide. By November 1997, a llegations h ad s tarted t o em erge t hat K abila h ad ‘ begun t o negotiate with and to help the Hutu’.66 These allegations proved to be true when the Interahamwe and ex-FAR f ought o n t he side o f K abila w hen wa r b roke o ut in August 1998.67 Following t he w ithdrawal o f f oreign f orces a nd t he es tablishment o f t he transitional g overnment, t he FD LR f lourished in t he K ivu p rovinces, w ith t he ‘tolerance, collaboration and even active complicity of certain FARDC officers’.68 The relationship between the FDLR and FARDC is rooted in t he earlier years of the war when the two groups collaborated against the common enemy of Rwanda Source: Yamba Kantu/Institute for Environmental Security. and its surrogate, RCD-Goma. Through mutual agreement, FARDC and the FDLR

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have operated side by side, granting each other freedom of movement through the Map 7–3: Map of natural resources and conflict areas other’s territory, allowing each other to trade without interference, and FARDC even supplying the FDLR with arms, ammunition and uniforms and referring to their members as ‘our brothers’.69 Both FARDC and the FDLR have engaged in t he exploitation of resources in the areas they control. FARDC was formed from the integration of various rebel force e lements (a mong o thers t he R CD-Goma, ML C a nd Mai-Mai) w ith t he government force then known as the Forces d’Armée Congolais (Congolese Armed Forces, FAC), w hich wa s es tablished a fter L aurent K abila c ame t o p ower. Th e demobilisation of the various rebel and militia groups, such as the CNDP, Mai- Mai, PARECO and PUSIC has resulted in some of their elements being integrated into the FARDC through a process called brassage.70 It is reported that elements of FARDC started exploiting minerals since it was deployed in the eastern Congo in 2006 after the election of Kabila.71 Two of the most lucrative mining sites, namely Bisie min e in W alikale t erritory a nd minin g-rich zo nes in K alehe t erritory, are controlled b y F ARDC.72 In m ost c ases, F ARDC s oldiers min e t he min erals themselves, although they often use the civilian population to do t he digging for them.73 According to reports, elements of FARDC have seized the entire production of Source: Swisspeace. minerals f rom min ers in s ome lo cations, b ut m ore t ypically t hey h ave t aken a share as a form of payment while allowing the miners to keep the rest.74 In many Other activities engaged in by the FDLR and its civilian associates include taxing mines under FARDC control, specific mineshafts or areas are known to belong to markets in K ibua a nd Nyabondo in N orth K ivu a nd in K ahumgwe, Sa nge a nd particular local military officials. The yield from these mineshafts is collected and Kilembwe in S outh K ivu, p roducing a w ide ra nge o f a gricultural g oods (e ven sold by agents acting on behalf of FARDC officials. FARDC soldiers also routinely cannabis), exp loiting t imber in P inga t erritory, p oaching hi ppopotamuses a nd extort minerals and money from civilians at military checkpoints along roads, in elephants for meat and ivory in areas under its control along Lake Albert in Lubero addition to imposing ‘taxes’ on miners. and trade in charcoal produced from wood cut in Virunga National Park.76 The FDLR has diversified its sources of income by taking control of both legal PARECO i s a llied t o t he FD LR a nd t hus b y ext ension co llaborates w ith and i llicit co mmercial ac tivities in a reas i t co ntrols. Thi s hig hly r emunerative FARDC. However, this group is less homogeneous and thus has a less well-defined predatory economic tactic has enabled the rebel movement hierarchy to sink deep political o r e conomic a genda. I t w ould s eem t o b e in volved in minin g in a n opportunistic way rather than as a well-organised strategy. and comfortable roots in the eastern DRC. The FDLR controls cassiterite mines at Lulingu a nd L emera in S outh K ivu a nd at Nyabondo in N orth K ivu, a nd g old Rwanda and the CNDP deposits in K ilembwe in S outh K ivu. I n addi tion, i t s ets u p r oadblocks (f or example, there are six roadblocks along the Shabunda-Bukavu road) to ‘tax’ trade The CNDP was established on 30 D ecember 2006 b y Brigadier-General Laurent passing along roads under its control.75 Nkunda, who had fought with the RPA to oust the Hutu government, which had

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carried out the genocide. He then joined the RCD-Goma faction and by 1998 had routes continues, despite a co mmuniqué issued on 31 M arch 2010 in w hich the become o ne o f i ts m ain o fficers.77 In 2009 h e wa s in dicted b y t he K inshasa lifting of all illegal barriers and taxes was announced.85 government for war crimes and a warrant for his arrest was issued. The CNDP is an armed non-state group although Nkunda has tried to present Uganda–MLC collaboration it as a p olitical tool to clean up C ongolese p olitics.78 The g roup has named t he FDLR as its main enemy and in t his way attracted active Rwandan support.79 In From the above it is clear that Uganda had a hand in the creation of the MLC and fact, t here is e vidence t hat t he Rwandan authorities have b een complicit in t he the mutual relationship was maintained throughout the war. The following two recruitment of soldiers (including children), have facilitated the supply of military examples further illustrate the support Uganda gave to the MLC. First, when the equipment and have sent officers and units from the Forces Rwandaises de Défense Sun City I talks, as part of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, ended inconclusively in (Rwanda Defence Forces, RDF) to the DRC in support of the CNDP.80 The group April 2002 a nd B emba wa s n amed t he t ransition p rime mini ster, P resident relies on the civilian population to dig for minerals and takes a proportion of the Museveni imm ediately co ngratulated him t o s how s upport.86 Second, w hen production.81 It controls coltan mines at Bibatama, a wolframite mine at Bishasha differences cr opped u p b etween W amba a nd hi s lieu tenants, N yamwisi a nd and cassiterite mines throughout North Kivu. It is also involved in mineral trade Tibasiima, the Ugandan authorities brought them to Kampala for peace talks and through extortion and imposition of taxes along roads in Sake, Mushake, Kilolirwe succeeded in b rokering a m erger of the MLC and RCD-ML with B emba as the and Kitchanga, and at border crossings at Bunagana on the Uganda/DRC border, leader o f t he n ew g roup c alled Front d e L ibération d u C ongo (Front f or t he and co llects sig nificant s ums f rom t he c harcoal t rade f rom V irunga N ational Liberation o f C ongo, FL C).87 This co llaboration did n ot l ast, h owever, b ecause Park.82 The CND P c harges t rucks t ransitting K itchanga b etween US$100 a nd Nyamwisi attempted to break away from the alliance to form his own group and US$150 at illegal roadblocks, while pedestrians are charged 500 Congolese francs because clashes erupted between former members of the MLC and RCD-ML over – those who attempt to evade the tax and are caught are charged triple the usual the ext raction o f g old a nd t he h arvesting o f t imber a nd co ffee in Or ientale amount.83 Province when the RCD-ML attempted to challenge the MLC’s monopoly over the In J anuary 2009, t he CND P s plit w hen G eneral B osco N taganda dep osed production and trade in commodities, including diamonds, gold and coffee, in its Nkunda a s i ts le ader a nd a nnounced t he t ransformation o f t he g roup in to a territory.88 political m ovement a nd in tegration o f i ts f ighters w ith F ARDC. Th e c lose relationship between the group and Kigali was clear at a press conference at which INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL RESPONSES Ntaganda appeared in the company of General Kabarebe and other high-ranking TO THE CONFLICT Rwandan o fficials.84 During f ighting in a nd a round G oma in 2009, t he RD F captured Nkunda and placed him un der house arrest in R wanda, where he has Because state and non-state actors have generally coerced civilians to help with the been ever since. illegal exploitation of the DRC’s natural wealth, it has resulted in h uman rights The fighting that erupted in North Kivu in late 2008 and continued into 2009 violations. Th ese a re, in t urn, v iolations o f in ternational a nd r egional h uman between the forces of FARDC and the CNDP has been presented as an attempt by rights in struments s uch a s t he I nternational C ovenant o n Ci vil a nd P olitical FARCD to force the CNDP to demobilise and integrate into the national force. Rights89 and t he A frican C harter o n H uman a nd P eoples’ R ights.90 In t he c ase However, t his f ighting wa s ac tually a n a ttempt b y t he K inshasa g overnment t o concerning a rmed ac tivities o n t he Territory o f C ongo ( DRC v U ganda)91 the assert its authority over the eastern DRC. In fact, the CNDP had created a s tate International C ourt o f J ustice f ound, f or exa mple, t hat U ganda h ad v iolated within a s tate in t he areas it controlled where it exploited natural resources and various p rovisions o f in ternational h umanitarian l aw a nd in ternational h uman ‘exercised military, political and administrative influence’ in Masisi and some parts rights law instruments. 92 The court also found that ‘the actions of various parties of Rutshuru. The arrest of Nkunda has not stopped the CNDP’s de facto control of to t he complex conflict in t he DRC have contributed to t he immense suffering North Kivu and to a lesser extent South Kivu. The above ‘taxation’ on commercial faced by the Congolese population’.93 The human rights violations have included

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deliberate k illing of civilians, rape, lo oting and s ome ac ts of c annibalism.94 The natural r esources i llegally. Th e p rotocol a lso c alls u pon e very m ember s tate t o violations in p articular a nd t he co nflict in g eneral h ave e licited r egional a nd ensure that all acts of illegal exploitation of natural resources are offences under its international responses, which are discussed next. criminal law. Finally, the protocol calls on each member state to impose effective and deterrent sanctions commensurate with the offence of illegal exploitation of Regional responses natural r esources co mmitted, in cluding im prisonment f or in dividual p ersons convicted of such offences. In 2004, un der t he auspices o f t he United Nations a nd t he A frican Union, t he The I CGLR h as dra wn u p a n ac tion p rogramme f or t he di sarmament a nd states of the region established the International Conference on the Great Lakes repatriation o f a ll a rmed g roups in t he e astern D RC.99 The f our iden tified region (I CGLR)95 as a f orum f or r esolving a rmed co nflict, m aintaining p eace, categories of groups are: security and stability, and laying the foundation for post-conflict reconstruction. In December 2006, in N airobi, Kenya, the states concluded the Pact on Security, I Genocidal forces of the FDLR operating from the DRC territory 96 Stability and Development in the Great Lakes region, which, inter alia, provides I The LR A, P eople’s R edemption A rmy, A llied D emocratic F orces a nd t he for t he co nclusion o f t wo p rotocols t hat a re v ery g ermane t o t his di scussion, National Army for the Liberation of Uganda namely the Protocol on Non-aggression and Mutual Defence in t he Great Lakes I Any group or militia that threatens the security and stability of the region, and 97 region (a rticle 5), and t he P rotocol a gainst t he Il legal E xploitation o f N atural I Local defence militias opposed to central authority and armed dissident groups Resources (a rticle 9). 98 The P rotocol o n N on-aggression a nd M utual D efence declares t hat ac ts of a ggression in clude ‘the provision of a ny s upport t o a rmed Little is known about the implementation of this programme. groups … which might carry out hostile acts against a member state’ (article 3(h)), The AU, t hrough i ts Peace a nd S ecurity C ouncil, h as co mmitted i tself t o a while it defines armed groups as ‘any armed group that does not belong to, or is forceful disarmament of the negative forces in t he eastern DRC. At its Libreville not officially incorporated into, the defence and security forces of member states’ meeting in January 2005, it expressed serious concerns over the security situation (article 3(4)). Under the protocol, member states propose several measures to deal in t he e astern D RC, es pecially t he p resence o f a rmed n egative f orces.100 It with t he a rmed g roups in cluding n ot t o g ive a ny h elp, dir ectly o r in directly, accordingly called for the forceful disarmament of the ex-FAR, the Interahamwe actively o r p assively, t o a rmed g roups o perating a gainst a ny m ember s tate; t o and other armed groups. Between February and March 2005, it sent a preliminary apprehend and disarm members of armed groups who use or attempt to use their evaluation team to make recommendations on how the disarmament would b e territories to prepare or mount armed attacks and/or conduct subversive activities carried out. This was followed in April 2005 by a meeting of the AU and military against o ther s tates; t o intercept a nd di sarm m embers o f a rmed g roups f leeing experts f rom B urundi, R wanda a nd U ganda w here co nsensus wa s r eached across t heir co mmon b orders, a nd t o acco rd e ach o ther m utual a ssistance in regarding p olitical a nd mi litary s upport a s w ell a s s ources o f s upplies t o t hese prosecuting armed groups throughout the Great Lakes region (article 8). negative forces. This meeting also discussed the modalities of implementing the The P rotocol a gainst Il legal E xploitation o f N atural R esources a ims a t Peace a nd S ecurity C ouncil de cision r eached a t t he L ibreville m eeting o n promoting a nd s trengthening m echanisms t o p revent, c urb a nd eradic ate t he forcefully disarming the negative forces, including a possible timeline and size and illegal exploitation of natural resources; intensifying and revitalising cooperation mandate of the envisaged African force to undertake the task. among member states to achieve more efficient and sustainable measures against As a r esult of t he f ighting t hat er upted in t he e astern DRC l ate in 2008, a n the i llegal exp loitation o f n atural r esources, a nd p romoting p olicies a nd extraordinary r egional s ummit o f t he I CGLR wa s h eld in K enya, a t w hich t he procedures a gainst t he i llegal exp loitation o f n atural r esources (a rticle 2). Th e former Tanzanian president, B enjamin Mkapa (the co-facilitator of the AU and protocol declares that the illegal exploitation of natural resources is a violation of ICGLR), a nd G eneral O lusegun O basanjo (t he S pecial En voy o f t he S ecretary the rights of member states to permanent sovereignty over their natural resources, General for the Great Lakes region) were tasked with mediating between the DRC and commits member states to end impunity for persons responsible for exploiting government and the CNDP. The mediation efforts in Nairobi and Goma resulted

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in the conclusion of the peace agreement between the government and the CNDP The Council, in R esolution 1807 (2008), ext ended the asset freeze and travel on 23 March 2009. ban t o in dividuals o perating in t he D RC a nd co mmitting s erious v iolations o f The AU’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy and Decision international law involving the targeting of women in situations of armed conflict, recognises that natural resource governance lies a t the nexus of peace, security, including k illing a nd m aiming, s exual v iolence, a bduction a nd f orced stability and sustainable development. In addition, the AU-New Partnership for displacement.106 In addition, it sanctioned individuals obstructing the access to or Africa’s Development (NEPAD) peace and security agenda, which was developed the di stribution o f h umanitarian a ssistance in t he e astern D RC, a s w ell a s in 2003, iden tified t he n eed t o g enerate s tandards f or a pplication in t he individuals o r entities s upporting t he i llegal a rmed g roups in t he e astern D RC exploitation and management of Africa’s natural resources in situations of conflict, through the illicit trade in natural resources.107 While extending the mandate of the 101 as one of the continent’s eight peace and security priorities. As a result, apropos Mission des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo (MONUC), the the DRC, the Policy and Decision, inter alia, called on the DRC government to Group o f E xperts a nd t he Sa nctions C ommittee, t he C ouncil a lso r enewed t he regulate a rtisanal minin g t o im prove l abour co nditions, p revent h uman r ights sanctions listed in various resolutions.108 violations and ensure that artisanal mining contributes to poverty reduction and Sanctions in t he f orm o f t ravel b ans a nd a sset f reezes a s en visaged in, f or 102 sustainable development. example, Resolution 1857 (2008) have been imposed on, among others, four FDLR leaders, n amely C allixte Mb arushimana, S tanislas N zeyimana, P acifique International responses Ntawunguka and Léopold Mujyambere. Although the FDLR military commander, Major-General Sylvestre Mudacumura, was placed on the sanctions list in 2005, United Nations Security Council, MONUC and sanctions this remains an essentially symbolic gesture because, like most of the sanctioned persons, he lives in K ivu province and has no bank account or any possibility of The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) h as declared that the situation in travel.109 the eastern DRC in particular and the DRC in general constitutes a threat to the Although Mission d es N ations Unies en R épublique D émocratique d u C ongo maintenance o f in ternational p eace a nd s ecurity, a nd a s a r esult h as p assed (MONUC) (n ow c alled Mission d e l ’Organisation d es N ations U nies p our l a numerous r esolutions t o de al w ith t he si tuation. I n addi tion, t he C ouncil h as Stabilisation en R épublique Démocratique du Congo [MONUSCO]) is the biggest recognised the linkages between the illegal exploitation of natural resources, illicit UN peacekeeping mission in t he world, with a C hapter VII m andate, it has not trade in such resources and the proliferation of and trafficking in arms as factors fuelling and exacerbating conflicts in the Great Lakes region. Thus, in Resolution lived u p t o exp ectations f or a n umber o f r easons. Fir st, b oth t he C ongolese 1493 (2003), i t imposed an arms embargo on a ll foreign and C ongolese armed government and general population view the force with suspicion as a result of the groups and militias operating in the territories of North and South Kivu and Ituri, history of the UN in t he Congo. According to Prunier, the suspicion stems from, and o n g roups n ot p arties t o t he G lobal a nd A ll I nclusive A greement o n t he among o thers, t he r ole p layed b y t he UN in L umumba’s m urder in t he e arly 110 Transition in t he DRC.103 It followed this by establishing a s anctions committee 1960s. Second, troop numbers are small compared to the area that it is supposed and a g roup of experts to monitor the implementation of the arms embargo in to police. Third, when fighting has broken out between the different militias/rebel Resolution 1533 (2004). 104 In Resolution 1596 (2005), t he UNSC further imposed groups and/or between the militias/rebel groups and FARDC, as happened in 2004 travel restrictions and a freeze on the assets of individuals and entities violating the in Bukavu between Nkunda’s troops and the FDLR, MONUC troops seemed to be arms embargo105 and, in Resolution 1649 (2005), it extended the applicability of the ‘demoralised and rudderless’.111 This is attributed to a lack of skills, resources and travel and financial restrictions to political and military leaders of foreign armed military e quipment s uited to counterinsurgency operations.112 Finally, w hile t he groups o perating in t he D RC a nd C ongolese mi litias r eceiving s upport f rom UNSC h as directed it t o w ork h and in h and w ith FARDC in t he protection of abroad t hat co ntinue t o im pede t he p articipation o f t heir co mbatants in t he civilians a nd in c arrying o ut D DR,113 the co llaboration h as b een f raught w ith disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) processes. difficulties, as FARDC violates human rights, collaborates with rebel/militias (that

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MONUSCO i s s upposed t o dem obilise) a nd en gages in i llegal exp loitation o f The Kimberley Process natural resources and illicit trade in those resources.114 120 UNSC R esolution 1925 (2010) 115 is t he l atest t o c hange t he m andate o f The K imberley P rocess C ertification S cheme f or R ough Di amonds was MONUC a nd a lso r enames M ONUC t he U nited N ations Or ganisation established to find a s olution to the international problem of conflict diamonds Stabilisation M ission in t he D RC (M ONUSCO). I n t he r esolution t he C ouncil that are used to finance armed conflicts and the activities of rebel movements that authorises M ONUSCO t o u se a ll n ecessary m eans t o c arry o ut i ts p rotection aim t o un dermine o r o verthrow leg itimate g overnments. U nder t he s cheme, mandate, in cluding protection of civilians, humanitarian p ersonnel and human conflict diamonds are defined as ‘rough diamonds used by rebel movements or rights def enders un der immin ent t hreat o f p hysical v iolence, a s w ell a s t he their a llies t o f inance co nflict a imed a t un dermining leg itimate g overnments’ protection o f t he UN p ersonnel, faci lities, in stallations a nd e quipment. Th e (section I). Th e K imberley P rocess es tablishes a n in ternational cer tification mission must also support government efforts to fight impunity and ensure the scheme for rough diamonds based on national laws and practices. Each participant protection o f ci vilians a gainst v iolations o f in ternational h uman r ights a nd is, inter a lia, called o n t o es tablish a sys tem o f in ternal co ntrols desig ned t o humanitarian law, including all forms of sexual and gender-based violence. eliminate the presence of conflict diamonds from shipments of rough diamonds During 2008,M ONUC, in co llaboration w ith F ARDC, p lanned a nd b egan imported into and exported from its territory (section IV). implementing a n o peration in N orth a nd S outh K ivu c alled ‘ Kimia’ t hat wa s The DRC is a member of the Kimberley Process and has been involved since intended to increase military pressure on the FDLR. However, the operation was the negotiations stage.121 However, the country has found it difficult to implement called off after the resumption of fighting between FARDC and CNDP in August the K imberley P rocess r equirements b ecause, f irst, t he g overnment do es n ot 2008. I n 2009, M ONUC a nd FARDC l aunched Operation Kimia II against t he control the trade in diamonds from rebel-held areas in the eastern DRC; second, FDLR and other Congolese groups that still resisted integration of their forces into the government itself faces enormous challenges in ending endemic corruption,122 FARDC. I n t he o peration M ONUC p rovided ra tions, f uel s upplies, m edical third, even when the government has deployed its forces in the eastern DRC, they evacuation o f w ounded p ersonnel a nd s upporting a ir a nd a rtillery f ire u pon have en gaged in t he sm uggling o f di amonds j ust li ke t he n umerous r ebel a nd request by FARDC.116 During t he o peration, w hich en ded in D ecember 2009, a militia groups who pervade the region. total o f 1 564 FD LR co mbatants, in cluding 42 c hildren a nd 2 187 dep endants, joined the disarmament, demobilisation, resettlement and reintegration (DDRR) process. The strength of the FDLR is also estimated to have been reduced by half The International Criminal Court due t o t his o peration.117 Since J anuary 2010, F ARDC a nd M ONUSCO h ave The D RC sig ned t he R ome S tatute o n 8 S eptember 2000 a nd dep osited i ts conducted joint planned operations known as ‘Amani Leo’, which targeted FDLR ratification on 11 A pril 2002. I n July 2003, t he Of fice of the Prosecutor started strongholds. W hat t hese o perations h ave s hown i s t hat mi litary p ressure i s essential t o b reak do wn FD LR’s co mmand a nd s upport s tructures, c ut o ff t he investigating cr imes w ithin t he j urisdiction o f t he I CC t hat w ere b eing group’s sources of revenue and encourage a collapse in morale. In all, efforts by the committed in t he Ituri region. In March 2004, t he DRC government decided to FARDC and MONUSCO to demobilise and integrate Congolese armed non-state refer t he D RC si tuation t o t he I CC a nd a sked t he P rosecutor t o ‘ investigate in groups have resulted in the demobilisation of nearly 1 000 combatants during the order to determine if o ne or more persons should be charged with such crimes 123 first quarter of 2010.118 (falling within the jurisdiction of the Court that may have been committed).’ As In m y o pinion, h owever, t he s uggested w ithdrawal o f 2 000 UN mi litary a result of the Prosecutor’s investigations, arrest warrants were issued for Thomas personnel b y 30 J une 2010 ‘ from a reas w here t he si tuation p ermits’ h as s ent a Lubanga, M athieu N gudjolo C hui, G ermaine K atanga a nd B osco N taganda. wrong sig nal in a s fa r a s co nfronting t he m enace o f t he FD LR a nd o ther Lubanga, Chui and Katanga were arrested and transferred to the ICC jurisdiction, rebel/militia g roups i s co ncerned.119 What i s r equired i s f or M ONUSCO t o but N taganda i s s till a t l arge. Th e P rosecutor h as n ow s et hi s sig hts o n K ivu concentrate its forces in the eastern DRC to once-and-for-all deal with and end the provinces, where hopefully new indictments and warrants of arrest will be issued phenomenon of rebel and militia groups in the region. soon.124

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On 28 May 2008, Jean-Pierre Bemba was arrested in Belgium on four counts of others such as the Mai-Mai, continue to sow terror in the eastern DRC. war cr imes and t wo of cr imes against humanity.125 According to t he warrant of In o rder t o s ustain t heir ac tivities, t he r ebel a nd mi litia g roups s tarted arrest issued by the ICC, Bemba and his MLC had intervened in the conflict in the exploiting t he r ich n atural r esources in t he a reas t hey c ame t o co ntrol. Thi s CAR in 2002–2003 a nd ‘pursued a p lan of terrorising and brutalising innocent practice of exploiting the DRC’s natural resources to support the war effort was civilians, in p articular d uring a c ampaign o f m ass ra pes a nd lo oting’.126 It i s started by the AFDL, when Kabila began signing mining concessions with private unfortunate that the ICC has indicted Bemba as a result of its investigations into investors from all over the world to finance the war against Mobutu even before he events in the CAR and not on any crimes he may have committed during the long came to p ower. Thus Kabila s et a p recedent t hat wa s subsequently followed by war in t he DRC. Also, there are no charges relating to the plunder of Congolese numerous rebel and militia groups in the DRC. natural r esources, w hich t he ML C c arried o ut d uring i ts o ccupation o f l arge The question remains, what should be done about the various rebel and militia swathes of territory in Orientale and Equator provinces. groups that continue to exploit the fluid situation to perpetuate their existence? The failure to indict Bemba on crimes he may have committed during the DRC My recommendation is that the strategy to defeat these groups should be based on war has not gone unnoticed and the ICC has been criticised for allowing the rebel short- and long-term timelines. In the short term, the capacity of the MONUSCO leader to ‘get away too lightly’, particularly in view of the prosecution of Thomas and FARDC f orces s hould b e im proved t o en able t hem t o def eat t hese g roups Lubanga w ith cr imes r elating t o r ecruitment o f c hildren.127 This s eeming militarily. Experience has shown that military pressure could lead to the demise of contradiction highlights the problem the ICC has experienced in t he DRC, as in these rebel and militia groups in the eastern DRC. The military operations against other countries, of not having the capacity to arrest the people for whom arrest the FDLR (Operation Kimia II and Operation Amani Leo), for example, resulted in warrants have been issued. The LRA’s Joseph Kony and his top commanders, for the rebel elements abandoning their bases, pulling out of their positions in villages whom warrants were i ssued in 2005, a re still at l arge, w hile t hat i ssued against and losing access to markets, communication routes and some mining areas. Thus, Sudanese President Omar el-Bashir is unlikely to be executed as long as he remains as the results of these operations exemplify, military operations against the rebel in power. This clearly shows that the ICC will face great difficulty in dealing with and militia groups should be intensified and sustained. the numerous rebel and militia groups in the eastern DRC. It may indict rebel and In the long run, however, there is a need to rebuild the state institutions of the militia leaders (for example Ntaganda), but it will be next-to-impossible to take the DRC s o t hat t hey b ecome c apable o f m aintaining l aw a nd o rder. A ny f oreign indicted persons into custody without the support of the relevant state. intervention is simply a temporary measure that does not address the basic causes of the conflict and so cannot redress the situation on a permanent basis. The rebel CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS and mi litia g roups h ave b een f ishing in t roubled wa ters sim ply b ecause t he Congolese state is not strong in the east. In this regard, Reyntjens has, for example, The co untries ini tially in volved in t he D RC co nflict, p articularly U ganda a nd observed that in the eastern DRC, possession of a gun i s a sufficient excuse128 for Rwanda, had hoped to find Laurent Kabila and the AFDL a useful cover for their the imposition of ‘taxes’ by the rebels and militias. Security sector reforms are thus strategic objective of creating a buffer economic and political security zone in the needed t o b uild t he c apacity o f t he C ongolese N ational P olice a nd FARDC t o eastern C ongo. H owever, K abila di sappointed t hem b y fa iling t o s erve t heir ensure the maintenance of law and order. interests. As a result, the two countries started a policy of creating and supporting Furthermore, the countries of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC need to rebel g roups t o un seat t he K inshasa g overnment. Th e g roups s ubsequently normalise t heir r elations s o t hat t hey s top s upporting a nd co unter-supporting disintegrated in to s plinter g roups a nd w ere n ot h elpful a t a ll a s t hey s tarted rebel and militia groups in each other’s territories. From the above, it is clear that fighting among themselves and also gave raise to new movements that sprung up the majority of the rebel and militia groups in t he eastern DRC have links with to challenge the foreign-created groups. This happened all over the eastern DRC. other states in t he region. The establishment of regional frameworks such as the Although some of the rebel and militia groups, such as RCD-Goma, RCD-ML and ICGLR a nd its va rious p rotocols on n onaggression a nd combating illegal RCD-Nationale, ce ased t o exi st w hen t hey j oined t he t ransitional g overnment, exploitation o f n atural r esources o f t he r egion w ill g o a lo ng wa y t owards

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promoting peace and security in the Great Lakes region and the elimination of the 18 Howard A delman a nd G ovind C R ao, Th e Z airian wa r a nd r efugee cr isis, 1996–1997: negative rebel and militia group elements. The normalisation of relations among creating a culture of conflict prevention, in Howard Adelman and Govind C Rao (eds), War and p eace i n Z aire/Congo: a nalysing a nd e valuating i ntervention – 1996–1997, T renton: the states of the region will eliminate suspicion(s) and promote cooperation and Africa World Press, 2004, 1–29, 4. joint ac tion t o e liminate t hese g roups a nd p romote p eace. Thi s i s in deed w hat 19 It wa s co mposed o f f our g roups, n amely t he Parti de la R évolution P opulaire (People’s happened in t he case of the joint action taken by the DRC and Rwanda, which Revolutionary Party, PRP), which was founded in 1968 by Laurent Kabila; Conseil National resulted in t he a rrest o f N kunda a nd t he in tegration o f m ost o f hi s f orce in to de Résistance pour la Démocratie (National Resistance Council for Democracy, CNRD), led FARDC. Clearly, collaboration among the states of the region would be a powerful by Andre Kisasu Ngandu with a Lumumbist association; Mouvement Révolutionnaire pour la weapon for eliminating once-and-for-all the various rebel and militia groups that Libération du Zaïre (Revolutionary Movement for the Liberation of Z aire, MRLZ), le d by Masasu N indanga; a nd Alliance D émocratique d es Peuples (Democratic Peoples’ A lliance, continue to sow unrest in the eastern DRC. ADP), le d b y D eogratias B ugera w ith C ongolese Tutsi a ssociates. K abila wa s n amed t he spokesperson of the group, Bugera secretary-general and Ngandu army commander. Ngandu NOTES was assassinated in January 1997. 20 J-P C hrétien, The G reat L akes o f A frica: tw o t housand y ears o f h istory, N ew York: Z one 1 The D emocratic R epublic o f C ongo h as c hanged n ames a n umber o f t imes sin ce 1885: Books, 2003, 344. Congo F ree S tate (1885–1908); B elgian C ongo (1908–1960); R epublic o f t he C ongo – 21 G N zongola-Ntalaja, Th e r ole o f in tellectual in t he s truggle f or dem ocracy, p eace a nd Léopoldville (1960–1964); D emocratic Republic of the Congo – L éopoldville (1964–1966); reconstruction in Africa, Africa Journal of Political Science 2(2) (1997), 1–14, 2. Democratic Republic of the Congo – Kinshasa (1966–1971); Republic of Zaire (1971–1997); 22 Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo from Léopold to Kabila, 224. and, since 1997, the Democratic Republic of Congo. Throughout this chapter I use the latter 23 International Cr isis G roup (I CG), D emocratic R epublic o f C ongo: a n a nalysis o f t he name. agreement and prospects for peace, Africa Report 5, Brussels, 20 August 1999, 1. 2 G N zongola-Ntalaja, The C ongo f rom L éopold t o K abila: a p eople’s h istory, L ondon: Z ed 24 M Ward, Rebels and militias in resource conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo Books, 2002, 235. (DRC), Mimeograph, on file with author, 2010. 3 F Reyntjens, The privatisation and criminalisation of public space in t he geopolitics of the 25 Ibid. Great Lakes region, The Journal of Modern African Studies 43(4) (2005), 598–607, 588. 26 Apropos Uganda, the government of Kabila and that of Museveni signed a memorandum of 4 Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo from Léopold to Kabila, 1. understanding for the Uganda army (in effect comprising the Uganda Peoples Defence Force 5 K C D unn, Imagining the Congo: the international relations of identity, New York: Palgrave and the Congolese Armed Forces) to conduct joint operations against Ugandan rebel groups Macmillan, 2003, 22. operating in the DRC. In fact, at the start of the in August 1998, Ugandan 6 Ibid. soldiers were stationed on the DRC side of the slopes of Mount Rwenzori. 7 H W F rench, A continent for the taking: the tragedy and hope of Africa, New York: Vintage 27 Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo from Léopold to Kabila, 227. Books, 2005, 52. 28 G P runier, From gen ocide t o c ontinental w ar: t he ‘ Congolese’ c onflict a nd t he cr isis o f 8 Dunn, Imagining the Congo, 22. contemporary Africa, London: Hurst, 2009, 137. 9 Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo from Léopold to Kabila, 26. 10 R Anstey, King Léopold’s legacy: the Congo under Belgian rule, 1908–1960, London: Oxford 29 Global Witness, Same old story: a b ackground study on natural resources in the DRC, June University Press for Institute of Race Relations, 1966, 261. 2004, 5, h ttp://www.globalwitness.org/media_library_detail.php/118/en/same_old_story 11 Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo from Léopold to Kabila, 52. (accessed 30 July 2010). 12 Dunn, Imagining the Congo, 62. 30 Ibid, 6. 13 R Dowden, Africa: Altered states, ordinary miracles, London: Portobello Books, 2008, 366. 31 A Hochschild, King Léopold’s ghost: a story of greed, terror and heroism in colonial Africa, 14 Dunn, Imagining the Congo, 63. London: Macmillan, 1998, 165. 15 Ibid. 32 Ibid, 164. 16 M van Leeuwen, Imagining the Great Lakes region: discourses and practices of civil society 33 Global Witness, Same old story, 6. regional approaches for peace-building in Rwanda, Burundi and DR Congo, The Journal of 34 R L emarchand, Political a wakening i n t he B elgian C ongo, L os A ngeles: U niversity o f Modern African Studies 46(3) (2008), 393–425, 401. California Press, 1964, 234. 17 French, A c ontinent f or t he t aking, 54; M M cNulty, Th e co llapse o f Z aïre: im plosion, 35 For a f ull di scussion on t his s ee G N zongola-Ntalaja, The C ongo f rom L éopold to Kabila, revolution o r ext ernal a ggression? The J ournal o f M odern A frican S tudies 37(1) (1999), 128–131. 53–82, 59. 36 For a full discussion see ibid, 121–135.

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37 Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo from Léopold to Kabila, 135. on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the DRC, 38 Ibid, 147; Global Witness, Same old story, 8. Final report (S/2002/1146), 16 October 2002. 39 Global Witness, Same old story, 8. 62 Ibid. 40 K Vlassenroot and Hans Romkema, The emergence of a n ew order? Resources and war in 63 With t he establishment of t he t ransitional government in 2003, m any of t he g roups t hen eastern Congo, http://www.jha.ac/articles/a111.htm (accessed 11 June 2010). operating in the eastern DRC became part of the government. I concentrate on the current 41 International Crisis Group (ICG), Congo crisis: military intervention in Ituri, Africa Report groups as they are the main focus of this chapter. 64, Nairobi, 13 June 2003, 4. 64 ICG, Congo: a comprehensive strategy to disarm the FDLR, 1. 42 Peace agreement between the government and the CNDP, Goma, 23 March 2009. 65 Ibid, 2. 43 Ward, Rebels and militias in resource conflict. 66 ICG, Democratic Republic of Congo, 19. 44 K P A puuli, Th e im plications o f t he a rrest o f J ean-Pierre B emba b y t he I nternational 67 See for example Prunier, From genocide to continental war, 206, w ho notes that in K indu, Criminal Court, East African Journal of Peace and Human Rights 14(2) (2008), 247–265, 249. many of the 5 000-strong Congolese garrison was actually made up of Rwandese ex-FAR and 45 R Herbert, De facto partition in t he Congo, South African Yearbook of International Affairs Interahamwe, who w ere f iercely lo yal b ecause t hey co uld s ee n o h ope f or t heir si tuation 2000/1, Pretoria: GCIS, 2000, 277–283, 280. unless Kabila won. 46 Prunier, From gen ocide t o c ontinental w ar, 205; A puuli, Th e implications o f t he a rrest o f 68 ICG, Congo: a comprehensive strategy to disarm the FDLR, 24. Jean-Pierre Bemba, 250. 69 Global Witness, Faced with a gun, what can you do?, 43. 47 Apuuli, The implications of the arrest of Jean-Pierre Bemba, 250. 70 A p rocess t hrough w hich p reviously h ostile a rmed g roups a re in tegrated a nd t rained t o 48 K P Apuuli, The politics of conflict resolution in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): become part of a unified national army. the Inter-Congolese Di alogue process, African Journal on C onflict R esolution 4(1) (2004), 71 Global Witness, Faced with a gun, what can you do?, 26. 65–84, 75. 72 UN Group of Experts on the DRC re-established pursuant to Resolution 1857, Final report 49 Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources (S/2008/773), 2008, 36; Global Witness, Faced with a gun, what can you do?, 27. and Other Forms of Wealth in the DRC, Final report (S/2003/1027), 2002, 36, 71. 73 Global Witness, Faced with a gun, what can you do?, 26. 50 International Cr isis G roup (I CG), Congo a t w ar: a b riefing o n t he i nternal a nd ext ernal 74 Ibid, 27. players in the Central African conflict, Report 2, Brussels, 17 November 1998, 4. 75 UN Group of Experts on the DRC, Final report, 13 February 2008. 51 Ibid. 76 Ibid, 11. 52 UN Group of Experts on the DRC, Final report (S/2008/43), 13 February 2008. 77 Prunier, From genocide to continental war, 322. 53 K P A puuli, Th e I CC a rrest wa rrants f or t he L ord’s R esistance A rmy le aders a nd p eace 78 Ibid, 323. prospects for northern Uganda, Journal of International Criminal Justice 4(3), 2006, 179–187, 79 ICG, Congo: a comprehensive strategy to disarm the FDLR, 2. 186. 80 UN Group of Experts on the DRC, Final report (S/2008/773), 12 December 2008, 15. 54 UN Group of Experts on the DRC, Interim report, 29 April 2010, 6. (C onfidential – on file 81 Global Witness, ‘Faced with a gun, what can you do?’, 48. with author.) 82 Ibid, 49; UN Group of Experts on the DRC, Interim report, 7. 55 Global Witness, Faced with a g un, what can you do? War and the militarisation of mining 83 UN Group of Experts on the DRC, Interim report, 7. in eastern Congo, July 2009, 4, h ttp://www.globalwitness.org/media_library_detail.php/786/ 84 ICG, Congo: a comprehensive strategy to disarm the FDLR, 4. en/global_ witness_report_faced_with_a_gun_what_can_yo (accessed 15 May 2010). 85 UN Group of Experts on the DRC, Interim report, 7. 56 International Cr isis G roup (I CG), Congo: a c omprehensive s trategy t o d isarm t he FD LR, 86 Apuuli, The politics of conflict resolution in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 76. Africa Report 151, Nairobi/Brussels, 9 July 2009, 17. 87 Apuuli, The implications of the arrest of Jean-Pierre Bemba, 251. 57 UN Group of Experts on the DRC, Interim report, 7. 88 Global Witness, Same old story, 13, 18. 58 Global Witness, Same old story, 4. 89 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G res 2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR Supp 59 Ibid, 6. (No 16) a t 52, UN D oc A/6316 (1966); 99 UNT S 171; 6 ILM 368 (1967), ado pted on 16 60 For an overview of the locations of these resources, see Global Witness, Same old story. December 1966 and entered into force on 23 March 1976, http://www.umn.edu/humanrts/ 61 M Meredith, The state of Africa: a history of fifty years of independence, London: Free Press, insfree/b3ccpr.htm (accessed 20 J uly 2010). S ee especially article 6(1): E very human being 2005, 540. S ee a lso UN S ecurity C ouncil, Panel o f E xperts o n t he Il legal E xploitation o f has a right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of Natural Resources and O ther Forms of Wealth of t he DRC, Report (S/2000/796), 31 J uly his life; Article 7: N o one shall be subjected to torture, or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 2000, paragraph 126; UN S ecurity Council, Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of treatment or punishment ... Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the DRC, UN Security Council, Addendum 90 Organisation o f A frican U nity, A frican C harter o n H uman a nd P eoples’ R ights (B anjul to the report (S/2001/1072), 13 November 2001; and UN Security Council, Panel of Experts Charter), OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/3 rev 5, 21 ILM 58 (1982), ado pted on 27 June 1981 and

214 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 215 REBELS AND MILITIAS IN RESOURCE CONFLICT IN THE EASTERN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO PHILLIP KASAIJA

entered in to f orce o n 21 O ctober 1986, h ttp://www.hrcr.org/docs/Banjul/afrhr.html, 103 United N ations S ecurity C ouncil (UNSC), R esolution 1493 (S/RES/1493 [2003]), 28 J uly (accessed 19 July 2010). See especially article 4: Human beings are inviolable. Every human 2003, paragraph 20. being shall be entitled to respect for his life and the integrity of his person. No one may be 104 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Resolution 1533 (S/RES/1533 [2004]), 12 M arch arbitrarily deprived of this life; article 5: Every individual shall have the right to the respect 2004, paragraph 10. of the dignity inherent in a human being and to the recognition of his legal status. All forms 105 United N ations S ecurity C ouncil (UNSC), R esolution 1596 (S/RES/1596 [2005]), 3 M ay of exp loitation a nd deg radation o f m an, p articularly s lavery, s lave t rade, t orture, cr uel, 2005, paragraphs 13 and 15. inhuman o r deg rading p unishment a nd t reatment, s hall b e p rohibited; a rticle 21 (1): A ll 106 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Resolution 1807 (S/RES/1807 [2008]), 31 M arch people shall be free to dispose of their wealth and natural resources ... 2008, paragraph 13. 91 International Court of Justice (ICJ), Case concerning armed activities on the territory of the 107 United N ations S ecurity C ouncil (UNSC), R esolution 1857 (S/RES/1857 [2008]), 22 Congo ( Democratic R epublic o f t he C ongo v U ganda), J udgment o f 19 D ecember 2005, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/116/10455.pdf (accessed 19 July 2010). December 2008, paragraph 4. 92 Ibid, paragraph 219. 108 See United Nations Security Council (UNSC), R esolutions 1698 (2006); 1771 (2007); 1799 93 Ibid, paragraph 221. (2008); 1856 (2008) and 1896 (2009). 94 Apuuli, The implications of the arrest of Jean-Pierre Bemba, 258. 109 ICG, Congo: a comprehensive strategy to disarm the FDLR, 10. 95 The member states are Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, the 110 Prunier, From genocide to continental war, 246. DRC, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Sudan, Uganda and Zambia. 111 Ibid, 298. 96 International Conference on the Great Lakes region (ICGLR), Pact on Peace, Stability and 112 ICG, Congo: a comprehensive strategy to disarm the FDLR, 25. Development in t he G reat L akes region, adopted on 15 D ecember 2006 b y t he Heads of 113 UNSC, Resolution 1856 (S/RES/1856 [2008[), 22 D ecember 2008. The resolution mandates State a nd G overnment o f t he I CGLR a nd en tered in to f orce o n 21 J une 2008, MONUC to use its monitoring and inspection capacities to curtail the provision of support http://www.icglr.org/icglr-pacte.php (accessed 19 July 2010). to i llegal a rmed g roups t hat der ive in come f rom t he i llicit t rade in n atural r esources. 97 International Conference on the Great Lakes region (ICGLR), Protocol on Non-Aggression However, the resolution does not cover FARDC. and Mutual Defence in the Great Lakes region, Adopted at the second summit of the ICGLR 114 See, generally, Global Witness, Faced with a gun, what can you do? on 30 November 2006, http://www.icglr.org/key-documents/peace-security/Protocol%20on 115 UNSC, Resolution 1925 (S/RES/1925 [2010]), 28 May 2010. %20Non-aggression%20and%20Mutual%20Defence%20in%20the%20Great%20Lakes%20 116 ICG, Congo: a comprehensive strategy to disarm the FDLR, 10. Region.pdf (accessed 19 July 2010). 98 International C onference on the Great L akes region (ICGLR), Protocol against the Illegal 117 UN Group of Experts on the DRC, Interim report. Exploitation o f N atural R esources, ado pted a t t he s econd s ummit o f t he I CGLR o n 30 118 Ibid, 6. November 2006, h ttp://www.icglr.org/key-documents/democracy-good-gov/Protocol%20 119 Ibid. against%20the%20Illegal%20Exploitation%20of%20Natural%20Resources.pdf (acces sed 19 120 Kimberley P rocess C ertification S cheme f or R ough Di amonds, ado pted a t a mini sterial July 2010). meeting in Interlaken on 5 November 2002, http://www.kimberleyprocess.com (accessed 19 99 International C onference o n t he G reat L akes r egion (I CGLR), R egional P rogramme o f July 2010). Action f or P eace a nd S ecurity: Di sarmament a nd R epatriation o f a ll A rmed G roups in 121 Global Witness, Same old story, 28. Eastern D RC, 21 S eptember 2006, h ttp://www.icglr.org/key-documents/peace-security/ 122 Ibid. Regional%20Programme%20of%20Action%20for%20Peace%20and%20Security.pdf 123 ICC, Prosecutor receives referral of t he situation in t he DRC, The Hague, 19 A pril 2004, (accessed 19 July 2010). (ICC-OTP-20040419-50-En), h ttp://www.icc-cpi.int/pressreleasedetails&id=19&1=en.html 100 African Union, 23rd meeting of the Peace and Security Council, Libreville, 10 January 2005 (accessed 15 May 2010). (PSC/AHG/COMM [XXIII]). 124 Ward, Rebels and militias in resource conflict. 101 Priority 7 s tates: ‘Generating minim um s tandards f or a pplication in t he exp loitation a nd 125 Apuuli, The implications of the arrest of Jean-Pierre Bemba, 248. management of Africa’s resources (including non-renewable resources) in areas affected by conflict.’ 126 Ibid. 102 Pax A frica, F rom t he g round u p: n atural r esource g overnance f or r econstruction a nd 127 Ward, Rebels and militias in resource conflict. sustainable de velopment, P aper p resented a t t he A U S takeholders’ W orkshop o n 128 Reyntjens, The privatisation and criminalisation of public space, 597. Implementation o f t he AU P olicy o n P ost-Conflict R econstruction a nd D evelopment in Africa, Lusaka, Zambia, 17–19 July 2007.

216 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 217 CHAPTER 8 Militias, pirates and oil in the Niger Delta

Ibaba Samuel Ibaba and Augustine Ikelegbe

INTRODUCTION

Although t he N iger D elta p roduces t he b ulk o f N igeria’s oil a nd ga s w ealth, i t remains o ne o f t he le ast-developed p arts o f t he co untry. Thi s p aradox h as triggered a conflict that has lingered on for five decades. This conflict has recently been m anifested t hrough huge mi litarisation o f t he r egion, mi litia in surgency, hostilities between youth militias and the Nigerian military, militia attacks on the oil industry and consequent huge disruptions, the theft of oil by syndicates, and militias and intra- and inter-ethnic, community and militia conflicts. Since the late 1990s, militia groups such as the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), Movement f or t he E mancipation o f t he N iger D elta (MEND), a nd Niger D elta People’s S alvation F ront (NDPSF) h ave b een co nducting h ostilities a gainst t he military and transnational oil companies. Fundamentally, grievances against de velopment neglect, a lienation f rom t he nation’s oil wealth, and oil-based environmental degradation are at the root of this militancy,1 but greed and the resultant commercialisation of violence have led to what Ik elegbe2 calls ‘ deviant in surgent mi litias’. Specifically, t he em ergence o f diverse mi litia ac tivities (un derpinned b y o pportunism a nd cr ime w hich disconnect such ac tivities f rom t he insurgency) has resulted in t he branding of militias as criminals. More co nfusing a re in terconnections among mi litias,

MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 219 MILITIAS, PIRATES AND OIL IN THE NIGER DELTA Ibaba Samuel Ibaba and Augustine Ikelegbe

pirates, cults, oil theft syndicates, syndicates that kidnap for ransom, armed gangs, from t he s ocioeconomic a nd p olitical m arginalisation o f t he min ority et hnic thugs and bouncers. The interconnections denote a confused agenda and activities groups in the Niger Delta by the major ethnic groups in Nigeria are seen to be the that tend towards self-destruction. In addition, there is an increasing presence of fundamental causes of the conflict,4 looting of oil wealth for selfish purposes is militias in p olitics a nd t hey a re em erging a s ps eudo-governments in r ural now seen to be driving and sustaining the conflict.5 However, according to Ukiwo, communities. greed is held out as the main cause only because it exonerates the Nigerian state These matters, among others, raise pertinent questions: from c ulpability in t he n eglect, un derdevelopment a nd m arginalisation o f t he region.6 I What i s t he n ature a nd es sence o f mi litia g roups in t he N iger D elta? Greed, corruption and grievance appear to be interconnected, and Billon has I Can militias be separated from pirates? highlighted t hree p oints o f co ntact.7 First, co rruption c an in crease g rievance. I What are the critical factors and conditions that sustain militia groups? Second, co rruption in g overnance in duces g reed t hat m otivates m arginalised I What are the roles of state and non-state actors in t he emergence of militia political and military groups to act for change. Thus marginalised groups could groups? seek political power for personal aggrandisement. Third, political institutions such I What is the impact of militia activities on the national economy and security? as conflict resolution mechanisms are usually undermined by political corruption. I How have the state and transnational oil companies responded to the conflict? Thus, though Collier and Hoeffler’s ‘greed’ thesis may not aptly capture the Niger In this chapter, we attempt to answer these questions and give a systematic analysis Delta co ndition, n eglecting i t co uld r ob u s o f a c learer un derstanding o f t he of the phenomenon of militias and pirates in the Niger Delta. conflicts in the region.8 The chapter begins with an introduction that raises questions to be addressed. In the context of the ‘grievance versus greed’ thesis, two broad categories of It then reviews the literature on resources and conflict, particularly how the ‘greed actors are involved in t he conflict – t hose driven or motivated by grievance and and grievance’ thesis applies to the Niger Delta; maps the violence and crises in the those motivated by greed. But if we agree that corruption is a product of greed, and region and the activities and engagements of the militias with the Nigerian state that it induces marginalisation and inequality, we may conclude that greed also can and the transnational oil companies, and examines the factors and developments be a source of grievance. that un derlie t he em ergence o f t he mi litia p henomenon. Th e c hapter a lso It is true that oil wealth has been transferred out of the Niger Delta for the examines the diverse actors that are engaged in the conflict other than the militias, benefit of the ethnic majorities that control the Nigerian state. But how much of how t he mi litias in terface w ith p olitics a nd g overnance, t he im pact o f mi litia this wealth has benefited the ordinary citizens of the majority ethnic groups? Is the activities, mi litia a nd mi litary en gagements, a nd t he v iolent co nflicts o n t he scenario different in the Niger Delta where the leadership lives in affluence while economy and human security. Furthermore, it interrogates the responses of the the vast majority of the citizens live in abject and deepening poverty? It is evident Nigerian s tate, t he t ransnational o il co mpanies, r egional o rganisations a nd t he therefore t hat t he et hnic a nd r egional p olitics o f h egemony, ex clusion a nd international co mmunity to t he co nflict. The c hapter co ncludes with the prebendalism that underpin the grievances in the Niger Delta are a product of the examination o f c urrent ef forts a imed at r esolving t he co nflict a nd ra ises i ssues greed of the ruling class. needing further consideration. In the Niger Delta, the political leaders who champion the ‘grievance’ thesis Resources and conflict: the dilemma between have also often embezzled development funds through misuse of public offices. greed and grievance Following the implementation of the 13 p er cent derivation funds in 2000, h uge revenues have flowed into the Niger Delta. In comparison, the region has received The current literature locates the causes of violence in the Niger Delta in the ‘greed far more revenue than the other geopolitical zones, but this has had little impact and grievance’ perspectives of Collier and Hoeffler.3 Although grievances resulting on t he ci tizens. F or exa mple, t he six N iger D elta s tates w ere a llocated a bout

220 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 221 MILITIAS, PIRATES AND OIL IN THE NIGER DELTA Ibaba Samuel Ibaba and Augustine Ikelegbe

US$4 billion out of US$11 billion meant for the 36 states of the federation from the resource rents, and the peaceful settlement of grievances … Viable social contract federation account in 2007.9 can be sufficient to restrain, if not eliminate, opportunistic behaviour such as large- Because of corruption a nd p oor p lanning, only a sm all proportion of t hese scale theft of resource rents, and the violent expression of grievance.12 funds trickled down to the masses. Thus there has been little improvement in the standard o f li ving. Th e U nited N ations D evelopment P rogramme (UND P) Murshed and Tadjoeddin further mention inequitable distribution of resources, reported in 2006 that people still suffer extreme deprivation despite the huge flow unstable polity and declining economic growth as capable of weakening the social of o il r evenue in to t he r egion.10 It n otes, f or exa mple, t hat o ne p rimary h ealth contract.13 Clearly, this perspective provides a u seful explanation for the conflicts facility serves 43 s ettlements, or a t otal of 9 805 p eople, in a n area of 44 s quare in the Niger Delta. The issues of the national question and dissatisfaction with the kilometres. Similarly, only 20–24 p er cent of the population have access to clean country’s admini strative a nd p olitical s tructure a nd mi sgovernance a re o ther water. Awareness o f t he lo oting o f de velopment f unds b y p olitical le aders a nd factors t hat a re c learly in dicated.14 The n ature a nd c haracter o f t he s tate a nd public o fficials h as a lso b ecome a s ource o f g rievance. Th e r esulting corporate resource governance have been so inequitable and unfair that violent disillusionment over corruption and failed access to development and resources appropriation of resources has become the norm. Corruption and misgovernance have fuelled class, ethnic and social tensions that turn violent as each group lays have er oded co nfidence in t he s tate a nd t ransnational o il co mpanies. E lectoral claim to a fair share of the oil wealth.11 fraud has diminished the essence of the social contract and the general population Explaining t he conflicts f rom t he p erspectives of g reed or g rievance w ill b e has lost faith in governmental institutions at the three tiers of governance (federal, more meaningful when located in the context of the conflict system. For example, state a nd lo cal). F rustration w ith t he fa ilure o f g overnance exp lains t o a l arge whereas the ‘grievance’ thesis may reasonably capture the essence of the agitations extent the diverse forms and dimensions of violent conflicts that plague the region. against the Nigerian state, it does not adequately explain intra- and inter-ethnic, But apart from the issues of resource management and governance, there has been community, militia/cult and related conflicts. a breakdown of society’s social fabric. Social disorganisation has led to the collapse It is noteworthy that access to resources has been a s ource of grievance that of societal control and traditional norms, and has resulted in de viant behaviour underlies in ter- a nd in tra-community a nd in ter-ethnic co nflicts in t he N iger and crime.15 Delta. F urther, y ouths have o verthrown co mmunity leadership structures primarily a s p art o f a s truggle f or acces s t o co mmunity a nd t ransnational o il Violence and crisis in the Niger Delta company r esources. On t he o ther h and, i t i s p ossible t hat in c ases w here t he political leadership supports youth movements, it is to further their ambition to The conflict has taken several turns and dimensions that have to be presented for embezzle state funds. Therefore, the struggle for resources born from a g enuine a clearer appreciation of the violence. need f or de velopment a nd co mpensation f or r esources o n t he o ne h and a nd opportunistic desires and greed for accumulation on the other is at the centre of Mapping the Niger Delta conflict: from agitation to resistance the conflicts. Murshed and Tadjoeddin a lso draw attention to t he fac t t hat t he g reed and The neglect, marginalisation and underdevelopment that generated activism and grievance variables are not sufficient to explain the outbreak of violence and point fomented unrest in t he Niger D elta b egan during t he colonial administration.16 out that the weakening of the social contract underlies conflict: Indeed, the recent events defined by oil politics constitute merely the tipping point in a co nflict dating back to the colonial era. Th us, conflicts in t he Delta can be … e ven if r ents f rom c apturable resources do co nstitute a size able prize, v iolent categorised a s p re- a nd p ost-oil co nflicts, w ith dif ferent s trands o f en gagement conflict is unlikely to take hold if a country has a framework of widely agreed rules, characterising the post-oil conflicts. both f ormal a nd inf ormal, t hat g overns t he a llocation o f r esources, in cluding The conflict can be mapped by means of the six phases in table 8–1.

222 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 223 MILITIAS, PIRATES AND OIL IN THE NIGER DELTA Ibaba Samuel Ibaba and Augustine Ikelegbe

Table 8–1: Trend of conflics in the Niger Delta I There was a loss of faith in the government and its institutions as well as in the oil companies. This resulted in the mobilisation of the people, particularly the Phase Period Agitation youth and civil society, against the state and oil companies17 1 1950–1965 I Civil agitation for special developmental attention because of I State repression and excessive use of force turned peaceful civil disturbances unique ecological difficulties and for separate regions because of marginalisation by ethnic majority groups into v iolent en gagements, a s y outh a nd mi litant ac tivists ado pted a rmed confrontation both as a defence mechanism and as an effective instrument in 2 23 February I Militant insurgent engagement by Adaka Boro and the Niger Delta 18 to 6 March Volunteer Service (NDVS) the pursuit of their goals 1966 I Separation or autonomy as the goal of engagement 3 1970–1982 I Agitations by host communities against transnational oil Militias, pirates and cults in the Niger Delta companies I Demands for basic social infrastructure and amenities, and payment 19 of compensation for damages to land and property The insurgency in t he Delta involves a w elter of different groups – civil society organisations, mi litias a nd cults. M emberships a nd roles o verlap because 4 1983–1990 I Conflict between host communities and transnational oil companies over payment of adequate compensation for damages individuals and groups who identify themselves as, for example, militias may also to land, water and property, and for development projects be members of cult groups and be engaged in p iracy. Radical ethnic, pan-ethnic I Litigation and peaceful obstructions and protests as the instruments of engagement and youth-based civil society organisations have been so militant that they have been erroneously listed as militias. 5 1990–1996 I Emergence of civil, community, ethnic and regional groups in response to state and transnational oil companies’ insensitivity and Civil society groups in the Niger Delta include the Ijaw National Congress, the repression Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, the Egbema National Congress and I Peaceful demonstrations by host communities and occupation of the Isoko Community Oil Producing Forum. Cult groups include the Greenlanders, oil production facilities, demanding adequate compensation for damages and development attention Deegbam, Bush B oys, B lack Braziers, Icelanders, Vikings, Vultures, G ermans and

6 1997–2009 I Militant and militia actions against transnational oil companies Mafia Lords. Militia groups include the NDPVF, MEND, NDPSF, the Niger Delta 20 I Demand for resource ownership and control by civil, political and Militant Force Squad (NDMFS), and the Egbesu Boys of Africa. Whereas the civil militia groups society and militia groups are pan-ethnic and are therefore found in a ll states of I Violent confrontations and low-intensity war between militia groups and the military the Niger Delta, the cult groups are based in particular localities. For example, the Deegbam is based in Port Harcourt in Rivers State. It is noteworthy, however, that Sources: compiled from L Owugah, Local resistance and the state, Paper presented at the Oil Watch African General Assembly, Port Harcourt, 9–14 February 1999, 5–8; and A Ikelegbe, Beyond because s ome o f t hem (s uch a s t he Vikings and Black B raziers) o riginated a s the threshold of civil struggle: youth militancy and the militiaisation of the resource conflict in the campus cults, they are found at nearly all tertiary institutions in the country. Niger Delta region of Nigeria, African Study Monographs 27(3) (2006), 87–122, 104–106. The f irst m anifestation o f t he mi litia p henomenon in t he N iger D elta wa s between F ebruary a nd M arch 1966, w hen A daka B oro’s Niger D elta Volunteer Service (NDVS), co mprising a rmed mi litant I jaw y ouths, s eized s ome A number of issues are inextricably linked to the conflict: communities a nd o il faci lities, de clared a N iger D elta P eople’s R epublic, a nd engaged t he N igerian mi litary un til i t wa s def eated a nd i ts m embers t ried f or I Deprivation, neglect, underdevelopment and associated alienation have been treason. There was a ces sation of militant activities until 1997 w hen the current at the base of the agitations and conflict since the 1950s manifestation began. The present militia groups, comprising mostly Ijaw militants, I The in sensitivity o f t he g overnment a nd t he fa ilure o f g overnmental first em erged in t he W arri r egion t o f ight t heir I tsekiri n eighbours, t he o il institutions to address the issues effectively meant that the issues that caused companies and the Nigerian military deployed to protect the oil infrastructure and the conflict remained unresolved to contain t he conflict arising f rom p olitical and resource marginalisation. The

224 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 225 MILITIAS, PIRATES AND OIL IN THE NIGER DELTA Ibaba Samuel Ibaba and Augustine Ikelegbe

most p rominent mi litant g roup, t he Federated N iger D elta I jaw C ommunities The militias use essentially speedboats and guerrilla tactics when attacking oil (FNDIC), supported mainly Ijaw causes and militant activities elsewhere (apart and mi litary installations. A lthough t hey have operated in t he oil cities of Port from violent clashes during the Warri crisis between 1997 and 2004). Harcourt and Warri as well as other towns, their main targets are along the creeks, Following t he K aiama D eclaration21 of D ecember 1998 – w hich h ad b een swamps, estuaries and waterways of the Delta. Their main strategy has been to signed b y s everal t housand Ijaw y ouths a nd m arked t he s tarting p oint o f v ery disrupt oil production and compel government to negotiate with them on their radical demands – and subsequent military operations against youth protests that demands. Th ey h ave ac hieved t his t hrough i ssuing p ress r eleases, de livering followed, mi litant g roups en gaged in co unterattacks a nd r esistance. P rominent threats and ultimatums to oil companies, attacking personnel and facilities of oil companies, di srupting a nd e ven s hutting do wn o il p roduction, k idnapping o il militia groups that emerged during this period were the Egbesu Boys of Africa, the workers o r t aking t hem h ostage, a nd c arrying o ut a rmed a ttacks a nd Niger D elta R esistance M ovement, the Niger D elta O il P roducing C ommunities counterattacks a gainst s ecurity f orces gu arding o il in stallations a nd p atrolling Development O rganisation, t he ND PVF, t he ND VS a nd t he Supreme E gbesu waterways. Th e o bjectives o f t he mi litias in clude en ding in justice a nd n eglect, Assembly. Between 2003 and 2005, the NDPVF and the NDVS were prominent in achieving ethnic emancipation and survival, true federalism, obtaining a g reater the eastern part of the Niger Delta. Currently, the most prominent militia groups share of the oil revenue, redressing marginalisation and underdevelopment caused are MEND, the Coalition for Militant Action (COMA), and the Martyrs’ Brigade. by the Nigerian state and oil companies, acquiring ownership in the oil industry, Youth militias in t he Niger Delta are actually a lo ose confederation of militia promoting em ployment a nd e conomic em powerment, ac hieving s elf- groups, bands, cults, and freelance, volunteer and hired fighters. They are based in determination and increasing their political representation.24 numerous camps in the remote corners of the swamps, estuaries and creeks. The The mi litias c an b e c ategorised o n t he b asis o f o bjectives o r et hnic diffuseness of the overall militia organisation is further complicated by sometimes composition. There are private militias (NDPVF, Adaka Marines, Martyrs’ Brigade, multiple and overlapping memberships, shared participation in b attles called by Niger Delta Vigilante, NDMFS and Niger Delta Coastal Guerrillas), ethnic militias other g roups, a nd e ven b road m obilisations f or c auses o f di verse g roups a nd (the Meinbutus, A rugbo F reedom F ighters, I duwini Volunteer F orce and Egbesu communities, sometimes across state borders and the eastern and western axis of Boys) and pan-ethnic militias (MEND, COMA and the NDPSF). the Delta.22 As Okonta notes, the constituent groups within MEND ‘take their own Pirates are armed bands and gangs that attack boats and passengers along the decisions and plan their attacks separately, but are able to coordinate with other coast and waterways. They often block and obstruct traffic on river routes, attack units in joint expeditions where necessary’.23 and seize boats, hold passengers hostage (demanding huge sums as ransom) and The militias are organised on the basis of military hierarchy and formations. steal passengers’ possessions. Attacks on some of the waterway routes in B ayelsa and Delta states have been so frequent and violent that the state governments have MEND, for example, w hich is t he most prominent g roup, has a co mmand and created security outfits to contain the menace. In Bayelsa State, the government platoon structure in a ll states of the Niger Delta, each headed by a co mmander, created the Bayelsa Volunteers consisting of about 5 000 y ouths, while the Delta with a central command in the Ijaw territory of Delta State. The intelligence unit State government created the Waterways Security Committee. The Joint Military undertakes strategic studies and provides tactics that underlie its operations. The Task Force has been patrolling and policing the waterways since the late 1990s to leadership h ave fa lse n ames a nd identities, a nd t o a l arge ext ent a re un known, curtail, among others, the threat posed by pirates. particularly to the Nigerian security forces and operatives. Other groups that are These p irates a re cr iminal a nd de viant e lements in t he mi litia g roups o r based in p articular lo cations a re o rganised in to a rea co mmands, t oo. I t i s opportunistic e lements t hat m asquerade a s mi litias. W ith sm all a rms a nd noteworthy t hat t hese co mmands a ll h ave a s emblance o f mi litary f ormations, opportunities to extort, these groups have turned the waterways into territories for command s tructure a nd di scipline. Th e mi litias h ave p redominantly y outh profiteering. That the pirates and militias are closely related is clear from the fact members. The militia groups along the eastern axis of the Delta interface with cult that the militias dominate and control the creeks. The phenomenon has also been groups that usually serve as fertile grounds for recruitment. associated with increased militancy and militia activities along the creeks.

226 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 227 MILITIAS, PIRATES AND OIL IN THE NIGER DELTA Ibaba Samuel Ibaba and Augustine Ikelegbe

Ikelegbe25 succinctly des cribes t he in terconnection b etween mi litias a nd operations a nd b rutalities w ere c hallenged f or t he f irst t ime b y a rmed y ouths, pirates: resulting in c lashes a nd b loody b attles a t K aiama, E keki Y enagoa, Y enagoa, Oliobiri, Opia, Ikemya and Ogbia. Youth militias subsequently emerged as a major There is a strong linkage between the militias, armed gangs and cultists, the pirates force o f co unter-violence a nd a rmed en gagement. M ilitia a nd mi litary and the bunkerers. The boundaries between them may be fluid as one group could confrontations h ave co ntinued in s everal co mmunities a nd o il in stallations, easily m erge in to t he o ther. Th e p irates f or exa mple a re lin ked t o t he dir ect waterways, militia camps and even military barracks and facilities. The military waterways robbery, are agents of larger bunkerers, guards to oil theft operations and has h ad t o p atrol t he wa terways a nd cr eeks, gu ard v essels, t ankers a nd s hips, guides to the boats, barges and ships of bunkers. They may be part of larger militias protect oil installations and personnel, and intervene in ci ties and communities and armed bands that may be involved in popular violence. with militia presence and activities. In the process, the military deployed several thousand m en w ith s ophisticated w eaponry s uch a s n aval wa rships, fa st Ukiwo s tates t hat t o s eparate p irates f rom mi litias w ould b e li ke s eparating amphibious crafts, helicopter gunboats, armoured personnel carriers and tanks. Siamese twins rather than separating sheep from goats.26 The fact is that pirates The mi litias a re a lso fa irly w ell a rmed w ith r ocket l aunchers, m achine gun s, have b ecome mi litias, just a s mi litias en gage in p iracy t o m obilise resources t o rocket-propelled g renades, b ombs, a utomatic a nd a ssault r ifles, AK-47s a nd sustain insurgency or for personal enrichment. Piracy has thrived because of the bazookas. The ensuing cycle of violence has been sustained by the availability of loose control, lack of discipline and loss of focus among the militia groups. arms in t he r egion, f unds f rom f orceful a ppropriations o f r esources f rom o il Cults started out as violent secret campus fraternities that moved beyond the companies, the underground economy and persistent state military actions and campuses in terms of membership, organisation and operations. Once outside the repression. campuses, the fraternities became more extensive, armed, criminalised and brutal. Attacks a nd co unterattacks h ave t aken p lace in t he o il in stallations, lo cal More importantly, in Rivers and Bayelsa states they became extensions of, or were communities, militia camps, military posts and along the waterways. The militias affiliated with or worked in collaboration with and under the control and direction have attacked numerous oil facilities such as pipelines, gas facilities, flow stations, of, the militia groups, from which they also received arms and funding. The cult oil platforms and terminals, offshore oil facilities, vessels and even towns such as groups, particularly, formed alliances with the NDPVF and NDV in their intensive the main oil cities of Warri and Port Harcourt. They have s eized vessels, cargo internecine wars over territorial and resource control in Rivers State between 2004 ships, boats, barges, helicopters, equipment and oil facilities, and kidnapped and and 2007.27 abducted h undreds o f f oreign o il w orkers. I t i s n oteworthy t hat i t t ook t he combined effort of the Nigerian navy, army and air force, and the use of military Militias and military engagements hardware such as helicopter gunships, to subdue one militant camp in Delta State in May 2009, during a counterinsurgency operation.28 The region has been militarised since the early 1990s following the Ogoni protests Militia activities and attacks have been quite intense since 2006. Between 2003 and in creased a gitation a nd p rotests. E xtensive mi litary dep loyments a nd and 2005 t here w ere s everal in cidents, in cluding eig ht a ttacks o n t he s ecurity operations h ave t urned t he en tire r egion in to a l arge ga rrisoned co mmand, forces/police in w hich 36 p eople were killed and two injured; five attacks on oil particularly since the late 1990s. The forces of occupation and military action have companies t hat le d t o t he k illing o f eig ht p eople (f ive exp atriates), w hile 18 included the Internal Security Force in Ogoniland, Operation Hakuri I and II and expatriates were taken hostage.29 There were a f urther 39 mi litia attacks between Operation F lush O ut. A j oint mi litary t ask f orce co denamed Operation R estore January a nd A ugust 2006, w hich le d t o t he de aths o f 36 p eople (in cluding 21 Hope now operates in the region. soldiers and six n aval personnel). Perhaps more significant was the bomb attack Military dep loyments in tensified sin ce D ecember 1998 a fter t he K aiama on Bori Camp, the headquarters of the amphibious brigade of the Nigerian army Declaration a nd t he I jaw y outh p rotests t hat f ollowed. Th e dep loyments, in Port Harcourt in Rivers State on 19 April 2006 and the 29 April 2006 attack on

228 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 229 MILITIAS, PIRATES AND OIL IN THE NIGER DELTA Ibaba Samuel Ibaba and Augustine Ikelegbe the Joint Military Task Force headquarters in Warri in Delta State.30 About 130 oil The genesis of militias and pirates workers were taken hostage in 33 a ttacks with nine deaths between January and July 2007.31 The February 2008 attack on Equatorial Guinea drew attention to the The em ergence o f mi litias in t he N iger D elta c an b e t raced t o hi storical a nd 34 threat that Niger Delta militias could pose to regional stability and security in the contemporary forces at five levels. Gulf of Guinea. The militarisation of politics

The militias, opportunism and crime State power, institutions, resources and public office in N igeria often have been privatised and manipulated for personal gain.35 Because of the state’s centrality to The co re g roups o f mi litias s uch a s MEND a re c learly r evolutionist a nd t hey the politics of distribution, accumulation, welfare and development, it is an object pursue political objectives as well as development of the region. However, some of in tense h egemonic s truggle. Thi s h as s pawned in tense, l awless a nd a moral militia groups have been criminalised and are driven by opportunism and greed, struggles for power, leading to corruption, violence and conflicts. The nature of as evidenced by their participation in oil theft, kidnapping and hostage taking, and the state and state politics underlies and undermines electoral processes and has extortion f rom in dividuals, v essels, g overnments a nd o il co mpanies. To t hese turned e lections in to f raudulent, v iolent a nd f lawed ex ercises. Th e in tense elements, v iolence h as sim ply b een co mmercialised in t he co ntext o f l ucrative struggles f or s tate p ower exp lain w hy ext ensive e lectoral ir regularities a nd opportunities. I nitially, o pportunistic mi litia e lements w ere gu ards, es corts a nd electoral v iolence h ave b een p erpetrated b y a rmed t hugs a nd b ands, a p oint agents of oil theft syndicates or bunkerers. However, such militias soon came into highlighted by Human Rights Watch:36 their own, in terms of the control of territory for bunkering, the crude refining or production o f p etroleum p roducts a nd t he co llection o f t olls f rom o ther o il The transition to democracy in 1999 exacerbated youth militancy as unscrupulous bunkerers and vessels. politicians u sed hired ‘thugs’ to c arry out v iolence to ensure t heir v ictory at t he In stealing oil, the militias do not act alone but in collusion with high-ranking polls. Prior to the 1999 a nd 2003 f ederal state and local elections, all parties, but serving and retired military, security, government and oil company officials and most effectively the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP), recruited and armed merchants and syndicates.32 The oil theft syndicates fund and arm the militias and members of youth groups to intimidate opposing politicians and their supporters. armed gangs. The syndicates also benefit from the instability and insecurity that In t he Niger D elta, e lections h ave b een v iolent and f lawed b ecause of t he hig h result f rom co nflicts a nd c lashes b etween t he mi litias a nd t he mi litary. Th e stakes. Political parties and leaders have used youth groups to engage in electoral involvement of such corrupt officials of oil companies and military and security violence, b uying t hem a rms a nd p aying t hem t o u se v iolence t o in timidate units dem onstrates t he co mplex w eb in w hich mi litia ac tivities a nd e ven t he opponents. This happened in Rivers State where the NDV and NDPVF were used conflicts are enmeshed and how these webs endanger national security. At the core 37 in electoral violence. Cults, confraternities and armed bands have also been used of this complex web are conflict beneficiaries who profit from the conflicts and in struggles and contestations for political power in the Niger Delta. therefore have interests in co nflict perpetuation for greater or sustained profits. This has had two broad effects. First, because of social disorganisation induced However, we should note that militia engagements in oil theft are sometimes not by increasing anonymity, poor social relationships and increasing competition for 33 simply for profit but to sustain and finance militia operations. resources, p oliticians in o r o utside p ower los e co ntrol o f t he ac tions o f y outh Militia criminality has been manifested in participation in piracy, kidnapping, groups.38Second, youth groups are often abandoned after the elections. There are extortion, p olitical in timidation, t huggery, e lectoral v iolence, b ank r obberies, three reasons for this: armed robberies and other crimes. Criminality is mostly engaged in by the small armed bands, cults, private militias and freelance militias, which are less under the I Politicians who use youth groups to win elections abandon them because their control of the core and more insurgent ethnic and pan-ethnic militia groups. services are no longer useful or needed

230 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 231 MILITIAS, PIRATES AND OIL IN THE NIGER DELTA Ibaba Samuel Ibaba and Augustine Ikelegbe

I Patrons of the youth groups fail to meet the needs and aspirations of the youths However, the crucial point here concerns the character of the violence. Ethnic because o f t heir unr ealistic dem ands. Thi s b reaks t heir s ocial co ntract a nd identity wa s t he ra llying p oint f or m obilisation, a nd et hnic mi litias w hose results in t he withdrawal of support/allegiance on the part of the groups and members were predominantly youths were responsible for t he v iolent conflicts. abandonment by the ‘principal’ Small arms and dynamite and other explosives were used freely and the elite and I Losing politicians also abandon the youth groups almost immediately after the opinion le aders o n b oth sides en sured t hat t he y ouths did n ot l ack w eapons. elections because they cannot maintain these groups However, these arms were not surrendered when the hostilities ended, and neither were the fighters rehabilitated and reintegrated into their communities. This was However, the arms bought for youth groups by their patrons are not retrieved, and also the case with other inter-community and ethnic conflicts in the region. This arms for mobilisation and operations are therefore easily obtained. This explains underlies the intensification of piracy, violent crimes and opportunism when these why incidences of militancy and militia operations and even violent crimes tended armed youths had to struggle for survival and relevance. to increase significantly after the 1999, 2003 and 2007 elections. Inter- and intra-community struggles over oil resources Inter-ethnic struggles and antagonisms Inter- and intra-community conflicts in t he Niger Delta over oil resources have One of the most significant outcomes of several decades of colonisation in Nigeria 39 provided a fertile ground for militia activities and piracy. It is not that there were is ethnic consciousness and identity politics. Perceived domination and exclusion among the different ethnic groups in the country have engendered suspicion, and no conflicts between communities prior to the regional conflict, but the number even palpable hatred, that have sowed the seeds of ethnic antagonism and violence. and in tensity o f co nflicts h ave a ssumed a larming p roportions d ue t o Inter-ethnic and inter-community conflicts have been quite pervasive in Nigeria. militarisation, a rms p roliferation a nd t he p reponderance o f a rmed g roups o r The defining aspect of these conflicts is the use of ethnic militias to carry out such bands. R ecent exa mples o f in ter-community co nflicts in clude t hose b etween conflicts. Emadike/Epebu and Ogbolomabiri/Bassambiri (Bayelsa State), between Bille/Ice In the Niger Delta, there have been several inter-ethnic conflicts, for example and E kunuga/Okolomade, b etween A lesa/Eleme a nd O krika (R ivers S tate) a nd 42 between the Ijaw and Itsekiri in Delta State; the Ogoni-Okrika and Ogoni against between Odimodi/Ogulagha and Isama/Gbarigolo (Delta State). the Andoni in Rivers State; and between the Ilaje and Arogbo Ijaw in Ondo State. A number of factors have triggered these conflicts. The first is the divide-and- The violence between the Itsekiri and Ijaw appears to be the most prominent and rule t actics t hat o il co mpanies u se t o fac tionalise co mmunities a nd t urn o ne can b e t raced t o co lonial co nquests, in tegration, t rade r elations a nd t he community against another through partisan and partial patronage. The second institutionalisation of Itsekiri dominance through the paramount status acquired are land disputes arising from the high value placed on land precisely because of by the Itsekiri .40 the o il i t mig ht co ntain. Th e t hird co ncern c hieftaincy di sputes, t he co llapsing Antagonism r eached a c limax in 1997 w hen t he h eadquarters o f t he Warri authority of traditional governance systems and the erosion of the roles of elders South local government area was relocated from Ogbe-Ijoh (an Ijaw community) in t he m oderation o f s ocial a nd co mmunity lif e. Th e f ourth i s t he g eneralised to Og idigben (a n I tsekiri co mmunity). Th e I jaw r esponse a nd t he co unter- lawlessness a rising f rom t he co llapse o f s ocial a nd m oral va lues a nd s ocial response by the Itsekiri led to intermittent violence between 1997 and 2004.41 The disorganisation. These have facilitated the tendencies towards the militarisation of revenue allocation criteria in Nigeria used among others the local government to inter- and intra-community feuds and the ready use of armed confrontations and determine a group’s share of federal revenue. More importantly, the location of the violent conflicts to settle disputes.43 headquarters benefits from the provision of social infrastructure and amenities. As a result, factions and communities now generally use violent confrontations The struggle over the location of the headquarters was therefore a s truggle over to deal with disagreements. The mobilisation, recruitment, training and arming of resources and development inputs. youths were common factors in all these conflicts. In Rivers State, cult groups were

232 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 233 MILITIAS, PIRATES AND OIL IN THE NIGER DELTA Ibaba Samuel Ibaba and Augustine Ikelegbe

Map 8–1: Niger Delta region may regard them as much more beneficial than employment. The result is that there may develop a g roup of individuals reluctant to work even if offered employment opportunities. Such individuals, often than not, become societal rejects. The boy soldier who is introduced to violence at an early age may become unemployable and in most cases not willing to be educated.45

Oil politics and the criminalisation of insurgency

Fundamentally, in surgency in t he N iger D elta c an b e b lamed o n de cades o f neglect, mi litarism a nd in justice.46 Furthermore, o il p olitics i s o ne o f t he underlying c auses. A aron, Ib eanu, O koko et a l, Ik ein, Ik porukpo, O pukiri a nd Ibaba, Naanen and Nna47 have all noted that inequitable oil wealth distribution and allocation are the most critical factors in the crisis. Besides majority ethnic group domination, the centralised nature of federalism and revenue allocation, the abuse of h uman r ights, o il-based environmental deg radation a nd fa ilure o f co rporate social responsibility on the part of oil companies lie at the root of the oil politics. The fact is that the rapacious tendencies of government and oil companies have given birth to ethnic nationalism in the Niger Delta.48 Although income f rom oil and ga s account for about 90 p er cent of exp ort earnings, 40 per cent of the gross national product, and 84 per cent of government revenues,49 the N iger D elta t hat acco unts f or o ver 90 p er cen t o f o il a nd ga s production in the country suffers from neglect, underdevelopment and poverty.50 The dominant view is that the drastic reduction in the derivation share of revenue allocation, particularly between 1980 a nd 2000, m ay be attributed to the shift in revenue en dowment a nd g eneration f rom t he m ajority g roups t hat co ntrol t he state to the minority groups that lack power.51 The federal government under the Source: Yiruo Zhao (http://www.circleofblue.org/waternews/2009/world/war-on-water/). hegemony o f t he n orthern r egion s eized co ntrol o f o il a nd ga s r evenues a nd diverted the dominant bases of revenue allocation from derivation to population, land mass and equality of states. This disadvantaged the Niger Delta and reduced recruited b ecause o f t heir f ire-power a nd p aid h eavily f or t heir s ervices in t he the benefits from oil and gas to this area to a trickle. 44 conflicts. Ikporukpo captures part of these effects: The Niger Delta people attribute the situation to the politics of marginalisation The militarisation of people, particularly the youths, has a number of implications. of minority groups and Nigeria’s perverted federalism. The main source of friction Many of t hese ‘warriors’ b elieve t hat t here are economic gains in t he plunder of is thus the reduction in the derivation share of revenue allocation, which is set out another community. Such gains mean a lot to many unemployed individuals who in table 8–2.

234 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 235 MILITIAS, PIRATES AND OIL IN THE NIGER DELTA Ibaba Samuel Ibaba and Augustine Ikelegbe

Table 8–2: Changes in the derivation component of revenue allocation that the criminalisation of insurgency has become a m eans of sharing in t he oil Sources: Compiled from A M Jega, Democracy, wealth. Period Share of derivation good governance and development in Nigeria, 1960–1970 50 per cent Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 2007, 203–245; S I Ibaba, Understanding the Niger Delta crisis, Port The youth movement 1970–1975 45 per cent Harcourt: Amethyst and Colleagues, 2005, 1975–1980 20 per cent 98–99; G I Mbanefoh and F O Egwaikhide, As we noted earlier, militias in the Niger Delta are made up largely of youths, a fact 1980–1983 2 per cent Revenue allocation in Nigeria: derivation attributable to the central role of youths in t he conflicts plaguing the region. A 1984–1992 1,5 per cent principle revisited, in A Kunle, R Suberu, A number of factors have been identified as the reasons for this: 1992–2000 3 per cent Agbaje and G Herault (eds), Federalism and 2000 to date 13 per cent political restructuring in Nigeria, Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 1998, 213–231. I Youths are the most active segment of the population I Youths (including women) are worst affected by the widespread poverty in the This awareness has radicalised political actions and agitations for greater access to region the oil wealth, and has resulted in the formation and proliferation of civil society I A g rowing a wareness o f t he r egion’s p redicament a nd t he radic alisation o f groups a nd mi litant y outh m ovements. Th e en suing mi litancy a nd in surgency unrest infected the youth, who began to see it as their role to champion the were criminalised by the commercialisation of violence. A n umber of incentives struggle led t o t his. F irst, t he o il co mpanies m ade i t co rporate p ractice t o a ward I The b ehaviour o f t he N igerian f ederal g overnment and o il co mpanies, surveillance contracts to youth groups to protect their facilities.52 The huge sums particularly their insensitivity towards the region’s protests against repression, paid f or s uch s ecurity co ntracts n ot o nly en sured g reater acces s t o a rms a nd angered t he y outh, w ho b egan t o o rganise t hemselves in to g roups a t t he firepower, but also led to the formation of splinter groups and violent competition community and ethnic levels. A significant outcome of this was the emergence among youth groups. of numerous youth groups such as the Ijaw Youth Council and the National Another factor is that chiefs, elites and politicians used youth groups to further Youth Council of Ogoni People, which among others, demanded justice and their a gendas o f acc umulation o f w ealth. Thi s i s lin ked t o t he s abotage o f o il that attention be given to development installations, o il t heft a nd k idnapping o f o il w orkers f or ra nsom. On t he o ther hand, state governments in the region pay huge sums of money to steer militants A dominant engagement strategy of youths in t he Niger Delta from 1997 wa s to away from violence. For example, the leader of the NDPVF has noted that at one convene summits and conferences to draw attention to the plight of the region and time t he R ivers S tate g overnment wa s p aying mi litants 100 mi llion n aira p er – m ore im portantly – t o de clare t heir s tand o n t hese i ssues. Perhaps t he m ost month to refrain from violence.53 These payoffs were intended to ensure that oil famous of such meetings was the All Ijaw Youths Summit in Kaiama, Bayelsa State, production continued and to secure the revenue allocations based on derivation. in December 1998. The Kaiama Declaration included the following: The b acklash, h owever, i s t hat t he youths w ho received t hese l arge s ums of money w ere un willing t o t ake o n o ther w ork. E ven w orse, t he h uge r evenue inflows in to t he N iger D elta h ave n ot b een ade quately in vested in t he p eople, I The Ijaws own all land and natural resources including mineral resources in thereby creating an environment for grievance and conflicts. It is noteworthy that their land corruption in g overnance in t he Niger Delta has created bad role models for the I All leg islation (L and U se A ct, P etroleum D ecree et c) t hat dep rives a nd youths. There is a general feeling that the current 13 per cent derivation in revenue alienates the people from their natural resources stand abrogated allocation was achieved through the youths’ struggles, but that the youths have I All s ecurity f orces o f o ppression o n I jaw l and s hould b e w ithdrawn been alienated from the wealth through corruption. Therefore, it is not surprising immediately

236 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 237 MILITIAS, PIRATES AND OIL IN THE NIGER DELTA Ibaba Samuel Ibaba and Augustine Ikelegbe

I All o il co mpanies exp loiting o il in I jawland s hould ce ase exp loitation a nd I Youths Youths: Overthrow of community withdraw immediately until the issues being contested have been resolved versus leadership and usurpation of youths power The activities began as peaceful protests, but soon transformed into militant and I Youths Community: Inequitable versus distribution of resources that short- violent confrontations. Significantly, it was the violent and repressive nature of the community changes the youths federal government’s response to the demands and p eaceful youth protests that I Claims Claims agents: Short-changing of forced the youth to fight back in organised armed groups. They drew inspiration agents community members from the Adaka Boro revolt, which lasted for 12 d ays, in 1967. A s noted earlier, versus Community: Refusal to pay agreed Adaka Boro, an Ijaw from Kaiama in Bayelsa State, formed the NDVS and declared community fees, rejection of double dealings the Niger Delta Republic. The youth movements identified with the popular and Youths: Dethronement of chiefs, I Youths attacks on chiefs heroic m ovement of Adaka B oro in t heir quest f or f reedom. Whereas Nigeria’s versus Chiefs: Fractionalisation of youth government considered him to be a criminal, he is revered and celebrated as a hero chiefs bodies through partisan support in Ijawland. and patronage, kidnapping, encroachment on land and fishing Actors in the conflict grounds, attack of community member(s) Individuals, groups, security operatives and oil companies are central actors in the Inter- Inter-community Youths, chiefs Community: Attacks on rival conflict. The actors differ in their roles in the conflict, their perceptions and goals, community struggles for location and elites of community members and conflicts and ownership of oil- the property and the nature of their engagement. The conflicts in the region can be categorised based resources, access communities to oil resources and Table 8–3: Actors in Niger Delta conflicts struggles for favoured distribution

Type of Source of conflict Actors in Instruments/mode Community Community struggles Youths, chiefs, Transnational oil companies: conflict conflict versus for transnational oil elites, Fractionalisation of community Intra- Struggles between Community Urban elites: Hijacking of transnational company attention, transnational leaders, refusal to pay community groups, local factions: community resources, disregard oil community oil companies compensation, breach of conflict governance organs/ I Urban elites for local elites companies development projects, security memorandum of understanding, sub-structures and versus local Local elites: Inciting youths and compensation for oil operatives payment of inadequate local elite for access elites chiefs against the urban elites spillages and and compensation to and distribution of memorandum of communities Community: Attacks on oil oil-based resources understanding with installations, disruption of transnational oil production, seizure of equipment, I Youths Youths: Destruction of property companies kidnapping of personnel versus owned by the elites, harassment elites of their relatives Community Struggles against Community Community: Disruption of oil Elites: Fractionalisation of youth versus state repression, inequitable youths and production, attack on security bodies through partisan support share of benefits from security operatives and patronage, attacks on rival oil operatives State: Militarisation/military groups occupation, attacks, arrests

238 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 239 MILITIAS, PIRATES AND OIL IN THE NIGER DELTA Ibaba Samuel Ibaba and Augustine Ikelegbe

the federal and state governments in the Niger Delta. The first is the choice to act Inter-ethnic Struggles for greater Youths, elites Encroachment on land and water access and favoured and chiefs resources, attacks on communities decisively in the common interest and end militia activities. The second option is allocation of oil-based to protect selfish and parochial interests, which in s ome instances are in t andem resources with the interests of the militant youth. Intra- Leadership succession Youths versus Violent engagements, militia/cult/ crises, conflicts over youths encroachment on area of control or Militias in government confraternity resources, methods and oil theft zone groups targets of engagement, We n oted e arlier t hat t he u se b y p oliticians o f a rmed p olitical t hugs d uring struggles for territory, elections partly laid the foundation for the formation of militia groups. It is also influence and access to true that militia groups have provided support, or even sponsored candidates for oil resources, elections. The involvement of militia groups in t he electoral process has resulted transnational oil 55 company payments in their leaders and members gaining political prominence. In Rivers State, for and patronage example, t he ND PVF a nd t he ND V w ere dra wn in to t he e lectoral p rocess b y opposing politicians.56 Their leadership and members were thus favoured by the Sources: S I Ibaba, The environment and sustainable development in the Niger Delta: the Bayelsa State experience, Unpublished PhD thesis, Port Harcourt: University of Port Harcourt, 2004, government with regard to political appointments, contracts awards and monetary 194–199; K Okoko, The Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) – Host community payments. relations survey, Unpublished report submitted to the SPDC Western Operations, Warri, Nigeria, The r ole o f t he mi litia g roups in p olitics, t he e lectoral p rocess a nd t heir 1998, 14. relevance t o p oliticians c an b e a ttributed t o s everal fac tors. Fir st, sin ce 1999, elections in Nigeria and particularly in t he Niger Delta have almost always been as in ter-ethnic, in tra-community, in ter-community, co mmunity-oil co mpany, rigged. For this reason, politicians relied heavily on armed youths to ‘win’ elections community-state, in ter-militia/cult/confraternity g roups a nd in tra-militia/cult/ through violent actions. Second, election rigging in the Niger Delta is particularly confraternity g roups, a nd mi litia/cult-oil co mpanies/Nigerian s tate. Th e ac tors pervasive in t he rural communities in t he creeks and swamps that are under the have h ad di verse o bjectives, p layed n umerous r oles a nd u tilised di verse control o f t he mi litia g roups. Th e mi litant y outh a re p articularly u seful f or engagement methods. campaigning in s uch dif ficult t errain a nd f or r igging e lections t here. Thir d, It is clear that youths are key actors in the conflicts. Ikelegbe has noted that the governments in t he Niger Delta use militia and cult group leaders to secure the current p hase o f a gitations in t he r egion h as b een t aken o ver b y t he y ouths. release of hostages, a process that benefits both sides through the payment of huge However, i t i s sig nificant t hat t he y outh m ovement i s un coordinated, a nd t he sums of money as ransom in which some public officials also share. Fourth, state associated di sorderliness h as cr eated do ubts a bout t he dir ection, co ntent a nd and lo cal g overnments p ay t he mi litia g roups t o m aintain t he p eace o r ce ase sincerity of the struggle.54 disruptive violent activities.

Militias and interfaces with civil society, politics Militias as pseudo-government and governance Universally, a g overnment p erforms t hree b asic f unctions, n amely t he The analysis so far suggests that militia activities in the Niger Delta endanger the maintenance of law and order, the facilitation of development and social progress national e conomy, s ecurity a nd de velopment a spirations o f t he N iger D elta and, s omewhat m ore s pecifically, t he p romotion o f s ocial w elfare a nd li ving people. But the militia groups have continued to gain ground in numbers, camps, conditions.57 However, t he fa ilure o f t he s ocial co ntract in t he N iger D elta, profile and activities, and the Nigerian state has found the suppression or defeat of indicated b y t he fa ilure o f t he va rious g overnments t o sig nificantly f ulfil t hese the militias difficult. This section of the chapter examines the dilemma faced by functions, p articularly in t he co astal a nd swa mpy a reas, h as r esulted in mi litia

240 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 241 MILITIAS, PIRATES AND OIL IN THE NIGER DELTA Ibaba Samuel Ibaba and Augustine Ikelegbe

groups a nd p irates t aking o ver t hese f unctions in lo cal co mmunities.58 Some society h ave t ended t o sy mpathise w ith v iolent en gagements b ecause o f militia g roups en gage in t he f ollowing g overnmental f unctions in h ost government repression. In fac t, s everal civil g roups in t he Niger D elta are pro- communities: militia, either declaring their support for militia activities or actually taking part in their mobilisation. This may be one of the reasons why some CSOs such as the I Procurement of drugs for health centres or hospitals Ijaw Youth Council are sometimes listed as militia groups. I Payment of stipends to medical p ersonnel to encourage t hem to b e at t heir posts I Payment of stipends to teachers to enhance their dedication Impact of militia activities and the conflicts I Provision o f p ower g enerators a nd/or s upply o f p etrol/diesel t o p ower Militia attacks have led to the seizure, occupation, destruction, vandalisation and generators disruption o f n umerous o il f low s tations, p ipelines a nd t erminals, a s w ell a s I Payment o f exa mination a nd s chool f ees f or s tudents in p rimary a nd secondary schools equipment, h elicopters and s hips sin ce 1998. Th e ac tivities of t he mi litias h ave caused considerable di sruption to oil production, destruction of oil production I Scholarship a wards t o uni versity un dergraduates, in cluding t hose a t foreign universities (particularly in Ghana) facilities a nd in security t o o il co mpany o perations, e quipment a nd s taff. Th ese I Sponsorship of individuals to acquire vocational skills activities have at various times led to a s evere decline in o il production, with oil I Provision of potable water production along the eastern and western axis of the region being cut by 17 to 50 59 I Financial grants to traders, entrepreneurs and artisans per cent. In the first quarter of 2009, the country’s daily oil production dropped to 1,6 million barrels from an earlier 2,029 million barrels per day, mainly because The militia groups perform these functions because governments at all levels are of disruptions in o il production caused by militia activities.60 Oil theft, which is either un able o r r eluctant t o f ulfil t hese d uties. Th us mi litant le aders w ho s ee aided b y a nd f uels t he co nflict, h as c aused h eavy los ses t o t he o il in dustry, themselves a s p atriots, f eel o bliged t o u se p art o f t heir r esources t o s upport particularly in terms of oil revenues. Between January and September 2008 alone, community development. This practice is common among militants based in the the country lost about US$20,7 billion to oil theft.61 Ijaw co mmunities o f B ayelsa a nd D elta s tates a nd h as r esulted in s ome The local economy of the region has been devastated, too. Farming, fishing, communities and local people identifying with the militia groups. These activities garner support for the militias, as they are seen by community members as not trading, co mmerce, s chooling a nd r elated ac tivities h ave b een a bandoned in only benefactors but also an alternative to government. several communities due to hostilities and attacks. Pervasive insecurity and threats have exacerbated already precarious living conditions and livelihoods and raised Militias as members of civil society living cos ts. Th e l ack o f s ecurity in t he r egion h as a lso le d t o a l ack o f infrastructural development and discouraged investment and capital inflow. The Militias and civil society organisations (CSOs) in t he Niger Delta have common backlash i s t hat i t h as s trengthened t he co nditions o f un derdevelopment a nd origins a nd o bjectives, ex cept t hat t heir m ethods o f en gagement dif fer. Th e poverty that contributed to the conflicts in the first place. paradox of poverty in the midst of plenty provided the context for the emergence The conflicts have also disarticulated the people from the social values, order of militias. It is noteworthy that the youth movement that gave birth to ethnic and pan- and fa bric t hat h old co mmunities t ogether. Th e s ame i s t rue o f t raditional ethnic youth associations emerged as part of a new social movement that started governance sys tems a nd in stitutions. A s a co nsequence, t here i s p ervasive as a result of the agitation in the region, and that the youth groups were part of civil lawlessness, mi litarisation o f s ocial r elations, v iolence a nd acr imony b etween society. Some of these groups, such as the NDVF and the FNDIC, were militant groups and disunity. Among the youths there has emerged an aggressive, violent, and m etamorphosed in to mi litia g roups. F urthermore, s ome s egments o f ci vil lawless, criminal and lazy culture.62

242 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 243 MILITIAS, PIRATES AND OIL IN THE NIGER DELTA Ibaba Samuel Ibaba and Augustine Ikelegbe

Resource conflicts and the human security crisis West African States (ECOWAS) has not significantly intervened. This is perhaps in the Niger Delta due to Nigeria’s prominence in the regional organisation. However, there has been considerable in ternational in terest a s a r esult o f t he h eavy in ternational The protests, militia activities and military operations in the region have combined investments in t he Niger Delta and the Gulf of Guinea oil. It is noteworthy that to en shrine a sys tem o f in discriminate k illings, m aiming, ra pe, lo oting a nd Nigeria accounts for over 60 p er cent of the oil in t he Gulf of Guinea, and it is destruction of property and homes. On t he roads, along the waterways, in t heir strategic in terms of being a secure source of future petroleum needs of the United communities a nd et hnic r egions, t he p eople h ave b een ext ensively h arassed, States.65 Furthermore, the effect of the insecurity and attacks in the Niger Delta on flogged, beaten, detained and abused. Numerous settlements have been sacked or the volatility of oil supply and prices have raised international concerns and led to destroyed in t he f ighting b etween mi litias a nd t he mi litary a nd b etween t he interventions t o p rovide a s ecure a nd s table en vironment f or s ustained o il militias, et hnic g roups, co mmunities a nd y outh g roups o r in t he s earches f or production and supplies. Second, countries whose citizens have been victims of militants in the communities by the military.63 kidnapping h ave t ended t o p rovide s upport t o t he N igerian s ecurity a gencies. Mobile p olice a nd mi litary o perations a gainst p rotesting co mmunities h ave Third, there have been attempts to support the Nigerian state or even intervene caused s evere de vastation a nd de aths in U muechem, Og oniland, Ik o, C hoba, directly in t he m anagement o f t he co nflict. Th e US a nd B ritain h ave p rovided Ikenya a nd Il aje. C ommunities s uch a s t he O di a nd O dioma w ere li terally equipment and training support and the US has donated refurbished coast guard destroyed. In 2003, military and militia confrontations led to the destruction of the ships to the Nigerian navy.66 Fourth, there have been deployments and exercises in Obumkiran, Kuntie, Setorubor and Okerenkoko communities. The cult wars and the Gulf of Guinea by the US Africa Command, which has become more active in later mi litary ac tions a gainst mi litias in R ivers S tate c aused de vastation a nd the region as part of US government efforts to protect oil investments, offshore oil killings a nd t urned s everal t owns a nd co mmunities s uch a s Tombia, B uguma, installations and shipments from the Gulf of Guinea. Bukuma, Ogbakiri, Amadi-Awa and Okirika and parts of Port Harcourt into ghost towns between 2003 and 2004, as most residents fled. The streets of Warri and Port Harcourt h ave n ot b een s pared mi litia a ttacks a nd mi litary o perations. H omes Responses to the militias and conflicts by the have b een burnt or destroyed, as have s chools, churches, stores, businesses and Nigerian state and transnational oil companies social faci lities. L ocal p eople, r esidents, b ystanders a nd co mmunity m embers, Response of the federal government particularly y ouths, t he a ged, w omen a nd c hildren h ave b een k illed in t he fighting.64 The central strategy of the Nigerian federal government has been to protect oil Another co nsequence o f mi litary o perations a nd mi litia ac tivities h as b een installations, pacify the region in t erms of militarisation, repress conflict groups internal di splacements. Th ousands o f in digenes h ave b een di splaced f rom t he and cr eate a n en abling en vironment f or co ntinued o il p roduction. Thi s wa s communities and clans t hat have b een s cenes of intermilitia wars, mi litary and evident in t he suppression of the peaceful protests by the Ogoni and the entire militia co nfrontations a nd mi litary a ttacks. S ome sim ply di sappeared in to t he region since the early 1990s. However, state repression turned the peaceful protests forests, o thers h ave t aken s helter in n eighbouring co mmunities a nd s ome into violent confrontations as youth activists adopted armed confrontation as the migrated to the cities. Refugee camps were established and in t he 2009 mi litary mechanism for the pursuit of their goals.67 operations in Gb aramatu k ingdom in D elta S tate s ome di splaced p ersons t ook Apart from the military and repressive response, the government has tried to refuge in schools, hospitals and other public facilities. build p eace t hrough de velopment en gineering. N otable ef forts in clude t he Resource conflicts and regional and establishment o f t he N iger D elta D evelopment B oard in 1961, t he P residential international interventions Committee on the 1,5 per cent Oil Derivation Fund for the Oil Producing States in 1981, the Oil Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission in 1992, and In spite of the intensity of the conflict and regional and international ramifications the N iger D elta D evelopment C ommission in 2001. H owever, t hese ext ra- for security and stability in the West African region, the Economic Community of ministerial agencies failed to achieve much development of the region due to overt

244 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 245 MILITIAS, PIRATES AND OIL IN THE NIGER DELTA Ibaba Samuel Ibaba and Augustine Ikelegbe

centralisation, co rruption, p atron-client/prebendial p olitics, a nd t he l ack o f position t hem f or p atronage f rom t he o il co mpanies. Th ese s truggles t riggered political will. While these intervention efforts raised expectations, their failure and intra-community co nflicts t hat a ggravated t he v iolence in t he r egion. S uch the co ntinued a bsence o f co ncrete de velopment in creased r esentment a nd conflicts h ave o ccurred in E vreni (D elta State) and Nembe, Ogb olomabiri, and resistance.68 Peremabiri (Bayelsa State). In 2009, o wing t o a b alance o f p ower a nd t error b etween t he mi litary a nd Oil companies have been instrumental in the repression of protest activities in militias, particularly after the failure of a major in the western the r egion. Th ey o ften u se s ecurity o peratives t o b reak u p dem onstrations b y Delta region, which was met by extensive militia counterattacks on oil facilities communities o r t o p rotect t hem a gainst a ngry co mmunities. Th e b rute f orce that saw daily productive decline to its lowest level ever, the federal government employed by these operatives has sometimes resulted in deaths and destruction of reached o ut t o mi litia le aders a nd p roclaimed a n a mnesty p rogramme. Th e property, as occurred in, for example, the Umuechem case. This has incensed the programme t ook ef fect in O ctober 2009 a nd en tailed a di sarmament, people who perceive the oil companies to be allies of the federal government. To demobilisation, r ehabilitation a nd r eintegration f or mi litia m embers. Th e make matters worse, oil companies do not only guard their premises and area of programme was embraced by the main militia groups and an estimated 17 000 operations w ith h eavily a rmed s oldiers a nd p olicemen, b ut a lso a rmed a nd members surrendered arms and entered rehabilitation camps. The main militia motivated them and thereby made them overzealous in harassing the local people. groups declared a uni lateral ceasefire. However, there have been huge challenges Armed youths have also been hired to protect oil installations, which aggravated of in adequate c amp s paces, p oor p lanning a nd im plementation, in adequate inter- and intra-youth group squabbles and arms proliferation. However, in spite funding, poor management of the camps and poor political will and commitment. of operating under security shields, their facilities have been perennial objects of As a result, there has been mounting disenchantment, which has manifested in the militia attacks. suspension o f uni lateral ce asefire b y MEND a nd a lo w-scale r esumption o f hostilities. CONCLUSION: ENDING THE VIOLENCE

Oil company responses The current discourse and opinion on the Niger Delta agree that military might is unlikely t o p rovide a s olution t o t he N iger D elta cr isis.71 As M ichael W atts Just li ke t he g overnment, o il co mpanies h ave r esponded t o t he co nflicts w ith emphatically states: interventions in t he form of community development projects. For example, the Shell P etroleum D evelopment C ompany s pent US$32 mi llion o n co mmunity In the Niger Delta … militarisation cannot guarantee stability … Naked force, even development in 1997, US$42,6 mi llion in 1998, US$60,23 mi llion in 2000, a nd with the best of American technical advisers and electronic gadgets, is doomed to US$68 mi llion in 2007. 69 However, b ecause o f t he a bsence o f co mmunity failure and risks sliding more deeply into a low grade civil war – with the prospects participation a nd in put in t he co mmunity de velopment p rocess, t hese of massive escalation of violence and attacks on oil installations.72 interventions h ave l argely fa iled t o ac hieve t he desir ed g oals o f p roviding infrastructure a nd s ocial s ervices. B ecause co mpany in terventions w ere o ften Clearly, v iolent s uppression o f t he co nflict w ill accen tuate in security. Th e compelled b y v iolent co mmunity p rotests, t here h ave em erged c ascades o f experience o f Yugoslavia h as s hown t hat r epression o nly sw eeps t he c auses o f conflicts that have led to a vicious circle of violence as more conflicts meant more agitation and dissent under the carpet for a m oment, but that they then flare up development attention.70 again, often with disastrous consequences.73 On the other hand, some participation Significantly, oil companies have been buying peace with phoney contracts and in r esource o wnership a nd co ntrol, in creases in t he der ivation f und a nd payments t o co mmunity m embers in o rder t o en sure unin terrupted o il abrogation of repressive oil laws will certainly return large development funds to production. B ut t his h as c aused ext ensive di vision a nd f ractionalisation in t he the region and improve the situation, even though it may not immediately ensure communities as diverse community groups struggled for community leadership to development.

246 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 247 MILITIAS, PIRATES AND OIL IN THE NIGER DELTA Ibaba Samuel Ibaba and Augustine Ikelegbe

One n eglected acco unt o f t he fa ilure o f t he W illink R eport74 to en gineer Finally, t he ide a o f dem obilising, r ehabilitating a nd in tegrating mi litant y ouths development in t he Niger Delta is the absence of democratic input. The report through projects such as the ‘arms surrender for cash payment’ in Rivers State in predicated the success of its recommendations on the establishment of democratic 2004–2005 and amnesty for militias that repudiate violence and surrender arms by institutions, which suggests that the many years of authoritarian rule in N igeria the federal government in 2009–2010, has had some weaknesses. To have maximal may have aggravated the crisis in the region. conflict resolution effects, these projects should be carried out within a framework The adoption of democratic principles such as the r ule of law, fundamental of peace agreements based on inclusive dialogue and in a comprehensive, planned, human rights, rule by consent and public interest-based political participation will funded and effective programme that provides sufficient incentives for voluntary enhance acco untability a nd t ransparency, w hich a re f undamental t o p eace mass dem obilisation, p roductive e conomic en gagements a nd ef fective building in t he N iger D elta. L ack o f p olitical p articipation co uld in duce a nd reintegration in to s ociety. E xisting p rogrammes o f s kills de velopment a nd sustain poverty,75 just as self-interested participation promotes corruption, which, economic em powerment b y g overnments, in ternational o rganisations, in turn, deepens the inequalities that trigger conflicts. We contend, therefore, that international donor agencies and non governmental organisations (NGOs) are still the de epening o f t he dem ocratic co ntent o f g overnance i s t he b est o ption f or feeble, p articularly in t he lig ht o f t he h uge m ass un employment si tuation a nd securing peace in the Niger Delta. economic decline. Furthermore, it should be noted that democratic methods and democratically Besides, something concrete has to be done to provide temporary economic based negotiations are yet to be adopted as a mechanism for resolving the conflict. support to militia members and leaders who have been receiving huge amounts The p rocesses o f b road co nsultation, p articipation, di alogue, n egotiations w ith from o il t heft, k idnapping a nd ext ortion f rom o il co mpanies, p ayments f rom critical actors and the building of compromises and agreements have been very governments and commissions from vessels and oil theft syndicates. Apart from poor. It should be noted that conflict resolution mechanisms, among others, are efforts aimed at a militia amnesty, development and political reform goals would more effective in a democratic environment than violent confrontation. Thus, the be f utile w ithout a f undamental a nd co mprehensive r esolution o f t he r egion’s democratisation o f t he co nflict m anagement p rocess w ould b e cr itical f or t he development and p olitical p roblems. T ackling t hese c hallenges i s f urther resolution of the conflict. predicated o n t he w illingness o f t he p olitical le adership t o co mmit ‘ symbolic In N igeria, e lections – w hich a re a m ost cr itical a spect o f dem ocratic suicide’,77 for dem ocracy w ill b e ac hieved o nly w hen t he p olitical le adership governance – h ave b een a bused t hrough r igging o f v otes. Thi s m eans t hat t he abandons its pursuit of parochial interests.78 leadership h ave n ot b een c hosen b y t he p eople a nd t hat n o s ocial co ntract o r compact have b een established b etween the p eople and those w ho govern. The NOTES implication is that the needs and aspirations of citizens are not at the forefront of the government’s agenda and activities. The result is frustrated expectations that 1 U U kiwo, F rom ‘ pirates’ t o ‘ militants’: a hi storical p erspective o n a nti-state a nd a nti-oil have led to violence. Ike Okonta sums up the role of democratic, governance and company m obilisation a mong t he I jaw o f W arri, w estern N iger D elta, African Af fairs 106(425) (2007), 587–610. rights deficits in the crisis as follows: 2 A Ik elegbe, P opular a nd cr iminal v iolence a s in struments o f s truggle: t he c ase o f y outh militias in t he N iger D elta r egion, P aper p resented a t t he N ordic A frican I nstitute MEND properly understood, is the violent child of the deliberate and long running International Workshop on Violent Conflict in the Niger Delta, Oslo, 18–19 August 2008. constriction of the public space in t he Niger Delta in w hich the ordinary citizens, 3 P Collier and A H oeffler, On e conomic causes of civil war, Oxford Economic Papers 50(4) now reduced to penurious citizens, can exercise their civil and political rights in the (1998), 563–573; P Collier and A Hoeffler, On the incidence of civil war in Africa, Journal of Conflict Resolution 46(1) (2002), 13–28. legitimate pursuit of material and social wellbeing. Behind the mask of the MEND 4Ukiwo, From ‘pirates’ to ‘militants’; U Ukiwo, Horizontal inequalities and insurgency in the militant is a p olitical subject forced to pick up an AK-47 t o restore his rights as a Niger D elta, P aper p resented a t t he I nternational C onference o n t he N igerian S tate, Oi l citizen.76 Industry and the Niger Delta, Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, 11–13 March 2008; A Ikelegbe, Beyond

248 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 249 MILITIAS, PIRATES AND OIL IN THE NIGER DELTA Ibaba Samuel Ibaba and Augustine Ikelegbe

the threshold of civil struggle: youth militancy and the militiaisation of the resource conflict 23 Okonta, Behind the mask. in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, African Study Monographs 27(3) (2006), 87–122. 24 Ikelegbe, Beyond the threshold of civil struggle. 5 A Ikelegbe, The economy of conflict in the oil-rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria, African and 25 Ibid, 47. Asian Studies 5(1) (2006), 1–55. 26 Ukiwo, Horizontal inequalities and insurgency in the Niger Delta, 1175. 6 Ukiwo, Horizontal inequalities and insurgency in the Niger Delta. 27 Human Rights Watch, Violence in Nigeria’s oil-rich Rivers State, 3. 7 Philippe B illon, B uying p eace o r f uelling wa r: t he r ole o f co rruption in a rmed co nflicts, 28 The Punch, 18 May 2009; This Day, 18 May 2009; The Nation, 18 May 2009. Journal of International Development 15 (2003), 413–426. 29 Ikelegbe, Popular and criminal violence as instruments of struggle, 17–18. 8 Collier and Hoeffler, On economic causes of civil war; Collier and Hoeffler, On the incidence 30 Ibid, 18–19. of civil war in Africa. 31 S I Ibaba, Alienation and militancy in the Niger Delta: hostage taking and the dilemma of the 9 The Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC), Overview of SPDC Operations, Paper Nigerian state, African Journal on Conflict Resolution 8(2) 2008, 11–34, 22. presented at SPDC seminar for academics, Port Harcourt, 5–6 November 2008. 32 Watts, Petro-insurgency or criminal syndicate?, 653. 10 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Niger Delta human development report, 33 Ibid. Abuja: UNDP, 2006. 34 Agbu, Ethnic militias and the threat to democracy, 29. 11 Michael Watts, Petro-insurgency or criminal syndicate? Conflict and violence in t he Niger 35 Claude Ake, The political question, in H E A lapiki (ed), The Nigerian political process, Port Delta, Review of African Political Economy 114 (2007), 637–660. Harcourt: Emhai Printing and Publishing, 2001; E Ekekwe, Class and state in Nigeria, Lagos: 12 S M M urshed a nd M Z T adjoeddin, R evisiting t he g reed a nd g rievance exp lanations f or Longman, N igeria, 1986; S O yovbaire, Th e N igerian s tate a s a co nceptual va riable, in C violent in ternal co nflict, Journal o f International D evelopment 21(1) (2008), 87–111, 102, Edogun (ed), Nigeria: politics, administration and development, Port Harcourt: The Nigeria http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/search/allsearch?mode=quicksearch&WISindexid1=W Political Science Association, University of Port Harcourt, 1980; K K Aaron, Can a privatised ISall&WISsearch1=revisiting+the+greed+and+grievance (accessed 14 January 2009). state p rivatise? I nsights a nd exp eriences f rom N igeria’s p rivatisation p rogramme, THED I 13 Murshed and Tadjoeddin, Revisiting the greed and grievance explanations, 104. Monograph 1, Port Harcourt: Kemuela Publications, 2006. 14 B B B N aanen, Oil producing minorities and the restructuring of Nigerian federalism: the 36 Human Rights Watch, Violence in Nigeria’s oil-rich Rivers State, 3. case of the Ogoni people, Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 33(1) (1995), 37 Agbu, Ethnic m ilitias a nd t he t hreat t o d emocracy; H uman R ights W atch, V iolence in 46–78. Nigeria’s oil r ich R ivers State; P M L ubeck, M J W atts and R onnie L ipschutz, Convergent 15 C O Ikporukpo, The oil industry and communal self-destruction in the Niger Delta region, interest: US en ergy security and the ‘securing’ of Nigerian democracy, Internal policy report, Paper p resented a t t he Fir st P an I jaw C onference, 2003, R ivers S tate: I jaw C ongress Washington, DC: Center for International Policy, 2007; Ib aba, Alienation and militancy in Publications, 21–26. the Niger Delta; Joab-Peterside, On the militarisation of Nigeria’s Niger Delta. 16 Naanen, Oi l-producing min orities a nd t he r estructuring o f N igerian f ederalism; C harles 38 Ikporukpo, The oil industry and communal self-destruction in the Niger Delta region, 21. Ukeje a nd Wale A debanwi, E thno-nationalist c laims in s outhern N igeria: in sights f rom 39 O Nnoli, Ethnic politics in Nigeria, Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers 1978; J S Coleman, Yoruba a nd I jaw n ationalisms sin ce t he 1990s, Ethnic a nd R acial S tudies 31(3) (2008), Nigeria: background to nationalism, Benin City: Brosburg and Winstrom, 1986; A ugustine 563–591; K O koko a nd N J Nna, F ederalism and r esource allocation: t he N igerian Ikelegbe, State, militias and conflict in N igeria, Canadian Journal of African Studies 39(3) experience, Nigerian Journal of Oil and Politics 1(1) (1997), 16–35. (2005), 490–516. 17 Lemmy O wugah, Th e N iger D elta co nflict: r esource co ntrol a nd r evolutionary v iolence, 40 Ukiwo, From ‘pirates’ to ‘militants’. Paper presented at the International Conference on the Nigerian State, Oil Industry and the 41 C O O pukri a nd I S Ib aba, I nter-ethnic co nflicts in N igeria a nd t he n ational q uestion, Niger Delta, Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, 11–13 March 2008, 715. Development Studies Round Table 2(2) (2006), 35–47 18 Owugah, Local resistance and the state, 5–8. 42 Ikporukpo, The oil industry and communal self-destruction in the Niger Delta region. 19 Watts, Petro-insurgency or criminal syndicate?, 656. 43 Ibid; S I Ib aba, Understanding t he N iger D elta crisis, P ort H arcourt: A methyst a nd 20 Ibid, 656; Osita Agbu, Ethnic militias and the threat to democracy in post-transition Nigeria, Colleagues Publishers, 2005. Research r eport 127, N ordiska A frika I nstitute, 2004, 29–32; S J oab-Peterside, On t he 44 Joab-Peterside, On the militarisation of Nigeria’s Niger Delta. militarisation of Nigeria’s Niger Delta: the genesis of ethnic militia in R ivers State, African 45 Ikporukpo, The oil industry and communal self-destruction in the Niger Delta region, 26. Conflict Profile 1(2) (2005), 40–45; Ike Okonta, Behind the mask: Niger Delta economies of 46 Cyril O bi, En ter t he dra gon? C hinese o il co mpanies a nd r esistance in t he N iger D elta, violence, Working P aper 11, O xford: S t P eters C ollege, O xford University, 2006; H uman Review o f A frican P olitical Ec onomy 35(3) (2008), 417–434, 423, h ttp://www.informa- Rights Watch, Violence in Nigeria’s oil rich Rivers State in 2004, Briefing Paper, 2005, 4. world.com (accessed 14 January 2009). 21 Kaiama Declaration, Resolutions of the All Ijaw Youths Conference, Kaiama, Bayelsa State, 47 Aaron, C an a p rivatised s tate p rivatise?; O Ib eanu, Two r ights m ake a w rong: b ringing 11 December 1998. human r ights b ack in to N iger D elta di scourse, P aper p resented a t t he I nternational 22 Ukiwo, Horizontal inequalities and insurgency in the Niger Delta. Conference on the Nigerian State, Oil Industry and the Niger Delta, Yenagoa, Bayelsa State,

250 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 251 MILITIAS, PIRATES AND OIL IN THE NIGER DELTA Ibaba Samuel Ibaba and Augustine Ikelegbe

11–13 M arch 2008, 96–106; K O koko, J N na a nd S I Ib aba, The p olitics o f o il a nd t he 69 I S Ib aba, Understanding t he Niger D elta cr isis, Port H arcourt: A methyst a nd C olleagues development o f u nderdevelopment i n t he N iger D elta, P ort H arcourt, U niversity o f P ort Publishers, 2005. Harcourt Press, 2006; A Ikein The impact of oil on a developing country: the case of Nigeria, 70 K O koko, Th e S hell P etroleum D evelopment C ompany (S PDC) – H ost C ommunity Ibadan: E vans B rothers (N igeria Pu blishers), 1991; C O Ik porukpo, F ederalism, p olitical Relations Survey, Unpublished report, 1998. power and the economic power game: conflict over access to petroleum resource in Nigeria, 71 The Nation, 18 May 2009; Watts, Petro-insurgency or criminal syndicate?, 20. Environment P lanning, G overnment a nd P olicy 14 (1996), 159–177; C O O pukri a nd S I 72 Watts, Petro-insurgency or criminal syndicate?, 20. Ibaba, Oi l-induced en vironmental deg radation a nd in ternal p opulation di splacement in 73 Gregory En egwea a nd Ga briel U moden, NYSC: tw enty y ears o f n ational s ervice, L agos: Nigeria’s Niger Delta, Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa 10(1) (2008), 173–193, Gabumo Publishing, 1993, 1. http://www.jsd-africa.com/Jsda/V10N1_Spring2008/PDF/OilInducedEnvDegr.pdf 74 The Willink C ommission, Report of the c ommission appointed to en quire into the fears of (accessed 13 M arch 2008); N aanen, Oi l p roducing min orities a nd t he r estructuring o f minorities and the means of allaying them, London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1958. Nigerian federalism; N J Nna, The Niger Delta: state legislation and disempowerment, Owerri: 75 Okonta, Behind the mask. Springfield, 2001. 76 Ibid, 23. 48 Ukeje and Adebanwi, Ethno-nationalist claims in southern Nigeria, 581. 77 P Patrick Wilmot, Apartheid and African liberation, Ile-Ife: University of Ife Press, 1982, 148. 78 I A B aamus, E thnic mi litia m ovements a nd t he cr isis o f p olitical o rder in p ost-military 49 SPDC, Overview of SPDC operations. Nigeria, Journal of Social Science 13(3) (2006), 191–198, 197. 50 Ibaba, Understanding the Niger Delta crisis. 51 Mbanefoh a nd E gwaikhide, R evenue a llocation in N igeria: der ivation p rinciple r evisited, 226. 52 Watts, Petro-insurgency or criminal syndicate?, 653. 53 National Standard, 15 November 2007, 20. 54 Ikelegbe, Beyond the threshold of civil struggle 55 Joab-Peterside, On the militarisation of Nigeria’s Niger Delta, 46–47. 56 Human Rights Watch, Violence in Nigeria’s oil rich Rivers State, 4–6. 57 S I Ibaba, The environment and sustainable development in the Niger Delta: the Bayelsa State experience, Unpublished PhD thesis, Port Harcourt: University of Port Harcourt, 2004. 58 Murshed a nd T adjoeddin, R evisiting t he g reed a nd g rievance exp lanations f or v iolent internal conflict. 59 Ikelegbe, The economy of conflict, 117. 60 The Punch, 13 March 2009. 61 Report of the Niger Delta Technical Committee 2008, 120. Thi s committee was set up in September 2008 by the federal government to collate and review all past reports on the Niger Delta, appraise the recommendations, and make other proposals that will assist in co nflict resolution and p eace building in t he Niger D elta. Th e committee s ubmitted its report in November 2008. 62 E Osaghae, A Ik elegbe, O O larinmoye and S O khomina, Youth militias, self-determination and resource control struggles in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, 2007. 63 Ikelegbe, Beyond the threshold of civil struggle. 64 Human Rights Watch, Violence in Nigeria’s oil-rich Rivers State, 9. 65 P M L ubeck, M J W atts and R L ipschutz, Convergent interests: US energy security and the ‘securing’ of Nigerian democracy, International Policy Report, Center for International Policy, Washington, DC, 2007, 4. 66 Ikelegbe, The economy of conflict, 47–48. 67 Joab-Peterside, On the militarisation of Nigeria’s Niger Delta, 48. 68 Oil M inerals P roducing A reas D evelopment C ommssion (O MPADEC), Quarterly R eport (1) 1993, 1–5; Owugah, Local resistance and the state.

252 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 253 CHAPTER 9 Rebels, militias and governance in Sudan

Samson S Wassara

INTRODUCTION

Understanding the nature of rebellions and civil wars in S udan requires a c lose look a t t he i ssues t hat co ntribute t o s uspicion, l ack o f co nfidence a nd m utual distrust in its heterogeneous society. The primary actors in the armed violence are the g overnment, r ebels a nd mi litia g roups. Th eir co mmitment t o t he u se o f violence in addr essing problems could be examined from the perspective of the economic and social structures of the country, ideologies, the quest for power at different le vels, a nd t he s truggle f or co ntrol o f r esources. I t i s dif ficult t o disassociate t he p henomenon o f a rmed v iolence f rom t he r ole o f o ther fac tors influencing do mestic co nflicts. H uman s ecurity i s t hreatened b y r esponses o f governments, r ebels a nd t he mi litias t hat a re dir ectly in volved in t he dif ferent violent conflicts in Sudan. The purpose of this chapter is to identify militia and rebel groups and review their roles and those of other actors in the Sudanese conflict situation. The chapter also examines factors of violence and the strategies actors adopt during the armed conflict. Hence, t here are related concepts t hat should b e explained in o rder to understand t he nature of rebels and other armed Sudanese groups t hat operate across international boundaries.

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The history of political instability in in dependent Sudan can be attributed to Historical grievances the co lonial legac y t hat i solated S outhern S udan f rom n orthern S udan. Furthermore, the causes of rebellions and armed violence are rooted in the ethnic The conflict in Sudan can be said to be partly a product of history and the colonial composition o f S udan, in hi storical g rievances a nd in e conomic di sparities. legacy. The slave trade during the Turko-Egyptian period and the Mahdist regime at Incompatible p ublic p olicies a nd p roblems o f m arginalisation o f t he co untry’s the en d o f t he 19t h cen tury lef t i ts m ark o n et hnic r elationships in S udan. regions in terms of wealth and power-sharing are at the heart of centre-periphery Reference t o n ative S udanese b y s ome n ortherners a s s laves (abd) perpetuates disputes in the country. Nearly all rebel groups in the country claim that they are distrust and indignation. These ancient hatreds revive identity differentiations and fighting because their regions have been neglected by Khartoum-based oligarchies violent rivalries, contributing to prolonged conflict in Sudan. since in dependence in 1956. G iven t he r ise in t he n umber o f r ebellions, p ost- With regard to Sudan’s colonial legacy, scholars such as Mohamed O Beshir, Sir independent regimes have used several strategies to undermine rebel groups in James Robertson, Oliver B Albino, Robert O Collins and Severino Fuli argue that Sudan. The cheapest and most effective strategy to contain rebellions was to enlist the British Southern policy was partly responsible for the north-south divide in civilians in militia groups. This chapter therefore attempts to provide an analysis Sudanese p olitics.2 The S outhern p olicy f ormulated b y t he B ritish co lonial of t he Sudanese rebel g roups, t ogether w ith t he g overnment responses a nd t he administration in the 1920s advocated separate development for Southern Sudan. manner in w hich t hey m anipulate et hnicity, s ocial s tructure a nd ide ologies t o This consisted of closing S outhern Sudan to a ll Islamic and Arab inf luences in control p ower a nd e conomic r esources. I t a lso f ocuses o n r esponses o f t he terms o f t rade, e ducation a nd r eligion. Thi s p olicy c hanged o nly a fter a n international community to the problems related to the violence in Sudan. administrative co nference o n 12 A pril 1946 r ecommended t hat t he f uture o f Southern Sudan should be linked to a united Sudan. It is against this background THE NATURE OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY IN SUDAN that the colonial administration implemented a n ew policy of merging Southern Sudan and northern Sudan as an administrative unit after the Juba Conference on Sudan is a co untry subject to ethnic fusion over millennia. Its early history has 12–15 June 1947. Thi s was followed by the nomination of s outherners into the revolved l argely a round exp ansion o f E gyptian inf luences s outhwards t hrough Legislative Assembly in 1948. A ll these developments led to the involvement of trade a nd co nquests. A ncient in digenous k ingdoms in t he N ile va lley, s uch a s Southern Sudanese in the political system tuned to self-determination of Sudan. Meroe, Alwa, Makuria and Soba, were infiltrated by the over centuries. The However, t he im plementation o f t he S udanisation p rogramme r esulted in a present Sudan is the product of the Turko-Egyptian military campaigns in search public o utcry in S outhern S udan b ecause t he ci vil s ervice wa s do minated b y of gold and slaves led by Mohamed Ali from Egypt in 1821. The expansion of the northerners. S outherners w ere di sappointed b y t he ac tion o f t he t ransitional invasion into the Blue Nile, the Nuba Mountains, and later to the southern part of government b ecause t hey h eld o nly six j unior admini strative p ositions. Thi s Sudan, b rought t ogether p opulations w ith dif ferent o rigins. Th e et hnic development was regarded by Southern politicians as deceit and another effort at composition of contemporary Sudan includes Arabs, Nubians, Beja and Fur in the Northern internal colonialism. north, N ilotics (Din ka, N uer S hilluk et c), a nd n on-Nilotic g roups s uch a s t he Southern m embers o f p arliament c alled f or a co nference t o di scuss a Azande who live on the Nile-Congo divide plateau.1 The domination of power by constitution that would embody a federal status for Southern Sudan. On 13 M ay ethnic g roups t hat c laim A rab des cent h as b een p artially r esponsible f or t he 1955, Prime Minister Ismail al-Azhari issued a stern warning against holding such conflicts and rebellions in Sudan. Indeed, the perception of the Sudanese conflicts a co nference, b ut i t n evertheless t ook p lace o n 5–6 J uly 1955. 3 Conference as A rabs v ersus b lack A fricans f inds i ts o rigins in t he et hnic s tructure o f t he participants dem anded, a mong o thers, a f ederal sys tem o f g overnment. Th e society. political co nfrontations t hat en sued le d t o r iots o f w orkers in J uly 1955 a t t he

256 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 257 REBELS, MILITIAS AND GOVERNANCE IN SUDAN Samson S Wassara

Nzara a groindustrial co mplex. Th e de ath o f ci vilians a t t he h ands o f n orthern The quest for cultural and ideological domination troops during the riots accelerated the mutiny (which started on 18 August Issues o f n ational identity, et hnicity, l anguage a nd r eligion a re un derpinned by 1955) and marked the beginning of rebellions in Sudan before independence was debates about the contradictory nature of Sudanese politics that drives the society attained.4 into r ebellion. S udan i s di verse in t erms o f g eography, c ulture a nd t he p eople. Lesch des cribes in det ail t he di verse et hnic composition of t he s ociety and t he Power and political rivalry contested n ational iden tity o f S udan.7 The ide ological f oundations o f S udanese politics were constructed on the platform of uniformities. It means the nationalist Policy in congruities ado pted b y the p ost-colonial g overnments o f S udan movements t hat s tepped in to t he s hoes o f co lonial p owers a t in dependence contributed to the political violence and the emergence of rebel movements and formulated exclusive national policies based on race and religion. militia groups on the political scene. The roots of the divisive policies and political Ethnic co mplex a nd e conomic m arginalisation w ere im portant fac tors in rivalry could be traced back to the vision and subsequent split of the Graduates’ subsequent rebellions against the political regimes in K hartoum. Lesch8 and Jok9 Congress in to r ival p olitical a ssociations in t he 1940s. Thi s o rganisation wa s demonstrate that the military government of General took over created in 1938 b y Sudanese civil servants to advocate self-determination during power f rom ci vilians in 1958 t o im pose t he p olicies o f A rabisation a nd the colonial period. The Graduates’ Congress later fragmented into two political Islamisation t hat p revious ci vilian p ost-independent g overnments co uld n ot 5 enforce. The military regime took repressive measures such as forced Islamisation parties: Ashigga and Umma. Ashigga became the National Unionist Party in the of chiefs, changing weekends from Sunday to Friday (that is, observing Friday as 1950s and le d to t he t ransitional government under t he l ast colonial governor- the weekly day off for government, public and business offices instead of Sunday) general o f S udan. Th ese p olitical p arties w ere a t t he cen tre o f t he di visive a nd and f orcing p arents t o s end c hildren t o K oranic s chools ( khalwas) t o enf orce violent political developments after independence. cultural domination on Southern Sudan. Although the regime was brought down The first post-colonial elections in 1958 revealed serious divisions in the ranks by popular demonstrations in 1964, the successive central governments continued of the northern parties. The Umma Party won the election, but could not attain a similar policies until the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in decisive victory to enable it to push an Islamic constitution through parliament. 2005. The s everity o f t he p olitical f eud b etween t he Umma Party a nd o ther p olitical parties invited t he Sudanese military to t he p olitical arena. This led to G eneral Economic and social exclusion Ibrahim Abboud t aking p ower t hrough a mi litary coup d ’état on 17 N ovember 1958.6 The purpose of the takeover was to silence the demand of southerners for a Historically, t he co lonial g overnment wa s n ot in terested in b alanced e conomic federal sys tem o f g overnment a nd t o im pose A rabisation a nd I slamisation b y growth. I t f ocused o n exp ort-oriented de velopment p rogrammes s uch a s t he production o f co tton a nd gum A rabic. A gricultural s chemes a nd t ransport force. A bboud’s p olicies p recipitated a n ational p olitical di vide a nd le d t o t he infrastructure were planned and developed to respond to British demand for these emergence of the movement in 1963. products. F or t his r eason, ra ilway lin es a nd a groindustry s prang u p in cen tral At the time, competition for power between civilian and military elites became Sudan, while infrastructure in the outlying regions of southern and western Sudan a n ew p henomenon in S udanese p olitics. In fac t, p ower os cillated b etween t he was n eglected. Th e co lonial de velopment p rogramme l aid t he f oundation o f military a nd t he ci vilian e lites t hroughout t he p ost-colonial hi story o f S udan. imbalanced economic development. As a result, the post-colonial governments of Rebellions were the common denominator in t he rivalries between the military Sudan inherited the Gezira Scheme and Sudan Railways, in addition to a few light and democratic governments. Most regime changes took place in Sudan when an industries around Khartoum. There are manifest links between economic policies, active civil war was raging in the country. welfare o f ci tizens a nd a rmed co nflicts in a g iven p olitical sys tem. S tudies o f

258 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 259 REBELS, MILITIAS AND GOVERNANCE IN SUDAN Samson S Wassara

conflict economics demonstrate that there is a potential for violence when glaring Map 9–1: Oil exploration and conflict areas economic disparities characterise an economic system and armed conflicts have economic cos ts related to wa ging civil wars or preventing t hem.10 This wa s t he situation in S udan w hen A bboud’s mi litary r egime l aunched t he f irst t en-year national de velopment p lan in 1960 a nd t he s ubsequent f ive-year p lans d uring Nimeiri’s military regime in the 1970s. Plans formulated by the government reinforced concentration of development programmes in cen tral Sudan. For example, new dams were built at Er R usairis and New Halfa to boost irrigation projects in Khashm el Girba and Managil; sugar factories w ere co nstructed a t G uneid H ajr e l-Asalaya a nd K enana; a nd cem ent factories were built in Rabak and Atbara. These plans allowed a concentration of development activities in the centre of the country while outlying regions such as Southern S udan, t he N uba M ountains, s outhern B lue N ile, e astern S udan a nd Darfur were excluded from economic development, thus exacerbating feelings of marginalisation. Th e rebellions and civil wars after t he in dependence of Sudan could be attributed to economic and social exclusion from national development plans.

Oil exploration and exploitation

A n ew fac tor t hat co ntributed t o t he exi sting p roblems wa s o il. Oi l i s a lso considered an immediate cause of the civil war that started in 1983. The discovery of oil in 1978 and how it was exploited was a major factor in triggering the conflict between t he g overnment o f N imeiri a nd t he r egional g overnment o f S outhern Sudan in 1983. 11 Oil exploitation in Southern Sudan adds to the region’s strategic importance and attracted transnational companies (TNCs) such as the American Chevron, the French Total, and the Canadian Arakis Energy Corporation. These companies were involved in o il exploration and exploitation in t he region in t he period 1978–1998. Patey refers to Chevron, Total and Arakis as first movers and to Talisman, OVM-Austria and Lundin Petroleum – which entered the race for oil in 1998–2003 – a s Western j uniors.12 But p ressure f rom h uman r ights g roups forced o ut t he f irst t wo in 2002 a nd 2003 r espectively, le aving o nly L undin Petroleum of Sweden still in operation in Sudan. Source: http://www.rightsmaps.com/.

260 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 261 REBELS, MILITIAS AND GOVERNANCE IN SUDAN Samson S Wassara

Asian TN Cs, s uch a s t he C hina N ational P etroleum C orporation, t he rebel groups have emerged to seek justice for the marginalised peoples of Sudan Malaysian Petronas and the Indian ONGC, filled the vacuum left by the departed through armed struggle. The history of rebel groups since independence reveals Western o il in vestors. Th ese TN Cs co ntinued t o o perate in S udanese o ilfields that Southern Sudan was the hothouse of these rebellions, leading the world to despite cr iticism b y h uman r ights o rganisations. Th e W est acc used t hem o f describe the conflict in the country as a south–north conflict. As different civilian sponsoring militia in Unity State and northern Upper Nile to protect their business and military regimes emerged and collapsed, there were also a m ultiplication of interests. The desire to control the oilfields became a decisive factor in the creation rebel groups in t he transitional areas such as the Nuba Mountains and the Blue and use of tribal militia forces to ensure the security of TNCs in the oil areas. The Nile, as well as in other regions such as eastern Sudan and Darfur. relations b etween TNCs and mi litia g roups were n ot well received by t he lo cal Although t his c hapter em phasises t he S PLA a nd S udan L iberation population a nd t he S udan P eople’s L iberation A rmy (S PLA). Oi lfield s ecurity Movement/Army (SLM/A) rebel groups in Sudan, table 9–1 provides a summary arrangements between the government, the TNCs and the local militia targeted of all the main rebel groups in Sudan from 1955 to 2009. local communities t hat were uprooted and replaced by new s ettlers. Paul Wani Gore13 explains the demographic impact of oil exploration in the northern Upper Table 9–1: Main rebel groups in Sudan Nile as follows: Rebel Year Estimated Leadership Comments/notes First, during the civil war people were forced to leave their land in masses either as movement launched strength* displaced people within the GoS controlled areas or behind the SPLA lines. The Torit 1955 NA Emidio Tafeng Some disappeared into the population in t he area was thus drastically reduced. Second, those who remained Mutineers and Paul Ali countryside and others resettled in behind were dislodged or killed when oil was discovered on their land. About 80 Gbutala Congo-Léopoldville (Kinshasa) where they regrouped to launch the villages were burned and the inhabitants were either killed or forced to escape from Anyanya I armed movement the advancing army and the militias who came to clear the area to make way for the Anyanya 1963 15 000 Emidio Operations concentrated along the oil companies. Tafeng, border areas of Congo (now the Despite t hese in cidents, t he A sian TN Cs r emained imm une t o h uman r ights 1963–1969 DRC), Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia. Disbanded in 1972 with the signing groups’ protests to excesses committed by government forces and the militias in Joseph Lagu, of the Addis Ababa Agreement Sudan. Th ey w ere interested in t he exp loitation of t he oil at any cos t. In 2004, 1970–1972 China had the largest share (41 per cent) in Petrodar, a consortium of the China Anyanya II 1977 NA Samuel Gai Remnants of the Akobo Mutiny in National P etroleum C orporation, P etronas (40 p er cen t) a nd o ther les ser Tut; Akuot 1975 who escaped into Ethiopia. companies. The Chinese brand of bilateralism with the government of Sudan was Atem to Leaders killed by the SPLA; dispersed 1975–1983; and became government militia in not linked to conflict resolution, as it kept aloof from the excesses committed by William Upper Nile. Choul and Koang the g overnment o r i ts t ribal mi litias in o ilfields a nd e ven side d w ith S udan in Abdalla replaced the murdered leaders multilateral forums such as the UN Security Council. Choul; Gordon REBEL GROUPS IN SUDAN Koang Sudan 1983 125 000* Dr John Launched in 1983 and supported by Sudanese rebel groups can be defined as organised armed movements that have People’s Garang, the Ethiopian Derg. Operated in the risen up against central governments in Khartoum to pursue identity, nationalism, Liberation 1983–2005 whole Southern Sudan, parts of the justice, p olitical r ights a nd c hange in t he p olitical sys tem es tablished sin ce Army Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile and independence of the country in 1956. From the inception of the SPLA in 1983, the eastern Sudan. Transformed into an army in 2005 after the CPA distribution of rebel groups has tended to stretch beyond Southern Sudan. Various

262 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 263 REBELS, MILITIAS AND GOVERNANCE IN SUDAN Samson S Wassara

Eastern 2005 6 000 to Musa An amalgam of rebel groups that Koang Chol. However, the Marxist-Leninist regime of Ethiopia did n ot lend its Front 7 000 Mohamed operated under the umbrella of the support t o t he Anyanya I I movement, w hich c alled f or s eparation o f S outhern Ahmed and Democratic National Alliance Sudan. (This chapter w ill t reat t he SPLA and Sudan L iberation Army [SLA] as Mabruk Salim established in 1989. They signed the Mubarak Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement in typical S udanese exa mples o f t he p roliferation o f r ebel g roups t hat w ere 2007 established because of marginalisation and which strived to achieve justice in a

Sudan 2003 8 000 to Abdel Wahid Operates in the three states of Darfur united Sudan.) Liberation 9 000 el-Nur (2003 with a concentration around Jebel Army to date) Marra Mountain. The SLA Abdel Wahid faction continues to wage an THE SUDAN PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY armed struggle to liberate Darfur The SPLA emerged as a r esult of accumulated grievances of Southern Sudanese Minni Minawi Joined the government of Sudan against the central government in Khartoum, such as poor implementation of the (2006 to after signing the DPA in 2006. date) Operated in Darfur like a pro- Addis A baba A greement. Th e a brogation o f t he A ddis A baba A greement a nd government militia group promulgation of September Laws in 1983 were merely the final nails in the coffin

Justice and 2003 5 000 Khalil Ibrahim Operates in Darfur, but attacked of the decade-long fragile peace. Equality Omdurman in May 2008. Signed a The SPLA originated in the Bor mutiny on 13 May 1983 under the command Movement framework peace agreement with of Karbino Kuanyin. It was the result of an underground resistance movement led (JEM) the government in Qatar in February by . The Ethiopian government requested the Southern Sudanese to 2010 submit concept notes outlining t heir goals and objectives to prove t heirs was a * Excluding joint integration units, police, prisons and wildlife services. liberation movement worth supporting. The first paper presented by the Anyanya Sources: constructed by the author from sources such as Mohamed Omer Beshir, The Southern Sudan: from conflict to peace, Khartoum: Khartoum Bookshop, 1975, 68; Gérard Prunier, Armed II leadership s tressed s ecession o f S outhern S udan f rom t he r est o f S udan. movements in Sudan, Chad, CAR, Somalia, Eritrea and Ethiopia, Analyse 02/08, Berlin: Centre for However, the Ethiopian government rejected the idea of secession and accordingly International Peace Operations, 2008, 3–4; ICG, Sudan: saving peace in the east, Africa Report 102 refused to support a cause that would play into the hands of Eritrean secessionist (5 January 2006), 6; Sudan Issue Brief 15, December 2009, 8, htpp://www.smallarmssurvey armed movements. John Garang then prepared a second concept paper, stressing sudan.org (accessed 15 March 2010). unity of the Sudan on a n ew basis that would create New Sudan, which won the acceptance o f t he E thiopian g overnment. Th e p aper s tated t hat t he S udanese movement would create a socialist-oriented united Sudan and that the movement Historical fac ts a bout p olitical co nflict in S udan s how t hat t he n umber o f would b e c alled t he S udan P eople’s L iberation M ovement/Army (S PLM/A). Sudanese rebel g roups is increasing.14 The f irst recognised rebel g roup in p ost- Ethiopian en dorsement o f Ga rang’s p aper s parked a de adly p ower s truggle colonial Sudan was the Anyanya movement. This rebel group concluded the Addis between his group and the Anyanya I I supporters, the majority of whom hailed Ababa Agreement with the military government of Jaafar Nimeiri in 1972. Th e from the Nuer Nilotic group. The disagreement degenerated into a Din ka versus agreement granted the group a f orm of autonomy similar to the federal system Nuer confrontation and political leaders of Anyanya II such as Samuel Gai Tut and southerners were calling for before the independence of Sudan. Disenchantment Akuot Atem were killed.15 with the implementation of the agreement came to light when the Akobo Wau The launching of the SPLA on a divided platform of Sudan (secession versus garrisons and Juba Airport soldiers mutinied during the period 1975–1976, which unity) co ntinued t o h aunt t he r ebel g roup in i ts de velopment a s a li beration led t o t he des ertion f rom t he a rmy b y f ormer Anyanya soldiers. Th e A kobo movement. In recognition of this fact, Arop attributes the following statement to mutineers co ngregated a t B ilpam in E thiopia un der t he co mmand o f G ordon John Garang:

264 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 265 REBELS, MILITIAS AND GOVERNANCE IN SUDAN Samson S Wassara

Our objective was therefore to influence Anyanya II and to have them join us. The military co up t o o ust t he m ovement’s le ader, J ohn Ga rang. Th e N asir fac tion Anyanya II, on the other hand, were trying to influence us to join them. Thus, at the managed t o r elease s enior S PLA o fficers s uch a s K erubino Kuanyin a nd Th on start … we had two movements with different objectives. While SPLM was for the Arok Th on W illiam N yuon f rom det ention, w ho t hen j oined t he fac tion. Th e unity of the Sudan, the Anyanya II was for the separation of Southern Sudan.16 failure of the coup had a lasting effect on the SPLA, which led to it being divided into the Torit (or mainstream) and Nasir factions. It degenerated into intertribal The S PLA ide ology wa s s pelled o ut in t he r efined do cument J ohn Ga rang violence that pitched the Nuer against the Dinka. The Bor Dinka bore the brunt of presented to the Ethiopian government. The SPLM Manifesto issued in July 1983 the conflict, as the Nuer-dominated Nasir faction overran towns and villages in embraced Marxism-Leninism as its official ideology. Tenets of the manifesto rotate Jonglei State. It drove out the Bor Dinka from their areas, forcing them to seek around issues such as creation of a new united Sudan that would provide equality refuge in E quatoria. In addition, prominent southern politicians such as Joseph and j ustice t o m arginalised a reas; adoption o f a socialist system o f r ule; Oduho and Martin Majier were casualties of the power struggle between the Torit restructuring of power of the central government to end the monopoly of power and Nasir factions. The Nasir faction collaborated with the National Islamic Front by groups of individuals such as cliques in Khartoum, and fighting against racism (NIF) regime, with the support of the new Tigrean-dominated regime in A ddis that minority groups have institutionalised and instrumentalised to repress people Ababa under Meles Zenawi, to overrun almost all the towns east of the White Nile of the marginalised areas of Sudan. previously controlled by the SPLA. Having successfully overcome the Anyanya II, the SPLA institutionalised the The SPLA received moral and military support from Kenya and Uganda after military co mmand s tructure a nd i ts p olitical w ing, t he S PLM. J ohn Ga rang losing its rear bases in Ethiopia. With this support, it was able to reorganise to halt became its chairman and commander-in-chief of t he SPLA. Kerubino Kwanyin government offensives in a n arrow strip of land along the border of Sudan with Bol a nd William Nyuon B any w ere b oth p romoted t o t he g rade o f lieu tenant- Uganda. This led to the Nasir group being isolated from neighbouring countries, colonel a nd w ere m ade dep uty c hairman a nd dep uty co mmander-in-chief a nd especially Ethiopia, which compelled the group to open communications with the chief of staff for s ecurity operations respectively. Sa lva Kiir wa s e levated to t he NIF r egime in K hartoum. Thi s c ulminated o n 21 A pril 1997 in a n a greement grade of major and appointed deputy chief of staff for security operations. The known as the Khartoum Peace Agreement (KPA). This agreement revealed a level SPLA wa s o fficially l aunched. M any o fficers a nd o fficials def ected f rom t he of fragmentation in the ranks of the Nasir faction.17 There were seven signatories government and the army to join the SPLA. They were absorbed into the existing to the agreement: military and civilian structure established by the movement. The SPLA was successful militarily in i ts early days. This was reinforced by I The Southern Sudan Independent Movement led by intensive propaganda campaigns from a radio t ransmitter in E thiopia. The rebel I The SPLA Bahr el Ghazal group led by Kerubino Kuanyin Bol group was able to build a credible army that managed to overrun and control main I The SPLA Bor group led by Arok Thon Arok towns in S outhern Sudan. With the exception of Malakal, the SPLA captured all I The SPLA independent group led by Kwac Makuei towns e ast o f t he W hite N ile b y 1989. M ilitary s uccesses o f t he S PLA w ere I The Equatoria Defence Force led by Theophilus Ochang accompanied by diplomacy. The rebel group left channels of communication open I The Union of African Parties under the leadership of Samuel Aru Bol with g roups s uch a s t he National A lliance o f w orkers a nd p olitical p arties t hat I The SPLM-United led by Lam Akol (this group signed a separate agreement in culminated in t he K oka D am D eclaration o n 24 M arch 1986. Th e de claration 1997 called the Fashoda Peace Agreement) called f or co mmitment t o co nflict r esolution; es tablishment o f p arliamentary democracy; r einstatement o f t he 1964 co nstitution o f S udan; a bolition o f t he These developments weakened the SPLA in the 1990s until the period leading to September Laws (Sharia laws); and formation of a unity government. IGAD (I nter-governmental Authority o n D evelopment) r ounds o f n egotiations The collapse of the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia led to internal dissent in the culminating in the CPA signing in Kenya. The government of Sudan exploited the SPLA. Two senior SPLA officers, Riek Machar and Lam Akol, staged a premature situation to incorporate the disparate forces of the Nasir faction into the ranks of

266 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 267 REBELS, MILITIAS AND GOVERNANCE IN SUDAN Samson S Wassara

its militia groups. However, leaders of the Nasir group soon discovered that the Wani Igga to turn his portfolio of third-in-command over to Machar. The top four government wa s n ot interested in im plementing t he KPA, and t his le d t o t heir commanders of the SPLA were John Garang, Salva Kiir, Riek Machar and Wani defection between 2002 and 2004. Igga. This streamlining of command and the integration of former defectors into In the meantime, the SPLA-Torit faction began to regain strength and overran the ranks of the SPLA enabled the rebel group to conduct negotiations in Kenya towns such as Kurmuk, Yei, , Tonj, Thiet Gogrial and Kapoeta. The SPLA as a united movement. increased its pressure on the government by besieging major cities of S outhern Although the political wing of the SPLA was not developed to the standard of Sudan s uch a s J uba a nd Wau. A s talemate o n t he wa r f ronts p rovided b etter the military wing, the rebel group was pragmatic in dealing with the international opportunities f or a n egotiated s ettlement o f t he S udanese a rmed co nflict. Th e actors. John Garang’s support of Operation L ifeline Su dan enabled t he SPLA to SPLA Nairobi Declaration of January 2002 called for change and the establishment penetrate the Western world. The organisation shifted much of its resources to of a system of accountability to ensure unity in the IGAD peace process. This was SPLA-controlled areas in the 1990s because of government intransigence towards followed by a number of seminars on the process of institution building. the W estern w orld.18 The S PLA a lso es tablished t he S udan R elief a nd Rehabilitation Agency as an umbrella organisation for local Southern Sudanese Map 9–2: Rebel-controlled areas in south Sudan, 2001 non-governmental o rganisations (N GOs) b ased in N airobi. I t b ecame t he gatekeeper of both local and international NGOs operating in S outhern Sudan. The SPLA used the agency to control civilians and assert its political dominance over external resources.19 Also, the SPLA created faith-based organisations such as the New Sudan Council of Churches, which were loyal to it. This council enabled the S PLA t o dra w t o i ts side C hristian o rganisations s uch a s t he C hristian Solidarity International and t he Samaritan Purse. These organisations, together with Sudanese churches, dislodged the SPLA from the Marxist-Leninist character it adopted to garner the support of Mengistu’s Derg in Ethiopia. The SPLA learned from the mistakes that were made during negotiations of the Addis Ababa Agreement under Joseph Lagu in 1972. The first weakness of this agreement h ad b een t he va gueness a nd l ack o f gu arantees t o en sure i ts implementation. Th at t he S PLA f eared a r epetition wa s dem onstrated in t he length of negotiations of the CPA and details of the agreement. Then John Garang made s ure t hat t here w ere m any w itnesses t o t he a greement. A nother les son learned by the SPLA from the Addis Ababa Agreement was in the area of security Source: http://www.rightsmaps.com/. arrangements. The Anyanya forces (some 6 000 men) had been absorbed into the Sudan a rmed f orces, w hile a f urther 6 000 h ad b een a bsorbed in to t he p olice, The message was appealing to the disillusioned leaders of the Nasir faction in the prisons a nd w ildlife f orces o f S outhern S udan.20 Their m ost s enior o fficers, Khartoum government, who entered into negotiations with the SPLA in Nairobi including J oseph L agu him self, h ad b een t ransferred t o t he n orth, w hich lef t and def ected t o t he S PLA. Th ese in cluded s enior le aders s uch a s R iek Machar, members in t he s outh w ithout s enior mi litary le adership. The SPLA avoided a Taban D eng Ga i a nd L am A kol. Th ey w ere reintegrated into t he rebel mi litary similar arrangement. However, its presence in the joint integrated units (JIUs) has structure and organisation. In a gesture of unity before the signing of the CPA, the not fostered integration in t he proper sense of the word. The SPLA coexisted in SPLA reshuffled its command structure to include R iek Machar, by p ersuading designated uni ts in t he lo cations o f dep loyment a s s tipulated in t he CP A.

268 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 269 REBELS, MILITIAS AND GOVERNANCE IN SUDAN Samson S Wassara

Consequently, it remained as an army with its own command during the interim The de claration o f t he S LA r esembled t he S PLA m anifesto in m any r espects, period. indicating that there were connections between the two. Although the latter had denied any relationships with groups on another war front in western Sudan, these The Sudan Liberation Movement/Army have been confirmed by Wear and Whitehouse: The SLA’s connection to the south’s SPLA is not just alphabetic or ideological. Since The SLM/A was founded by Abdel Wahid Nur, a lawyer, Abd al-Shafi, a student of 1991, w hen t he US s tarted t o s upport him, J ohn Ga rang s ought t o o pen u p a education, and Abdu Abdalla, a graduate in languages. It emerged as an organised Darfurian front in his war against Khartoum. The International Crisis Group (ICG) rebel g roup o n t he S udanese p olitical s cene w hen M inni A rkou M innawi, t he reports that the SPLA gave military training to 1 500 Darfurians in M arch 2002. secretary-general of the SLM/A, made its political declaration in a press release on These t hen w ent o n t o b ecome t he co re f ighters o f t he S LA. I ndeed t he ini tial 14 March 2003. In the declaration the movement claimed that Darfur had been an manifesto of the SLA was edited by the SPLA.22 independent state from the 16th century to the second decade of the 20th century, when it was forcibly annexed to the modern-day Sudan. The SLM/A accused the Government forces and security agents began to harass members of the Fur tribes post-independent r egimes in K hartoum o f sys tematically p ursuing a p olicy o f in Zalingei, Tour and Nyarteti on the western slopes of Jebel Marra in 2002. Th e marginalisation, di scrimination, ex clusion a nd exp loitation of D arfur w hile lack of security along the Nyala-Kas-Zalingei road was blamed on gangs of bandits waging war against ethnic groups of marginalised regions such as the Nuba, Funj, associated with the Fur people. Indeed, armed resistance had started earlier than Beja and Rashaida. The declaration further highlighted the monopoly of power the date of the SLA political declaration. The SLA was first known as the Darfur and w ealth a nd in stitutionalisation of h egemonic p olicies of control by Sudan’s Liberation Front when it launched a military attack on Golou in West Darfur on successive civilian and military regimes in Khartoum. 26 F ebruary 2003. A fter m aking i ts p olitical de claration, t he S LA a ttacked E l The SLM/A also stated that its objective was ‘to create a united Sudan on a new Fashir Airport in North Darfur on 25 April 2003, killing 75 soldiers and destroying basis o f e quality, co mplete r estructuring a nd de volution o f p ower, e ven seven a ircraft.23 The S LA en joyed t he b acking o f t he F ur, t he l argest A frican development, cultural and political pluralism, and moral and material prosperity Muslim ethnic group in Darfur, as well as the backing of the Zaghawa and Masalit for all Sudanese’.21 It made the following statements: under the leadership of Abdul Wahid al-Nur.

I The unity of Sudan must be anchored on a new basis that is predicated on full Table 9–2: Main Darfur rebel factions after the Darfur Peace Agreement acknowledgement of Sudan’s ethnic, cultural and political diversity Rebel Faction/year of Factional leadership Comments I There s hould b e a de centralised f orm o f g overnance b ased o n t he r ight o f groups / establishment Sudan’s different regions to govern themselves autonomously through a federal estimated military or confederal system strength I Arab tribes and groups were an integral and indivisible component of Darfur SLM SLM Mainstream Abdel Wahid The largest rebel group, which social fabric that have been equally marginalised and deprived of their rights 8 000 – 2003 rejected the DPA and enjoys broad to development and genuine political participation 9 000 support in Darfur. The leader is rather I The SLM/A would work to achieve an understanding and common g round isolated from his supporters with the Democratic National Alliance and other political forces in o rder to SLM Mini Minawi Signed a peace deal with the remove the NIF’s dictatorial regime and establish a dem ocratic system based Government government in May 2006. Weak after on a n ew p olitical di spensation o f f reedom, j ustice a nd r espect f or h uman 2006 the signing of the DPA and many field commanders deserted the group rights, and equality for all Sudanese

270 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 271 REBELS, MILITIAS AND GOVERNANCE IN SUDAN Samson S Wassara

SLM Masalit Khamis Abdalla Tribal in composition. Operated in However, according to Brosché24 and G ore et al 25 armed conflict had started in 2006 Dar Masalit in west Darfur Darfur b efore 2003. C onflicts b etween et hnic g roups h ave b een p art o f SLM/Classic Ahmed Abdel Shafie The group is led by a founding community relationships over local political issues and administrative boundaries 2006 member of the SLM. The faction for m ore t han f our de cades. Th e r ebel g roups in D arfur s uffered f rom rejected the DPA factionalisation d ue t o et hnic dif ferences a nd m anipulation b y t he r egime in SLM Free Will Abdel Rahman Musa Composed exclusively of Tunjur 2006 nationals. The leader was politically Khartoum. Table 9–2 p rovides a s ummary of the main Darfur rebel groups and manipulated and the group became factions that were formed after the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) a pro-government faction in Abuja in April 2006. Group of 19 Suleiman Marajan Umbrella organisation under the According t o P runier t here h as b een a n in creased f ragmentation o f r ebel 2005 leadership of the Maidob group in groups in w estern S udan a fter M inni M innawi o f t he S LA sig ned t he D PA in North Darfur Abuja.26 The SLM splintered further when Minnawi signed an agreement with the SLM/Unity Showed the highest military presence government of Sudan in May 2006, as most of his commanders deserted him. A 2006 in Darfur in 2007 and Kordofan after defectors of Minnawi rallied around major split occurred between Abdul Wahid al-Nur, who controlled the political this faction wing of the SLA, and Minni Minnawi, who controlled its military wing. Groups JEM Mainstream Khalil Ibrahim The best organised and supported such a s t he G roup o f 19 r emained a s um brella o rganisations t hat f ragmented JEM 2003 by both Chad and Eritrea. Its further into SLM/Unity and SLM Free Will, as shown in table 9–2 alongside. 5 000 programme is Islamic and negotiated Unlike in S outhern S udan, fac tionalisation a ffected r ebel m ovements o f with the government in Qatar (Doha) Darfur for a number of reasons. First, there was no history of armed movements JEM Field Mohamed Saleh Considered to be the militant Islamic from which the current rebel groups could learn lessons, which meant that they Revolutionary Harba wing of JEM, but merged with the Command SLM in late 2007 were unprepared in t he ext reme for a s ustainable armed and p olitical struggle. 2005 They launched a rebellion with the hope of finding a quick fix to their grievances, JEM Collective Abdallah Banda and Dormant since its establishment. It is but without considering the political environment and the incompatible economic Leadership Bahar Abu Garda one of the factions created with and c ultural in terests o f t heir s ub-region. S econd, t he g overnment p layed a n 2007 indirect support of the government important role in splitting the SLA. For instance, the SLM Free Will leader ended to weaken the JEM mainstream up a s g overnment mini ster in F ebruary 2007. 27 The co mpeting in ternational National Jibril Abdel Karim Supported by the Chadian military Movement for Bari interests over the possibility of oil reserves in Darfur and northern Chad attracted Other rebel Reform and many peace brokers and spoilers. It should be noted that the regions adjacent to groups Development 500 Darfur h ave p otential o il r esources. Fin ally, t he inf ormal fac tor in t he c urrent 2004 Darfur co nflict i s a c ultural co mpetition a mong A rab, En glish a nd F rench Darfur Mohamed Idris Azrag The only faction that has called for speakers. Independence secession of Darfur from Sudan Front/Army 2007

Sources: Gérard Prunier, Armed movements in Sudan, Chad, CAR, Somalia, Eritrea and Ethiopia, RESPONSES OF THE GOVERNMENT: ESTABLISHMENT Analyse 02/08, Berlin: Centre for International Peace Operations, 2008, 3–4; Johan Brosché, OF MILITIA GROUPS Darfur: dimensions and dilemmas of a complex situation, Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 2008, 24–38; Sudan Issue Brief Number 15, December Militia g roups in S udan a re o ften hir ed a nd o rganised b y t he g overnment a s 2009. auxiliaries of the national army to fight rebels groups. They are heterogeneous in

272 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 273 REBELS, MILITIAS AND GOVERNANCE IN SUDAN Samson S Wassara composition a nd operate un der dif ferent n ames, o ften acco rding t o t heir The Southern Sudan Defence Force and tribal militia geographic lo cations. Th e mi litia g roups in S udan a re p art a nd p arcel o f t he groups in Southern Sudan government’s counterinsurgency strategy. As such, they are hired to fight for the government def ence f orce. S ome mi litia g roups h ave a n et hnic o bjective w hile The es tablishment o f mi litia g roups in t he co ntext o f p olitical de velopments i s others are created by influential individuals with the goal of enriching themselves. closely r elated t o t he g eographical di stribution o f ac tors a nd o rganisational They m ake m oney from in ternal social di sorder w ith the s upport o f t he structures. The government responded to operations of rebel groups by creating government b y wa ging v iolence a gainst r ebels a nd p lundering p roperties o f the PDF in 1989. I t is an umbrella organisation for all paramilitary groups that communities supporting rebel groups. The heavy reliance of the government on existed before the NIF came to power on 30 June of the same year. There are about 31 militia groups is both an economic and a tactical strategy. 10 000 ac tive m embers o f t he P DF, w ith 85 000 r eserves. These f orces w ere From an economic perspective, the militias are cheap to maintain because they deployed a longside r egular a rmy uni ts a gainst va rious r ebel g roups. S o t he do not receive regular wages from the government. Their work is voluntary and disparate militia groups were united under the PDF in n orthern Sudan and the self-paying because they keep all the loot acquired during an operation. Tactically, Southern Sudan Defence Force (SSDF) in S outhern Sudan. Several tribal militia the government depends on militia groups because the war zones in S udan are groups a lready exi sted in S outhern S udan b y 1989. Th ey co ntinued t o b e very ext ensive, le ading t o t hin di stribution o f t he p rofessional a rmy. A nother controlled by the military intelligence until the government and the Nasir faction reason for dependence on militia groups is that the military regime of Omer el- of the SPLA concluded the Khartoum Peace Agreement. Bashir purged most of the professional officers from the army. The few remaining The SSDF was created in 1997 as a Southern Sudan component of the PDF and military and security officers were deployed around the national capital to protect as part of the K hartoum Peace Agreement to bring all the tribal militia groups the seat of the government, and light and heavy industries in central Sudan. under a unified command of Paulino Matip, who was appointed the chief of staff The various militia groups in Sudan are described in this study as ethnic and of t he SS DF. The Fertit F riendly Forces wa s un der E l Tom E l Nour in B ahr e l tribal. Other civilian paramilitary groups are recruited, trained and armed by the Ghazal, the Mundari militia under Clement Wani in Equatoria, and the Peace and government for the purpose of waging proxy wars against rebels and communities Reconstruction Brigade under Abdel Bagi Ayii in northern Bahr el-Ghazal, supporting rebel movements. The formation of tribal militia groups started under and s o f orth. Tribal wa rlords w ere g iven mi litary t itles a nd w ere authorised t o Nimeiri in 1983 as a counterinsurgency strategy.28 control t he a reas w here t heir p resence wa s p ermanently m aintained. Thi s The mi litary r egime o f Om ar e l-Bashir in stitutionalised a ll mi litia g roups structure was composed of a number of militia groups distributed in all the main supported by the government after promulgation of the Popular Defence Act in regions of Southern Sudan. Young observed that in the context of the second civil October 1989. Thi s A ct leg itimised mi litia a nd a llied p aramilitary g roups a s war, t he t erritorial b oundaries o f S outhern Sudanese a rmed g roups w ere n ever auxiliaries of the national army. Scholars such as Salmon29 and Young30 examined demarcated and the loyalties of individual members to their groups were typically the origins, composition and development of the Popular Defence Force (PDF). temporal and transient.32 The turnover of b oth territory and group affiliation – There w ere 12 m ain mi litia g roups di stributed in dif ferent p arts o f S outhern including ‘side switching’ between the government of Sudan and the SPLA – was Sudan, but the number increased depending on new political developments. The high among militia groups. Young summarised the problem as follows: PDF was headed by Brigadier Babiker Abdel Mahmoud Hassan, who was directly responsible to the president of Sudan. After 1990, all militia groups were organised There is no doubt that the SSDF comprised a significant number of fighting forces into military formations modelled on the structure of the PDF, and trained and at i ts p eak o f ac tivity. D uring t he l ast s tages o f t he s econd ci vil wa r va rious deployed in s ensitive areas such as oilfields and other oil infrastructures such as components o f t he SS DF (o f w hich t here a re o ver 30) co ntrolled l arge p arts o f pipelines a nd r efineries. Thi s s tudy exa mines t wo mi litia g roups in o rder t o western, cen tral a nd e astern Upper Nile, p arts o f n orthern a nd w estern B ahr e l deepen the understanding of the counterinsurgency strategy of the government in Ghazal, and areas of E astern E quatoria t hat were cr itical in m aking p ossible t he Sudan. development and operation of the country's emerging oil industry...

274 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 275 REBELS, MILITIAS AND GOVERNANCE IN SUDAN Samson S Wassara

But arriving at an accurate count of SSDF members remains highly problematic. National Peace Major-General Eltom Bazia, Geitano, Taban, Bussere, Halima, Bagare, First, the numbers change constantly as recruitment within some groups is ongoing. Forces (Fertit) Elnur Daldoum Mboro, Khor Gana, Deim Zubeir, Sopo, Raja and Secondly, the SSDF is largely made up of non-regular forces – and the dividing line Tumsah between civilians and combatants is extremely grey. Thirdly, some individuals may Peace and Sultan Abdel Bagi Ayii El Miram, Bahr el Arab, Agok, Malual, Tadama, identify t hemselves a s a ffiliated a t o ne m oment b ut t hen r eject t he l abel o nce a Reconstruction Um Driesi and Bringi particular objective has been achieved or given up.33 Brigade Source: John Young, The south Sudan defence forces in the wake of the Juba Declaration, Geneva: The CPA progressively changed the relations between the militia groups and the Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, 2006, 42–48, also available at SPLA. In t he b eginning t hey were angered b ecause of t heir exclusion f rom t he http://www.googlesyndicatedsearch.com/u/SmallArmsSurvey?q=John+Young%2C+The+south negotiation process in Kenya. Militia groups were not accommodated in the SPLA +Sudan+defence+forces+in+the+wake+of+th&sa=go%C2%A0 (accessed 18 December 2009). as was stipulated in the CPA when John Garang was alive. The ascendance of Salva Kiir to power after the death of Garang was marked by reconciliation between the The in crease in n umbers i s attributed t o di sagreements b etween mi litia g roups SPLA a nd m ain mi litia g roups in t he SS DF. The p rocess o f r econciliation wa s over integrating into the government army or the SPLA. Most of the militia groups sealed by the Juba Declaration of 8 January 2006. This arrangement paved the way were divided into two groups under new leaders who joined the government. For for absorption of about 18 militia groups under a number of warlords, while others example, w hen P aulino M atip j oined t he S PLA un der t he t erms o f t he J uba joined t he SAF a s s tipulated in t he CP A. I n s hort, t he mi litias o perating in Declaration, hi s s enior lieu tenants, G ordon K ong a nd Ga briel T angyang, Southern Sudan are referred to in the CPA as ‘other armed groups’. Table 9-3 is a established t heir own g roups and a llied w ith t he Sudan g overnment a rmy. The sample ext racted f rom a lo nger t able, co mpiled b y Young a nd co ntaining a n huge n umber o f mi litia g roups co mplicated t he im plementation o f t he CPA in exhaustive list of 60 dif ferent militia groups allied with the government army or Southern Sudan because they created insecurity and continuously switched sides the SPLA, which shows the heterogeneity of militia groups in Southern Sudan that between the Sudan government forces and the SPLA depending on the benefits constituted the SSDF before the Juba Declaration. one of the two may offer. The militia groups that were dissatisfied with the CPA partners melted into communities and engaged in banditry and cattle rustling. Table 9–3: Sample of militia groups according to the three regions of Southern Sudan The Janjaweed in Darfur Militia group Commander/ Areas of operation before the Juba leader Declaration The Janjaweed militia group became prominent after the Darfur rebellion in 2003. It is described as an ‘Arab’ paramilitary militia group on camels and horses and is South Sudan Major-General Paulino Bentiu, Rubkona, Mayom, Makien Wankay, Unity Matip Nhialdiu, Heglig and Kharasana known for perpetrating violence against civilians in Darfur. Movement The Janjaweed is a mi litia g roup organised by t he government t o wa ge war against r ebel g roups in D arfur. I ts m embers en listed w ith t he S udanese a rmy Fangak Forces Major-General Gabriel Bashlakon, Fangak, Deil, Kwerkan, Kwerdaf, Tangyan Faguer, Fag, Kaldak and Dor within the framework of the PDF and the military structure in D arfur known as the Border Intelligence and are recruited from two categories of ‘Arab’ tribesmen, Pibor Defence Major-General Ismael Pibor, Akobo Road, Likuangole, Juba and Bor Forces Konyi namely c amel owners in t he des ert areas of North D arfur and c attle owners in South D arfur. Th e f ormer co mprise t he M ahariya, I raygat, M ahamid a nd B eni Mundari Forces Major-General Clement Terekaka, Juba road, Tali, Rejaf East, Kaltok, Wani Gemeiza and Jebel Lado Hussein w ho u se c amels in t he o ffensive a gainst t he ci vilians b elieved t o b e supporting t he S LA. Th e c attle-owning A rabs a re t he R ezeigat, B eni H alba, Equatoria Brigadier Fabiano Torit, Juba, Torit Road and mountains around Taaisha a nd M aaliya. Th e c urrent es timated s trength o f t he Janjaweed is a bout Defence Force Odongi Torit 5 000 men.34

276 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 277 REBELS, MILITIAS AND GOVERNANCE IN SUDAN Samson S Wassara

Gore et al argue that ‘Arab’ paramilitary groups have been operating in Darfur The popularity of the rebel groups at the beginning of active rebellion in 2003 since 1980 as Libyan proxy forces.35 After the victory of Habré over Libyan-backed cannot be overestimated. The call of the rebel groups for an end to government rebel groups in Chad, they retreated to Darfur in 1988. Hoile confirms that there neglect of Darfur was popular, also among the ‘Arabs’. Communities supported the is a Chadian factor in the evolution of the Janjaweed.36 Armed ‘Arab’ groups known rebels with food supplies and cash, and many youths joined the rebels. However, as the Islamic Legion, which operated in Chad but were based in Sudan and were the DPA changed the degree of support to the government among African and allegedly e quipped b y L ibya, w ere s potted in D arfur in 1987 d uring t he Arab tribes. While the support for signatories of the DPA declined, the popularity government of Saddiq Al Mahdi. Authorities in the greater Darfur area described of non-signatories (SLA-Abdul Wahid and the JEM) wa s remarkable. Although these armed groups as robbers and bandits. ethnicity was a fac tor in t he f ragmentation of t he rebel g roups, t he majority of Janjaweed militia groups have a well structured leadership at the political and Arabs remained neutral in the conflict. Tanner and Tubiana observed that Mujib military levels. The known political organisers in Darfur were Ahmed Haroun and ar-Rahman az-Zubeir of the SLA-Abdul Wahid initiated contact with the Baggara Ali Kushayb, who both hailed from South Darfur. The latter is the commander of and Abbala (Mahariyya and Mahamids) tribes at Wadi Toro and Sabanga in t he 38 South D arfur a nd o verall co mmander o f Janjaweed armed uni ts in t he t hree northwest and in the area of Jebel Marra. Agreements between the parties led to Darfur states. The other two Darfur states were commanded by Abdullah Mustafa the o pening o f j oint A rab-Fur m arkets in t he r ebel-held a rea o f J ebel M arra. Looted li vestock wa s r eturned t o o wners a nd e ventually 500 ‘ Arab’ f ighters, Abu Shineibat (West Darfur), and both Mohamed Ali Hamiditi and Musa Hilal including f ormerly ac tive Janjaweed elements, j oined t he S LA-Abdul W ahid (North Darfur). Musa Hilal was the most notorious f ield commander in N orth faction. Darfur. The government of Sudan directed operations of the Janjaweed against the SLM and the JEM, which draw support mostly from the ‘African’ tribes of the Fur, Zaghawa, Masalit, Dajo, Maidoub, Berti and Tunjur. The Janjaweed strategy was to IMPACT OF THE REBEL GROUPS AND MILITIA destroy v illages a nd, acco rding t o B rosché, 1 595 v illages w ere des troyed in t he ON SOCIETY period 2003–2007.37 Small a rms t hreaten t he li ves o f un armed ci vilians in t he a ftermath o f p eace It should be noted that many Janjaweed attacks against civilian populations had agreements. Th e si tuation o f S outhern S udan a fter t he CP A j ustifies t his both e conomic a nd raci al m otives. Th e g overnment u sed t he Janjaweed as assumption. Garfield’s study in t he Lakes State of Southern Sudan demonstrates counterinsurgency f orces, w ith ex cellent k nowledge o f t he t errain, t o a void that violent insecurity is pervasive (with robbery and intercommunity fights most spreading t he a rmy t hinly in a n exp ansive r egion t he size o f F rance. S udanese commonly reported) because residents are heavily armed.39 This human insecurity authorities t ook ad vantage o f t he readiness o f t he Janjaweed to do t he f ighting is w idespread acr oss m any s tates in t he r egion. I n s ome c ases, di sagreements because t his en abled t hem t o b uild u p t ight s ecurity a round K hartoum w here between t he S PLA a nd f ormer mi litia f orces er upt in v iolent co nfrontations in there are huge investments and oil business installations. which hundreds of civilians lose lives and their properties are looted. Actors in t he S udanese co nflict o f D arfur m aintain co mplex r elations in Destruction of b asic s ervices i s in evitable in S udanese armed conflicts. Th e pursuing their interests. Ethnic contiguity plays its role as many tribes straddle the army, r ebel g roups a nd p aramilitary g roups a ll co ntribute t o t he des tructive border with Chad. Interactions increased between rebel groups (such as the SLA processes. Th ey de liberately des troy t he inf rastructure f or e ducation, h ealth, and JEM) a nd s ections o f A rab mi litias in t he wa ke o f t he D PA w hen t he markets and transport services. Vandalised schools, health centres and bridges are government of Sudan committed itself to disarming the Janjaweed. The latter felt a common feature and continue to be so in war zones of Southern Sudan, the Nuba betrayed by the government because it blamed it for all the atrocities committed in Mountains a nd t he B lue N ile, a nd r ecently in t he D arfur r egion. Th e t actic o f Darfur. This development brought some rapprochement between sections of the destroying f ood s upplies, b ombarding c attle c amps a nd di splacing r ural Janjaweed and the rebel groups in Darfur. populations has resulted in food insecurity and market disruptions. The situation

278 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 279 REBELS, MILITIAS AND GOVERNANCE IN SUDAN Samson S Wassara

has not stabilised sufficiently in D arfur to enable surveys on the impact of war. multidimensional. Approaches and responses to the complex armed conflicts in Some of t he des truction i s an in evitable outcome of t he war s trategies and t he Sudan could be explained in terms of the interests, positions and roles of the main tactics used during the civil war. protagonists. The complexity of Sudanese conflicts, with the increasing number of Sudanese ci vil wa rs a ffected s tructures o f g overnment a nd r ural e conomic rebel g roups, i s a c hallenge f or ga uging p olitical a nd co mmunity r eactions, systems in m arginalised areas in t he country. The nucleus of political systems is sentiments and sympathies. confined t o ga rrison t owns w hile t he r ural a reas a re t he s cene o f mi litary operations. R ebel a nd mi litia m ovements co ntributed t o t he sys tematic Responses of local communities destruction of local authority that used to maintain law and order in r ural areas. As the civil war intensified, civilian populations were dislodged and resettled in Conflict-affected communities in S udan have limited options in t he face o f t he peace v illages, ID P c amps in K hartoum, o r a round t he ga rrison t owns. People military, rebel and militia offensives in war zones and in destinations of flight from holding gun s w ere t he s ources o f a uthority. F or exa mple, in U pper N ile, violence. In the experience of Sudan, the first response of communities is to avoid commanders of militia groups such as the White Army (Geish Mabor) acted as being t rapped in wa r zo nes. M any p eople f lee a rmed co nflict a nd b ecome tribal c hiefs. A ctions o f r ebel a nd mi litia le aders di srupted c ustoms, c ulture, internally di splaced p ersons (ID Ps) a round ga rrison t owns o r r efugees in civilian life and kinship structures and in t he process destroyed human dignity. neighbouring co untries. A ccording t o t he I nternal Di splacement M onitoring This resulted in the breakdown of law and order in society. Centre there are about 2,7 million IDPs within Darfur and nearly 250 000 refugees Roles of dif ferent rebels and mi litia g roups in un dermining r ural e conomic from Darfur in eastern Chad.40 systems could b e s een in t heir c apacity to brutalise civilian p opulations during The second option for communities is to protect their land and property from hostilities in wa r zo nes. W ar t actics in cluded des truction o f cr ops a nd occupation b y o ther et hnic co mmunities. Thi s i s a p atriotic a pproach t hat commandeering of livestock to bring besieged populations to submission. In other transforms co mmunity m embers in to r ebels a nd o ther p aramilitary g roups. cases, r ural p astoralists f ound i t dif ficult t o m ove lo ng di stances in s earch f or People remaining behind during armed conflicts are emotionally attached to their richer pastures and the result was overgrazing and environmental degradation in ancestral lands to the extent that they become embroiled in the violence between war zones. The government-supported militia in oilfields stole livestock and drove the warring parties. In the name of defence of ancestral land, local communities away communities to leave space for oil exploration and exploitation. Similarly, seek p rotection f rom ei ther side o f t he wa r a nd in ext reme c ases o pt f or s elf- some Nuba communities were besieged to submission and were resettled in peace villages. Finally, a huge disruption of the socioeconomic system was experienced defence g roups, t hereby mi litarising t he co mmunity. Thi s k ind o f co mmunity in during the militia missions that accompanied trains action le ads t o t he b reakdown o f t he r ule o f l aw a nd los s o f authority o f lo cal from Babanusa to Wau. Civilian populations were subjected to systematic plunder communities. C ommunal mi litarisation i s a fac tor in t he dif ferent t ypes o f of livestock, destruction of crops and abduction of women and children during banditry experienced during the conflict or in the post-conflict period. these o perations. A simi lar s trategy wa s r eplicated in t he D arfur r egion w here civilian populations were displaced and ended up in camps. Although these camps Militarist responses of the government were guarded by AU and UN p eacekeepers, they have been subjected to attacks and raids. The mi litary g overnment h as u sed force t o m aintain unity sin ce 1989, w hen it overthrew the ‘democratically’ elected government of Saddiq Al Mahdi. One of the Responses of actors and stakeholders main reasons for ousting the civilian government was that the latter was too weak to deal with the SPLA, which was the dominant rebel movement at that time. The Responses o f va rious s takeholders t o a rmed co nflicts a re r elated t o s ocial a nd combination of militaristic and diplomatic approaches began in 1994 un der the political structures of affected societies. These responses are as varied as they are auspices of the IGAD. However, it took more than a decade for the government to

280 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 281 REBELS, MILITIAS AND GOVERNANCE IN SUDAN Samson S Wassara

reconsider militarism as an approach to resolving the conflict with the SPLA in This US a pproach i s n ot o nly a pplied in b ilateral r elations, b ut a lso a t t he Southern Sudan and the three areas of Abyei, Blue Nile and the Nuba Mountains. multilateral le vel w ith r egard t o in ternational o rganisations a nd s eems t o h ave Despite the CPA, there have been sporadic military operations in Abyei and South worked in the case of SPLA-led conflict in Sudan. The US supported the SPLA in Kordofan, too. The Abyei Administrative Area experienced clashes between the the I GAD p eace ini tiative, a nd inf luenced i ts E uropean p artners. Th e I GAD government and SPLA forces in 2008. Th e government denied involvement and process was a combination of a regional approach backed by multilateral support. blamed t he M isseriya mi litia a nd t he S PLA f or en gaging in a rmed v iolence. The roles of the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF), the US a nd the UN in s upporting President el-Bashir addressed the problem by issuing Republican Decree 146, and mediation efforts of Kenya yielded positive results, as was demonstrated by the an agreement entitled ‘Roadmap for return of IDPs and implementation of Abyei signing o f t he CP A. H owever, t his t ype o f a pproach i s l acking in t he D arfur Protocol’ was signed by the ruling National Congress Party and the SPLM.41 conflict. Th e AMIS wa s dep loyed in D arfur a nd wa s l ater t ransformed in to Militarist t endencies p ersist in wa r-affected r egions co vered b y p eace UNAMID. This hybrid force lacked the logistical and financial support that would agreements. For instance, violence erupted in Upper Nile (Malakal town) on two make it effective in its operations. Western powers such as the US and France are occasions in 2006 a nd 2009, r esulting in h eavy ci vilian c asualties. Th e A frican reluctant to commit critically needed equipment to t he force. The UN S ecurity Union M ission in S udan (AMIS) los t t en s oldiers on 29 S eptember 2007 in i ts Council made resolutions that remain blueprints, because both Russia and China frustrated t he possibility o f s trong ac tion in t he Darfur a rmed conflict. camp at Haskanita, with government and rebel groups trading accusations about Accordingly, the positive contribution of the UN to the Darfur conflict is restricted the in cident.42 Brosché co nfirmed t hat AMIS a nd UN exp erts w ere un able t o to the provision of humanitarian assistance to IDPs within Darfur and Sudanese identify t he p erpetrators o f t he in cident. H owever, t he a ssumption i s t hat t he refugees in eastern Chad. government o f S udan wa s b ehind t he a ttack, i ts p urpose b eing t o f rustrate The strongest response of the UN to the armed conflict in Darfur could be seen negotiations a bout t he dep loyment o f t roops f rom t he UN A frican M ission in in t he h andling o f a trocities co mmitted b y t he Janjaweed against un armed Darfur (UN AMID). D arfur wa s t he s cene o f s ustained mi litary ac tion b y t he civilians. Th e UN S ecurity C ouncil r eferred t he c ase o f a trocities t o t he government against the rebel groups that did not sign the DPA. International Criminal Court in March 2005. The Court issued a warrant for the arrest o f A hmed H aroun, a g overnment mini ster a nd t he g overnor o f S outh INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO SUDANESE Kordofan, and Ali Kushayb, a Janjaweed commander, in April 2007. The refusal of ARMED CONFLICTS the government to cooperate with the Court escalated the conflict to the extent that the president of Sudan was indicted for crimes against humanity in D arfur. The co mplexity o f t he S udanese co nflicts h as in vited b oth b ilateral a nd This was released in a p ress statement of the judges on 4 M arch 2009. Th e AU multilateral r esponses. B ilateral r esponses t o a rmed co nflict h ave ra rely h elped considered the decision inappropriate with regard to an African president still in Sudan in addr essing the underlying causes of the political conflicts, for they are power. expressed in terms of ideology and business interests. The relationship of the US with Sudan has been ambiguous because the country appeared to put pressure on CONCLUSION Sudan to resolve its chronic conflicts, but at the same time tried to appease the country t o ga in a nti-terrorism co operation. S udan p roved t o b e u seful f or Sudan experienced numerous conflicts in nearly all its regions except the extreme intelligence gathering a bout in stitutions a nd p eople a ssociated w ith O bin north. Sudan emerged as an independent country amid mutiny and rebellion. The Laden, w ho lived in S udan until 1994. H owever, another role of the US wa s to length o f t he ci vil wa r a nd fa ulty p olicy de velopment hig hlighted n ational contain t he s pread o f mi litant I slam f rom S udan t o n eighbouring g eopolitical consciousness a bout m arginalisation a nd s ocial ex clusion a nd r esorting t o regions. These two incompatible US p olicy goals only aggravated the conflict in violence to solve problems. The essence of governance is at stake in S udan, with Darfur and made the CPA rather shaky. the n umber o f r ebel a nd mi litia m ovements co nstantly in creasing sin ce

282 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 283 REBELS, MILITIAS AND GOVERNANCE IN SUDAN Samson S Wassara

independence. This is an indicator that the underlying causes of conflict have yet 2 Mohamed Omer Beshir The Southern Sudan: background to conflict, London: Hurst, 1968, to be addressed by the parties to Sudanese conflict. Human security is threatened 37–69; Sir James Robertson, Transition in Africa: from direct rule to independence, London: Hurst, 1974, 102–116; O liver B A lbino, En r oute to Addis Ababa, University of Juba, First in zones of armed conflict, which extends to peaceful areas inside and outside the Conference 1985, 26–28 F ebruary, The role of Southern Sudanese people in the building of country. Thi s h appens in t erms o f wa r-related mig rants w ho t ry t o es cape t he modern Sudan, Khartoum: Arrow, 1986, 111–123; Robert O Collins, Sudanese nationalism, excesses o f t he ci vil wa r t hat des troyed t heir p roperty a nd in stitutions o f southern policy and unification of the Sudan, 1939–1946, in M ahasin Abdel Gadir H ag al Safi (ed), The Nationalist Movement in the Sudan, Khartoum: Institute for African and Asian governance. Studies, U niversity o f K hartoum, 1989, 230–260; S everino F uli, Shaping a f ree S outhern One key finding of this study is that rebel groups seek policy or regime change Sudan, Limuru: Paulines Publications Africa, 2002, 168. through v iolence, f orcing g overnments t o r ecognise t heir iden tities a nd t heir 3 G N Sanderson, Indirect rule in northern Sudan as an anti-nationalist strategy, 1920–1939, in Mahasin Abdel Gadir Hag al Safi (ed), The nationalist movement in the Sudan, Khartoum: participation in t he formulation of p olitical, social a nd economic p olicies. Institute of African and Asian Studies, University of Khartoum, 1989, 340. Meanwhile, militia groups lack a vision of their own, but are part of war strategies 4 Beshir, The S outhern S udan: b ackground t o c onflict, 73; J oseph L agu, S udan: o dyssey of r uling e lites t hat a ttempt t o r emain in p ower o r p ursue v ested e conomic through a state from ruins to hope, Khartoum: Mohamed Omer Beshir Centre for Sudanese interests. I n t his r espect, mi litia g roups o perate li ke m ercenaries b ecause t heir Studies, Omdurman Ahlia University, 491–493. 5 Holt and Daly, A history of the Sudan, 126–127. motives a re p rimarily e conomic. Th ey a re em powered t o lo ot a nd di srupt 6 Ibid, 148–150. community livelihoods and force civilians into submission through the weapon of 7 Ann M osely L esch, Sudan: c ontested n ational i dentities. B loomington: I ndiana University hunger. Both rebel and militia groups are sources of banditry and insecurity in the Press, 15–24. 8 Ibid, 37–40. regions o f S udan t hat h ave b een a ffected b y a rmed co nflict. F or in stance, t he 9 Madut Jok, Sudan: race, religion and violence, Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2007, 53–80. proliferation of small arms constitutes a m ajor source of insecurity in S outhern 10 Göran Lindgren, Studies in conflict economics and economic growth, Uppsala: Department Sudan in the post-conflict period. of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 2006, 49–68. 11 Samson S Wassara, A framework for economic and social development of Southern Sudan: The future of Sudan will continue to hang in t he balance so long as critical implications f or o il a nd wa ter m anagement a nd r esource p olitics, in K arl W ohlmuth, demands o f t he p eripheral r egions a re n ot s eriously addr essed b y t he cen tral Reconstructing economic governance after conflict in resource-rich African countries: learning government in Khartoum. The demands revolve around the national questions of from country experiences, Bremen: Universität Bremen, 2008, 177. 12 Luke A P atey, Understanding m ultinational co rporations in wa r-torn s ocieties: S udan in identity and c ulture c lashes, e conomic de velopment, p ower s haring and wealth focus, in K arl Wohlmuth and Urban Tino (eds), Reconstructing economic governance after sharing. Th e g rievances exp ressed b y t he m arginalised p eople co uld le ad t o conflict in resource-rich African countries, Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2007, 182–184. balkanisation of Sudan. This can be prevented only if A frican countries take the 13 Paul Wani Gore, The oil and its influence on the demographic, economic and commercial lead in finding suitable compromises to ensure that peace prevails on the continent processes: the case of northern Upper Nile in Southern Sudan, in Karl Wohlmuth and Tino Urban (e ds), Reconstructing e conomic go vernance a fter c onflict i n r esource-rich A frican as a whole. The Southern Sudanese are pressing for the referendum to take place countries, Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2007, 174–175. in 2011, in line with the terms of the CPA. If the referendum results are in favour 14 Mohamed Omer Beshir, The Southern Sudan: from conflict to peace, Khartoum: Khartoum of secession of Southern Sudan, there is a li kelihood of more social and political Bookshop, 1975, 50–71. 15 Arop M adut-Arop, Sudan’s p ainful r oad t o p eace: a f ull s tory o f t he f ounding a nd instability in S udan, w hich w ill cer tainly h ave an ad verse ef fect on t he A frican development o f S PLM/SPLA, BookSurge, LL C, 2006, 50–58, h ttp://www.booksurge.com continent. (accessed 12 March 2010). 16 Ibid, 74. 17 Arop Sudan’s painful road to peace, 333. NOTES 18 Atul Karim, : a review, 1996, 182, http://www.cf-hst.net/UNICEF- Temp/Doc-Repository/doc/dpc388692 (accessed 10 May 2010). 1 P M H olt and M W D aly, A history of the Sudan: from the coming of Islam to the present 19 William R eno, Complex o perations i n w eak a nd f ailing s tates: t he S udan r ebel p erspective, day, 5th ed, Harlow: Pearson Education, 2000, 2–7. in Prism 1(2), sd, 116–117.

284 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 285 REBELS, MILITIAS AND GOVERNANCE IN SUDAN

20 Beshir, The Southern Sudan: from conflict to peace, 172. 21 Minni A rkou M innawi, The S udan L iberation M ovement a nd S udan L iberation aA rmy (SLM/SLA) political declaration, 2003, 2, posted on 14 March 2003 on http://www.sudannet (accessed 21 February 2010). 22 Avery Wear and David Whitehouse, Save Darfur from US intervention, Institute of Socialist Review, issue 50, November-December 2006), 6. 23 Darfur Liberation Front, Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM), Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), Justice a nd E quality M ovement, 2007, 1–3, h ttp://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/ para/darfur.htm (accessed 19 March 2010). 24 Johan B rosché, Darfur: d imensions a nd d ilemmas o f a c omplex s ituation, U ppsala: CHAPTER 10 Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 2008, 5–13. 25 Paul Wani Gore et al, Eight grassroots conflicts in Sudan, Khartoum: UNICEF, 2004, 49–52. 26 Gérard P runier, Armed m ovements i n S udan, Ch ad, CAR , S omalia, E ritrea a nd E thiopia, Analyse 02/08, Berlin: Centre for International Peace Operations, 2008, 3–6. The regionalisation of rebel 27 Ibid, 4. 28 Douglas H Johnson, The root causes of Sudan’s civil wars, Oxford: James Currey, 2003, 67– activities: the case of the 69. 29 Salmon, A paramilitary revolution, 12–19. Lord’s Resistance Army 30 John Young, The s outh Sudan d efence forces in the w ake of the Juba D eclaration, G eneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, 2006, 13–18, also available at http://www.googlesyndicatedsearch.com/u/SmallArmsSurvey?q=John+Young%2C+ PAUL OMACH The+south+Sudan+defence+forces+in+the+wake+of+th&sa=go%C2%A0 (acces sed 18 December 2009). 31 Country p rofile: S udan, 2004, 11, a vailalble a t h ttp://mongabay.com/reference/country_ profiles/2004–2005/Sudan.html (accessed 15 March 2010). INTRODUCTION 32 Ibid, 19. 33 Ibid. Since 1986, n orthern U ganda h as b een b edevilled b y v iolent a rmed co nflict 34 Sudan I ssue B rief N umber 15, D ecember 2009, 8, h ttp://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org between s uccessive r ebel g roups a nd t he N ational R esistance A rmy/Movement (accessed 15 March 2010). 35 Paul W ani G ore, A bdel H amid B alla, M una M ohamed T aha A youb, A bbas S hah (NRA/M) government led by Yoweri Museveni. The most resilient of these rebel Musa, El Tayeb Ibrahim Ahmed Wadi, Osman Mohamed Osman, Musa Adam and Abraham groups has been the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), led by the enigmatic Joseph Matoch Dhal, Eight grassroots conflicts in Sudan, 46–54. Kony. Th e a rmed co nflict in n orthern Uganda i s r ooted in U ganda’s do mestic 36 David Hoile, Darfur: the road to peace, 3rd ed, London: European-Sudanese Public Affairs politics and the problems of state-making and nation-building, including the lack Council, 2008, 135–136. 37 Brosché, Darfur: dimensions and dilemmas of a complex situation, 40–41. of national integration and failure to build consensus on the role of the constituent 38 Victor Tanner a nd J érôme Tubiana, Divided t hey f all: t he f ragmentation o f D arfur’s r ebel groups in national politics. But the conflict has been regionalised. Louise Fawcett groups, Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, 2007, 62–64. defined regionalisation as a situation in which inter- and intrastate conflicts spill 39 Richard Garfield, Violence and victimisation in south Sudan: Lakes State in the post-conflict over into neighbouring countries, lin k up with conflicts in t hose countries and period, Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, 2007, 12–13. 40 Internal Di splacement M onitoring C entre, S udan: 4,9 mi llion ID Ps acr oss S udan draw t hem a nd o ther ac tors, a nd a lso a ttract t he in tervention o f in ternational face o ngoing t urmoil, Norwegian R efugee C ouncil, 27 M ay 2009, 6, h ttp://www.internal- actors.1 displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/%28httpInfoFiles%29/A5170810EB2A7213C12575C In n orthern Uganda, s uccessive rebel g roups, es pecially t he LR A, organised 300342A91/$file/Sudan_Overview_May09.pdf (accessed 27 February 2010). 41 UNMIS, The CPA monitor: monthly report on the implementation o f the CPA, June 2008, and sought support externally and set up bases and ‘sanctuaries’ across the border 27, http://www.unis.org/english/cpaMonitor.htm. and, in s o doing, have destabilised regional security. The government of Uganda 42 Brosché, Darfur: dimensions and dilemmas of a complex situation, 70–73. countered support for the LRA by supporting rebel groups in neighbouring Sudan

286 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 287 THE REGIONALISATION OF REBEL ACTIVITIES: THE CASE OF THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY Paul Omach

and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and by intervening in conflicts in institution-building a nd dem ocratisation. I nternational n orms h ave a lso lo cked those countries. The conflict in northern Uganda has thus been linked to conflicts diverse groups within colonially defined boundaries, and granted them rights to in n eighbouring co untries a nd w ith in traregional co nflicts in t he G reat L akes make demands that the state cannot satisfy due to the lack of empirical attributes complex. US intervention to safeguard its geostrategic interests against the threats of statehood. This has proved to have a destabilising effect on the emerging states. of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism increased the complexity of the conflict The historical process of state-making that Africa experienced resulted in the and has made it more difficult to resolve. The linkage of the conflict to a regional creation of ‘weak states’ lacking the attributes of ‘empirical statehood’.9 Weak states conflict complex contributed to transforming the LRA from a rag-tag rebel outfit lack domestic political and social consensus, the idea and institutions of the state to a f ormidable guer rilla force w hose ac tivities s pan s tate b oundaries and h ave are contested and governments face challenges to legitimacy and viability. Regimes serious consequences for foreign policies of states and for regional security. rely on the suppression of opponents, the use of force and political cooptation to This chapter examines the regionalisation of the conflict in northern Uganda remain in p ower. In such situations threats to the stability of the state emanate and the transformation of the LRA rebel movement into a r egional actor in t he from domestic s ources. S ecurity in a w eak state is v iewed in t erms of fac tional security of East and Central Africa regions. It does so by examining the problems struggles, whereby ruling cliques obscure the distinctions between regime security of state-making and nation-building and conflicts in Uganda; the regional security and s ecurity o f t he s tate.10 However, t he co nflicts t hat r esult f rom do mestic environment a nd r elations o f t he co untries in E ast a nd C entral A frica; g lobal incoherence a re ra rely p urely in ternal o r co nfined w ithin t he b oundaries o f a geostrategic interests, and coincidence of the domestic, regional and global. single state. They ‘spill over’ into neighbouring states and are linked to conflicts in those s tates a nd w ith n eighbourly r elations. P olitics a nd v iolence b ecome INTERNAL CONFLICTS AND REGIONAL interconnected and intertwined at the local, national, regional and global level as CONFLICT COMPLEXES insurgents and governments compete for external support using various networks. The p reservation a nd s trengthening o f t he s tate b ecomes t he p riority o f Recent attempts at understanding the problem of internal conflicts, which have governments, both domestically and externally. The boundary between internal become the dominant threat to peace and security, have focused on the nature of and international conflict is blurred, and the value of foreign intervention becomes the state and on domestic politics. A review of the debates on internal conflicts in harder t o a ssess in t he n ational s ecurity s tate, a s o utside p owers a nd f orces Africa by Richard Jackson offers useful insights in t his regard.2 Internal conflicts intervene to support conflicting factions.11 are t he r esult o f s tate-making a nd n ation-building a nd o f ‘ accumulating, Recent s tudies h ave hig hlighted t he r egional a nd g lobal d ynamics o f centralising a nd co ncentrating t he p ower r esources n ecessary f or ef fective contemporary intrastate conflicts. These dynamics and links have been labelled territorial do mination’.3 State-making in A frica h as b een co mpared w ith t he regional s ecurity co mplexes, r egional co nflict f ormations a nd r egional co nflict European experience, which took centuries and generated collective violence from complexes.12 These studies build on the old analysis of regions, which is defined as rebel groups.4 Africa has been likened to Western Europe between the 16th and the existence of distinct and significant subsystem of networks or relations among 18th centuries when the earliest sovereign states emerged.5 This was a p eriod of a set of states located in geographical proximity to each other. A region mediates violent co nflicts d uring w hich ‘ weak s tates w ere e liminated a nd p olitical the interplay of the state and the international system. Buzan observed that the arrangements that were not viable were either reformed or disappeared’.6 But in ‘reality o f s ecurity in terdependence i s un avoidable’, especially w ith n eighbours, Africa, external interference created and preserved several unviable states, added because threats and friendship are most intensely felt at close range.13 to t he s ecurity p redicament, a nd m ade co nflict a c haracter o f t he co ntinent.7 Interaction b etween s tates r esults in a w eb o f s ecurity in terdependence o r Colonial powers created states with artificial boundaries, lack of leg itimacy and formations c alled ‘ security co mplexes’. This r efers t o a g roup o f s tates w hose incapacity to control their territories.8 The processes of state-making and nation- primary security concerns link together sufficiently that the national security of building have been compressed within a relatively short time. This is in contrast to each cannot realistically be considered apart from the others. This definition is the E uropean exp erience, w hich s aw sim ultaneous a ttempts a t s tate-making, consistent w ith t hose o f V ayrynen t hat ‘ regional co nflict f ormations’ a re s o

288 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 289 THE REGIONALISATION OF REBEL ACTIVITIES: THE CASE OF THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY Paul Omach

complex a nd entangled t hat t hey ‘cannot b e e asily de composed into in dividual building. In Uganda, the social contract of independence dissipated fairly rapidly. conflicts’. He defined ‘regional conflict formations’ as ‘a complex mixture of intra- Since then, violent internal conflicts have been endemic. This may be explained by national, intraregional and extraregional conflicts of violent character’.14 In a study the s tructure a nd p rocesses o f a w eak s tate. Th e Ugandan s tate i s a ‘ dislocated of armed conflicts in the period 1989–1997, Wallensteen and Sollenberg identified polity’, characterised by t he lack of domestic p olitical and s ocial consensus and 15 ‘regional co nflict co mplexes’, w hich t hey def ined a s ‘ situations w here sufficient structural integration of the constituent regional, ethnic, religious and neighbouring countries experience internal or interstate conflicts with significant ideological parts.17 Internal threats to stability of the state and regimes are endemic links between the conflicts’.15 This accounted for more than half of the conflicts that and governments face challenges to their legitimacy and viability. In a weak state were t aking p lace a t t he t ime. L inks b etween co nflicts im pact o n p eace ef forts like U ganda, t he p olitical e lite i s p reoccupied w ith i ts p olitical s urvival a nd since changes in conflict dynamics or resolution of one conflict will have an effect maintaining an integrated state. It has to manage both internal threats from local on a neighbouring conflict. ‘strongmen’ o r g roups a nd ext ernal t hreats. Thi s le ads t o ex clusive p olitics, Conflict linkages are composed of numerous transnational networks, ranging authoritarianism and an intense struggle for political dominance. from mi litary, e conomic a nd s ocial t o p olitical n etworks.16 Military n etworks The p olitical s truggles in U ganda a fter in dependence, s pecifically a fter t he increase activities like the cross-border flow of arms and combatants, overt and collapse o f t he 1962 s emi-federal co nstitution a nd t he f irst p ost-independent covert mi litary in tervention a nd h arbouring o f r ebels f rom n eighbouring coalition government headed by , reflected precisely such a struggle countries. Political networks include cross-border links between elites, personal for political dominance. The first post-independence government was an attempt connections and friendship between politicians, ideological affinity and historical to de licately b alance va rious r egional, et hnic a nd ide ological in terests. B ut t his antagonism. Economic and financial networks, especially those of an illicit nature, ultimately co llapsed w hen O bote a rrested di ssident m embers o f t he c abinet, increase regional and global links of war economies and of conflicts. Rebel groups, suspended the constitution and forced the Kabaka of the Baganda, the dominant criminal gangs and the state all rely on cross-border networks of the ‘shadow trade’ ethnic group in Uganda, into exile in 1966.18 This resulted in a crisis of legitimacy in looted goods and natural resources as a source of revenue. Social networks, such and h eightened co nflicts in t he et hnically f ragile s tate. W ith dimini shed as t he exi stence o f et hnic g roups acr oss b orders, r efugee f lows a nd di aspora legitimacy, Obote began to rely increasingly on the army to maintain power, but it communities, facilitate illicit trade and arms transfers and promote the regional also gave the army a taste for power and in 1971 the army, under the command of interconnectedness of conflicts. Idi A min, o verthrew t he O bote g overnment. I nitially, A min a ttempted t o w in The lin k b etween t he co nflict in n orthern U ganda a nd co nflicts in support a mong g roups t hat w ere h ostile t o O bote, b ut b efore lo ng, v iolence, neighbouring countries as well as intervention by extraregional actors, notably the repression and terror, which the regime used as the methods of control, caused US, led to regionalisation of the activities of the LRA. This has made the conflict widespread alienation, generated bitterness and hostilities, and intensified ethnic more co mplex a nd dif ficult t o r esolve. Th e lin k in volves va rious n etworks b y and r eligious co nflicts in U ganda.19 It a lso r esulted in to s ocial di slocation a nd which arms and combatants move across porous state boundaries and different institutional decay. The presence of a large number of Ugandan exiles in Tanzania conflicts w ith e ase. Th ere i s a lso w idespread involvement by government army who were committed to the overthrow of Amin’s regime and Tanzania’s hostility officers and rebels alike in a t rade in va luable resources and basic commodities led t o t he in terface o f do mestic a nd r egional s ecurity. A min wa s e ventually across the conflict zones in t he Great L akes region. Diaspora communities and overthrown in 1979 by a combined force of the Tanzanian People’s Defence Force refugees have also added to the interlinking of conflicts. and Ugandan guerrillas after the invasion and occupation of Tanzanian territory north of the Kagera River by Amin’s army in October 1978.20 STATE-MAKING AND INTERNAL CONFLICTS IN UGANDA After t he o verthrow o f A min, v iolence a nd di sorder co ntinued, a nd t he successive regimes were confronted with the problem of re-establishing societal To understand the roots of conflict in n orthern Uganda and why it has been so and p olitical order. There was an institutional and p olitical vac uum, w hich t he intractable, it is important to examine the problems of state-making and nation- anti-Amin coalition (which was hastily put together during the Moshi conference

290 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 291 THE REGIONALISATION OF REBEL ACTIVITIES: THE CASE OF THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY Paul Omach

in Tanzania) was not able to fill. The major political actors of the time, most of However, the optimism was premature. The country was highly polarised and whom were political returnees whose claim to a role in national politics rested on divided along the regional and ethnic north–south divide. The support base of the their ‘roles’ in the overthrow of Amin, were deeply divided along regional, ethnic, NRA wa s a lso cen tred in a nd co nfined t o t he s outhern p arts o f t he co untry. military, political and ideological lines.21 Intrigues and manoeuvres were rife, as Furthermore, t he c apture o f p ower b y t he NR A h ad n ot addr essed t he cr ucial different groups positioned themselves for political control, but the euphoria and question of the post-war order, including issues related to political control and the hopes o f p rogress a nd n ational r econciliation t hat f ollowed t he en d o f A min’s roles of the various actors in national politics. The NRA adopted the language of 22 brutal rule dissipated. The first post-Amin choice for the presidency, Yusuf Lule, inclusion and exclusion, and t hat determined t he role of t he dif ferent ac tors in held p ower f or o nly t hree m onths, w hile hi s s uccessor, G odfrey B inaisa, wa s national p olitics. I t ex cluded t hose M useveni l abelled ‘criminal e lements’ f rom deposed from office after nine months. participation in p olitics. Th e p eace t he NR A c laimed t o h ave r estored wa s After t he o verthrow o f B inaisa, a ‘ caretaker’ mi litary co uncil o rganised therefore a victor’s peace, which depended on the ability of the NRA to impose and multiparty dem ocratic e lections in D ecember 1980. F our p olitical p arties maintain its control over the defeated groups. contested t he elections: the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) le d by Obote, the The imm ediate c hallenge t o t he NRM g overnment em erged f rom e lements Democratic P arty (D P) le d b y P aul S emogerere, t he C onservative P arty (CP) associated with the parties the NRA defeated. A number of rebel groups of varying under t he le adership o f M ayanja N kanji a nd t he U ganda P atriotic M ovement political a nd mi litary sig nificance t ook u p a rms a gainst t he NR A g overnment. (UPM) led by Yoweri Museveni. But the elections were held in a tense atmosphere They included the Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA), Uganda People’s of considerable controversy, mistrust, p olitical violence and threats of civil war. Army, N inth O ctober M ovement, H oly S pirit M obile F orces (HS MF) a nd t he Allegations o f ir regularities in fa vour o f t he UPC, w hich o btained t he m ost National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU). parliamentary seats, created problems of legitimacy for the new government and triggered more armed conflict. Museveni, who had threatened to ‘go to the bush’ and wage war if t he elections were rigged, formed a r ebel group and launched a THE REGIONAL CONTEXT OF THE CONFLICT guerrilla war against the UPC g overnment of Obote. The conflict increased the IN NORTHERN UGANDA militarisation o f p olitics, w ith t he mi litary b eing u sed t o r esolve p olitical differences. Th e co nflict a lso p olarised U ganda a long t he r egional a nd et hnic From t he outset, t here was an overlap of t he conflict in n orthern Uganda w ith north-south divides, creating conditions for more conflicts. The army gradually conflicts in neighbouring countries. The overlap was created by, among others, a succumbed to fragmentation along ethnic lines, and in July 1985, i t deposed the massive inf low o f r efugees f rom U ganda t o S udan, p ermeable b orders, a UPC government of Obote. After a mi litary takeover, President Daniel arap Moi proliferation of arms across the border, a large number of armed Ugandan exiles of K enya in tervened in t he co nflict a nd un successfully t ried t o m ediate in t he in neighbouring Sudan, and a history of mutual suspicion and elite networks. The peace t alks b etween t he mi litary g overnment a nd M useveni. I n J anuary 1986, capture of state power in Uganda by the NRA after a guerrilla war and Museveni’s Museveni and the NRA deposed the military junta of General Tito Okello. negative a ttitude t owards t he in ternationally acc laimed p rinciple o f s tate The NRM p romised to restore p eace, p olitical stability and dem ocracy, and sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs of other states created anxiety within a few months it succeeded in extending its control over the entire country among Uganda’s neighbours and heightened suspicion. During the OAU summit and es tablishing a m easure o f s tability.23 In M ay 1987, t he NRM g overnment in Addis Ababa in July 1986, Museveni castigated African leaders for advocating signed an agreement with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank the sanctity of state sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs of states in and b egan to implement structural adjustment programmes. This endeared t he the face of oppression.24 NRM government to Western donors and resulted in a flow of aid. Western donors The lin kages o f t he do mestic s ecurity b etween U ganda a nd S udan w ere began to view Uganda as an island of stability in a t roubled region and a country highlighted in t he outbreak of violence in n orthern Uganda simultaneously with that enjoyed political stability and sustained economic growth. attacks on Ugandan refugees in the east bank refugee camps in Southern Sudan by

292 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 293 THE REGIONALISATION OF REBEL ACTIVITIES: THE CASE OF THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY Paul Omach

Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) rebels. The SPLA feared that the Sudan ‘contagious’ effects.29 Moi also felt personally insulted when Museveni marched to government would enlist the help of Ugandan refugees to fight against it. The NRA Kampala and took p ower by force after sig ning a p eace agreement t hat he had government, which was sympathetic to the SPLA, on the other hand feared that facilitated, for Moi had staked his reputation on brokering the peace agreement the S udan g overnment w ould h elp t he exi led g roup t o r ecapture p ower in between Museveni’s NRA rebels and the Okello government.30 Faced with internal Uganda.25 The a ttack acce lerated t he r eorganisation o f exi led s oldiers o f t he threats, t he K enyan le ader in 1987 acc used U ganda o f s upporting K enyan defeated Uganda N ational L iberation A rmy (UNL A) a nd t he f ormation o f t he dissidents and of training Kenyan youth and helping others to travel to Libya for UPDA rebel group and armed attacks against the NRA in Uganda. military training.31 On its part, Uganda accused Kenya of allowing insurgents to Following attacks on government army positions in Uganda by UPDA rebels, use Kenya as a r ear position and transit route. Suspicion was heightened by the President Museveni accused the Sudanese government troops stationed in Nimule capture in November 1987 of Brigadier Smith Opon Acak and Major John Olwol, of re-arming and providing transport for the UPDA. He said that the Sudanese two f ormer o fficers o f t he def unct UNL A, in e astern U ganda, a fter t hey h ad government wanted to use northern Uganda as a r ear f lank against the SPLA.26 entered Uganda from Kenya.32 The media in the two countries heightened tension Sudan s trenuously denie d a r ole in t he attack a nd, in t urn, acc used Uganda of with h ostile p ropaganda, b ut t he t wo co untries un dertook n umerous b ilateral supporting the SPLA and of trying to export its revolution. President Museveni initiatives to reduce the tension. denied the accusation, and tried to calm his neighbour’s fear: The NR A g overnment u sed a co mbination o f mi litary a nd di plomatic initiatives in its response to the conflict in northern Uganda. In an address to the [I]t is not our duty – not even our desire – to export this revolution to anybody else, nation on the anniversary of Uganda’s independence, President Museveni declared or to any other African country. Likewise, it is not correct for anybody to seek to that ‘fighting a nd a nnihilating t hese t ypes o f e lements i s a j ustified c ause’.33 He export counter-revolution to Uganda. Let us allow the people of each country to embarked o n a di plomatic o ffensive t o cr iminalise r ebel g roups, a mong o thers shape their destiny without interference from external quarter, be it brotherly or referring to them as ‘the elements that have caused untold suffering to the people 27 foreign. of Uganda, violated human rights, murdered people, destroyed the economy and violated the sovereignty of the people of Uganda.’34 Criminalisation of rebels was The t wo n eighbours h eld s everal b ilateral m eetings b etween 1987 a nd 1993, aimed a t ra tionalising t he g overnment’s mi litarist p olicy a nd m obilising during which they pledged not to support ‘each other’s criminals, and to cooperate international support. The government sought to delegitimise opposition of the on border security. In 1990 Uganda and Sudan reached an agreement in terms of Ugandan diaspora, which was critical of the NRM government and sympathetic to which Sudan deployed a military team to monitor whether Uganda was supplying the rebels. Internationalisation added to the complexity of the conflict. the S PLA. Th ese b ilateral a greements w ere limi ted t o co nfidence b uilding After more than a year of military stalemate, the NRA government agreed to measures s uch a s a n ex change o f mi litary mi ssions. Th ey did n ot addr ess t he grant amnesty to those who renounced rebellion. It also agreed to negotiate with underlying issues in the conflict or face up to the reality that the ‘criminals’ were not only proxies; they had their own interests and strategies. Meanwhile, distrust the UPDA, the main rebel group operating in n orthern Uganda. At the time the and r ecriminations co ntinued a mid o ccasional a ir ra ids b y S udan o n Ugandan UPDA was under pressure from the Holy Spirit Movement, a splinter rebel group territory, and cross-border skirmishes involving armies of the two countries and led by Joseph Kony, which was emerging as a f ormidable and contending rebel rebel groups. group. Negotiations between NRA and UPDA commanders began in e arnest in The co nflict in n orthern Uganda a lso o verlapped w ith in ternal co nflicts in March 1988, c ulminating in a n a greement o n 3 J une 1988. H owever, a s plit Kenya a nd inf luenced r egional r elations.28 Like n eighbouring S udan, K enya occurred within the ranks of the UPDA: the larger faction under the command of harboured a s uspicion that the Ugandan leader would support dissident groups Lieutenant-Colonel Angelo Okello Okeno surrendered and was integrated into the seeking to overthrow the regime of President Moi. Since the abortive coup in 1982, NRA, w hile a nother fac tion un der B rigadier O dong L atek di sowned t he p eace Moi’s regime had been under growing threat from dissident groups. There were talks and the settlement, and opted to continue fighting. According to a f ormer fears t hat M useveni’s a scent t o p ower t hrough a n a rmed s truggle w ould h ave UPDA rebel, some Ugandans in the diaspora advised the UPDA not to agree to the

294 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 295 THE REGIONALISATION OF REBEL ACTIVITIES: THE CASE OF THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY Paul Omach

terms of the settlement.35 The peace initiative failed to acknowledge the complexity military assistance. Others blame political rivalry between local politicians, while of the conflict. It did n ot include strategic actors like members of the Ugandan yet others blamed NRA military officers for sabotaging the negotiations.37 diaspora o r o ther n ational a nd r egional ac tors. A s Wallensteen a nd S ollenberg argued, i t i s v ital f or a ny p eace ini tiative t o ac knowledge r egional co nflict THE ROLE OF THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY IN complexes where they exist and develop processes that involve them all.36 THE REGIONAL CONFLICT COMPLEX The faction of the UPDA rebel group, which disassociated itself from the peace agreement, allied with Kony’s Holy Spirit Movement to form the Uganda Christian Renewed h ostilities followed t he co llapse of p eace t alks and t he LR A l aunched Democratic Army. In 1992, the group was renamed the Lord’s Resistance Army. By numerous attacks to prove that it was still a force to be reckoned with. It intensified then, Kony had purged the group of other leaders and consolidated his control its guerrilla activities and abducted children and took them for training in Sudan, over the group. The LRA is an arcane rebel movement, of which little is known, which h ad b egun t o p rovide s ubstantial log istical s upport f or t he g roup. Th e due to the failure by its leadership to present a coherent programme to the public, conflict thus became closely intertwined with the conflict in Sudan and the global apart from the obvious objectives of overthrowing the government of Museveni. and geostrategic issues such as the US-led war against terrorism. The LRA became The o rganisation co mprises f ormer s oldiers a nd c hild s oldiers w ho h ave b een an actor in regional security, and a pawn in relations between Sudan and Uganda. forcibly r ecruited a nd i s a hig hly m obile guer rilla g roup, w ith t he dep lorable In October 1994, Uganda cancelled the agreement it had reached with Sudan reputation of killing civilians and committing other human rights abuses. Kony, in 1990 allowing Sudan to station a military monitoring team in Uganda, accusing who claims to be a spirit medium, started his rebel ‘career’ as ‘spiritual adviser’ to the team of engaging in activities incompatible with its mandate.38 Uganda broke a UPDA battalion commanded by Major Opia. After Major Opia died in a b attle off diplomatic relations with Sudan in April of the following year on the grounds in 1987, Kony took command of the unit and formed the Holy Spirit Movement. that t he l atter wa s s upporting i ts di ssidents.39 During t his p eriod, t he U ganda He em barked o n f orcible r ecruitment o f f ormer s oldiers a nd UP DA r ebels, government a rmy c lashed w ith a nd des troyed t he c amps o f a lleged I slamic and abduction of civilians, mainly children, to build his force. fundamentalist rebels at Buseruka on the escarpment of the western Rift Valley The LRA emerged as the most formidable rebel group in t he 1990s, after the near L ake A lbert. I ncidences o f a rmed a ttacks o n p olice s tations in M pigi a nd 40 surrender o f t he UP DA. B ut t he r ise o f t he LR A co incided w ith a de cline o f Mukono districts in central Uganda were also reported. support f or r ebels a mong t he lo cal p opulation in n orthern U ganda, a nd t he By now, Uganda’s policy towards Sudan had converged with those of Western government’s p olicy o f in volving t he lo cal p opulation in co unterinsurgency states. Sudan had b een increasingly isolated since t he f irst Gulf War, due to its operations as ‘vigilantes’. By 1993, the loss of civilian support began to impact on perceived radic al I slamist ide ology a nd exp ansionist a genda. I n 1990 t he G ulf the group, which also lost a number of its fighters when they surrendered to the states s topped e conomic a ssistance a nd f inance o f S udan’s t hree-year r ecovery government. Thr ough in termediaries, t he LR A co ntacted t he U ganda programme. I n 1991, t he E uropean C ommunity h alted n on-humanitarian government’s mini ster o f s tate in c harge o f ‘ pacification o f t he n orth’, B etty economic assistance to Sudan. In the same year, the US added Sudan to its list of Bigombe, and requested negotiations to end the conflict. Peace talks between LRA state s ponsors o f t errorism. B y 1995, t he US wa s ac tively p roviding mi litary commanders and their NRA counterparts and Bigombe began at the end of 1993, assistance to armed opponents of the Khartoum regime: the rebel umbrella, the with religious leaders and elders attending as observers. Agreement was reached National D emocratic A lliance a nd t he S PLA, a s w ell a s E thiopia, Er itrea a nd on a ce asefire and f ree p assage for LR A rebels, but collapsed in F ebruary 1994 Uganda. These t hree states were considered by t he US t o b e t he ‘new f rontline when Museveni gave an ultimatum to the LRA to surrender within seven days or states’ against the Islamist regime in Sudan. In 1996, Washington approved US$20 face military action. Museveni accused the LRA of dishonesty and lack of good million t o t he t hree co untries.41 In t he s ame y ear, t he United Nations im posed faith, and argued that the LRA was using the negotiations to rebuild its capacity sanctions on Sudan to force it to hand over suspects implicated in the assassination through recruitment and that it was negotiating with the government of Sudan for attempt o n E gyptian p resident H osni M ubarak. A ppearing b efore t he S enate

296 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 297 THE REGIONALISATION OF REBEL ACTIVITIES: THE CASE OF THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY Paul Omach

Subcommittees o n A frica a nd o n O perations a nd Human R ights, US A ssistant fighting a gainst M obutu’s g overnment.48 In M arch o f t he s ame y ear, t he S PLA Secretary of State for African Affairs, , acknowledged that the US had destroyed WNB F b ases in S udan a nd c aptured a n umber o f i ts s oldiers, w hile delivered ‘non-lethal, defensive military assistance’ to Uganda ‘to help improve the others surrendered to Ugandan government troops. effectiveness of its military to defend itself against Sudanese sponsored aggression, 42 in particular that of the LRA’. The US provided US$3,85 million in financial years REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTIONS 1997 and 1998 in addi tion to a US$400 000 in ternational military education and training programme to improve professionalism of the Ugandan army.43 I have also Concerns about the inter-linkage of conflicts in Uganda and Sudan in the regional pointed out elsewhere that the US used the conflict in northern Uganda as a proxy conflict complex and the increased threats to regional stability led to numerous to supply the SPLA, with which the UPDF shared military facilities.44 US policy interventions in the form of mediation, among others, by Libya, Iran and Malawi, 49 was inf luenced b y i ts p erception o f M useveni a s a r eliable p artner a nd a s a n without much success. The complexity of the conflict, multiplicity of issues and ‘interlocutor’ in the region.45 In the process, the conflict in northern Uganda and lack o f sin cerity b ogged do wn t he n egotiations. N onetheless, w idespread the LR A w ere lin ked t o a co mplex w eb co nstituting t he G reat L akes co nflict abduction of children by the LRA and their use as child soldiers and sex slaves, complex. This increased the cycle of violence and counter-violence. together with other gross violations of human rights and abuses, led to widespread Between 1995 a nd 1998 U ganda fought proxy wars with Sudan that drew in international pressure on Sudan and Uganda to seek a peaceful end to the conflict. Ethiopia a nd Er itrea, b oth m embers o f t he ‘ new f rontline s tates’ a gainst t he Former US President Jimmy Carter, acting through the Carter Center, brokered an agreement b etween U ganda a nd S udan t hat wa s sig ned in D ecember 1999 in Islamist regime in Sudan. Both countries had broken off diplomatic relations with Nairobi and witnessed by the UN C hildren’s Fund (UNICEF), Save the Children Sudan after acc using it of destabilising t heir countries by supporting dissidents and s ome f riendly f oreign g overnments. Under t he acco rd, Uganda a nd S udan and s ponsoring t he s pread o f I slamic f undamentalism. U gandan t roops m ade agreed t o ce ase h ostilities a gainst e ach o ther, s top s upporting e ach o ther’s periodic incursions into Sudan in pursuit of the LRA and two other Uganda rebel dissidents, exchange prisoners of war and facilitate the return of war captives, and groups, the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) and Uganda National Rescue Front II restore di plomatic t ies b y t he en d o f F ebruary 2000. 50 Although a l ack o f t rust (UNRF), a nd a lso in s upport o f t he S PLA. Th e WNB F a nd UNRF II r ebels stalled t he p rocess o f implementation, t he acco rd p rovided t he b asis f or f uture operated f rom b ases in S udan a nd Z aire. B etween 1994 a nd 1997, t he WNB F relations. In the course of 2000, intense diplomatic activities by the Carter Center launched a s eries o f a ttacks in t he West N ile, f rom t heir b ases in S udan a nd and UNI CEF, t he UN H igh C ommissioner f or R efugees, t he C anadian northeastern Zaire. In September 1996, between 600 and 800 WNBF soldiers were 51 government, Libya and Egypt resulted in the signing of a new agreement. 46 reported to have entered Uganda through Zaire. They, among others, destroyed In t he wa ke o f im proved r elations b etween S udan a nd U ganda, t he bridges, mined roads and attacked refugee camps. Museveni reasoned that Sudan International Organisation of Migration (IOM), UNICEF and the governments of and Zaire under Mobutu intended to ‘keep the Ugandan army pinned down’ and Sudan and Uganda repatriated about 323 p eople who had been abducted by the make it incapable of coming to the aid of Rwanda, which was under threat from LRA b ut h ad es caped t o n orthern S udan f rom t he s outh.52 A t urning p oint in former Forces Armées Rwandais and Hutu Interahamwe militias operating f rom relations b etween U ganda a nd S udan o ccurred on 12 J anuary 2002, w hen 47 bases in eastern Zaire. Presidents Om ar e l-Bashir a nd M useveni h eld a m eeting in K hartoum. Th e In 1996, Uganda, together with Rwanda and Angola, which felt their security improved r elations b etween t he t wo co untries c ulminated in t he sig ning o f a was threatened by Mobutu, intervened in Zaire in support of dissidents fighting to protocol on 10 M arch 2002, w hich allowed the Ugandan government soldiers to overthrow hi s r egime. WNB F c amps in n ortheastern Z aire w ere o verrun b y ‘execute a limi ted mi litary o peration w ithin t he b orders o f S udan’ a gainst t he Ugandan government troops, and the security of the border areas was handed over LRA.53 Thereafter, Ugandan government troops were deployed as far as Juba, the to the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo rebels, who were regional capital of Southern Sudan.

298 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 299 THE REGIONALISATION OF REBEL ACTIVITIES: THE CASE OF THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY Paul Omach

REGIONAL CONFLICT COMPLEX: DYNAMICS long t ime a rgued t hat co operation b y t he g overnment o f S udan wa s v ital f or AND TRANSFORMATION defeating the LRA and for ending the conflict in northern Uganda. Intervention by the Ugandan army into Southern Sudan had a b oomerang effect, for instead of The im provement in t he r elations b etween S udan a nd U ganda r eflected t he destroying the LRA, it elicited counter-violence against the civilian population in interplay o f do mestic, r egional a nd international de velopments. S ince t he mid- Southern S udan a nd n orthern U ganda. Th e LR A cr ossed b ack in to n orthern 1990s, the Khartoum government had been under growing international pressure Uganda, spreading more mayhem and destruction. Within a short time, the scale to prove its anti-terrorist credentials. Sudan had been internationally isolated since of the humanitarian crisis reached unprecedented heights as entire communities 1991 and subject to UN sanctions since 1996. Sanctions were beginning to have an beyond t he t raditional a rea o f LR A o peration in t he A choli s ub-region w ere impact on the regime in Khartoum. The costs of armed conflict and pressure from displaced. I nternational a ttention o n t he co nflict in creased, a s did p rotection various di ssident g roups w ere a lso a ffecting t he g overnment. A s a r esult, t he activities b y in ternational n on-governmental o rganisations (N GOs) a nd UN Khartoum regime ended the alliance with the radical National Islamic Front Party 57 agencies. Chris D olan a nd L ucy H ovil h ave a rgued t hat t he UN u sed of Al Hassan Turabi and also ratified the 1997 Convention for the Suppression of humanitarian protection as a ‘Trojan horse’ to intervene in the conflict because of Terrorism a nd t he 1999 I nternational C onvention f or t he S uppression o f 58 resistance by the Ugandan government to external intervention in the conflict. Financing Terrorism.54 Uganda was also under international pressure to peacefully In N ovember 2003, J an E geland, t he UN U nder S ecretary-General f or resolve i ts co nflict w ith t he K hartoum g overnment, a nd en d t he k illings a nd Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief, referred to the conflict as one of the abduction of civilians by the LRA. The military solution to the conflict had proved world’s l argest n eglected h umanitarian em ergencies a nd, o n 14 A pril 2004, h e ineffective a nd t he ‘ new f rontline’ a lliance h ad f loundered w ith t he E thiopian- Eritrean co nflict a nd t he co nflicts in t he D RC a nd t hat b etween U ganda a nd briefed the Security Council on the humanitarian situation in n orthern Uganda. Rwanda during the intervention by the two countries in t he DRC. In 1999, t he Among o thers, t he S ecurity C ouncil s tressed t he im portance o f ‘ exploring a ll government reluctantly agreed to grant amnesty to rebels and the Amnesty Act peaceful avenues to resolve the conflict, including through creating a c limate in was promulgated in 2000. which s olution b ased on di alogue mig ht b e f ound’.59 The Ugandan g overnment The 11 S eptember 2001 t errorist attacks on the World Trade Center in N ew described the S ecurity C ouncil statement as ‘unacceptable’,60 and the call by the York and the Pentagon in Washington DC, and the resultant US ‘ war on terror’, Permanent Representative of Canada to the President of the Security Council for added a n ew dim ension. A fter t he attacks, rebel g roups b egan t o b e v iewed a s the situation in northern Uganda to be put on the agenda of the Security Council potential terrorist organisations and possible cells in an international network of as ‘unjustified’.61 It reiterated its view that ‘the situation in northern Uganda is an terrorist o rganisations. M ost s tates w ere t herefore a t p ains t o p rove t heir a nti- internal matter on which she is the only one who can recommend, call for, and terrorist credentials. In D ecember 2001, t he US adde d t he LR A and t he A llied initiate action as she sees fit.’ It insisted on a military solution to the conflict, and Democratic F orces (AD F) r ebels in U ganda t o i ts ‘ Terrorist E xclusion L ist’ demanded a regional military approach involving the Mission des Nations Unies en designed to protect the safety of the country and its citizens under the new US République D émocratique d u C ongo (MONUC), United Nations M ission in t he Patriot Act. B oth rebel g roups were b eing s upported by Sudan. In March 2002 Sudan (UNIMIS), African Union Forces in Sudan, the SPLA, Sudan and DRC to Uganda followed suit and passed the Anti-Terrorism Act, thereby criminalising disarm t he LR A.62 In do ing s o, t he Uganda g overnment co ntradicted i tself a nd the LR A a nd o ther r ebel g roups.55 Thus U ganda a nd S udan p resented t he unwittingly acknowledged the regional and global entanglement of the conflict. cooperation between them as a demonstration of ‘their coordination and readiness to s upport t he in ternational co mmunity in i ts leg itimate m easures t o co mbat The demand by the government of Uganda for a r egional military offensive 63 terrorism as reflected in UN Security Council Resolution 1373’.56 against t he LR A did n ot r eceive a sy mpathetic h earing and r elations b etween Following the signing of the protocol of 10 M arch 2002, un der which Sudan Uganda and the DRC were less than cordial. Uganda had only recently ended its allowed the Ugandan army to carry out military operations against the LRA in military in tervention in t he D RC in s upport o f va rious r ebel g roups a nd t he Southern Sudan, the Ugandan army launched Operation Iron Fist to destroy the government of the DRC had also filed a case against Uganda with the International LRA rebels at their bases in Southern Sudan. The Ugandan government had for a Court of Justice, accusing Uganda of illegal exploitation of natural resources from

300 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 301 THE REGIONALISATION OF REBEL ACTIVITIES: THE CASE OF THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY Paul Omach

Map 10–1: LRA activities, December 2008 – April 2010 various fac tions in t he s outh, a nd un leash s erious r eprisal a gainst ci vilians. A military c ampaign a gainst t he LR A w ould b e b urdensome f or M ONUC in t he northeastern DRC and UNIMIS and African Union forces in Sudan who were too thin on the ground and overstretched. The UN and AU were therefore reluctant to take on another conflict.64 The government of Uganda contributed further to internationalisation of the conflict by referring the LRA to the International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC opened investigations against the LRA in J uly 2004 a nd in O ctober 2005, i ssued arrest warrants against five top LRA commanders for committing war crimes and crimes against humanity. Adam Branch65 correctly argued that the government of Uganda was using the ICC as a political instrument to advance its militarisation of the co nflict a nd wa s cr iminalising t he LR A a s a m eans o f de legitimising i ts political a nd mi litary o pposition. Th e g overnment exp ected t o b enefit f rom internationalisation of the conflict and hoped that the ICC indictment would put pressure on the government of Sudan to stop supporting the LRA, which would accelerate the demise of the rebel group. However, the ICC indictment made the conflict m ore co mplex a nd en tangled in t he p olitics o f in ternational cr iminal prosecution and has proved to be an obstacle to peaceful settlement of the conflict rather than a help. When co nflicts a re en tangled in a r egional co mplex, t he d ynamics o r resolution o f o ne o f t he co nflicts h as a n ef fect o n n eighbouring co nflicts. Improvement in relations between Uganda and Sudan, and the signing of the CPA between the government of Sudan and the SPLA, affected the conflict in northern Uganda a nd t he LR A. Th e es tablishment o f t he a utonomous g overnment in Southern S udan, in lin e w ith p rovisions o f t he CPA, dep rived t he LR A o f t he freedom to operate from bases in Southern Sudan and of direct support from the government of Sudan. It prompted the LRA to shift its base from Southern Sudan to Garamba National Park in the northeastern part of the DRC. Ugandan security officials66 suspected that the relocation was done with the help of the government Source: Amelie Desgroppes, IFRA/ICG. of S udan a nd f ull k nowledge o f o fficials in t he D RC. Th ere w ere a lso f ears b y Ugandan s ecurity o fficials t hat t he LR A mig ht h ave es tablished b ases in t he the D RC. Th e S PLA a nd t he g overnment o f S udan h ad j ust sig ned t he Central African Republic (CAR), and linked up with rebel groups in Chad and the Comprehensive P eace A greement (CP A) a nd t he a utonomous g overnment o f CAR. Chad has consistently accused Sudan of supporting Chadian rebel groups. A Southern Sudan had been established. As the organisation leading the government visit t o U ganda in l ate 2007 b y t he p resident o f t he CAR a t t he in vitation o f of Southern Sudan, the SPLA was trying to enlist support and cooperation of the Museveni might have been related to these fears. various armed groups in the south, including former allies of the LRA. Engaging Relocation by the LRA to the northeastern part of the DRC resulted in LR A the LRA militarily would create a split and jeopardise efforts aimed at uniting the attacks spreading to a wider area. The LRA has been accused of attacking civilians

302 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 303 THE REGIONALISATION OF REBEL ACTIVITIES: THE CASE OF THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY Paul Omach

and h umanitarian w orkers in S outhern S udan, a nd im peding r epatriation o f envoy, which raised the profile of the negotiations. Other African countries like Sudanese r efugees f rom t he D RC, t he CAR a nd Uganda.67 A hig h-profile LR A Kenya, Tanzania and S outh Africa sent observers, while NGOs such as Caritas, attack in the DRC took place on 23 January 2006 when the rebel group attacked a Saint Egidio and Pax Christi also acted as observers and peace advocates. Despite detachment o f M ONUC f orces a nd k illed eig ht G uatemalan p eacekeepers a nd initial challenges, in an unprecedented development, the LRA and government of severely w ounded f ive o thers. Thi s le d t o di scussions b y t he UNSC a nd t he Uganda sig ned a l andmark ces sation o f h ostilities a greement in A ugust 2006. 71 sponsorship by the UK of a resolution for military action against the LRA.68 Agreements were also later reached on the other items on the agenda. Transformation in t he regional conflict complex also acted as a s pur for the However, the failure of Kony to show up in R ikwangba for the signing of the historic J uba p eace t alks b etween t he LR A a nd g overnment o f U ganda. A n final agreement raised doubts about the future of the peace talks. Demands by the improvement in t he relations b etween Uganda and Sudan deprived the LRA of LRA le ader f or ‘ clarification’, in cluding o n s ome i ssues a lready a greed u pon, direct s upport, w hile Operation I ron F ist disrupted t he mi litary f ormation a nd showed that mistrust and suspicion remained between the two parties. Even the organisation of the LRA. In May 2006, Kony, the LRA leader, released a video in fact t hat t he t alks w ere g oing on did n ot s top Museveni f rom entering into a n which h e c alled f or p eace n egotiations w ith t he g overnment o f U ganda. Th e agreement w ith t he D RC f or a j oint mi litary ac tion a gainst t he LR A.72 The message was delivered to President Museveni by President Salva Kiir of Southern cessation of hostilities agreement finally collapsed when, on 14 D ecember 2008, Sudan, w ho offered t o m ediate. He m ade t his offer b ecause t he government of the Ugandan army, with the consent and backing of the DRC and the US, launched Southern Sudan knew that if the conflict in northern Uganda did not end, it would military strikes against LRA rebel jungle hideouts in the Garamba National Park. complicate the implementation of the CPA and lead to a fresh outbreak of conflict The offensive, which lasted three months, was a dismal failure. It did not achieve in Southern Sudan. Therefore, the government of Southern Sudan was intent on its in tended o bjective o f de cimating t he le adership o f t he LR A a nd in stead getting rid of the LRA factor and strengthening its position in de aling with the provoked brutal LRA reprisals against civilians in the DRC and to some extent in government of Sudan. Southern Sudan. Initially, Ugandan president Museveni insisted on an unconditional surrender 69 by the LRA, but he later agreed to take part in the peace talks with the LRA. In REGIONALISATION OF CONFLICTS AND an address to the nation, the president acknowledged that there was tremendous REBEL ACTIVITIES pressure on the government to negotiate with the LRA rebels. At the time Uganda was p reparing t o h ost t he p restigious C ommonwealth h eads o f s tates a nd The preceding discussion shows that the conflict in n orthern Uganda has b een governments m eeting. Since t he disastrous i ntervention i n t he DRC and very dynamic. It evolved from a local and national level conflict that was rooted in increasing authoritarianism at home, Western governments had begun to rethink the problems of a w eak state, to a regional level conflict with global dimensions. their previously favourable opinion of the Ugandan leader. It was therefore vital for Weak in ternal g overnance, fa ilure t o es tablish s tate co ntrol a nd m eaningful Museveni to reinvent himself as a peacemaker. administration in t he b order a reas o f n orthern U ganda, S outhern S udan, Talks between delegations from the LRA and the government of Uganda began northeastern D RC a nd t he CAR p rovided a n o pportunity f or r ebels t o o perate on 14 J uly 2006 in J uba under t he mediation of t he v ice-president of S outhern almost unhindered. Likewise, arms and government soldiers have been moving Sudan, Riek Machar. However, the talks got off to a difficult start with both parties across p orous b orders in p ursuit o f r ebels a nd in tervening in n eighbouring taking hard-line stances. From the onset, the government viewed the purpose of conflicts. The UPDF has made periodic incursions into Southern Sudan and the the talks as negotiating the terms of surrender for the LRA. It rejected LRA calls DRC in p ursuit o f t he LR A, a nd a lso t o a ssist t he S PLA. Thi s h as r esulted in for cessation of hostilities. The LRA adopted the tactic of walking out and stalling interlinking of the conflicts across the region, regionalisation of rebel activities and the negotiations.70 the development of the Great Lakes regional conflict formation. The conflict in The p eace t alks w ere faci litated a nd w itnessed b y a n umber o f f riendly northern U ganda i s p art o f t his r egional co nflict co mplex o r f ormation. Th e countries, such as Norway, Canada and Denmark. The UN a ppointed a s pecial boundaries of the regional conflict complex are fluid and dynamic. The conflict is

304 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 305 THE REGIONALISATION OF REBEL ACTIVITIES: THE CASE OF THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY Paul Omach also linked by networks of illicit trade in n atural resources, such as timber and CONCLUSION minerals, which has sustained the conflict. Against the background of regionalisation, the LRA rebel group has changed Since t he 1990s, m ost v iolent co nflicts h ave h ad a n in trastate n ature. A n over time from an organisation made up of former soldiers of the defeated UNLA explanation f or t hese co nflicts c an b e f ound in in ternal di scord, lin ked t o t he who were fighting to recapture state power, to an army of predominantly children process of state-making and nation-building. These conflicts involve the state as abducted from northern Uganda. It has operated as a p roxy in t he war between well a s n on-state ac tors s uch a s r ebel m ovements a nd mi litias t hat co ntest t he Uganda and the US on the one hand, and the Islamist government in Sudan, which political authority and legitimacy of governments. But contemporary conflicts are the US accused of sponsoring fundamentalism and terrorism, on the other. Since not o nly in ternal, t hey a re a lso r egional. Th ey s pill o ver b orders, lin k u p w ith 2007, the LRA has been abducting civilians from the DRC and Southern Sudan conflicts in neighbouring countries and draw in neighbouring states, and develop and conscripting them into its ranks. Inevitably, the composition and interests of into regional conflict complexes. In the process, they attract the intervention of the LR A h ave va ried a nd c hanged w ith t ime. Th e co nflict a lso a ttracted o ther international ac tors. Thi s h as t ransformed n on-state r ebel g roups in to m ajor actors: t he US adde d t he LR A t o i ts li st o f ‘ terrorist o rganisations’, a nd actors in r egional a nd in ternational s ecurity. I n U ganda, t he co nflict in i ts humanitarian agencies and the ICC also intervened in the conflict. This has made northern part and which has its roots in domestic political problems related to the the conflict more complex, and has had an impact on the search for a negotiated failure to build national consensus, has linked up with conflicts in n eighbouring settlement. I n addi tion, t he interaction b etween t he LR A a nd s tates w ithin t he states and regional conflicts. The conflict became regionalised and the LRA, which region a nd o ther ac tors h as e volved a nd i t i s co nceivable t hat w ith t ime, t he has b een t he m ost f ormidable r ebel g roup in n orthern U ganda, exp anded i ts character of the LRA might change as its interaction with other actors continues activities to the whole region. to change. Any analysis and intervention to resolve the conflict must take note of The increased role of rebel movements in regional and international security the dynamic nature of the conflict. has presented problems on whether to engage with them and how to do so. Most Regionalisation of rebel activities and links between conflicts in neighbouring of the rebel groups have the dubious reputation of engaging in criminal violence countries mean that changes and dynamics in o ne conflict have effects on other and p erpetrating w idespread h uman r ights a buses. Th e LR A r ebel g roup in conflicts within the region. The signing of the CPA in Sudan in January 2005 and Uganda has such a reputation too, which has made it unattractive to engage using election in t he DRC in 2006 h ad an impact on both the LRA and the conflict in peaceful m eans. Thi s di lemma h as b ecome m ore ac ute sin ce S eptember 2001, northern Uganda. It les sened t he va lue of t he LR A t o Sudan, s o t hat S outhern when rebel groups began to be viewed as terrorist organisations, although opinion Sudan was not willing to continue hosting the UPDF on its territory, while in the is divided on this classification. Thus, countries like the US and Uganda added the DRC efforts were made to integrate various rebel forces into the national army. LRA to the list of terrorist states, but other countries still feel that Uganda should Efforts t o resolve t he conflicts in t he DRC t hrough p eaceful m eans provided a engage with the LRA and seek a peaceful solution to the conflict. There is a need solution to the problem of the meddling by the UPDF in the conflict. Apart from to de velop a co herent p olicy o n h ow t o en gage r ebel g roups. To l abel t hem a s directly intervening in t he DRC, the UPDF had also been providing support for terrorist and preclude any engagement with them is not a useful option. The voices rebel groups in the DRC. These developments influenced the strategic options and of rebel movements must be heard. However, engaging rebel groups should not be choices o f b oth t he LR A a nd t he g overnment o f S outhern S udan (G oSS) a nd misconstrued for condoning their criminal activities. provided an impetus for the Juba peace talks. Emphasis should also be placed on understanding the domestic contexts that The im plication i s t hat co nflicts t hat a re in terlinked n eed t o b e addr essed lead to conflicts and the emergence of rebel groups, and on trying to address them. within a r egional f ramework. A ttempts m ust b e m ade t o in volve a ll s trategic The b order a reas w here r ebels o perate h ave lo w le vels o f g overnance a nd actors, at the local, national, regional and global levels. Conflicts that are entangled administrative co ntrol. E stablishing a n ef fective s tate authority a nd m eaningful in a regional web cannot be meaningfully addressed in isolation of other conflicts administration o ver f rontier t erritories w ould b e a n im portant s tep t owards that impact on it. addressing the regionalisation of conflicts.

306 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 307 THE REGIONALISATION OF REBEL ACTIVITIES: THE CASE OF THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY Paul Omach

It i s a lso v ital t o exa mine exi sting r egional s ecurity f rameworks a nd t heir approaches to regional conflict formations, New York: Center on International Cooperation, suitability for helping the grievances of the rebel groups to be heard, for these are 2002; M D uffield, Global go vernance a nd t he n ew w ars: t he m erging o f d evelopment a nd security, London and New York: Zed Books; R Leenders, ‘Regional conflict formations’: is the often lef t o ut o f n egotiations. C onflict m anagement n eeds t o h ave a r egional Middle East next? Third World Quarterly 28(5) (2007), 959–982. awareness and take into account various dimensions of regional interlinkages. It 17 D A Low, The dislocated polity, in H B Hansen and M Twaddle (eds), Uganda now: between should not be restricted to individual states or conflicts, because the resolution of decay and development, London: James Currey, 1988, 36–53. conflict in one country may require resolution of other conflicts within the region. 18 A M O bote, Th e f ootsteps o f U ganda’s r evolution, East A frican J ournal (October 1968), 7–13; J J Jorgensen, Uganda: a modern history, London: Croom Helm, 1981; G M Khadiagala, Uganda’s domestic and regional security since the 1970s, Journal of Modern African Studies NOTES 31(2) (1993), 231–255. 19 Africa C ontemporary R ecord, 1972–1973, B271, L ondon; H B H ansen, Ethnicity a nd t he 1 Louise F awcett, E xploring r egional do mains: a co mparative hi story o f r egionalism, military in Uganda, Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1977. International Affairs 80(3) (2004), 429–446. 20 T Avirgan and M Honey, War in Uganda, London: Zed Press, 1982. 2 Richard Jackson, Violent internal co nflict a nd t he A frican s tate: t owards a f ramework o f 21 C G ertzel, Uganda a fter A min: t he co ntinuing s earch f or le adership a nd co ntrol, African analysis, Journal of Contemporary African Studies 20(1) (2002), 29–52. Affairs 79(317) (1980), 461–489. 3 Y C ohen, B R B rown a nd A F K Or ganski, Th e p aradoxical n ature o f s tate-making: t he 22 Africa Research Bulletin, Exeter, 15 August 1985, 7722. violent cr eation o f o rder, The A merican P olitical S cience R eview 75(4) (1981), 901–910. 23 National Resistance Movement (NRM), Ten-point programme of the NRM, Kampala: NRM 4 C Tilly, Reflections on the history of European state-making, in C Tilly (ed), The formation Publications, 1986. of nation-states in Western Europe, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975. 24 Y K Museveni, Must Africa keep quiet?, Speech at the OAU Summit, held in Addis Ababa on 5 M Ayoob, State-making, state-breaking and state failure, in C Crocker and F Hampson (eds), 29 July 1986, in Y K Museveni, What is Africa’s problem? Kampala: NRM Publications, 1992, Managing global chaos, Washington, DC: USIP Press, 1996. 168. 6 J Herbst, War and state-making in Africa, International Security 14(4) (1990), 117–139, 119. 25 T A llen, Flig ht f rom r efuge: t he r eturn o f r efugees f rom S outhern S udan t o n orthwest 7 Ayoob, State-making, state-breaking and state failure, 42. Uganda in the late 1980s, in T Allen (ed), In search of cool ground: war, flight and homecoming 8 C Young, The African colonial state and its political legacy, in D R othchild and N C hazan in northeast Africa, London: James Currey, 1996; Africa Research Bulletin, 15 June 1986, 8096; (eds), The precarious balance: state and society in Africa, Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1988. P Woodward, Uganda and Southern Sudan: peripheral politics and neighbour relations, in 9 J S M igdal, Strong s ocieties and w eak s tates: s tate-society relations and s tate c apabilities in H B Hansen and M Twaddle (eds), Uganda now: between decay and development, London: the Third World, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988; R H Jackson, Quasi-states: James Currey, 1988, 237. sovereignty, international relations and the Third World, Cambridge: Cambridge University 26 Africa Research Bulletin, 15 September 1986, 8199. Press, 1990. 27 Y K M useveni, A ddress t o t he n ation o n t he a nniversary o f U ganda’s in dependence, 10 Y Sayigh, Confronting t he 1990s: s ecurity in t he d eveloping c ountries, Adelphi Papers 251, Kampala: 9 October 1987. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990, 16–17; B B uzan, Peoples, states 28 Khadiagala, Uganda’s domestic and regional security since the 1970s, 231–255. and fear: the national security problem international relations, Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 29 S Hill and D Rothchild, The contagion of political conflict in Africa and the World, Journal 1983; B Buzan, Peoples, states and fear: an agenda for international security studies in the post- of Conflict Resolution 30(4) (1986), 716–735. Cold War era, London: Pearson Longman, 1991. 30 Khadiagala, Uganda’s domestic and regional security since the 1970s, 243–245. 11 Buzan, Peoples, states and fear (1991), 68. 31 Africa Research Bulletin, 5 June 1987, 8495; Weekly Topic, 22 April 1987, 3. 12 B Buzan, Peoples, states and fear (1983); Buzan, Peoples, states and fear (1991); R Vayrynen, 32 Republic o f U ganda, Report o f t he P arliamentary C ommittee o n D efence a nd I nternal Regional conflict formations: an intractable problem of international relations, Journal of Affairs o n t he W ar i n n orthern U ganda, K ampala: R epublic o f U ganda, 1977, 31–32. Peace Research 21(4) (1984), 337–359, 984; P Wallensteen and M Sollenberg, Armed conflict 33 Y K M useveni, A ddress t o t he n ation o n t he a nniversary o f U ganda’s in dependence, and regional conflict complexes, 1989–97, Journal of Peace Research 35(5) (1998), 621–634. Kampala: 9 October 1987. 13 Buzan, Peoples, states and fear (1991). 34 Y K Museveni, Speech on the opening of the National Resistance Council session, National 14 Vayrynen, Regional conflict formations, 344. Assembly, Kampala, 7 April 1987. 15 Wallensteen and Sollenberg, Armed conflict and regional conflict complexes. 35 Confidential interview, 2 August 2008, cited in P Omach, Understanding obstacles to peace 16 B R R ubin, A A mstrong and G R N tegeye, Regional conflict formation in the Great Lakes in northern Uganda: actors, interests and strategies, Research paper submitted to Concern region i n A frica: s tructure, d ynamics a nd c hallenges f or p olicy, N ew Y ork: C enter o n for Development Initiatives in Africa, Fordia, Dar es Salaam, 2009. International Cooperation, 2001; A A mstrong and B R R ubin, Conference summary: policy 36 Wallensteen and Sollenberg, Armed conflict and regional conflict complexes.

308 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 309 THE REGIONALISATION OF REBEL ACTIVITIES: THE CASE OF THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY Paul Omach

37 D Pain, The bending of spears: producing consensus for peace and development in northern 66 Confidential interview, Kampala, November 2007, cited in Omach, Elusive search for peace Uganda, R eport C ommissioned by International A lert a nd K acoke Madit, L ondon, 1997; in northern Uganda. Paul Om ach, Th e s tate, in surgency a nd in ternational r elations: t he c ase o f U ganda, 67 UNSC, S/PV 5331. Unpublished PhD thesis, Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand, 2003. 68 UNSC, S/PV 5359. 38 Africa Research Bulletin, 24 November 1994, 11603. 69 East African, 22–28 May 2006, 1, 4. 39 Africa Research Bulletin, 25 May 1995, 11813. 70 East African, 10–16, July 2006, 8; Daily Monitor, 17 July 2006, 1–2. 40 Africa Research Bulletin, 26 April 1995, 11801. 71 Sunday Vision, 27 August 2006, 1–2. 41 Africa Confidential 37(3) (1996), 1. 72 Daily Monitor, 12 December 2007, 3; 42 Susan R ice, s peech h eld o n 29 J uly 1998, ci ted in Om ach, The s tate, i nsurgency a nd international relations. 43 Ibid. 44 Paul Om ach, Elusive s earch f or p eace i n n orthern U ganda, R esearch p aper s ubmitted t o Concern for Development Initiatives in Africa (ForDIA), Dar es Salaam, 2008. 45 E H auser, U ganda’s r elations w ith W estern do nors in t he 1990s: w hat im pact o n democratisation?, Journal of Modern African Studies 37(4) (1999), 621–641. 46 Africa Research Bulletin, 30 December 1996, 12480. 47 Y K Museveni, Uganda’s role in t he Democratic Republic of Congo, Address to Parliament in Kampala on 28 May 2000. 48 Africa Research Bulletin, 19 May 1997, 12659; R G ersony, The anguish of northern Uganda, Report o n t he r esults o f f ield-based a ssessment o f t he co nflict in n orthern U ganda, Submitted to the US embassy and USAID mission, Kampala, August 1997, 78. 49 Africa Research Bulletin, 24 October 1996, 12390. 50 UN Security Council (UNSC), Uganda/Sudan: joint statement S/2002/269, 15 M arch 2002; Wairagala Wakabi, Will Atlanta save the day for Sudan’s core fundamentalists?, East African, 17–23 July 2000, 32. 51 East African, 17–23 July 2000, 32; East African, 2–8 October 2000, 10. 52 Omach, The state, insurgency and international relations. 53 UNSC, S/2002/269. 54 Omach The state, insurgency and international relations. 55 Ibid. 56 UNSC, Resolution 1373, Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, adopted b y t he S ecurity C ouncil a t i ts 4385t h m eeting, o n 28 S eptember 2001, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/557/43/PDF/N0155743.pdf? OpenElement (accessed 22 April 2008). 57 Monitor, 17 December 2003; New Vision, 28 February 2004, 1; Monitor, 5 April 2004. 58 Chris D olan, a nd L ucy H ovil, H umanitarian p rotection in U ganda: a T rojan h orse? Background paper, Londen: Humanitarian Policy Group, 2006. 59 UNSC, SC/8057 AFR/900. 60 Daily Monitor, 7 October 2005, 1–2. 61 UNSC, S/2006/29; SC/8695. 62 UNSC, S/2005/785; S/2006/29; New Vision, 8 May 2006, 1–2. 63 Daily Monitor, 7 October 2005, 1–2. 64 East African, 12–18 June 2006, 1–2. 65 Adam B ranch, U ganda’s ci vil wa r a nd t he p olitics o f I CC in tervention, Ethics a nd International Affairs 21(2) (2007), 179–198.

310 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 311 CHAPTER 11 Militant Islamist groups in northern Nigeria

MUHAMMED KABIR ISA

INTRODUCTION

This c hapter f ocuses o n t he ac tivities o f mi litant I slamic g roups in n orthern Nigeria and recounts how in recent times they have capitalised on the opportunity provided b y t he c urrent dem ocratic di spensation t o in crease t heir ac tivities a s non-state ac tors. Th e o bjective i s t o in terrogate t he in creasing c hallenges a nd threats posed to state power and its territorial integrity by the growth and spread of mi litant Islamist g roups in n orthern Nigeria, p articularly sin ce t he 1980s. A major a im i s t o p rovide a n exp lanation o f t he r esurgence a nd r e-emergence o f these g roups in n orthern N igeria.1 The c hapter a lso a ssesses t he t rends a nd dynamics that have accounted for the emergence of groups such as the Maitastine sect, the Zakzaky Shiite movement, and the Nigerian Taleban in Yobe State and its subsequent transformation into Boko Haram. Pertinent questions that the chapter seeks to answer are:

I How h as t he em ergence o f mi litant Islamic g roups/movements in n orthern Nigeria posed a challenge and threat to the power of the secular state and its sovereignty? I What are the historical trends and dynamics associated with the emergence of the militant Islamic groups in northern Nigeria?

MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 313 MILITANT ISLAMIST GROUPS IN NORTHERN NIGERIA MUHAMMED KABIR ISA

I What are the conditions that breed militant Islamism? He p osits t hat t here i s a n eed t o a ppreciate e ach c ase o f f undamentalism a nd I What roles do religious doctrine, sociopolitical realities or ideology play? Islamism independently in the country where it is found and constitutes a political force, and to consider its developments in that particular cultural context. Esposito The analysis is based on the assumption that the emergence, growth and spread of further m aintains t hat t alk o f a w orldwide I slamic u prising a nd a c lash o f militant Islamist groups in northern Nigeria pose a challenge to the legitimacy of civilisations4 in which Islam may overwhelm the West is just a part of the search the state and are symptomatic of the weak nature and character of the state. The for a ‘new enemy’, something to fill the ‘threat vacuum’ created by the demise of causes and consequences of the resurgence of militant Islamist movements and the Soviet Union and subsequent discreditation of communism. His conclusions their challenge to the political status quo are discussed in t he context of existing are that the fear of a unified Islamist uprising is unwarranted. political realities. In the perception of Mahmood,5 and scholars such as Marty and Appleby,6 the The N igerian s tate h as, o ver t ime, b een c haracterised b y unmi tigated analysis of Islamism and religion in general is consistent with the assumptions of despotism, c apricious g overnment p olicies, f iscal cr ises, de bt-ridden e conomy, the t heories o f m odernisation t hat p erceive r eligion a s a ntithetical t o t he inequalities a nd in justices, b ad g overnance, l arge-scale co rruption, development o f dem ocratic, m odern s ocieties. H ence, I slamism a nd o ther fractionalisation of the ruling class, weak political and economic institutions, and politico-religious movements are considered to be opposed to modernity, while a n ear a bsence o f s ecurity o f li ves a nd p roperty. Th e c urrent e conomic cr isis opportunistically tapping its achievements for developing its own tenets. manifested b y t he h arsh r ealities o f exi stence r einforces t he c hallenges t o t he Islamism co nceptually i s a bout p olitical m ovements t hat p ursue I slamic legitimacy o f t he s tate b y t hese mi litant I slamist g roups. Th e s eemingly idealism, m odern ide ologies a nd a p olitical p rogramme. I slamism, w hich in complacent way in which the state manages the emerging issue of militant Islamic denotes al-’islaamiyya, is a s et of ideologies depicting Islam not only as a groups points to one fact – the inability of the ruling class to properly manage the religion b ut a lso a p olitical sys tem co mparable t o s ocialism o r c apitalism a nd state affairs. which holds that modern Muslims must return to the roots of their religion and unite politically by the formation of Islamic political movements (al-harakat al- 7 ISLAMISM AND MILITANT ISLAMISM – CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS islamiyya al-siyassiyya). However, this does not imply that there are universally accepted conceptions of Islamism.8 Studies o n I slamism, jihad, f undamentalism a nd mi litancy a re va ried a nd Islamism – w hich do es n ot n ecessarily im ply mi litancy – i s a n um brella divergent, specifically in terms of their perceptions. Daniel Pipes, an editor of the concept a pplicable t o di verse I slamist m ovements t hat a re o ften co mmonly Middle East Quarterly, is a le ading scholar among those who perceive Islamism grouped under the banner of ‘Islamist’, such as the Saudi Wahhabism, al-Qaeda, and militant Islamism as a dangerous threat to the political stability of the world. the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Algeria, the Hizb ut-Tahrir, and the Taleban He v iews I slamism a nd f undamentalism a s a b elief sys tem, a f orm o f p olitical in Afghanistan and Pakistan.9 Simply lumping together these varied and distinct ideology t hat i s e very b it a s d angerous a s co mmunism a nd o ne t hat s hould streams of Islamist groups, for example by implying that the Wahhabism of t he therefore b e co nfronted h ead-on, j ust a s A merica a nd t he W est co nfronted Taleban and the Salafism of al-Qaeda constitute a homogeneous brand of Islam, is communism.2 The s trength o f t his a rgument lies in t he fac t t hat e ven s ome likely to add to the confusion.10 Muslims co nsider I slamism a nd f undamentalism a s r epresenting a t hreat t o Islamism does have its roots in b oth the Salafiyya movement and the radical political stability in the countries where they are active and by implication a threat Islamist o rganisations c urrently co mpeting f or p olitical p ower a ll acr oss t he to world peace in general. Pipes argues that religious and civil law should be kept Middle East and similarly can be said to have its roots in the nation-states of the separate f rom e ach o ther a nd t hat Q u’ranic l aw i s f lexible en ough t o p ermit Middle E ast a nd N orth A frica. O ther va riants o f I slam t hat h ave ga ined changes in tradition. prominence are Shiism and Sunni. The former is a minority variant of Islam that On the other side of the debate is John Esposito, who argues that Islamism or acquired prominence in t he wake of the 1979 I ranian revolution. The minority Islamic fundamentalism does not pose a major threat to world political stability.3 status of Shiites compared to the Sunni Muslims, the Shiite communal activism,

314 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 315 MILITANT ISLAMIST GROUPS IN NORTHERN NIGERIA MUHAMMED KABIR ISA

and also the leading political role played by Shia scholars () and religious Hadith. M ilitant Islamists t herefore s eek t o c apture t he s tate t hrough lega l a nd authorities o f t he Shiite over t ime h ave unif ied Shiite Islamism, s aving i t f rom democratic means or through a violent revolution, coup d’état or secession.17 fragmentation and degeneration.11 Militant I slamists radic ally r einterpret t raditional I slamic co ncepts, Nevertheless, t he p rincipal r esponsibility f or mi litant I slamism lies w ith particularly its views of battles or jihads, when mobilising the faithful by warning Muslims a nd, m ore s pecifically, w ith t he A rabs. H ow c an t hey co nfront t hese them against ‘enemies of Islam’ and urging them to defend the faith. The faithful responsibilities? Should the response be national or international, theological or are encouraged to train, organise and actively participate in t he actualisation of philosophical, intellectual or political, repressive or accommodating, Muslim or 18 their goals by employing tactics such as temporary withdrawal from society. The Arab?12 faithful can also be urged to target state institutions and symbols that are regarded Islamism as a concept also increasingly denotes the political manifestations of as s ecular o r s tate in struments, o r a gencies t hat a re p erceived t o b e t ools o f Islam. L eading I slamic t hinkers s uch a s M uhammad I qbal, J amal ad-Din a l- oppression and domination. Afghani, Sa yyid A bdul A’la M aududi (P akistan), Sa yyid Q utb (E gypt) a nd t he There a re t hree m ain va riants o f mi litant I slamism: t he in ternal mi litancy Ayatollah Khomeini (Iran)13 have aspired to apply many aspects of the Shariah, particularly that dealing with reviving and revitalising modern s ociety, creating against Muslim regimes that are considered to be impious (such as in M orocco, pan-Islamic p olitical uni ty, a nd e liminating n on-Muslims a nd p articularly Libya a nd A lgeria), t he ir redentists f ighting t o r edeem t he l and r uled b y n on- Western inf luences f rom t he M uslim w orld.14 These I slamic p hilosophical Muslims or under occupation (such as in Nigeria) and the global militants waging 19 underpinnings laid the basis and premises for contemporary Islamism. Islamism a jihad against the West. is therefore a form of identity politics that is usually expressed through movements whose a im i s t o p romote M uslim iden tity. E xamples o f I slamist p olitical ISLAMISM AND MILITANT ISLAMISM IN movements are the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria, Jamaal Islamiyya in Egypt, NORTHERN NIGERIA the Justice and Development Party in Turkey and Morocco, and the Society of the 15 Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Algeria, , , Sudan and . Contemporary militant Islamist movements in northern Nigeria can be identified The militant Islamist movement is a m odern phenomenon that constitutes a by the manner in which they pursue the principles of Islam. They seek to achieve part o f a w ider r esurgence o f r eligious iden tity de veloping acr oss t he M uslim their goals by violently confronting the symbols and institutions of state power, world. Militant Islamism – as well as radical Islamism – is rooted in the recurring authority and legitimacy with the ultimate aim of taking over state power. Further, cycles of revivals characteristic of Muslim history. It is also a reaction, more often they s eek t he s trict a pplication o f I slamic l aw, t he t ransformation o f M uslim than not very violent, to the severe crisis of modernity converging with the rise of society, a nd t he a bandonment o f E uropean/Western c ultural inf luences a nd charismatic prophetic le aders. Militant Islamism is a r eligious movement and a innovations. political ideology that encompasses a s ocial element of protest, engagement in a The logic of Islamism and political Islam is a di stinct and unifying idea that counterattack o n s ecularism a nd a n iden tity f or t he h ave-nots o f t he M uslim 16 characterises a nd i s in herent in I slamic hi story a nd exp eriences t hrough t he world. Militant Islamists seeks a way of life that differs from Western secularism. They Muslim eschatology on the idea of Islamism that is associated with the Mahdi. The also wa nt t o t otally I slamisise t he s ocial a nd p olitical sys tems un der G od’s Islamic doctrine of death and afterlife is based in the belief in the Mahdi, the great sovereignty, r ule a nd l aw. Th ese g oals a re t o b e r ealised t hrough r evival o r reviver who will eventually come back to purify the Islamic ‘faith’ by struggling establishment of a worldwide Islamic state based on Shariah law. Their emphasis with a nd co nquering t he en emies o f t he I slamic o rder. Th e co nquering Mahdi is on the state, which is seen as the main instrument for actualising the Islamic would eventually establish justice and equality in t he global order and freedom religion that will guarantee the revival of and a total return to the Qu’ran and the from tyranny and oppression.20

316 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 317 MILITANT ISLAMIST GROUPS IN NORTHERN NIGERIA MUHAMMED KABIR ISA

This b elief in t he resurgence of t he Mahdi is w idely accepted by Sunni and colonial t o t he p resent t imes, t here h as exi sted in creasing appeal t o a n Islamic Shiite Muslims in n orthern N igeria (a s w ell a s t he g lobal I slamic alternative, manifested by calling for the Islamisation or reIslamisation of society. community/order), e ven t hough t he Shiite (Shia) s ects v iew t he Mahdi as t he hidden Imam. Therefore, Muslims have come to define and justify most and any THE STATE AND RESURGENCE OF SOCIAL attempts a t r eviving r eligion t hrough mi litant I slamism t o f ight in justices a nd MOVEMENTS IN NIGERIA oppression a s p art o f t heir r eligious o bligations. U ltimately, t he b elief i s t hat a charismatic Islamic leader would emerge to oust an existing order of injustice and In Nigeria, the burgeoning capitalist class comprises not only the comprador and inequality and establish in its place one that is equal and just, as enshrined by the indigenous b usinesspeople b ut a lso s tate em ployees f rom t he ci vil s ervice, t he Qu’ran and the Sunnah or practices of the Prophet . It is therefore not military and the police. The state itself over the years became the major source, uncommon for t he followers of organised Islamist m ovements t o identify t heir facilitator and protector of their wealth, either through deliberate policies such as leaders as the Mahdi and to also refer to him as a mujaddid (reviver or reformer).21 indigenisation, co mmercialisation a nd p rivatisation a nd t rade li beralisation One of t he m ajor t rends t hat h ave c haracterised n orthern Nigeria f rom t he policies, or through corruption. It is fundamental given the critical role of the state early 19th century to the present is the emergence and/or resurgence of revivalists, in capital accumulation in t he post-colonial era t hat political contestation would be b ased o n c apturing s tate p ower. H ence, t he co ntest f or t he c apture o f s tate reformists, radicals, fundamentalists and revolutionary Islamist movements. Most power is intense between the competing sections of the polity. This is especially of t hese m ovements h ave, a t va rious s tages o f t heir de velopment a nd d uring true in view of the expanded revenue base the state has acquired from petroleum almost every period, opposed and in s ome cases totally rejected established and export earnings, which has risen dramatically from the 1970s.24 existing I slamic s cholarship. M ore o ften t han n ot, t he mi litant a nd ext remist The hi storical o rigin o f t he s tate in t he co lonial era a nd i ts r ole in t he variants of these movements have become very critical of the nature, character and development of capitalist production processes and relations, largely shaped and constituent order of the state in Nigeria.22 defined its role in the accumulation process in the post-colonial era. The existence A cursory examination of the recorded history of the resurgence of Islamism of the ruling class revolves around the state from which it derives its origin and and mi litant m ovements in n orthern N igeria r eveals t hat t hey a re a r ecurring wealth by employing every available means to secure power and access. Thus, the phenomenon that is similar to the 19th-century jihad of Uthman dan Fodio. The competition a nd s truggles f or s tate p ower, p articularly in t he e conomic cr isis key to understanding contemporary militant Islamism in n orthern Nigeria is to period and the post-adjustment era, heightened identity politics in Nigeria.25 comprehend the role and place of the Sokoto jihad, the caliphate order that was The accentuation of identity politics is linked to the phenomenon of prolonged established t o r esist co lonialism a nd s ecular Western r ule t hrough a r egional military r ule a nd i ts in stitutionalisation o f ‘permanent t ransition’, which le d t o network. Islamist movements in northern Nigeria have capitalised on this network increased r epression o f m ass a nd p opular o pinions a nd e qually in creased to create transnational connections with global Islamic society. disarticulation from the legitimacy of the state. This situation intensified different The most recent militancy has been spurred by both the economic crisis and forms of identity mobilisation and consciousness on the ethnic, regional, religious, governance def iciencies a t a ll le vels o f t he N igerian g overnment, a s w ell a s b y communal and minority political levels. opportunities provided by the opening up of the democratic space. But it is mainly Identity consciousness and m obilisation are often p ositive features of plural based on the traditional protest agenda of challenging and undermining the post- societies b ut m ay b ecome co unterproductive w hen t hey a re em ployed f or colonial s ecular s tate. Thi s h as b een acco mpanied b y a nti-Western s entiments ‘discriminatory practices and unjustified use of violence’.26 The perception of denial fuelled by external influences that included Arab financial support for Wahhabi- of r ights and domination by others creates t he b asis for identity conflicts, w ith style p reaching, t he r egression o f t he N igerian e conomy, a nd t he M iddle E ast identities becoming highly politicised over the issues of control of political and conflicts.23 All t hrough Nigeria’s chequered p olitical de velopment since t he pre- economic power.27

318 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 319 MILITANT ISLAMIST GROUPS IN NORTHERN NIGERIA MUHAMMED KABIR ISA

The accen tuation o f r eligious iden tities a nd t he p henomenal g rowth o f of c ultural s elf-determination. I n Y orubaland, t his c ultural s elf-determinism religious revivalism exploded in the era of the post-adjustment economy. The rise assumed the form of Yoruba nationalism, in Igboland it manifested in demands for of religious identity is linked to the phenomenon of increased economic hardship confederation, while in the Muslim north it took the shape of Shariah advocacy.31 under the structural adjustment programme, which accounted for the sharp rise A second explanation for the ascendancy of Shariah was its use as a b argaining in religious ac tivities and t he m obilisation of religious identities in co mpetitive chip b y t he n orth, w hich wa s losin g p olitical inf luence a nd r elevancy in t he politics. Ibrahim convincingly showed that ‘the dynamics of religious movements Nigerian federation. In order to reassert the region’s influence, its dominant class in co ntemporary N igeria i s v ery co mplex a nd c annot b e r educed t o a sim ple employed Shariah as a negotiating chip for a new national pact among contending “revivalist movement” or a mechanical response to political and economic crisis’.28 national forces.32 However, h e o bserved t hat i t i s f undamentally im portant t o co mprehend t he One of the triggers of Shariah advocacy in some northern Nigerian states was multiplication of religious movements in N igeria and the intensification of their the r esentment o f b eing a t t he p eriphery o f N igerian p olitics a nd i ts p ower fervour within the context of economic and social crises. One should also consider configuration. There were times when the northern political leaders held powerful the co nditions cr eated b y t he fa ilures o f t he mi litary t ransition p rogramme t o political p ositions in N igeria a nd o thers w hen t he n ortherners accep ted t heir democracy, failure of the civilian and democratic processes, and most importantly economically marginal position. However, with the federal elections of 1999, t he amid t hese fa ilures a nd cr ises, t he attempt by t he co mmon p eople t o s eek a nd balance of political power shifted to the south without a marked transformation in produce autonomous spheres of meaning and actions in the context of the severity the economic marginality of the north. Hence, the politics of Shariah advocacy 33 of economic hardships created by the mortgaging and sale of the state through the was part of a protest against regional economic inequalities in Nigeria. policy of privatisation of the state and its investments.29 Map 11–1: Nigerian map of states with Shariah laws and principles It is safe to postulate at this juncture that colonial and post-colonial Nigeria had been characterised and dominated by regimes that have been repressive and, over time, these regimes imposed their ideologies and political authority on the people. Ibrahim also avers that ‘the repression, imposition of an official ideology, and t he ex cesses of t he p arty m achine f orced p eople t o retreat into ide ological domains not controlled by the state and it would seem that religion is the major expression of this possibility’.30 In the past decade, Nigeria has witnessed some mainly Muslim states in t he north transform their legal systems to conform to Shariah, with penal laws that apply severe p unishment f or cr imes. The j udiciaries in t hese s tates w ere reorganised and in s ome instances created to administer purely Shariah law. I n furtherance of Shariah law, state policies were aimed at cleansing society in order to establish social justice through organising Zakkah collection and distribution to the needy, banning begging, rehabilitating the destitute and prostitutes, improving education, and creating a state-controlled and -funded security machinery called the Hisbah to function alongside the Nigerian police force. The 12 northern states, in green, that have adopted Shariah laws and principles are Several r easons h ave b een ad vanced t o exp lain t he ad vocacy o f Shariah Borno, Yobe, Gombe, Bauchi, Jigawa, Kano, Katsina, Kaduna, Zamfara, Sokoto, implementation in N igeria. On e exp lanation i s t hat t he N igerian f ederation i s Kebbi and Niger. The northern states that have not adopted Shariah are Adamawa, becoming more decentralised and part of the decentralisation is taking the form Taraba, Benue, Plateau, Nasarawa, Kogi and Kwara.

320 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 321 MILITANT ISLAMIST GROUPS IN NORTHERN NIGERIA MUHAMMED KABIR ISA

Another fac tor t hat m ay n ot b e co mpletely r uled o ut i s t hat t he MILITANT ISLAMIST GROUPS IN NORTHERN NIGERIA implementation of Shariah in some northern Nigerian states was not unconnected to the desire of Muslims to embrace Islamic law to govern their lives, coupled with Recent political developments, such as the implementation of Shariah law in states of n orthern N igeria a nd t he r esurgence o f radic al a nd r evolutionary I slamic the failure of Western-trained elites to deliver services through Western secular movements, can best be understood from their history, nature and character, and state f unctions. Th ey b elieved t hat o bedience t o G od en genders p eace a nd the society in w hich they evolved. This would require an in-depth study of the progress, which their elites were incapable of providing. These Muslims – who are ideas and philosophy of these movements. largely p easants, un employed o r l andless p roletariats – a spired t o h ave t heir Militant Islamist movements and their organisation are spread across a w ide society li berated f rom in justice, in equality, co rruption, cr ime, in efficiency, range of demographics and vistas in n orthern Nigeria. Central to understanding 34 backwardness, social dislocation and neglect through Uthman Dan Fodio’s jihad. these movements is the Sokoto jihad and caliphate, founded by Uthman Ibn Fodio, The rising popularity of militant Islamist movements in northern Nigeria can which s erve a s a f ramework, a n in spiration a nd a m odel f or p resent-day be attributed to a combination of factors, including increased inequality, injustices, movements, both Sunni and Shia.39 poverty, fa iled s ocial s ervices, in security a nd leg itimacy cr ises o f t he w eak 35 authoritarian Nigeria state, as well as failed structural adjustment programmes. Early militant Islamic movements of northern Nigeria Ironically, Islamist militant movements regard themselves as pragmatic and a modern adaptation of Western-styled organisations that are better suited to deliver Militant Islamist movements of the early 19th century in Hausa societies that later the services demanded by large educated cohorts of Muslim youths in n orthern evolved in to t oday’s mi litants in n orthern N igeria w ere t he Quadriyya and Nigerian ci ties. Th ese m ovements a re q uick t o ado pt W estern inf ormation Tijjaniyya. Th ese m ovements ad vocated t he p urification o f I slamic b eliefs a nd technology to advance their cause, reach out to adherents and solicit funds, as well practices, which had been corrupted by practices and customs considered to be as to connect to other global Islamic movements.36 unIslamic. Early Islamic militants under the banner of the Quadriyya accused the The contemporary militant Islamist movements and organisations in northern leadership of the then Hausa societies and their associates of ungodly practices Nigeria h ave r emained t he dr iving f orce b ehind t he s pread o f I slamism in t he leading to ‘polytheism’ and ‘syncretism’. This laid the basis for Ibn Fodio’s Sokoto country. I n fact, some o f these o rganisations have co me t o r epresent the jihad, which challenged unjust and corrupt rulers, particularly their distortions of the Islamic system.40 embodiment o f a n I slamic a lternative a nd, if y ou li ke, a t hreat t o W estern According to Uthman Ibn Fodio’s manifesto, ‘Jihad was aimed at teaching and secularism, democracy and Western-oriented perceptions of rights in the views of spreading pristine or true Islam and the establishment of a system of government Western observers and scholars such as Huntington, Pipes, Marty, Appleby and based on the Shariah’. With support from Hausa and Fulani peasants, Uthman Ibn Fuller, as well as the Nigerian and many Middle Eastern governments. Fodio succeeded in es tablishing an Islamic political order governed by the Amir However, to many ardent adherents of Islamism and Islamist movements in ul-Muminin (commander of the faithful), who later transformed himself into the northern N igeria, t hese r epresent a n a lternative t o co rrupt, exh austed a nd Sarkin M usulmi (ruler o f M uslims). Th e jihad challenged a nd q uestioned t he ineffectual r egimes t hat h ave fa iled t o de liver o n p romises m ade. T o m any management of religious and political power in n orthern Nigeria and succeeded 37 observers from outside the movements, they represent a destabilising force and in replacing the Hausa aristocratic group with an intellectual and scholarly elite tools in the hands of demagogues who will employ whatever means available in the that led the emirates across the region. The administrative structures put in place globalised w orld t o s eize p ower. T o n ational g overnments a nd t heir o fficials, after t he jihad represented t he sy mbolic im portance a nd p lace o f t he S okoto movements such as the Maitastine, Shiite (Muslim Brothers or Islamic Movement caliphate today. 41 of N igeria) a nd N igerian Taleban (Boko H aram) co njure u p t he im age o f The jihad of Uthman Ibn Fodio continues to exert a great cultural influence in confrontational outfits, violence and terrorist groups.38 northern N igeria. A t i ts in ception, t he caliphate state em phasised j ustice, t he

322 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 323 MILITANT ISLAMIST GROUPS IN NORTHERN NIGERIA MUHAMMED KABIR ISA

removal of unfair taxes, and an Islamic education for the Hausa communities. The Nigeria, as exemplified in t he intensification of the demand for the inclusion of jihad was also a challenge to the ‘polytheism’ and ‘syncretism’ that was prevalent in Shariah laws in the Nigerian constitution during the constitutional conference of the Hausa states at the time.42 To date, the jihad has represented one of the major the 1970s. Th e I ranian r evolution o ccurred a t a t ime w hen m ost s cholarly landmarks in the political history of events of Islam in northern Nigeria and West endeavours w ere dir ected a t de bating t he accep tance o f ei ther c apitalism o r Africa as a whole. It was a turning point that shaped the history of West Africa in socialism. Islamism served as a t hird option, but the perception was that it was the 19th century.43 dominated a nd s uppressed b y t he o ther t wo. I slamism wa s a lso lin ked t o t he Under colonialism, the greatest challenge to the state and colonial authority Muslim Students’ Society of Nigeria (MSS) in the 1970s.46 came from the rise of the Mahdist militant Islamist movement (Mahdiyya), with Mahdism as its guiding philosophy and principle. The Mahdist movement evolved Recent militant Islamist movement in northern Nigeria: as a trans-Saharan anti-colonial Islamic fundamentalist movement. Its origins can the Maitastine and Shiite movements be traced to a messianic doctrine that proffered that at the turn of each century, a Mahdi would emerge with powers to strengthen Islam and make justice triumph. It should be stated clearly that the reason for classifying the Maitastine movement The do ctrine h olds t hat w hen t he Mahdi emerges, h e w ould a ttract a l arge with the Shiite is not because they share common doctrinal beliefs, approaches or followership of Muslims in hi s quest to establish justice and Islamism in s ociety. principles, b ut ra ther b ecause o f cer tain s hared c haracteristics. Th e t wo Most M uslims lo ok t owards t he a rrival o f t he Mahdi for de liverance f rom movements em erged a t a bout t he s ame t ime, a nd i t i s li kely t hat t he s ame inequalities, unjust leadership and bad governance. conditions dic tated t he log ic of t heir em ergence. In addition, t hey b oth h ave a The Mahdist militant Islamist movement considered British colonial rule and radical and revolutionary anti-establishment stance and share the total rejection of the amalgamation of the northern and southern protectorates as satanic and evil. the exi sting s tate o rder. Thi s wa s p rominent in t he co ntinuous a nd p ervasive The movement was inspired by the resistance of Sultan Attahiru and his rejection confrontations and very often violent armed conflicts with constituted authority of B ritish r ule b y un dertaking t he hijra or f light t o S udan a s sy mbolic o f t he or its agencies, and also in the concerted pursuit and desire to change the secular Prophet Mohammad’s flight from to in 621 AD (t he Hijrah), after state o rder t hrough a jihad or I ranian-styled r evolution t hat w ould u ltimately the s ultanate f ell t o B ritish im perial a nd co lonial r ule in t he 1900s. 44 In 1907 replace the corrupt, Western-styled secular state with an Islamic state. concerted ef forts w ere m ade b y t he Mahdist movement t o r egain t he S okoto Apart from these similarities, there was no distinctive link between the two Sultanate, b ut i t fa iled t o m atch t he s uperiority o f B ritish p ower a nd mi litary movements in t erms of Islamic doctrines and principles. As a m atter of fact, the might. However, some of the members of the ruling aristocratic elite and Islamic Shiite movement took a lesson from the state handling of the Maitastine movement scholars co mpromised b y en tering in to s ome f orm o f un derstanding w ith t he to r ealign i ts s trategy a nd a pproach t owards t he s tate, w hile n ot r ejecting o r British to recognise and allow the and their subjects to practise the Islamic jettisoning i ts ide als a nd p rinciple o f a r evolution o r jihad for es tablishing a n faith and religion unhindered.45 In spite of the British assurances that it would not Islamic state. interfere with the way of life of caliphate society, the British colonial state and emirs The Maitastine radical militant Islamist movement became very popular in the were threatened and challenged by the Mahdist movement for several years. early 1980s in the city of Kano and other areas of northern Nigeria. It came to the The awakening and rising tide of contemporary militant Islamist tendencies – limelight a s a r esult of its prolonged armed and v iolent confrontation w ith t he apart f rom t he 19t h-century Ib n F odio jihad – a re in timately lin ked t o t he security a nd mi litary a gencies, h ence t he reference t o t he 1980 Maitastine civil perception o f t he s uccessful I ranian r evolution o f t he 1970s. The I ranian disturbance in K ano. Thi s v iolent co nfrontation l ater s pread t o o ther ci ties o f revolution provided a symbolic orientation to radical scholars such as Ibrahim el- northern Nigeria. Zakzaky that revolutionary change can lead to a replacement of the secular state The Maitastine was a n a nti-status q uo movement dr iven b y I slamic order w ith an Islamic caliphate state. It radic alised Muslim p olitics in n orthern fundamentalism. I ts m embers a re a nti-establishment sy ncretists w ho c hallenge

324 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 325 MILITANT ISLAMIST GROUPS IN NORTHERN NIGERIA MUHAMMED KABIR ISA

both t he do minant r eligious a nd p olitical a uthorities, a nd in deed t he l arger MSS t o m obilise Muslim s tudents t o ad vocate in 1978 f or t he in clusion o f t he Muslim ummah (community). Th e m ovement wa s f ounded b y A lhaji M arwa Shariah penal code law in the Nigerian constitution and later for a revolution that Maitastine, who was killed in a confrontation with the political authorities in the would lead to a t ransformation of the Nigerian secular state into an Islamic one. 1980 di sturbances in w hich m ore t han 4 177 p eople die d.47 The m ovement h as These firebrand revolutionary tendencies led him to confront the agencies of the been classified as radical and militant with a millenarian belief largely because of state, which ultimately led to his expulsion from the university.52 its expressed perceptions that the dominant Muslim population is derailing from The Muslim Brothers, then under the leadership of el-Zakzaky, do not regard the tenets of the Qu’ran and getting richer and more Westernised to the detriment themselves as members of an organisation, but claim total commitment to Islam. 48 of the lowly, poor and non-Westernised segment of society. As such their aim is to establish a ‘nation which should be wholly Islamic; Islamic The Maitastine movement r epresents a radic al s hift f rom o ther f orms o f in t he s ense t hat i t co nsiders as t he L ord o f t he n ation’.53 To the Muslim Islamist movements because it operated at variance with established or accepted Brothers, no Muslim can be a M uslim and a s ecularist at the same time; in fac t, beliefs o r t heories, es pecially w ith r egard t o I slamic b eliefs a nd in junctions secularism is disbelief.54 (heterodox m ovement). Th e Maitastine movement b elieved t hat i t s hould b e The Muslim Brothers attracted members from mainly the youthful segment of constituted only of genuine Muslims and righteous servants of God. The members society, p articularly f rom uni versities a nd o ther t ertiary in stitutions a nd f rom rejected other Muslims for having gone astray while maintaining that their beliefs secondary s chools. I nitially, i t wa s m ore o f a n e lite I slamic va nguard in i ts are t he m ost r ealistic b ecause t hey r evolve a round ‘ Qu’ran only’, a t endency membership and recruiting style. It saw itself as a mi ssionary and revolutionary towards an obsession with the Qu’ran and a rejection of the Hadith and Sunnah of group that sought to address the ills of Muslim society. Its initial doctrine, among the P rophet M uhammad a nd o ther r elated s anctioned s ources o f I slamic l aw. others, focused on the ills of the Muslim ummah in Nigeria, including moral laxity, Members of the movement live in secluded quarters isolated from other members unIslamic practices, dissatisfaction with governance by Muslim leaders, and the of s ociety w hile r ejecting e verything t hat i s E uropean o r W estern, es pecially lack of access to political expression, particularly participatory politics, under an education, s chools a nd m aterial t hings li ke radios a nd w ristwatches. Th ey a re authoritarian regime. The situation in Nigeria – particularly under military rule – opposed to affluence and as such condemn material wealth and t he r ich.49 The was exacerb ated by s erious e conomic and s ocial cr ises t hat resulted in t he vast members exhi bit in tense h atred f or a gents o f t he s tate s uch a s t he p olice a nd majority o f p eople s uffering p overty, un employment a nd h unger. Th e M uslim armed f orces. Th ese f eelings p artly co ntributed t o t he r ecurrence o f v iolent Brothers offered the anxious youths seeking change, a brighter future.55 confrontations with the security and military agencies in Kano and other parts of 50 When i t wa s ini tially es tablished, t he M uslim B rothers wa s a p urely Sunni northern Nigeria in the 1980s. It was believed that the group had been completely suppressed by the state in group. H owever, t he c lose a ssociation o f i ts le adership w ith I ran s ubsequently 1980, but it resurfaced in 2005 in the Jigawa and Kano states of northern Nigeria. brought about the infiltration of the movement by Shiite doctrines, and el-Zakzaky This im plies t hat t he Maitastine movement m ust h ave b een o perating later iden tified w ith t he I slamic do ctrine o f Shiism. Thi s u ltimately le d t o a underground in n orthern Nigeria for years. The members are scattered all over fractionalisation of the Muslim Brothers into a Sunni group and a Shiite group. The northern Nigeria, as far as Jalingo in T araba State.51 It is dif ficult to identify its Shiite splinter g roup wa s le d b y e l-Zakzaky a nd wa s l ater t ransformed in to a leaders and c urrent ide ological underpinnings b ecause o f i ts co vert a nd militant Islamist group, the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN). The Sunni group clandestine manner of operation and the fact that it has gone unnoticed in society was le d b y e l-Zakzaky’s former lo yal s upporters A bubakar M ujahid (in Z aria), in northern Nigeria. Aminu A liyu Gusau (in Z amfara) and Hallam A hmed Shuaibu (in K ano). Th e The first group of contemporary Muslims in northern Nigeria to be classified Sunni group dif fered f undamentally f rom el-Zakzaky on issues of do ctrine and as radic al a nd mi litant I slamists w ere t he M uslim B rothers le d b y Ib rahim e l- rejected the injection of Shiite doctrine and theology into the movement. It has Zakzaky. He was a student at the Ahmadu Bello University at the time of the 1970 continued to retain its commitment to a radical process of Islamisation under the Iranian revolution and was inspired by it to lead the MSS. E l-Zakzaky used the Sunni doctrine.56

326 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 327 MILITANT ISLAMIST GROUPS IN NORTHERN NIGERIA MUHAMMED KABIR ISA

In the past, the disregard for state authority of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria I The Tijjaniyya and Quadriyya, which have spiritual and commercial links with (IMN) was exhibited in a n umber of confrontations with the state. Its leader, el- other Sufi orders in West and North Africa Zakzaky, spent in t otal about nine years in nin e dif ferent prisons f rom 1981 t o I The Wahhabi Izala movement, which runs a charity and first aid organisation 1998, under different administrations and regimes. The Shiite denounced the state and has links with the Saudis and government, disregarded party politics and elections, was contemptuous of I The Salafiyya movement, w hich r uns s chools, in ternet c afés a nd b usiness Nigeria’s constitution, refused to recognise its laws, refused to respect the national outlets, or anthem and national pledge, and disregarded the Nigerian flag. In other words, the I The militant Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN) (formerly under the banner Shiite rejected every symbol of Nigerian statehood.57 The Shiite faction had open of M uslim B rotherhood), w hich n ot o nly h as a w ebsite, r uns s chools a nd confrontations a nd r unning b attles w ith s ecurity a gents o f t he s tate f or s everal clinics a nd p ublishes n ewspapers, b ut a lso p ossesses t he a ttributes a nd years that often resulted in t he loss of lives and property. Bloody confrontations disposition of an organisation like (with which it is linked and which and clashes have characterised its relationship with the state and the mode of state operates like a state within the state in Lebanon) responses until 1999, the beginning of the era of democratic enterprise in Nigeria. Over t ime, t he IMN h as r estrategised a nd c hanged t actics. I t i s n o lo nger The emergence and subsequent transformation of this movement are linked with confrontational a nd, a s s uch, h as s hed i ts mi litant ga rb. H owever, i t r etains i ts the dissatisfaction associated with the weak economic base of the contemporary ideals and goals of an Islamic state. This was aptly captured in its condemnation of Nigerian economy, which is characterised by poverty, deteriorating social services the introduction of Islamic Shariah laws and penal code, especially with regard to and inf rastructure, e ducational b ackwardness, r ising n umbers o f un employed punishment in w hat i t r egards a s a n unI slamic s tate. I n t he Shiite view, t he graduates, m assive n umbers o f un employed y ouths, d windling f ortunes in politicians who started the reform do not have a history of Islamic activism and are agriculture, inadequate and near lack of support for agriculture, and the weak and seen a s opportunists.58 In recent t imes, t he le aders of t he m ovement h ave b een dwindling productive base of the northern economy. According to this movement, coopted by dominant state elements such that they are espousing and using the the current democratic enterprise has produced a set of political leaders who lead same symbols of power that they had denounced in the past. In fact, between 1999 by de ception a nd s loganeering o f I slamic r evivalism t o m obilise a nd c apture and 2007 the leader of the movement was a senior special adviser to the governor support by claiming to be reintroducing Islamic legal principles despite a massive of Kaduna State, w hich guaranteed him dir ect access to t he corridors of p ower collapse of services, poverty, failed governance, absence of social justice and a fair rather than the corridors of prisons. electoral process that produced consensus candidates that lack legitimacy. These The Sunni splinter g roup w ent in to de cline a nd wa s r educed t o m ainly corrupt and power-hungry politicians hijack votes and are self-imposed leaders. missionary activities (da’awah). Its membership further shrunk as a r esult of the They de clare billions of f ictitious amounts of naira as a ssets t o b e recouped a s growing inf luence o f t he m ainstream Sunni Wahhabi movement o f Jama’atul investments through falsification and overpricing of contracts – all of this in spite Izalatul Bid’ah Wa Ikamatus Sunnah (JIBWIS) in northern Nigeria. of the existence of a framework of due process and diligence in contracts awarded and procurements.59 The emergence of neo-militant Islamist movements in The neo-militant Islamist movement was aimed primarily at overthrowing the northern Nigeria: the Nigerian Taleban or Boko Haram present ‘ Western’ a nd ‘secular’ s tate o rder in N igeria a nd r eplacing i t t hrough phenomenon, 2001–2009 violent m eans w ith a h olistic I slamic m odel a nd o rder. Th e g roup c alled Muhajirun holds that it should start by exclusion from other segments of society The emergence of a nebulous neo-militant Islamist movement in the eastern part by r eplicating t he hijira (the ep ic hi storical r etreat a nd exi le o f t he P rophet of northern Nigeria in 2001 should not be equated to or classified with established Muhammad from Mecca to the mountains) that ultimately led to the creation of Sufi Sunni movements such as the following: the first Islamic state in Mecca (the kingdom of ). The Muhajirun, in

328 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 329 MILITANT ISLAMIST GROUPS IN NORTHERN NIGERIA MUHAMMED KABIR ISA

its early formative stage in 2001 strove for self-exclusion of its members from the The Nigerian army sent in t roops to deal with the militants when it became mainstream corrupt society by living in areas outside or far away from society in clear t hat t he Nigerian p olice co uld n ot co ntain t hem. At le ast 18 p eople w ere order t o in tellectualise a nd radic alise t he r evolutionary p rocesses t hat w ould killed in a fortnight of clashes between the group and a combined force of the army ultimately lead to a v iolent takeover of the state. It also advocated for the strict and t he p olice. A fter t he es calation o f t he co nflict, t he co ncern wa s h ow t he application o f I slamic l aw a nd t he t ransformation o f t ainted M uslim s ociety authorities had allowed the group to evolve into a public security threat. Related through a violent armed and revolutionary takeover of the secular state, which was questions were how the group obtained arms and weapons training and who its seen as evil and unjust. The movement also sought to eliminate external influences internal and external sponsors and links were. It was obvious that the militants had and innovations in t he practice of Islam.60 However, it did n ot reject or refuse to an ext ensive n etwork o f ce lls t hat r ecruited m embers f rom p laces a s va ried a s use technological elements such as motorcycles, cars, cellular phones and AK-47 Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State in the northeast, to the states neighbouring 63 guns, and other benefits that modernity confers on society and which are derived Niger and Chad. from Western civilisation. Early in 2003, t he then governor of Yobe State intervened by requesting the The Muhajirun, Hijrah or Ahl al-Sunna Wal Jama’ah – as it was known before members of the group to disband peacefully and return to their parents, but they its metamorphosis into Boko Haram – aptly fits the description of a neo-militant refused to heed his call. In a last show of defiance, they engaged in a v iolent and confrontational o uting w ith t he s ecurity a gencies in D ecember 2003, a ttacking Islamist m ovement. A lthough i ts I slamist do ctrine wa s in spired b y t he A fghan Geidam police station. This resulted in the arrest of about 200 members and loss Taleban of the late 1990s, i t has no established link with the Afghan group. The of 18 li ves. Since then there have been sporadic violent confrontations between members o f w hat i s s ometimes r eferred t o a s t he ‘ Nigerian Taleban’ an d fragmented members of Ahl al-Sunna wal Jama’ah and the security agencies, the ‘Afghanistan’ a re m ainly f rom t he u pper a nd midd le c lasses o f n ortheastern latest being in July 2009. Nigeria. A ccording t o t he f ormer g overnor o f Yobe S tate, A lhaji B ukar A bba Boko Haram is a transmutation of the Muhajirun, Hijirah or Ahl al-Sunnal wal Ibrahim, some of its leaders and members are university graduates and students Jama’ah group once referred to as the Nigerian Taleban. It is the same movement from inf luential and affluent backgrounds. The movement recruits its followers that was dislodged from the Kanamma region of Yobe State in December 2003 and from unemployed youth and is based on a cell network to ensure adequate training was then led by Aminu Tashen-Ilimi, a university dropout. It is also the movement and skills in the use of weapons as well as ideological orientation.61 that reincarnated and reinvented itself as Boko Haram in Maiduguri, from where In 2003, t he Muhajirun organised a nd r eplicated t he hijrah of t he P rophet it established, directed and controlled cell networks with cell commanders in a ll Muhammad f rom M aiduguri – o nce t he a ncient c apital o f t he K anem B ornu the major cities of northern Nigeria (Maiduguri, Bauchi, Potiskum, Wudil, Kano, Empire, the earliest Islamic empire in the region before the advent of the Sokoto Zaria, Katsina, Jos, Jalingo, Danja etc) between January 2004 a nd July 2009. Th e caliphate – t o a n unin habited a rea b etween Yobe S tate a nd t he Niger R epublic Islamist Movement, after its reinvention as Boko Haram, was led by a new leader, called Kanamma. It was from this location that it began to launch its attacks. Their Muhammad Yusuf. W ith s ome o f hi s f ormer a llies a nd co mpatriots f rom t he first v ictims were members of t he lo cal community w ith w hom it clashed over Muhajirun, t he m ovement en gaged in a s eries o f n ew f orms o f v iolent farmlands and f ishing g rounds. Subsequently it b egan launching attacks on t he confrontations with the police and other security agencies.64 symbols of state authority such as the police stations in K anamma, Geidam and Boko Haram set up its headquarters at the Ibn Taimiyya in the ancient Damaturu, the state capital of Yobe State. In some of the raids on police stations it city of Maiduguri, in the eastern part of northern Nigeria. The mosque doubled as stripped them of caches of arms and ammunitions, burned them down, and killed the residence of Muhammad Yusuf and as its ideological, orientation headquarters several p olice o fficers. A fter t he a ttack o n K anamma p olice s tation t he g roup and training camp. Boko Haram did not really change its doctrine from its earlier retreated t o a p rimary s chool in K anamma w here i t h oisted t he f lag o f one of opposition to all forms of Western education and civilisation (while still Afghanistan.62 using i ts t echnological t ools). Thi s o pposition t o W estern e ducation a nd

330 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 331 MILITANT ISLAMIST GROUPS IN NORTHERN NIGERIA MUHAMMED KABIR ISA

civilisation could be seen in t he light of the class consciousness of the group, in The idea of boko is not just about rejecting Western education per se; it is a that the elites of northern Nigeria had failed to live up to expectations and deliver judgement of its failure to provide opportunities for better lives and thus became on promises made, especially regarding the establishment and enactment of the a symbol for the Boko Haram movement to capitalise on the shortcomings of yan Shariah and principles in Muslim-dominant states in northern Nigeria.65 boko. Subsequently it was coupled with haram (forbidden). The movement used The word boko is derived from the English word ‘book’ and was coined at the the term to mobilise unemployed, unskilled and poverty-stricken youths to join its inception of colonialism in northern Nigeria.66 It has come to mean the ability to cause, di slodge t he s ecular, boko-controlled s tate in N igeria, a nd in troduce t he read a nd w rite, es pecially in t he Western-styled e ducational sys tem, a s di stinct strict application of Shariah law and the creation of an Islamic state. This partly from the Islamic, Arab and Middle Eastern educational systems, which existed in explains w hy Boko H aram’s primary t argets of attack were sy mbols of t he state northern Nigeria before being dislodged by colonialism. It served as a rejection – such as security agencies, which had become widely despised. and in i ts e arliest f orm a s a r esistance – t o co lonial im position o f W estern Boko H aram considers i tself t o b e t he l aw enf orcement a gent a gainst t hose education a nd i ts sys tem o f co lonial s ocial o rganisation, w hich r eplaced a nd opposed t o i ts do ctrine. In i ts v iolent co nfrontation w ith t he Nigerian s ecurity degraded the earlier Islamic order of the jihadist state. forces (a combined team of the army, police and other agencies) from 25 to 31 July Islamic s cholars a nd c lerics w ho o nce h eld swa y in t he caliphate state a nd 2009, i ts le ader, M uhammad Yusuf, wa s k illed in M aiduguri.67 Confrontations courts, a ssigned t he n ame boko to n orthern e lites w ho s poke, ac ted, r uled a nd between the group and the police in several cities in northeastern Nigeria revealed operated the state like their Western colonial masters. It is not uncommon to hear that Boko Haram had grown in size a nd membership and had learned from its in discussions among Islamist scholars and average northerners that poverty and experiences sin ce r elocating f rom K anamma. I t h ad c hanged i ts ide ology a nd collapsed governance – the bane of the region – can be blamed on the failures and strategy of advocating for a strict compliance with Islamic laws and principles of corrupt attitudes of yan boko (modern elites trained at secular schools) who have Shariah to also condemning Western education and secularism. It also targeted acquired a Western education and are currently in positions of power. As such, the northern elites and Islamic clerics w ho have ad apted to and followed Western- system represented by the yan boko is unjust, secular and has no divine origin. It styled democracy and s ecular ideology. The July 2009 en counter left about 700 is therefore unIslamic, which in turn accounts for its ineptitude and corruptness. people dead in Maiduguri alone and displaced about 5 000 in just five days. It was All of this forms a sound basis for the ideological orientation and mobilisation reported t hat, in B auchi, a bout 50 m embers o f t he s ect h ad b een k illed a nd of unemployed and unskilled Muslim youths in n orthern Nigeria. These youths hundreds arrested. Between 2003 and 2009, the group had grown to such an extent have unfettered access to Islamic education in which the criteria for admission are that it was able to mobilise thousands of members from Katsina, Damaturu and informal and less cumbersome as long as one can serve one’s master/tutor for the Potiskum to rally behind their leader, Muhammad Yusuf. The security forces had duration of one’s study in fa rmlands and in p etty trading in urb an centres – a s to use intensive fire power to dislodge the group and its leaders from their hideout. opposed to access to Western education that is restricted by entry requirements The a rrests o f s ome C hadians le d t o s peculation t hat t here co uld b e a n and that is not readily available. international dimension through a network of Chadian and Nigerian rebels. In co lonial a nd p ost-colonial n orthern N igeria, acq uisition o f a W estern A chilling revelation is that some of the captured graduates belonging to the education b ecame t he sine q ua n on of a b etter s tandard o f li ving a nd a k ey t o movement are children of the affluent in society. The fact that most investigations opportunity, a means of uplifting one’s position and access to power. In the post- initiated by the government in the past few years were never concluded leads some structural ad justment era o f t he l ate 1980s, a n ew f orm o f n eo-liberal m arket to conclude that the current investigations would suffer the same fate as previous economy wa s u shered in t hat p rivatised t he s tate a nd r esulted in uni versity- ones. For example, six y ears after the 2003 in cident nothing has been heard of a educated graduates struggling to find employment. Employment became a matter report or government white paper about the outcome of the investigation on the of a patron-client relationship, coupled with access to state power. neo-militant Islamist movement’s activities, or about its source of funds, support

332 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 333 MILITANT ISLAMIST GROUPS IN NORTHERN NIGERIA MUHAMMED KABIR ISA

base, recruitment style and networking, and – most importantly – sources of arms is perceived as a greater threat than – among others – hunger, disease (HIV/AIDS, and ammunition. malaria et c), l ack o f lif e’s b asic n eeds, o ppressive l aws, b ad le adership, p oor The resurgence and spread of this and similar groups confirm that the state in governance, unfair terms of international trade, foreign debt and conditionalities Nigeria is weak and incapable of managing militant Islamists or groups such as of in ternational f inancial in stitutions.68 And f inally, A frica i s r egarded a s b eing those in t he Niger D elta b ecause of t he weak character, ineptitude and corrupt incapable of addressing its own problems despite efforts such as the formation of nature of the leadership and its ruling class. The state seems to lack a co mmon the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the African Union approach of dealing with armed non-state groups. Although the state responded (AU) and the efforts of such African organisations to address underdevelopment, with massive and unprecedented force to the Boko Haram uprising and the Niger violent conflicts and threats to human security. African governments are seen as Delta insurgence, it has so far extended amnesty only to the Niger Delta militants. too weak to govern, or being governed by corrupt governments that ‘have limited It is obvious that the presence of natural resources such as oil has influenced the or unr eliable c apacities f or in ternal s ecurity, l aw enf orcement a nd b order different a pproaches t aken b y t he g overnment t o addr ess mi litant u prisings in protection. As such, this lack of governance capacity makes them attractive venues different regions of the country. for the development of violent extremism, terrorism and criminal activities.’69 In order to prop up these weak and failing African states, the US in F ebruary Global and regional response to militant Islamic 2007 launched AFRICOM (the US A frican Command), which has as one of its groups in Nigeria and Africa objectives addr essing t he t errorist t hreats em anating f rom A frica. AFRI COM seeks to build t he c apacities of African states to prevent and combat mi litancy, The sig nificance o f t his s tudy a lso lies in t he 11 S eptember 2001 a ttacks o n terrorism, ext remism a nd in surgencies t hat co uld in terfere w ith acces s t o o il American soil. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, US foreign policy dramatically supplies f rom co untries s uch a s N igeria.70 There i s a v ery s trong A frican changed from the Cold War and immediate post-Cold War era to a heavy focus on apprehension t hat AFRI COM, in t he gui se o f de velopment a ssistance a nd defining, co nceptualising, p reventing a nd co mbating g lobal t errorist t hreats combating terrorism, could be used to destabilise African countries with whose against American interests and allies. The aftermath of 9/11 included a change in leaders and governments the US does not get along. Similarly, there is a fear that US foreign policy towards countries with predominantly or substantially Muslim instead of preventing and combating terrorism, AFRICOM could make countries populations. Muslims in N igeria, North Africa and elsewhere were perceived to that are closely associated with Islamism targets of American hostilities.71 espouse radic al v iews o r t he ide ology o f I slam t hat p romoted v iolence a gainst AFRICOM’s s tated mi ssion i s t o p revent co nflicts b y p romoting s tability Western interests. Islam was intrinsically and incorrectly linked to terrorism and regionally a nd ‘ prevail o ver ext remism’ b y n ever let ting i ts s eeds g erminate in regarded a s a m ajor t hreat t o US n ational s ecurity. Thi s, in t urn, cr eated Africa. This was to be realised through ‘active security missions’ that address the misconceptions of Muslims, by the development of events post 9/11, a s terrorist underdevelopment and poverty that are making Africa a fertile breeding ground suspects and Islam as an anti-Western ideology. for terrorists. In essence, AFRICOM is a reincarnation of the US ‘manifest destiny’ Americans and their Western allies evolved a number of misconceptions and policy that seeks to save Africans from their inability to rule themselves and to prescriptions about Islam, Islamism and militant Islamist movements in Africa. transform the conditions under which they can be turned into terrorists.72 First, they view Muslims in Africa as generally attracted to a radical ideology Although Nigeria is one of t he countries AFRICOM has t argeted to b enefit that is promoting violence against Western interests. Second, they see this form of from i ts w ide ra nge o f p rogrammes, i ts g overnment h as b een n ervous a bout terrorism a s a t hreat t o A frican in terests t hemselves. I n o ther w ords, I slamist openly em bracing i t in v iew o f t he w idespread o pposition o n t he co ntinent. terrorism i s s een a s a m ajor a nd f undamental t hreat t o t he li velihoods o f t he However, AFRICOM has gone ahead and included northern Nigeria in t he Pan- people in Africa as opposed to security threats such as urban violence, pastoralist Saharan r egion t hat i t i s c losely m onitoring f or t errorist t hreats. I t w ould b e conflicts, the proliferation of arms and state violence. Similarly, Islamism in Africa interesting to see how the leadership in Abuja will behave in the future in terms of

334 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 335 MILITANT ISLAMIST GROUPS IN NORTHERN NIGERIA MUHAMMED KABIR ISA

accepting American assistance to deal with Islamic militancy in the northern and It i s ir onic t hat t he exp ansion o f dem ocratic s paces in N igeria h as cr eated the in surgency in t he N iger D elta r egions. S uch accep tance w ould im ply opportunities for civil society as well as non-state actors to increase their powers acknowledgement of t he state’s incapacity to de al w ith national s ecurity t hreats and ac tivities. M ilitant r eligious a nd s ocial m ovements o f va rying p ersuasions, and also inflame anti-government and anti-Western passions. some of which pursue extreme ideals, are more willing than ever to capitalise on the weakening power and legitimacy of the state in order to assert their doctrines CONCLUSIONS and philosophy. In some instances, avowed militants use extremist movements to create q uasi-states w ithin t he N igerian s tate, t hereby f urther w eakening a nd It is fast becoming obvious to social observers and scholars alike that in the years undermining its legitimacy. The failure of the government in N igeria to provide ahead religion as a social phenomenon – more than any other social variable such social and economic benefits to the citizens has severely undermined its support as et hnicity – w ill t ake cen tre s tage in t he di scourse o n N igeria’s p olitical from the populace. landscape. It will play a major role in shaping the future direction of the country. However, t he g overnment c an t urn a round t his n egative t rend b y Many fac tors acco unt f or t his de velopment a nd i t i s cr ucial t o a ppreciate t he strengthening its capacity to provide public goods, proactively responding to the challenges they pose to the Nigerian project at this early stage of the debate. needs of its citizens, and strengthening democracy as well as free and fair elections Globally, t here i s a lso a r ising t endency t owards w hat i s t ermed ‘ religious to gu arantee t he r ights a nd s ecurity o f ci tizens. Th e s tate m ust a lso di stribute essentialism’. Thi s p henomenon, w hich i s a lso t ermed mi litancy, ext remism, national resources equitably and transparently, and has to be accountable to the radicalism o r f undamentalism, h as t he p otential o f ext ending acr oss n ational population for h ow it u ses t hese resources. Th e s tate in N igeria must pursue a boundaries a nd r egions. N igeria i s n ot s pared f rom t he g lobal wa ve o f t his social and economic policy that will ensure the realisation of rights, equity and phenomenon. Through the use of information technology, Nigerian militants now justice for all Nigerians, regardless of their identity (religious, ethnic, regional and have access to material, finance and other resources that they can use to create or other affiliations). organisations and networks, proselytise radical ideas and recruit new members. The b est gu arantee for a p eaceful and prosperous Nigeria is one t hat is not The activities of these radical groups could be inadvertently assisted by the failed threatened b y ext remism o r radic alism, h as de ep dem ocratic va lues a nd neo-liberal p olicies o f s tructural ad justment, n egative co nsequences o f institutions, p romotes g ood g overnance, a nd e qual a nd fa ir t reatment o f a ll globalisation, the poorly performing Nigerian economy, and the poor leadership citizens, and h as a v isionary le adership t hat i s f ully committed to t he Nigerian and g overnance t hat a re m arginalising cer tain g roups in t he co untry. I n s uch nation. A nything s hort o f t his w ould gu arantee t he co ntinuation a nd e ven circumstances, r eligion b ecomes a v iable a lternative f or s ocial di scourse a nd generation of more militancy that we are witnessing in t he northern and Niger identity, as well as a means to achieving social justice and equality. Delta regions of the country at present. Militancy, extremism, radicalism and fundamentalist means or ideologies are used to fill alternative spaces that the state has either failed to provide or closed; or NOTES they are a reaction against alienation from modern institutions of governance that 1 Politically, Nigeria is divided into 36 administrative divisions, referred to as states, and one fail to deliver social services and other benefits to the people. The search and quest federal c apital territory, namely Abuja. Northern Nigeria is a l arge geographical area and to re-assert identities, institutions, values and norms that make meaningful sense contains 19 of the 36 states that make up the administrative units of Nigeria. The country is to t he a verage ci tizen in N igeria c annot b e w ished a way, p articularly a mid t he further constituted into six geopolitical zones, of which three are part of northern Nigeria. decaying inf rastructure a nd det eriorating s ocial s ervices in t he co untry. Th e The northeast zone consists of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe states. The northwest zone is made up of Kano, Jigawa, Katsina, Kaduna, Zamfara, Birnin Kebbi and search f or a lternative o r n ew o rders i s p articularly a ttractive t o t he vu lnerable, Sokoto, a nd t he n orth-central zo ne o f N iger, Kwara, B enue, K ogi, Nasarawa a nd P lateau disempowered a nd m arginalised N igerians w ho a re a lso s usceptible t o states. S ee Nations Online: countries of t he world, Federal Republic of Nigeria – co untry manipulation by elites wielding or seeking power. profile, http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/first.shtml (accessed 9 June 2009).

336 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 337 MILITANT ISLAMIST GROUPS IN NORTHERN NIGERIA MUHAMMED KABIR ISA

2 D Pipes, Is Islamic f undamentalism a t hreat to p olitical stability? From s ame dif ferences, 26 Ibid. National Review, 7 November 1994. 27 Ibid. 3 John L E sposito, Political Islam: beyond the green menace, Current History, January 1994, 28 Jibrin Ib rahim, P luralism a nd r eligious co nflict in N igeria: a r esearch a genda, P aper http://www.iiu.edu.my/deed/articles/espo.html (accessed 15 May 2010). presented at the African Studies Association Conference, Boston, 1993, 2. 4 S P H untington, Th e c lash o f ci vilisations?, Foreign A ffairs 72(3) (Summer 1993), 22–28, 29 Ibid. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/48950/samuel-p-huntington/the-clash-of- 30 Ibid, 3. civilizations (accessed 15 May 2010). 31 Ali A M azrui, Shariacracy and f ederal m odels in t he era o f g lobalisation: N igeria in 5 S Mahmood, Islam and fundamentalism, Middle East Report 191 (1994), 29–30. comparative perspective, Paper delivered at the International Conference on Sharia, held at 6 Martin E Marty and R Scott Appleby, Introduction, in Martin E Martin and R Scott Appleby the Commonwealth Institute, London, 14–15 A pril 2001, h ttp://www.gamji.com (accessed (eds), Fundamentalism and the state, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993, 3. 10 June 2001). 7 Answers.com, http://www.answers.com/topic/islamism (accessed 15 March 2009). 32 Ibid, 1. 8 International Crisis Group, Understanding Islamism, Middle East/North Africa Report 37, 2 33 Ibid, 3. March 2005, h ttp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/ 34 M Tabiu, Sharia, federalism and Nigerian constitution, Paper delivered at the International 037-understanding-islamism.aspx (accessed 3 August 2010). 9 Trevor Stanley, Definitions: Islamism, Islamist, Islamiste, Islamicist, Perspectives on World Conference on the Restoration of Shariah in Nigeria: Challenges and Benefits, London, 2001, History and Current Events, July 2005, h ttp://www.pwhce.org/islamism.html (accessed 19 http://www.gamji.com (accessed 10 June 2001). March 2010). 35 Lubeck et al, The globality of Islam, 2. 10 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 11 International Crisis Group, Understanding Islamism, Executive summary. 37 For exa mple t he R esearch a nd Pu blic P olicy C enter, R AND C orporation, Sa nta M onica, 12 H Redissi, Toward a third type of fundamentalism, 2002, http://www.codesria.org/Archives/ California, US (American); and the Project for the Research of Islamist Movements (PRISM) ga10/Abstracts/206–11/Religion_Redissi.htm (accessed 13 March 2009). of t he Global R esearch in I nternational Affairs (GLORIA) C entre at t he Interdisciplinary 13 See S M A bbas Z aidi, Th e f undamentalist di stortion o f t he I slamic m essage, Athena Centre Herzliya (Jewish). Intelligence J ournal 3(4) (2008), 59–75, h ttp://www.athenaintelligence.org/aij-vol3-a18.pdf 38 J L E sposito (ed), Political Islam: revolution, radicalism or reform? London: Lynne Rienner, (accessed 6 March 2009). 1997. 14 Answers.com, http://www.answers.com/topic/islamism (accessed 15 March 2009). 39 J N P aden, Faith a nd p olitics i n N igeria: N igeria as a p ivotal s tate i n t he M uslim w orld, 15 International Crisis Group, Understanding Islamism. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2008, http://www.usip.org/resources/faith- 16 D Zeidan, The Islamic fundamentalist view of life as a p erennial battle, Moral economy of and-politics-nigeria (accessed 15 May 2010). Islam 5(4) (2001), 24. 40 A R Moten, Political science: an Islamic perspective, London: Macmillan, 1996. 17 Ibid, 25. 41 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 42 Paden, Faith and politics in Nigeria. 19 International Crisis Group, Understanding Islamism. 43 Moten, Political science: an Islamic perspective. 20 I M uazzam, New I slamic r eligious m ovements a nd d emocratic go vernance i n N igeria. A 44 S Best, Nigeria: the Islamist challenge: the Nigerian ‘shiite’ movement, http://www.conflict- research report on the Muslim Brothers, Research report submitted to the Centre for Research prevention.net/page.php?id=40&formid=73&action=show&surveyid=1#author (acces sed and Documentation (CRD), Kano, Nigeria, July 2001. 15 May 2010). 21 Ibid. 45 Ibid. 22 R L oimeier, P atterns a nd p eculiarities o f I slamic r eform in A frica, Journal o f R eligion i n Africa 33(3), Islamic thoughts in 20th-century Africa (2003), 237–262, http://www.jstor.org/ 46 Best, N igeria: t he I slamist c hallenge; M uazzam, N ew I slamic r eligious m ovements; S L stable/1581849 (accessed 25 February 2009). Sanusi, Fundamentalist groups and the Nigerian legal system: some reflections, in A Imam, 23 P L ubeck, R L ipschutz a nd E W eeks, Th e g lobality o f I slam: Sharia as a N igerian ‘self- J Morgan a nd N Y uval-Davis (e ds), Warning s igns o f f undamentalisms, Nottingham, UK: determination’ m ovement, P aper p resented a t t he C onference o n G lobalisation a nd S elf- Women Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUML), 2004. Determination, QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS106, London, April 2003. 47 K Z S kuratowicz, R eligious f undamentalist m ovements: s ocial m ovements in t he w orld 24 A J ega (e d), Identity t ransformation a nd i dentity p olitics u nder s tructural a djustment i n system? Case study of the Maitatsine movement in Nigeria, 1980–85, Paper presented at the Nigeria, K ano, N igeria: N ordiska A frikainstitutet a nd C entre f or R esearch a nd annual m eeting o f t he A merican S ociological A ssociation, P hiladelphia, 12 A ugust 2005, Documentation, 2000. http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/3/2/5/1/pages32519/ 25 Ibid. p32519–1.php (accessed 13 March 2009).

338 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 339 MILITANT ISLAMIST GROUPS IN NORTHERN NIGERIA

48 Centre for D emocratic Research and Training (CDRT), B ayero University, Kano, 2005, A report o f a c ommissioned s tudy o n t he Ul ama i n c ontemporary n orthern s tates o f Nigeria, Report submitted to the Federal Government of Nigeria. 49 Ibid; Skuratowicz, Religious fundamentalist movements. 50 Best, Nigeria: the Islamist challenge. 51 Centre f or D emocratic R esearch a nd Training, A r eport o f a c ommissioned s tudy o n t he Ulama. 52 Ibid. 53 Muazzam, New Islamic religious movements. CHAPTER 12 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid. 56 Sanusi, Fundamentalist groups and the Nigerian legal system. 57 Best, Nigeria: the Islamist challenge. Armed Islamist groups in Egypt, 58 Best, Nigeria: the Islamist challenge; Sanusi, Fundamentalist groups and the Nigerian legal system. 59 Paden, Faith and politics in Nigeria. Algeria and Morocco 60 Sanusi, Fundamentalist groups and the Nigerian legal system. 61 IRIN – H umanitarian News a nd A nalysis, Nigeria: Muslim f undamentalist u prising r aises ERIC GEORGE AND ALEKSI YLÖNEN fears o f t errorism, UN Of fice f or t he C oordination o f H umanitarian A ffairs, 16 J anuary 2009, http://www.irinnews.org/Reort.aspex?ReportId=82382. A similar report can be found at http://www.jihad watch.org/archives/000727.php-3/1 a nd http://www.nigeriamasterweb. com/Talebanofnigeria.html. INTRODUCTION 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid. This c hapter exa mines t he m ost p rominent a nd c urrent m ajor a rmed I slamist 64 Ibid; Isa Umar Gusau, Boko Haram: how it all b egan, 2 A ugust 2009, h ttp://www.sunday. dailytrust.com (accessed 2 August 2009). groups in E gypt, A lgeria and Morocco. It discusses t heir common features and 65 Isa Umar Gusau, Boko Haram. differences, in cluding ide ology, r ecruitment a nd p articular f eatures s uch a s 66 Wikipedia, Boko H aram, h ttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko_Haram (acces sed 1 A ugust development and activities. Contemporary armed Islamist groups in t hese three 2009). 67 BBC News, Nigeria sect head dies in custody, 31 July 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/- countries have emerged as a v iolent manifestation of Islamist opposition against /2/hi/africa/8177451.stm (accessed 31 July 2009). the state, which originated in Egypt in the 1960s, but also draws inspiration from 68 W Okumu, Africa Command: opportunity for enhanced engagement or the militarisation of earlier forms of Islamism. Their emergence is simultaneously a r esponse to state US-Africa r elations? Pretoria: I nstitute f or S ecurity S tudies, A frican S ecurity A nalysis Programme, 2007; B M esfin, The establishment and implications of the United States Africa policies, social crisis and international factors. Command: an African perspective, ISS Occasional Paper 183, Pretoria: Institute for Security Since t he 1970s, t he a ppearance o f s ocial, p olitical a nd f inancial I slamist Studies, 2009. networks has c ulminated in t he unprecedented internationalist character of t he 69 Okumu, Africa Command. now ‘global’ jihad. Th ese n etworks h ave b ecome in creasingly im portant in t he 70 Ibid. 71 Ibid. recent de velopment a nd a gendas o f E gyptian, A lgerian a nd M oroccan a rmed 72 Ibid. Islamist groups as they have sought to overcome their local weaknesses through regional a nd in ternational lin kages. Thi s de velopment r eflects c hanges in t he conception a nd p ractice o f jihad, a s a rmed I slamist g roups h ave ad apted t heir ideology a nd p raxis t o t he lo cal, r egional a nd g lobal co ntext. R egional a nd international factors have been significant in s haping their agendas, targets and

340 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 341 ARMED ISLAMIST GROUPS IN EGYPT, ALGERIA AND MOROCCO ERIC GEORGE AND ALEKSI YLÖNEN

recruiting practices since the 1990s, r esulting in a co mbination of both internal pursue their objectives through the violent actions of armed groups and how this and external activities, while apparently lacking, however, any strategic cohesion. development fits into the context of wider trends within Islamism is the subject of The major groups discussed in t his chapter are the al-Jihad/Egyptian Islamic this section. Jihad (EIJ) in Egypt, the Salafi Group for Preaching and Combat (Groupe Salafiste pour l a P rédication e t l e C ombat, GSPC) / al-Qaeda in t he L and of t he Islamic Islamism, political Islam and Salafi Maghreb (AQIM) in Algeria, and the Moroccan Islamic Fighting Group (Groupe Islamique C ombattant Marocain, GICM) in M orocco. The EIJ a nd AQIM insert The a rmed I slamist g roups ac tive in E gypt, A lgeria a nd Morocco a re Sunni in themselves within a hi storical legacy of armed Islamist violence, which has now orientation a nd o ften c laim s ome f orm o f a ssociation w ith Salafi jihadism (a l- assumed a m ore international approach, w hile t he GICM can b e deemed more Salafiyya al-Jihadiyya), the global jihad nominally led by al-Qaeda. Salafi jihadism clearly a direct product of this recent internationalisation. is j ust o ne m anifestation o f Sunni Islamism, i tself p art o f a w ider I slamism The chapter is organised in the following manner: the next section provides a understood here as ‘the active assertion and promotion of beliefs, prescriptions, general o verview o f t he e volution o f a rmed Islamist g roups a nd t heir ide ology laws or policies that are held to be Islamic in character’.1 Islamism is a complex and within t he broader context of Islamism, and examines t he external fac tors t hat multifaceted phenomenon, but for the purposes of this analysis it may be said to have influenced this evolution. It is followed by a t hird section that provides an encompass three broad approaches.2 outline of the internal factors that have impacted on the development, activities Insofar as it offers guidelines for the organisation and governance of Muslim and recruitment practices of the groups as well as on their internationalisation. communities, I slam a s a r eligion m ay b e s aid t o be in herently p olitical. The fourth section examines the global war on terror (GWoT) and how initiatives Nonetheless, t he t erm ‘ political’ I slam i s a nalytically u seful in a ssigning a such t he Trans-Saharan C ounterterrorism I nitiative (T SCTI) h ave a ffected n ot classification t o t hose g roups p ossessing cer tain s pecific c haracteristics w ithin only armed Islamist groups operating in t he region but also, and perhaps more Islamism. Political Islam as an expression first gained currency after 1979 in t he importantly, t he r egimes g overning t hese t hree co untries. Th e f ifth s ection context o f I ran’s I slamic r evolution a s t he co mbination o f I slam a nd p olitics contains some concluding remarks. became perceived as a threat in the West. In the process, it established the lasting perception that the linking of Islam and politics was a radical deviation rather than 3 IDEOLOGY AND EXTERNAL FACTORS IN THE a historical constant in Muslim societies. The Muslim Brotherhood is emblematic EVOLUTION OF ARMED ISLAMIST GROUPS IN EGYPT, of those groups and organisations that now recognise some degree of distinction ALGERIA AND MOROCCO between the political and the religious, and pursue societal reform ‘institutionally’ through a u sually n on-violent p olitical p rocess. M uslim B rotherhood Violent forms of Islamism and t heir ext reme m anifestations ex emplified in t he organisations are present t hroughout t he Middle E ast as well as in A lgeria and actions o f a rmed I slamist g roups a re b ut o ne o f t he t rajectories f ollowed b y Sudan, a nd simi lar p olitical g roupings a re ac tive in T urkey, M orocco a nd dissenting a nd co ntesting v oices in t he I slamic w orld a gainst es tablished Indonesia. While these organisations have continued to seek guidance from Islam’s sociopolitical o rder a nd p ractices. Th e em ergence o f t hese g roups r epresents a holy texts, they have favoured an interpretation of Islam that is compatible with particular a nd sin gular t rajectory co nditioned b y t he in terplay b etween w ider elements o f m odernity, a llowing t hem t o o perate a nd f unction o penly w ithin historical fac tors o perating a t a n ational a nd in ternational le vel, a nd t he modern state structures and their institutions. corresponding evolution of Islamism as it has responded to the challenges posed The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in Egypt by Hassan al-Banna in 1928 by m odernism, n ationalism, s ecularism, co mmunism, in ternal p olitical c hange against the background of Ataturk’s abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate four years and stagnation, and most recently globalisation. How and why some advocates of earlier, g rowing W estern inf luence in M uslim l ands, a nd t he b udding a nti- the most radical brand of Islamism in Egypt, Algeria and Morocco have chosen to colonialism of the Western-educated elite. The demise of the symbolic unity of the

342 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 343 ARMED ISLAMIST GROUPS IN EGYPT, ALGERIA AND MOROCCO ERIC GEORGE AND ALEKSI YLÖNEN

Arab M uslim w orld a nd t he im ported m odernist v isions o f n ationalism, al-Salaf a l S alih, for guid ance, a nd i t ini tially s ought t o in tegrate e lements o f secularism a nd p rogress le d t he B rotherhood t o ado pt a n o utspokenly a nti- modernity t o p repare I slamic s ocieties f or t he c hallenges o f t he co ntemporary Western outlook based on respect for Islamic values. The Brotherhood’s popularity world. Salafists eventually b ecame in creasingly co ncerned w ith r esistance t o grew and the organisation extended its reach beyond Egypt and into neighbouring Western inf luence a nd de veloped w hat w ould t urn o ut t o b e lo ng-lasting lin ks countries through a combination of social work, preaching (da’wa), and ‘Islamic’ with the Wahhabi Islam of Saudi Arabia. The opposition to political Islam reflects anti-colonialism.4 a p an-Islamist, a nti-nationalistic do ctrine t hat h as faci litated co nvergence o f In 1954, t wo y ears a fter E gypt’s in dependence, t he c lash b etween N asser’s interests for decades between religiously conservative Sunni regimes and Western nationalism and the Islamism of the Brothers resulted in t he organisation being interests o pposed t o A rab n ationalism. M oreover, Sa udi A rabia’s w ealth h as banned a nd v iolently s uppressed. Th ese v iolent c lashes w itnessed t he r ise o f enabled the Kingdom to export Wahhabi Islam and solidify its connection to the Sayyid Qutb, who by equating the nationalist regime with jahiliya, a state of pre- Salafis, while extending its influence in the context of its rivalry with Iran.8 Islamic ig norance, challenged t he regime’s legitimacy on profoundly acc usatory The Salafis place great importance on a strict adherence to ‘Islamic’ individual and divisive religious grounds. Following Qutb’s execution in 1966, t he Muslim behaviour and adopt a co nservative fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. The Brotherhood r e-assessed hi s co ntroversial a pplication o f kufr (impious) a nd emphasis on preaching and the promotion of Islamic virtues and values reflects whether it applied to the regime only, to the whole of a corrupt society, or was to the traditional Salafi concern with preserving and uniting the Muslim community be interpreted metaphorically.5 The implications were significant, given that Qutb of believers (ummah) and rejecting the legitimacy of modern concepts such as the had argued that Muslims had the religious duty to conduct jihad against those who nation or t he n ation-state a s f orms of s ocial organisation a nd g overnance. Th e were deemed to be kufr in order to salvage Islamic society from decay. Taken to the Salafis h ave f ocused o n da’wa rather t han p olitics, a nd o pposed t he M uslim extreme, t he log ic o f Q utb’s t hinking in spired a rmed g roups, m ost n otably in Brotherhood’s p olitical ac tivism. N onetheless, t heir r eligious a uthorities, t he Egypt a nd in A lgeria, t o p ursue v iolent c ampaigns o f t error a gainst r egimes ulema, h ave c alled attention t o corruption a nd unIslamic m oral b ehaviour a nd accused of profanation against divine sovereignty, their perceived supporters, and officials h ave r esponded b y in tegrating t hem in to s tate s tructures, w hich h as eventually against all those who failed to share the same radical politico-religious allowed their influence to impose itself in certain communities and push sections beliefs. of them in t he direction of violent disposition towards ‘Islamic’ law and order.9 The Muslim Brotherhood continues to be a major force within political Islam. Because o f i ts ra pid g rowth in r ecent y ears, a nd w hile r emaining os tensibly Its political engagement and renunciation of the violence inherent to Qutb’s ideas apolitical, ‘Da’wa Salafism’ now represents a de cisive constituency in places such helped to lay the foundation for what Tibi refers to as ‘institutional Islamism’,6 the as Algeria.10 hallmarks of which are a reconciliation of Islam with elements of modernity and a Salafi jihadism, a third form of Islamism, borrows elements from the legacy of non-violent a ttempt t o ga in p ower t hrough es tablished p olitical s tructures. both the Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood. It shares with the Salafis a strong Indeed, the majority of Muslim Brotherhood organisations have worked within ‘a conviction t hat I slamic va lues m ust b e r estored a nd a r efusal t o r econcile t he legal framework, except where they were prevented from taking political action’.7 modern concepts of political organisation and nation-states with its interpretation Second, the writings of al-Banna and, in particular, those of Qutb have provided of Islamic doctrine. Contrary to the traditional Salafis, however, it advocates jihad, key s ources of inspiration and form p art of t he ‘ ideological’ f ramework for t he a re ligiously s anctioned armed s truggle, rather t han preaching a s t he m eans of current Salafi jihadist movement. achieving its ends. Jihad symbolises the sacred defence of Muslim lands and the A second manifestation of Islamism includes movements such as the Salafi, Algerian war of independence, for instance, associated the concept of jihad with which h ave r emained a political a nd s ought t o ac hieve s ocietal r eform t hrough the a rmed s truggle a gainst t he co lonial p ower. A co ntemporary p arallel exi sts non-violent action, often focused on preaching. Since its beginnings in t he early today in t he P alestinian M uslim B rotherhood o rganisation, H amas, a nd i ts 20th century, Salafism has looked to the teachings of the ‘venerable ancestors’, the struggle a s a f orm o f jihad in r esponse t o o ccupation. Th us dep ending o n i ts

344 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 345 ARMED ISLAMIST GROUPS IN EGYPT, ALGERIA AND MOROCCO ERIC GEORGE AND ALEKSI YLÖNEN

interpretation, jihad may be conducted internally against Muslim rulers, globally the groups and individuals claiming to form part of al-Qaeda. Throughout these against the West or be irredentist in character, as in the case of Palestine.11 three de cades a s eries of mi litary and p olitical e vents, b eginning with t he 1967 The Salafi jihad adopts the thought of Qutb when it considers violent action Israeli defeat of the Arab states and Egypt’s peace with Israel in 1978, continuously against M uslim r ulers de emed kufr a r eligious d uty. A s le ader o f t he M uslim undermined t he ‘ Islamic’ leg itimacy o f n ationalist r egimes in t he e yes o f Brotherhood in Egypt during the 1960s, Sayyid Qutb called for the overthrow of radicalised Islamists. The Palestinian cause has been an important rallying cry for the n ationalist N asser r egime, w hich h e co nsidered unI slamic f or p lacing t he Egyptian armed Islamic groups since the 1970s a nd the unresolved conflict may sovereignty of the nation ahead of divine authority. As seen above, this occurred have in spired s ome o f t he a ttacks a gainst t he E gyptian t ourist in dustry in as t he US f omented a p ro-Western p an-Islamism w ith r eligiously co nservative 2004–2006. The Palestinian question appears to have been converted into a source regimes in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan as a bulwark against the rise and spread of of funding and used to recruit volunteers internationally for the global jihad.13 Nasser’s A rab n ationalism. Q utb u sed t he co ncept o f den unciation ( takfir) to Secular Arab nationalism has responded by asserting its dominion over t he declare the Nasser regime kufr and believed that Muslim society was reverting to religious s phere, ei ther t hrough v iolent r epression o r b y co opting di ssenters. a s tate of p re-Islamic ig norance ( jamaliya). B y ado pting these views, t he Religion h as b een u sed a s a s ource o f leg itimacy f or t hese r egimes, b oth t o contemporary Salafi jihadists have dep arted sig nificantly f rom t he t raditional consolidate t heir h old on p ower a nd t o f orge a n ational identity. Islamism wa s Salafi respect for Muslim authorities, provided these abide by Islamic principles. itself at times profoundly nationalist and drew on the association of religion and Salafi jihadists have objected to the strategic alignment of Muslim governments the nation for its own legitimacy. The idea of a jihad against a foreign non-Muslim with the West in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Algeria. In line with oppressor was a popular mobilising factor in the war of independence of the Front this criticism, beginning in t he 1980s, t he focus of the Salafi jihad expanded to de Libération Nationale (FLN) in A lgeria, while in t he late 1980s a nd 1990s t he include Western interests in Africa, Europe, America and South Asia. Front I slamique du S alut (FIS) p ortrayed i ts I slamism a s a co ntinuation a nd recuperation of the liberation struggle against France. After ideology: external factors in the evolution During the 1980s, a s eries of events further encouraged the growth of armed of armed Islamist groups Islamic g roups a nd adde d a l ayer o f co mplexity t o t heir r elationship w ith t he governing regimes of their home states. These regimes reacted cautiously to the The evolution of armed Islamist groups in Egypt, Algeria and Morocco has been growing power of radical violent Islamism, exemplified by the Iranian Revolution marked b y f our k ey mi lestones: t he ini tial r esponse t o Q utb’s ide as a nd t he of 1979, A nwar Sadat’s assassination in 1981 a nd the attacks on US M arines in accompanying radic alisation o f cer tain e lements w ithin a w ider I slamism; t he Beirut in 1983. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 thus proved timely by congregation, s truggle a nd e ventual v ictory o f a m ultinational Muslim f ighting providing an external enemy and a c ause towards which worried regimes could force in A fghanistan and creation of jihadi salafist networks; the return of these redirect internal dissent and anti-US sentiment. It also offered a v ehicle for the combatants to t heir home countries and t heir contribution to an internal jihad spread of Saudi Wahhabism and for a Cold War rapprochement between Pakistan against unIslamic regimes, and finally, the global jihad targeting enemies of Islam and t he US. Sa udi Wahhabism has b een strategically a ligned w ith t he US sin ce around the world.12 These milestones have been reached against the background of 1945, w hich h as r esulted in t he o rientation o f jihad towards A rab n ationalist a s eries o f in ternal a nd ext ernal fac tors t hat, in ef fect, h ave co nditioned t he regimes and Soviet influence in places such as Egypt, Algeria and Afghanistan. evolution of armed Islamist groups. It is estimated that up to 50 000 ‘Arab’14 fighters went through Afghanistan, the In Egypt during the 1970s a nd 1980s, a s well as in A lgeria in t he 1990s, t he majority co ming f rom Sa udi A rabia, E gypt a nd A lgeria. Th e ‘ victory’ o f t he internal jihad against ‘impious regimes’ aimed at toppling and replacing the state. mujahedeen and their subsequent return to their countries of origin furthered the The merging of religious fundamentalism and a violent political ideology in these radicalisation of violent Islamism in several ways. This future ‘first generation’ of two countries crystallised with devastating results and it is now characteristic of al-Qaeda came dir ectly f rom M uslim co untries w here t hey h ad a lready b een

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politically ac tive. Th e A fghan exp erience cr eated o pportune co nditions f or t he Yemen in def ence o f a s upranational ummah. A co nnection b egan t o a ppear reinforcement o f Sa udi-financed in ternational I slamist n etworks a round Salafi between ‘deterritorialisation and radical Islamisation’.16 jihadists and forged increased commonalities between armed Islamist opposition Compared w ith o ther m anifestations o f v iolent I slamism, t his g lobal jihad 17 in Egypt and Algeria. It allowed, for instance, the EIJ to tap into private financing appears as the only one with no detectable strategy or clear objectives. Drawing 18 to f und i ts ac tivities, p ermitted o perations w ithout a n e laborate s ocial on Qutb’s legacy, the five-pillar doctrine of ‘sunni jihadists internationalism’ calls constituency, and facilitated an eventual merger with al-Qaeda in 2001. EIJ wa s for a ‘violent world revolution’ against jahiliya (pre-Islamic barbarism) and al-kufr al-alami (international unbelief).19 It is thus markedly different from the ‘internal founded in A fghanistan during the 1980s b efore becoming active in E gypt, and jihad’ against impious regimes or the ‘irredentist’ jihad in Palestine. The internal exerted influence over Osama bin Laden, a son of an important Saudi family and jihad in Egypt and Algeria largely failed to reach their objectives in the 1990s and a founding leader of al-Qaeda. groups s uch a s t he EIJ a nd t he GS PC r eoriented t heir s truggle t o in clude The radic alisation o f t he r eturnees wa s co mpounded b y t he dif ficult r e- international o bjectives a nd r emote en emies s uch a s t he US, I srael a nd t heir insertion of the veterans into civilian life, leading some Algerian mujahedeen to Western a llies. G roups o f m ore r ecent cr eation s uch a s M orocco’s GICM h ave influence the creation and strategies of both the FIS a nd the Groupes Islamiques focused dir ectly o n in ternational t argets a nd, t ogether w ith t he EIJ a nd GS PC, Armés (GIA). Finally, following the Soviet defeat, the US turned its attention away claim membership with the al-Qaeda network. from Afghanistan, leaving Saudi Arabia and Pakistan less subjected to American While this international tendency continues to be prevalent, internal agendas influence as they reconfigured their relationship with the armed groups. In the five persist a s w ell, b inding t ogether t he in ternal a nd in ternational s truggle a gainst years that elapsed between the first World Trade Centre attacks in N ew York in Qutb’s jahiliya. This is the case with the Algerian AQIM, which continues to target 1993 and the bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the US paid little attention the s tate a nd i ts a llies in A lgeria. Salafi jihadism also co ntinues t o b e o riented to the activities of armed Islamist groups.15 During the 1990s, however, a number towards r egime c hange in p laces s uch a s I raq, w here t he in surgents r eject of US foreign policy decisions shifted the attention of the jihadists from targeting democracy and Shia rule and seek to establish an Islamic emirate,20 taking aim at the regimes of Islamic countries to a global jihad against external enemies. ‘sheikist’ Salafists and more moderate Muslim Brothers k nown to s eek p olitical 21 Armed Islamist groups interpreted the 1991 US-led Gulf War in and the compromises w ith s ecularists. In Saudi Arabia, t he close connections b etween deployment of troops in Somalia in 1993 as evidence of US imperial designs on the Salafis and Wahhabis and a regime aligned with the US have combined to place the Muslim world, and responded with their own February 1993 attacks in New York. Kingdom in a de licate position in relation to the ‘politically radical wing of neo- fundamentalism’.22 As the next section will explore, the development and activities While relations with the West and the issue of how to confront or coopt violent of a rmed I slamist g roups co ntinue t o r espond t o t he dem ands o f a n ide ology forms o f I slamism w ere a lready fac tors b efore 1991, t he co nflict accen tuated a constantly adapting to internal and external factors. crisis in M uslim s tates a nd w ithin I slamic m ovements t hat di vided e ven t he supranational Islamism of the Muslim Brotherhood. After the 1996 Taleban rise to power, t he ‘Arab’ v olunteers r emaining in A fghanistan r eorganised a round t he INTERNAL FACTORS IN THE RECRUITMENT AND networks supported by bin Laden, himself only recently arrived from Sudan. In ACTIVITIES OF THE MAIN EGYPTIAN, ALGERIAN AND Algeria, the GIA began targeting France as an ally of the regime, and networks of MOROCCAN ARMED ISLAMIST GROUPS returning mujahedeen promoted t he in ternationalisation o f v iolent I slamism. A number of internal factors help one to understand the rise of armed Islamist Young ‘re-Islamised’ Algerians in France with little connection to the project of an groups in Egypt, Algeria and Morocco. This section identifies and examines these Islamic state in their homeland, were drawn to the more radical GIA before later factors and their influence on the recruitment and activities of these groups, and aligning themselves with the global jihad and surfacing in Afghanistan, the US and concludes by looking at the recent trend towards internationalisation.

348 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 349 ARMED ISLAMIST GROUPS IN EGYPT, ALGERIA AND MOROCCO ERIC GEORGE AND ALEKSI YLÖNEN

Internal factors and general recruitment trends Some Islamist groups, such as the Salafi in Algeria, have sought to establish an alternative community through the provision of services and Islamic order and the Since independence, post-colonial regimes in E gypt, Algeria and Morocco have creation o f a lternative I slamic n etworks.29 Others h ave en gaged in p roviding engaged in authoritarian and repressive policies, which lay emphasis on coercion education and s ocial s ervices t hrough charitable ac tivities, civil s ociety, student and co ncentration o f s tate r esources a t t he di sposal o f t he g overning e lite. unions, p rofessional l abour o rganisations, s ocial h elp a ssociations a nd I slamic Consequently, t he s ocioeconomic l andscape h as b ecome a r eflection o f s tate banks. These groups also appeal to liberal professionals and members of the urban agendas in which political and economic power has been placed in the hands of a middle c lasses di sgruntled b y t he l ack o f p rospects un der mi litary r ule a nd small number of privileged individuals. This has resulted in g rowing e conomic economic crisis.30 imbalances, a mplified b y t he l ate 1980s r ecession, a nd t he in ability o r In E gypt, A lgeria a nd M orocco, t he s tate’s w ithdrawal f rom im poverished unwillingness o f t he s tates t o p rovide ’social, e conomic, p olitical a nd psy chic neighbourhoods and slums has created space for the growth of local Islamic orders goods t o t heir exp anding, in creasingly y outhful, urb anised a nd li terate based largely on neo-fundamentalist foundations. These spaces, consisting of parts 23 populations’. of individual neighbourhoods, are often governed by Shariah (Islamic law) and at Thus, an expanding youth population has found itself alienated due to a lack of times, violent coercion is used to enforce the Islamist order seen as a prerequisite opportunities, w hich contrasts w ith t he m edia im ages of wealth in E urope and for establishing an Islamic community. This trend has also reached poor Muslim America. The dream of a better material life has remained unfulfilled, leading to neighbourhoods in the West, where some armed Islamist groups have recruited in disenchantment and bitterness across wide sectors of the population. In Egypt, this ‘places of congregation’ (, internet cafés, cafeterias, gyms, summer camps has manifested in a g eneralised hopelessness particularly among an urban youth etc), a mong t he vu lnerable a nd m arginalised (p risons, r efugee cen tres, w elfare that has grown increasingly religiously conservative in response to unmet material agencies, possibly universities etc), and through radical mosques and bookshops 24 expectations. In Morocco, similar sentiment has been witnessed in the phrase ana that act as ‘recruitment magnets’.31 daya (my life is a m ess),25 and in A lgeria in hitiste, a co mbination of the Arabic word f or ‘ wall’ a nd a F rench s uffix u sed b y t he A lgerian y outh t o s uggest Egypt employment p rospects limi ted t o r eclining a gainst a wa ll.26 This m alaise i s reflective o f a s ocial cr isis n ot addr essed by s tate p olicies. It i s sy mptomatic o f The o rigins o f al-Jihad/EIJ r elate t o t he E gyptian s tate’s in creasing populations in Arab countries no longer willing to see ‘their dignity, their worth as instrumentalisation o f r eligion in t he co ntext o f a r egional I slamic r esurgence human b eings, t heir h uman r ights a nd t heir f undamental f reedoms t rampled during t he 1970s. Thi s le d t o a g rowing I slamisation o f s ociety a nd t he upon on a daily basis by institutions and individuals, including “security” forces, politicisation of religion. The Islamist political opposition’s challenge to the state who act on behalf of, and on orders from, national political authorities’.27 as a r eligious-political actor gained strength,32 which in t urn provoked a r egime This deepening disillusionment has contributed to the conditions conducive to crackdown o n t he I slamist m ovement in t he l atter 1970s. W hile t he M uslim political ext remism m anifested in a n I slamic r esurgence a nd i ts m ore v iolent Brotherhood operated as the outlawed mainstream religious opposition, its armed expressions a s a co unterforce t o t he a uthoritarian s tates. A lienation f rom a n offshoots ado pted a v iolent a pproach t hat e ventually b irthed t he f ounding o f increasingly m odern s ociety t hat r emained in accessible p rovoked a mi litant groups s uch a s al-Jihad (now k nown a s t he EIJ), Takfir w al-Hijra and Hizb a l- response a mong t he g rowing, co nservative s ections o f t he p oor a nd e ducated Tahrir al-Islami. youth, and provided momentum for Islamist organisations and their ideologies. While regime repression weakened the violent jihadist elements under Kamal Linking iden tity i ssues w ith s ocial j ustice, I slamist g roups b ecame p articularly Habib in Alexandria, the groups of Mohammad Abd al-Salam Farag in and appealing t o t he m arginalised s ectors o f t he p opulation b ecause t hey p rovided followers of Karam Mohammed Zuhdi in Assiut survived. In 1980, al-Jihad took services w here t he g overnment fa iled t o do s o a nd o ffered r emedies t o o ther shape with the fusion of Farag’s group in Cairo and Zuhdi’s branch in Assiut, with aspects of the social crisis.28 the l atter in corporating hi s al-Jama’a a l-islamiyya a l-jihad i yya ( Jihadi Islamic

350 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 351 ARMED ISLAMIST GROUPS IN EGYPT, ALGERIA AND MOROCCO ERIC GEORGE AND ALEKSI YLÖNEN

Group, JI G) in to t he n ew m ovement.33 The le adership o f al-Jihad was f urther engaged in i solated a ttacks desig ned t o p aralyse t he r egime’s tourism in dustry, reinforced by a member of Egyptian military intelligence, Abbud al-Zumur, who ending with the November 1997 massacre in Luxor. On 25 June 1995, it staged an orchestrated the group’s armed activities. Al-Jihad rejected both Sadat’s credentials assassination attempt on President Mubarak during an Organisation of African as a p ious M uslim le ader a nd t he s tate’s in strumentalisation o f r eligion.34 Unity (OAU) summit in Ethiopia in collaboration with the Sudanese intelligence, Borrowing t he arguments put forward e arlier by Q utb, al-Jihad embarked on a which included as protagonists individuals claiming affiliation with al-Qaeda. By campaign of violence against the regime and propagated popular mass rebellion. this time, however, Egypt’s armed Islamists had already begun to shift their focus Despite o rchestrating t he a ssassination o f Sad at o n 6 O ctober 1981, al-Jihad’s to international targets, as the EIJ m oved closer to the networks orchestrated by planned I slamic r evolution fa iled t o m aterialise a nd o nly i solated di sturbances Osama bin Laden. took place near Assiut. The state retaliated by imprisoning al-Zumur, Farag and a The EIJ’s current base resides principally with an exiled leadership in Western number of al-Jihad leaders as well as Sadat’s assassin, Khaled al-Islambouli.35 countries and, to a lesser degree, in urban centres of northern Egypt. In 1998 the Armed Islamist groups in Egypt regained strength in the early 1990s with the group announced that it had joined al-Qaeda, with which it merged in 2001. B in return o f t he mujahedeen from A fghanistan. Th ey r einforced t heir p resence in Laden has provided financing to the group through the Faisal Islamic Bank and urban a reas o f U pper E gypt a nd n eighbourhoods o f C airo a nd A lexandria b y the A l-Shamal I slamic B ank in S udan, w here h e wa s h osted b y t he co untry’s employing a mix ed strategy of conviction and intimidation while continuing to Islamist regime from 1992 to 1996. The international activities of EIJ are attributed target t he Egyptian p olitical elite.36 Obtaining f inancing used as an extension of to t he inf luence o f a l-Zawahiri, w hose p rominence in t he o rganisation h as Saudi f oreign p olicy,37 the m ovements w ere dr iven m ostly by s tudents o f lower convinced some followers to associate themselves with al-Qaeda. Divisions within socioeconomic s tanding a nd t he urb an midd le-class b ourgeoisie, im posing EIJ appeared in December 2007 when imprisoned leader Sayed Imam abandoned morality and discipline through an authoritarian community.38 Their appeal to the the use of violence and announced the cessation of armed activities. middle classes was brief, however, as the poorer cadres of the society and eventual There i s n ow e vidence t hat t he in ternet h as ga ined im portance a s a n power base of the groups turned increasingly violent, targeting the middle classes international recruitment tool. Al-Qaeda has reportedly recruited individual cells which then turned to the state structures for stability and protection.39 by facilitating operations within Egypt through information sharing, training and 44 One p rincipal c haracteristic o f al-Jihad’s recruiting s trategy wa s r eligious networking. On 23 F ebruary 2009, a b omb exploded in C airo’s Khan al-Khalili agitation. It u sed a n etwork o f p rivate m osques, s ome Sa udi-funded, in w hich market killing a French tourist. The attack was allegedly perpetrated by an isolated group possibly inspired by the internet,45 or a jihadist ‘self-starter’, rather than a radical preachers such as Muhammad Abd al-Salam Farag engaged in recruitment. ‘commanded’ or ‘guided’ group.46 In its heyday during the 1990s, t he organisation also recruited from the ranks of the p residential gu ard, t he ci vil s ervice, mi litary in telligence, t he m edia a nd Algeria academia.40 Farag’s b ranch o f al-Jihad in C airo wa s co mposed o f f ive t o six 41 autonomous and loosely linked cells presided over by ‘emirs’ such as Ayman al- By the late 1980s, an Islamist movement consisting mostly of university professors Zawahiri, and controlled through a common strategy. In Assiut, the other main al- and students had taken form in response to state repression in Algeria. This group Jihad branch operating under Karam Mohammed Zuhdi consisted of a number of recruited l argely b y p reaching in ‘ popular n eighbourhoods’ w here lo cal ulema 42 small groups in university towns recruited through kinship and tribal bonds. enjoyed s upport. U nlike E gypt, w here t he r egime h ad w eakened t he I slamist In t he e arly 1990s, a l-Zawahiri a ssumed t he le adership o f t he EIJ fac tion, opposition t hough t he a pplication o f a s tate r eligious do ctrine, t he A lgerian breaking ranks with t he imprisoned a l-Zumur and converting t he g roup into a authorities proved incapable of channelling religious sentiment in t heir favour.47 network isolated from a clear social constituency43 and increasingly targeting the Algerian I slamist g roups u sed t he a vailable p olitical s pace t o cr eate a m ass Egyptian r egime. I n 1990, f ive m embers o f t he o rganisation w ere a rrested f or movement revolving around the ulema and an increasingly receptive poor urban assassinating t he s peaker o f t he n ational a ssembly, a nd f rom 1992 t o 1997 i t youth harbouring grievances arising from the economic crisis and the disruption

352 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 353 ARMED ISLAMIST GROUPS IN EGYPT, ALGERIA AND MOROCCO ERIC GEORGE AND ALEKSI YLÖNEN

of the democratic process. This culminated in t he creation of the FIS in M arch media-savvy AQIM has produced propaganda videos in the local Berber language 1989 as an Islamist alliance of various groups.48 and couched its recruitment in terms of historical grievances by calling for the re- The early success of the FIS stemmed from its ability to unite the poor urban conquest o f A l-Andalus, w hich in cludes l arge p arts o f S pain, a nd a nger a t a youth w ith t he pious b ourgeoisie un der t he s ame Islamist ide ology in o rder t o century o f f oreign do mination. Thi s h as b een co mbined w ith m ore t raditional challenge t he r egime a nd p rovide a n a lternative p roject t o a n ex clusive a nd preaching in m osques, the invocation of a p ervasive state of social malaise and repressive s tate. H owever, in t he co urse o f t he 1990s a nd es pecially a fter t he humiliating images of Muslim immigrants in Western countries.52 government cancelled elections in 1991 to prevent the victory of the FIS, violence This propaganda has been used to raise the profile of the international jihad, escalated t o s uch le vels t hat i t f ragmented t he I slamist m ovement a nd i ts most notably in Iraq, above internal concerns and to facilitate the recruitment of constituency. Factions dominated by the mujahedeen leadership migrated to the young people detached from the nationalist project of the FIS and more attracted ranks of the more radical and violent GIA, rallying the urban youth underclass and to jihadist internet sites. New recruits have reportedly been sent to ‘radicalising opposing any compromise with the regime. The GIA deliberately targeted civilians training camps’ for three to six months either to prepare them to fight in Iraq or 53 and i ts v iolence a lienated a m ore m oderate p ious b ourgeoisie t hat t hrew i ts oblige them, knowingly or not, to take part in s uicide attacks in A lgeria. This support behind the Armée Islamique du Salut (AIS), the armed wing of the FIS, demonstrates that both AQIM’s internal and external agendas remain significant ultimately resulting in a r econciliation of sorts with the regime in a p rocess that and interlocked. mirrored the Egyptian experience.49 By 1998, popular support for the GIA had eroded dramatically and the global Morocco jihadist movement o ffered a des perately n eeded ide ological a nd s trategic The Groupe Islamique de Combat Marocain (GICM) was formed during the 1990s alternative, particularly for the Salafi jihadists from Afghanistan. This resulted in around a n ucleus of Moroccan A fghanistan veterans en dorsing a r igorous Hassan H attab b reaking f rom t he GI A t o f orm t he GS PC in S eptember 1998, interpretation of the and Sunna and the rejection of a s tate not based on publicly co ndemning a ttacks a gainst ci vilians a nd limi ting i ts v iolence t o Islamic l aw.54 The f ounding o f t he GI CM co incided w ith t he M oroccan s tate’s 50 representatives of the state. The GSPC has attracted the most attention among the decision t o r educe i ts p resence in t he im poverished o utskirts o f C asablanca, remaining armed Islamist groups in A lgeria for both its alleged ties to al-Qaeda increasing t he a ppeal o f I slamism w ithin di senfranchised a nd di sconnected and its activities. In September 2006, the group officially announced its adherence sectors o f t he p opulation. Th e GI CM p rovided a s ense o f s olidarity in t hese to al-Qaeda, changing its name to Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb quarters through recruitment into small groups and local orders led by an (AQIM). AQIM h as sin ce co ntinued t o o rient i ts a ttacks o n t he s tate s ecurity and united by a common Salafist ideology. As in Egypt, these organisations police apparatus, a s w ell a s f oreign interests, w hile un dertaking k idnappings t hat a lso their neighbourhoods and enforce their interpretation of a strict moral and legal appear to have been financially lucrative. In May and June 2009 i t engaged in a Islamic co de. Yet, ra ther t han b eing le d b y p rominent in dividuals a s w ith al- campaign o f s uicide a ttacks a nd a mbushes, n otably a gainst a mi litary co nvoy Jihad/EIJ, any Islamist individuals to whom at least one other person is willing to protecting Chinese workers, police recruits and paramilitary gendarmes.51 pledge allegiance can potentially achieve the status of emir.55 Integration in to a n in ternational c ampaign g rants a n ext ernal leg itimacy t o The GICM represents the increasingly international approach adopted by the AQIM t hat i t h as fa iled t o o btain in ternally a nd p rovides a n o utlet f rom i ts armed Islamist g roups since t he 1990s. Th e GICM appears to have maintained ideological p osition t o ‘ purify’ s ociety. W hile t he A fghan v eterans a nd t he contacts with violent Algerian Islamists in France and Belgium ,and its activities remaining members of the Islamic insurgency share an ideological and personal have included propaganda, recruitment for international jihad and coordination of connection with other groups of the al-Qaeda network, the continued focus on local cells through what is portrayed as the ‘international al-Qaeda network’. The overthrowing the FLN regime in Algeria has hindered its capacity to attract new May 2003 Casablanca and March 2004 Madrid bombings as well as accusations of recruits more inspired by the transnational jihadism of al-Qaeda. As a result, the serving a s a log istical b ase f or al-Qaeda have p laced t he g roup un der r enewed

354 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 355 ARMED ISLAMIST GROUPS IN EGYPT, ALGERIA AND MOROCCO ERIC GEORGE AND ALEKSI YLÖNEN

scrutiny.56 According to newspaper accounts, the GICM has received funds from Western countries have led the US to turn its attention to the vast lands that lie to al-Qaeda and its European financiers, and logistical support, training and religious the south of these countries. education from the Taleban, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, the Algerian GIA and GSPC, and several other violent extremist groups.57 As far as its internal jihad The global war on terror and armed Islamist groups is co ncerned, h owever, t he GI CM h as b een un able t o b uild a n a genda t hat in Egypt, Algeria and Morocco successfully challenges the religious legitimacy of the monarchy in the eyes of the general population. The g lobal wa r o n t error (GWoT)67 has h ad im portant r epercussions in E gypt, Algeria and Morocco. These three countries have all collaborated with the US-led INTERNATIONALISATION war o n t error a nd o ne o f t he k eys t o det ermining s tate r esponse h as b een t he degree to which the actions and presence of violent actors have been perceived by The armed Islamic groups in Egypt, Algeria and Morocco have shown a growing the r egimes n ot a s a t hreat, b ut a s b eneficial t o s tability a nd s ecurity.68 While international orientation since the late 1990s t hrough their al-Qaeda affiliation.58 officially meant to offer new measures against the threat of armed Islamist groups This s hould n ot di stract f rom co ntinuing ‘ national’ o r in ternal a gendas a nd in t he r egion, ini tiatives s uch a s t he T SCTI h ave a lso cr eated a f ramework b y activities, particularly in the case of Algeria, while recognising that the frustrated means of which regimes can gain access to new resources in exchange for a more attempts a t in ternal jihad in t he 1980s a nd 1990s h ave le d m any f ollowers t o muscular foreign presence to penetrate the region. renounce v iolence a nd dem and a m ore in clusive p olitical p rocess t hrough democratisation.59 Algerians, m oreover, h ave a lso ad hered in l arge n umbers t o The global war on terror and regime response conservative, non-political, non-violent Salafi organisations, or simply aspire to to armed Islamist groups leave the country.60 Outside N orth A frica, r ecruitment in to a rmed I slamist E uropean ce lls in Egypt, Algeria and Morocco openly supported the US in 2001 and 2002, but found Britain, France and Spain has also taken place. It has been achieved by drawing on their domestic support compromised by the decision to invade Iraq, an event met a s ense o f a lienation a nd s eparation, h umiliation, r eligious co mmitment, p eer with demonstrations of anger across North Africa.69 Morocco is considered by the pressure, t he ummah as a n a lternative t o t he E uropean co ncept o f n ation, a nd US t o b e a k ey n on-NATO p artner70 and r eports h ave s uggested t hat t errorist emphasising the importance of violent jihad.61 Radical imams and activists have suspects were questioned by Moroccan authorities on b ehalf of US in telligence used in doctrination, s ubversion a nd s ocialisation a s m ethods o f r eligious a nd services. Egypt has also provided interrogation services, although it has kept its political propaganda,62 at times resulting in v iolent acts that seek to emulate the support lo w p rofile in a n ef fort t o r econcile p ublic o pinion a nd t he a nnual jihadist cause in Iraq.63 US$2 billion in aid received from the US.71 One report on Algeria already noted in Moreover, the internet continues to attract followers to the al-Qaeda agenda in 2004 that states openly supporting the war on terror risked finding the threat of the transnational ummah with jihadist networks extending into Western countries. extremism increasing rather than diminishing. For these regimes, US involvement Recruiting ac tivities a re k nown t o h ave t aken p lace in m osques in H amburg, may undermine ‘the strategic weakness, dependent nature and possible legitimacy London, Marseilles and Montreal.64 Whereas internet propaganda reaches sections deficits’ of the states concerned.72 of disgruntled second-generation immigrants in t he Western countries, it alone Joining the war on terror, however, also conceivably offers an opportunity to appears n ot t o b e s ufficient f or s uccessful r ecruitment,65 but i t m ay in spire settle political scores and gain newfound international legitimacy.73 In exchange individual acts of Islamist violence.66 In North Africa, the uncertainty concerning for s upport, dem ands f or im provements in t he a reas o f h uman r ights a nd the exact nature of the activities of armed Islamic groups and the perceived threat democracy m ay m ore e asily b e ig nored a nd e ven r efuted un der t he p retext o f of v iolent I slamism u sing t he r egion a s a n in cubator b efore s pilling o ut in to controlling the Islamist threat.74 Egypt has had a in place since

356 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 357 ARMED ISLAMIST GROUPS IN EGYPT, ALGERIA AND MOROCCO ERIC GEORGE AND ALEKSI YLÖNEN

Sadat’s assassination in 1981 a nd A lgeria sin ce t he c ancelled e lections o f 1991. While E gypt’s p osition a s a m ajor US p artner in t he r egion r emains Algeria h as s upported t he wa r o n t error a nd, in ex change, r eceived mi litary uncontested, A lgeria h as s ought t o c hallenge M orocco’s p rivileged r ole b y equipment p reviously w ithheld d ue t o h uman r ights co ncerns. A n a pparent emphasising its own experience with violent Islamism and portraying the country resurgence of armed Islamic groups in the region, evidenced in the reported 2003 as a b astion of regional and international security. Algeria has received US army kidnapping of 32 European tourists in southern Algeria for which AQIM claimed training a nd accep ted t he p resence o f t he US F ederal B ureau o f I nvestigation responsibility, s trengthened t he r egime’s military c apabilities, a nd by ext ension, (FBI). Moreover, it is suspected that some sectors of the armed forces connected to the US p resence in t he a rea.75A cer tain d uality m ay b e det ected in t he o fficial the oil industry are receptive to the US securitisation of the Sahara, since it may in 80 Algerian response; on the one hand, its internal discourse has announced violent fact be beneficial to their interests. This situation reflects the Algerian leadership’s groups t o b e o n v erge o f di sappearance, w hile t he r egime h as sim ultaneously propensity to continue its exclusive governance, t his t ime by using US mi litary emphasised the omnipresence of danger for external audiences.76 support to monopolise oil-generated revenue. For the US, it remains unclear how strongly democratisation, good governance or respect for human rights should be prioritised w hen s trong-armed r egimes m ay b e co nsidered m ore ef ficient a nd Armed Islamist groups and the Trans-Saharan compliant allies.81 Counterterrorism Initiative

Algeria and Morocco have b oth collaborated w ith t he US o n its Trans-Saharan CONCLUDING REMARKS Counterterrorism I nitiative, a p rogramme t hat a lso in cludes M auritania, M ali, Armed Islamist groups in Egypt, Algeria and Morocco emerged in the generalised Niger, Chad, Nigeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Senegal. The stated objective is to help context of a crisis of the post-colonial state. As such, these groups initially sought secure the region from potential terrorist threats and underlies the fear that the to p rovide a n a lternative I slamic p olitical o rder a nd v iolently c hallenged t heir Sahara may become, or may already be, a base for terrorist camps. It thus seeks to respective r egimes in o rder t o ac hieve t heir g oal. A fter t hree de cades a nd enhance t he mi litary a nd p olice c apabilities o f r egional s tates t o s upport t he unsuccessful internal jihads, the strategy and objectives of the now global jihad is eradication of violent non-state actors.77 The programme is headed by the US State no longer clear. While there is no denying that the global jihad has appealed to Department a nd in cludes t he US A id A gency a s w ell a s t he D epartment o f individuals across the world and at times produced spectacular and devastating Defence. Its anti-terror activities range from ‘diplomacy, development assistance, results, the route chosen by political Islamists where regimes have allowed Islamic and military activities aimed at strengthening partner countries’ counterterrorism parties to enter the political arena appears to have yielded more results in terms of 78 capabilities and inhibiting the spread of extremist ideology’. setting the groundwork towards the creation of an Islamic society, albeit one that The rationale for the TSCTI is arguably based on what Keenan has referred to incorporates some elements of modernity. as the ‘banana theory of terrorism’, whereby terrorists coming out of Afghanistan This political Islam, however, has been the subject of intense criticism not only move through Iraq and into the Horn of Africa and the Sahel to receive al-Qaeda from Salafi jihadists, but also from non-violent and apolitical Salafi movements. In 79 training before making their way to North Africa, Europe and the US. This threat countries s uch a s A lgeria, a t endency t o w ithdraw co mpletely a nd w ithout was magnified by the March 2004 Madrid train bombings, leading to the fear that confrontation from the political arena and from the state appears to be gathering armed I slamic g roups n ow h ad a f irmly es tablished c apacity t o s trike a long momentum a nd en joying g reater p opular s upport t han t he g lobal jihad. Th e Europe’s s outhern p eriphery. Th us, t he g lobalisation o f t he t errorist t hreat h as emphasis on the security of the state as opposed to that of the individual, which allowed the US to pressure its allies, increased the sense of fear within Europe, and partially exp lains t he s tate’s g radual w ithdrawal f rom t he e veryday lif e o f i ts set the stage for the creation in 2007 of the first US command dedicated to Africa citizens a s a p rovider o f s ervices, a m ediator o r a faci litator o f o pportunities, and responsible for the military component of the TSCTI. contributed to the appeal of radical Islamist ideas among the poor and disgruntled

358 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 359 ARMED ISLAMIST GROUPS IN EGYPT, ALGERIA AND MOROCCO ERIC GEORGE AND ALEKSI YLÖNEN

sectors of the population and within the ranks of a f rustrated middle class. This 10 A B oubekeur, Salafism and radic al p olitics in p ost-conflict A lgeria, C arnegie En dowment f or frustration a nd di senchantment h ave n ot va nished a nd s hould n ot b e International P eace, C arnegie P aper 11, S eptember 2008, 13–17, h ttp://www.carnegie endowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view& id =22293 (accessed 1 July 2009). underestimated, but for the most part they do not appear to be channelled towards 11 International Crisis Group, Understanding Islamism, 14. violent jihad. 12 Ibid. Moreover, although the perpetrators now come from across the Muslim world, 13 K Dalacoura, Islamist movements as non-state actors and their relevance to international relations, the ranks of armed Islamic groups do not appear to have swelled proportionally to in D Josselin and W Wallace (eds), Non-state actors in world politics, Houndmills: Palgrave, 2001, 235–248, 238–239. the level of dissatisfaction felt by the general population. Armed Islamist groups in 14 In Afghanistan the externally recruited mujahedeen were often considered ‘Arabs’ and ‘Afghans’ Egypt A lgeria a nd M orocco, w eakened in ternally b y a co mbination o f l ack o f upon return to their countries of origin. popular support and regime crackdowns in the context of the war on terror, have 15 Roy, Globalised Islam, 292–301. embarked on a campaign to compensate for their internal failures by increasingly 16 Ibid, 69. 17 Ibid, 55. emphasising external agendas. Armed Islamist groups have thus been portrayed as 18 According t o M H afez, Suicide b ombers i n I raq: t he s trategy a nd i deology o f m artyrdom, real t hreats t o t he p revailing status q uo by b oth t heir r espective s tates a nd t he Washington, D C: United States Institute for Peace, 2007, 66–70, t hese f ive concepts are tawhid international community, irrespective of their actual capacity. This explains why (unity of God) as a way of life, hakimiyyat Allah (God’s sovereignty) over right and wrong, bida as regional a nd in ternational co ntexts h ave b ecome p rogressively p ertinent, o r in strict j urisprudence a nd r ejection o f inn ovation, takfir with M uslims ac ting o utside t he cr eed either to repent of face execution, and jihad in terms of violent struggle. some cases, even a dominant part of their agendas and activities. 19 Tibi, Political Islam, world politics and Europe, 99–101. Despite lacking common strategic unity, these groups do co ntinue to pose a 20 Hafez, Suicide bombers in Iraq. threat. This threat, however, does not appear to lie in t he capacity to destabilise 21 Kepel, La yihad. regimes or t he wider international community. Above a ll, it is a m enace to t he 22 Olivier Roy, Globalised Islam: the search for a n ew ummah, 233, s uggests neo-fundamentalism is less historically ambiguous than ‘salafi’. security o f t he in dividual ci tizen fa lling v ictim t o a n i solated m anifestation o f 23 B Maddy-Weitzman, The Islamic challenge in North Africa, Middle East Review of International armed Islamist activity in Egypt, Algeria, Morocco and elsewhere. Affairs 1(2) (1997), http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/ 1997/issue2/jv1n2a7.html (accessed 5 February 2009). 24 Immigration a nd R efugee B oard o f C anada, E gypt: R ecruitment b y I slamist mi litant g roups, NOTES including methods and incidence, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 19 A ugust 2008, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/ 49b92b4b12.html (accessed 26 June 2009). 1 International Crisis Group (ICG), Understanding Islamism, Middle East/ North Africa Report 37, 25 Ibid. 2 Ma rch 2005, 1, h ttp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/ r egions/middle-east-north-africa/north- 26 Kepel, La yihad, 260. africa/037-understanding-islamism. aspx?alt_lang=he (accessed 15 February 2009). 27 B Chourou, Promoting human security: ethical, normative and educational frameworks in the Arab 2 This a b road c lassification u sefully p ut f orward b y I nternational Cr isis G roup, Understanding states, Paris: UNESCO, 2005, 63. Islamism, 3–5. 28 A Hermassi, State and democratisation in the Maghreb, in E Goldberg, R Kasalen and J S Migdal 3 Ibid, 2. (eds), Rules and rights in the Middle East, Seattle: Washington University Press, 1993, 102–117, 4 G Kepel, La yihad: expansión y declive del Islamismo, Barcelona: Ediciones Península, 2001, 27–38. 106–107. 5 Ibid, 41. 29 Boubekeur, Salafism and radical politics in post-conflict Algeria, 13–17. 6 Bassan Tibi, Political Islam, world politics and Europe, Abingdon: Routledge, 2008, 101, r efers to 30 G Martínez Muñoz, El estado árabe, Barcelona: Bellaterra, 1999: 327–328; D Zeidan, Radical Islam ‘institutional Islam’ as a ‘ peaceful variety of p olitical Islam’ but h as c lear reservations about its in Egypt: a co mparison of two g roups, Middle East Review of International Affairs 3(3) (1999), democratic credentials. See chapter 7, Political decline and democracy’s decline to a voting procedure. http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/ 1999/issue3/jv3n3a1.html (accessed 5 February 2009). 7 O Roy, Globalised Islam: the search for a new ummah, New York: Columbia University Press, 2004, 31 Peter R N eumann a nd B rooke R ogers, R ecruitment a nd m obilisation f or t he I slamist mi litant 60. movement in Europe, International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 8 International Crisis Group, Understanding Islamism, 8–9. December 2007, 46, h ttp://ec.europa.eu/ j ustice_home/fsj/terrorism/prevention/docs/ec_ 9 Ibid, 12. radicalisation_study_on_mobilisation_tactics_en.pdf (accessed 27 June 2009).

360 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 361 ARMED ISLAMIST GROUPS IN EGYPT, ALGERIA AND MOROCCO ERIC GEORGE AND ALEKSI YLÖNEN

32 The government’s promotion of Islamism resulted in a proliferation of private mosques (ahli) away 53 Ibid. from the regime control. These became meeting places for militants and recruits, reinforcing the 54 El Pa ís, L a ra ma m arroquí de al Q aeda, 1 A pril 2004, h ttp://www.elpais.com/articulo/ Muslim Brotherhood and more radical groups. Providing identity and community discourse along internacional/rama/marroqui/Qaeda/elpepuint/20040401elpepuint_9/Tes (acces sed 30 M arch with services and welfare became paramount in t he Islamist project, facilitating recruitment and 2009). training of radicals (J L Esposito, The Islamic threat: myth or reality?, New York: Oxford University 55 S Z emni, Moroccan I slamism b etween l ocal p articipation a nd i nternational I slamist n etworks o f Press, 1992, 138–139). These groups found fertile ground in Upper Egypt and Alexandria, as well influence? Presented a t E xperts R oundtable C onference: in ter-regional c hallenges o f I slamic as in t he ‘Ain S hams a nd I mbaba n eighbourhoods in C airo, em ploying a mix ed s trategy o f fundamentalist movements in North Africa in relation to network support, Addis Ababa: Institute conviction and intimidation’, S Ismail, The politics of urban Cairo: informal communities and the for Security Studies, 17–18 June 2009, 6–7. state, Arab Studies Journal 4(2) (1996), 119–132. 56 El País, La rama marroquí de al Qaeda; H Roberts, Jihadi movements in North Africa: the dynamics 33 M Sageman, Understanding terror networks, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, of radicalisation, deradicalisation and redeployment, Presentation at ‘Jihadi terrorism – w here do 134. we s tand?’, S econd R oyal I nstitute f or I nternational R elations C onference o n I nternational 34 Farag’s group claimed that the state’s measures to incorporate Islamic law (Sharia) in 1980 a s the Terrorism, 13 F ebruary 2006, h ttp://www.irri-kiib.be/speechnotes/06/060213-jihad.terr/ ‘main source’ of legislation was hypocritical because it coincided with a c lampdown of Muslim roberts. htm (accessed 31 March 2009). Brothers and Islamist student organisations as an extension of a p olicy of rapprochement with 57 El País, La rama marroquí de al Qaeda. Israel. 58 International Crisis Group, Islamism, violence and reform in Algeria, 17. 35 International Crisis Group, Islamism, violence and reform in A lgeria, Middle East/North Africa 59 Roy, Globalised Islam, 1, 2. Report 29, 30 July 2004, 4–5, http://www.crisisgroup.org/ home/index.cfm?id=2884&l=1 (accessed 60 A Boubekeur, Political Islam in Algeria, Centre for European Policy Studies, Working Document 15 February 2009). 268, M ay 2007, 4, h ttp://www.appstudies.org/pictures/fileStudies/News0.8086664_Political 36 Ismail, The politics of urban Cairo, 119–132; Martínez Muñoz, El estado árabe, 273. %20 Islam%20in%20Algeria.pdf (accessed 29 June 2009); Boubekeur, Salafism and radical politics 37 Dalacoura, Islamist movements as non-state actors, 240–241. in post-conflict Algeria. 38 S Zubaida, Trajectories of p olitical Islam: Egypt, Iran and Turkey, The Political Quarterly 71(3) 61 Neumann a nd R ogers, R ecruitment a nd m obilisation f or t he I slamist mi litant m ovement in (2000), 60–78, 68. Europe, 80. 39 Kepel, La yihad. 62 Ibid, 64. 40 Immigration a nd R efugee B oard o f C anada, E gypt: R ecruitment b y I slamist mi litant g roups, 63 Boubekeur, Salafism and radical politics in post-conflict Algeria, 10. including methods and incidence. 64 Roy, Globalised Islam, 282, 302. 41 ‘Emir’ in t his context refers to a r epresentative of an armed Islamist group in E gypt or Morocco 65 Neumann a nd R ogers, R ecruitment a nd m obilisation f or t he I slamist mi litant m ovement in who assumes the religious title in part to boost his legitimacy and facilitate recruitment. Europe, 84, 87. 42 Sageman, Understanding terror networks, 134. 66 Johnston, Analysis-Egypt bomb unlikely to signal militancy resurgence. 43 Ibid, 148. 67 The administration of President Barack Obama has discontinued use of the term ‘war on terror’ 44 Immigration a nd R efugee B oard o f C anada, E gypt: R ecruitment b y I slamist mi litant g roups, and instead uses t he term ‘overseas contingency operation’: Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/ including methods and incidence. wiki/War_on_Terror (accessed 28 April 2010). 45 C Johnston, Analysis-Egypt bomb unlikely to signal militancy resurgence, Reuters, 24 F ebruary 68 J A Nuñez Villaverde, B Hageraats and K Malgorzata, Terrorismo Internacional en África, Madrid: 2009, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/ LN428437.htm (accessed 30 March 2009). Catarata, 2009, 170. 46 Neumann a nd R ogers, R ecruitment a nd m obilisation f or t he I slamist mi litant m ovement in 69 M el-Khawas, North Africa and the war on terror, in J Davis (ed), Africa and the war on terrorism, Europe, 26. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007, 83. 47 Kepel, La yihad, 269. 70 T A rcher a nd T P opovic, The t rans-Saharan c ounterterrorism t hreat, Th e Finni sh I nstitute o f 48 Ibid, 270–271. International A ffairs, FII A R eport 16, 2007, 34, w ww.upi-iia.fi/assets/publications/FIIA_ 49 Ibid, 400. Report_16_2007.pdf (accessed 5 June 2009). 50 L Martinez, Le cheminement singulier de la violence islamiste en Algérie, Critique internationale, 71 El-Khawas, North Africa and the war on terror, 81–83, 88. 20 J uly 2003, 172, h ttp://www.ceri-sciencespo.com/publica/critique/article/ci20p164–177.pdf 72 International Crisis Group, Islamism, violence and reform in Algeria, 23. (accessed 15 February 2009). 73 Nuñez Villaverde, Hageraats and Malgorzata, Terrorismo Internacional en África, 127. 51 Aljazeera, P olice die in A lgeria a mbush, 18 J une 2009, h ttp://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/ 74 Chourou, Promoting human security, 64. 2009/06/20096189448297706.html (acces sed 29 J une 2009); B BC, A lgeria mi litants ‘ ambush 75 J K eenan, Th e b anana t heory o f t errorism: a lternative t ruths a nd t he co llapse o f t he ‘second’ police’, 18 June 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ hi/africa/8108159.stm (accessed 8 May 2010). (Saharan) front in the war on terror, Journal of Contemporary African Studies 25(1) (2007), 31–58, 52 Boubekeur, Salafism and radical politics in post-conflict Algeria, 10. 45.

362 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 363 ARMED ISLAMIST GROUPS IN EGYPT, ALGERIA AND MOROCCO

76 Archer and Popovic, The trans-Saharan counterterrorism threat, 32. 77 Ibid, 8–10. 78 United States Government Accountability Office (USGAO), Combating terrorism: actions needed to enhance implementation of trans-Sahara counterterrorism partnership, USGAO, Report to the Ranking M ember, C ommittee o n F oreign A ffairs, H ouse o f R epresentatives, J uly 2008, 1, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08860.pdf (accessed 5 March 2009). 79 Keenan, The banana theory of terrorism, 44–45. 80 Boubekeur, Salafism and radical politics in post-conflict Algeria, 11–12. 81 Keenan, US militarisation in Africa, 18–19. CHAPTER 13 From rebellion to opposition: UNITA in Angola and RENAMO in Mozambique

JUSTIN PEARCE

INTRODUCTION

It is tempting to consider Angola and Mozambique as two countries with parallel histories.1 Both w ere co lonised b y P ortugal a nd r emained un der co lonial domination f or m ore t han a de cade a fter t he de colonisation o f m ost o f t he continent. B oth b ecame in dependent in 1975 w ith g overnments do minated b y Portuguese-speaking urban elites that had nationalist aspirations but which were firmly rooted in particular regions and whose rhetoric inclined to the left. Both of these governments were seen as a threat by apartheid South Africa and by right- wing elements in t he West. Both Angola and Mozambique experienced internal conflicts t hat w ere f uelled b y S outh A frican b acking f or a rmed o pposition movements: Resistência N acional d e M oçambique (RENAMO) in M ozambique and União p ara a I ndependência T otal d e A ngola (UNITA) in A ngola. Th e international dét ente o f t he l ate 1980s le d t o in ternationally s upported p eace processes, which envisaged the ruling parties and rebel movements in Angola and Mozambique competing at the ballot box. From that point, the well-known stories diverge. Angola returned to war only months after the 1992 elections, and peace did not arrive definitively until after the

364 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 365 FROM REBELLION TO OPPOSITION: UNITA IN ANGOLA AND RENAMO IN MOZAMBIQUE JUSTIN PEARCE

death o f J onas Sa vimbi, f ounder a nd le ader o f UNIT A, in F ebruary 2002. I n Ovimbundu migrant labourers who were working in the north at the time. Before Mozambique, by contrast, there has been no threat of a return to civil war since the 1974, UNIT A guer rillas w ere a ble t o inf iltrate e astern A ngola f rom b ases in first e lection in 1994, a nd f urther e lections h ave b een h eld regularly sin ce t hat independent Zambia. But the colonial government’s suppression of anti-colonial time. Moreover, to concentrate on the obvious historical parallels between Angola activity prevented UNITA f rom operating in t he C entral Highlands, t he region and Mozambique is to ignore some fundamental differences, most crucially in the with w hich it i s u sually a ssociated a nd in w hich it m ade its s trongest identity- respective o rigins o f UNITA a nd REN AMO. UNITA, a long w ith i ts r ivals t he based claims. Movimento P opular d a L ibertação d e A ngola (MPLA) a nd Frente N acional d e It wa s o nly a fter t he co up o f 25 A pril 1974 in P ortugal t hat t he li beration Libertação d e A ngola (FNLA), s tarted o ut a s a n ationalist m ovement t hat wa s movements were able to operate freely in the colonies. When UNITA, the MPLA founded to oppose Portuguese colonialism in Angola, and only later acquired its and the FNLA arrived in the Central Highlands, the lack of previous politicisation foreign co nnections. I n M ozambique, FRELIM O wa s t he o nly m ovement t hat meant that they were received as strangers and outsiders. The three movements mobilised a gainst co lonialism. REN AMO c ame in to b eing o nly a fter competed in an open field for the support of the local population. It was, however, independence, f ounded b y R hodesia w ith t he p urpose o f des tabilising t he UNITA that succeeded in m aking the most forceful identity-based claims to the FRELIMO government. people o f t he C entral H ighlands. Sa vimbi u sed hi s faci lity w ith t he Umbundu Today, however, we might see the narratives converging again: the MPLA and language t o p ersuade t he p eople of t he C entral Highlands t hat h e a nd UNITA FRELIMO remain firmly in p ower, with UNITA and RENAMO looking weaker could r epresent t heir in terests b etter t han t he P ortuguese-speaking MP LA than e ver b efore. To un derstand w hy t hese p arties h ave n ot b ecome ef fective leadership in faraway Luanda. Respect for local tradition and for the churches also opposition movements, we need to ask a number of questions about the political formed an important part of UNITA’s early discourse. UNITA evoked the MPLA’s space in Angola and Mozambique, as well as about the parties themselves. To what alliance with Cuba as evidence that the party was committed to an atheist doctrine, extent is this about the weakness of democratic institutions, and to what extent is and used this to win the support of a mostly Christian rural population. it a bout t he p arties’ o wn s hortcomings? T o w hat ext ent a re t he p roblems Relations b etween t he t hree in dependence m ovements det eriorated d uring experienced by UNITA and RENAMO specific to former rebel movements, and to 1975 and their rivalry became an all-out struggle to take unique control of the state what extent are they analogous to the difficulties faced by all opposition parties? upon independence. The support t hat UNITA had mobilised in t he 18 m onths To answer such questions will require an examination of the individual histories of following t he P ortuguese co up a llowed Sa vimbi t o de clare in dependence in UNITA and RENAMO and their relationship with the people whom the leaders of Huambo on the same day that the MPLA’s president, Agostinho Neto, declared 2 both movements saw as their constituencies. This chapter will argue that ideas independence in Luanda. Savimbi’s reign in the city of Huambo lasted only until about politics that were formed in wartime, more particularly about the concepts February 1976, when UNITA was expelled by Cuban forces allied to the MPLA. of p arty, s tate a nd g overnment a nd t heir r elationship w ith p eople, s till p ersist today a nd h ave hin dered t he f ormer r ebel m ovements in es tablishing a r ole Guerrilla warfare against the MPLA befitting players in a multiparty democracy. The f ollowing 12 y ears w ere cr ucial in s haping t he c haracter o f UNITA a s i t UNITA’S BEGINNINGS established i tself in r ural A ngola. Th e MP LA n ever ga ined co ntrol o ver t he countryside, a nd t he s tate t hat i t es tablished co nsisted es sentially o f urb an UNITA’s o rigins m ust b e s een w ithin t he w ider co ntext o f a nti-colonial enclaves. Th e r ural zo nes w ere ei ther t he do main o f UNIT A, o r co ntested mobilisation in A ngola. The MPLA and FNLA had been active for several years militarily between the two sides. UNITA sought to establish bases that served both before UNITA’s in ception in 1966. Sa vimbi, f ormerly a n o fficial in t he FNL A, a military and civic function. Its success in doing so depended on how secure its broke away and founded UNITA on the grounds that the FNLA, based among the military control was over a particular area. Accounts of UNITA’s violence against Bakongo et hnic g roup o f n orthern A ngola, di scriminated a gainst s outhern people on the margins of areas of control are many, but my concern here is with

366 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 367 FROM REBELLION TO OPPOSITION: UNITA IN ANGOLA AND RENAMO IN MOZAMBIQUE JUSTIN PEARCE

the a reas w here UNITA wa s w ell es tablished: h ere, b ases b ecame t he h ome t o temporarily, it would take the peasant population with it, removing people from soldiers, to political officials, and to professionals such as teachers and nurses, and areas where they might be controlled by the government and placing them in areas were central to UNITA’s relationship with the farming population. UNITA would that were more securely under UNITA’s control. UNITA also conducted raids on establish a relationship with the soba (village chief), persuading him o f the need government-held areas, or attacked groups of people as they journeyed from one for the village to supply food to UNITA. A UNITA loyalist in the village would be town to another. The people kidnapped in these attacks were typically put to work recruited to coordinate the rendition of a quota of food production to the people for UNITA, sometimes as soldiers or porters, but often in professional roles. The at the base. Teachers and nurses would go into the villages to offer education and movement o f p eople wa s n o les s im portant f or t he MP LA: t he g overnment health c are t o t he lo cal p opulation. UNIT A a s a p olitical o rganisation wa s relocated people from the contested zones to resettlement areas alongside the main indistinguishable f rom UNITA a s a p rovider of s ervices and f rom UNITA a s a roads, o r w ithin t he limi ts o f ci ties t hat w ere co ntrolled b y t he g overnment, military movement. UNITA tried to convince people that it was the defender of physically bringing people under the control of the state. their own best interests against a hostile MPLA. This type of relationship between UNITA a nd t he p eople r eached i ts m ost s ophisticated exp ression w ith t he Identity politics establishment of Jamba, UNITA’s bush capital in Cuando Cubango province, in the To each of the political movements, the people under its control were ‘our people’, early 1980s. Jamba’s location, far from the Ovimbundu heartland, was determined and those under the control of the other side were ‘enemy people’. People came to by ease of access for the South African planes that supplied it. But to the people identify themselves as ‘government people’ or ‘UNITA people’. Yet these identities who spent time there, Jamba was ‘almost like a ci ty’ or ‘a state within a s tate’. Its were not a matter of political choice, they were a matter of necessity. To profess to hospitals, its schools, its international air links and its visits from South African be a ‘ UNITA person’ in g overnment territory was to risk death, and vice versa. dignitaries were seen as evidence of UNITA’s potential as a government in waiting. Hence the paradox of political identities in wa rtime Angola: identities had to be maintained a s a m atter o f lif e o r de ath, y et t he dep th o f t he co nviction t hat A parallel state? underlay these identities was questionable, and identities could (and had to) be As UNIT A b uilt i ts b ases in t he co untryside a nd a t J amba, t he MP LA wa s changed as one passed from the control of one armed force to another. establishing its state in the towns. Within these enclaves, the MPLA’s state-building Those people who lived close to the frontlines of military control would talk about both sides a s predators. But those who spent extended periods under the efforts included the establishment of a system of state-run shops that ensured low- control of one or other or both sides, exposed to the state-building efforts of either cost food for the urban population, which was issued with ration cards. People or b oth, w ere m ore li kely t o ac knowledge t he leg itimacy o f t he m ovement, o r who lived in the city during this period would speak with approval of the MPLA’s movements, w hose co ntrol t hey exp erienced. W hen a sked w hy A ngola efforts to keep a supply of food coming into a city, which, thanks to the war, was experienced such a p rotracted conflict, several interviewees answered along the virtually cut off from its agricultural hinterland. They also spoke of the provision lines of ‘there were two governments – the MPLA and UNITA – and both wanted of e ducation a nd h ealth s ervices un der t he MP LA: s ervices t hat w ere m ade power’. The co ncept o f t he p olitical m ovement a s a co mpetitor in a ga me f or possible only by t he presence of Cuban exp ertise. It was a p oliticised s ociety – absolute power and exclusive legitimacy is important for understanding political attendance at MPLA rallies was encouraged, if not obligatory. developments after the end of the war. While the MPLA state was recognised as such, and UNITA was not, there are some striking parallels to b e found in t he manner in w hich t hey constructed a The peace process and renewed war relationship w ith lo cal p opulations. B oth s ought leg itimacy b y p ositioning themselves a s p roviders o f s ervices a nd a s t he def enders o f t he n ation a gainst The Angolan peace process that culminated in the 1991 Bicesse Accord was largely foreign a ggression. Th e m ovement of p eople b ecame a n important s trategy f or a product of the détente in in ternational p olitics of that p eriod and the ‘end of both sides. W henever UNIT A wa s f orced t o r etreat ei ther p ermanently o r history’ narratives that accompanied it.3 It took little account of Angola’s internal

368 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 369 FROM REBELLION TO OPPOSITION: UNITA IN ANGOLA AND RENAMO IN MOZAMBIQUE JUSTIN PEARCE

politics. As I h ave o utlined, t here wa s n o s pace f or p olitical c hoice in wa rtime government controlled territory in some cases for the first time ever, or at least for Angola. Politics was understood as compulsory identification with a m ovement the first time since the 1992 elections. that was in power in a particular region of the country by force of arms. Angola in 1992 remained divided militarily between the MPLA and UNITA; there was no From military collapse to political defeat reason why a n otional ceasefire would change the way in w hich political control The memorandum of understanding signed by the Angolan Armed Forces and was understood. The 1992 election results largely reflected the pattern of military UNITA a fter Sa vimbi’s de ath in F ebruary 2002 l aid o ut a p rocess w hereby t he control as it was at that stage of the conflict. Voting was a matter of endorsing the people still remaining under UNITA control at that point would be reincorporated authority of t he p arty in c harge, h ence UNITA’s strong s howing in t he C entral into civilian life. Simultaneously, those UNITA leaders who had been in the bush Highlands. with Savimbi were relocated to Luanda, far from the movement’s core constituency The circumstances and actions that led to the return to war early in 1993 a re in the Central Highlands. beyond the scope of this chapter; suffice to say that they reflected the continuing The m assive m ovement o f p eople a t t he en d o f t he wa r m ay h ave b een aspirations t o a bsolute p ower b y b oth p arties t o t he co nflict, n either o f w hich conceived for military purposes, but it also had political consequences. Political complied w ith t he s pirit o f t he p eace acco rd, a nd b oth o f w hich ac ted in a identity was still equated with political control, and the state remained identified provocative manner. It was only after the Lusaka Accord of 1994, when the UNITA with the MPLA. People who may have spent decades under the control of UNITA deputies elected in September 1992 took up their seats in parliament, that we can now became ‘government people’. This provided the context for the parliamentary start t o t alk a bout UNIT A’s r ole a s a n o pposition m ovement. B ut t he elections of 2008, in w hich a clear MPLA victory in t he provinces of the Central parliamentarians’ role was circumscribed by the extraordinary situation in which Highlands contrasted with UNITA’s electoral success in t he region in 1992. 6 The they found themselves. With the leadership on both sides dedicated to winning the notion t hat t he f ormer ‘ UNITA p eople’ w ere n ow ‘ government p eople’ wa s conflict by military means, there was no space for democratic engagement. Even if reinforced by the MPLA’s firm control of state resources throughout the national UNITA at the time had had the political imagination to mobilise in t he civilian territory. In some cases, being employed in government service after the end of the sphere, it would have been impossible to do s o thanks to the repressive political war was contingent on joining the party. climate in Luanda at the time. After 1998, the civilian wing of UNITA was further The MPLA began promoting its electoral message months before the official start of the campaign, and was helped by the bias towards the party in state media. weakened by t he em ergence of UNITA R enovada, a s plit in t he p arty t hat wa s Party c ampaigners p resented t ools a nd g rain t o r ural co mmunities, a nd engineered by t he government in a wa y t hat was made p ossible by t he MPLA’s motorcycles t o t he c hiefs. At t he s ame t ime, t he g overnment h urried t o f inish command of the financial and judicial resources of the state. Messiant argues that projects such as n ational r oads, e lectricity infrastructure a nd ci ty centre the B icesse A ccord en trenched a mi litary log ic in p olitics b y v irtue o f b eing a renovation schemes. These were inaugurated during a national tour by President settlement that excluded the majority of Angolans, and gave a v oice only to the dos Sa ntos in t he w eeks b efore t he e lection, in w hich t he n ew p rojects w ere MPLA and UNITA; these two parties ‘had been fashioned by this war … and by presented as the gift of the MPLA. All this helped to project the MPLA as the party intense and various connections with other countries that each had woven in and of p eace a nd r econstruction, a p oint o f v iew t hat wa s f urther em phasised b y 4 for this war’. The elections were thus ‘the last battle in the war’, and the return to references t o UNIT A a s h aving b een w holly r esponsible f or t he wa r a nd i ts 5 war was inevitable. associated destruction. Interviews w ith v illagers revealed t hat p olitical t hinking Neither side co mplied completely with the Lusaka Accord; as the agreement was still guided by an either-or logic learnt during wartime. collapsed, the government’s endgame to the war comprised a co unterinsurgency UNITA h ad n either t he s pace n or t he r esources t o p romote a n a lternative strategy a imed a t des troying UNIT A’s a gricultural b ase. Th e r esult wa s t he message. Th e p arty h ad li ttle m ore t han i ts s tatutory a llocation f rom t he s tate displacement o f s everal mi llion r ural p eople, m any o f w hom t hus en tered budget, w hich in a ny c ase wa s di sbursed s everal w eeks l ate, a fter t he e lectoral

370 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 371 FROM REBELLION TO OPPOSITION: UNITA IN ANGOLA AND RENAMO IN MOZAMBIQUE JUSTIN PEARCE

campaign had supposedly begun. Nor could UNITA call upon its old foreign allies, finding a n ew patron in a partheid S outh Africa. B efore 1990, m ost accounts of since in ternational o pinion h ad d uring t he 1990s s hifted t owards a n MP LA RENAMO’s ac tivity em phasise i ts r ole a s a f orce a lien t o M ozambican s ociety, government whose control of the country’s oil resources appeared unchallenged.7 ‘pseudo-guerrillas’9 who engaged in violence with no political purpose other than This shift in o pinion was manifested, inter alia, in g overnment’s support for UN what wa s o rdained b y i ts f oreign b ackers. I t wa s o nly in 1981 t hat REN AMO sanctions a gainst t he di amond t rade w ith UNITA, a nd l ater f or t he K imberley adopted a political programme, and then it did so only at the urging of its South Process t hat s eeks t o ex clude f rom in ternational m arkets di amonds min ed in African s ponsors. I ts p rofessed co mmitment t o a f ree m arket e conomy s eems, rebel-held a reas. B y t he t ime o f t he p arliamentary e lection in 2008, UNIT A’s with hin dsight, t o h ave b een a c ynical c hoice desig ned t o ga in t he approval o f former foreign allies showed little interest in challenging the MPLA’s domination foreign b ackers. D uring t he wa r, ‘ RENAMO’s p olitical s tructure in side of the political system. Mozambique [wa s] li ttle m ore t han a n o ffshoot o f i ts mi litary co mmand Already co nstrained b y a l ack o f r esources, UNIT A’s m ost s killed le aders structure’.10 appeared more dedicated to reconstructing the party as a national force in Luanda than to mobilising in the party’s heartland. Those who remained in the provinces Political engagement in wartime seemed to be concentrating their resources on providing for the welfare needs of those p eople w hose p ro-UNITA co nvictions r emained s trong en ough t o k eep Yet des pite i ts f oreign o rigins a nd l ack o f a co nsistent p olitical p rogramme, them w ith t he p arty. Th ose w ho s till iden tified t hemselves a s ‘ UNITA p eople’ RENAMO succeeded in s ome areas in es tablishing a p olitical relationship w ith would h abitually a pproach t heir lo cal p arty b ranch f or h elp w ith m oney in a n rural Mozambicans as opposed simply to subordinating them in a regime of fear.11 emergency, or to find a j ob in a b usiness run by a UNITA sympathiser. Many of The nature of the relationship between RENAMO and the civilian population has these people felt that their continued adherence to UNITA prevented them from been the subject of controversy among observers of Mozambique.12 What is clear, seeking jobs in t he state sector, and they saw UNITA as the body to which they however, i s t hat REN AMO’s wa ys o f o perating dif fered f rom o ne p art o f should turn for welfare. UNITA, in the eyes of its followers, played a state-like role Mozambique t o a nother, dep ending o n h ow r eceptive t he lo cal p eople w ere for t hose w ho f elt n o s ense o f ci tizenship in a s tate t hat r emained s trongly towards t he guer rillas, a nd o n REN AMO’s mi litary s uccess in p enetrating a identified with a single party.8 particular area. During the war, RENAMO was best able to establish a relationship It was significant that in 2008 UNITA achieved its best result (31,37 per cent of with t he r ural p opulation in t hose a reas w here FRELIM O’s r ural de velopment the p arliamentary v ote) in C abinda, a lo ng wa y f rom i ts hi storic h eartland. policies, p articularly v illagisation, cr eated di scontent a mong t he fa rming Cabinda has a well-organised civil society, which had coalesced around demands population.13 Opposition t o v illagisation wa s m ost m arked in t he n orth, w here for a utonomy s everal y ears b efore UNIT A t urned i ts a ttention t o t he ex clave peasants had no exp erience of living in l arge v illages. G effray goes s o far as to province. As the elections approached, UNITA built links with existing networks of opposition to the MPLA. Operating in an environment where it had no strong suggest that peasant farmers in Nampula Province were in conflict with FRELIMO historic t ies w ith t he p eople, UNITA wa s a ble t o b reak f ree f rom t he o ld-style before RENAMO even arrived, and the rebel movement simply took advantage of politics that it practised in the Central Highlands and seek a mode of engagement existing g rievances in m obilising t he fa rming p opulations. B y co ntrast, more befitting a democracy. RENAMO’s relationship with p eople in t he s outh was largely one of terror and predation, a fac t t hat R oesch a ttributes t o s outhern fa rmers b eing m ore RENAMO’S BEGINNINGS enthusiastic about FRELIMO’s agricultural reform policies than was the case in the north.14 Yet even within the southern province of Gaza, Roesch found there were RENAMO’s o rigins w ere n ot p ropitious f or i ts de velopment in to a p opular different a ttitudes t owards FRELIM O in dif ferent p arts o f t he p rovince, a nd opposition movement. It was created by the intelligence services of white-ruled resentment of FRELIM O in cer tain a reas a gain cr eated a m ore conducive Rhodesia w ith t he p urpose o f des tabilising t he FRELIM O g overnment, l ater environment for RENAMO.

372 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 373 FROM REBELLION TO OPPOSITION: UNITA IN ANGOLA AND RENAMO IN MOZAMBIQUE JUSTIN PEARCE

Ethnicity was another tool that RENAMO used to gain adherence in cer tain Roesch found t hat about half of p eople on t he b ases c ame to accept life under areas. RENAMO made claims to ethnic solidarity with the Ndau (Shona-speaking) RENAMO as preferable to life elsewhere.19 RENAMO encouraged identification people o f cen tral M ozambique, a n a rea q uite di stinct f rom N ampula, w here with t he m ovement t hrough ‘ perfunctory’ p olitical e ducation, t hough ‘ neo- RENAMO wa s b est a ble t o m ake i ts s trongest p olitical c laims.15 But e ven if traditional r eligious di scourse’ s eemed t o b e REN AMO’s fa voured s trategy f or RENAMO’s p rincipal et hnic a ssociation wa s w ith t he N dau, REN AMO gaining the allegiance of people under its control. nevertheless managed to make identity claims in the north as well, capitalising on The kind of positive incentives described here – the promise of patronage and the historic marginalisation of the Makua people of the region. influence in return for support – are significant in that they prefigure the methods An influential analysis by Gersony divides RENAMO’s areas of influence into used b y REN AMO a fter t he en d o f t he wa r. N evertheless, t he fa ilure o f b oth zones of taxation, control and destruction.16 Tax areas were those with a dispersed FRELIMO and RENAMO to establish a peaceful and sustainable relationship with population that was left alone in ex change for tribute. Control areas were those much of the rural population led to many people being alienated from both sides, where RENAMO organised labour. Destruction areas were where RENAMO had even if they had no choice but to profess support for whichever side controlled the no h ope o f es tablishing a p olitical r elationship, a nd r elied o n p ure t error. area in which they lived: ‘It appears they now support[ed] whichever side [would] 20 According to Vines the major function of RENAMO’s control areas was: protect them, in order to save their own skin.’

… to provide food and services for the organisation … RENAMO obtains most of Peace settlement its labour forces from the other two zones, ‘tax’ and ‘destruction’ areas. Its workforce As with Angola’s Bicesse Accord, the peace settlement in Mozambique grew out of is therefore predominantly captive, detained against its will and forbidden to depart. international political developments rather than as a result of any internal change RENAMO exploits those very areas from which its first constituency of support was in the country. Following the General Peace Accord of October 1992, RENAMO 17 drawn – rural peasant communities. benefited from funding from foreign donors, who saw the former rebel movement as the logical counterpoise to FRELIMO in a m ultiparty Mozambique, and was Vines nevertheless observes that RENAMO’s relationship with the population in encouraged b y i ts f ormer p rincipal b acker, S outh A frica, t o t ake u p t his r ole. control areas was not only one of forced labour: However, t he m odality o f t he p eace p lan wa s s uch t hat RENAMO wa s a ble t o continue behaving not so much as a p olitical party as a mi litary movement with Despite t he o verall p icture o f REN AMO’s h arsh t reatment o f t he p opulation i t aspirations to statehood.21 encounters, there is another side t o its administrative practices. When RENAMO RENAMO retained control of its armed forces during the electoral campaign enters a district for the first time there is some attempt to win over peasant support. period, and restricted the access of FRELIMO campaigners, and even some voter Already in t he early 1980s REN AMO played in t his way on local discontent with education t rainers, t o REN AMO-controlled zo nes. E uropean p arliamentary FRELIMO’s ac hievements, p articularly a bout t he l ack o f co nsumer g oods a nd monitors observed that at one location in Nampula province, the polling station villagisation, to obtain sympathy … was located inside a RENAMO camp that remained essentially intact, patrolled by armed RENAMO soldiers, despite the supposed demobilisation process.22 Promise of power and land has also been one of the offers RENAMO has made in The si tuation des cribed h ere s uggests a simi lar ‘log ic o f wa r’ t o t hat w hich rural areas to obtain support … Further confirmation that RENAMO was attracting Messiant identified as underlying the failure of the Angolan peace process in the the disgruntled and the power-hungry came in 1982 through research conducted by early 1990s.23 The fact that the militarised, territorial politics of wartime continued FRELIMO. It showed that many of the rebels in I nhambane province were failed into t he t ransition p eriod in M ozambique wa s a p owerful b argaining c hip f or local election candidates from 1978, who saw RENAMO as an alternative method RENAMO’s le ader, A fonso D hlakama, a p oint t hat h e un derscored w hen h e to take power.18 announced that he was pulling out of the election; it took diplomatic intervention

374 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 375 FROM REBELLION TO OPPOSITION: UNITA IN ANGOLA AND RENAMO IN MOZAMBIQUE JUSTIN PEARCE

to bring RENAMO back in.24 Yet fears that this situation of divided military control force in t he n orth.29 RENAMO’s s uccess w ent b eyond t he a reas t hat i t h ad would destroy Mozambique’s electoral process just as it had done in A ngola two controlled mi litarily d uring t he wa r. I n Il ha de M oçambique, f or exa mple, years e arlier p roved t o b e unf ounded, p ossibly b ecause FRELIM O avoided a ny RENAMO b ecame t he do minant p arty b ecause t he i sland’s r esidents h ad, f or action that might have provoked a reaction from RENAMO.25 geographical r easons, b een s pared t he v iolence o f t he wa r. Thi s lef t r oom f or RENAMO to mobilise long-standing resentment over the belief that the island, the Electoral gains original core of colonial Mozambique, had been marginalised since independence. In certain provincial urban centres, notably the city of Beira, RENAMO proved Some h ave s uggested t hat REN AMO’s t hreatening b ehaviour a head o f t he able to mobilise local sentiment of discontent with the government in Maputo. elections scared people into voting for RENAMO.26 What is more certain is that RENAMO managed to w in votes above and b eyond t hose of t he p eople in t he Waning support areas that it controlled. UN f igures suggest that at the time of the peace accord, 27 RENAMO controlled 24 per cent of the territory and 7 per cent of the population, This apparent firming of RENAMO’s political position in the decade following the but in t he e lections, t he f ormer r ebel m ovement ga ined 37,78 p er cen t o f t he first elections led commentators t o suggest t hat t he 2 004 p residential a nd parliamentary votes, while Dhlakama, its presidential candidate, gained 33,73 per parliamentary elections could prove to present the biggest electoral challenge to cent of the presidential votes. In other words, RENAMO’s share of the vote was FRELIMO e ver. I nstead, t he 2004 e lections s aw a s harp dr op in REN AMO’s greater than the population that it controlled at the end of the war. support. More recently, controversy over the nomination of candidates in Beira for However, i ts s upport r emained co ncentrated in t hose r egions w here i t h ad the 2008 lo cal elections has presented RENAMO with arguably its deepest crisis been able to make its strongest political and ethnic claims during the war, namely since the end of the war. RENAMO’s electoral decline is not an isolated event, nor the centre and centre-north of t he country. Its worst results were in t he s outh, the r esult o f a s udden c hange in f ortunes; i t i s b est un derstood b y t racing where e ven t he a reas t hat REN AMO h ad co ntrolled d uring t he wa r v oted f or RENAMO’s trajectory since the peace accord. FRELIMO: this was a reaction to the brutality practised by RENAMO in the areas RENAMO’s guerrilla origins left it with a lack of cadres, and the party came to where it had never managed to consolidate its power by political means during be r un b y a sm all g roup cen tred a round D hlakama. Thi s g roup’s p osition wa s wartime. C ahen suggests that for RENAMO, having a p olitical programme was reinforced b y t he fac t t hat i t b ecame a c hannel f or f unding t o t he p arty f rom less im portant t han p roviding a v oice t o ‘ a va riety o f s ocial e lements a nd 30 communities – a s ort o f co alition o f m arginals w hich h ave b een ex cluded foreign donors who recognised Dhlakama’s legitimacy. RENAMO continued to politically and socially from the state, from the market and from development, not operate acco rding t o a p atron-client log ic w ith r espect t o i ts s upporters, in a just since FRELIMO’s coming to power but in many cases since the beginning of manner analogous to the way in which it had tried to win support in some areas the century’.28 during the war. In the early 1990s, the party faced a crisis over young people who After 1994, REN AMO was able to build on the political base that had been had been recruited to the party with the promise of study bursaries, which never confirmed by the elections. Fortuitously for RENAMO, the farmers of northern materialised. The result was an angry protest, in w hich RENAMO officials were and central Mozambique – t hose who were RENAMO’s key constituency during taken hostage and Dhlakama was called upon to intervene; his response was to the war – were the same people who were worst hit by the economic liberalisation promise that the party would contact foreign sponsors with a view to resolving the programme that international financial institutions obliged FRELIMO to adopt as situation.31 The C omprehensive P eace A greement (CP A) gu aranteed t he a co ndition f or lo ans t o f inance r edevelopment. Th e r esulting r esentment wa s deployment o f RENAMO p ersonnel in t eaching a nd o ther g overnment s ervice compounded by the fact that the mid- to late 1990s saw rapid growth in southern positions. I n t hose a reas t hat w ere s een a s REN AMO a reas, t his p rocess wa s Mozambique as the area’s proximity to South Africa helped it to attract investment. delayed b y a l ack o f co operation b etween t he g overnment a nd RENAMO, a nd The growing wealth gap served to consolidate RENAMO’s position as a p olitical ultimately i t wa s REN AMO t hat s uffered t hrough t he los s o f r esources o f

376 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 377 FROM REBELLION TO OPPOSITION: UNITA IN ANGOLA AND RENAMO IN MOZAMBIQUE JUSTIN PEARCE

patronage. In another example of patronage politics,32 RENAMO granted timber independent running on a ticket that sought to put the local needs of Beira ahead concessions to businessmen in areas that it controlled. of n ational p arty-political co ncerns. H e w on co nvincingly, a pparently h aving What i s sig nificant a bout t hese in stances i s t hat t hey r eflect h abits le arnt attracted the support of a large number of people who would otherwise have voted during the time of war, when RENAMO operated as a quasi-governmental entity for RENAMO. As Luís de B rito’s analysis makes clear, RENAMO’s failure in t his in the areas that it controlled. The persistence of this mode of operating is a sign case was due to a decision-making process that favoured the views of party elites that RENAMO has had difficulty in adapting to a role appropriate to a multiparty above those of the mass support base. Simango was expelled from RENAMO in political system. Manning characterises RENAMO as ‘a military organisation with September a nd w ent o n t o f orm a n ew p olitical p arty, t he M ozambique weakly de veloped admini strative a nd p olitical w ings h aving t o do wnplay i ts Democratic Movement. E arly in M arch 2009, REN AMO’s political commission military character and strengthen its political and administrative side, largely by sacked the head, deputy head and spokesperson of the parliamentary group, Maria recruiting n ew p eople in t he ci ties’.33 The r esult wa s t ensions b etween t he n ew, Moreno, L uis T rinta a nd E duardo N amburete. Th e p arty exp lained M oreno’s urban RENAMO cadres and the old guard whose sense of entitlement was derived dismissal in t erms o f h er h aving appeared o n a p ublic p latform w ith S imango, from the time they spent in t he bush. When fears were raised of defection from while reports suggested that Trinta and Namburete were also close to Simango.37 RENAMO o r es pionage, ‘[a]lm ost uni versally a mong t op le vel o fficials, t he The les son o f B eira f or REN AMO wa t hat t he p arty wa s a ble t o c apitalise o n solution most commonly proposed for this problem is more money to distribute popular discontent – b ut only for as long as RENAMO was prepared to put the as patronage’.34 wishes of potential voters ahead of the priorities of the party hierarchy. The more Thus RENAMO approached the 2004 e lections without having consolidated recent events give credibility to De Brito’s warning that the crisis surrounding the the gains it had made in the previous ten years. The elections were characterised Beira lo cal e lection b odes i ll f or REN AMO a nd in deed f or t he f uture o f t he by a s harp dr op in t urn-out co mpared w ith t he p revious n ational e lections o f multiparty system in Mozambique. 1999.35 Such voter apathy, much remarked upon by political commentators, was far more damaging to RENAMO than to FRELIMO: RENAMO received 1,6 million THE BURDENS OF OPPOSITION votes in 1999 but only 900 000 in 2004. For those who took a negative view of the status quo, FRELIMO had not delivered, but RENAMO had not delivered either, This chapter has so far attempted to trace the continuities between RENAMO’s and manifestly had nothing to deliver. Moreover, the idea of democracy, which and UNITA’s history as rebel movements, and the difficulties they have faced in had been so prominent in t he political discourse that surrounded the end of the becoming effective opposition parties in peacetime. It is, nevertheless, evident that war, had also failed to present the better life that was promised. In other words, some of the most serious challenges that they face are the same difficulties that all those who were dissatisfied with the government’s performance appeared to have opposition parties have in common. It would be short-sighted to look at UNITA’s become dissatisfied with the political system as a whole. Rather than voting for the and RENAMO’s problems w ithout co nsidering t hat t he o pposition p arties t hat opposition, they saw no reason to participate in t he democratic process at all. In have emerged since 1990 in b oth countries have proved to be considerably less 2004, Dhlakama managed to gain only 31,74 per cent of the vote, just under half successful than the former rebel movements in consolidating electoral support. All the 63,74 per cent received by FRELIMO’s candidate, Armando Guebuza. This is opposition p arties m ust co ntend w ith t he fac t t hat t he r uling p arty en joys in contrast to the 1999 p residential election, in w hich Dhlakama received 47,71 abundant fa vourable m edia co verage a nd h as t he r esources a t i ts di sposal t o per cent of the vote, less than five percentage points behind incumbent president present s tate-sponsored b enefits a nd de velopment a s t he g ift o f t he p arty.38 At Joaquim Chissano, who gained 52,29 per cent. present, t hese p henomena a re m ore e vident in A ngola t han in M ozambique, Events surrounding t he 2008 m unicipal elections in B eira provide a f urther thanks to the greater concentration of Angola’s media in the hands of the state, and illustration o f REN AMO’s le adership p roblems. I ntraparty t ensions s aw D aviz Angola’s o il-based e conomy t hat le aves t he p arty-state c ash-rich. Th e Simango, the ‘natural’ RENAMO candidate for the city leadership, pushed aside by opportunities for patronage enjoyed by ruling parties encourage them to swallow the p arty hiera rchy in fa vour o f M anuel P ereira.36 Simango s tood a s a n sections of the opposition, while themselves remaining intact: witness the large

378 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 379 FROM REBELLION TO OPPOSITION: UNITA IN ANGOLA AND RENAMO IN MOZAMBIQUE JUSTIN PEARCE

number of defections from UNITA and other opposition parties to the MPLA in the rebel movements in the bush power, achieved by force of arms, came first. The the months preceding the 2008 elections in Angola. political r elationship c ame l ater, a nd i t wa s a n ex clusive o ne. Th e p olitical On the level of public discourse, all the opposition parties suffer from under- relationship did n ot co nsist in p eople c hoosing a m ovement t o le ad t hem: i t representation in the media: more so in Angola than in Mozambique. But here the consisted o f a p olitical-military e lite det ermining t he t erms o f en gagement former rebel movements have a particular problem over and above the difficulties between the movement and the population. At no stage was there a q uestion of faced by parties that do n ot have a mi litary history. The MPLA and FRELIMO political c hoice f or t he p eople un der t he co ntrol o f t he m ovement. I n A ngola, have v irtually m onopolised n ationalist di scourse in t heir r espective co untries, UNITA and the MPLA were perceived as ‘rival governments’. There is evidence to each party portraying itself and itself alone as the guardian of the national interest. suggest that RENAMO, too, saw itself and presented itself as an organisation with RENAMO’s o wn hi story m akes i t dif ficult t o p ut f orward cr edible n ationalist the p rerogatives a nd t he r esponsibilities o f a s tate. B oth m ovements c laimed claims of its own. UNITA, on the other hand, has so far proved unable or unwilling exclusive power, and the exclusive right to exercise the prerogative of violence, in to reclaim its early history of anti-colonial mobilisation. This appears to be the the territory and over the people they controlled. result of the MPLA both having cornered the political initiative and having the Once the two movements are understood in t his way, it should become clear monopoly over the means of expression. Similarly, when the ruling party enjoys a why their transition to working within a democratic polity has not been easy. The disproportionate le vel o f lo yalty f rom t he n ational m edia, i t b ecomes e asy t o post-war t ransitions o f t he e arly 1990s a ppear t o h ave b een b ased o n t he 39 discredit the opposition by blaming it for the past conflict. assumption that the rival movements represented the interests of different groups within the population, whose differences could best be resolved at the ballot box. TURNING ARMIES INTO PARTIES People would vote for the party of their choice, and in this way the election would become a n exp ression o f p opular w ill w ithin a sin gle p olity, t his p olity b eing Turning now to the internal difficulties that the former rebel movements face as a consequence o f t heir hi story, i t i s c lear t hat b oth UNITA a nd RENAMO h ave associated with a non-partisan state and a common vision of nationhood. Such a suffered as a result of a particular kind of authoritarian leadership, in the persons vision had little in co mmon with the nature and the modus operandi of UNITA of Dhlakama and Savimbi. Authoritarianism is not exclusively a problem of former and RENAMO – n or in deed o f t he MP LA a nd FRELIM O – in t he 1970s a nd rebel m ovements, a lthough s uch a le adership s tyle f lourishes in a mi litary 1980s, y et t he e lections w ere o rganised o n a ssumptions t hat ig nored t his fac t. environment. But aside from the character of leaders, there is a more fundamental Indeed, in stead o f a sking w hy f ormer r ebel m ovements h ave n ot do ne w ell a s and more obvious point to be made: an armed rebel movement is not the same opposition political parties, it might be more instructive to ask why it was ever thing a s a p olitical p arty, a nd i t i s h ere t hat I w ould s uggest t hat f ormer r ebel assumed that rebel movements – and, for that matter, authoritarian party-states – movements are at a p articular di sadvantage w hen compared w ith t hose p arties were capable of transforming themselves into political parties worthy of the name. whose origins are in civil society.40 The exa mples q uoted e arlier f rom M anning’s r esearch i llustrate h ow In wartime, b oth UNITA and RENAMO engaged w ith p opulations in wa ys RENAMO continued after the 1992 p eace accord to operate according to a log ic that ranged from terror and coercion to the cultivation of a co nsensual political learnt in wartime: a logic in which RENAMO controlled territory and had certain relationship between the political movement and the people under its control. The rights and responsibilities regarding that territory and the people who lived in it. latter case represents the more positive face of the rebel movements, and it is this UNITA has been operating in a peacetime environment only since 2002, a decade version of events that tends to be evoked by the movements’ leadership in making less than RENAMO, a nd i ts mode o f e ngagement w ith i ts constituents in their claims to political legitimacy: a legitimacy that would be denied by those who peacetime has yet to be established. There are, however, signs that UNITA, like saw t he r ebel m ovements o nly a s v iolent a nd p redatory. Yet t he exa mples o f RENAMO, co ntinues t o a ttempt t he p olitics o f p atronage in de aling w ith t he UNITA and RENAMO illustrate that this political relationship, forged in wartime, minority of supporters who, despite pressure from the MPLA, have remained loyal has nothing in common with the workings of a political party in a democracy. For to UNITA since the end of the war.41

380 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 381 FROM REBELLION TO OPPOSITION: UNITA IN ANGOLA AND RENAMO IN MOZAMBIQUE JUSTIN PEARCE

This s trategy i s s ustainable f or n either side , g iven t he s uperior r esources First, t he n ature o f t he t wo guer rilla m ovements i s h ard t o p in do wn. enjoyed in each case by the government. While patronage politics is not unique to Christopher Clapham has presented an influential typology of guerrilla warfare; former rebel movements, the quasi-governmental character of RENAMO and of he iden tifies li beration in surgencies (w hich s eek in dependence f rom a co lonial UNITA in the bush meant that both movements – and their constituents – entered power), s eparatist in surgencies (w hich s eek in dependence f or a r egion o f a n the democratic era with entrenched ideas about the responsibilities of the political existing state), reform insurgencies (which seek profound changes in a n existing movement towards those under its control, and with no tradition of articulating state), a nd wa rlord in surgencies, ‘ where t he in surgency i s dir ected t owards a popular dem ands w ithin a dem ocratic sys tem. REN AMO m ay h ave s tarted t o change of leadership that does not involve the creation of a state any different from break t he m ould b y ado pting a m ore s ocially en gaged s tyle o f p olitics in, f or that which it seeks to overthrow, and which may involve the creation of a personal example, Beira, but then high-handed leadership reversed its successes. It is too fiefdom separate from the existing state structures and boundaries’.42 UNITA defies soon t o t ell w hether UNIT A w ill le arn les sons f rom i ts sig nificant ga ins in categorisation here, since it began as a liberation movement that became a reform Cabinda. insurgency that also had elements of warlordism. RENAMO likewise straddles the latter two categories, if not the first. Clapham himself acknowledges that reliance CONCLUSION on such t ypologies ‘runs t he r isk of imposing oversimplified c ategorisations on movements whose character is both changeable and mixed’.43 This is particularly Given t he y outh o f A ngolan a nd M ozambican p olitical sys tems, i t w ould b e true of a m ovement like UNITA, which existed for over 30 y ears and adapted to premature to make def initive judgements regarding t heir success and failure as different political and military circumstances. opposition movements. First, it is difficult and perhaps meaningless to disentangle Second, cases in which former armed movements became civilian opposition assessment of the parties themselves from the assessment of democratic systems as parties are extremely rare, which again leave us little basis for comparison. Let us a whole. A restrictive constitutional system limits opposition parties’ possibilities consider the various uprisings in independent African states that have ended in a for ac tion, but at t he s ame t ime a sys tem t hat on p aper offers opportunities to change in the political order: Ethiopia, Eritrea and Rwanda present cases of rebel opposition parties is of little value if the parties do not actively seek to define and movements t hat c ame t o p ower b y f orce o f a rms ra ther t han b y co nverting defend the political space that is available to them. UNITA in t his sense is at a themselves into civilian opposition movements. Sudan presents a uniq ue case in particular disadvantage, given that the MPLA government used the smokescreen that t he CP A en sured t he admi ssion o f t he S udanese P eople’s L iberation provided b y t he r esumption o f wa r in t he 1990s t o s trengthen i ts g rip o n t he Movement rebels to government as junior members of a coalition at the national institutions of state in a manner contrary to the democratic promises of the post- level, but also as the governing party in a n ewly devolved regional government. Bicesse constitution. Second, success and failure are relative; however, at the time Since t hen, t he p riorities o f t he S udan P eople’s L iberation A rmy h ave b een of writing it is evident that neither UNITA nor RENAMO is a serious contender determined b y t he r eal p rospect o f le ading a n in dependent S outhern S udan. for government, nor is either party in a p osition to bring strong pressure to bear Liberia’s post-war settlement served to accommodate several former rebel leaders on legislation in parliament. In terms of these minimal definitions, neither party as public office bearers, and with only one election having been held since the end can be described as effective. of the war, there is no e vidence of any other former rebels making headway in The r easons f or t his a re co mplex, a s t he hi stories o utlined in t his c hapter opposition p olitics. I n B urundi, t he Forces p our l a D éfense d e l a D émocratie, a demonstrate, a nd t he dif ferent t rajectories f ollowed b y UNITA a nd REN AMO former rebel group associated with the ethnic Hutu majority, gained power in a should serve as a warning against making blanket assumptions about the political free election in 2005 t hat resulted from a p eace settlement. It took several more efficacy of former rebel movements. Similarly, there are no obvious comparisons years, to 2009, b efore a sm aller rebel group, the Forces Nationales de Libération, to be drawn between UNITA’s and RENAMO’s post-war trajectory and those of laid down its arms and transformed itself into a political party. Its effectiveness as other African guerrilla movements. an opposition party has yet to be demonstrated.

382 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 383 FROM REBELLION TO OPPOSITION: UNITA IN ANGOLA AND RENAMO IN MOZAMBIQUE JUSTIN PEARCE

The c ases m ost comparable t o A ngola and Mozambique are t hose of S ierra allowed the Rwanda Patriotic Front to sweep to power following the genocide of Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): these provide examples of 1994. former rebel movements attempting to operate as political parties, though making In brief, the fact that neither UNITA nor RENAMO won a wa r, and the fact less impact than either RENAMO or UNITA. In Sierra Leone, the Revolutionary that both had the chance to contest elections, stems from particular contingencies United F ront P arty (R UFP), t he p eacetime in carnation o f t he R evolutionary that were replicated in n o other cases. To these we must, of course, also add t he United F ront (R UF) r ebel g roup, co ntested t he p ost-war e lections in 2002. internationally dominant political ethos of the early 1990s: the idea of liberal peace However, the party gained a m ere 2 p er cent of the parliamentary vote and five that enjoyed a resurgence with the end of the Cold War. However, as argued earlier, years l ater ef fectively di sappeared in a m erger w ith t he A ll P eople’s C ongress. in hin dsight t he a ssumption t hat r ebel m ovements co uld e asily t ransform Kandeh ascribes the RUFP’s failure to the fact that ‘Foday Sankoh, the RUF leader, themselves into opposition parties appears misguided; in t heir relationship with was in jail and the RUF faced an uphill task convincing the public to vote for the society in peacetime, both parties have been constrained by the habits of the past. 44 very elements that had laid waste to the country’. This contrasts with Angola and Yet the military origins of UNITA and RENAMO tell only part of the story. Mozambique, where the votes for the opposition came from those people whose The different choices by the two parties made after the elections of the early 1990s experience of the rebels had not primarily been one of violence and where the lack also affected their later fortunes, UNITA’s unwillingness to play an oppositional of any post-conflict justice mechanism left rebel leaders at liberty to campaign. In role after 1992 contributed in the end to the greater consolidation of power by the the D RC, m embers o f t he f ormer r ebel m ovement, t he Mouvement p our l a MPLA, while RENAMO’s participation saw its support grow during the decade Libération du Congo (MLC), assumed seats in parliament after the 2006 post-war following e lections, a s i t s eemed t o t urn i ts b ack o n i ts mi litary o rigins a nd election. No conclusive research has been done on the MLC’s effectiveness as a managed t o m obilise s upport w ithin a dem ocratic sys tem. B oth m ovements political actor, in a country where the reach of the state system remains limited. retained t he s upport o f s ome o f t heir wa rtime f oreign a llies t hrough t he e arly If the Angolan and Mozambican cases allow few points of direct comparison 1990s but such support was no longer available to UNITA as it emerged from the with other African conflicts, what then do they have in common with each other? last phase of the war in 2002. Particularly in the case of Angola, the superiority of In b oth Angola and Mozambique, a g overnment was opposed by a sin gle rebel resources enjoyed by the ruling party cannot be ignored. Leadership styles, too, are movement, and e ach of t he rebel movements was hig hly centralised around an to blame, particularly for RENAMO’s inability to consolidate the support that it iconic leader: this largely eliminated the possibility of rogue troops and splinter gained after the war ended. groups threatening the peace. However, in the Angolan case it also made it easy for It would be wrong to blame all of UNITA’s and RENAMO’s problems on their Savimbi t o r emobilise hi s f orces w hen h e b ecame di ssatisfied w ith t he 1992 election r esults. Th e p olitical di scourses a ssociated w ith UNIT A w ere m ore wartime o rigins. W hat i s c lear i s t hat w here t hey h ave en joyed s uccess in coherent and more entrenched among a certain section of the Angolan population peacetime politics, they have not done so as a consequence of being former rebel than was the case with RENAMO, and this enabled UNITA to retain some of its movements. On t he contrary, t hey have succeeded only inasmuch as t hey have support base when it went back to war. Though both RENAMO and UNITA were managed to move away from their military past. If there is a p olicy lesson to be associated w ith cer tain regions of t heir respective countries, n either m ovement learnt from these observations, it is that the strategy of offering rebel movements had a strong ethnic character that could guarantee it votes purely on the basis of the o pportunity t o co ntest e lections in t he a mbit o f a p eace p rocess m ust b e identity, and nor did either have separatist aspirations in the manner of the Sudan recognised f or w hat i t i s: a n exp edient m edium-term m easure t o faci litate t he People’s Liberation A rmy. A lthough t here w ere m any in stances o f t he a buse o f laying down of arms without any party to the conflict having to lose face. It should state power in A ngola and in Mozambique in t he 1980s, t here was nothing on a not b e mi staken f or a n e asy route t o a f unctioning dem ocracy. A f ormer rebel scale that provoked the kind of dissatisfaction that ensured widespread popular movement is, at best, no more than a basis for the construction of a political party. support f or t he E thiopian a nd Er itrean r ebellions. On t he o ther h and, n either This basis may provide visibility and, depending on the wartime behaviour of the UNITA nor RENAMO wa s operating in t he environment of s tate co llapse t hat movement, a m easure o f leg itimacy, b ut t he c ases o f REN AMO a nd UNIT A

384 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 385 FROM REBELLION TO OPPOSITION: UNITA IN ANGOLA AND RENAMO IN MOZAMBIQUE JUSTIN PEARCE

demonstrate t hat f ormer r ebel m ovements co me w ith a legac y o f p olitical 12 C G effray, La c ause d es a rmes a u M ozambique: a nthropologie d ’une g uerre ci vile, P aris: arrogance and authoritarian methods. As a contributor to a new and participatory Karthala, 1990; R Gersony, Summary of Mozambican refugee accounts of principally conflict- related experience in Mozambique: report submitted to Ambassador Moore and Dr Chester A democratic sys tem, a f ormer r ebel m ovement h as n o n atural ad vantage o ver a Crocker, Washington, DC: US Department of State, Bureau for Refugee Programs, 1988; M newly established party. Hall, Th e M ozambican N ational R esistance M ovement (REN AMO): a s tudy in t he destruction o f a n A frican co untry, Africa 60(1) (1990); J M cGregor, Violence a nd s ocial change in a border economy: War in the Maputo hinterland, 1984–1992, Journal of Southern NOTES African S tudies 24(1) (1998), 37–60; M inter, Apartheid’s c ontras; N ilsson, F rom ps eudo- terrorists to pseudo-guerrillas; T Young, The MNR/Renamo: external and internal dynamics, 1 P Chabal, with D B irmingham, J F orrest, M N ewitt, J S eibert and E A ndrade, A history of African Affairs 89(357) (1990), 491–509. post-colonial l usophone A frica, London: H urst, 2002, a nd W M inter, Apartheid’s c ontras, 13 Vines, Renamo: terrorism in Mozambique, 114–115. London: Z ed B ooks, 1994, p rovide a co ncise overview of t he de colonisation process a nd 14 O Roesch, Renamo and the peasantry in southern Mozambique: a view from Gaza Province, subsequent developments in the former Portuguese colonies in Africa. Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines 26(3) (1992), 2 The observations made about UNITA’s wartime strategies, unless otherwise attributed, are 462–484. based o n in terviews co nducted b y t he a uthor in A ngola in 2008 w ith p eople f ormerly 15 Roesch, Renamo and the peasantry in s outhern Mozambique, 469, des cribes RENAMO as attached to UNITA. The analysis of Mozambique relies more on existing literature on the ‘very m uch a n N dau p olitical p roject’. V ines, Renamo: t errorism i n M ozambique, 83, country. attributes the association between RENAMO and the Ndau to the fact that the Ndau inhabit 3 F Fukuyama, The end of history and the last man, London: Hamish Hamilton, 1992, provides the area closest to the Zimbabwe border from which the first RENAMO insurgents arrived, the b est-known exp osition o f t his t hinking, w hile a t renchant cr itique o f i ts b lanket and the choice of Ndau as a lingua franca in the RENAMO military. application to situations such as that in Angola is provided by Margaret Anstee, who was UN 16 Gersony, Summary of Mozambican refugee accounts. special representative in A ngola during the 1992 e lections. M A nstee, Orphan of the Cold 17 Vines, Renamo: terrorism in Mozambique, 91. War: t he i nside s tory o f t he c ollapse o f t he A ngolan p eace p rocess, 1992–3, Basingstoke: 18 Ibid, 93. Macmillan, 1996, 127, o bserved ‘an alarming tendency in Western international politics – 19 Roesch, Renamo and the peasantry in southern Mozambique, 472. post-Cold War … – to preach universal remedies in the starkest terms of black and white … 20 Vines, Renamo: terrorism in Mozambique, 94. On the political side it lies in embracing democracy and carrying out, as quickly as possible, 21 M C ahen, ‘Dhlakama é m aningue nice!’: an atypical former guer rilla in t he Mozambican “free a nd fa ir” multiparty e lections. Th e p roblem w ith t he en gagingly simple – a nd v ery electoral campaign, Transformation 35 (1998), 1–48. possibly simplistic – a pproach is that when you try to follow the precepts, reality has the 22 African-European I nstitute / A WEPA, Report o f AWEPA’s o bservation o f t he Mozambique uncomfortable habit of getting in the way … Democracy cannot be created overnight, least electoral process 1992–1994, Amsterdam: AWEPA, 1995. of all in places with a long history of authoritarian rule or civil war.’ 23 Messiant, MPLA et UNITA. 4 C Messiant, MPLA et UNITA: processus de paix et logique de guerre, Politique Africaine 57 24 African-European Institute / AWEPA, Report of AWEPA’s observation. (1995), 40–57, 43. 25 Contrast this with the actions of the Angolan government in the months following the 1992 5 Ibid, 49. elections: see Messiant, MPLA et UNITA. 6 In the 2008 e lections, the MPLA gained 82 p er cent of the vote in H uambo province and 26 African-European Institute/AWEPA, Report of AWEPA’s observation. almost 75 p er cent in B ié, in co ntrast to 1992, w hen UNITA achieved a m ajority in b oth 27 Ibid, 13. provinces. 28 Cahen, Check on socialism in Mozambique, 56. 7 C Messiant, Angola: Une ‘victoire’ sans fin? Politique Africaine 81 (2001), 143–161. 29 J Pearce, 2004, Mozambique: across the great divide, Mail & Guardian, 29 November 2004, 8 J Pearce, L’Unita à la recherche de ‘son peuple’: carnets d’une noncampagne sur le planalto, http://www.afrika.no/Detailed/6788.html (accessed 20 March 2009). Politique Africaine 110 (2008), 47–64. 30 C Manning, Armed opposition groups into political parties: comparing Bosnia, Kosovo and 9 A Nilsson, From pseudo-terrorists to pseudo-guerrillas: the MNR in M ozambique, Review Mozambique, Studies in Comparative International Development 39(1) (2004), 54–76, 64–65. of African Political Economy 58 (1993), 35–42. 31 C Manning, Constructing opposition in Mozambique: Renamo as political party, Journal of 10 A Vines, Renamo: terrorism in Mozambique, London: Centre for Southern African Studies, Southern African Studies 24(1) (1998), Special Issue on Mozambique. University of York, in association with James Currey, 1991, 80. 32 Ibid, 185. 11 M C ahen, C heck o n s ocialism in M ozambique: W hat c heck? W hat s ocialism? Review o f 33 Ibid, 188. African Political Economy 57 (1993), 46–59. 34 Ibid, 188.

386 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 387 FROM REBELLION TO OPPOSITION: UNITA IN ANGOLA AND RENAMO IN MOZAMBIQUE

35 Voter turnout was 69,51 per cent in 1999 but fell to between 36 per cent and 43 per cent in 2004 (Mozambique News Agency, Supreme court ratifies election results, AIM reports 173, Part III 5 J anuary 2000, h ttp://www.poptel.org.uk/mozambique-news/newsletter/aim173.html (accessed 22 M arch 2009); M ozambique News Agency, Frelimo win huge election victory, AIM r eports 289, 22 D ecember 2004, h ttp://www.poptel.org.uk/mozambique-news/ Responses newsletter/aim289.html (acces sed 22 M arch 2009) co mments t hat ‘[t]h e lo w t urnout i s largely a REN AMO phenomenon, with its supporters failing to go to the polling stations. FRELIMO mobilised its core votes, RENAMO did not’. 36 L de Brito, Beira – o fim da Renamo? IDeAS: Informação sobre Desenvolvimento, Instituições CHAPTER 14 e Análise Social 5, Maputo: Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos, 2008. 37 Allafrica.com, M ozambique: R enamo s acks p arliamentary le adership, 10 M arch 2009, http://allafrica.com/stories/200903100433.html (accessed 18 March 2009). 38 The comment by Chabal and Daloz on the difficulties faced by many African opposition Local communities, militias and parties is of relevance here: ‘If the notion of the individual and the meaning of representation are bound up with the identity, defence and furtherance of the interests of the community, then t here c an b e n o p lace in t he p olitical sys tem f or a n o pposition w ith n o m eans o f rebel movements: the case of the delivering resources to its constituents’ (P Chabal and J-P Daloz, Africa works: disorder as a political instrument, Oxford: James Currey, 1999, 55). Revolutionary United Front in 39 The FRELIMO campaign in t he 1999 n ational elections in M ozambique played on threats that REN AMO mig ht r eturn t o wa r (C arter C entre, O bserving t he 1999 e lections in Sierra Leone Mozambique: Final report, 2000). I nterviews conducted by t he author in A ngola in 2008 suggest that the MPLA used similar tactics against UNITA. 40 For example, Zimbabwe’s Movement for Democratic Change, with its origins in the union KRIJN PETERS movement. South Africa’s African National Congress, although it had an armed element, was able to benefit from the widespread popular mobilisation against apartheid that had taken place in the 1980s by its allies and sympathisers within South Africa. 41 J Pearce, L’Unita à la recherche de ‘son peuple’. INTRODUCTION 42 C Clapham, African guerrillas, Oxford: James Currey, 1998, 7. 43 Ibid, 6. African rebel m ovements em erging after t he en d of t he C old War h ave readily 44 J K andeh, S ierra L eone’s p ost-conflict e lections o f 2002, The J ournal o f M odern A frican been di smissed a s l acking a ny c lear ide ology o r p olitical a genda, let a lone Studies 41(2) (2003), 189–216, 199. representing the voice of the people. Evidence for this can be found in the uneasy, if not oppressive, relationship these movements have with local communities and in the need to increase their ranks by force, rather than on a voluntary basis, or so it is argued.1 On top of that, African conflicts are presented as having clear dividing lines between, on the one hand, civilians – o ften portrayed as passive victims – and, on the other, atrocious rebels. The conflicts in Sierra Leone and Uganda and their respective rebel movements, the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF) and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), are repeatedly used as examples to underline this thesis. Material presented in this chapter, collected from former RUF combatants and civilians w ho li ved in R UF t erritory, g ives r eason t o do ubt t hese ra ther o ne- dimensional p erceptions.2 Instead, t he d ata hin t a t a m uch m ore co mplex

388 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 389 LOCAL COMMUNITIES, MILITIAS AND REBEL MOVEMENTS: THE CASE OF KRIJN PETERS THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT IN SIERRA LEONE relationship, constantly changing over the course of the war. Accounts of ex-RUF and situations created by, t he rebel environment, and show how t hese changed combatants and civilians who lived in r ebel-controlled areas suggest that a w ide during the course of the war. On several occasions I refer to the conflict in Uganda and di verse ra nge o f in teractions w ere t aking p lace, in w hich b oth g roups and the LRA, with which, I believe, the RUF shared considerable similarities. The 3 expressed sig nificant le vels of agency, necessary to navigate t he d angerous war phases distinguished in the conflict are as follows: terrain t o t heir b est a bility. T o b etter un derstand h ow b oth co mbatants a nd civilians ‘move’ through an unstable political landscape, I use the concept of ‘social I Phase I (1991–1993): co nventional wa rfare, f rom t he R UF in cursion t o i ts navigation’, as developed by Mats Utas and Henrik Vigh. Social navigation can be near defeat described a s ‘ the wa y in w hich a gents s eek t o dra w a nd ac tualise t heir lif e I Phase II (1994–1996): b ush c amps, f rom t he es tablishment o f i solated RUF trajectories in o rder t o in crease t heir s ocial p ossibilities a nd lif e c hances in a jungle bases to their destruction shifting a nd v olatile s ocial en vironment’.4 In t heir w ork, U tas a nd V igh f ocus I Phase III (1997–1999): co llaboration, f rom j oining t he mi litary junta to t he mainly on (ex)combatants in L iberia (Utas5) and Guinea-Bissau (Vigh6), but the Lomé Peace Accord framework of social navigation is also helpful for understanding the trajectories of I other combatants in other conflicts (including those of Sierra Leone and Uganda). Phase IV (1999–2002): s talemate, f rom t erritorial o ccupation t o Equally, I b elieve, the concept of ‘social navigation’ is useful to understand how demobilisation civilians (are forced to) ‘move’ in a war context. As Vigh explains, ‘navigat[ing] the terrain of war is primarily a q uestion of e valuating t he movement of t he s ocial Preamble: the making of the Revolutionary United Front environment, one’s own possibilities for moving through it, and its effect on one’s planned and actual movement’,7 and this is what civilians in war zones have to do In 1978, Sierra Leone became a one-party regime under the authoritarian rule of all the time in order to survive. President Siaka Stevens of the All Peoples’ Congress Party. Political opposition was Rather than ‘evaluating the social environment’, Vigh argues for ‘evaluating the either oppressed or bought off by Stevens. Radical students in Freetown and some movement of t he s ocial en vironment [o wn em phasis]’ a nd b y s o do ing other m ajor t owns, in terested in s ocialism, Gadd afi’s ‘ Green B ook’ a nd P an- acknowledges t he rapidly c hanging a nd f luid s ocial t errain cr eated by wa r. For Africanism, organised themselves in the Mass Awareness and Participation (MAP) instance, the RUF in 1991 was not the same movement as the RUF in 1995, in 1998 movement and became increasingly proactive in their protests against the regime.8 or in 2000. A mong t he f eatures t hat c hanged (o n s everal o ccasions d uring t he Forced into exiled by the regime, MAP le ader Alie Kabbah then approached the course of the war) were its military tactics, its mode of conscription, the level of Sierra L eonean P an-African U nion (P ANAFU) w ith t he r equest t o ga ther civilian s upport, t he n umber a nd n ature (lo cal, n ational o r in ternational) o f candidates for revolutionary training in L ibya, but PANAFU rejected the idea of enemies and allies, and the kind of atrocities it committed. As the RUF created and an a rmed s truggle. N evertheless, in t he l ate 1980s, a round 50 S ierra L eoneans responded to new situations, these in turn offered new possibilities and terminated travelled to Benghazi, Libya, to receive military training.9 Among them was Foday previous ones for civilians living in the danger zone, requiring active navigation. I thus suggest an approach in studying local communities in war zones that is able Sankoh, a former corporal in the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Force (RSLMF) to take this constantly moving terrain into account and acknowledges civilians in and future leader of the RUF. After Sankoh returned to Sierra Leone to further war zones as active survivors rather than passive victims. organise his rebellion, he met with Charles Taylor – leader of the National Patriotic Four dif ferent p hases in t he co nflict a re di scussed b elow. I n e ach o f t hese Front of Liberia (NPFL).10 The NPFL – with the support of Sankoh and a group of phases, t he RUF did un dergo sig nificant c hanges a nd a s a r esult r epresented a Sierra L eoneans – f irst l aunched i ts in cursion in to L iberia in D ecember 1989. different social environment that local communities had to navigate. I will discuss Fifteen months later, the RUF used NPFL-controlled territory to start its incursion some of the attitudes and responses of the local communities to the demands of, into Sierra Leone.

390 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 391 LOCAL COMMUNITIES, MILITIAS AND REBEL MOVEMENTS: THE CASE OF KRIJN PETERS THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT IN SIERRA LEONE

Phase I (1991–1993): Conventional warfare; from It was in 1993 t hat the rebels captured my brother. Then the soldiers came to our the RUF incursion to its near defeat village. They accused my father that he had given his son to the rebels. To punish him for that they killed him. That was the reason for me to join the rebels. At that In M arch 1991, n o m ore t han a h undred f ighters en tered K ailahun di strict in time, if you only were giving water to the rebels, the soldiers would kill you.15 eastern Sierra Leone from neighbouring Liberia. Ten days later this was followed by another group of fighters entering the southeastern border district of Pujehun. Part of the explanation for these particular brutal counterinsurgency practices and The groups were composed of Sierra Leoneans – some were trained in Libya and the opposite effect they had on ending the war or winning the support of the local some were more recently recruited in Liberia and trained at the NPFL’s infamous population may be found in t he ethnic manipulation of the military forces. For Sogoto base – and Liberian ‘special forces’ on loan from Charles Taylor’s NPFL. In instance, a fter co ming t o p ower in 1980, P resident D oe t urned t he L iberian 11 addition, both groups had some revolutionaries from Burkina Faso among them. national army into an ethnic Krahn-dominated force that went on the rampage in Although it was well known that the RSLMF did h ave a m ore ceremonial role – Gio- and Mano-dominated areas. Stevens and Momoh made the Sierra Leonean Stevens and his handpicked successor Momoh relied more on a special and well- army an almost completely ethnic Temne, Koranko and Yalunka (all ethnic groups armed police force unit, the Internal Security Unit, than on any real capacity to from the northern part of the country) institution, which had less affiliation with deal with military threats – it was clear to the insurgents that they had to embark civilians living in Mende-dominated areas. In Uganda, the first president, Milton on a m assive r ecruitment c ampaign t o in crease t he m ovement’s numbers. Th e Obote, himself a Langi from the northern part of the country, relied heavily on the NPFL rebels had previously employed this tactic in L iberia. When, in D ecember army dominated by northerners. Idi Amin, who ousted Obote in a co up in 1971, 1989, t he NP FL en tered L iberia (f rom C ôte d ’Ivoire), i t a lso did t his w ith a massacred thousands of soldiers from the Langi and Acholi ethnic groups.16 Amin relatively sm all f orce. H owever, i t q uickly in creased i ts ra nks b y ef fectively was o verthrown in 1979 a nd O bote c ame b ack in p ower a s a r esult o f a recruiting predominately among the Mano and Gio ethnic groups, which had been controversial election in 1980. Yoweri Museveni, who helped in the overthrow of marginalised and oppressed by the authoritarian President Samuel Doe, an ethnic Amin, took his forces to the bush and fought against Obote for the next five years. Krahn. A brutal counterinsurgency by Doe’s forces only played in the hands of the In 1986, Museveni seized power, ignoring negotiation attempts by Tito Okello, an NPFL.12 Acholi w ho h ad o verthrown O bote t he p revious y ear. E thnic g roups f rom t he As was the case in President Doe’s counterinsurgency in neighbouring Liberia, southwest and south dominated Museveni’s National Resistance Army, and this the response by the Sierra Leonean army did not make things much better.13 In a may explain to some extent the unscrupulous behaviour of a section of his soldiers number of cases it sealed the fate of the voluntary and forced rebel recruits and when on a mission in Acholiland. civilians, a s i s exp lained by a n admini strator w ithin t he Ci vil D efence Force, a To co py t he NP FL’s t actic o f r ecruiting a mong o ppressed et hnic g roups – militia group fighting against the RUF (see below): perhaps on the suggestion of the Liberian ‘special forces’ – the RUF tried to exploit the resentments of local people against the All People’s Congress (APC) r egime. The counterinsurgency of [among others] the Sierra Leone army was quite ruthless, The APC – a party mainly representing the interests of the Temne ethnic group – straight f rom t he b eginning, [a nd t his] m ade t hose R UF f ighters a nd ci vilians was widely condemned by the Sierra Leone population. This resentment turned forcibly co nscripted a nd w ho w ere lo oking o ut f or a n o pportunity t o es cape t o into open hatred in t he e astern part of t he country, which formed t he p olitical hesitate a bout t heir es cape p lans. I f s ummary ex ecution wa s wa iting a fter a homeland of the banned Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP), an organisation that successful desertion attempt, it was probably a better deal to stay in the movement mainly represented t he Mende et hnic interests. Nevertheless, t he reality on t he and adapt to it as [well] as possible.14 ground was more complicated. Many civil servants and police officers of Mende ethnicity had little choice but to cooperate with the APC r egime. Others, whose This i s un derlined b y a f emale ex-R UF co mbatant w ho r efers t o t he political or economic positions were endorsed by the regime, often in exchange for counterinsurgency tactics of the army as the main reason why she joined the RUF: loyalty t o t he APC, ac ted a s b rokers a nd p atrons f or t he p easantry. L ocal

392 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 393 LOCAL COMMUNITIES, MILITIAS AND REBEL MOVEMENTS: THE CASE OF KRIJN PETERS THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT IN SIERRA LEONE populations at all levels were thus navigating the pre-war (but clearly not peaceful) provided by villagers and/or new recruits from the area. In more than a few cases, terrain to the best of their abilities. the RUF and the other factions were used by civilians to settle local disputes, as is The in discriminate k illings b y t he r ebels o f t hose w ho w ere e ven va guely evident from a comment made by a former RUF clerk: associated with the APC regime did not evoke the widespread support among the population in the eastern districts the RUF had hoped for. The larger part of the The civilians played a double role. They were going to the RUF and from there to population – although in favour of change and perhaps even endorsing an armed the SLA [Sierra Leone Army] and then to the CDF [Civil Defence Force]. So that is struggle – judged their own possibilities for surviving and moving through these how t he R UF b ecame s uspicious. M any ci vilians u sed t he fac tions f or t aking insecure t imes t he hig hest if t hey did n ot j oin. B ut t here wa s s ome le vel o f revenge on each other for old quarrels and grudges. So the enemy of the RUF was voluntary co nscription, in p articular a mong a c lass o f s ocioeconomic not only the CDF or the SLA, but the whole society. Many of the earlier atrocities of marginalised young people, often belonging to the weaker lineages in society. The the RUF can be explained by this double role of the civilians.20 labour of some of these youngsters had been exploited by landlords or families-in- law (as part of a bride price). Others were school dropouts. The above comment suggests an agentive – t hat is, expressing agency – r ole by By the end of the 1980s, the extent of support trickling down to the end of the local co mmunities/people. R ather t han b eing p assive v ictims, t hey w ere ac tive patrimonial chain, where most of the rural youngsters were positioned, dried up survivors, in s ome cases using the armed factions to their own benefit. Clearly, completely – a nd t he y oungsters t ried t o s urvive b y do ing p iece j obs (a nd civilians caught up in the war terrain tried to build up some relationship with the sometimes co mmitting p etty cr imes) in urb anised cen tres o r in t he co untry’s armed groups to increase their possibilities for survival. This is also illustrated by many alluvial diamond-mining pits. Or they ran away from their villages to escape the following comment of a ci vilian who remained in hi s village throughout the the made-up charges of kangaroo courts controlled by the rural elite.17 For these war (first under RUF control, then under Sierra Leone Army [SLA] control, and rural vagrants, the RUF’s populist ideology of ‘no more slave, no more master’ and then again under RUF control):21 its promises of free education and medical care for the ‘masses’ must have sounded attractive and of particular relevance to their own situations. It was important to have a good relationship with the commander, so whenever he In co ntrast, y oung p eople f rom s tronger lin eages o r m ore f irmly t ied t o a asked you do something, you do it quickly and do it right. Then he can protect you. patrimonial network were much more likely to join the Civil Defence Force (CDF) If y ou g ive him a sm all present or s o, h e s tarts t o li ke y ou. Th e m ajority of t he militia. This is confirmed for instance by William Reno, who shows how the level of control over youth (more particularly, illicit diamond mining gangs) by chiefs civilians a re un der t he p rotection o f a s pecific co mmander o r f ighter. M y o wn determined whether these gangs joined the RUF or were turned into militia units commander, M Rogers, was not too bad. At least he was much better than M [the to defend local communities.18 Similarly, support for the (chiefly aligned) CDF – a RUF commander in charge during the second RUF occupation]. Rogers talked for militia that was based on the hunter guilds called the Kamajoisia in Mende – in the the civilians [pleaded on their behalf], for all civilians. His wife is from W [a nearby 22 main v illages in t he e astern di strict wa s hig her t han in t he sm aller a nd m ore village]. isolated villages, which often have their origin as a main village’s farming outpost, staffed b y do mestic s laves.19 The a bove s hows t hat t o b etter un derstand lo cal On 29 April 1992, a s uccessful coup was staged. The National Provisional Ruling communities’ responses to, and support for, rebel movements, a detailed historical Council, headed by the 27-year-old Valentine Strasser, took power and was much and political analysis of the local situation is necessary. more favourably predisposed towards the Mendes. However, the regime made the Local a nd p re-war fac tors did inf luence t he R UF a nd i ts c ampaign in a tactical mistake of sending some of the APC loyalist and predominately Freetown- different way, too. The first rebels to enter Sierra Leone – the so-called ‘Vanguards’ based army commanders to frontline positions to let them, too, taste the bitterness – had limited information about who was and who was not an APC s upporter, of war.23 These commanders had little interest in fighting for their new masters and beyond the most visible public figures. Therefore they had to rely on information sabotaged the struggle against the rebels by looting rather than protecting villages

394 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 395 LOCAL COMMUNITIES, MILITIAS AND REBEL MOVEMENTS: THE CASE OF KRIJN PETERS THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT IN SIERRA LEONE and towns. The ‘soldier by day, rebel by night’ or ‘sobel’ phenomenon was born. mainly on the abduction of people, as the following statement of a f ormer RUF Nevertheless, a s a r esult o f c ampaigns b y t he co mbined f orces o f t he RS LMF, commander attests: Kamajors, G uinean s oldiers (in S ierra L eone a s p art o f a m utual def ence agreement) and the United Liberian Movement for Democracy (a rebel movement We got our manpower mainly via capturing people. It was not easy for civilians in created by Liberian exiles in Sierra Leone opposed to the NPFL and the RUF), the the government territory to get accurate information about the RUF and its aims rebels found themselves nearly defeated by the end of 1993. Driven back to the far and objectives, so they were not likely to join out of free will. But once we captured east o f t he co untry, t hey a bandoned t heir h eavy mi litary e quipment a nd them we started to sensitise them and people started to join the movement because ‘disappeared’ in the Gola Forest, a long strip of primary rainforest along the Sierra of the ideology and because they were not harassed any more.25 Leone/Liberian border. The en vironment in w hich t he LR A in U ganda – t he o ther r ebel m ovement Phase II (1994–1996): Bush camps, from the infamous for its abductions of (predominately) under-age combatants26 – operates establishment of isolated RUF jungle bases to their does show s ome striking simi larities with t he RUF in p hase II. W hen t he LR A destruction moved its military bases to Southern Sudan, it increasingly became detached from the lo cal p opulation, w hich wa s f orcefully r esettled b y t he a rmy t o s o-called The RUF did not disappear for long, however. Early in 1994 it started to establish ‘protected villages’.27 Moving in terrain sparsely populated by civilians, conscription jungle camps in in accessible terrain all over the eastern and southern half of the by abduction seemed to be the only way open for a movement that could not rely country, in cluding t he s o-called ‘ Zogoda’ in t he K ambui S outh F orest R eserve, on voluntary conscription to fill its ranks. where rebel leader Foday Sankoh stayed most of the time. From these camps the Abductees quickly found out that it was better to become a fighter than remain RUF launched hit-and-run campaigns or sent fighters on ambush missions. The a RUF civilian in the camp (or for that matter, an LRA civilian) and be extremely movement had completely changed its strategy from a more or less conventional vulnerable to ‘harassment’ (read: forced labour, physical punishments, rape etc). rebel force aiming to conquer towns and mining areas – and ultimately the capital The R UF ac knowledged t hat f orced r ecruitment wa s n ot t he p referred o ption Freetown – to a forest-based guerrilla movement with very little control over any because of the risk forcible recruits present if t hey manage to escape,28 but it had territory. Th e i solated b ush c amps w ere un der c losed c anopy a nd p rovided several ways of preventing defection. A mixt ure of warning against desertion by protection to the RUF, but at the same time created a considerable dilemma with publically p unishing t hose w ho a ttempted t o do s o, a nd r ewarding t hose w ho regard t o r ecruitment. D uring t he f irst y ears, t he RUF a t le ast p artly r elied o n showed willingness to fight for the RUF’s cause with higher ranks and privileges, voluntary r ecruitment. S ometimes v olunteers s tepped f orward a fter t he R UF turned out to be quite effective in limiting desertion. Added to this was the tight explained its ideology in the villages and communities; sometimes those interested security around the camps – probably as much to prevent enemies from entering in joining the RUF actually went to RUF territory to join up.24 If it had had control as to prevent RUF conscripts from escaping – and the hostile attitudes of the army of villages and towns, it could have rounded up people and forced them to join or towards e veryone e ven va guely s uspected o f b eing co nnected t o t he r ebels o r have u sed s lightly m ore s ubtle co ercive m easures t o s afeguard n ew r ecruits. coming from its territory. Even upon reaching their home area, escapees were far However, a s a f orest-based guer rilla m ovement t hese p ossibilities n o lo nger from s afe – o r s o t he RUF co nscripts b elieved – a s t he f ollowing s tatement by existed. another former RUF fighter confirms: During these years, few volunteered and even if p otential conscripts had the intention of joining the RUF, it was not easy to find a camp and reach it unharmed; The reason for their [the RUF conscripts] loyalty was that when you are away from both the army and the rebels were highly suspicious of everyone moving around your brothers or family during the war for a lo ng time, they will consider you as in the combat zones. To increase its ranks, the RUF during this period depended their enemy, especially if the people hear that you are rebel. No sooner you come to

396 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 397 LOCAL COMMUNITIES, MILITIAS AND REBEL MOVEMENTS: THE CASE OF KRIJN PETERS THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT IN SIERRA LEONE

your home town than they will kill you. So that was why we from the RUF stayed now and then accused [by the LRA] of having joined the government [as LDU together to continue fighting till we were getting peace.29 members].’37 In short, while the Kamajor (and the LDUs) created new possibilities for civilians (that is, to stay in their villages with some level of protection or return Moreover, communities within the RUF zone were under strict orders to return to r eclaimed v illages), a t t he s ame t ime i t (unin tentionally) p rovoked f urther 30 escapees. Similarly, Ugandan camp dwellers who had welcomed ‘home’-deserted hostile reactions from the rebel movements. Overall, the war terrain became even LRA combatants were sometimes hacked to death by LRA fighters. This happened more complex and more difficult to navigate for the local population. 31 at, for instance, the Pagak camp in May 2004. During t he s econd h alf o f 1996, t he R UF a nd t he n ewly e lected S LPP Because of its change in t actics, the RUF no longer had to limit its actions to government w ere n egotiating a p eace t hat c ulminated in t he sig ning o f t he 30 the eastern part of Sierra Leone. Virtually all villages and communities were now November 1996 Peace Accord, but the Kamajor – trained and guided by within t he r each o f R UF uni ts, w hich s ometimes t ravelled f or d ays a long t he the South African firm Executive Outcomes – a ttacked a n umber of country’s numerous bush paths to suddenly appear and launch their hit-and-run RUF base camps, including the Zogoda. These successful attacks may have forced 32 actions. Local communities served as little more than a source of manpower, food a reluctant rebel organisation into signing the peace accord. Alternatively, it may and other essentials to the RUF, obtained by intimidation or violence. The military, have caused the RUF to lose what little confidence it had that a p ost-war Sierra restrained by its heavy equipment to the more inhabited areas and passable roads, Leone under a SLPP government favouring the Kamajor would ever be a safe place hardly represented a t hreat to the remote RUF camps or was in a ny position to to reintegrate. The following comment by a former RUF commander – referring protect local communities (if it was willing to do so in the first place). to the attack on Freetown in January 1999 in which more than 5 000 civilians died It became clear that if lo cal communities wanted protection against the RUF – s uggests t hat t he co mbined ac tions o f t he Kamajor and E xecutive O utcomes (and t he ‘ sobels’), t hey h ad t o o rganise i t t hemselves. H ence, t he b irth o f t he (with the endorsement of the government) in the months before the signing of the Kamajor militia. Kamajors (in Mende kamajoi or kamasoi [singular], Kamajoisia 1996 peace accord, provoked a desire for a deadly revenge: ‘In [the attack on] the [plural]), were specialist (bush animal) hunters and had superior knowledge of the Zogoda we lost so much manpower. You know, January 6 [1999] was our revenge.’38 forest and its bush paths.33 Helping the army from the early days of the conflict as scouts, t hey were subsequently organised by lo cal chiefs to protect v illages and increasingly did go on the offensive.34 A similar development took place in Uganda Phase III (1997–1999): Collaboration, from joining where (state-sponsored) homeguard groups or lo cal defence units (LDUs) were the military junta to the Lomé Peace Accord established in early 1990 in answer to the ambushes and hit-and-run actions of the LRA, a gainst t he b ackground o f a mi litary f orce w ith n o c apability (n or Although a peace accord was signed, few soldiers, CDF fighters or rebels registered willingness) t o p rotect lo cal co mmunities.35 The Kamajors became in creasingly for the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programme. There successful in t heir actions, and highly popular among the population. However, were high levels of distrust between the different factions and a number of violent their close ties with local communities – many of the earlier Kamajors did the job clashes w ere r eported d uring t he f irst p ost-Abidjan m onths. I n February 1997, on a part-time basis, being on guard for several months after which they returned Sankoh wa s a rrested in N igeria o n w eapon c harges a nd k ept in c ustody at t he to their farms for the harvesting season36 – probably triggered the RUF in a further request by the Sierra Leonean government. It increasingly became clear that the paranoia a gainst t he ci vilians, f or t hey p erceived a ll t o b e p otential Kamajor peace accord would not hold and that the war was not over yet. supporters (s ee a lso t he co mment a bove b y t he RUF c lerk o n t he ‘double r ole’ Nevertheless, t he s uccessful mi litary co up o n 25 M ay 1997 s till c ame a s a civilians played). surprise to all who did not have their ears to the ground. But those who had, had In Uganda, the atrocities of the LRA towards local communities also increased noticed t hat l arge s egments of t he army felt increasingly sidelined by t he SLPP when g overnment o fficials cr eated t he LD Us. A s o bserved b y Finn ström o n government, w hich p ut i ts co nfidence a nd s upport in t he p opular a nd w idely Acholiland: ‘Even villagers who happen to have a spear or only knife in the hut are praised Kamajor. A nd a n en d t o t he wa r w ould a lso m ean a n en d t o t he wa r

398 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 399 LOCAL COMMUNITIES, MILITIAS AND REBEL MOVEMENTS: THE CASE OF KRIJN PETERS THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT IN SIERRA LEONE economy from which many soldiers and commanders profited. However, the next junta from the capital, the major towns and the mining areas. But it failed to crush move of the renegade army was truly surprising. Within hours of the successful the RUF/AFRC completely. coup, the renegade soldiers – calling themselves the Armed Forces Revolutionary Again, t here a re s ome s triking simi larities w ith U ganda, w here t he a rmy Council, AFRC – invited their enemy, the RUF, to come out of the bush and join launched a major military campaign in 2002, the ‘Iron Fist Offensive’, to deal with the army’s forces in t he capital. For eig ht months, t he RUF/AFRC junta was in the LRA once and for all. The campaign included some 10 000 a rmy troops, the control of the capital, most of the larger towns and the diamond mining areas. use of military gunships, US logistical support and the open support by the SPLA After more than three years in the bush, the RUF was among the civilians again. (post-September 11, t he LR A wa s p ut o n t he US t errorist li st a nd p ressure o n 42 But it soon found out how unpopular it was. By sheer intimidation, however, President Omar el-Bashir’s government in Sudan was increasing). However, the the R UF wa s a ble t o r ecruit n ew f orces, a s t he f ollowing s tatement o f t he campaign failed and the LRA moved into new territories. paramount’s speaker (second in co mmand, after the paramount chief) of a l arge Similarly, the AFRC/RUF forces in Sierra Leone regrouped during the second village in central Sierra Leone makes clear: half of 1998. Starting from their bases in the east (RUF) and north (AFRC), they recaptured t own a fter t own. On 6 J anuary 1999, t he co mbined f orces a ttacked Freetown and entered t he e astern p art of t he city. After s everal d ays of intense The RUF just put an ultimatum: if the Kamajor would not surrender it would burn fighting t he R UF/AFRC f orces w ere b eaten b ack b y EC OMOG t roops, b ut a n down the whole town. So the paramount chief asked the Kamajor to surrender. The estimated 6 000 p eople (ci vilians a nd f ighters) die d. Th e r ebels a nd r enegade Kamajor leader even became the second-in-command here in M akali under RUF soldiers raped, mutilated and burned alive hundreds, if not thousands, of civilians, control.39 taking ra ndom r evenge o n t he c apital’s in habitants w ho t hey p erceived a s betraying the RUF/AFRC cause. Still, civilians employed a range of tactics to deal with these threatening situations. So again the rebels were driven back, but this time it was clear that no military According t o t he s ame v illager: ‘ To prevent h arassment o r f orced co nscription victory would be possible for either side. The international community pushed for people hid in the jungle during the daytime; only in the night-time we came back new p eace n egotiations a nd in J uly 1999, t he L omé P eace A ccord wa s sig ned to the town.’40 And another villager explained how they prevented the RUF from between t he R UF a nd t he S LPP g overnment. Th e acco rd p romised a b lanket confiscating their food: amnesty for all fighters and commanders and a government of national unity that included cabinet posts for the RUF and AFRC.43 One year before the [1999] ce asefire I s tarted to work on the community farm of which the produce goes to the RUF. Normally you can keep the produce from your Phase IV (1999–2002): Stalemate, from territorial own private farm, but if you have a lot of produce the rebels can still take some of occupation to demobilisation it. So what we did was to hide the produce in the 5 gallon containers in the ground.

41 Sometimes the rebels used sticks to search the ground. Again, disarmament and demobilisation of fighters did not really take off. At the time of the signing of the Lomé Accord, the RUF was in control of a large cigar- Nevertheless, despite the fact that the RUF and the AFRC had joined forces (to shaped a rea – w hich in cluded t he di amond minin g a reas – r unning f rom t he form the so-called People’s Army), their days were numbered right from the start. eastern district of Kailahun all the way to the western district of Port Loko. It was The in ternational co mmunity w idely co ndemned t he co up a nd a fter s everal reluctant t o h and o ver i ts t erritories o r e ven a llow f ree acces s t o g overnment ultimatums, in e arly 1998 t he N igerian-dominated EC OMOG (E conomic officials or UN military observers. For nearly two years – until DDR really started Community of West African States Monitoring and Observation Group) troops, in May 2001 – the RUF was the de facto government in these areas and again the supported by loyal government forces and t he civil defence forces, repelled t he relationship between the RUF and the civilians changed significantly. For instance,

400 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 401 LOCAL COMMUNITIES, MILITIAS AND REBEL MOVEMENTS: THE CASE OF KRIJN PETERS THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT IN SIERRA LEONE although the RUF had already created a so-called G5 branch to deal with civilian [of g ravel] f or t he R UF a nd o ne p ile f or y ourself, b ut y ou h ad t o a rrange t he and ci vilian-military a ffairs e arly o n in t he co nflict, t his b ranch n ow q uickly expenditures [fuel, equipment, food for the miners etc] yourself. If a big diamond expanded to deal with issues such as land disputes, theft, accusations of adultery was found in the RUF pile they could confiscate your pile as well because they then and local quarrels.44 expected something in t here. But if t hey did n ot find a g ood diamond they leave With the RUF claiming to be the (de facto) ‘government’ in the areas under its your pile untouched. They introduced these mining licences ... L ater in 2000 t hey control, local populations could expect at least some level of service provision by banned the card system [mining licences] and introduced two days of labour for the 49 the n ew a uthorities. I n fac t, w hen t he R UF l aunched i ts s truggle in 1991 i t RUF and three days for yourself. propagated an ideology of free education and medical health care to all.45 Some of the l arger p hase II j ungle c amps h ad p rimary s chools, a nd m edicines w ere In pre- and post-war Sierra Leone, mining was/is based on a t wo- or three-pile 50 provided to the fighters and their families free of charge.46 In phase IV t he RUF system. One pile of g ravel (t he g ravel mig ht contain t he di amonds) i s f or t he made some attempts to institutionalise these services in its occupied territory, or landowner, one is for the supporter (who pays for the fuel, equipment and food) so t he acco unts s eem t o s uggest. P erhaps t his wa s n o m ore t han a k ind o f and o ne i s f or t he l abourers. Th e r ebels u sed a simi lar sys tem, w ith t he R UF ‘government’ t aking t he p osition (a nd t he p ile) o f t he l andowner a nd a t t imes opportunistic and last minute attempt by the RUF to win the hearts and minds of replacing the pile system with a number of days of labour. Evidence suggests that the people, but equally it can be argued that only at this stage – when not all efforts the RUF system became less exploitative after phase III.51 However, it is important and resources had to be directed towards fighting – was the RUF in a p osition to to p oint o ut t hat, a t t he s ame t ime, a n in creasing n umber o f R UF a nd AFR C implement its ideology. In any case, the following comments by two civilians who commanders a rranged t heir own minin g operations, a nd s ome of t hem u sed a lived in RUF territory suggest that there was indeed some level of free education much more exploitative system of mining. and health care under the RUF ‘government’: This ‘governmentalisation’ o f t he RUF c an a lso b e o bserved w ith r egard t o agriculture. Ex-RUF fighters (both rank and file and commanders) claimed that Here in Pendembu there were free medicines, but not too much. There was also free farming was a central part of the RUF’s ideology.52 In phase II, most RUF bases had primary education.47 their own rice farms in proximity to where fighters and civilians worked (the latter most likely as forced labourers). According to an ex-RUF fighter: There were no medicines so we treated ourselves with the native ones [herbs]. But

there was a school and it was free education. The teachers were not paid. Six of my Every base got its own [rice] swamp. In a circle of about five miles around the base 48 grandchildren were in that school. There was no harassment taking place at all. no ci vilians w ere li ving. B eyond t hat ci vilians w ere li ving in v illages un der t he control o f co mbatants. Th ere w ere t he [r ice] swa mps lo cated w here b oth t he Controlling t he m ajor di amond minin g a reas, b ut w ithout t he co nstant r isk o f civilians and the combatants worked.53 being attacked or b ombarded by EC OMOG f ighter j ets, t he RUF’s approach to mining did s tart t o c hange s omewhat. P reviously, minin g o perations h ad b een During phase IV, accounts seem to suggest that the RUF enforced its ideas about likely to be less constant or frequent, but very intensive and heavily dependent on food production in most of its territory, as is suggested by the following comments forced l abour. D uring p hase IV, minin g b ecame m ore f ormalised a nd t he RUF by a civilian in the Kailahun area: experimented with various mining schemes to regulate the mining of diamonds, as is evident from the following extract from an interview with a village chief: In G [a village in eastern Sierra Leone] we laid [made] upland [rice] farms. All the landowners had fled, so it was all common land now. We were farming for ourselves It was from ’98 that the RUF was in control of Tongo and Kono, right up to the end and there was a community [RUF] farm. For the community farm, the seed rice was of the war. I came here in 2000. The arrangement in place at that time was one pile provided by the RUF. There was a [R UF] government store, and the seed rice in

402 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 403 LOCAL COMMUNITIES, MILITIAS AND REBEL MOVEMENTS: THE CASE OF KRIJN PETERS THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT IN SIERRA LEONE

there wa s g iven t o t he fa rmers f or t heir own in dividual fa rms, but t hey did n ot an estimated 10 mi llion war-induced refugees in t he world. The number of provide us with food for work when we worked on the community farm. We had to internally di splaced p eople (ID Ps) wa s e ven hig her: 26 mi llion in 2008. work one day a w eek on the community farm. The produce from our own farms Civilians c an de cide t o m ove t o s afer a reas (s uch a s urb an cen tres in n on- was f or u s t o k eep. I f y ou s ell i t a t t he G uinea b order, y ou h ave t o g ive s ome violent parts of the country, special camps, or they can stay with relatives) as a commission to the RUF.54 pre-emptive measure, but more likely they have already experienced some level of disturbance and violence. In a n umber of cases (for example in U ganda), As w ith m any o f t he l andowners in t he minin g a reas, t he (b igger) fa rm a nd people are forced by the government to move to camps. In other cases, a move plantation owners were often the first to flee (or to be killed). By confiscating this can f ollow t he des truction o f a v illage b y f ighting f orces. N either ID P n or land f or community fa rming ac tivities, t he RUF in ef fect implemented its own refugee c amps a re n ecessarily zo nes o f s afety. ID P a nd r efugee c amps (in rough-and-ready land reform agenda. This must have been an attractive element particular if r efugee c amps a re lo cated c lose t o a b order) a re f requently to a rural underclass lacking secure land entitlements. However, the RUF replaced targeted by both militias and rebel movements in search of manpower, food or the ‘village farm or field’ by a ‘community farm’ on which civilians and fighters had for ac ts of retaliation. The le vels of structural v iolence (resulting f rom war- to work. The harvest of these community farms went straight to the RUF and was induced trauma, for instance) and sexual harassment can be significant within used to feed the fighters or traded. the camps. The number o f d ays ci vilians in R UF t erritory h ad t o w ork o n t hese fa rms varied, but seemed to be lower in phase IV. The RUF also introduced ‘government I Stay i n a d anger o r c onflict z one, b ut t ry t o l imit r isks b y l imiting c ontact stores’ that acted as seed banks. Various accounts suggested that these operated on and exposure to the fighting forces. Large numbers of civilians in conflict zones a no- or low-interest basis, reflecting the RUF’s socialist ideas about agriculture. decide not to run away but to stay in their villages and communities (at least to Overall, the accounts above do not seem to indicate an extremely high degree of start off with). They try to survive the threats posed by the various fighting civilian l abour exp loitation by t he RUF during p hase IV, but it i s important t o forces b y em ploying va rious t actics. Temporarily (d ays o r s ometimes e ven acknowledge t hat o ther inf ormants in dicated hig her le vels o f exp loitation, in weeks), hiding in the bush or in farming fields when there is an attack or the particular when civilians lived closer to the frontline or within the territory of a threat of it has enabled civilians to remain in their communities for extended particularly unscrupulous commander.55 periods. C learly, information a nd e arly-warning m echanisms a re cr ucial f or this (ci vilians on t he r un f rom a n earby v illage a re a c lear sig nal). In other THE RESPONSES OF LOCAL COMMUNITIES TO cases, fighting forces have a co nstant or highly frequent presence in v illages MILITIA AND REBEL ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA and communities so that it does not become feasible to hide anymore. Key to surviving in t hese situations is to keep a lo w profile, b e obedient and mind Above, the conflict in Sierra Leone was discussed, with a special focus on its main one’s own business, and not give any reason to be singled out or draw attention. rebel movement. I showed how the RUF’s multiple changes in (military) strategies offered n ew o pportunities f or ci vilians t o r espond, w hile f rustrating o ther I Remain i n o ne’s v illage i n a d anger z one a nd a ctively s upport a m ilitia o r possibilities. It is clear that in situations of prolonged armed conflict civilians and rebel or ganisation. One de liberately b uilds u p a r elationship w ith a f ighting local co mmunities a re f orced t o r espond a nd ac t f or t heir s urvival. I n es sence, force, beyond and above a cer tain compliance that may take place under the three responses are possible: previous response. Local community members can support the fighting faction financially, with manpower – for example a family member or child is enlisted I Try t o l imit a ny c hance o f (f urther) c ontact w ith r ebel o r m ilitia g roups b y – or through providing vital information. In return, the armed group will offer physically distancing oneself from the danger or war zone. Escaping violence by some level of protection. However, by taking sides, one exposes oneself, which moving to safer areas is a response employed by millions – in 200856 there were can w ork a gainst o ne if t he f ighting f orce le aves (r etaliation b y co mmunity

404 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 405 LOCAL COMMUNITIES, MILITIAS AND REBEL MOVEMENTS: THE CASE OF KRIJN PETERS THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT IN SIERRA LEONE

members) or worse, when the enemy manages to capture the village or town of fighters and commanders were often not adequate. As a result, few civilians (but collaborators may de cide to f lee b efore t his happens, together with t he took the risk to remain in their communities when there were rumours that an repelled fighting forces). attack mig ht t ake p lace (in r eturn, t his f earsome r eputation wa s s ometimes used b y t he R UF a s a mi litary t actic). I n t he co nflict (1977–1992) in Clearly, there can be some level of overlap of these three reactions. Moreover, since Mozambique, t he M ozambican N ational R esistance M ovement, REN AMO, war terrains are in co nstant motion, it is possible (and even likely) that within a had a simi lar r eputation f or b eing ext remely b rutal, in p articular in t he conflict’s lif espan, ci vilians em ploy m ore t han o ne r esponse. A lso, t hese t hree southern a reas, in stilling f ear a mong t he p eople a nd c ausing m ass responses do not necessarily imply free choice: civilians can be forced to actively displacement.58 support faction fighters or a minor has no other choice but to flee with his parents to safer areas. And most importantly, communities are not homogenous entities, I Is t he f ighting f orce r oaming, w hich m ay m ake i t p ossible f or ci vilians t o so t here a re li kely t o b e co nsiderable dif ferences a mong t he v illagers a nd temporarily hide (and also hide their most precious possessions), or is it static community members with regard to the survival mechanism they choose and at and likely to stay for prolonged periods in one community/village? In the latter what point they do so. case, such a response is unlikely to be feasible. Communities under prolonged There a re m any fac tors inf luencing t he n ature a nd t iming o f ci vilians’ control of the RUF – such as in its stronghold in Kailahun District – had to find responses to the threat posed by fighting factions. Some of these factors are related ways of surviving this occupation, and often built up some relationship with to c haracteristics o f t he f ighting f orce, w hile o thers co ncern t he t raits o f a fighters and commanders. However, the phase characterised by the RUF hit- community. Below I list some of the most important ones. and-run attacks did not allow such a response and it was often difficult to take cover in time when there was yet another surprise attack. The conflict in Côte Variables for the fighting force d’Ivoire b etween g overnment f orces a nd t he P atriotic M ovement o f C ôte d’Ivoire (later joined by two other factions forming a politico-military alliance I Does t he f ighting f orce h ave a c lear a nd m eaningful ide ology o r p olitical called the New Forces), quickly resulted in a split of the country (including an agenda that is likely to attract the support of civilians? Clearly, this was one of internationally m onitored buffer zone) w ith t he New Forces controlling t he the weaker points of the RUF, which had little to offer beyond a superficial and northern h alf o f C ôte d ’Ivoire.59 At le ast in t his c ase co mmunities in t he populist critique of the political and economic state of the country. In contrast, different parts of the country knew with which armed group they were dealing. the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front, which successfully fought against the Derg regime and overthrew Ethiopia’s dictator Mengistu, had a political agenda I Is t he f ighting f orce p redatory o n t he co mmunity f or i ts s urvival? I f s o, that included a b an on early marriages, equal divorce rights, equal access to communities c an b e exp loited b eyond t heir p oint o f s urvival. E vidence education a nd e qual p roperty r ights. M any – in cluding w omen a nd g irls – suggests t hat in a reas un der s ustained co ntrol o f t he R UF, t he m ovement joined v oluntarily.57 More p rofound p olitical a gendas c an a lso a ttract n on- applied a mixture of means to look after its fighters and supply them with food, combatant supporters and intellectuals to enable a group to become more than without exploiting communities b eyond regeneration. With reference to t he just an armed movement. first wa r (1989–1996) in L iberia, O utram s uggests t he wa rlord m odel I Does the fighting force behave well and are there means to address misconduct (referring to ancient China) for understanding the ruthless predation of the and harassment of f ighters towards civilians, which would allow civilians to civilian population by fighters of all factions. This is partly explained by the stay in t heir communities without too much risk? The RUF quickly became fact t hat co mmanders acc umulated t he s poils o f t he co nflict b ut did n ot known as a fierce rebel movement, and mechanisms to control the behaviour provide for their fighters or pay them.60

406 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 407 LOCAL COMMUNITIES, MILITIAS AND REBEL MOVEMENTS: THE CASE OF KRIJN PETERS THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT IN SIERRA LEONE

I Is the ethnic, religious, national or political composition of the fighting force some point by an increasingly hostile army and civil defence forces to the west similar to that of the community? If not, there is a greater risk that civilians will and United Liberian Movement for Democracy forces to the east. Here, the be harassed by the fighters. The atrocious behaviour of the Liberian ‘special experience o f t housands o f y oung S outhern S udanese (nic knamed t he ‘los t forces’ within the RUF in the early days of the insurgency is explained by many boys’ of Sudan) who walked many hundreds of kilometres – f irst to Ethiopia ex-combatants a nd wa r-affected ci vilians a s a r esult o f t he fac t t hat t hese and then to Kenya – t o escape the violence during Sudan’s second civil war Liberians were fighting in another country than their country of origin. This (1983–2005) b etween t he g overnment a nd t he S udanese People’s Liberation 63 would imply, on the other hand, that Liberian fighting forces in Liberia would Army/Movement comes to mind. have a c leaner record, or that Sierra Leonean RUF fighters behaved better in their own country, and both assumptions have proven to be wrong. However, I What is the strategic importance of a community or village? Communities near the multiple insurgencies by Rwandan forces into the Democratic Republic of bridges, a t cr ossroads, c lose t o minin g a reas et c, m ay a ll b ecome hig hly Congo and their atrocious behaviour to local civilians61 makes one wonder if contested in t he conflict and are likely to experience more fighting. In Sierra there is after all some truth in this argument. Leone, co mmunities w ithin t he di amond minin g di stricts exp erienced hig h levels of violence due to the frequent attacks by the different fighting forces for control o f t he a rea, w ith a r esultant m assive di splacement. B ecause o f t he Variables for the community resumption of fighting between the Angolan government and UNITA in 1992, nearly 400 000 p eople died, 1,5 mi llion were displaced and 330 000 b ecame I Is the location of the community within or close to a war zone, which increases refugees:64 the c loser t he g overnment forces came t o UNITA-controlled the r isk o f en countering v iolence? C ommunities in S ierra L eone t hat w ere diamond areas, the fiercer the fighting became. close to or within contested areas hosted relatively large groups of fighters that were o ften in ‘ fighting m ode’. C ommunity m embers s ometimes c hose, if I What i s t he n ature o f co unterinsurgency? I f i t i s in discriminate a nd allowed, t o m ove de eper in to RUF t erritory w here f ighters w ere un der les s unscrupulous, t reating a ll ci vilians co ming f rom r ebel-held t erritory a s pressure. Villages that changed hands on multiple occasions were particularly potential r ebel co llaborators, ci vilians c an b ecome lo cked in p lace. Thi s vulnerable to suspicion and retaliation, and were more likely to be abandoned. happened in the early stages of the conflict in Sierra Leone but also during the Outram – r eferring t o a 1994 r eport b y t he C atholic C hurch o f M aryland January 1999 a ttack o n F reetown. Th en, ci vilians f rom t he e astern a nd County – notes that: ‘A report of an NPFL attack on Pleebo, Maryland County, AFRC/RUF-controlled part of the capital took a significant risk when crossing in October 1994, h eld by the LPC [L iberia Peace Council, one of the armed to t he w estern a nd EC OMOG-controlled p art, n ot only b ecause t hey could factions], s tates t hat a fter t aking t he t own t he NP FL m urdered ci vilians, have been killed by the AFRC/RUF, but also because ECOMOG soldiers were targeting church and medical personnel and any persons suspected of aiding executing s uspected r ebels a nd t heir co llaborators o n t he s pot.65 A (s tate- or supporting the LPC, often merely on the grounds that they had remained in sponsored) co unterinsurgency t hat h as a lienated, u prooted a nd k illed va st 62 the town while it was under LPC control.’ numbers of t he p opulation i s t hat of t he Janjaweed in t he D arfur region in Sudan,66 although in t his c ase t he o bjectives o f t he K hartoum g overnment I Does t he p hysical lo cation o f t he co mmunity r estrict t he p ossibilities o f should be questioned in the first place. villagers to go to safer places, for instance because of its remote location (no easy access to main roads), the inhospitable terrain or because the nearest safe I Is the community capable of, willing to and supported in ac tively defending area (s uch a s a n eighbouring co untry) r equires a j ourney t hrough a n a rea itself? The r ise of t he Kamajor/Civil D efence Force in t he conflict is a c lear controlled b y m ultiple a nd h ostile a rmed fac tions? Ci vilians in t he R UF- example. Th e exa mple o f t he Ugandan LD U h as a lso b een di scussed. B oth controlled eastern part of Sierra Leone did find themselves locked in place at initiatives, although starting as grassroots initiatives, received state support.

408 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 409 LOCAL COMMUNITIES, MILITIAS AND REBEL MOVEMENTS: THE CASE OF KRIJN PETERS THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT IN SIERRA LEONE

These are just a selection of the variables67 that influence the behaviour of factions insight in to how ‘local or community security may be dependent upon traditional and the responses of civilians/communities. Most, if not all, of these variables can authority and allegiances (provided by local militias established by the community change over the course of a conflict: a faction can become more exploitative and to provide security), dependent upon local warlords or politicians with their own hostile to civilians (perhaps in reaction to a lack of military success) over time, or armed forces’.68 a particular community may experience less harassment by a fac tion (because a But it can also show how local communities can actively increase their level of particular unscrupulous commander is stationed somewhere else and replaced by human security (in t he broader sense, of for example, gaining access to food or a m ore g enuine co mmander). Thi s w ill t hen inf luence t he r esponses o f health care) by building up relationships with rebel movements or commanders. communities. Ethnicity may, in the initial stage of a conflict, be of no importance, In p hase II, w hen i t wa s c ut o ff f rom t he w ider s ociety, t he R UF f orged i ts 69 but can later be used as a tool by warlords to engender support, forcing civilians millenarian s odalities. Attacking t he R UF’s j ungle b ases did n ot b reak t he with another ethnic background than that of the fighting force to fear for their fighters’ spirits but – as is the case with so many sectarian movements, including lives and thus flee. the LR A – o nly t riggered a m ore de adly and fatalistic attitude. If t here are any In short, there are few, if any, general patterns that can be distinguished in the possibilities for de-isolating s ectarian-styled rebel movements – f or instance by responses by communities to the threat posed by armed militias and rebel groups. building on t he t rading ac tivities t hat w ere a lready g oing on b etween t he RUF Rather, the response is based on a complex equation with multiple variables – and camps and petty traders in the area – this is worth exploring. In his 1996 book on the conflict in Sierra Leone, Richards describes the following possible scenario in I have not even brought ‘opportunity’ (in other words luck) or ‘psychological traits’ cases w here lo w-level co nflict p ersists in definitely (g iven t he s heer n umber o f (such a s r esilience) o f co mmunity m embers in to t he e quation. M oreover, t he disgruntled young people who can be easily be mobilised, if not by the RUF then responses are not even fixed over time. While it is important to guard against an by some other opportunistic peace spoiler): over-rationalisation – a mid an attack few would remain fully capable of making completely calculated decisions – by war-affected civilians, it would be wrong not … one in which civilians give up their understandable nostalgia for ‘peace’, come to to acknowledge t he t actics and strategies t hese civilians employ to survive in a accept war as a n ormal condition of life, and think creatively about how to build, situation created by protracted armed conflict. through civil defence, spiritual sanction, and other inventive uses of a war-oriented, ancestral, informal institutional culture, islands of more regular rural pursuits in the CONCLUSION midst of a sea of conflict.70

In this chapter, I have described some of the responses of local communities to the Starting from the observation that: ‘Belligerent groups are likely to tolerate civil re- demands of, and situations created by, a rebel environment. I have also shown that colonisation of at least parts of the war-shattered zone, to ensure better supply of these en vironments a re co nstantly c hanging, r equiring a n a gentive a nd ac tive basic commodities,’ Richards gives the example of market women in government ‘navigation’ b y ci vilians in t he wa r zo ne in o rder t o s urvive t he un stable a nd territory who have found ways to navigate the numerous checkpoints and trade dangerous times. Within the narrow concept of military or national security, there palm oil from rebel-controlled plantations for items of interest to the combatants.71 is li ttle s cope f or t aking t he ac tive s trategies o f ci vilians w ithin wa r zo nes in to This example of the ‘attack trade’ – first described with reference to the Biafra war, account. ‘may be one of the important processes through which the civil agrarian zones in However, the concept of human security – in i ts restricted sense as freedom war-torn Sierra Leone get back on their feet, and extend “peace f rom within”’.72 from violence but even more so in its broader view, which includes protection of Initiatives based on this idea of ‘peace from within’ also materialised in phase IV, basic h uman r ights, f ood s ecurity a nd ade quate s helter – dem ands a b etter giving rise to the RUF’s process of ‘governmentalisation’. This was made possible understanding o f t he f ull ra nge o f in teractions r ebel m ovements h ave w ith because t he R UF’s s urvival wa s les s c hallenged a nd sim ultaneously cr eated civilians in wa r-affected co untries. Using a h uman s ecurity approach g ives one opportunities for civilian peace-building initiatives.

410 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 411 LOCAL COMMUNITIES, MILITIAS AND REBEL MOVEMENTS: THE CASE OF KRIJN PETERS THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT IN SIERRA LEONE

The overall observation must be that rebel movements are (of course) not static emerging c ategories i n p ost-colonial A frica, O xford: J ames C urrey, 2005, 53–80; M U tas, entities and that their composition, agenda, targets and strategy can and are likely Building a f uture? Th e r eintegration a nd r emarginalisation o f y outh in L iberia, in P aul Richards (ed), No peace, no war: an of contemporary armed conflicts, Athens, to change over time. This affects the relationship they have with local populations, Ohio: O hio U niversity P ress/Oxford: J ames C urrey, 2005; M U tas, A bject h eroes: but these changes are also the result of the responses of civilians to the actions and marginalised youth, modernity and violent pathways of the Liberian civil war, in Jason Hart threats posed by the rebel organisations. Interventions, whether they are aimed at (ed), Years of conflict: adolescence, political violence and displacement, Oxford and New York: brokering a ce asefire o r a p eace acco rd, h elping ci vilians in t he wa r zo ne o r Berghahn Books, 2008. 6 Vigh, Navigating t errains o f w ar; H enrik V igh, S ocial de ath a nd v iolent lif e c hances, in planning the best counterinsurgency strategy, should take these relationships and Catrine C hristianse, M ats U tas a nd H enrik V igh (e ds), Navigating y outh – gen erating how they impact on each other into account. adulthood: social becoming in an African context, Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2006. 7 Vigh, Navigating terrains of war, 13. 8 I Abdullah, Bush path to destruction: the origin and character of the Revolutionary United NOTES Front (RUF/SL), Africa Development 22(3/4) (1997), 45–76. 9 Ibid. 1 See for instance Thandika Mkandawire, The terrible toll of post-colonial ‘rebel movements’ 10 L Gberie, A dirty war in West Africa: the RUF and the destruction of Sierra Leone, London: in Africa: towards an explanation of the violence against the peasantry, Journal of Modern Hurst, 2005. African Studies 40(2) (2002), 181–215. 11 P R ichards, Fighting f or t he r ainforest: w ar, y outh a nd r esources i n S ierra L eone, Oxford: 2 The material presented was collected during fieldwork undertaken in three periods, namely James Currey, 1996 (reprinted with additional material in 1998). November/December 2001, N ovember 2002 t o O ctober 2003 a nd N ovember/December 12 S E llis, The m ask o f a narchy, t he d estruction o f L iberia a nd t he r eligious d imension o f a n 2006. (See Krijn Peters, Expert report on the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, African civil war, London: Hurst, 1999. unpublished report, 2007.) The first two periods of fieldwork collection formed part of my 13 D Keen, Conflict and collusion in Sierra Leone, Oxford: James Currey, 2005, 2. PhD r esearch. Th e l ast f ieldwork p eriod, N ovember/December 2006, wa s p art o f t he 14 Krijn Peters, Footpaths to reintegration: armed conflict, youth and the rural crisis in Sierra preparation of an expert witness report on the RUF, requested by the Sesay defence team of Leone, Unpublished PhD thesis, Wageningen University, 2006, 63. the S pecial C ourt f or S ierra L eone. I a pplied t he n ormal r igid s cientific s tandards o f 15 Peters, War and the crisis of youth in Sierra Leone. objectivity, independency and triangulation to the data collection processes for this report. 16 Tim A llen, Trial justice: the International Criminal C ourt and the L ord’s Resistance Army, No m aterial p rovided b y t he S esay def ence t eam h as b een u sed, a nd co nducted a ll t he London/New York: Zed Books, 2006, 28. interviews, without help or support from the defence team. The defence team has not called 17 Peters, Footpaths to reintegration. upon me as a w itness. Part of this interview material is used for Krijn Peters, War and the 18 W Reno, Political networks in a failing state: the roots and future of violent conflict in Sierra crisis of youth in Sierra Leone, New York: Cambridge University Press/International African Leone, Internationale Politik und Gesellshaft 2 (2003), 52. Library Series (forthcoming in 2011). 19 P R ichards, K B ah a nd J V incent, Social c apital a nd s urvival: p rospects f or c ommunity- 3 Norman Long defines the concept of ‘agency’ as follows: ‘The notion of agency attributes to driven d evelopment i n p ost-conflict S ierra L eone, S ocial D evelopment P apers: C ommunity the individual actor the capacity to process social experiences and to devise ways of coping Driven Development/Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction 12, Washington, DC: The World with life, even under the most extreme forms of coercion. Within the limits of information, Bank, 2004. uncertainty a nd t he o ther co nstraints (f or exa mple p hysical, n ormative o r p olitico- 20 Peters, Footpaths to reintegration, 78. economic) that exist, social actors are “knowledgeable” and “capable”. They attempt to solve 21 The LRA, having its main bases in neighbouring Sudan, also depends on local informants for problems, le arn how to intervene in t he f low of s ocial e vents around t hem, and monitor its intelligence. Apart from obtaining some degree of protection, these informants and their continuously their own actions, observing how others react to their behaviour and taking families can, to some extent, manipulate LRA missions for their own ends. note or t he va rious contingent circumstances.’ N L ong, From p aradigm los t t o p aradigm 22 Peters, Armed conflict, youth and the rural crisis in Sierra Leone. regained? The case of the actor-oriented sociology of development, in N L ong and A Long 23 Richards, Fighting for the rainforest, 12. (eds), Battlefields of knowledge, the interlocking of theory and practice in social research and 24 Krijn Peters, Re-examining voluntarism: youth combatants in Sierra Leone, ISS M onograph development, London: Routledge, 1992, 22–23. 100, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2004. 4Henrik V igh, Navigating t errains o f w ar: y outh a nd s oldiering i n G uinea-Bissau, N ew 25 Peters, Armed conflict, youth and the rural crisis in Sierra Leone. York/Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2006. 26 C Blattman and J Annan, On the nature and causes of LRA abduction: what the abductees 5 M Utas, Agency of victims: young women’s survival strategies in t he Liberian civil war, in say, in T A llen a nd K V lassenroot (e ds), The L ord’s R esistance A rmy: w ar, p eace a nd Filip D e B oeck a nd A lcinda Honwana (e ds), Makers a nd b reakers: c hildren a nd y outh as reconciliation, Oxford: James Currey (forthcoming, 2010).

412 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 413 LOCAL COMMUNITIES, MILITIAS AND REBEL MOVEMENTS: THE CASE OF KRIJN PETERS THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT IN SIERRA LEONE

27 About 70 p er cent of t he Acholi p opulation i s es timated t o li ve in t hese IDP c amps. S ee 54 Peters, Expert report on the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, 63. Annette Weber, Jemera Rone, Jo Becker and Tony Tate, Abducted and abused, Human Rights 55 Peters, War and the crisis of youth. Watch, 14 J uly 2003, http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2003/07/14/abducted-and-abused 56 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), Internal displacement: global overview (accessed 29 June 2009). of t rends a nd d evelopments i n 2008, April 2009, 8, h ttp://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/ 28 RUF/SL, Footpaths to democracy: towards a New Sierra Leone, 1995, http://web.archive.org/ 49fe9a952.html (accessed 1 August 2010). web/20070614020255/http://www.sierra-leone.org/footpaths.html (acces sed 10 M ay 2010), 57 A Veale, From c hild s oldier t o ex-f ighter: f emale f ighters, d emobilisation a nd r eintegration 4. in Ethiopia, Monograph 85, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2003. 29 Peters, Footpaths to reintegration, 63. 58 M H all, Th e M ozambican N ational R esistance M ovement (REN AMO): a s tudy in t he 30 Krijn Peters and P Richards, Why we fight: voices of under-age youth combatants in Sierra destruction of an African country, Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 60(1) Leone, Africa 68(2) (1998), 183–210. (1990). 31 Allen, Trial j ustice, 77. 59 J-P C hauveau a nd P R ichards, West A frican in surgencies in a grarian p erspective: C ôte 32 For example, on 24 January 1995 the town of Kambia in the far west of the country close to d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone compared, Journal of Agrarian Change 8(4) (2008), 515–552. the Guinean border was attacked by the RUF. 60 Q Outram, ‘It’s terminal either way’: an analysis of armed conflict in L iberia, 1989–1996, 33 P Muana, The Kamajoi militia: civil war, internal displacement and the politics of counter- Review of African Political Economy 73 (1997), 355–371. insurgency, Africa Development 22(3/4) (1997), 77–100. 61 G P runier, From gen ocide t o c ontinental w ar: t he ‘ Congolese’ c onflict a nd t he cr isis o f 34 Other hunter guilds involved in t he war included the Tamaboros (Koranko ethnic group) contemporary Africa, London: Hurst, 2009. and the Kapras (Temne ethnic group). 62 Outram, It’s terminal either way, 361. 35 Allen, Trial j ustice, 47. 63 Joan Hecht, The journey of the lost boys, Jacksonville: Allswell Press, 2005. 36 Peters and Richards, Why we fight. 64 P le B illion, Resource wealth and Angola’s uncivil wars, in C J A rnson and I W Z artman, 37 S Finn ström, ‘ For G od a nd m y lif e’: wa r a nd cosm ology in n orthern U ganda, in P aul Rethinking the economics of war: the intersection of need, creed, and greed, Washington, DC: Richards (ed), No peace no war: an anthropology of contemporary armed conflicts, Oxford: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2005. James Currey, 2005, 109. 65 Human Rights Watch, Sierra Leone: Getting away with murder, mutilation, rape, New York: 38 Peters, Footpaths to reintegration, 78. Human Rights Watch, 1999. 39 Ibid, 54. 66 A de Waal, Counter-insurgency on the cheap, Review of African Political Economy 31(102) 40 Interview conducted as part of the preparation of Peters, Expert report on the Revolutionary (2004). United Front of Sierra Leone. 67 Other va riables f or t he co mmunity a re: (1) Th e k ind o f li velihoods t he co mmunity o r 41 Ibid, 59. community m embers dep end o n – a c arpenter c an le ave w ith hi s t oolbox, b ut a fa rmer 42 Allen, Trial j ustice, 50–51. cannot take his land with him; (2) some livelihood activities are seasonal (during the harvest 43 Paying the price: the Sierra Leone peace process, Accord (9), 2000. 44 The author studied over a h undred RUF intelligence (G5, in ternal defence unit, intelligent period a farmer will be more reluctant to abandon his fields); (3) If the micro-political pre- officer branch, etc) documents dealing with these issues, gathered by the Issa Sesay defence war relations within the community give reason for some to fear that these can be exploited team of which many were produced by RUF G5 branches. Originality of the documents has by fellow civilians/fighting factions; and (4) The ethnical, political or religious composition been confirmed by another external expert. of t he co mmunity a nd if t hese c haracteristics a re a mong t he r oot c auses o f t he wa r a nd 45 RUF/SL, Footpaths to democracy. therefore something which can agitate factions. 46 Peters, Footpaths to reintegration. 68 Jakkie Ci lliers, Human s ecurity in Africa: a c onceptual f ramework for review, Monograph, 47 Peters, Expert report on the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, 58. African H uman S ecurity I nitiative, 2004, 9, h ttp://www.iss.co.za/uploads/AHSIMONO1. 48 Ibid, 64. PDF (accessed 3 August 2010). 49 Peters, War and the crisis of youth. 69 P R ichards, N ew p olitical v iolence in A frica: s ecular s ectarianism in S ierra L eone, 50 C Fithen, Diamonds and war in Sierra Leone: cultural strategies for commercial adaptation GeoJournal 47 (1999), 433–442. to en demic lo w-intensity co nflict, U npublished P hD t hesis, L ondon: U niversity C ollege 70 Richards, Fighting for the rainforest, 155. London, 1999. 71 Ibid. 51 Peters, E xpert r eport o n t he R evolutionary United F ront o f S ierra L eone; P eters, Armed 72 Ibid, 156. conflict, youth and the rural crisis in Sierra Leone. 52 Peters, Footpaths to reintegration. 53 Ibid, 81.

414 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 415 CHAPTER 15 State, regional and international responses to militia and rebel activities in Africa

MACHARIA MUNENE

INTRODUCTION

States a re exp ected t o m aintain g eneral h armony a nd s atisfaction a mong t he people, or generic peace, as well as to keep the peace, meaning law and order. Most states, h owever, t end t o co ncentrate o n k eeping t he p eace a t t he exp ense o f maintaining g eneric p eace a nd t he r esult i s o ften co nfrontations.1 This i s particularly the case with fragile states, which, argues Eka Ikpe, lack the ‘capacity and resilience’ to protect themselves from various challenges. This means that they cannot protect citizens, absorb shocks and manage conflict without resorting to violence.2 Fragility creates an environment for violence because of the perceived inability of s ecurity f orces in a s tate t o co mmand t rust. S uch s tates b ecome b reeding grounds for illicit activities that compound their problems.3 If properly handled, the agitations can lead to reforms or semblances of reform as a way of keeping the peace, for it is the unheeded calls for reforms that lead to rebellions. When the point of rebellion has been reached, it means that the ruling elite would have lost legitimacy in t he e yes o f t he r uled, w ho h ave t ransferred t heir lo yalty t o n ew groups or leaders.4 In the process, different types of militia and rebels emerge.

MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 417 STATE, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO MILITIA AND REBEL ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA MACHARIA MUNENE

Militias and rebel groups tend to destabilise individual states and their regions and In Uganda the government encouraged and trained the Arrow Boys and Amuka some h ave ext ra-continental ra mifications a nd r equire dif ferent t ypes o f Boys supposedly t o p rotect t he ci tizens, w hile i ts s oldiers w ere f ighting J oseph responses. Both these groups challenge constituted authority, whether at the state, Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in the north. This was in the hope that the regional or international levels. Militias are organised and often armed groups that government would be able to disarm the militia once the LRA had been defeated.9 operate within a s tate and sometimes appear to be condoned. They generally do In Rwanda t he s tate h elped t o cr eate t he Interahamwe as a wa y o f m eeting a n not challenge the legitimacy of the government. Rebel movements, however, do assumed t hreat in t he c hallenge p osed b y t he Tutsi, b ut t hen i t s eemingly los t 10 not consider t he g overnment t o b e leg itimate a nd m ay a im at overthrowing it. control of the group. The danger is that such counterforces could embarrass those Since rebels can transform a lo cal conflict into a m uch wider issue that calls for who start or condone them when they become uncontrollable and take the law 11 solutions beyond the capacity of any single state, it calls for concerted effort within into their own hands. the region to resolve the conflict, on a regional or even continental basis. Another t ype o f r esponse i s t o en gage in co nstitutional r estructuring, a Responses t o mi litia a nd r ebel m ovements, w hether a t s tate, r egional a nd socioeconomic and political redistribution mechanism to deal with two internal international le vels, va ry acco rding t o t he c hallenges t hey p resent. R esponses challenges. The first is the political differences among politicians and the second include a ttempts a t s uppression o r p olitical acco mmodation t hrough is the friction between the idea of state and the idea of nation. Accommodating constitutional restructuring in t he form of power-sharing. If unresolved, it could political differences takes into account political interests of key players who have the proven ability to exercise influence on militias to disrupt or continue to disrupt lead to state fragmentation and separation. Regional as well as continental players, the peace if t hey are not addressed. Of va rious options, all of them focusing on worried about their complex interests, contribute to each of the responses. political co ntrol, p ower s haring h as in creasingly b ecome t he accep ted m ode o f constitutional r estructuring.12 This i s do ne b y cr eating s pecial p ositions t o STATE RESPONSES accommodate v ocal le aders w ho inf luence mi litias, a s h appened in K enya a nd Zimbabwe in 2008.13 State responses generally include suppression, creating counterinsurgency forces, The s econd type of constitutional restructuring takes into consideration t he constitutional r estructuring a nd in viting f oreign in tervention. I n t he c ase o f existing f riction b etween t he ide a o f a n ation a nd t he ide a o f a s tate14 by suppression, the state tries to destroy militias and rebel movements by mobilising recommending dif ferent ways o f s plitting t he s tate. On e way i s t o cr eate mini- all types of security apparatus in a show of force. The use of force is justified as the states, o r p rovinces a nd di stricts, w ithin t he s tate, w hich t hen r eceive lo cal proper response of the state to internal enemies. Suppression becomes a law and autonomy, w hile r emaining s ubordinate t o t he n ational g overnment. Th ey a lso order operation and a les son to other would-be troublemakers that the state has tend to compete with each other for national attention. Another way is to permit the capacity to act. In Kenya, for instance, Mwai Kibaki’s administration repeatedly territories to secede from the state and become independent countries. Both types tried t o cr ush t he Mungiki by a rresting m embers a nd le aders in p aramilitary are f ound in co nflicts in E thiopian co nstitutional reconstruction.15 While s tates 5 operations. Mungiki operations, however, appeared to decline only after its leader, were free to secede in t he reconstructed Ethiopian federal system after meeting Maina N jenga, wa s r eleased f rom p rison. N jenga t hen lin ked u p w ith f ormer laid-down stipulations, they still tend to compete for benefits from the national President Daniel arap Moi in a crusade for peace in which he advised his estimated government. 6 five million followers to change their ways. A dif ferent t ype o f r esponse i s t o in vite ext ernal in tervention, w hich i s a n At times, states engage in de ceptions and portray questionable behaviour as admission of defeat. Often it is the leaders of the ‘rebellions’ who call for external inevitable and in the best interests of the country.7 To deal with perceived threats, intervention. In Liberia, for instance, critics of Samuel Doe, such as Taylor, stirred they encourage pro-government militias or even create counterforces to militias in up foreign interest groups.16 However, when governments are desperate they, too, the f orm o f s pecial uni ts. I n S udan, t he g overnment ini tially en couraged A rab call for intervention. The transitional government in Somalia, unable to contain Al militias to counter the advances of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA).8 Shabaab, r epeatedly c alled o n E thiopia o r K enya t o in tervene o n i ts b ehalf.17

418 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 419 STATE, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO MILITIA AND REBEL ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA MACHARIA MUNENE

Although Kenya did n ot intervene, Ethiopia and Uganda did in t he name of the radio’.22 Despite these undertakings, disputes in one country spread to neighbours African Union. and led to the development of some four geographical clusters of conflict, namely the Mano River cluster, the cluster, the Great Lakes cluster, and CLUSTERS OF CONFLICT AND REGIONAL RESPONSES the Horn of Africa cluster. In each cluster, militia and rebel activities that started in o ne co untry t ended t o s pread t o n earby s tates a nd t o b ecome r egional The c alls f or in tervention f ocus a ttention o n t he r ole o f n eighbours in a g iven problems.23 region, particularly on the African continent. Political disputes among leaders that degenerate into disruption of the peace have garnered an assortment of regional The Mano River cluster responses. The presence of rival militias and rebel movements in a state or in the region m akes in tervention p roblematic, y et A frica, a s a co ntinent, h as h ad t o The conflicts in West Africa revolved mainly around the Mano River and attracted respond. their fair share of regional intervention. Although the Mano River cluster affected Since independence in t he 1960s, mi litias and rebel movements have been a mostly Sierra Leone and Liberia, it disrupted Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire, too. Sierra source of concern to the African continent and the creation of the Organisation of Leone and Liberia are products of post-American revolution debates on the future African Unity (OAU) was itself a response to this concern. The OAU had to deal of free blacks in North America. To start with, the English created Sierra Leone as with rebel movements that challenged, in the first place, the states as territorially a place to take blacks from Nova Scotia or slaves caught on the high seas rather constituted and, in t he s econd, t he leg itimacy of governmental authorities. The than t ake t hem t o C anada o r B ritain. Th e ‘ returnees’ b ecame t he Krios, w ho response of t he OAU was to discourage b oth t ypes of challenges. It upheld t he dominated t he in digenous p opulations.24 Liberia wa s a p roduct o f f ear o f t he sanctity o f co lonial b oundaries a nd t hereby di scouraged s ecessionist r ebel presence of free blacks among slaves in t he United States. Given that free blacks movements. It also prohibited interference in t he internal affairs of a si ster state, were suspected of inspiring slave revolt, the US did i ts best to find an alternative which implied no support to those who challenged governmental legitimacy.18 place for such people, and Liberia was forcibly acquired for that purpose.25 The This p osition, h owever, did n ot s top m ember s tates f rom interfering in t he blacks, who went to be free in West Africa, whether in S ierra Leone or Liberia, internal a ffairs o f o thers o r en couraging di ssidence, a nd a s a r esult t here w ere became m embers o f t he p rivileged c lass t hat t ended t o do minate t he ‘ natives,’ numerous quasi-wars between states. Somalia had irredentist ambitions in Kenya, which in turn created simmering resentments. When Doe, a Krahn rather than an Ethiopia and Djibouti and supported rebels in t hose areas. Like Somalia, Sudan 19 Americo-Liberian, t ook p ower in 1980, h e ga ined p opularity f or ex ecuting 13 supported Er itrean s ecessionists a gainst E thiopia. Sudan a nd L ibya s upported rebellions in C had with Libya’s troops o ccupying the Aouzou Strip in n orthern Americo-Liberian t op o fficials f rom t he p revious g overnment a t w hat b ecame 26 Chad.20 Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi did not consider artificial colonial boundaries known as the ‘Liberian Beach Party’. an obstacle to his grand idea of unifying ‘brothers and sisters’ in Tunisia, Chad, Conflicts in L iberia a nd S ierra L eone er upted in t he 1990s, s tarting w ith Mali and Niger with Libya.21 Liberia w hen Taylor l aunched hi s a ttack in D ecember 1989, a fter m ysteriously The OAU therefore eventually had to deal with the growth of militias and rebel escaping from a Massachusetts jail, before spreading to neighbouring Sierra Leone. movements that tended to destabilise regions and generate refugees. Security was Taylor h ad b road-based s upport in L iberia (in cluding c urrent P resident E llen 27 a m ajor co ncern a nd s o m embers a t t he 1969 O AU C onvention o n R efugees Johnson-Sirleaf, w ho do nated US$10 000) and wa s a lso s upported b y 28 requested that those offering asylum to refugees ensure that the latter ‘abstain from ‘international’ o perators. After Taylor’s co alition o f r ebels ra pidly a nnihilated any subversive activities against any member state of the OAU’. In return, signatory Doe’s f orces b y J uly 1990, i t s tarted f ragmenting in to f euding p ower-seeking states undertook ‘to prohibit refugees residing in their respective territories from groups that seemingly threatened the rest of West Africa. attacking any s tate m ember of t he OAU, by any ac tivity li kely t o c ause t ension The regional response in West Africa was both diplomatic and military and between member states, and in particular by use of arms, through the press, or by had mixed results. The Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS)

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tried t o in tervene di plomatically b ut fa iled. EC OWAS, le d b y N igeria, t hen de Angola (MPLA). South Africa had also responded to the presence of the MPLA transformed itself into a military organ called ECOMOG to intervene and restore in Angola with an invasion, condoned by the US, a nd thereby made Angola an peace in L iberia.29 Not all member countries were willing to send troops and so ideological and physical battleground in the Cold War.36 ECOMOG seemed to become part of the problem as other countries questioned South Africa and Rhodesia adopted a strategy of destabilisation of anti-racist Nigeria’s role and activities.30 ECOMOG eventually helped to settle the Liberian forces in t he neighbouring states. Given that FRELIMO worked closely with the civil wa r b y p romising T aylor imm unity f rom in ternational p rosecution a nd Zimbabwe A frican N ational U nion (Z ANU), R hodesia s upported a r ebel asylum in Nigeria. Nigeria’s foreign affairs minister, Oleyumi Adeniji, asserted that movement c alled t he N ational R esistance M ovement (MNR o r REN AMO) t o the a sylum wa s g iven ‘on h umanitarian g rounds in o rder t o s ave t he L iberian destabilise M ozambique. W hen Z ANU w on a nd R hodesia b ecame Z imbabwe, people from fighting, in order to save the peace process’ and vowed that Nigeria South A frica in herited t he s ponsorship o f REN AMO a nd h elped t o m ake i t would ‘not be harassed by anybody’ to hand over Taylor because ‘that is not what politically acceptable.37 South Africa also mounted raids on frontline states in i ts 31 a sovereign country would do’. Pointing out that if Nigeria reneged on the asylum, total n ational s trategy o f des tabilisation.38 To t his en d, S outh A frica f orced ‘nobody w ill r espect u s’, N igerian P resident O lusegun O basanjo in sisted t hat Mozambique to sign the Nkomati Accord, denying bases to the African National 32 ‘nothing should be done to erode the credibility of Nigeria’. Congress (ANC).39 Destabilisation of frontline states, however, could not stop the The impression created was that since the level of conflict in t he Mano River metamorphosis of R hodesia into Z imbabwe in 1980 o r S outh West A frica into cluster declined, providing a safe haven to warlords might be a way for regions to Namibia in 1990. A nd a lthough S outh A frica t ried t o un dermine t he a nti- end p rolonged co nflicts in t heir c lusters. Thi s t ype o f r esponse, h owever, wa s apartheid image by sponsoring a ‘third force’ in support of black-on-black violence eroded in 2006, w hen P resident O basanjo, un der p ressure f rom US P resident within South Africa, it was forced to abandon apartheid because it could no longer George W B ush, reneged on Taylor’s asylum. By handing over Taylor, Obasanjo guarantee white rule in the midst of increasing pressure for change.40 eroded the credibility of Nigeria, which then undermined Nigeria’s standing as a The response from the African side o f the racial equation was twofold. One, possible mediator in other conflicts.33 victims of colonialism and apartheid mounted guerrilla warfare against the regime and appealed for international help, starting with neighbouring African countries. The Southern Africa cluster Two, just as S outh Africa appeared to have the tacit support of the West, black South A fricans f ighting a partheid h ad b oth o pen a nd t acit s upport o f A frican The response to rebel movements in the Southern Africa cluster had two racially countries. Th ese co untries, h owever, w ere in dividually vu lnerable a nd t ogether opposed aspects. The first responses came from ‘white’ political entities trying to survive in t he mid st o f g rowing a nti-colonialism in A frica. Th e s econd wa s formed the frontline states to coordinate their responses to the threats posed by engendered by the attitudes and activities of ‘liberated’ African states in support of South A frica. Th e t hreats w ere b oth mi litary a nd e conomic, le ading, a mong ‘freedom fighters’ in the remaining colonial states, namely Rhodesia, South Africa, others, t o t he f ormation o f t he S outhern A frican D evelopment C ommunity South West Africa, Mozambique and Angola. The OAU expected every member (SADC). The purpose was to lessen the economic dependence of the ‘frontline’ to contribute financially according to ability, to assist such freedom fighters.34 states on South Africa, but SADC also aimed at coordinating its support for anti- On their part, the racist regimes tried to put up a united front against what they apartheid forces operating in t heir own countries. This objective changed when believed was an affront to the Western way of life. This was particularly the case in apartheid was defeated. the 1960s, w hen, o ther t han S outh A frica, o nly t he P ortuguese co lonies a nd Rhodesia r emained a s b astions o f w hite s upremacy, def ending w hat R hodesia’s The Great Lakes cluster prime mini ster, I an S mith, c alled ‘ Western, C hristian ci vilisation’.35 When t he Portuguese quit in the 1970s, Mozambique fell under the Frente de Libertação de Zimbabwe p resident, R obert M ugabe, a long w ith UN S ecretary-General K ofi Mocambique (FRELIMO) and Angola under the Movimento Popular da Libertação Annan a nd A U C ommission C hairman A lpha O umar K onare, a s w ell a s t he

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presidents of South Africa, Gabon, Mozambique, Nigeria, Namibia and Malawi, Habyarimana, there was a mass slaughter of the Tutsis. A government-sponsored were witnesses to the 2004 declaration by the International Conference on Peace, militia, the Interahamwe, went on a rampage in 1994 and killed more than 800 000 Security, Democracy and Development in the Great Lakes region (ICGLR), which people.45 The mass killings stopped when the RPF, operating from Uganda, took was sig ned in D ar-es-Salaam b y p residents o f 11 A frican co untries (A ngola, over co ntrol o f t he co untry a nd f ormer g overnment o fficials a s w ell a s t he Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda, Interahamwe militias es caped t o e astern Z aire, w here t hey b ecame a s ource o f Republic o f C ongo a nd S udan). Th e de claration s tressed t hat m ember s tates concern for the cluster. should n ot b e a llowed t o u se t heir t erritories a s b ases f or a ggression a nd By t he l ate 1980s, M obutu h ad b ecome a r egional embarrassment for other subversion a gainst e ach o ther. Th ey a greed t o ‘ neutralise, di sarm, a rrest a nd leaders in the Great Lakes cluster. Their response to the crisis in eastern Zaire was transfer to relevant international tribunals the perpetrators of genocide’ and also twofold, with countries united but then turning on each other. At first leaders – committed t hemselves to preventing ‘any direct or indirect support, delivery of Paul K agame o f R wanda, Y oweri M useveni o f U ganda, R obert M ugabe o f arms or any other form of assistance to armed groups operating in the region’.41 To Zimbabwe a nd J osé dos Sa ntos o f A ngola – f ormed a t emporary a lliance t o prove i t wa s s erious, I CGLR o fficials faci litated t he a rrest a nd t ransfer t o Th e support a rebellion against Mobutu.46 Hague for trial by the International Criminal Court (ICC) of Jean-Pierre Bemba.42 The second response led to the fragmentation of the alliance as allies turned on The D ar-es-Salaam D eclaration wa s o ne o f t he r egional r esponses t o each other. Each appeared bent on exploiting the natural wealth in the Congo and developments mainly in t he Great Lakes cluster that involved Uganda, Rwanda, some b ecame b ig exp orters o f min erals n ot f ound in t heir o wn co untries. Th e Burundi and particularly Congo. It was a response to the challenges posed by rebel allies started accusing each other of all sorts of things, and Kabila kicked Kagame’s movements a nd mi litias, w hich r equired co ncerted ef forts in t he f orm o f men out of Kinshasa and then Museveni and Kagame turned on each other in the mediations, p ower-sharing de als a nd in vasions. A t in dependence, w ith m any eastern C ongo. S tate in terests t ook cen tre s tage. Th ey a ll s tarted u sing r ebel politicians w illing t o be bought t o u ndermine t he government of P atrice movements t hat w ere iden tified w ith o ne co untry a s o pposed t o t he o ther, a s Lumumba, Joseph Mobutu ultimately replaced Lumumba and plunged the Congo, proxies within the eastern Congo. which he renamed Zaire, into protracted chaos that affected the neighbours for a long t ime.43 With t he em ergence o f M obutu a s t he s trong m an s oon a fter The Horn of Africa cluster independence, activities by Congolese militias and rebel movements affected and tended to destabilise its neighbours. Some countries in the Great Lakes cluster are linked to the Horn of Africa cluster, Among those neighbours that were affected were Uganda and Rwanda in the which i s e qually co mplex in t erms o f t he im pact o f, a nd r esponses t o, r ebel east and b oth had their own problems that were compounded by e vents in t he movements and militias. It is a cluster in which conflicts tend to be in multiples of Congo. Internal problems in Uganda had led Idi Amin to overthrow Milton Obote, seeming in compatibles a nd t here h ave b een a t le ast f our b order di sputes, t wo who then organised rebel movements from Tanzania. After ousting Amin in 1980, leading to wars.47 In competing for land, resources, the historical memory, faith the rebels fragmented and Kenya’s effort to mediate was not successful. Eventually and ideology, countries tend to support rebel movements in t he perceived rival Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Army came to power in 1986.44 Museveni country. Th e r egional o rgan t hrough w hich i ssues w ere t o b e h andled wa s t he was helped by Rwandese rebels, called the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF). Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which started as a b ody Members of the RPF were Rwandese exiles, mostly from a Tutsi background, concerned with the effects of drought, but then turned to security matters.48 who were in conflict with Juvénal Habyarimana's government. Under the umbrella Three co untries t hat do minate t he H orn o f A frica a s fa r a s r egionally of t he OAU, the region t ried to mediate b etween Habyarimana and t he RPF at destructive r ebel m ovements a re co ncerned, a re S udan, E thiopia a nd S omalia. Arusha, Tanzania, and succeeded in getting the two sides to sign a power-sharing They have competing interests that encourage rebellions and even wars, some of deal. Th e de al did n ot l ast a nd in stead, f ollowing t he a ssassination o f them in t he form of ‘proxy wars’ in w hich rebels are used against other states.49

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They suffer, notes Ruth Iyob, from a ‘crisis of identity, stemming from the contest attempts a t p eacemaking, h as n ot b een r esolved y et. I nstead, t he n eighbouring for hegemony by Christianity and Islam and African and Arab civilisations’.50 At countries o f S udan a nd U ganda en ded u p t rading acc usations t hat e ach wa s one time, Pan-Ethiopianism appeared to be the dominating influence in the region supporting rebels. Uganda supported the SPLA, while Sudan supported the LRA. in co mpetition w ith t he A rab M uslim inf luence, w hich wa s exp anding IGAD faci litated t he p eace p rocess in S udan b etween t he g overnment a nd t he southwards. B oth E thiopia a nd S udan s tressed hi storical c laims t hat p re-dated SPLA that led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in S udan.57 This had the European conquests. These were complicated by the Somali vision of occupying effect of reducing the need for Sudan to continue using the LRA or Uganda using Djibouti, Ethiopia and parts of Kenya. the S PLA a s p roxies. Th e r egion r emains v olatile es pecially w ith r egard t o t he The regional response varied from mediations to taking part in peacekeeping question of Somalia, which has called on its neighbours to intervene and save it.58 operations, a nd e ven cra fting g overnments o f n ational uni ty, a nd wa s o ften In the Horn of Africa cluster, the organisation for responding is the IGAD and specific to the particular country. The first were challenges from Somalia, in i ts it has had mixed results. It still faces c hallenges relating to disputes over borders Pan-Somali dr eam, in t he f orm o f s upport o f r ebel ac tivities in K enya a nd mainly b etween E thiopia a nd Er itrea, a nd o ver h ow t o de al w ith p roblems in Ethiopia. This resulted in t he l atter t wo entering into a def ence agreement and Somalia. With the support of the AU and the international community, IGAD has seeking OAU help. It also led Somalia into a quasi-war with Kenya, known as the had some limited successes in es tablishing a g overnment in S omalia, although it Shifta, and a r eal war with Ethiopia, t he Ogaden W ar.51 Instead of achieving its remains fragile, and in faci litating a s ettlement of the dispute between the SPLA dream, Somalia eventually disintegrated after 1991, w hen President Mohammed and the government of Sudan. Siad Barre was ousted by forces of the United Somali Congress.52 Somalia thereafter became a United Nations and OAU security problem, as it EXTRA-CONTINENTAL RESPONSES fragmented into warlord fiefdoms. The issue was handled in t wo ways. First, the US le d a UN-a ttempted in tervention t o r estore o rder b y di sarming S omali Extra-continental f orces, t ermed t he ‘ international co mmunity’ in r eference t o warlords. This was poorly executed and forced the UN to leave in an embarrassing powerful North American and Western European countries, affect developments manner.53 Second, t he OAU p aid m ore attention a nd en couraged IGAD t o de al in Africa and respond in roughly four overlapping ways. The first is a temporary with S omalia a nd i t s eemingly ado pted a t wo-track s trategy: o n t he o ne h and promotion of anti-government le aders to oust regimes or to support le aders of restoring cen tral a uthority a nd, o n t he o ther, k eeping t he p eace. T o r estore such regimes against the rebels. Such people, whether they are leaders of regimes governance, I GAD faci litated t he cr eation o f a f ederal t ransitional g overnment or rebel movements, are discarded once they have outlived their usefulness. The with elections being held in Nairobi.54 Transferring the Somali government from second i s t o m ount in tervention, ei ther uni laterally o r t hrough r ecognised Nairobi t o M ogadishu r equired s ecurity b ecause t he n umber o f wa rlords wa s international organs like the UN or the OAU/AU. The third is to accept a stalemate increasing, and some were comfortable in Nairobi.55 IGAD authorised the creation and pressure the parties to negotiate and accept a power-sharing deal. The fourth of a p eacekeeping f orce, f irst k nown a s t he I GAD P eace S upport M ission t o is to mobilise the International Criminal Court (ICC) to try specific persons. Somalia, w hich did n ot t ake p lace b ecause o f log istical fa ilures. N ext, I GAD There are t imes w hen a ll four appear to apply and t hey a ll f ind intellectual authorised the AU Mission to Somalia, which was partially realised in 2007 a nd support in the assertions of ‘experts’ on Africa. Given that the power to define is tries to keep the Federal Transitional Government afloat in the midst of opposition the power to destroy or create,59 the ‘experts’ tend to guide the responses with their from Al Shabaab and the warlords who are responsible for piracy along the Somali commentaries p ortraying s overeignty in A frica a s fa rce, p hantom o r mira ge. coast.56 Jeffrey Herbst, other than recommending redrawing of African boundaries rather Apart f rom S omalia, IGAD a lso concerned itself with Sudan, w here neither than try to resuscitate failing states, wanted the UN to decertify or deregister some negative p eace n or p ositive p eace exi sts, p articularly in t he s outhern p art. countries from the roster of sovereign states. Christopher Clapham, believing that Rebellion in S outhern Sudan started soon after independence and despite many the existence of some states is itself a threat to security, thinks that the sovereignty

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of African states should be shared with an external entity.60 Advocates of coups and of a military nature. After the disaster in Somalia, however, they tend to look for arming r ebel g roups t arget m ainly R obert M ugabe, t he im perial ‘ bogeyman’.61 different ways o f r esponding t o t hreats t o t heir interests a nd f ind a llies a mong Thus, James Kirchick of The New Republic begged outgoing US President George rebel movements and militias. Former American secretary of state, Condoleezza W Bush to enhance his legacy as a li berator by invading Zimbabwe in o rder to Rice, a sserted in 2008 t hat t he US wa s c alled t o le ad in de aling w ith ‘ a n ew ‘liberate’ millions.62 And Paul Collier, claiming that military ‘coups’ in A frica are perspective on what constituted threats’ to ‘an international order that reflects our ‘progressive’, wanted the new US president, Barack Obama, to use ‘moral authority’ values’.73 This mig ht h elp exp lain t he 2007 cr eation o f t he A frican C ommand derived from his ‘African identity’ to help mount coups.63 (AFRICOM), in itself an indication of Africa becoming more important from a US Congo i s a g ood exa mple o f t he f irst t ype o f in ternational r esponse o f security p oint of view.74 Through t he ‘three Ds’ of diplomacy, development and promoting and then dumping leaders. Soon after Congo became independent in defence, AFRICOM is supposed to help s olve s ecurity problems w ithout ext ra- 1960, Patrice Lumumba a nnoyed ext ra-continental f orces w ith hi s n ationalistic continental intervention, while keeping American troops out of Africa for decades policies on Congo. Immediately, interference from the US and Belgium, assisted by to come or ‘the next 50 years’.75 France, B ritain a nd S outh A frica, p lunged t hat co untry in to c haos. Th ey w ere African states, however, showed reluctance to host AFRICOM, in the light of supported by C ongolese p oliticians who had little time for Lumumba’s political the Bush ‘grand strategy’ of pre-emptive strikes based on suspicions of dictatorial and e conomic n ationalism.64 As a r esult, J oseph M obutu b ecame p resident o f inclinations or non-cooperation with, and possible questioning, of US hegemonic Congo but after he outlived his usefulness, he became expendable. The effort to desires.76 AFRICOM i s exp ected t o o utsource s ervices t o p rivate s ecurity distance themselves from some of their own creations was partly because these companies,77 which, according to Andrew Bearpark, director-general of the British countries considered that relying on individual leaders in a symbiotic relationship Association o f P rivate S ecurity C ompanies, ‘carry o ut ac tivities p reviously was in i tself unreliable.65 The US, a mong others, started to shift positions and to performed by national militaries’.78 African states resist hosting the command for abandon what former secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, termed ‘the essence of fear it mig ht b e used to stage quick attacks on neighbouring countries or e ven post-war American foreign policy’.66 destabilise the host country. The French have a record of giving the second type of international response, The third response is to try a multilateral approach to negotiated settlement in namely intervention.67 Considered a ‘traditional gendarme’ in Africa,68 the French a perceived stalemate between governments and rebels. The Germans, preferring response has tended to be one of intervention either to ensure survival of its men to side w ith the US a nd France, opt for coordinated responses from the West in in power or to depose them after they had outlived their usefulness.69 There were stemming t he inf lux o f A fricans t o E urope.79 They wa nt ‘ conflict p revention’ times, t herefore, w hen t he F rench u sed m ercenaries w ho h ad dir ect lin ks t o measures to ensure ‘development’ at the grassroots level and to address ‘the root Jacques F occart, t he p rincipal ad viser o f t he F rench g overnment o n A frica. I n causes’ t hat g ive r ise t o r ebels. W here t hat i s n ot p ossible, a s in t he c ase o f Rwanda, the French helped to train and arm the Interahamwe, which was largely Zimbabwe, where the leader supposedly destroys the country,80 Germans consider responsible for the genocide.70 Despite French support the rebel RPF won, which the ‘exit option’ of quitting.81 The Germans, not alone in seeking root causes, often accounted for the subsequent hostility between France and Rwanda. The image of join others in imposing power-sharing in order to end a perceived stalemate. France as a supporter of mass killers accounts for the French attempt, according to The f ourth t ype o f ext ra-continental r esponse co mbines t he o verthrow o f current p resident N ikolas Sa rkozy, t o ‘ rid t he r elationship b etween A frica a nd governments w ith t he a rrest o f le aders o f r ebel m ovements t o b e t ried a t Th e France of the fantasies and the myths … that pollute it’.71 It was Bernard Kouchner, Hague by the ICC as a way of curbing ‘impunity’. Although the US refused to be a Sarkozy’s current foreign minister, who founded Médecins Sans Frontières in 1971, member o f t he I CC, i t i s ac tive in r eferring A fricans t o in ternational cr iminal and later advanced the idea of the right to military humanitarian intervention.72 tribunals. Thi s h appened t o C harles T aylor, w hose r ebel m ovement ini tially Americans a lso engage in dif ferent t ypes o f in tervention, dir ectly a nd appeared to have American support in o verthrowing Liberia’s Samuel Doe,82 but indirectly, and they find it difficult to refrain from total involvement, particularly after p lunging t he r egion in to de ep c haos, A mericans en sured t hat Taylor wa s

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taken to trial at The Hague.83 Despite accusations of selective justice and targeting problem. On t he issue of separation, however, regional neighbours tend to insist Africans, particularly when it picked on Sudan’s President Omar el-Bashir, and of on the sanctity of the state as constituted. ignoring perpetrators of atrocities in big powerful countries,84 the threat of being On the regional front, there have been limited successes in terms of settlement referred to t he ICC h as acquired international p olitical c urrency in A frica a s a but not of resolution of conflicts. In part, the seeming success in the Mano River warning to both rebel movements and most governments. cluster was due to the strong action taken by ECOMOG, led by Nigeria, as well as From t he a bove, i t i s c lear t hat t here i s a g reat va riety in ext ra-continental the s upport o f ext ra-continental f orces, a lthough t he co untries in volved w ere responses and that they are affected by perceived interests. There are times when extremely weak. In the Horn of Africa, IGAD produced settlements in S omalia, they en courage r ebel m ovements t o des tabilise le aders o f t arget s tates w ithout which q uickly f loundered, a nd in S udan, w hich i s h olding. I n t he G reat L akes direct in tervention. S ometimes t hey in tervene dir ectly a nd im pose a p erson o f cluster, t he r esponse va ried f rom mi litary in terventions t o cra fting a p ower- their choice as the new ruler on a given state. They also put pressure on the parties sharing de al in t he D emocratic R epublic o f C ongo (D RC), b ut t his wa s in conflict to negotiate and reach power-sharing settlements. Most recently, they undermined by competing country and ‘international’ interests. In the Southern have used the ICC to give political warnings to leaders of both regimes and rebel Africa cluster, the region intervened to settle an acrimonious political dispute in movements. Zimbabwe that affected the area, by brokering a power-sharing deal. Power sharing is often an external imposition either by regional neighbours or CONCLUSION by ext ra-continental f orces. Th e r esponses f rom ext ra-continental f orces, a ll driven b y t heir o wn in terests, va ry, b ut t here i s t he t endency t o s upport r ebel The response to the presence of militias and rebel movements in any place and at movements plotting to oust target regimes or to strengthen leaders of such regimes any level is determined by the interests being advanced and protected. At the state against the rebels. Protection for such leaders is withdrawn once they outlive their level, t he g overnment r esponse c an t ake t he f orm o f a ttempted r epression, value. A t t imes, t he s upport t akes t he f orm o f uni lateral o r m ultilateral accommodation to t he w ishes of s ome of t he mi litias and rebel movements, or intervention supposedly on humanitarian grounds. An alternative, when there is a succumbing to pressure and getting out or agreeing to decapacitate the state. Some perceived stalemate, is to pressure the parties concerned to settle through power- militia a re s ponsored b y inf luential p eople in g overnments, o thers a re co opted sharing arrangements. In recent times, the extra-continental powers respond by after being established and perhaps being hard to control, and they are generally using the ICC as a wa rning to force leaders of regimes and rebel movements to used t o co unter r ebel m ovements. There a re r ebels w ho a spire t o p ower behave. I rrespective o f t he si tuation, ext ra-continental p owers s upport c lient irrespective of how it is achieved. If the state is weak, it surrenders power to the regimes or rebel movements when it suits their interests. In the process, they help rebels or opts for a p ower-sharing deal. In most cases, the state tends to respond to create instability by aiding rebel movements and even sponsor coups against by suppressing the rebellion and trying to deny it legitimacy or eventually cutting regimes they do n ot like or restore the peace by assisting in s ettling disputes in a deal on an aspect of autonomy or even separation. prolonged conflicts. States in a region worry about growing instability in an area within the region. This i s b ecause t he ac tivities o f mi litias a nd r ebel m ovements, a s w ell a s t he NOTES responses from governments, tend to generate refugees who flee to neighbouring states and also to create regional instability. The region then responds in s everal 1 Macharia Munene, ‘Generic p eace’ and ‘the p eace’: a di scourse, The Journal of L anguage, ways, depending on whether the rebel objective is to take over power or fragment Technology & Entrepreneurship in Africa 1(2) (2009), 218–228. 2 Eka Ik pe, C hallenging t he di scourse o n f ragile s tates, Conflict, Security a nd D evelopment the state. It tries to mediate and often suggest power-sharing deals. The region is 7(1) (2007), 85–124, 86. likely t o s upport t he exi sting g overnment if i t co nsiders t he r ebels t o b e t he 3 Gumisai M utume, Or ganised cr ime t argets w eak A frican s tates, Africa R enewal, U nited problem, o r m ay s upport t he r ebels if t he g overnment i s co nsidered t o b e t he Nations Department of Public Information 21(2) (July 2007), 3.

430 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 431 STATE, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO MILITIA AND REBEL ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA MACHARIA MUNENE

4 Macharia M unene, The p olitics o f t ransition i n K enya, 1995–1998, N airobi: Q uest a nd 21 Benjamin Nueberger, Irredentism and politics in Africa, in Naomi Chazan (ed), Irredentism Insight, 2001, 49–52, 54, 94–96. and international politics, Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner, 1991, 99–100. 5 Wangui Kanina and C Bryson Hull, Bodies pile up in Kenya’s Mungiki gang war, Reuters, 26 22 Quotes f rom O sita C Eze , Human r ights i n A frica: s ome s elected p roblems, L agos: Th e June 2008; Jane Mugambi, Kenya: massive manhunt in Central, Nairobi Star, 21 April 2009; Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 1984, 235–240. Kioi Mbugua, Containing Mungiki menace will require change in policy, The Nation, 29 May 23 Stephen Jackson, Borderlands and the transformation of war economies: lessons from DR 2007; F red M ukinda, K illings lin ked t o t he wa r a gainst Mungiki sect, Daily N ation, 23 Congo, Conflict, Security and Development 6(3) (2006), 426. October 2007, h ttp://.religionnewsblog.com/19737/mungiki-32 (acces sed 5 M ay 2010); 24 Marq de V illiers a nd S heila H irtle, Into A frica: a jo urney t hrough t he a ncient em pires, Gitau Warigi, Police impunity: Maj General Ali seems to be playing his politics better than London: Phoenix Giant, 1998, 251. Raila, Sunday Nation, 22 March 2009. 25 Macharia M unene, The T ruman a dministration a nd t he d ecolonisation o f s ub-Saharan 6 Beatrice O bwocha a nd J ames M unyeki, M oi a sks le aders t o s top wa r o f w ords a nd s eek Africa, Nairobi: Nairobi University Press, 1995, 5–6. dialogue, The Standard on Sunday, 7 March 2010, 4. 26 Reno, Warlord politics and African states, 80–81, 85. 7 John Kurk Jacobsen, Why do states bother to deceive? Managing trust at home and abroad, 27 Pita Ochai, Johnson-Sirleaf in the eye of the storm, Newswatch Magazine, 12 July 2009; Kate Review of International Studies 34(2), (2008), 337, 340. Thomas, Liberia Truth and Reconciliation Commission retracts controversial report, 2 July 8 John Prendergast, Roots of famine in Sudan’s killing fields, in John B Sorensen (ed), Disaster 2009, h ttp://www1.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-07-02-voa31-68744357.html and development in the Horn of Africa, New York: St Martin’s Press, 1995. (accessed 5 May 2010); BBC News, Sirleaf ‘sorry’ she backed Taylor, BBC, 12 February 2009, 9 Kasaija P hilip Apuuli, Th e International Cr iminal C ourt and t he L ord’s Resistance A rmy http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/7887117.stm (accessed 5 May 2010). insurgency in n orthern U ganda, in A lfred N hema a nd P aul T iyambe Z eleza (e ds), The 28 Reno, Warlord politics and African states, 92. 29 Benjamin W A hadzi, F ailure o f do mestic p olitics a nd ci vil wa r in L iberia: r egional resolution o f A frican c onflicts: t he m anagement o f c onflict r esolution a nd p ost-conflict ramifications of EC OWAS intervention, in K enneth Om eje (e d), War t o p eace t ransition, reconstruction, Addis Ababa: OSSREA, 2008, 55. Lanham, Md: University Press of America, 2009, 53–57. 10 David McDonald, From guerrillas to government: post-conflict stability in Liberia, Uganda 30 Tom P orteous, Resolving African conflicts, C rimes of W ar P roject: w ar i n A frica, and Rwanda, Third World Quarterly 29(2) (2008), 363. http://www.crimesofwar.org/africa-mag/afr_01_porteos.html (accessed 19 February 2007). 11 David Francis, Introduction, in David Francis (ed), Civil militias: Africa’s intractable security 31 Liberia-Nigeria: questions raised over Taylor’s exile in Nigeria, IRIN, Lagos, 21 August 2003, menace, London: Ashgate, 2005, 1–21. http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx/ReportedId=45709 (accessed 5 May 2010). 12 Rene Lemarchand, Consociationalism and power sharing in Africa: Rwanda, Burundi, and 32 Michael A Fletcher, Nigerian leader says he won’t turn Taylor over for trial, The Washington the Democratic Republic of the Congo, African Affairs 106(422) (2007), 1–20. Post, 6 May 2005. 13 Paul Collier, Obama’s footsteps, The Guardian, 12 February 2009. 33 A Bolaji Akinyemi, The Taylor saga: a clash of civilisations, New Africa, May 2006, 20–24. 14 Alfred Nhema, Introduction: the resolution of African conflicts, in Alfred Nhema and Paul 34 Amate, Inside the OAU, 459–460. Tiyambe Z eleza (e ds), The r esolution o f A frican c onflicts: t he m anagement o f c onflict 35 James Kirchick, How tyranny came to Zimbabwe: Jimmy Carter still has a lot to answer for, resolution and post conflict reconstruction, Addis Ababa: OSSREA, 2008, 2. The Weekly Standard, 12(38) (18 June 2007). 15 Teshome B W ondwosen a nd Jan Z áhroík, F ederalism in A frica: t he c ase o f et hnic-based 36 Peter J S chraeder, United S tates f oreign p olicy t oward A frica: i ncrementalism, cr isis a nd federalism in Ethiopia, International Journal of Human Sciences 5(2) (2008), 15–17; K idane change, Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge University Press, 1994, 211–215. Mengisteab, Ethiopia’s ethnic-based federalism: 10 years after, African Issues 29(1/2) (2001), 37 Tom Y oung, F rom t he MNR t o REN AMO: m aking s ense o f a n A frican co unter- 20–25. revolutionary insurgency, in P aul B R ich (ed), The dynamics of change in Southern Africa, 16 William R eno, Warlord p olitics a nd A frican sta tes, B oulder a nd L ondon: L ynne R ienner, New York: St Martin’s Press, 1994, 149–164. 1998, 29, 38. 38 Gwinyayi A lbert D zinesa, Swords i nto p loughshares: d isarmament, d emobilisation a nd 17 David Ochami, Leaders call for intervention in Somalia crisis, The Standard, Kenya, 18 July reintegration in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa, ISS Paper 120, Pretoria: Institute for 2009. Security Studies, 2006, 3. 18 Jon Woronoff, Organising African Unity, Metuchen, NJ: The Scarecrow Press, 1970, 329–330; 39 Stephen E llis a nd T sepo S echaba, Comrades a gainst a partheid: t he AN C a nd t he S outh Bereket Habte Selassie, Conflict and intervention in the Horn of Africa, New York: Monthly African Communist Party in exile, London: James Currey, 1992, 136–138. Review Press, 1980, 4–5; K orwa G A dar, Kenyan foreign policy behaviour towards Somalia, 40 Joan Wardrop, Th e s tate, p olitics a nd v iolence, 1989–1991, in N orman Etherington (e d), 1963–1983, Lanham: University Press of America, 1994, 29–39. Peace, politics and violence in the New South Africa, New York: Hans Zell, 1992, 46–68. 19 C O C A mate, Inside the OAU: Pan-Africanism in practice, London: Macmillan, 1986, 459– 41 Dar-es-Salaam Declaration on Peace, Security, Democracy and Development in t he Great 460. Lakes Region, Adopted by the heads of state and government, at its first summit, held in Dar- 20 Ibid, 450. es-Salaam, 19–20 N ovember 2004, h ttp://www.icglr.org/key-documents/declarations-

432 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 433 STATE, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO MILITIA AND REBEL ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA MACHARIA MUNENE

pacts/Dar%20Es%20Salaam%20Declaration%20on%20Peace%20Security%20Democracy% 57 Suzanne Jambo, Sudan: the challenge of national renewal, in H einrich Böll Foundation, In 20and%20Development.pdf (accessed 7 May 2010). quest for a cu lture of peace in the IGAD region, 149–159; A bdi Ismail Samatar and Waqo 42 Charles Kazooba, Central Africa: Great Lakes nations to send war crimes suspects to ICC, Machaka, Conflict and peace in Africa: a regional approach, in Heinrich Böll Foundation, In The Eas t A frican, 7 D ecember 2009, h ttp://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200912070705. quest for a culture of peace in the IGAD region, 35–38, 46. html (accessed 7 May 2010). 58 Ochami, Leaders call for intervention in Somalia crisis. 43 Indar Jit Rikhye, Military adviser to the Secretary-General: UN p eacekeeping and the Congo 59 Dan F H ahn, Political c ommunication: r hetoric, go vernment a nd ci tizens, S tate C ollege, crisis, New York: St Martin’s Press, 1993, 1–2, 318; J acques Depelchin, From the Congo free Penn: Strata Publishing, 1998, 65. state to Zaire, 1885–1974: Towards a demystification of economic and political history, Dakar: 60 Brennan M K raxberger, F ailed s tates: t emporary o bstacles t o dem ocratic dif fusion o r Codesria, 1992, 85–86; Marq de Villiers and Sheila Hirtle, Into Africa: a journey through the fundamental h oles in t he w orld p olitical m ap? Third W orld Q uarterly 28(6) (2007), ancient empires, New York: Phoenix Giant, 1997, 186; Herbert Weiss, War and peace in the 1055–1071. Democratic Republic of the Congo, Parts I, II a nd III, American Diplomacy V(3) (Summer 61 Macharia Munene, Zimbabwe: The bogeyman and the empire, Business Daily, 7 July 2008. 2000), http://www.unc.edu/depts./diplomat/AD_Issues/amdipl_16/weiss/ weiss (accessed 7 62 Kirchick, Mr President, liberate Zimbabwe. May 2010). 63 Paul C ollier, I n p raise o f t he co up: mi litary t akeovers c an b e a g ood t hing f or A frican 44 McDonough, From guerrillas to government, 361–362. democracy, New Humanist 124(2) (2009), http://newhumanist.org.uk/1997/in-praise-of-the- 45 Georges N zongola-Ntalaja, From Z aire t o D emocratic R epublic o f t he C ongo, U ppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1998, 7. coup (accessed 3 August 2010). 46 Michela Wrong, In the footsteps of Mr Kurtz: living on the brink of disaster in the C ongo, 64 Rikhye, Military Adviser, 1–2, 318 (see footnote 48); Depelchin, From the Congo free state to London: Fourth Estate, 2000, 257–289, 237. Zaire, 85–86; D e Villiers and Hirtle, Into Africa, 186; Nzongola-Ntalaja, Congo, 101; Weiss, 47 Markus Kornprobst, The management of border disputes in Africa: comparing West Africa War and peace. and the Horn of Africa, Journal of Modern African Studies 40(3) (2002), 369. 65 Macharia Munene, C old wa r di sillusionment a nd A frica, in M acharia Munene, J O lewe- 48 Dani W Nabudere, The role of intellectuals and integration in the IGAD region, in Heinrich Nyunya and Korwa Adar (eds), The United States and Africa: from independence to the end of Böll Foundation, In quest for a culture of peace in the IGAD region: the role of intellectuals and the Cold War, Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 1995, 25–49. scholars, Nairobi: Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2006, 73. 66 Henry K issinger, Does A merica n eed a f oreign p olicy? T oward a d iplomacy f or t he 21s t 49 Jon Abbink, Ethiopia-Eritrea: p roxy wa rs a nd p rospects f or p eace in t he Horn o f A frica, century, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001, 29. Journal of Contemporary African Studies 21(3) (2003), 409. 67 Comoros: reforming ‘the coup-coup islands’, IRIN humanitarian news and analysis, 10 April 50 Ruth Iyob, The foreign policies of the Horn: the clash between the old and the new, in Gilbert 2010, http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=83144 (accessed 16 July 2009). M K hadiagala a nd T errence L yons (e ds), African f oreign p olicies: p ower a nd p rocesses, 68 Michael M oran, Th e n ew ‘African C ommand’, Council o n F oreign R elations, 9 F ebruary London: Lynne Rienner, 2001, 113–116. 2007, h ttp://www.cfr.org/publication/12583/new_african_command.html (acces sed 19 51 Nene Mburu, Bandits on the border: the last frontier in the search for Somali unity, Trenton, February 2007). NJ: The Red Sea Press, 2005, 173–229; Selassie, Conflict and intervention, 117–125, 5. 69 Robert D G rey, A b alance sheet on external assistance: France and Africa, The Journal of 52 Bahru Zewde, Embattled identity in northeast Africa: a comparative essay, in Heinrich Böll Modern African Studies 28(1) (1990), 102–105; McGowan, African military, 357. Foundation, In quest for a culture of peace in the IGAD region, 21–22. 70 John James Quinn, Diffusion and escalation in the Great Lakes: the Rwandan genocide, the 53 Robert G P atman, Di sarming S omalia: t he co ntrasting f ortunes o f U nited S tates a nd rebellion in Z aire, and Mobutu’s overthrow, in S teven E L obell and Philip Mauceri (e ds), Australian peacekeepers during United Nations intervention, 1992–1993, African Affairs 96 Ethnic conflict and international politics, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, 119; We trained (1997), 509–533. Interahamwe & E x-FAR a s t ranslators a long F rench s oldiers, Rwanda N ews A gency, 2 54 Khalif Hassan Ahmed, Somalia: a nation in search of a state, in Heinrich Böll Foundation, In quest for a culture of peace in the IGAD region, 169. October 2008. 55 Greg Mills, How to intervene in Africa’s wars, Crimes of War Project: war in Africa, October 71 Moran, The new ‘African Command’. 2004, http://www.crimesofwar.org/africa-mag/afr_03_mills.html (accessed 7 May 2010). 72 Edward B Rackley, Could France’s new odd couple – Sarkozy and Kouchner – spell the end 56 Ben Macintyre, The battle against piracy begins in Mogadishu, Times Online, 16 April 2009, of F rench p rivilege f or A frica’s m ost v enal, 3 Q uarks D aily, 28 M ay 2007, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/ben_macintyre/article6101229.ece http://3quarksdaily.blogs.com/3quarksdaily/2007/05/could_frances_n.html (acces sed 6 (accessed 7 M ay 2010); Ga rowe On line, S omalia: A mison denies Al-Shabaab claims, 12 March 2010). February 2010, h ttp://allafrica.com/stories/printable/201002120931.html (acces sed 7 M ay 73 Condoleezza R ice, R ethinking t he n ational in terest: A merican r ealism f or a n ew w orld, 2010). 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434 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 435 STATE, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO MILITIA AND REBEL ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA

74 Chris J aniec, U nited s tates exp eriments w ith A frican C ommand, P olicy I nnovations, 29 October 2008, h ttp://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/briefings/data/000084/:pf_printable (accessed 23 A pril 2010); S ean McFate, Briefing, US A frica C ommand: next step or next stumble, African Affairs 107(426) (2008), 113. 75 Janiec, United States experiments with African Command. 76 John L Gaddi s, A g rand s trategy o f t ransformation, Foreign P olicy, November/December 2002, 50–57; Michael Barone, Bush’s grand strategy, US News and World Report, 26 February 2006. 77 McFate, Briefing, US Africa Command, 119. CHAPTER 16 78 Interview w ith A ndrew B earpark, International R eview o f t he R ed C ross 88 (863) (2006), 449–457. 79 Stefan M air, G erman in terests a nd A frica p olicy, in U lf En gel a nd R obert K appel (e ds), Germany’s Africa policy revisited: interests, images and incrementalism, London: Transaction Confronting the threats of armed Publishers, 2002, 15. 80 Rainer Tetzlaff, C ommitted p olitical le adership m atters! E thiopia un der P rime M inister Meles Zenawi and the question of continuity of political leadership, in Eva-Maria Bruchhaus non-state groups to human and Monika M Sommer (eds), Hot spot Horn of Africa revisited: approaches to make sense of conflict, Münster/Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2008, 112. security and the state in Africa 81 Andreas Mehler, Crisis prevention: a n ew paradigm for Germany’s Africa policy, in En gel and Kappel (eds), Germany’s Africa policy revisited, 179–188. WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE 82 Adekeye Adebajo, Liberia: a warlord’s peace, in Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothschild and Elizabeth M C ousens (eds), Ending civil wars: the implementation of peace agreements, London: Lynne Rienner, 2002, 599–630. 83 Baffour Ankomah, Baffour’s beef: a pound of flesh, but in whose interest? New African, May 2006, 8–9; A B olaji Akinyemi, The Taylor saga: a c lash of civilisations, New A frican, M ay INTRODUCTION 2006, 20–24. 84 Targeting Africa: the case for and against the ICC, New African, May 2009; ICC justice: who’s Activities of armed non-state groups (ANSGs) have had devastating consequences next? New African, July 2009. for civilian populations as well as the infrastructure that supports their welfare. The African adage that ‘when two elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers’ is true of a rmed co nflicts, f or ci vilians a re n ot o nly s trategic t argets b ut a lso b ear t he brunt of the consequences. African battle spaces are characterised by young boys carrying weapons taller than they, government forces and armed groups violating international humanitarian and human r ights l aws w ith impunity, terrified and massively displaced civilians, and carcasses of destroyed homes and infrastructure. ANSGs are not uniquely or exclusively an African phenomenon, for they are common in m any p olitical sys tems, in cluding ad vanced s ocieties s uch a s t he United States (Michigan Militia Corps), Canada (Front de Libération du Québec, Quebec L iberation F ront, FL Q), I taly ( Brigate R osse, R ed B rigades, B R) a nd Spain/France (B asque n ationalists). W hat i s uniq ue t o A frica i s t he a larmingly high level of loss of human life and destruction of property that militant and rebel groups a nd v iolent co nflicts c ause, t he lo ngevity o f s ome o f t hese g roups, t he

436 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 437 CONFRONTING THE THREATS OF ARMED NON-STATE GROUPS TO HUMAN SECURITY WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE AND THE STATE IN AFRICA seeming inability of governments to handle t hem, and t he p enchant of African explained p artly b y t he p olicymakers’ u se o f o ne-dimensional a pproaches t o governments to create fertile grounds from which such groups emerge. understand t he p henomenon, deni al o f g overnments’ f lawed p olicies t hat Although t hese g roups h ave h ad a p rofound im pact o n A frica’s p olitical, contribute t o t hese g roups’ f ormation, a nd i ll-conceived m easures t o co nfront economic and social development, currently no dedicated research is being carried them. While some of the governments’ measures used to confront these groups out to determine how many there are or to analyse the impact of their activities on have achieved limited results, most of them, such as use of brute violence, have the livelihoods of populations and capacities of states to function. Attempts made been counter-productive, as they end up recruiting sympathisers and followers for thus far have related to analyses of their histories, roots, objectives, motives and these g roups. Th e l ack o f a ppropriate a pproaches a nd r esources t o co nfront modi operandi, and the impact of their activities on socioeconomic systems.1 The ANSGs h as b een acco mpanied b y t he u se o f ex cessive f orce t hat v iolates difficulties of pinpointing the exact or even approximate number of groups and international h umanitarian a nd h uman r ights l aws, a nd t he cr iminalisation o f their membership, and the effects that they have on society, state, governance and these groups that make it difficult to engage them in peace talks. human security, partly stem from the lack of data and the state security policy of In o rder t o g enerate p ointers t hat co uld inf orm p olicy r esponses, i t i s denying t hat t hey exi st o r inf lating t heir n umbers f or b udgetary r easons o r important to first highlight the importance of factors such as state governance, the criminalising p olitical o pponents b y b randing t hem va gabonds, b andits a nd role of elite and youth groups, and the management of border areas and natural terrorists. In s ome c ases, governments have denie d t he existence of mi litia and resources in the formulation of policy and legal responses to prevent and combat rebel g roups t o co ver u p s erious g overnance a nd s ecurity si tuations t hat co uld the ANSG phenomenon in Africa. damage their reputations and scare away foreign investments. Nevertheless, there is a need to monitor and document ANSGs’ activities and State governance2 to s tudy t hem f rom a m ultidisciplinary p erspective. On e o f t he m ajor contributions of this work is the use of multidisciplinary approaches and concepts One of the key findings in t his study is that weak and badly governed states in as well as analytical frameworks and perspectives drawn mainly from the social Africa have a t endency to generate ANSGs o r to create fertile grounds for their sciences and humanities to shed light on how militias, Islamic militants and rebel development. A b adly g overned s tate m arginalises, ex cludes, im poverishes a nd groups in Africa are formed and affect human security and state capacity, on the suppresses s ome s egments o f t he p opulation b ecause o f t heir iden tities a nd one hand, and how they can be understood and dealt with at different levels, on relations with the centre of power. Some victims of misgovernance pick up arms to the other hand. redress their grievances. In reaction, states have clamped down on them with an This chapter highlights some of the key findings and conclusions of the work excessive u se o f s o-called leg itimate v iolence. B y u sing ex cessive a nd s enseless and captures the key policy recommendations that can be used to prevent ANSGs force t o leg itimise t hemselves, t hese s tates a lienate t hemselves f rom t he lo cal and t he v iolent co nflicts in w hich t hey a re en gaged f rom un dermining human populations, increasing both sympathy and support for the ANSGs. security and state capacity to provide public services. The unconventional ANSG tactics, in turn, impair the state’s ability to provide public goods and services, alienating it from the population, which perceives it to TOWARDS ADDRESSING THE ANSG PHENOMENON be too weak and ineffective to exercise its legitimate roles. The legitimacy of the IN AFRICA state is further eroded when its responses are heavy handed, fail to protect civilians or treat local populations as accomplices or sympathisers of ANSGs. Some African In t rying t o un derstand w hy t he ANSG p henomenon h as b ecome prevalent in military f orces e ven h ave a bandoned ‘customary co des t hat g overn t he u se o f Africa, w e c an s urmise f rom t he d ata p resented a nd a nalysed in t he va rious force’3 in co nfrontations w ith ANSGs b y t he di sproportionate u se o f v iolence, chapters that p olicymakers are palpably challenged when it comes to designing sometimes against civilians. When the military and police use excessive force and measures t hat c an ef fectively prevent and confront t hese g roups. This could b e extra-judicial means to extract information about ANSGs and discourage civilians

438 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 439 CONFRONTING THE THREATS OF ARMED NON-STATE GROUPS TO HUMAN SECURITY WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE AND THE STATE IN AFRICA from s upporting t hem, t hey p ut a ll m embers o f t he lo cal p opulation a t r isk, Youth factor especially when government forces withdraw from an area after operations. While ANSGs extensively and commonly use terror as a tactic, some states have chosen Although the book does not have a chapter dedicated to the role of the youth in to respond with similar tactics. There is a growing tendency in Africa for states to ANSGs, t he chapters by Engels, Ikelegbe, Ib aba, Kabir and O loo s how t hat t he ‘delegate co nflicts t o r ebels [a nd mi litias] ra ther t han u se t heir o wn f orces’.4 youth have been the dominant base of recruitment and participation in the ANSGs However, such a strategy can lead to international condemnation, as happened in as a result of their high levels of unemployment, poor education and addiction to the case of the Janjaweed in Darfur. drugs. Ikelegbe points out that conditions in Africa that made the youth turn on Although ANSGs are, to a large extent, a product of weak and failing African society in ra ge, def iance, s ubversion a nd r esistance h ave a lso cr eated a y outh culture w ith e lements o f ni hilism, fa talism, de viance, p opulism, r esentment, states, their activities have threatened human security and contributed to the crisis impunity a nd v iolence.7 Accordingly, approaches f or preventing a nd combating of the state, which manifests in the inability to provide public goods and services ANSG activities must aim at addressing societal inequalities, marginalisation and and u se v iolence in t he n ational in terest o nly. A part f rom co ntributing t o t he vulnerabilities t hat a llow a v iolent youth c ulture and recruitment opportunities mushrooming of ANSGs in A frica, t he cr isis of t he state h as lent credibility to into the ANSG rank and file to emerge. some of these ANSGs to challenge its legitimacy. Indeed, there is a high possibility The y outh c an a lso b e p revented f rom j oining ANSGs t hrough in stilling a for opportunistic rebel groups to emerge where governments lack the legitimacy, ‘peace s oftware’, which contains va lues t hat respect lif e. Peace va lues s hould b e capacity and resources to govern and control their territories. instilled among youths before they fall prey to political opportunists and warlords In his chapter on the crises of the state and governance (chapter 5), Ik elegbe who are out to exploit their material situation and lure them into political militia argues t hat t he r ise a nd m ultiplication o f ANSGs sin ce t he in dependence o f and rebel groups. African governments need to provide greater incentives for the African s tates a re in dications o f t he co ntinent’s g overnance cr isis, w hich h as youth t o en gage in p roductive ac tivities rather t han t o j oin v iolent g roups t hat marginalised and excluded groups due to their age and other characteristics, and terrorise the population to survive. has created a political environment that allows state abuse and misuse. The tragedy of state weakness and failure, and its consequences for human security, can best be overcome through completion of the nation-building project, immunisation of the Political elite manipulation state against an egoistic national elite, and establishment of durable governance In ga ining a de eper un derstanding o f t he r elationship b etween t he s tate a nd processes that enhance national interests. The nation-building project should aim ANSGs, special attention should be paid to how political elites govern the state, specifically a t addr essing q uestions o f iden tity, a nd in clude e conomic manipulate groups and use violence to maintain control of the state. This calls for development, equitable distribution of national wealth, inclusion of all citizenry in critical interrogation of how elections are held, how free and fair they are, and the national matters, and balanced use of state power. National development policies role that violence plays in t he electoral process. In all the cases examined in t he 5 should aim at promoting ‘national cohesion, stability and unity’. book, there are strong links among politics, opportunistic politicians and elites, Ironically, despite ANSGs’ g rievances against t he state for failing to provide unemployed youth and badly governed states. When stakes are high in elections, public goods and services, they too are: politicians turn to political gangs to intimidate opponents and voters. After the elections, these political gangs are either transformed into criminal gangs or into … un likely t o de liver t he p olitical a nd e conomic r eforms n ecessary f or rebel groups, as was the case with Yoweri Museveni’s Popular Resistance Army in development. I nstead, s uch r ebel o rganisations w ill t end t oward cr iminal Uganda that was launched in February 1981 to protest the outcome of the election enterprise, taking advantage of the absence of state control to extract resources from that returned Milton Obote to power in December 1980.8 Sabine Carey argues that the t erritory o r p opulation a nd, w here in surgency i s s uccessful, m ay im plement the risks of rebellion and insurgencies in sub-Saharan Africa increase because of authoritarian structures no different than those set in place by their predecessors.6 the way elections are carried out – f rom multiparty presidential elections to no

440 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 441 CONFRONTING THE THREATS OF ARMED NON-STATE GROUPS TO HUMAN SECURITY WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE AND THE STATE IN AFRICA elections at all – w ith the latter increasing the chances of political instability and impunity’ in most African societies.12 This culture allows these groups to develop large-scale violence.9 parallel g overnance sys tems t hat w eaken t he leg itimacy o f t he s tate, a nd u se Some of the hitherto abandoned elite-sponsored political violent gangs, as is violence a nd in timidation t o s ubjugate ci tizens. W ith t he s tate’s w eak l aw the case in N iger Delta, later transformed themselves into militias and criminal enforcement capabilities and failure to deliver public services, these groups offer gangs. A s t he exa mple o f t he Mungiki shows, t hese g roups exp loit t he p ower such services for a fee. Apart from revenue losses that further deprive the state of vacuum cr eated b y w eak s tates t o cr eate a n a lternative ‘ government,’ w hich resources i t n eeds t o m eet i ts o bligations t o t he ci tizenry, ANSGs’ p resence in provides security and survives by extracting levies for this service. In order to stop ungoverned spaces and provision of social services undermine state legitimacy. this trend, keen attention should be paid to the mode of conducting elections in Africa, with the aim of immunising it against abuse by political elites who pursue Controlling borders and border areas political power at the expense of democracy. The manner in which political elites capture political power and use it is critical to understanding the source and nature Borders and border areas are favoured by rebel groups because these enable them of political violence and how it has been used to gain control of the state. to ‘ extend t he b attlefield r egionally a nd t ransnationally’.13 These b order a reas In A frica, t here i s a t endency f or n ational e lites t o u se a ny m eans a t t heir become even more sought after if they contain natural resources. If a rebel group disposal t o c apture s tate p ower a nd m onopolise i t, t o ex clude a nd m arginalise is able to control a border, this enables it to smuggle minerals out of the country other ci tizens f rom t he b enefits o f t he s tate, a nd t o u se v iolence t o co ntain o r and s o f inance i ts wa r ac tivities. D arfurian r ebels, t he L ord’s R esistance A rmy threaten opponents. When these threats reach a certain level, the ruling elite forms (LRA) and Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in Uganda, the Revolutionary United state mi litias t hat i t u ses a gainst o pponents, t hus r emoving i tself f rom dir ect Front of Sierra Leone (RUF) and other groups frustrated government operations intervention a nd cr eating p lausible deni ability.10 Governments’ hidden due to their ability to move easily across porous and poorly controlled borders and contribution to the formation and support of ANSGs is, nevertheless, discernable into o ther s tates’ t erritories. S tates c an a lso a ttract ANSGs f rom n eighbouring across the continent. For instance, in 2003 a le ading Kenyan newspaper revealed states if their capacities to manage and control their border areas are weak, as these that the Mungiki had received military vehicles and sophisticated communication then s erve a s h avens f or t hese g roups. W hen a s tate i s t oo w eak t o co ntrol i ts equipment f rom t he g overnment t o p romote a cer tain c andidate’s p residential frontiers, these territories often become a ‘no-man’s land’ in which rebels reign and campaign in t he D ecember 2002 e lection.11 Although a llocation o f s uch terrorise local populations. The failure of the state to provide security to its citizens government e quipment could h ave b een authorised only at t he hig hest le vel of in m arginal t erritories er odes t heir lo yalty t o t he s tate a nd g ives r ebels a n government, h ow a mi litia g roup t hat h ad a r eputation f or c arrying o ut advantage when faced with responses such as military operations.14 horrendous ac ts o f b rutality o n t he p opulation g ot t he hig hly s ophisticated Borders and border areas can become theatres of confrontation if they separate military equipment has never come to light. antagonistic states. Poor interstate relations between leaders of neighbouring states Oloo (chapter 6) recommends that elites who use ANSGs be held accountable also p lay a r ole in p romoting ANSG ac tivities. F or exa mple, t he s our r elations for their violation of domestic and international laws. Those who fund and arm between presidents Yoweri Museveni and Omar el-Bashir were a key factor in the the youth, organise them into militia groups and manipulate them to engage in support each accorded the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and the LRA violence, should be arrested, prosecuted and punished. National laws should be respectively, as was the case of Rwandan and Ugandan support of anti-Kabila rebel strengthened t o p revent a nd co mbat t he f unding a nd o rganising o f ANSGs. groups.15 Foreign support given to rebels includes intelligence, training facilities, However, t he s tate a nd t he ci tizens, t hrough ci vil s ociety, s hould s hare t he weapons and ammunition, logistical assistance, tactical advice, financial support responsibility for ending political violence, particularly during election periods, by and sanctuary. Such support allows ANSGs t o expand their areas of operations monitoring and promoting a peaceful articulation of interests. across borders and makes it harder to deal with them without a regional strategy. It is obvious that the persistence of militias in A frica reflects the penchant of In a l ater section, we in fac t show that countries in t he Great Lakes region have elites for manipulation of the youth, and as Oloo notes, the depth of the ‘culture of now devised a regional strategy to deal with ANSGs.

442 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 443 CONFRONTING THE THREATS OF ARMED NON-STATE GROUPS TO HUMAN SECURITY WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE AND THE STATE IN AFRICA

Idean Sa lehyan p oints o ut t hat sin ce ext raterritorial b ases a llow r ebels t o to g overnment p lans a nd r etreat b efore o perations o r di ssolve in to ci vilian prolong conflicts and contribute to regional hostilities and instability, there is a populations. ‘necessity o f a b road r egional co operation in b ringing a bout a n en d t o Local communities respond to ANSGs in varied ways. In most cases, they flee transnational rebellions’.16 In order to end armed conflicts, ‘rebel host states must their homes and seek safety in internally displaced persons (IDP) camps or across provide credible promises of their own to demonstrate that foreign combatants on borders. In other cases, locals protect themselves and their property by taking up their territory are not welcome, now and in t he future. They must also monitor arms and forming s elf-defence units. There are a lso c ases w here lo cals support and verify rebel disarmament’.17 Even if a state has superior military capabilities to rebels or j oin t hem to ensure t heir property and families are s afe f rom attacks. keep rebels outside its boundaries, ANSGs such as the FDLR and the LRA could However, in m ost o f t hese si tuations, a s W assara o bserves in c hapter 9, t he still continue to threaten and undermine the livelihoods of the citizens of those outcome i s a b reakdown o f t he r ule o f l aw, los s o f lo cal g overnance a nd countries where they are allowed to roam free. Saleyhan argues that conflict can be militarisation o f t he co mmunities. Thi s, in t urn, co mplicates p ost-conflict terminated by ‘removal of sanctuary and actions by host states’ as was the case in peacebuilding ef forts a imed a t r estoring t he r ule o f l aw a nd j ustice, a nd Rwanda. demilitarising co mmunities t hrough dem obilisation a nd di sarmament Due t o t he a rtificial co lonial p artitioning o f A frica a nd m arginalisation o f programmes. At the end of a conflict, these local communities are usually afraid to frontiers and border areas,18 ethnic groups across borders are easily exploited by hand over their weapons or reveal their actual involvement in the conflict. While ANSGs. This is why ANSGs that rely on ‘sociocultural and sociospatial settings … some of the former combatants are reluctant to come forward to be demobilised are not bound by territorial borders’,19 especially those who are members of ethnic for f ear o f b eing h eld acco untable f or t heir ac ts d uring t he co nflict, o thers a re communities t hat s traddle s tate b oundaries. T ransboundary r ebel g roups a re disinclined t o h and o ver t heir w eapons w hile t heir s ecurity a nd s afety a re n ot difficult to manage due to the external resources, sanctuary and support that they guaranteed and mutual mistrust between communities continues to prevail. receive, w hich les sen t heir dep endence ‘ on t he g oodwill o f t he do mestic Peters’ chapter (chapter 14) reveals that the strength of the relationship existing population for their viability’.20 between rebels and local communities is critical in det ermining the timing and type of intervention in a conflict. For instance, at the early stages, when rebels have APPROACHES TO CONFRONTING THE ANSG friendly relations with local communities, they can be intransigent, as their anti- PHENOMENON IN AFRICA establishment message, cloaked in the form of grievances against the government, resonates with locals. However, the situation changes when, at a later stage, a rebel Local responses group alienates itself from the local population often through the brutal tactics it employs, so that it loses the ground advantage. In such a c ase, it is easier for the How an ANSG behaves determines, to a large extent, the support it receives from government to succeed in ending the conflict by exerting military and diplomatic the local population and the level of success in meeting its objectives. ANSGs rely pressure. H owever, mi litary m easures s hould en sure ade quate p rotection f or on local support to launch their campaigns against the state. Capitalising on local civilians o r e lse t hey co uld r egenerate s upport f or t he r ebels. Thi s i s w hat support a nd k nowledge o f t he lo cal t errain, ANSGs c an ini tially f rustrate happened in n orthern Uganda during three highly publicised operations against government responses and draw out the conflict for a long period. A state’s control the LRA, which were widely criticised for failing to eliminate the Kony menace of a territory does not guarantee the support of the local population, particularly and left civilians vulnerable to his reprisals. In the eastern Democratic Republic of if it has been marginalised and excluded from the centre of power. Most military Congo (DRC), locals have formed civil defence units to protect themselves, similar campaigns against rebel groups have been largely unsuccessful because they lacked to the formation of the Kamajor in Sierra Leone. In the long run, these units could intelligence a nd w ere n ot p lanned w ith a c lear un derstanding o f t hese g roups’ transform themselves into full-fledged rebel and militia groups filling the void left areas of operations.21 ANSGs, in most cases, possess accurate intelligence, are privy by the lack of a state presence.

444 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 445 CONFRONTING THE THREATS OF ARMED NON-STATE GROUPS TO HUMAN SECURITY WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE AND THE STATE IN AFRICA

Apart f rom i ts le adership a nd o rganisation, t he en durance a nd s uccess o f a public interest-based p olitical p articipation [w hich] w ill en hance accountability rebel g roup dep end, t o a l arge deg ree, o n t he lo cal s upport a nd a vailability o f and transparency’ and, by extension, popular participation in government.29 ‘capital to finance the logistics of a military campaign’.22 Consequently, it has to tap into t wo s ources: ‘[E]co nomic en dowments, w hich co me f rom di verse s ources, State responses including n atural r esource ext raction, t axation, cr iminal ac tivity o r ext ernal patronage; a nd s ocial en dowments, in cluding s hared b eliefs, exp ectations a nd In her chapter on the analysis of ANSGs through the comprehensive framework of norms that may exist in (o r be mobilised from within) certain ethnic, religious, their ‘relationship with the government and attitude towards state monopoly of cultural or ideological groups.’23 Therefore, a strategy for confronting ANSGs must violence’, En gels p oints o ut t hat n ational a rmies p lay ‘ a cr ucial r ole in t he aim at denying them such resources, because their availability, particularly at the emergence of armed non-state g roups’.30 Ibaba and Ikelegbe, Oloo and Wassara beginning, determines the type of members and way in which they are recruited, also call for special attention to the role that state violence plays in g erminating and how they commit to the group’s objectives.24 The ability of ANSG le aders to rebel ac tivities. A co mmon s tate r esponse t o r ebel ac tivities i s t he u se o f b rute gain access to and use these resources determines how its members behave vis-à- force, aimed at eliminating the groups, in p olice and military operations and the vis civilians and how long it lasts. Further, if t here are few resources, members activities of paramilitary and pro-government militia groups. In a statement given would probably engage in lo oting and other criminal activities to acquire funds. before t he United Nations Human R ights C ouncil, P rofessor P hilip A lston, t he However, if t hey do h ave acces s t o n atural r esources, t hey co uld cr eate a wa r special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, pointed out economy in which they play different roles.25 that ‘hyper-active death squads’ bring ‘no relief’ to the ANSG v iolence. Instead, In co untries w here ANSGs a re a fac tor in t he n atural r esource c urse, a n ‘they have only succeeded in un dermining the rule of law, distracting the police obvious s olution would b e to come up w ith ‘ better ways of m anaging resource from t heir p rotection a nd investigative r oles, f uelling t he c ycle o f v iolence a nd wealth for the benefit of the population’.26 Weinstein contends that a critical factor tarnishing [the government’s] reputation’.31 Alston advised governments to come determining t he p ropensity o f a r ebel g roup’s u se o f v iolence i s t he a bility t o up with a ‘detailed and convincing strategy for combating violence, extortion and mobilise m aterial r esources t o f inance t he wa rfare. H ence, ‘ rebel g roups t hat other cr imes b y ga ngs’, and a void m aking s tatements t hat t he g overnment w ill emerge in environments rich in natural resources or with the external support of ‘crush’ or ‘smash’ such groups. an o utside p atron t end t o co mmit hig h le vels o f in discriminate v iolence; Governments’ in decisiveness a nd im proper r esponses h ave a lso en gendered movements that arise in r esource-poor contexts perpetrate far fewer abuses and impunity and emboldened these groups. Though state responses are a key factor employ v iolence s electively a nd s trategically’.27 Although n atural r esources h ave in containing ANSG activities, if an operation is carried out in ways that alienate been widely regarded as Africa’s curse, there is no scientific evidence to prove that the local population, it ends up driving it into the arms of the rebels. Ibaba and resource abundance causes conflict. On the contrary, conflicts in resource-wealthy Ikelegbe argue that ‘violent repression of conflicts will accentuate insecurity’ and countries a re c aused b y ‘ poor in stitutional a nd g overnance q uality t hat a llows ’sweeps the causes of agitation and dissent under the carpet for a moment’, only for national elite to become corrupt and give maximum advantage to foreign mining them to ‘flare up again, often with disastrous consequences’.32 companies to reap huge profits’.28 Addressing the ANSG p henomenon is not solely a l aw enforcement measure Measures that could be used to eliminate the risk of ANSG v iolence include calling for the application of brute force, as this approach not only violates human increasing income levels and equitably distributing such natural wealth resources. rights through arbitrary executions and instilling fear in civilian populations, but Ibaba and Ikelegbe further propose some form of local ‘resource ownership and also generates counterviolence and lawlessness, which these groups exploit. This is control, increases in the derivation fund and abrogation of repressive oil laws’ that clearly illustrated by Oloo’s analysis in c hapter 6 o f the factors that contribute to will allow the governed to access and to extract the resources. This, as the case of the armed groups in Kenya. The two main reasons why there is a ‘proliferation of the N iger D elta i llustrates, m ust b e acco mpanied b y ‘ adoption o f dem ocratic armed militias’ are ‘the failure by the government to arrest, prosecute and punish principles such as the rule of law, fundamental human rights, rule by consent and members o f t hese mi litias a nd t heir s ponsors’33 and p oor g overnance, w hich

446 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 447 CONFRONTING THE THREATS OF ARMED NON-STATE GROUPS TO HUMAN SECURITY WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE AND THE STATE IN AFRICA generate conditions such as poverty that lead to the emergence of these groups. Some governments use the presence of ANSGs to militarise the state by pointing This means addressing this phenomenon requires a comprehensive approach that out that their activities are inimical to state and human security. For that reason, includes p unishment f or im punity, dem ocratic g overnance o f t he s tate, governments proceed to increase military budgets, and adopt draconian laws and enhancement of human security, equitable distribution of national wealth and/or measures that in the short and long term severely undermine state legitimacy and resources, and promotion of peace values. the c ulture o f h uman r ights. I n K enya, t here a re s peculations t hat t he S pecial The failure of brute force to repress the ANSG phenomenon and rebellion and Branch, a n in telligence o rganisation t hat wa s l ater r eplaced b y t he N ational the sinister motives that sometimes underlie such an approach are demonstrated Security Intelligence Service was responsible for setting up and sustaining a rebel by the following examples. When the Mengistu government was confronted by a group, the February 18 Revolutionary Army, in the early 1990s to boost and justify rebel insurgency in t he Ogaden in 1980, i t adopted a p olicy of depopulating the its high budget allocations to security apparatuses.38 34 region. Calling it ‘a f inal s olution’ to t he S omali insurgencies, t he government With r egard t o N orth A frica, G eorge a nd Y lönen s tate in c hapter 12 t hat aimed at forcing an exodus of Somali-speaking Ethiopians ‘as a way of ending the confronting Islamist militants could be complicated by the fact that their link to 35 20-year-old guerrilla war in the Ogaden’. The policy entailed government soldiers the ‘global jihad is no longer clear’. The approach of some states to allow Islamist ‘machine gunning herds of camels, robbing and burning fields, destroying settled political parties has yielded some positive results when combined with changes in farms a nd t aking a way y oung m en t o f ight in Er itrea’. Although E thiopia h ad government p olicies t hat t arget a ‘ frustrated midd le c lass’ a nd ‘ the p oor a nd defeated the Somali army that invaded the region in March 1978, a rebel group, the 39 disgruntled sectors of the population’. They recommend that states should seize Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), continued to wage an irredentist war the opportunity when ‘frustration and disenchantment [are not being] channelled with t he s upport o f E gypt a nd Iraq. W hen t he f ront ce ased t o exi st in 1989, a towards violent jihad’ to improve the human security of their citizens. In chapter splinter group formed the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). 11, Muhammad Kabir a lso hig hlights t his cr itical role of t he state in p roviding In n orthern U ganda, t he g overnment o f M useveni es tablished a sys tem t o social and economic benefits as a p reventive measure for growth of ANSGs, b y protect the local population from the LRA rebels and also depopulate the rural arguing t hat i ts c apacity s hould b e s trengthened t o p rovide p ublic g oods a nd areas in o rder to allow mopping up by the military.36 This encampment of local services, proactively respond to the needs of its citizens, guarantee a dem ocratic populations was also aimed at controlling the local populations and ensuring they society, equitably distribute national resources, and ‘pursue a social and economic neither supported the LRA nor dissented against the government. Nevertheless, policy that will ensure the realisation of rights, equity and justice’ for all citizens argues Chris Dolan, the local population was subjected to social torture through 40 an enf orced dep endency o n a p rotection sys tem t hat t hreatened i ts s ocial, regardless of their identity. economic and psychological wellbeing. The ‘protected villages’ that were set up in African governments could learn some useful lessons from law enforcement in northern Uganda (which turned out to be squalid internal displacement camps) the United S tates a nd p articularly h ow i t h as de alt w ith o ver 500 un organised were criticised by human rights groups for making the residents more vulnerable militia groups such as the Hutaree, which is not part of the National Guard or the 41 to various violations by the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) and the LRA. Naval Militia. Between 27 a nd 29 M arch 2010, a j oint anti-terrorism taskforce Dolan argues that ending the LRA insurgency has not been in t he government’s comprising state and local police forces, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) interests, as that would have deprived it of its reason for controlling a population and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives carried out special that it regards as hostile. Counterinsurgency against the LRA, apart from serving operations t hat le d t o t he a rrest o f nin e m embers o f t he H utaree mi litia in this purpose, h as a lso b een u sed to en hance e conomic interests of t he mi litary Michigan, Ohio and Indiana after collecting intelligence on the group’s intentions through dubious purchases of weapons and hiring of ‘ghost soldiers’.37 to commit mass violence. Apart from monitoring the group’s use of media such as Fighting a gainst mi litias a nd r ebels h as p rovided en ormous f inancial YouTube, F acebook, radio b roadcasts, e-m ail a nd v oice co mmunications, l aw opportunities f or t he s ecurity p ersonnel t o b enefit p ersonally f rom t he enforcement agencies also infiltrated the group and gained knowledge on its plans, procurement o f w eapons a nd hir ing o f s oldiers a nd l aw enf orcement o fficials. which m ade i t p ossible t o co ntain i t.42 The g overnment’s s pecial o peration

448 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 449 CONFRONTING THE THREATS OF ARMED NON-STATE GROUPS TO HUMAN SECURITY WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE AND THE STATE IN AFRICA effectively prevented an uprising that the group had intended to trigger by killing An in teresting t ransformation o f a n ANSG in to a p olitical p arty i s t hat o f police officers to provoke a heavy-handed government reaction.43 Kenya’s outlawed Mungiki sect, which transformed itself into the Kenya National African g overnments h ave t raditionally s ought t o s ubjugate in surgencies Youth A lliance (KNYA). D espite proscription, j ailing of its members and b eing through military force, as most consider negotiating with opponents to be a sign targeted by special police squads for elimination, the Mungiki has become a force of weakness. Consequently, most armed conflicts between government forces and to reckon with on Kenya’s political landscape. Claiming millions of members, it ANSGs, such as that between the Government of Sudan and the SPLA, take long has recently attempted to influence political developments in the country by either to en d. Of ten, t he in surgent g roups e ventually n egotiate t hemselves in to sponsoring p oliticians o r h aving i ts o wn m embers r un f or o ffice. A part f rom government, as was the case with the SPLA, RENAMO (the Resistência Nacional forming KNYA, which later became the Progressive Party Alliance, to overcome its Moçambicana, Mozambican National Resistance) and RUF. scary image of a m urderous and bloody sect, some Mungiki leaders have either converted to C hristianity or j oined establishment p oliticians to promote c auses Transforming ANSGs into civil actors: cases and challenges such as adoption of a new constitution that seeks to address Kenya’s long-standing historical grievances and injustices. How can ANSGs be transformed into parties that vie for and properly use political However, Denis Tull and Andreas Mehler are opposed to providing rebels with power? Th e a nswer t o t his q uestion co uld b e o f in terest t o t he S udan People’s a share of state power, as it creates an incentive for groups to seek power through Liberation Movement (SPLM), which recently won elections in south Sudan and insurgent v iolence.46 Ian S pears i s a lso o pposed t o p ower s haring b etween 44 is poised to run it as the newest state in Africa after a referendum next year. Many governments and ANSGs because it ‘is a surprisingly unstable form of government rebel groups find it difficult to transform into a political party or to function in a that … p rovides o nly a s hort-term r eprieve f rom v iolent co nflict’, is ‘ virtually democratic p olitical sys tem. W ith a f ew ex ceptions, r ebel g roups s uch a s unworkable’ beyond the transitional phase, as it is difficult to implement, and ‘does RENAMO in M ozambique a nd UNITA ( União N acional p ara a I ndependência not r esolve co nflict b ut in stead m ay o nly t emporarily di splace i t o r di sguise Total de Angola, National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) in Angola disputants’ more malevolent intentions’.47 Among power-sharing agreements that have found the political terrain too rugged to navigate with a guerrilla mindset and failed w ere t hose en tered in to t o en d ci vil wa rs in S ierra L eone, A ngola a nd modus operandi. These groups, as Justin Pearce put it in chapter 13, ‘have suffered Rwanda.48 as a r esult of a p articular kind of authoritarian leadership’. As Pearce notes, the While groups such as the RPF captured power after the failure of the Arusha performances of these groups in post-conflict political environments prove that a Peace A greement b ecause o f g overnment h ardliners w ho w ere o pposed t o t he ‘political r elationship, f orged in wa rtime, h as n othing in co mmon w ith t he arrangement, o thers, s uch a s t he M useveni-led NR A, s eized p ower a fter workings of a political party in a democracy’.45 abandoning t he N airobi a greement w ith t he t hen O kello mi litary g overnment. Although U ganda’s N ational R esistance A rmy (NR A) a nd t he R wandan Indeed, as Patricia Daley argues, approaches that seek to simply establish negative Patriotic Front (RPF) stand out as good examples of rebel groups that successfully peace t hrough ce asefire a greements, t ransitional g overnments, demi litarisation transformed t hemselves in to r espectable r uling p arties, t he S PLM h as b een and constitutional reform that end in democratic elections cannot be expected to accused of being dictatorial and embracing a guer rilla mentality while in p ower. guarantee lo ng-term p eace.49 Ending exi sting v iolent co nflicts t hrough During the 22 years it fought a bush war against the north, the SPLM was never agreements that establish positive peace is the best guarantee for preventing future run as a democratic outfit and is known to have dealt mercilessly with dissent on conflicts. a number of occasions. In the past few years that the SPLM has been learning the Governments must develop coherent approaches for addressing ANSGs based ropes o f g overnance a nd s tatecraft, i t h as face d s erious q uestions a bout i ts on an understanding of their objectives and the reasons that gave rise to them, commitments to democracy, governance and human rights. The fallout from the instead o f m aking k neejerk r esponses t hat cr iminalise a nd b rand t hem a s April 2010 e lections s eems t o h ave g enerated s plinter g roups t hat wa nt t o u se ‘terrorists’, and using brute force to eliminate them. Criminalising and labelling a violence to gain acceptance in the new political dispensation. group as ‘terrorist’ inevitably shuts out peaceful negotiation options and opens the

450 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 451 CONFRONTING THE THREATS OF ARMED NON-STATE GROUPS TO HUMAN SECURITY WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE AND THE STATE IN AFRICA door t o t he u se o f s tate s ecurity a pparatuses. Thi s wa s i llustrated b y h ow t he those c alled f or in t he I CGLR p act, p articularly t he es tablishment o f r egional solution of the northern Uganda conflict became complicated once the Museveni projects on governance and economic growth that aim at eliminating conditions government branded the LRA a terrorist organisation and ruled out any attempt that give rise to and sustain ANSGs. 55 The affected countries can also take joint to n egotiate w ith i t. Om ach c autions t hat en gaging r ebel g roups in p eaceful regional m easures t hat in clude ‘ sharing in telligence w ith o ne a nother, negotiations ‘should not be misconstrued as condoning their criminal activities’.50 coordinating co unterinsurgency ac tions a nd p roviding b order s ecurity’.56 Since ‘unilateral mi litary s olutions against rebels without b orders’ have ‘only minimal Regional responses success’, it is advisable to avoid them since they ‘go only so far in (t emporarily) containing v iolence’. Instead, Sa leyhan r ecommends m ediation, w hich i s m ore Saleyhan argues that although ‘building domestic institutions and state capacity, likely to succeed in s olving ‘long-standing insurgency’.57 And w here ANSGs a re fostering economic growth, reducing corruption and power-sharing among ethnic still active, attempts should be made to create an environment that allows peaceful groups’ h ave b een o ffered a s s trategies f or co nfronting ANSGs, t hey s hould b e negotiations t o t ake p lace. Thi s co uld in clude sig ning a nd enf orcing ce asefire undertaken within a r egional framework.51 However, ‘regional strategy does not agreements and deployment of a force to monitor their implementation. deny t he im portance o f lo cal p olicing a nd s ervice p rovision. R ather, i t add s Indeed, the sponsoring and facilitation of peace negotiations have become one meaningful international co operation among s tates in t he region t o t he mix o f of the common regional responses to ANSGs. Most peace negotiations on armed solutions to a civil conflict’.52 conflicts b etween s tates a nd ANSGs h ave b een c arried o ut w ithin r egional Conflicts in which ANSGs are supported by other states are difficult to address frameworks. Th ese in clude t he I GAD-facilitated C omprehensive P eace unless t hese s tates a re co mpelled t o a bandon t he s upport in t he in terests o f Agreement t hat en ded t he n orth–south wa r in S udan, a nd t he p eace processes regional integration, peace and stability. The best example of the use of a regional facilitated b y t he E conomic C ommunity o f West A frica S tates (EC OWAS) t hat framework for such a purpose is the International Conference on the Great Lakes ended civil wars in L iberia and Sierra Leone. The successes of these agreements region (I CGLR) o f A frica. A r egional p act, s uch a s t hat o f t he I CGLR, i s a n can be measured by how they address the root causes of the conflicts to produce appropriate m easure f or co nfronting ANSGs. H owever, i t m ust b e f ully durable s olutions t hat e quitably di stribute n ational r esources, b uild s tate implemented and supported by all participating governments. An initiative such institutions t hat gu arantee h uman s ecurity, a nd es tablish p rocesses t hat a llow as that by the African Union to transform borders into bridges of cooperation and peaceful and democratic engagement between citizens and communities and with integration co uld e liminate co nditions t hat a llow b order a reas t o b e a reas o f the state. The biggest challenges facing regionally facilitated peace agreements are operations for ANSGs.53 the lack of resources and weak monitoring regimes to ensure full implementation. Furthermore, co ntinental ini tiatives s uch a s t he A frican P eer R eview Poor implementation of a peace agreement can have catastrophic consequences, as Mechanism (APRM) of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) Gilbert K hadiagala co nfirms: ‘ Rwanda’s g enocide r esulted in p art f rom t he could be very effective tools for preventing ANSGs if they are fully implemented. weakness o f t he A rusha A greement a nd t he p altry ef forts t o im plement i t.’ In This proviso also applies to the APRM, which aims at improving governance and particular, the agreement sought to transform the existing ‘dominant ethnic basis effectiveness o f A frican s tates. F or in stance, in i ts 2007 r eport o n K enya, t he of power’, and in t he process ‘caused an extremist reaction’.58 This agreement was APRM warned of the impending eruption of ethnic violence if the way the country also exp ected t o b e im plemented in a hig hly v olatile r egion a nd f unded b y was being governed did not change. Had the government heeded this warning, the ‘unwilling and unprepared’ international actors. post-election violence of 2008 that was mainly spread by ANSGs and government As Engels (chapter 2), Omach (chapter 10) and Munene (chapter 15) point out, forces could have been prevented. there a re r ebel ac tivities t hat t ranscend n ational b oundaries a nd h ave r egional Since ANSGs s uch a s t he LR A h ave r egionalised t hemselves t hrough t heir dimensions. Addressing rebel activities in conflict clusters such as the Mano River activities, networking and sponsorships, regional mechanisms are needed to deal and Great Lakes regions can be very complicated due to the skill with which these with t hem.54 Such m echanisms s hould co ntain co nflict cir cuit b reakers s uch a s groups tactically and strategically use porous borders. In the Mano River conflict

452 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 453 CONFRONTING THE THREATS OF ARMED NON-STATE GROUPS TO HUMAN SECURITY WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE AND THE STATE IN AFRICA cluster, for example, rebel groups formed networks and worked closely together, This le aves t he q uestion: w hat a re t he b est in ternational a pproaches f or which required a r egional framework that included local, national, regional and addressing ANSG threats to human and state security in Africa? international actors to address the rebel activities. Such a framework, according to Although each ANSG activity has elicited different international responses, the Omach, should focus on border areas and aim to establish ‘effective state authority most co mmon o ne i s faci litation o f n egotiations w ith g overnments t hey a re and m eaningful admini stration o ver f rontier t erritories [a s] a n im portant s tep fighting against and those that support them. Other responses have been regional towards addr essing t he r egionalisation o f co nflicts’.59 Saleyhan p roposes t hat initiatives such as the ICGLR’s Pact on Security, Stability and Development, which international l aw b e s trengthened t o m ake h arbouring o f ANSGs in a s tate’s in p art c alls o n m ember s tates ‘ To abstain f rom s ending o r s upporting a rmed territory an act of direct military aggression and violation of the UN Charter. He opposition f orces o r a rmed g roups o r in surgents o nto t he t erritory o f o ther proposes that ‘the UN Security Council must treat deliberate support for another member states, or from tolerating the presence on their territories of armed groups state’s rebel organisation an act of war and adopt an equivalent response’.60 or in surgents en gaged in a rmed co nflicts o r in volved in ac ts o f v iolence o r subversion against the government of another state’ (article 5[b]).62 Furthermore, International responses states a re exp ected ‘ To co operate a t a ll le vels w ith a v iew t o di sarming a nd dismantling exi sting a rmed r ebel g roups a nd t o p romote t he j oint a nd International di scourses o n A frican h uman s ecurity h ave, sin ce 11 S eptember participatory management of state and human security on their common borders’ 2001, focused on the security-development nexus and securitisation of poverty- (article 5[c]). I t h as b een t hrough t his f ramework t hat Rwandan a nd Ugandan stricken Africa. Rita Abrahamsen argues that by linking the source of its security forces have launched Operation Amani, Operation Kimia and Operation Lightning threats in A frica t o p overty and low de velopment le vels, t he West h as justified Thunder to pursue rebel groups such as the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du militarisation of its foreign policy to root out radical elements.61 It is further argued Rwanda (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, FDLR) and LRA into that the high poverty levels and poor governance in Africa are threats to Western the DRC. This pact also aims to end state-sponsored rebel activities such as the security, a s t hey cr eate f ertile b reeding g rounds f or radic alised a nti-Western LRA in Uganda by the el-Bashir government. While the above operations have had elements a mong t he ANSGs. I n order t o confront a nd contain t hese t hreats in mixed r esults in t erms o f en ding r ebel ac tivities, i t h as sig nificantly r educed Africa before they threaten its interests on the continent and reach the West, the governments’ support of rebels operating in neighbouring countries. US has formed an Africa Military Command (AFRICOM), whose task is to break The latest international attempt to stamp out rebel activities is the US L ord’s up a ny lin ks o r n etworks t hat co uld p romote f undamentalism o r radic al ide as Resistance A rmy Di sarmament a nd N orthern U ganda R ecovery A ct o f 2009, across r egions in p articularly A frica a nd a lso t he M iddle E ast. S uch a n which designates the LRA as a t errorist organisation and seeks to eliminate the inappropriate attitude and approach to addressing African security challenges will threats i t p oses t o ‘civilians a nd r egional s tability’ t hrough ‘political, e conomic, fail, a s i t p ays li ttle a ttention t o t he r eal c auses o f t he ANSG p henomenon. military and intelligence support for viable multilateral effort to protect civilians AFRICOM is a ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution to African security challenges and does … to apprehend or otherwise remove Joseph Kony and his top commanders from not recognise that a t hreat to African s ecurity is not necessarily a t hreat to the the battlefield … to disarm and demobilise Lord’s Resistance Army fighters’.63 This West’s security. In fact, the reverse is true, for Africa’s security is more likely to be would en tail co ntinuing t o a ssist U gandan a nd C ongolese t roops t hrough threatened by lin king it t o t he s ecurity of t he West. As Kabir, a nd G eorge a nd AFRICOM and diplomatically engaging ‘with regional mechanisms, including the Ylönen point out in their chapters, African militant and armed Islamist groups do Tripartite Plus C ommission and t he Great L akes Pact’ in im plementing t he US not necessarily have links with the global jihad that the West regards as one of the policy on the LRA. biggest threats to its security. Therefore, approaches for confronting militant and The countries in the Great Lakes region are aware of the role rebel and militia armed Islamist groups in Africa should be based on the understanding that these groups play in illegally exploiting natural resources such as coltan to finance their groups a re n ot c learly a nd dir ectly t ied o r lin ked t o t he g lobal jihad, as has activities, and h ave proposed a cer tification m echanism for t he region’s natural generally been understood in the West. resources. Th e C ertification S cheme f or t he G reat L akes r egion a ims t o t arget

454 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 455 CONFRONTING THE THREATS OF ARMED NON-STATE GROUPS TO HUMAN SECURITY WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE AND THE STATE IN AFRICA those natural resources with the highest potential for illegal exploitation by rebel according t o W einstein, t he a vailable t ools t o inf luence ANSGs t o r espect groups and others financing armed conflicts. This certification mechanism has yet international humanitarian and human rights laws ‘are too blunt, too ineffective, to b e desig ned, de veloped a nd implemented d ue t o a l ack o f p olitical w ill a nd or w holly ir relevant’.67 To o vercome t his, t he I nternational R escue C ommittee financial co mmitment b y t he g overnments in t he r egion a nd t he in ternational (IRC) is carrying out an innovative programme in the Central African Republic to community. ‘train t he co untry’s va rious a rmed g roups in h uman r ights a nd in ternational Other international responses have included deployment of AU and UN forces humanitarian law, Geneva Convention or any other international laws’. Members and arraignment of rebel leaders such as Joseph Kony and Thomas Lubango, and of the main rebel group, L’Armée Populaire pour la Restauration de la République et President Om ar e l-Bashir, b efore t he I nternational Cr iminal C ourt (I CC) f or la Démocratie (Popular Army for the Restoration of the Republic and Democracy, displacing, harming, raping and killing civilians. The successes of these measures APRD), a re t rained n ot o nly in ‘ procedures t o f ollow a t a c heckpoint t hat a re are mixed, as both AU and UN missions in Somalia and the DRC have yet to wipe respectful of rights’, but also in international laws regarding civilian protection in out a ny ANSG t hat i s t hreatening h uman s ecurity a nd un dermining t he armed conflicts. These rebels are given the incentive of recognition and legitimacy establishment o f s tate s overeignties in t hose co untries. Th e ef fectiveness o f if t hey r espect h uman r ights a nd t he r ule o f l aw. Th e s trategy o f t he IR C o f international justice to deter ANSGs that target and use violence against civilians targeting the leadership for behaviour change and participation in the programme is discussed in detail in the next section. seem to be bearing fruit, as the rebels undergoing the training have shown a keen The AU has made a firm commitment to address the phenomenon of ANSGs interest in le arning about international humanitarian laws and applying them in through t he ado ption o f a c harter o n dem ocracy t hat p rohibits, r ejects a nd the field.68 condemns unconstitutional change of government in a ny member state (article In addition, the international community can employ a variety of instruments 2(4)).64 African co untries a re a lso en couraged t o ‘cooperate w ith e ach o ther t o to confront ANSGs and eliminate or limit their negative impact on civilians and ensure t hat t hose w ho a ttempt t o r emove a n e lected g overnment t hrough the state: unconstitutional means are dealt with in accordance with the law’ (article 14[3]). This charter cites an armed rebellion against a democratically elected government I Name, s hame a nd t arget ANSGs f or n ational, r egional a nd in ternational as one of the ‘illegal means of accessing or maintaining power [that] constitute an action. In order to do this, ANSGs should be closely monitored by national and unconstitutional change of government’ (article 23). international o rganisations t hat ‘ gather inf ormation o n h uman r ights The AU does not recognise militias and armed religious groups as liberation violations, assess its validity, and write reports that are quickly made public and movements that are exempted under the terrorism definition by ‘the principles of placed in the hands of key policymakers and the media’.69 However, Weinstein international l aw f or li beration or s elf-determination, in cluding a rmed s truggle and J effrey H erbst70 question h ow n aming a nd s haming in t he m edia c an against co lonialism, o ccupation, a ggression a nd do mination b y f oreign f orces’ influence the behaviour of a rebel group such as the LRA, which does not seem (article 3[1]). 65 The A U f urther p rohibits t he u se o f v iolence f or ‘ political, to care how it is viewed by Ugandans and the international community. Indeed, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other motives’ (article 3[2]). the LRA has b een known to engage in a trocious acts to draw attention and But t here a re g rey a reas in t hese p rescriptions. Fir st, t he A U l aw i s si lent o n generate publicity for itself. Naming and shaming will be effective only if they governments t hat are ‘democratically elected’ but u se v iolence to stay in p ower lead to serious consequences for ANSGs. and, s econd, t he s ame l aw i s si lent o n w hether ci vilians co uld j ustifiably u se I Impose s anctions o n ANSGs t o inf luence t heir b ehaviour. R egional a nd violence t o def end t hemselves a gainst s tate v iolence s uch a s t he u se o f s tate- international g overnments c an t ake m easures s uch a s ‘ travel b ans, b ans o n sponsored militias as ‘an alternative to direct use of force’.66 investment in a reas un der r ebel co ntrol, r estrictions o n a rms t ransfers, t he The def inition o f w hat co nstitutes h uman r ights v iolations s hould b e freezing o f f oreign a ssets a nd p rohibitions o n a g roup’s p olitical ac tivities broadened t o in clude ‘ acts o f v iolence co mmitted b y r ebel g roups’. However, a b r o a d ’. 71 Economic s anctions c an a lso b e im posed o n ‘lega lly t raded

456 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 457 CONFRONTING THE THREATS OF ARMED NON-STATE GROUPS TO HUMAN SECURITY WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE AND THE STATE IN AFRICA

commodities em erging f rom co nflict a reas’. Such s anctions ‘are desig ned t o Legal approaches for addressing the ANSG criminalise s pecific s uppliers w ithin a n o therwise lici t in dustry’.72 Sanctions phenomenon in Africa against ANSGs can take two forms. The first type aims at gaining ‘economic leverage over combatant factions Legal measures c an b e t aken at national and international le vels to address t he by limiting their capacity to trade in particular commodities’.73 These sanctions ANSG phenomenon in Africa. At the national level, one of the most common legal specifically t arget governments t hat support rebel g roups and le aders of t he measures i s g ranting o f a mnesty. Ib aba a nd Ik elegbe (c hapter 8) s uggest t hat groups. However, if these sanctions are to be effective, they must be monitored amnesty p rogrammes, w hich a re p art o f p ackages t hat in clude e conomic on the ground and states must cooperate to enforce them. Although the record empowerment, s hould b e p roperly p lanned a nd ex ecuted t o en sure f ull of commodity sanctions has been mixed, the impact of the UN s anctions to reintegration o f f ormer co mbatants a nd s hould in clude t he es tablishment o f weaken UNITA has been cited as a successful example. youth-based conflict prevention projects. Amnesties have been widely applied and The second type is certification of commodities from conflict areas, which used concurrently with other measures. For instance, the Ugandan government aims ‘to prevent the trade in a specific commodity from particular producers’ has offered amnesty packages to LRA combatants under a law guaranteeing them 74 from b eing s old o n t he w orld m arkets. Since cer tification i s b ased o n a r esettlement p ackage t hat in cludes a l ump s um o f a bout US$150, a m attress, ‘controlling access to the market for commodities that have not been certified’, blanket, hoe and some seeds. Although the Uganda Amnesty Commission claims it w ill b e m ost ef fective w hen ‘firms t hat purchase a nd s tates t hat consume to have demobilised 16245 individuals and provided reintegration support to 14 these commodities’ cooperate by not buying uncertified products. Although 604 others,80 the effectiveness of the programme has been widely questioned, as ‘these r egimes p rovide les s le verage o ver a p articular g roup in a p articular some of its beneficiaries were never fully integrated, have returned to rebel ranks conflict’ t hey s end a s trong m essage t hat a g roup’s e conomic r esources a re or h ave t aken u p a lif e o f cr ime t o s urvive. Th e ef fectiveness o f t he N igerian insecure.75 Apart from the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for Rough amnesty programme, which was launched in October 2009 to end militia activities Diamonds,76 another example of eliminating trade in conflict natural resources in t he N iger D elta r egion a nd i s c urrently b eing im plemented, i s a lso b eing is the Great Lakes region’s ‘mineral certification of origin scheme’. If effectively criticised f or l acking a p eace a greement f ramework t hat in cludes co nfidence carried out, ’sanctions and certification regimes …[that can] choke the lifeline building, and commitments to addressing grievances and other issues that could that s ustains a rmed n on-state g roups’ a nd ‘h elp t o s tarve b elligerents o f have contributed t o t he em ergence of ANSGs in t he country in t he f irst p lace. revenue, make the benefits of peace more attractive, or raise the costs of trade Other criticisms levelled at the Nigerian amnesty programme are its lack of legal sufficiently t o d ampen p rofit m argins’. Th ey a lso ‘ undermine co mfortable 77 status a nd a co mprehensive di sarmament, dem obilisation, r ehabilitation a nd stalemates in which both sides benefit from continued conflict’. The ef fectiveness o f s anctions w ill dep end o n t he f ollowing: t he r ebel reintegration p rogramme t hat in cludes t otal demi litarisation o f t he r egion. organisation must be sufficiently dependent on a particular resource flow to make Because of such shortcomings, it is most likely that it will fail to restore justice, the organisation and implementation of sanctions worth the costs of mobilising destroy t he i llegal e conomy, p romote h uman a nd en vironmental s ecurity, a nd compliance and enforcement mechanisms. Second, the leadership must be able to establish governance systems that ensure natural resources are equitably shared. bring the members of the faction along if the lever is powerful enough to provide Apart f rom t he u se o f n on-incarcerating m echanisms s uch a s a mnesty a nd incentives for settlement or behavioural change.78 truth co mmissions f or addr essing ANSG v iolence, cr iminal p rosecution h as become the preferred method of the international community.81 Legal approaches The side effect of this prescription is that when a non-state armed group is denied for addressing the bedlam caused by ANSGs s uch as the Mungiki, Mai-Mai and access to economic endowments such as natural resources that sustain it, it will Boko Haram are complicated by the fact that they cannot be classified in terms of probably resort ‘to looting to maintain its membership’.79 international law definitions of militias and self-determination groups. Even those

458 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 459 CONFRONTING THE THREATS OF ARMED NON-STATE GROUPS TO HUMAN SECURITY WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE AND THE STATE IN AFRICA groups that are fighting for national liberation, and are effectively recognised by constraints ICTs face in admini stering sanctions’ also make international justice the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Convention,82 have been denied recognition ineffective in en ding ANSGs v iolence. Instead of looking to ICTs to punish and by states that instead treat them as criminals or terrorists. This has conveniently deter in ternational cr iminals, m ore ef fort s hould b e p ut in to ‘ developing a n allowed governments to apply national criminal laws to deal with these groups. effective f ramework f or addr essing h umanitarian a trocities’ b y ‘ building r obust Regardless of whether the state regards ANSGs a s rebels, criminals or terrorists, domestic in stitutions in w eak s tates t hat c an s uccessfully c hannel p olitical they are obligated under international humanitarian laws to handle them in ways participation a nd di spute r esolution’.87 Ku a nd N zelibe c aution t hat I CT that do not violate their rights. On their part, ANSGs are also obligated to observe prosecutions mig ht a lso fail t o det er ANSG v iolence if t hey t ry t o remove a nd and respect international human rights and humanitarian laws.83 arrest the leadership ‘prior to the resolution of a civil conflict’. In addition, going Some r ebels g roups h ave m ade i t e asy f or g overnments t o b rand t hem the international justice route ‘might distort the incentives of leaders in weak states criminals d ue t o t heir l ack o f li beration cr edentials, cr iminal co nduct a nd to en gage in t he k inds o f co nstructive r eform ef forts t hat w ill t hwart f uture destruction o f ci vilian p opulation li velihoods. I n r esponse t o t hreats p osed b y humanitarian atrocities. In other words, rather than invest in b uilding domestic rebel groups, Musila (in chapter 4) points out that while some states have enacted institutions t hat c an in capacitate domestic offenders, le aders of s uch s tates w ill national laws that categorise them as criminals or terrorists, others have refused to often s eek t o u se t he t hreat o f a n I CT p rosecution t o ac hieve n arrow p olitical 88 ratify or apply international laws that would give them legal status. This further objectives that will often be inconsistent with the norm-promotion goals of ICTs.’ Okechukwu Oko argues that although ‘the criminal process can be deployed to complicates peacemaking efforts, as governments take obdurate positions of not engineer compliance with the law and to deter would be perpetrators of evil … the negotiating with ‘terrorist’ or ‘criminal’ groups. objectives o f u sing cr iminal p rosecution t o r e-establish s ocial e quilibrium a nd Currently, t he in ternational co mmunity i s in clined t o h old le aders a nd promote reconciliation … are simply unattainable’. It is unrealistic to assume that members of ANSGs accountable for violations of international humanitarian and ‘international cr iminal p rosecutions w ill r econcile m utually di strustful et hnic human r ights l aws. A part f rom t he a pplication o f t he uni versal j urisdiction groups with a long history of reciprocal hatred’.89 In the sense that the aim of such principle, t here a re va rious in stitutional f orums s uch a s ad ho c tribunals – f or prosecutions ‘ is t o a pportion b lame a nd p unish t he gui lty’, they fa il t o addr ess example the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the Special other s ources o f co nflict s uch a s s tate w eakness, p oor g overnance, in equitable Court f or S ierra L eone, a nd t he I CC, t hat a re b eing u sed t o det er a nd p unish allocation of resources, corruption and marginalisation that destabilise national 84 ‘human rights violations committed by armed non-state groups’. The main aim of 90 states. Legal m easures w ould addr ess t he un derlying c auses o nly if t hey w ere these trials and tribunals is ‘to send a strong signal to perpetrators and would-be undertaken in co ncert w ith p olitical r eforms a nd n ational s ocioeconomic perpetrators t hat t hey w ill b e h eld in dividually acco untable f or h uman r ights development. O ko c autions f urther t hat ‘ traditional n otions o f t he cr iminal 85 violations t hey co mmit’. However, in o rder f or t hese t rials a nd det errents t o process’ cannot address the type of violence committed by groups against other effectively influence the behaviour of ANSGs and their leaders, they must be seen groups. F urthermore, i t h as n ot b een em pirically v erified t hat in ternational to restore justice and punish perpetrators of violence. Drawn-out trials such as that criminal p rosecution c an det er v iolence. A b igger c hallenge f or enf orcing of Charles Taylor and the perpetrators of the 1994 Rwanda genocide at the ICTR, international justice in A frica lies in A frican governments’ reluctance to support as well as t he s eeming p owerlessness of t he ICC to arrest Joseph Kony and his prosecution o f A fricans in in ternational t ribunals f or wa r cr imes. A frican commanders, h ave lowered t he exp ectations m any h ad o f t hese in struments o f governments a re n ot o nly s ceptical a bout in ternational cr iminal l aw b ut a lso international justice to contribute to the promotion of peace and justice in Africa. openly hostile towards it,91 as shown by the position the AU has taken towards the Julian Ku and Jide Nzelibe argue that if ANSGs a re operating in w eak states, ICC and its pursuit of bringing the Sudanese president to justice in Th e Hague. they a re m ore li kely t o b e det erred b y inf ormal s anctions s uch a s de ath, Ralph Zacklin dismisses international criminal prosecution bodies as ‘mechanism imprisonment a nd t orture t han b y in ternational cr iminal t ribunal (I CT) for de aling w ith j ustice in p ost-conflict s ocieties’, s tating t hat t hey a re n ot prosecutions.86 The a wareness o f le aders s uch a s K ony o f ‘ the sig nificant politically and financially viable, and are inefficient and ineffective.92

460 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 461 CONFRONTING THE THREATS OF ARMED NON-STATE GROUPS TO HUMAN SECURITY WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE AND THE STATE IN AFRICA

CONCLUSION client sys tems, a nd c hange t he m ode o f p olitical en gagement f rom a zer o-sum game to a positive-sum game, which benefits all and does not allow a loser to be As stated above, this book is an exercise in b ringing about a g reater and deeper excluded a nd m arginalised a s fa r a s acces s t o p ublic g oods a nd s ervices i s understanding about ANSGs in A frica by providing a comprehensive framework concerned. Furthermore, states should be secured against political elites who use of analysis that categorises them and analyses each group’s motives, mobilisation it to marginalise citizens on the basis of their identity, and exclude them from the and recruitment, as well as its relationship to the state as either an instrument or benefits of public goods and services. 93 victim of its violence. Such a framework will assist with the conduct of in-depth However, a w ord o f c aution i s n ecessary: t here i s n o gu arantee t hat e ven a studies o n ANSGs a nd p roduce k nowledge t hat inf orms ef forts a t co nfronting combination o f t he r esponses hig hlighted in t his a nd o ther c hapters w ould their threats to human and state security. The utility of such a framework in policy effectively ext erminate t he ANSG t hreats t o human s ecurity. While t he c ase o f formation lies in p roviding information on options for dealing with ANSGs t hat Uganda s hows t hat r esponses s uch a s mi litary o perations, ci vilian c amps, transcend a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to prevent and combat ANSGs activities, as amnesties, p eace t alks, r egional mi litary ac tions a nd I CC in dictments94 have it r ecognises t hat e ach g roup’s uniq ue c haracteristics r equire t ailor-made provided some measure of state security, most of them have done more harm than measures. The exercise of generating effective policy responses should start with a good t o ci vilian p opulations a ffected b y t he LR A’s s trategy o f r egionalising thorough mapping of a group’s background, raison d’être, organisational structure, violence. leadership, modus operandi and sources of sustainability and support. This should However, whatever combination of approaches is adopted at the local, national, be f ollowed b y a n a nalysis o f t he g roup’s r elations t o t he s tate a nd va rious regional and international levels, the burden of responsibility for combating and responses to its activities. preventing ANSG ac tivities lies w ith t he s tates t hemselves. Ik elegbe c learly The s tudies in t his b ook s how t hat ANSGs h ave dif ferent m otives a nd illustrated the correlations between the nature of states, how they are governed and strategies t hat m ake i t dif ficult t o f ormulate co mmon s trategies f or co ntaining the phenomenon of non-state institutions of violence. If a state is badly governed, their activities. ANSG activities undermine human security and the state capacity constantly threatens the livelihoods of its population, excludes and marginalises to fulfil social contract obligations. With the weakening of the capacity of African segments of its population (particularly the youth) and uses violence to legitimise states t o de liver p ublic g oods a nd s ervices, i t i s m ost li kely t hat ANSGs m ay itself, then there is a hig h likelihood that its citizens could be lured into joining continue t o t hreaten h uman s ecurity f or t he f oreseeable f uture. B ased o n t his ANSGs, as the case studies in t his book have shown. But citizens also have the finding, an effective way to prevent and confront ANSGs is to build state capacity responsibility of ensuring that good leaders run their states properly and according to fully implement national development policies. to their wishes, which means that the citizenry must possess the ‘software of peace’ There is no single effective measure for addressing the ANSG phenomenon; a that enables it to live in j ust, democratic and fair societies. Citizen knowledge of combination of measures is needed. For instance, it would be simplistic to assume international humanitarian law and the consequences of violating these laws could that holding free-and-fair elections would guarantee good governance and install help them to block politicians or warlords from forming militias and launching good leadership. Ensuring that elections are not fraudulent could pre-empt action attacks against civilians. Monitoring and documenting activities of politicians and by disgruntled losers to adopt the rebel route (as Museveni did in 1982) o r cause other political opportunists are critical for holding them accountable through local neighbours to kill each other (as the Kenyans did in 2008). But most importantly, legal systems or international bodies such as the ICC. it i s h ow e lected g overnments de liver p ublic g oods a nd s ervices t o a ll ci tizens Ultimately, t he r esponsibility f or en suring t hat ANSG v iolence do es n ot regardless o f a ge, r eligion, et hnicity, g ender o r r egion a fter t he e lections t hat weaken the state and threaten human security lies w ith the governments (which matter most. If elections are used to promote sectarian, elite, individual or group must en sure t hat t hey do n ot a buse t heir t raditional m onopoly o n v iolence t o interests, they will most likely be accompanied by violence or plant its seeds. In legitimise themselves) and political elites (who must desist from using the youth addition, Africa needs to revise the methods of holding elections, immunise the and v iolence t o ga in a nd r etain p ower). A s tate’s abuse o f i ts m onopoly t o u se state from being captured by rapacious elites who use it to maintain patronage- violence f or t he p ublic g ood, a nd e lite p roclivity t o p olitical v iolence, a re t he

462 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 463 CONFRONTING THE THREATS OF ARMED NON-STATE GROUPS TO HUMAN SECURITY WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE AND THE STATE IN AFRICA elements m ost li kely t o cr eate a v icious c ycle o f s ocietal v iolence a nd 17 Ibid, 163. institutionalise it as a means of conflict resolution. 18 See A I A siwaju (e d), Partitioned A fricans: e thnic r elations a cross A frica’s i nternational boundaries, 1884–1984, London: Hurst, 1985. 19 Saleyhan, Rebels without borders, 163. NOTES 20 Ibid, 176. 21 See Shultz and Dew, Insurgents, terrorists and militias, 266. 1 See in particular works by T O Ranger, Connexions between ‘primary resistance’ movements 22 Weinstein, Inside rebellion, 7. and modern mass nationalism in E ast and Central Africa, The Journal of African History 9 23 Ibid. (1968), 437–453; Donald Crummey, Banditry, rebellion and social protest in Africa, Oxford: 24 For a detailed analysis on how rebel groups recruit members, see Weinstein, Inside rebellion, James Currey, 1986; Stanley Cohen, Bandits, rebels or criminals: African history and Western 8–16. criminology, Africa: The Journal of the International African Institute 56(4) (1986), 468–483; 25 W J B reytenbach, Of r ulers, r ebels a nd m ercantilists: t owards a n exp lanation f or t he Alice Hills, Warlords, militia and conflict in contemporary Africa: a re-examination of terms, continent’s ‘resource wars’, Africa Insight 32(2) (2002), 3–9. Small W ars & I nsurgencies 8(1) (S pring 1997), 35–51; C hristopher S C lapham, African 26 Weinstein, Inside rebellion, 342. guerrillas, Oxford: James Currey, 1998; W illiam R eno, Warlord p olitics a nd African states, 27 Ibid, 7. Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner, 1999; David J Francis, Civil militia: Africa’s intractable security 28 Wafula O kumu, U ganda m ay face a n o il c urse, The A frican.org, J une/July 2010, 42–44, menace? Farnham, S urrey: A shgate, 2005; M orten B øås a nd K evin C D unn, African http://www.the-african.org/ (accessed 9 July 2010). guerrillas: r aging a gainst t he m achine, B oulder, C olo: L ynne R ienner, 2007; a nd A ssis 29 Ibaba and Ikelegbe, chapter 8, 248. Malaquias, Rebels a nd r obbers: v iolence i n p ost-colonial A ngola, U ppsala: N ordiska 30 Engels, chapter 3, 84. Afrikainstitutet, 2007. 31 See United Nations Human Rights C ouncil, statement by Professor Philip Alston, Special 2 For a detailed analysis of the nexus between state, governance and rebel formation, see Denis Rapporteur o n ext rajudicial, s ummary o r a rbitrary ex ecutions, G eneva, 3 J une 2009, 5, Tull, The reconfiguration of political order in Africa: a case study of North Kivu (DR Congo), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/executions/index.htm (accessed 11 February 2010). Hamburg: GIGA, 2005. 32 Ibaba and Ikelegbe, chapter 8, 247. 3 See Richard H S hultz and Andrea J D ew, Insurgents, terrorists and militias: the warriors of 33 Oloo, chapter 6. contemporary combat, New York: Columbia University Press, 2006, 268. 34 Victoria Brittain, Ethiopia forces Ogaden exodus, Guardian (UK), 20 May 1980. 4 Idean Sa leyhan, Rebels w ithout b orders: transnational insurgencies in w orld p olitics, Ithaca 35 Ibid. and London: Cornell University Press, 2009, 170. 36 Chris D olan, Social t orture: t he c ase o f n orthern U ganda, 1986–2006, Oxford: B erghahn 5 Wassara, chapter 9. Books, 2009. 6 Jeremy M W einstein, Inside r ebellion: t he p olitics o f i nsurgent v iolence, New Y ork: 37 At the height of the war with the LRA, the Uganda People’s Defence Force deployed more Cambridge University Press, 2007, 341. than 5 000 ‘ ghost soldiers.’ See Jenkins Kiwanuka, Ghost soldiers delayed end of northern 7 Ikelegbe and Garuba, Youth conflicts in West Africa, 124–147. war, Monitor, 29 May 2008. 8 The Popular Resistance Army (PRA) later merged with the Uganda Freedom Fighters (UFF) 38 See Sunday Standard, 23 April 2000. led by Yusuf Lule, to become the National Resistance Army (NRA). 39 See George and Ylönen, chapter 11, 360. 9 Sabine C Carey, Rebellion in Africa: disaggregating the effect of political regimes, Journal of 40 Kabir, chapter 11, 334. Peace Research 44(1) (2007), 47–64. 41 Anti-government extremist groups and militias in the US grew from 149 in 2008 t o 512 in 10 An example of using militia to cover up a s tate’s role in v iolence against civilians is Sudan, 2009. See Niraj Warikoo, Experts: Christian militia part of growing trend, Detroit Free Press, where the government supported militia groups such as the Janjaweed in Darfur to confront 29 M arch 2010, h ttp://www.freep.com/article/20100329/NEWS05/100329048/1318/Will- rebels who were challenging their marginalisation from the centre of power in Khartoum. Hutaree-militia-suspects-be-released/Experts-Christian-militia-part-of-growing-trend 11 See Nation Team, Officers quizzed over missing Land Rovers, Daily Nation, 4 February 2003. (accessed 4 April 2010). 12 Oloo, chapter 6, 176. 42 See Fred Burton and Ben West, The Hutarees: exposure and vulnerability, Stratfor, 1 April 13 See Shultz and Dew, Insurgents, terrorists and militias, 266. 2010, h ttp://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100331_hutarees_exposure_and_vulnerability? 14 See W illiam R eno, A frican r ebels a nd t he ci tizenship q uestion, in Sa ra D orman, D aniel (accessed 3 April 2010). Patrick H ammett a nd P aul N ugent (e ds), Making n ations, cr eating s trangers: s tates a nd 43 See Mark W S mith, Facebook a n o pen w indow t o Hutaree mi litia, Detroit F ree P ress, 30 citizenship in Africa, Leiden: Brill, 2007. March 2010, h ttp://www.freep.com/article/20100330/BLOG36/100330033/1318/Will 15 See Omach (chapter 10) and Kasaija (chapter 7). Hutaree-militia-suspects-be-released/Facebook-an-open-window-to-Hutaree-militia 16 Saleyhan, Rebels without borders, 162. (accessed 3 A pril 2010); B en S chmitt, FB I u ses r use t o l ure H utaree mi litia: m emorial

464 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 465 CONFRONTING THE THREATS OF ARMED NON-STATE GROUPS TO HUMAN SECURITY WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE AND THE STATE IN AFRICA

gathering brought out group, Detroit Free Press, 2 April 2010, http://www.freep.com/article/ Democratic R epublic o f C ongo, K enya, R wanda, R epublic o f C ongo, S udan, U ganda, 20100402/NEWS01/4020343/1318/Will-Hutaree-militia-suspects-be-released?-Judges- Tanzania and Zambia. ruling-expected (accessed 3 April 2010). 63 See United States C ongress, L ord’s Resistance A rmy Di sarmament and Northern Uganda 44 This q uestion i s a nswered in det ail b y J eroen de Z eeuw, U nderstanding t he p olitical Recovery Act of 2009, 111th Congress, 1st session, S 1067, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/ transformation of rebel movements, in J eroen de Z eeuw (ed), From soldiers to politicians: billtext.xpd?bill=h111-2478 (accessed 19 May 2010). transforming rebel movements after civil war, Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner, 2008; M immi 64 See African Union, African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, adopted by Söderberg Kovacs, When rebels change their stripes, in Anna K Jarstad and Timothy D Sisk the eig hth o rdinary s ession o f t he A ssembly, A ddis A baba, E thiopia, 30 J anuary 2007, (eds), From war to democracy: the dilemmas of peacekeeping, Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/text/Charter%20on%20 University Press, 2008. Democracy.pdf (accessed 9 May 2007). 45 Pearce, chapter 13, 380. 65 See Organisation of African Unity, OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of 46 See D enis M T ull a nd A ndreas Mehler, Th e hidden cos ts o f p ower-sharing: r eproducing Terrorism, ado pted b y t he 35t h O AU S ummit in A lgiers, A lgeria, in J uly 1999, insurgent violence in Africa, African Affairs 104(416) (2005), 375–398. http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/Text/Algiers_convention 47 Ian S S pears, Africa: the limits of power-sharing, Journal of Democracy 13(3) (2002), 123– %20on%20Terrorism.pdf (accessed 9 July 2010). 136. 66 Saleyhan, Rebels without borders, 162. 48 See the Lomé Peace Agreement of 18 May 1999, the Lusaka Protocol of 15 November 1994 67 Weinstein, Inside rebellion, 343. and the Arusha Peace Agreement of 4 August 1993. 68 Peter Biro, Rebel training: introducing human rights in war-torn Central African Republic, 49 Patricia Daley, Challenges to peace: conflict resolution in t he Great Lakes region of Africa, The Huffington Post, 7 July 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-biro/rebel-training- introducin_b_638545.html (accessed 9 July 2010). Third World Quarterly 27(2) (2006), 303–319. 69 Weinstein, Inside rebellion, 344. 50 Omach, chapter 10, 307. 70 Jeffrey Herbst, International laws and the African child: norms, compliance, and sovereignty, 51 Saleyhan, Rebels without borders, 172. in M ichael D oyle a nd E dward L uck (e ds), International l aw a nd o rganisation: c losing t he 52 Ibid. compliance gap, Lanham, Md: Rowan & Litttlefied, 2004, 187–205. 53 See A frican U nion, D eclaration o n t he A frican U nion B order P rogramme a nd i ts 71 Ibid, 346. Implementation Modalities, Adopted by the Conference of African Ministers in C harge of 72 Ibid. Border I ssues, h eld in A ddis A baba, E thiopia, o n 7 J une 2007, h ttp://www.africa- 73 Ibid. union.org/root/AU/AUC/Departments/PSC/ps/PSC%20Publications/Border%20Issues_E.p 74 Ibid, 347. df (accessed 21 May 2008). 75 Ibid. 54 See D avid M waniki, M anasseh Wepundi a nd H arriet M orolong, The (n orthern) U ganda 76 Kimberley P rocess C ertification S cheme f or R ough Di amonds, ado pted a t a mini sterial peace p rocess: a n u pdate o n r ecent d evelopments, ISS S ituation R eport, 2 F ebruary 2009, meeting in Interlaken on 5 November 2002, http://www.kimberleyprocess.com (accessed 5 http://www.iss.co.za/uploads/SITREPUGANDA02-02-09.PDF (accessed 25 July 2010). April 2010). 55 See William Church and Marco Jowell, Conflict circuit breakers of the Great Lakes region 77 Weinstein, Inside rebellion, 347. of Africa, African Security Review (16)1 (2007), 18–32. 78 Ibid. 56 Saleyhan, Rebels without borders, 173. 79 Ibid, 348. 57 Ibid, 172–173, 176. 80 See U ganda A mnesty C ommission, h ttp://www.justiceinperspective.org.za/index.php? 58 Gilbert Khadiagala, Implementing the Arusha Peace Agreement on Rwanda, in Stephen John option=com_content&task=view&id=39&Itemid=79 (accessed 10 June 2010). Stedman, D onald S R othchild a nd E lizabeth M C ousens (e ds), Ending ci vil w ars: t he 81 See Okechukwu Oko, The challenges of international criminal prosecutions in Africa, 2007, implementation of peace agreements, Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner, 2002, 463. http://works.bepress.com/okechukwu_oko/1 (accessed 5 April 2010). 59 Omach, chapter 10, 307. 82 Additional Protocol I, P rotocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 A ugust 1949, 60 Saleyhan, Rebels without borders, 173. and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977. 61 Rita Abrahamsen, A b reeding g round for terrorists? Africa & B ritain’s ‘war on terrorism’, 83 Bert V A R öling, The legal status of rebels and rebellion, Journal of Peace R esearch 13(2) Review of African Political Economy 31(102) (2004), 677–684. (1976), 149–163. 62 Pact on Peace, Stability and Development in t he Great Lakes region, adopted by the heads 84 Weinstein, Inside rebellion, 348. of state and government of the ICGLR member states in Nairobi on 15 December 2006, and 85 Ibid, 349. entered in to f orce o n 21 J une 2008, h ttp://www.icglr.org/icglr-pacte.php (acces sed 5 86 Julian Ku and Jide Nzelibe, Do international criminal tribunals deter or exacerbate humani- September 2008). Th e I CGLR m embers a re A ngola, B urundi, C entral A frican R epublic, tarian atrocities? Washington University Law Review 84, 2006, 832.

466 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND State Crises IN AFRICA 467 CONFRONTING THE THREATS OF ARMED NON-STATE GROUPS TO HUMAN SECURITY AND THE STATE IN AFRICA

87 Ibid, 832. 88 Ibid, 832. 89 Oko, The challenges of international criminal prosecutions in Africa, 7. 90 Ibid, 8. 91 Ibid, 9–14. 92 See R alph Z acklin, The failings of ad ho c international t ribunals, Journal of International Appendix Criminal Justice 2 (2004), 542. 93 Rebel motives are also unpacked by Halvard Buhaug, Relative capability and rebel objective in civil war, Journal of Peace Research 43(6) (2006), 691–708. Militia and rebel groups in post-independent sub-Saharan Africa 94 See Wafula Okumu, Domestic terrorism in U ganda, in Wafula Okumu and Anneli B otha (eds), Understanding d omestic te rrorism i n A frica, P retoria: I nstitute f or S ecurity S tudies, Country Name of group Abbreviation Time period and further notes 2007, 80–82. Angola Frente de Libertação do FLEC Established 1963, aiming at Estado de Cabinda independence of the enclave of Cabinda. Dissolved in 1976, re-appeared in June 1991

Angola Frente Nacional da FNLA Established 1954 Libertação de Angola

Angola Movimento Popular de MPLA Established 1956 Libertação de Angola

Angola União Nacional para UNITA Established 1966, supported by US Indepêndencia Total de during the Cold War Angola

Burundi Force pour la Défense de FDD Established 1994, Hutu-Guerrilla la Démocratie

Burundi Parti pour la Libération PALIPEHUTU - du Peuple Hutu – Forces FNL Nationales de Libération

Cameroon Union des Populations UPC Established in 1948; led by Ruben du Cameroun Um Nyobé; anti-colonial movement

Central Mouvement Patriotique MPRC Established 2005 African pour la Restauration de la Republic République Centrafricaine

Central Union des Forces UFDR Established 2006, umbrella group African Démocratiques pour le (Groupe d’Action Patriotique Republic Rassemblement pour la Libération de Centrafrique + Mouvement des Libérateurs Centrafricains pour la Justice + Front Démocratique Centrafricain)

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Central Armée Populaire pour la APRD Established 2005 Chad Mouvement pour la Paix, MPRD African Restauration de la la Réconstruction et le Republic République et la Développement Démocratie Chad Mouvement pour la MDD Démocratie et le Central Front Démocratique du FDPC Established 2005 Développement African Peuple Centrafricain Republic Chad Rassemblement des RFC Forces pour le Changement Central Union des Forces UFR Chad Socle pour le SCUD Established 2005, eastern Chad African Républicaines Changement, l’Unité et la Republic Démocratie

Chad Armée Nationale de ANR Led by Mahamt Garfa (until 1994 Chad Union des Forces pour la UFDD Résistance commandant of the national Démocratie et le Développement armed forces); active in Eastern and Southern Chad, split off in Congo (RC) Ninjas Established 2002, ceasefire 2003 2003 Congo (RC) Cobras Second half of the 1990s

Chad Concorde Nationale CNT Congo (DRC) Alliance de Forces AFDL Established October 1996 Tchadienne Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo Chad Comité de Sursaut CSNP National de la Paix et de Congo (DRC) Congrès National pour CNDP Established 2006, North Kivu la Défense du Peuple la Démocratie Congo (DRC) Conseil National de CNL/APL 1964–1966 Chad Forces Armées du Nord FAN Led by Hissen Habré; first rebel Libération / Armée movement in Africa since anti- Populaire de Libération colonial struggles to seize power Congo (DRC) Conféderation des Conakat 1960–1963 Chad Forces Armées de la FARF Associations Tribales de Katanga République Fédérale Congo (DRC) Forces Démocratique FDLR Estimated 9 000 fighters; former Chad Front de Libération Frolinat Established 1966 pour la Libération du Rwandan militaries and militias Nationale du Tchad Rwanda participating in the 1994 genocide Congo (DRC Front de Libération FLNC Established 1968 by former army Chad Front Uni pour le FUC Nationale Congolais officer Nathaniel Mbumba; Changement military defeat 1978 Démocratique Congo (DRC) Front Nationalistes et FNI Agreed to disarm in August Chad Mouvement pour la MDJT Established 1998, northern Chad, Integrationistes 2007 Démocratie et la Justice ceasefire 2003 Congo (DRC) Forces de Résistance FRPI Established November 2002 au Tchad Patriotique d’Ituri

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Congo (DRC) Mai-Mai militia Collective term for local militia in Côte d’Ivoire Groupe Patriotique pour GPP Established 2002, umbrella group the Kivus la Paix of pro-government militia

Congo (DRC) Mouvement pour la MLC Established shortly after the Côte d’Ivoire Union des Patriotes pour UPLTCI Established 2003, pro-government Libération du Congo beginning of the war in 1998 la Libération Totale de la militia Congo (DRC) Mouvement National MNC/L 1960/61 Côte d’Ivoire Congolais/Lumumba Djibouti Front pour la Restauration FRUD Congo (DRC) Mouvement National MNC/K 1960/61 de l’Unité et de la Congolais/Kalondji Démocratie

Congo (DRC) Mouvement MRC Agreed to disarm in August 2007 Ethiopia/ Alliance of Eritrean AENF Established 1999 Révolutionnaire Congolais Eritrea National Forces

Congo (DRC) Rassemblement RCD Split after the war of 1996/97 Ethiopia/ Eritrean Liberation Front ELF Established early 1960s Congolais pour la Eritrea Démocratie Ethiopia Ethiopian Democratic EDU Conservative/monarchist Congo (DRC) Rassemblement RCD – Goma Established 1998 Union Congolais pour la Démocratie – Goma Ethiopia/ Eritrean People’s EPLF Established 1970, split off to form Eritrea Liberation Front the ELF. Linked to the TPLF; EPRDF Congo (DRC) RCD – Mouvement de RCD-ML Established 1999, North Kivu, + EPLF overthrew the Ethiopian Libération supported by Uganda, split from government in 1991 the RCD Ethiopia/ Ethiopian People’s EPRDF EPRDF + EPLF overthrew the Congo (DRC) Union des Patriotes UPC Established 2002, led by Thomas Eritrea Revolutionary Democratic Ethiopian government in 1991 Congolais Lubanga, Ituri region Front Côte d’Ivoire Congrès des Jeunes Cojep Supports President Laurent Ethiopia Islamic Front for the IFLO OLF splinter group Patriotes (‘Young Patriots’ Gbagbo (but not government Liberation of Oromiya including student militia) controlled) Côte d’Ivoire Forces Nouvelles de FNCI (MPCI Alliance of the FNCI Ethiopia Oromo Liberation Front OLF Established 1973, Côte d’Ivoire (alliance of + MJP formed in 2003 during the war; http://www.oromoliberation Mouvement Patriotique + MPIGO) political leader front.org de Côte d’Ivoire, (now prime minister); Ethiopia Ogaden National ONLF/A Established 1969 Mouvement pour la supported by traditional Dozo Liberation Front/Army Justice et la Paix and hunters (especially in 2002/03), Mouvement Populaire http://www.fninfo.ci Ethiopia Tigray Liberation Front TLF Established 1974 as a students’ pour le Grand Ouest) organisation, dissolved 1976 by Côte d’Ivoire Front de Libération du FLGO Established 2002, ‘patriotic’ youth the TPLF Grand Ouest militia in the Western region (loyal Ethiopia Tigray People’s Liberation TPLF Established 1975 to the president/government side, Front fought against MJP and MPIGO) The Gambia Green Boys Pro-government, reported to be Côte d’Ivoire Front pour la Sécurité de FSCO Established 2002, pro-government affiliated with the ruling APRC Centre-Ouest militia

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Guinea Union des Forces UFDG Armed conflict against the Madagascar JINA (secret organisation) Established 1945, anti-colonial Démocratiques de Guinée government of Guinea in 2000/01 movement

Guinea Union des Forces pour UFGN Madagascar Mouvement de la Established 1945, anti-colonial une Guinée Nouvelle Rénovation Malgache movement, military defeated 1956 Guinea Rassemblement des RFDG Madagascar PANAMA (secret Established 1945, anti-colonial forces Démocratiques de organisation) movement Guinée / Rally of Democratic Forces of Mali Alliance Démocratique Established 2006, former Guinea du 23 mai pour le combatants of the 1990s Tuareg Changement rebellion Guinea Young Volunteers

Guinea-Bissau Partido Africano da PAIGC/FLING Seized power after independence Mali Armée Révolutionaire ARLA Tuareg rebellion 1990–1996 Independéncia da Guiné in 1975; overthrown by a coup de Libération de l’Azawad e Cabo Verde / Frente da in 1980 Mali Front Populaire pour la FPLA Tuareg rebellion 1990–1996 Tutta para la Libération de l’Azawad Independencia Nacional da Guiné Mali Front Islamique Arabe FIAA Tuareg rebellion 1990–1996 de l’Azawad Kenya Rebellion Anti-colonial revolt 1952–56

Kenya Shifta Secessionist/separatist war 1963– Mali Front National pour la FNLA Tuareg rebellion 1990–1996 67 Libération de l’Azawad

Liberia Lofa Defence Force LDF Loma-dominated, allied to Charles Mali Front Uni de la Libération FULA Tuareg rebellion 1990–1996 Taylor de l’Azawad

Liberia Liberian Peace Council LPC Mali Mouvement Populaire MPA Tuareg rebellion 1990–1996 de l’Azawad Liberia Liberians United for LURD Established 1993, partly proxy of Reconciliation and the armed forces of Liberia, fought Mali Mouvement Populaire MPLA Tuareg rebellion 1990–1996 Democracy against NPFL pour la Libération de Liberia Independent National INPFL Split to form the NPFL in February l’Azawad Patriotic Front of Liberia 1990 because of personal rivalries Mali Mouvement Touareg MTNMC Founded 18 September 2007 between Prince Johnson (INPFL) Nord-Mali pour le and Charles Taylor (NFPL) Changement Liberia National Patriotic Front NPFL Established 1989, led by Charles Mauretania Frente Popular de Polisario 1975–1991 of Liberia Taylor; overthrew Doe’s regime in September 1990 Liberación de Seguia el Hamra y Rio de Oro Liberia Movement for MODEL Established in early 1993 Democracy in Liberia Mozambique Frente de Libertação de FRELIMO 1964–1974 Moçambique Liberia United Liberation ULIMO Established 1991 Movement for Mozambique Resistência Nacional RENAMO 1975–1992, supported by US Democracy Moçambicana during the Cold War

474 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND STATE CRISES IN AFRICA 475 APPENDIX WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE

Namibia South West Africa SWAPO/PLAN Established 1960 Nigeria Niger Delta People’s NDPVF Established 2003, broke up after People’s Organisation / (Niger Delta) Volunteer Force the detention of its leader, People’s Liberation Army Dokubo-Asari, in September 2005 Namibia Nigeria Niger Delta Volunteer Niger Forces Armées FARS (Niger Delta) Force NDVF Révolutionnaires du Sahara Nigeria Niger Delta Vigilante NDV Leader Ateke Tom (Niger Delta) Niger Front Démocratique pour FDR 1990s le Renouveau Nigeria O'odudua (also O'odua) OPC Established 1994, south-western (Centre, People’s Council Nigeria Niger Front pour la Libération FLAA Tuareg rebellion 1990–1994 Lagos) de l’Air et de l’Azawad Nigeria Zamfara State Vigilante ZSVS Established 1999 Niger Mouvement des MNJ Established 1991 Service Nigériens pour la Justice Rwanda Forces Démocratique FDLR Established 2000; DRC and Nigeria Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa pour la Libération du Rwanda agreed to disband the (North) Rwanda FDLR in December 2008

Nigeria Al-Sunna Wal Jamma Established 2002, also known as Rwanda Front Patriotique FPR (Followers of the Prophet) Taleban Rwandaise

Nigeria Arewa People’s Congress APC Rwanda Interahamwe, Hutu Militia Interahamwe was not formally Nigeria Bakassi Movement for BAMOSD Declared ’secession’ from Nigeria dissolved after the 1994 genocide (south-east) Self-Determination in 2006 but merged with the Hutu Militia

Nigeria Bakassi Boys Established 1999 Senegal Mouvement des Forces MFDC Established 1982; armed conflict (south-east) Démocratiques de 1990–2004, split in ‘Front Nord’ Casamançe and ‘Front Sud’ Nigeria Bakassi Freedom Fighters (south-east) Sierra Leone Armed Forces AFRC Defected members of the armed Revolutionary Council forces Nigeria Biafran Organisation of BOFF Name was given only at the end (Biafra) Freedom Fighters of the Biafran war (1967–1970) Sierra Leone Civil Defence Force CDF

Nigeria Egbesu Boys of Africa EBA Sierra Leone Revolutionary United RUF Entered 1991 Sierra Leone, Front supported by NPFL Fighters Nigeria Hisba Established 2001 (North) Sierra Leone West Side Boys WSB Led by Foday Kallay

Nigeria Movement for the MASSOB Established 1999 Somalia Al-Ittihad al-Islami / AIAI Established 1992 (Biafra) Realisation of the (Islamic Union) Sovereign State of Biafra Somalia Alliance for the Liberation ALS/ARS Established 2007 Nigeria Movement for the MEND Active since January 2006 of Somalia / Alliance for (Niger Delta) Emancipation of the the Reliberation of Niger Delta Somalia

476 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND STATE CRISES IN AFRICA 477 APPENDIX WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE

Somalia/ Front de Libération de la FLCS Sudan Justice and Equality JEM Darfur Djibouti Côte des Somalis Movement

Somalia Northern Frontier NFDLF Sudan Justice Front Established 2007, Arab militia District Liberation Front Sudan New Sudan Brigade Established 1995, eastern branch of SPLA Somalia Popular Resistance PRA Established 2007 Movement in the Land Sudan Popular Defence Forces Government-controlled armed of Two Migrations group

Somalia Rahanweyn Resistance RRA Established 1995/96, allied with Sudan Sudan Alliance Forces SAF Established 1994 Army SDM Sudan Sudan Liberation SLM/A Established June 1992 at the Movement/Army University of Khartoum Somalia Somali Democratic SDM Established 1992, southern Movement Somalia Sudan Sudan People’s Liberation SPLM/A Established 1983, Southern Sudan Movement/Army Somalia Somali National Alliance / SNA Established July 1992 as an United Somali Congress alliance of parts of the USC and Sudan The Beja Congress Established 1993, eastern Sudan the Somali Patriotic Movement; Sudan United Front for Liberation UFDL Established 2007 led by Mohammed Farah Aidid and Development Somalia Somali National Front SNF Established 1991 Sudan United Revolutionary URFF Established 2007 Somalia Somali National SNM Established 1982, declared Force Front Movement independent republic of Uganda Allied Democratic Forces ADF Established 1995 Somaliland in 1991 Uganda Front for National Fronasa Established 1973 Somalia Somali Patriotic SPM Established 1989 Salvation Movement Uganda Holy Spirit Mobile Forces HSMF Established by Alice Auma (Alice Somalia Somali Salvation SSDF Established 1978, declared Lakwena) (later her father, Democratic Front autonomy of the Puntland region Severino Lukoya) since August in 1998 1986

Somalia Supreme Islamic Courts SICC Uganda Lord’s Resistance Army LRA Established 1987 by Joseph Kony Council Uganda National Resistance NRM/A Led by Yoweri Museveni, seized Movement/Army power in 1986 Somalia Union of Islamic Courts UIC Established 1991, supported by Eritrea Uganda Uganda Freedom UFM Former Save Uganda Movement, Movement 1980s Somalia Western Somali WSLF Liberation Front Uganda Uganda People’s UPDA 1986–1988 Democratic Army South Africa Umkhonto we Sizwe MK Uganda Uganda National UNLF/A Established 1979, defeated by the Sudan Eastern Front Established 2005, ceasefire Liberation Front/Army NRA in 1986 Sudan Janjaweed, Fursan and Arab and Fur militias first Uganda Uganda National Rescue UNRF 1980–1986 Malihiyat mentioned in 1994, Darfur Front

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Uganda Uganda National Rescue UNRF II Established 1996, signed ceasefire Front II in December 2002 Uganda Uganda People’s Army UPA Uganda West Nile Bank Front WNBF Established 1995 Bibliography Zambia Mushala-Army 1976–1982, leader Adamson Mushala; restricted to the North- West Province of Zambia Aaron, K K. Can a privatised state privatise? Insights and experiences from Nigeria’s privatisation programme. THEDI Monograph 1. Port Harcourt: Kemuela Publications, 2006. Zimbabwe Zimbabwe African Abati, R euben. Th e s ad s tory o f N igeria, 21 J anuary 2007. A vailable a t h ttp://www.guardian National Union ZANU newsngr.com (accessed 20 March 2007). Zimbabwe Zimbabwe African ZAPU Established 1961, merged with Abbink, Jon. Ethiopia-Eritrea: proxy wars and prospects for peace in the Horn of Africa. Journal People’s Union ZANU in December 1987 of Contemporary African Studies 21(3) (2003). Sources: compiled by Bettina Engels drawing from: Bruce Baker, When the Bakassi Boys came: Abdullah, I. B ush p ath t o des truction: t he o rigin a nd c haracter o f t he R evolutionary United eastern Nigeria confronts vigilantism, Journal of Contemporary African Studies 20(2) (2002), Front/Sierra L eone. The J ournal o f M odern A frican S tudies 36(2) (1998), 203–235. 223-244; ; J Bakonyi, S Hensell and J Siegelberg (eds), Gewaltordnungen bewaffneter Gruppen: Abdullah, I. Bush path to destruction: the origin and character of the Revolutionary United Front Ökonomie und Herrschaft nichtstaatlicher Akteure in den Kriegen der Gegenwart, Baden-Baden, 2006; (RUF/SL). Africa Development 22(3/4) (1997). M Bøås and K C Dunn (eds), African guerrillas: raging against the machine, Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner, 2007; M Bøås and A Hatløy, ‘Getting in, getting out’: militia membership and prospects for Abdullah, Ibrahim and Muana, Patrick. The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone: a revolt reintegration in post-war Liberia, The Journal of Modern African Studies 46(1) (2008), 33–55; of the Lumpen-proletariat. In Christopher Clapham (ed), African guerrillas. Oxford: James Currey, 1998. C Clapham, African guerrillas revisited, in Bøås and Dunn (eds), African guerrillas: raging against the machine, Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner, 2007; N Florquin, and E G Berman (eds), Armed and Abi-Saab, Georges. Wars of national liberation in the Geneva Conventions and Protocols. Recueil aimless: armed groups, guns, and human security in the ECOWAS region, Geneva: Small Arms Survey, des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International de la Haye 165 (1979), 357–455. 2005; N P Gleditsch, P Wallensteen, M Eriksson, M Sollenberg and H Strand, Armed conflict Abrahamsen, Rita. A breeding ground for terrorists? Africa & Britain’s ‘war on terrorism’. Review 1945–2001: a new dataset, Journal of Peace Research 39(5) (2002), 615–637; J Harnischfeger, of African Political Economy 31(102) (2004), 677–684. Ethnische Selbstbestimmung und Demokratie, Minoritätenvölker und Milizen im Nigerdelta, Peripherie 26(103) (2006), 338–363; K Schlichte, In the shadow of violence: the politics of armed Abutudu, M I M. Human security in Africa: challenges and prospects. In A Boron and G Lechini groups, Frankfurt am Main/New York: Campus, 2009, 35–36; Small arms survey, Sudan issue brief, (eds), Politics and social movements in an hegemonic world. Buenos Aires: Clacso, 2005. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2007; IISS armed conflict database (International Institute for Strategic Adar, K orwa G. Kenyan foreign p olicy b ehaviour t owards S omalia, 1963–1983. Lanham: Studies, London), http://acd.iiss.org (accessed 20 March 2009); and AKUF database (University of University Press of America, 1994. Hamburg), http://www.akuf.de (accessed 20 March 2009). Addison, Tony. Africa’s recovery from conflicts: making peace work for the poor. Helsinki: United Nations University/World Institute for Development Economics Research, 2003. Additional Protocol I. P rotocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, a nd Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977. Additional Protocol II. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977. Adebajo, Adekeye. Liberia: a warlord’s peace. In Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothschild and Elizabeth M C ousens (e ds), Ending ci vil w ars: t he i mplementation o f p eace a greements, London: Lynne Rienner, 2002. Adejumobi, S. Ethnic militia groups and the national question in Nigeria. Social Science Research Council. A vailable a t h ttp://programs.ssrc.org/gsc/gsc_quarterly/newsletter8/content/ adejumobi/printable (accessed 12 August 2009).

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al-Azhari, Ismail 257–8 al-Bashir, Omar 6, 274, 282, 430 Algeria 1, 12, 120, 131, 317, 341–2; armed Islamist groups 342–9; global war on terror 357–8; Index internationalisation 356–7; recruitment and activities 349–351, 353–355 alien occupation 97 Please note: page numbers in italics refer to tables and figures. Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL) 11, 90, 186–8, 298 al-Islambouli, Khaled 352 al-Jihad/Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) 342, 351, 352 Abacha, General Sani 57 Alliance pour la Majorité Présidentielle (AMP) 190 Abboud, Ibrahim 258, 259–60 Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), Uganda 187, 205, 300, 443 Abdalla, Abdu 270 All Ijaw Youths Summit, Bayelsa State 237 Abidjan Peace Accord 399 Al-Ittihad al-Islami (Union of Islamic Courts, UIC), Somalia 12 Abyei area, Sudan 282; Protocol 282 Acak, Smith Opon 295 al-Jihad group 12 accountability: acts of rebels and militias 101–2; All Peoples’ Congress (APC) 393, 394 international laws 102–6; All Peoples’ Congress Party, Sierra Leone 391 measures under national law 107–9 al-Mahdi, Sadiq 278, 281 Adaka Boro revolt, Niger Delta 238 al-Nur, Abdul Wahid 273 Adaka Marines, Niger Delta 227 Al-Qaeda 12, 158, 342, 343, 347–8, 358; Addis Ababa Agreement 264, 265, 269 network 349; Adeniji, Oleyumi 422 Salafism 315; Afghanistan 346; Soviet invasion 347 transnational jihadism 354–6; Africa Military Command (AFRICOM) 454 Western countries 356 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 203 Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Magreb (AQIM), Algeria 342, 354–5 African Commission 103 al-Shafi, Abd 270 African Court 92 Al-Shahaab religious militia, Somalia 12, 61, 62, 93, 419 African National Congress (ANC), South Africa 11, 89, 95, 100, 108, 423 Alston, Philip 157, 162–3, 165, 447 African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) 452 al-Zawahiri, Ayman 352 African traditional world views 47–8; al-Zumar, Abbud 352 and spiritualism 173–4 Amachuma militia, Kenya 7, 151 African Union (AU) 91, 92, 100, 204, 335, 420, 456; America 428–9; post-war foreign policy 428 charteron democracy 100–1; American Mineral Fields International 188 enforcement actions 98; Americo-Liberian top officials 421 Forces in Sudan 301, 303; Amin, Idi 291, 393, 424 Mission to Somalia 426; Amnesty International 157 Peace and Security Council 205 Amuka Boys, Uganda 419 African Union Forces in Sudan 301, 303 Angola 1, 17, 20, 26, 33, 34, 37, 38, 71, 90, 120, 131,187, 365–6, 451; African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) 282 small arms proliferation 24 AFRICOM, US 335–6, 429; Angolan Armed Forces 371; see also Africa Military Command; US Africa Command Memorandum of Understanding 371 Ahl al-Sunna Wal Jama’ah movement 330, 331 Annan, Kofi 423–4 ahlu Sunna religious militia, Somalia 12 anti-colonial grievances 11 Ahmad, Muhammad (Mahdi) 49–50 Anti Stock-Theft Unit, Kenya 172 Akabo Wau garrisons, Sudan 264 Anti-Terrorism Act, Uganda 300 Akol, Lam 266–7, 268 Anyanya movement, Sudan 258, 265, 266, 269 al-Afghani, Jamal al-Din 316 apartheid South Africa 95, 98, 108, 373, 423

524 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND STATE CRISES IN AFRICA 525 INDEX WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE

Arab-Fur markets 279 Banda, Hastings 55–6 Arabs 316, 344; Bantu militia 176 nationalism 345–6, 347 Bany, William Nyuon 266 Area Boys, Lagos 16 Barre, Siad 426 Arewa People’s Congress 57 Basque nationalists, Spain/France 437–8 armed conflicts, causality and sustainment 18 Bayaye, Kenya/Uganda 16 Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) 106, 400; Bayelsa Volunteers, Niger Delta 227 and RUF, People’s Army 400–1 Bearpark, Andrew 429 armed Islamist groups 341–2; Bédié, Henri Konan 76 external factors after ideology 346–349; Belgian colonial rule of Congo 184–5 external factors and ideology 342–6; Belgium 355, 428 global war on terror and regime response 357–8; Bemba, Jean-Pierre 192, 210, 424 internal factors in recruitment and activities 349–51; Biafra 57 internationalisation 356–7; Biafran war, Nigeria 71 Islamism, political Islamism Bicasse Accord, Angola 369–70 and Salafi jihadism 343–6; Bigombe, Betty 296 recruitment into European cells 356; bin Laden, Osama 12, 282, 348 see also under Algeria; Egypt; Morocco Biya, Paul 126 armed non-state groups (ANSGs) 1–4, 14–15, 18–20, 27–28, 31, 34–9, 437; Black Braziers group, Niger Delta 225 borders and border areas 443–4; black markets, smuggling and illegal trading 135 international responses 454–8; Boko Haram, Egypt/Nigeria 12, 34, 313, 330, 459 legal approaches 459–62; Bol, Kerubino Kwanyin 266 local responses 444–7; Boro, Adaka 225 nature and character in Africa 14–15; Botswana 126, 128, 131 phenomenon of 136–8, 438–9; Brazzaville, see Republic of Congo place of women 16; Brigate Rosse (BR), 437–8 political elite manipulation 441–3; Britain 428 regional responses 452–4; British Association of Private Security Companies 429 state and governance as victims 139–40; Bululu, Lunda 192 state governance 439–40; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, US 449 state responses 447–50; Burkino Faso 38, 131, 392 transforming into civil actors 450–2; Burundi 1, 14, 21, 35, 37, 38, 69, 120, 131, 187; youth factor 441 Hutus 11; Armée Islamique du Salut (AIS) 12, 354 Tutsis 11, 21 arms proliferation 135 Bush, George W 422, 428 Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALIR) 199 Bush Boys group, Niger Delta 225 Arrow Boys, Uganda 419 Arugbo Freedom Fighters, Niger Delta 227 Cameroon 37, 126, 131; Atem, Akuot 265 armed insurgencies 71; authority: African conceptions of 46; ‘Beti’ militia, University of Yaoundé 73 and contemporary politics 54–7; Carter, Jimmy 299 ethnicity and kinship 55–6 Carter Centre 299 az-Zubeir, Mujib ar-Rahman 279 Central African Republic (CAR) 1, 20, 32, 34, 35, 38, 61, 69, 81, 120, 126, 131, 303, 457 certification of commodities 458 Babanginda, Ibrahim 57 Certification Scheme for the Great Lakes region 456 Baghdad Boys, Kenya 151 Chad 1, 20, 35, 38, 69, 78, 81, 83, 100, 120, 187, 273, 303, 331, 333, 358, 420 Bakajika Law, DRC 190 charismatic leaders 26 Bakassi Boys 57, 76 Chicoco Movement 57

526 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND STATE CRISES IN AFRICA 527 INDEX WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE

Chissano, Joaquim 378 Dar-es-Salaam Declaration 434 children: abduction 102, 191; Darfur 273; enslavement of girls 102; Border Intelligence 277; rebel groups 17; rebel groups 6, 100, 271–2, 443 recruitment 17, 38, 174–5; Darfur Liberation Front 6 soldiers 63, 202, 296 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) 273 Chinkororo militia, Kenya 7, 151 Da’wa S alafism 345 Chol, Gordon Koang 264–5 Deby, Idriss 12 Christian Solidarity International 269 decolonisation era 134–5 Chui, Mathieu Ngudjolo 209 Deegbam group, Niger Delta 225 circumcision 61–2 Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda 59 citizens and popular groups responses 134–6 Democratic Party (DP), Uganda 292 civil defence forces (CDF) 106, 394, 399 Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 1–2, 6, 7, 14, 17, 19, 20, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 52, 59, 69, civil struggle groups 3 106, 120, 131, 288, 301, 445; civil wars 120 atrocities 102; Coalition for Militant Action (COMA), Niger Delta 226, 227 collaboration with FDLR and PARECO 199–201; Cobras militia, RoC 6 conflicts 300; Cold War 51, 71, 324, 389, 423 cross-border trading 190; collective identity constructions 79 current status of conflict 190–1; Collier, Paul 428 history of conflict 184–8; colonialism 46, 51, 71, 97, 125 independence period 185–6; Comité Spécial du Katanga, DRC 188–9 international responses to Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 92 conflict 206–10; Commission on Human Security 53 Kinyarwanda-speaking communities 58; communism 9 Kivu region 58, 78; community militias 7, 8, 16 militias and rebel movements 191–4; Comoros 90 natural resources in eastern DRC 189, 197, 197–9; Compagnie du Katanga, DRC 188–9 natural resources and conflict areas 201; Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), Sudan 259, 269, 276, 277, 301–2, 306, 453 Congrès National pour la Defénse du Peuple (CNDP), Rwanda 37, 103, 191, 202, 205 rebel groups in eastern DRC 194–6; Congo-Brazzaville, see Democratic Republic of Congo regional responses to conflict 204–6; Conseil Nationale de Libération (CNL) 189–90 Rwanda and CNDP 201–3; Conseil National pour la Défense de Démocratie/Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie struggle for control of natural resources 183–90; (CNDD-FDD), Burundi 11, 38–9 Uganda–MLC collaboration 203; Conservative Party (CP), Uganda 292 war crimes against humanity 99; Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism 300 youths and children 30, 38 corrupt and impious regimes 22 democracy 126 corruption and mismanagement 130 democratisation 131 Côte d’Ivoire 6, 17, 21, 35, 37, 38, 69, 78, 83, 120, 126, 131 destruction of property 102 counter-insurgency tactics 30 Dhlakama, Afonso 375–6, 380 counter-insurgent militias 7, 8 diasporas 79; Court on Human Peoples’ Rights 103 Ugandan 295–6 crimes against humanity 101, 102 dictatorships 126 criminal militias 7, 8 disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) processes 206, 401–2 Cuba 367, 368 displacement of populations 191 culture 3, 25–6, 48, 54, 57; Doe, Samuel 35, 392, 419, 421, 429 and religion 173–4; dos Santos, José 435 symbols and traditions 78–9 Dozo, Côte d’Ivoire 73, 76 customary law 92 drugs 17

528 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND STATE CRISES IN AFRICA 529 INDEX WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 244–5, 421–2, 453; Ogaden region 12; Convention on Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Small Arms and Oromo opposition 72 Light Weapons 25 Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict 300 Economic Community of West African States Monitoring and Observation Group (ECOMOG) Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) 11 400–1, 422 ethnicity 16, 72–3, 135, 259; economic crimes 19 politicisation of 148–9 economic crisis and security 52 ethnic militias 7, 8 economic decline 130, 135; ethnic mobilisation and coercion 26 and social ferment 23 European Community 297 economic incentives 26 extortion and plundering regime 33 economic resources 74 Egbema National Congress, Niger Delta 225 Farag, Mohammad Abd al-Salam 351, 352 Egbesu Boys of Africa, Niger Delta 19, 57, 73, 225, 226, 227 Fatah, Palestine 95 Egeland, Jan 301 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), US 359, 449 Egypt 2, 12, 131; Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC) 226, 242–3 armed Islamist groups 342–9; Fodio, Uthman Ibn 49, 318, 322, 323–4 global war on terror 357–8; Force Publique, Congo 185, 188 internationalisation 356–7; Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) 94, 187, 191, 193, 200, 207 Islamic Jihad 61; Forces Armées du Nord (FAN), Chad 11 peace with Israel 347; Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR) 93, 183 recruitment and activities 349–353; Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) 102, 191, 193, 194, 199–201, 202, 205, tourist industry 347 207, 444, 455 Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) 349, 353 Forces de Libération du Grand Ouest (FLGO), Côte d’Ivoire 38 el-Bashir, Omar 299, 401, 443, 456 Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL), Burundi 11 elections 126, 127, 135, 231; Forces Nouvelles, Côte d’Ivoire 103 rebellion and insurgencies 441–2 Foreign Policy index 31; elite 7, 39, 65, 73, 122, 131, 177, 236, 365, 379, 439, 446; Failed States Index 128 business 160; Forum for the Restoration of Democracy – Kenya (FORD–K) 161 civilian and military 258; France 5, 283, 347, 348, 355, 356, 428 construction 22–3; Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) 11, 31, 89, 94, 366, 373, 375–8, 422–3 governing 35, 350; Frente Nacional de Liberação de Angola (FNLA) 366 intellectual and scholarly 323; Front de Libération du Congo (FLC) 203 networks 293; Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ), Canada 437–8 political 30, 23, 29, 40, 65, 82, 129, 148–9, 291, 352, 441–2, 463; Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), Algeria 9, 11, 89, 347 political and military 381; Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) 347, 348, 354 ruling 7, 29, 128, 284, 324, 417; functionality and dysfunctionality 30–1 Western-educated 343–4 el-Zakzaky, Ibrahim 326–8 Gabon 126, 131 embargoes 98 Gaddafi, Muammar 391, 420; emigration 135 ‘Green Book’ 391 Equatorial Guinea 20, 26, 37, 126, 131 Gai, Taban Deng 268 Eritrea 14, 71, 90, 297, 298; Gambia 76–7 secessionists against Ethiopia 420 Garang, John 265–7, 269 Eritrean-Ethiopia war 34 gender: role distribution 64; Eritrea People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) 11, 12, 14, 16, 71, 95 violence 64 Ethiopia 2, 20, 21, 35, 120, 297, 298, 420, 425–7; Générale des Carrières et des Mines, DRC 190 constitutional reconstruction 419; General Peace Accord 375 Derg 269; General Service Unit, Kenya 172

530 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND STATE CRISES IN AFRICA 531 INDEX WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE

Geneva Conventions 97, 102, 457; Hittiste, Algeria 16 Additional Protocol I 95, 97, 460; HIV and AIDS 64 Additional Protocol II 98, 104, 105; Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami movement 315, 351 breaches of 104–5; Holy Spirit Mobile Forces (HSMF), Uganda 293 and Protocols 103 Holy Spirit Movement (later IRA) 61, 73, 295–6 genocide 101, 102 Horn of Africa 31, 61, 65, 81, 358, 421, 431 Germans 429; human insecurity 2, 31–2, 36, 39, 279–80 Niger Delta group 225 humanitarian crisis 34 Ghana 55, 126, 131 humanitarian law 101 Gio groups, Liberia 17 human rights 92, 101, 457; Global and All Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the DRC 206 groups 260; globalisation 74; violations 203–4 and arms proliferation 24–5 Human Rights Watch 157, 172, 231 global war on terror (GWoT) 342, 357 human security 2; Goma Acts of Engagement 191 crisis and resource conflicts, Niger Delta 244 good governance, attributes of 123 Hussein, Kimani Ruo 156 government militias 5 Hutu: in Burundu 11; government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) 306 extremists 187; governance and development 123–4, 130–2 government 201–2 Graduates’ Congress, Sudan 258 Hutu-Tutsi promordial dichotomy 58–9 Great Lakes region 59, 69, 81, 288, 305, 443, 455–6; Pact on Security, Stability and Development 204, 455 Ibrahim, Alhaji Bukar Abba 330 Green Bombers, Zimbabwe 17 Icelanders group, Niger Delta 225 Greenlanders, Niger Delta 225 identity 70, 72–73, 78–81; grievance(s): and opportunism 18–20; crisis 21; versus greed discourse 18 national 259; Gronna Boys, Liberia 17 politics 369; Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain (GICM) 342, 349, 355–6 in search of 57–9 Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC), Algeria 12, 342, 354, 356 identity-based grievances 17 Groups Islamiques Armés (GIA) 348, 354, 356 ideology 70, 72–3 Guebuza, Armando 378 Iduwini Volunteer Force, Niger Delta 227 Guinea 17, 37, 69, 126, 131 Igga, Wani 269 Guinea-Bissau 71, 131, 390 Ijaw militant youths, Niger Delta 225 Gulf of Guinea 245 Ijaw National Congress, Niger Delta 225 Gulf War 297 Ijaw Youths Movement 57, 228 gun boat diplomacy 25 Ikome, Francis 126 Gusau, Aminu Aliyu 327 illegal trading and commercial networks 37 Ilunga, Emile 192 Habib, Kamal 351–2 Imam, Sayed 353 Habyarimana, Juvenal 35, 424 independence period 46, 47, 51 Hadith 317 individual rights 92 Hague, The 424, 429–30; Indonesia 343 Regulations 93 industrial capacity utilisation 130 Hamas, Palestine 95, 345 inequalities 127; Haroun, Ahmed 278, 283 class-based and social 82 Hassan, Babiker Abdel Mahmoud 274 insurgent militias 7 Hijrah 330 insurgent rebel movement 9 Hilal, Musa 278 Interahamwe militia, Rwanda 7, 9, 93, 102, 183, 187, 191, 194, 199, 205, 419, 425, 428

532 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND STATE CRISES IN AFRICA 533 INDEX WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE

Inter-Congolese Dialogue 190, 203 irredentist rebel movement, Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) 267–8, 281, 425, 426; see separist rebel movement Partners Forum (IPF) 283; Islam, conversion to 156–7 peace process 268, 283 Islamic fundamentalism 297, 298 internal displacement 34 Islamic law 317 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 281 Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) 322, 327–8, 329 internally displaced persons (IDPs) 281 Islamic political movements 315 internal rebellion 120 Islamic Salvation Front political movement, Algeria 316 Internal Security Force, Ogoniland 228 Islamism: and militant Islamism 314–17; International Conference on the Great Lakes region (ICGLR) 204, 205, 424, 452, 453; political and Salafi jihadism 343–6; Pact on Security, Stability and Development 455 see also militant Islamist groups, Northern Nigeria International Convention for the Suppression of Financing Terrorism 300 Isoko Community Oil Producing Forum, Niger Delta 225 International Court of Justice (ICJ) 99 Israel 97, 99, 349; defeat of Arab states 347 international courts 93 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 203 Jamaal Islamiyya political movement, Egypt 316 international crimes 101 Jama’atul Izalatul Bid’ah Wa Ikamatus Sunnah (JIBWIS) 328 International Criminal Court (ICC) 99, 209–10, 283, 303, 424, 430, 456, 460; Janjaweed militia, Darfur 6, 93, 277–9, 283; Rome Statute 102, 209 ‘Arab’ tribesmen 277–8 international criminal law (ICL) 101, 105–7, 460–1 Jeshi la Embakasi militia, Kenya 151 International Criminal Tribunal (ICT) 460–1 Jeshi la Kayole militia, Kenya 7 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 99, 105, 107, 460 Jeshi la Mzee militia, Kenya 151 international criminal tribunals 106 is Alive Ministry 62 International Crisis Group 187 Jeunes Patriotes militia, Côte d’Ivoire 6 international humanitarian law (IHL) 93, 104–5, 457 jihad 317; global 12, 341, 343, 347, 348, 454; International human rights law (IHRL) 102–4 Islamic 49, 314; international law 3, 11, 90–1; Palestine 349; accountability 101; Sokoto 318, 323; breaches by rebels and militia 91, 101–2; see also Fodio, Uthman Ibn enforcement action 97–9; Jihadi Islamic Group (JIG) 351–2 legal responses and accountability 96–9; Johnson-Sirleaf, Ellen 421 locating non-state actors 91–2; joint integrated units (JIUs), Sudan 269 norm generation 97–8; Joint Military Task Force, Niger Delta 227, 230 political responses 100–1; Juba: Airport soldiers 264; variety of non-state actors 93–5; Conference, Sudan 257; Westphalian model 91 Declaration 276–7; international legal order 90 Peace Agreement 109; International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg 106 peace talks 306 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 52–3, 130, 292 Justice and Development Party, Turkey/Morocco 316 International Organisation of Migration (IOM) 299 Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), Khartoum 108, 278, 279 international organisations 92 justice-seeking and loot-seeking 18 International Rescue Committee (IRC) 457 international tribunals 105 Kabarebe, James 187, 202 Internet: jihadist sites 355; Kabbah, Alie 391 and recruitment 353, 356–7 Kabila, Joseph 186–8, 190, 199, 200, 425 intra-state conflicts 45-6, 289–90 Kabila, Laurent-Désiré 31, 38, 186–8, 189–90 Iqbal, Muhammad 316 Kagame, Paul 425 Iran 299; revolution 315–16, 324–5, 347 Kaiama Declaration, Niger Delta 226, 228–9, 237–8 Iraq 349; US-led Gulf War 348 Kamajor militias, Sierra Leone 8–9, 73, 76, 445

534 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND STATE CRISES IN AFRICA 535 INDEX WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE

Kamotho, Joseph 162 Kimani, Kihika 164 Kamunya, John Maina 161 Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds 209, 458 Kango, Kaahwa Mandro 193 Kissinger, Henry 428 Karaha, Bizima 192 Koko Dam Declaration, Sudan 270 Karume, Njenga 161, 162 Konare, Alpha Oumar 423–4 Kasavubu, Joseph 186 Kong, Gordon 277 Katanga, Germain 107, 209 Kony, Joseph 15, 287, 295–6, 304, 305, 419, 456, 460 Kaunda, Kenneth 55–6 Kouchner, Bernard 428 Kaya Bombo Youth gang, Kenya 151 Kuanyin, Kerubino 267 Kenya 2, 7, 21, 22–3, 27, 34, 55, 120, 126, 127, 131, 283, 294, 419, 420; Kushayb, Ali 278, 283 armed insurgencies 71, 447; bombings 348; Lagos 16 criminal gangs 150, 151–2; Lagu, Joseph 269 ethnic groups 148–9, 152; land entitlements 73 internally displaced persons (IDPs) 154; language 259 Kalenjin warriors 150; Lankwena, Alice 61 Kengakenga execution centre 176; L’Armée Populaire pour la Restauration de la République et la Démocraticie (APRD) 457 Kikuyu group 148, 150, 160, 162, 175; Latek, Odong 295 Kirinyaga Kingdom 155; leadership 14–15, 29, 35, 54, 71–2, 221, 446; Kwekwe hit squad 164–5; community 222, 246–7; Maasai morans 150; political 222, 249; Muslim community 156–7; traditional 56 Nandi rebellion 50; League of Nations 91 origin and rise of militia groups 149–52; Lendu militia, DRC 7 post-election violence 65; Léopold II, King 184–5 ritualistic practices 25; l’ tat Indépendant du Congo 186 social base 16; liberation: movements 71; Special Branch 449; rebel movement 9, 11; state, ethnicity and militias 147–9; struggle 46 vigilantes 158–60 Liberia 2, 6, 14, 19, 20, 33, 35, 38, 64, 69, 78, 120, 138, 390, 392, 419, 421; Kenya African Democratic Union 150 civil war 37; Kenya African National Union (KANU) 148, 160–1, 171; small arms proliferation 24; youth wing 150 youths 30, 80 Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) 165, 172 Liberian Beach Party 421 Kenya National Youth Alliance (KNYA) 162, 451; Liberian ‘Special Forces’ 392, 393 renamed Progressive Party Alliance 162 Libya 131, 299, 317, 391, 420 Kenyan Human Rights Commission 157 Libyan Islamic Fighting Group 356 Kenya People’s Union (KPU) 150 Lomé Peace Accord 399–410 Kenyatta, Jomo 55–6 Lomé Peace Agreement 99, 106 Kenyatta, Uhuru 161, 164 Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), Uganda 12, 15, 17, 32, 34, 61, 72, 73, 93, 191, 193, 205, 287–8, Khartoum 297, 300 296, 300,389, 391, 397, 419, 444, 445; Khartoum Peace Agreement (KPA) 267, 275 activities 302; Khomeini, Ayatollah 316 border crossing 443; Kibaki, Mwai 148, 164, 418 internal and regional conflicts 288–90; Kiboi, Bramwell Kiso 169 Khartoum backing 98; Kidogos, Uganda 17 regional and international interventions 299; Kihara, Jane 162 regional conflict complex 297–8, 299–305; Kiir, Salva 266, 269, 304 regionalisation of conflicts and rebel activities 305–6

536 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND STATE CRISES IN AFRICA 537 INDEX WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE

Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament, US 455 militia and rebel activities 417–18; Lubanga, Thomas 107, 193, 209, 456 extra-continental responses 427–30; Lule, Yusuf 292 Great Lakes cluster 423–5; Lumumba, Patrice 185–6, 207, 424, 428 Horn of Africa cluster 425–7; Lusaka Accord 370 Mano River cluster 421–2; regional responses 420–7; Machar, Riek 266–7, 268–9 Southern Africa cluster 422–3; Machicha, Tanzania 16 state responses 418–20 Madagascar 131 militias 4–9, 13, 53, 76, 93–4, 138; Mafia group, Niger Delta 225 in government, Niger Delta 241; Mahdi, belief in 317–18 as members of civil society, Niger Delta 242–3; Mahdism 324 as pseudo-government, Niger Delta 241–2; Mai-Mai militia, DRC 7, 50, 93–4, 102, 193, 200, 459 social bases 15–17; Mai-Mai-Yakutumba, DRC 193 types in Africa 8; Mai-Mai-Zabuloni, DRC 193 violence and atrocities 62–5 Maitastine, Alhaji Marwa 326 militias and civil society organisations (CSOs) 242 Maitastine movement 313, 322, 325–8 mineral wealth 19 Makoit, Moses 171 Minnawi, Minni Arkou 270, 273 Malawi 34, 55, 299 Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en République Démocratique Mali 20, 21, 120, 131, 358 du Congo (MONUSCO) 207, 208, 211 Mambas government militias (RoC) 6 Mission des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo (MONUC) 207, 301, 302–4 Mano groups, Liberia 17; River region 81 Mkapa, Benjamin 205–6 Martyrs’ Brigade, Niger Delta 226, 227 Mobutu, Joseph Désiré 31, 58, 185–6, 187, 191, 298, 424, 425, 428 Marxism 46, 71 Mohamed, Ali 256 Mass Awareness and Participation (MAP) movement 391 Moi, Daniel Arap 148, 150, 161, 163, 292, 294–5, 418 Matakwei, Wycliffe 167, 168 Momoh, Joseph 35, 392, 393 Matip, Paulino 275, 277 monarchical regimes 131 Maududi, Sayyid Abdul A’la 316 Moorland Defence Force, Kenya 176 Mau Mau, Kenya 9, 50, 89, 149–50, 157, 173 Morel, E D 185 Mauritania 99, 100, 358 Moreno, Maria 379 Mauritius 126, 128, 131 Morocco 99, 100, 131, 317, 358; Mazrui, Ali 54, 64 armed Islamist groups 342–9; Mbau, Elias 162 global war on terror 357–8; Médecins Sans Frontières 428 internationalisation 356–7; Meinbutus militias, Niger Delta 227 Islamic Jihad 61; Mende ethnic group, Sierra Leone 17 recruitment and activities 349–353, 355–6 Mengistu, Haile Mariam 35, 266–7, 269, 448 Moryham youths, Somalia 16 Michigan Militia Corps, US 437–8 Moshi conference, Tanzania 291–2 Middle East conflicts 318, 343 Mouvement des Forces Démoctatiques de la Casamance (MFDC), Senegal 12 migration 78–81 Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice 80 militant Islamist groups in Northern Nigeria: caliphate order 318, 323–4, 332; Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire 73 early movements 323–5; Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo (MLC) 37, 192, 200, 203 global regional response 334–6; Mouvement Révolutionnaire Congolais (MRC), DRC 7 Mahdist movement 324; Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) 38 neo-militant movements 328–34; Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) 37, 219, 225, 226, 227 Quadriyya 323; Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, Niger Delta 225 recent movement 325–8; Tijjaniyya 323; Movimento Popular de Liberteção de Angola (MPLA) 9, 94, 366–7, 369, 381, 422–3 see also jihad Mozambique 2, 17, 26, 34, 71, 90, 120, 131;

538 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND STATE CRISES IN AFRICA 539 INDEX WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE

FRELIMO-RENAMO blanket amnesty 99; New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) 206, 335, 452 youths 30; New Sudan Council of Churches 269 see also Resistência Nacional de Moçambique (RENAMO) Ngudjolo, Matheu 107 Mozambique Democratic Movement 379 Ngwale, Kinjikitile (prophet) 50 Mubarak, Hosni 297 Niger 120, 131, 331, 358, 420 Mugabe, Robert 55–6, 423, 425, 428 Niger Delta 16, 37, 72, 73, 83, 234, 446–7; Muhajirun 329–30 actors in conflicts 238–40; Muhammad, the Prophet 124, 318, 329–30 bomb attack on Bori Camp 229–30; Mujaddid (reformer) 49 civil society groups 225; mujahedeen 347, 348, 352, 354 corruption and poor planning 222; Mujahid, Abubakar 327 counterinsurgency operation 229; Mulele, Pierre 189 cult groups 225; Mulele rebellion 189 ethnic militias 227; Mungiki militia, Kenya 7, 147, 150, 151, 152–3, 418, 442, 451, 459; ‘grievance versus greed’ thesis 221, 222; Defence Council 164; oaths 154, 155; impact of militia activities and conflicts 243; origin and composition 153–5; inequitable distribution of resources 223; politics 160–3; inter- and intra-community struggles 233–5; religious resources 61–2; inter-ethnic struggles and antagonisms 232–3; religious roots 155–8; militarisation of politics 231–2; state response 163–5; militia groups 225; tactics and strategies 158–60 militias and military engagements 228–30; Museveni, Yoweri 12, 17, 72, 192, 287, 292–3, 296, 298, 299, 304, 393, 424, 425, 441, 443 militias, opportunism and crime 230; Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt/Algeria 315, 322, 326–7, 329, 343–4, 348 Nigeria’s oil and gas wealth 219; Muslims 49, 316; movements 318 oil politics and criminalisation of insurgency 235–7; Muslim Students’ Society (MSS), Nigeria 325, 127 pan-ethnic militias 227; Musulmi, Sarkin (ruler of Muslims) 323 private militias 227; mutilation 102 regional and international interventions 244–245; Mwangi, Gitau 162 resources and conflict 220–3, 244; Mwathi, Mohamed Kamau 156 revenue allocation 236; trend of conflicts 224; violence and crisis 223–5; Namburete, Eduardo 379 youth movement 237–9 Namibia 26, 37, 38, 71, 187 Nasser, Gamal Abdul 344, 346 Niger Delta Coastal Guerrillas 227 National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU) 187, 205, 293 Niger Delta Development Board 245 National Congress for the Defence of the People 59 Niger Delta Development Commission 245 National Democratic Alliance, Khartoum 297 Niger Delta Militant Force Squad (NDMFS) 225, 227 National Islamic Front (NIF) 267, 300 Niger Delta Oil Producing Communities Development Organisation 226 national liberation movements (NLMs) 91, 94–6 Niger Delta People’s Republic 225 National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) 17, 38, 71, 90, 391, 392 Niger Delta People’s Salvation Front (NDPSF) 219, 225, 227 National Provisional Ruling Council, Sierra Leone 395–6 Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) 219, 226, 227, 231 National Resistance Army (NRA), Uganda 11, 14, 31, 71, 287, 292–4, 450, 451 Niger Delta Resistance Movement 226 National Resistance Movement (NRM), Uganda 90, 287, 293, 423 Niger Delta Vigilante 227 National Resistance Party, Uganda 393, 424 Niger Delta Volunteer Service (NDVS) 225, 226 National Security Intelligence Service, Kenya 449 Nigeria 2, 14, 16, 20, 21, 34, 35, 56–7, 90, 120, 126, 131, 131, 333; National Unionist Party, Sudan 258 case analysis 132–4; natural resources 18 economic crisis 318; Ndicho, Stephen 161 elites 22; neo-liberalism 74 Islamist militancy 25; Neto, Agostinho 367 Niger Delta 19, 23, 27;

540 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND STATE CRISES IN AFRICA 541 INDEX WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE

religious revivalism 230; O’odua People’s Congress (OPC), Nigeria 16, 57, 74 ritualistic practices 25; Operation Amani, Rwanda, Uganda 455 small arms proliferation 24; Operation Flush Out, Niger Delta 228 state and social movements 319–22; Operation Hakuri I and II, Niger Delta 228 states with Shariah laws and principles 321, 321–2 Operation Iron Fist, Uganda 193, 300, 304 Nigerian state and transnational oil companies: federal government response 245–6; Operation Kimia, Rwanda, Uganda 455 oil company responses 246–7 Operation Lifeline Sudan 269 Nimeira, Jaafar 264 Operation Lightening Thunder, Sudan, Uganda 194 Ninja militias (RoC) 6 Operation Okoa Maisha, Kenya 172 Ninth October Movement, Uganda 293 Operation Restore Hope, Niger Delta 228 Njenga, Maina (alias) 153, 157, 418; Operations and Human Rights 297–8 see also Kamunya, John Maina oppression and foreign intrusion 49–51 Njenga, Mohamed 156 Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), Kenya 171, 172 Nkanji, Mayanja 292 Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 97, 420, 426; Nkomati Accord 423 Convention on Refugees 420; Nkrumah, Kwame 55–6 summit in Addis Ababa 293, 353 Nkunda, Laurent 59, 191, 201–2 Organisation of Petroleum Producing Countries (OPEC) 132–3 neo-patrimony 28 Oromo Liberation Front rebels 100 non-governmental organisations (NGOs): Caritas 305; Othaya 162 Pax Christi 305; Saint Egidio 305 Pakistan 335, 346, 347, 348 non-state violent actors: belligerents, insurgents, rebels 96; Palestine 95, 99, 347, 349 historicity 70–2; Pan-Africanism 391 militias 93–4; Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), South Africa 11, 95 motives, mobilisation and recruitment 72–5; Pan-African Union (PANAFU), Sierra Leone 391 national liberation movements (NLMs) 94–6; Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), Cape Verde 11, 72 relationship to state and government 77; Parti pour l’Unité et la Sauvegarde de I’Intégrité du Congo (PUSIC) 193 social embeddings 78–81; Party of National Unity (PNU), Kenya 173 state, military and armed groups 75–8 Patriotes Résistants Congolais (PARECO) 193, 201 non-statist or private militias 5, 6 Peace of Westphalia 91 North Africa 449 People’s Defence Force, Tanzania 291 Northern Uganda Recovery Act, US 455 People’s Militia, Tanzania 76 Nouri, Mahamat 108 People’s Redemption Army, DRC 191–6 Ntaganda, Bosco 202, 209 People’s Volunteer Force, Niger Delta 57 Nur, Abdel Wahid 270 Permanent Representative of Canada 301 Nyarugabo, Moise 192 personal and arbitrary rule 126–7 Nyuon, Thon Arok Thon William 267 political dimensions 123 political indoctrination 26 Obama, Barack 428 political militias 6, 7, 8 Obasanjo, Olusegun 205–6, 422 Political Revenge Movements, Kenya 176 Obote, Milton 31, 35, 291, 292, 393, 424, 441 politics: militarisation of 129; Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), Ethiopia 12, 16, 448 nature of 127–8; Ogaden War 426, 448 of violence 129 Oil Derivation Fund for the Oil Producing States 245 Popular Defence Force (PDF), Sudan 274 Oil Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission 245 Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Rio de Oro (Polisario) Front, Western Sahara 95, Okello, Tito 35, 292, 393 100 Okeno, Angelo Okello 295 Popular Resistance Army, Uganda 441 Olwol, John 295 Portuguese colonies 422–3

542 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND STATE CRISES IN AFRICA 543 INDEX WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE

post-colonial period 21–2, 125; Arab 426; insurgencies 11–12; Christianity 48, 50, 59, 61, 174, 426, 451; state, governance and conflict 51–3 Islam 49, 59, 61, 351, 426; Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy and Decision, AU 206 narratives and symbols 46; post-independence period 130, 134, 136 rituals 48, 60–1; poverty 32, 52, 80–1, 133–8, 147, 174–5, 206, 221, 235–7, 242–3, 329, 346 use of 59–62 power 135; Republic of Congo (RoC) 1, 14, 20, 35, 120 masculinity and relations 64; Republic of Sierra Leone Military Force (RSLMF) 391, 392 struggles for 27–8, 127; resistance 46–7, 120 supernatural 60, 168 Resistência Nacional de Moçambique (RENAMO), Mozambique 11, 28, 31, 365–6, 372–3, 450; pre-colonial experiences 125 armies into parties 380–2; Príncipe 131 burdens of opposition 379–380; pro-government militias 8 electoral gains 376–7; Protocol against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources 204 peace settlement 375–6; Protocol on Non-aggression and Mutual Defence in the Great Lakes region 204 political engagement in wartime 373–5; pro-Western pan-Islamism 346 waning support 377–9 pseudo-democracies 131 resource-rich regions in Africa 20 resources 46, 70; Quran 316–17, 318, 326 cattle 64; Quranic law 314 competition model 20; quasi-military or paramilitary militias 5–6 Congolese 184, 186, 188, 190, 192–3, 202; cotton and 259; Qutb, Sayyid 316, 344, 349, 352 crude oil 37; gas 12; racist regimes 97 minerals 20, 24, 37; Raray boys, Sierra Leone 16 natural wealth 102; Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) 187–8, 191–2; oil 12, 20-1, 24, 73; RCD-Goma199, 200, 202; oil price decline 130; RCD-Kisangani (RCD-ML) 192, 193; palm oil trade 25; RCD-ML 203 struggle for 20–1; Rassemblement Démocratique pour le Rwanda (RDR) 199 wild rubber 184–5 reactive desperation 22 restorative justice for victims 107 rebellion and resistance 49–51 Revolutionary United Front (RUF), Sierra Leone 15, 17, 32, 34, 71, 450; rebel movements 9, 11–12, 13; border crossing 443; social bases 15–17; bush camps 396–9; types of militia in Africa 10 conventional warfare 392–6; recruitment 80–1; making of 391; forced 74–5; territorial occupation to demobilisation 401–4 see also under armed Islamic groups; Internet Rhodesia 422–3; reform insurgencies 71 later Zimbabwe 423 reformist rebel movement 9 Rice, Condoleezza 429 refugee crisis 34 Rice, Susan 297–8 regional and international dynamics 36 Rift Valley Kalenjin Warriors, Kenya 7 regional embeddings 81 road blocks and taxes 202 regional interests 135 Roadmap for return of IDPs 282 regional militias 7, 16 Rwanda 2, 14, 21, 34, 35, 37, 38, 69, 120, 187, 428, 451; regional recruits (migrants) 17, 79–80 and CNDP 201–203; regional warriors (recruited fighters) 17, 80 ‘Congo Desk’ 199; religion 3, 16, 25–6, 72–3, 135, 259; genocide 58–9, 99, 102, 460; African traditional 49, 50, 59, 61, 173–4; refugees to Zaire 188–9

544 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND STATE CRISES IN AFRICA 545 INDEX WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE

Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) 202 Shineibat, Abdullah Mustafa Abu 278 Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) 16, 38, 90, 98, 107, 450 Shuaibu, Hallam Ahmed 327 Rwandan Patriotic Front/Army (RPF/A) 186 Siche, David 167–8 Sierra Leone 2, 14, 16, 17, 19, 20, 26, 32, 33, 35, 38, 69, 78, 83, 106, 120, 131, 451; Sabaot Land Defence Force (SLDF) 7, 27, 34, 147, 165; civil war 37; Chebyuk Phase I settlement scheme 166; Kamajor militia 398, 399; Chebyuk Phase II (Cheptoror) 166; mining 403; comparison with Mungiki 173–6; responses of local communities 404–6; Mount Elgon forest 165, 166, 167, 169, 172, 173; ritualist practices 25; organisational form 167–9; small arms proliferation 24; origin and composition 166–7; territorial occupation to demobilisation 401–4; politics 171–2; variables for community 408–10; source of funds 169–70; variables for fighting force 406–8; Soy sub-tribe 166–7; youths 23–4, 30, 80; state response to 172–3; see also Revolutionary United Front (RUF) 389 tactics and strategies 170–1 Sierra Leone Army (SLA) 395 Sadat, Anwar 347, 358 Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) 393 Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) 100 Simango, Daviz 378–9 Salafi jihadism (al-Salafiyya al-Jihadiyya) 343–6, 349, 351, 354 single party systems 126 Salafiyya movement 315 slave trade 51 Small Boys Unit (SBU), Liberia 17 Samaritan Purse (Christian organisation) 269 Smith, Ian 422 sanctions 98 social discontent 23 Sankoh, Foday 15, 17, 71, 82, 106, 391, 396 socialism 46 São Tomé 131 social movement/broad-based militias 7 Sarkozy, Nikolas 428 social relationships 70, 74 Saudi-Arabia 345, 346, 349; Society of the Muslim Brotherhood 316 Wahhabism movement 315, 347 socio-economic disruptions and poverty 32–3; Savimbi, Jonas 366–7, 371, 380 individuals and communities 90–1 46 Somalia 2, 12, 16, 35, 56, 61, 120, 122, 348, 420, 425–7 secessionist rebel movement, Soro, Guillaume 82 see separist rebel movement South Africa 16, 71, 95, 97, 131, 423, 428; security forces of state 76 ANC-National Party agreement 99; Seko, Mobutu Sese 35, 55–6, 186 Executive Outcomes mercenary firm 399 self-determination militias 7 Southern African Development Community (SADC) 423 Semogerere, Paul 292 Southern Sudan Defence Force (SSDF) 275–7 Senate Subcommittees on Africa 297–8 Southern Sudan rebellion 426–7 Senegal 12, 21, 120, 131, 358; South West Africa 96; later Namibia 423 struggle for autonomy in Casamançe 71 South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO), Namibia 11, 89, 94, 108 separist rebel movement 9 Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) 99, 105, 460 Serut, John 171 statehood, dimensions of 122 Settlement Plan 100 state in Africa: collapse 122; sexual violence 102 crisis 124–8; Shariah law 316–17, 320–1, 333 and governance crises 21–2; Shell Petroleum Development Company 246 legal entity 121; Shifta guerrillas, Kenya 71 nature of 120–122; Shiism, variant of Islam 315–16 power and capacity 121; Shiite (Shia) movement 318, 325–8; responses to rebels and militias 97–8; Muslims 318 weakness and collapse 34–6, 128–9

546 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND STATE CRISES IN AFRICA 547 INDEX WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE

state-patronised militias 5, 6 Sunnah Muslims 318 statist militias 5, 8 Sunni, variant of Islam 315–16, 327–8 Stevens, Siaka 391, 392, 393 Sunni Muslims 318 Strasser, Valentine 395 Sunni Wahhabi movement 328 sub-Saharan Africa 128 Supreme Egbesu Assembly, Niger Delta 226 Sudan 2, 6, 14, 20, 21, 34, 35, 36, 38, 61, 69, 76, 81, 106, 120, 255–6, 298, 301, 343, 418, 425–7; Swaziland 131 actors and stakeholders 280–1; Swiss Federal Council 95 Arabs versus black Africans 256; Ashigga political party 258; Takfir wal-Hijra group 351 British Southern policy 257; Taleban: Afghanistan 315, 330, 348; conflict and security 256; Egypt 12; cultural and ideological domination 259; Kenya 151, 176; economic and social exclusion 259–60; Morocco 356; ethnic composition 65, 256; Nigeria 313, 322, 331–2; government responses 273–4; Pakistan 315 historical grievances 257–8; Tambwe, Alexis 192 international responses 282–3; Tangyang, Gabriel 277 local communities 281; Tanzania 16, 126; militarist responses of government 281–2; bombings 348; oil exploration and exploitation 260, 261, 262; German regime 50 post-colonial elections 258; Taylor, Charles 17, 38, 71, 82, 391, 392, 419, 429, 460 power and political rivalry 258; territorial liberation revolts 71 rebel-controlled areas 268; Territory of Congo (DRC v Uganda) 203–4 rebel groups 262–3, 263–4, 264–5; Tigray People’s Liberation Front 71 society, rebel groups and militia 279–80; Togo 78, 131 Southern 90, 99; Torture Convention 102 Torit mutiny 258; traditions 25–6; Turko-Egyptian-European intrusion 49–50; and social norms 49 Turko-Egyptian military campaigns 256; transnational companies (TNCs) 260, 262 Umma political party 258 Transparency International 31 Sudan Alliance Forces (SAF) 276 Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI) 342, 357, 358–9 Sudanese and Chadian rebels 100 tribunals 101 Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) 271, 279 Trinta, Luis 379 Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) 263, 270–1, 273 Tripartite Plus Commission, US 455 Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) 193–4, 262–3, 265–70, 276, 281, 297, 298, 301–2, 401, Tsotsis, South Africa 16 418, 427, 443, 450; Tuareg rebellion (Mali, Niger and South Algeria) 12; attacks on Ugandan refugees 293–4; Azawad independent state 12, 21 Manifesto 266; Tunisia 126, 358, 420 Nairobi Declaration 268 Turabi, Al Hassan 300 Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) 450 Turkey 343 Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) 12, 98, 265 Tut, Samuel Gai 265 support for struggle against Khartoum 100 Tutsis 419, 425; Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Agency 269 in Burundi 11; Sufi Sunni movements 328–9; Salafiyya 329; Congolese 187 Tijjaniyya 329; Wahhabi Izala 329; Uganda 2, 14, 17, 26, 34, 35, 36–7, 38, 69, 99, 100, 102, 108–9, 120, 126, 131, 138, 187, 192, 199, see also Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN) 297, 390–1, 419; Sungu Sungu gang, Kenya 151 exiles in Sudan 293;

548 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND STATE CRISES IN AFRICA 549 INDEX WAFULA OKUMU AND AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE

guerrillas 291; United Somali Congress 426 Karamajong people 64; United States (US) 334, 421; local defence units (LDUs) 398; imperial designs on Muslim world 348; operations against LRA 445; law enforcement 449; regional context of conflict 293–6; Marines in Beirut 347; and Rwanda conflict 300; Patriot Act 300; state making and internal conflicts 290–3 response to Sudanese armed conflicts 282–3; Uganda Amnesty Commission 459 Terrorist Exclusion List 300; Uganda Christian Democratic Army 296 war against terrorism 297 Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) 294, 306 US Africa Command 335–6, 429 Uganda National Rescue Front II (UNRF) 298 Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM) 292 vigilante militias 7, 8, 76 Uganda People’s Army 293 Vikings group, Niger Delta 225 Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) 292 violence: and culture link 62–3; Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) 193–4, 298 dialects of 28–30; Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA) 293, 295–6 elite-sponsored political gangs 442; ul-Muminin, Amir (commander of the faithful) 323 engagement and resistance 22; Umkhonto we Siswe, South Africa 89 forms of Islamism 342–3; underground economies 19 indiscriminate, crime and terror 32, in politics 129; institutionalisation of 2; União para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) 11, 365–7; instrument of politics 127; armies into parties 380–2; murder 102, 191; guerrilla warfare 367–8; rape 102, 194; identity politics 369; rape of women and children 64; military collapse to political defeat 371–2; terrorist groups 322; as parallel state 368–9; torture 102, 191; peace process and renewed war 369–71; see also under militias UNITA Renovada 370 Vultures group, Niger Delta 225 Union des Forces pour la Démocratie et la Développement (UFDD), Chad 11–12 Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC) militia, DRC 7, 193 Wagacha, Hassan Waithaka 156 Union du Haut-Katanga, DRC 188–9 Wahhabi Islam, Saudi Arabia 345 Union Minière du Haut-Katanga 190 Wamba, Ernest dia 187–8 United Force for Democracy and Development, Chad 108 Wangari, Khadija 156 United Liberian Movement for Democracy 396 war crimes 101, 102, 109 United Nations (UN) 91, 92, 94, 97, 100, 204, 426, 427, 456; warlord: insurgencies 9; enforcement actions 98; militias 7, 8 Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief 301; Warsama, Nathan 171 Human Rights Council 447; Waruinge, Ndura 153, 156, 161; Save the Children 299 conversion to Christianity 157; United Nations African Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) 282 conversion to Islam 156 United Nations Charter 454 Waterways Security Committee, Niger Delta 227 United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 299 weapons: AK-47 rifle 64–5, 168; United Nations Development Plan (UNDP) 123, 193 G3 rifle 168; United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 31 traditional 168 United Nations Human Development Index 128 Western Kenya Human Rights Watch (WKHRW) 168 United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNIMIS) 301, 303 Western Sahara 95, 99 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 98, 99, 106, 283, 300, 301, 454; Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) 448 MONUC and sanctions 206–8 West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) 298; United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) 207–8, 211 bases in Sudan and Zaire 298

550 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES MIILITIAS, REBELS AND ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY AND STATE CRISES IN AFRICA 551 INDEX

white minority rule 71 World Bank 52–3, 130, 292; report of 2006 128 World Trade Centre terrorist attacks 300, 348 World War II 94

Yan D aba, Nigeria 16 Yemen 349 youth 23–4; arms bought for 232; crisis and militancy 81–3; exploitation of 65; manipulation of 442–3; militias 7, 8, 17, 23; poverty 333; scholarships 78; social status 82; violent culture 441 Yusuf, Muhammad 331–3

Zaire 31, 37, 56, 90, 126, 186; see also Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) Zakzaky Shiite movement 313 Zambia 55, 188, 367 Zenawi, Meles 267 Zimbabwe 17, 26, 37, 38, 55, 71, 126, 127, 131, 187, 419, 428 Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) 11, 423 Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) 11 Zolou militias, RoC 6 Zuhdi, Karam Mohammed 351–2

552 INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES 1 Militia book cover 11/8/10 2:27 PM Page 1

Throughout Africa, armed militia, rebel and militant Understanding the genesis and evolution of violent

groups continue to threaten state sovereignty and to armed groups in Africa is a critical enterprise as part Militias destabilise the security of some of even the strongest of the effort to contain the phenomenon of weak, economies on the continent. The question is: How failed and failing states in Africa. This book contends should African states respond to the challenge posed that armed militia and insurgent groups with a , R Militias, by such armed groups? The impressive range of case variety of assorted grievances have proliferated in ebels and Islamist Militants: Human I studies gathered here, ranging from the pirates of Africa because of the profound crisis that has the Niger Delta and the rebels of the eastern DRC bedevilled the project of post-independence nation who prey upon rich natural resources, to the cultural building on the continent. Militias, rebels and Islamist Rebels and and religious advocacy by Kenya’s Mungiki and the militants discusses the worrying trend that has armed Islamists of Northern Africa, reveals the emerged from the progressive militarisation of complexity of the problem. For all those who wish to societies and polities across Africa and the understand the contribution these groups make to formidable challenges of restoring a healthy balance Islamist continuing insecurity in African states, this collection between civilian and military institutions. It reminds of well-researched case studies is essential reading. one that violent groups and movements are not David M Anderson simply going to fade away and that there is a need Professor of African Politics at the University for vigorous efforts to check their proliferation. Militants Human Insecurity of Oxford Gilbert M Khadiagala and Fellow at St Cross College, Oxford Jan Smuts Professor of International Relations University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa and State Crises Militias, rebels and Islamist militants is a carefully researched study which shows that armed non-state

actors have become major contributors to human nsecurit insecurity on the continent. It analyses the causes of in Africa the phenomenon and its consequences on the populations and the capacity (or lack of it) of states to protect against it and deal with it. The book also y and S provides practical suggestions on how to deal with this phenomenon. It is highly recommended reading

for scholars, researchers, policy makers and anyone tat

seeking a deeper understanding of militia, rebel and e Crises in Africa Islamist militant groups and the impact their actions have on human insecurity and the state crisis in Africa. Major General Henry K Anyidoho Deputy Joint Special Representative for the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operations in Darfur (UNAMID) and former Deputy Force Commander and Chief of Staff of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) Edited by Wafula Okumu and Augustine Ikelegbe Wafula Okumu and Augustine Ikelegbe have done a sterling job in assembling a wide cross-section of able Africanist scholars to analyse the challenging dynamics of violence perpetrated by armed non- state groups which continues to undermine the emergence and maturation of African states in the post-colonial and post-Cold War eras. Africa needs concrete proposals on how to address the human, national and regional insecurity posed by rebel, militia and Islamist militant groups. This book is a Okumu and I must-read for both intellectuals and practitioners interested in promoting human security in Africa. Martin R Rupiya Executive Director The African Public Policy & Research kelegbe Institute (APPRI)