Rebecca Kenneison. The Special Operations Executive in Malaya: World War II and the Path to Independence. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019. 256 pp. $115.00, cloth, ISBN 978-1-78831-389-6.

Reviewed by Richard Duckett

Published on H-War (January, 2020)

Commissioned by Margaret Sankey (Air University)

For anyone anticipating a blow-by-blow ac‐ ational reports, one of the main conclusions of the count of the Force 136 operations in Malaya, this book is that the MCP and its military wing, the review should probably start by stating that that MPAJA, were preparing to challenge the colonial is not what this book is about. The aims of the authority throughout the wartime period and up book, as set out in the introduction, are threefold: to the 1948 Emergency. That challenge should frst, to reveal the impact of the Special Opera‐ have come as no surprise to London or colonial tions Executive (SOE) upon the capability and ex‐ ofcials in Malaya; that it did, the author argues, pectations of the was due to the inability of British ofcials to use (MCP); second, to cast new light upon the political the wealth of information they had available as ambitions of the MCP both during and after the intelligence. war; and third, to assess the nature of imperial in‐ The book has seven chapters, and starts with telligence gathering in the period between 1945 an overview of SOE’s early organization in the Far and the Emergency of 1948. The overall trajectory East, known as the Oriental Mission. The Oriental of the book is to use the SOE archives to provide a Mission has been perceived as achieving very lit‐ clearer understanding of the causes of the tle, not just in Malaya but throughout the Far East Malayan insurgency than has hitherto been avail‐ in the lead-up to the Japanese War and up to 1942, able. when it ceased to exist.[1] This interpretation is One of the major criticisms of the previous challenged, partly by revealing that up to 165 historiography provided by the author is that, un‐ MPAJA guerrillas were trained at Oriental Mis‐ til now, “the consensus has long been that the sion’s Special Training School, which was estab‐ only armed resistance body of any signifcance lished in during 1941. This gave the was the MPAJA [Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese MPAJA “a good start” (p. 25) and allowed the later Army]” (p. 7). Other groups such as the Malay SOE mission in the Far East, known as Force 136, guerrillas and the Overseas Chinese Anti-Japanese to reestablish contact with those MPAJA guerrillas Army (OCAJA) have had little attention, to the ex‐ its Oriental Mission personnel had trained. The tent that the MPAJA has been written about as training of these and other parties for “stay be‐ “the only” opposition in Malaya. Claims that the hind” operations, if it had happened earlier, OCAJA were nothing but gangsters, it is argued, could, the author argues, have conceivably saved are “highly misleading.” By examining SOE’s oper‐ Singapore from being surrendered. Nonetheless, H-Net Reviews the main argument from this chapter is that the of the war. The Malay resistance also worked with “frst steps were taken along the road to the Force 136 for these reasons, but a more immedi‐ ” (p. 28). ate reason was to ensure that they were not sup‐ Chapter 2 focuses on the establishment of the pressed by the MPAJA. Five of Force 136’s opera‐ Malay Country Section of SOE in the Far East. tions were to the Malay resistance; one was be‐ Most of the men who stafed it were those that the trayed within days but the other four all reported Oriental Mission had enabled to escape from Sin‐ friction with the MPAJA. Perhaps the biggest “re‐ gapore. This nucleus of men was essential to the veal” in these chapters, however, is the “war with‐ thirteen operations and 320 men who were even‐ in a war” between the MPAJA and the OCAJA, who tually sent into Malaya, where they trained and had established a “proto-state” (p. 89) where they armed approximately 5,222 guerrillas by the time “controlled a population of around 100,000 peo‐ of the Japanese surrender. The interesting take‐ ple” (p. 94). Such was the determination of the away from this chapter is the examination of the MPAJA and its political masters in the MCP to diferent motivations of indigenous personnel for dominate the guerrilla movements that the OCAJA joining Force 136, and the interservice rivalry be‐ and began to cooperate against the MPA‐ tween the Allies. This is something of a founda‐ JA. The conclusion is that the Emergency started tional chapter, which fnishes by promising “star‐ during the war, when Malays, overseas Chinese, tling new insights” (p. 49) in the following three and British worked together to prevent the MCP/ chapters, which deal, in turn, with the MPAJA, the MPAJA from dominating the postwar political Malay resistance, and the OCAJA. scene. These three central chapters are really the The fnal two chapters detail, respectively, guts of the book. It is here that the book succeeds how the MCP/MPAJA used the period between the in its central aim of revealing new insights into surrender of Japan and the return of the British the nature of the wartime resistance movements colonial authorities to further prepare for a revo‐ in Malaya. One interesting allegation is that both lutionary attempt at power, and how the British Mountbatten, as supreme commander in South‐ singularly failed to recognize the coming threat. A east Asia, and Colin Mackenzie, the head of Force concluding chapter makes several judgements re‐ 136, were less than honest with London with their garding the MCP/MPAJA on the one hand, and knowledge of the MCP and MPAJA. This was for British intelligence failures on the other. In sum‐ two reasons: frst, because they were worried mary, the MCP/MPAJA-sponsored Malay Emergen‐ about relations with Chiang Kai-Shek; and second, cy was a long time coming and the British author‐ because SOE had short-term military objectives ities should have noticed it because they had all aimed at winning the war and an invasion of the information they required, not least from the Malaya would beneft from as much assistance as multiple postoperational reports of Force 136 of‐ it could get. Perhaps signifcantly, this thread is cers who had been involved in the thirteen Malay not weaved into the later chapter on British intel‐ operations. The fnal verdict is that, like else‐ ligence failures leading up to the Malayan Emer‐ where that SOE operated, it was responsible for gency. developing postwar confict within countries lib‐ erated from the Axis. The MPAJA signed the Blantan Agreement with Force 136 in December 1943 to secure food, Rebecca Kenneison has succeeded in her aim medicine, arms, and training. It was also a calcu‐ of using the SOE archive to further our under‐ lated move, Kenneison argues, to ensure that the standing of the origins and development of the MCP had some political leverage beyond the end Malayan Emergency of 1948. The role of the Spe‐

2 H-Net Reviews cial Operations Executive in developing the post‐ war insurgency is compellingly argued, and her conclusions will necessarily become part of any further work in the area of decolonization, intelli‐ gence, and SOE studies. There remains room, however, for a detailed study of the thirteen SOE operations in Malaya during World War II, since this book has focused upon their impact on Malayan politics in the postwar period. Note [1]. Charles Cruickshank, SOE in the Far East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).

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Citation: Richard Duckett. Review of Kenneison, Rebecca. The Special Operations Executive in Malaya: World War II and the Path to Independence. H-War, H-Net Reviews. January, 2020.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=54378

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