Lush Fields and Parched Throats Political Economy of Groundwater

Ll l v } 822 INGU92 '' -- ' jj \J\ -••- .\l*X'it >- Lush Fields and Parched Throats Political Economy of Groundwater in Gujarat Bela Bhatia The recent discussion on groundwater resources has raised questions of social and economic equity in the distribution of water resources as well as about the role played by water markets, state intervention and other regulatory mechanisms. However, a number of deeper questions have not received adequate attention: Who owns groundwater resources? Who benefits from their use? Who causes and who suffers from their overexploitation? How can proper utilisation of these resources to meet real needs be ensured? This study focuses on two alarming aspects of the present water utilisation patterns in Gujarat: overexploitation and inequity. The aspect of overexploitation has been investigated from macro data and the inequity aspect, in the absence of secondary data at the village level, through a case study of eight villages in Sabarkantha district.

THE years 198S-88 will be remembered in a dangerously low level. The discussion also This section examines this important develop- Gujarat for a long time as 'dry years' or raised questions about social and economic ment, and it's relevance to the issue of water 'thirsty years'. These will be harsh memories: equity in the distribution of water resources, scarcity. unending stretches of parched land, ceaseless as well as about the role played by water Droughts and Famines in Gujarat search for water, back-breaking labour on markets, state intervention and other regu- The earliest authentic records of scarcity relief work sites, the scorching heat, exhaus- latory mechanisms. At the same time, a and famine available for the state relate to tion, anaemia, and even death in the shape number of deeper questions received insuf- the 17th and 18th centuries. Very scant infor- of hundreds of decaying skeletons of cattle ficient attention: Who owns groundwater mation is available for earlier periods. In lying on the wayside. resources? Who benefits from their use? most cases, famine seems to have followed And yet, breaking this sepulchral land- Who causes and who suffers from their a massive crop failure resulting from drought, scape like a mirage, there were lush fields overexploitation? How can we make sure or, in some years, from pests or invasions with healthy stalks and shiny leaves, swing- that these resources are utilised to meet real of locusts, rats and caterpillars [see, e g, Gu ing in a casual breeze while fresh water flow- needs rather than to enrich a privileged jaral Relief Manual, 1979, section on The ed beneath, tickling their roots. Clear water minority? Historical Survey of Calamities in Gujarat']. through which one could see fertile soil, This ongoing debate, as well as the per- unaffected by the surrounding desolation, sonal experience of rural life under drought Loveday, while talking of famines in rich with the promises of bountiful yields. conditions in Sabarkantha district (north India, observes that, between the years 297 But the dream turned sour when one observ- Gujarat), motivate the present study. The and 1907, the less severe famines have tended ed not only that the neighbouring Held was study focuses on two alarming aspects of to recur in cycles of five years, and the more 1 barren but also that its owner and her family present water utilisation patterns in Gujarat: severe ones in cycles of SO years. Rough hardly had enough water to drink. Their overexploitalton and inequity. While the estimates worked out by him showed that it own well was rapidly drying up, even as their overexploitation aspect has been investigated was towards the middle and the end of each richer neighbours were reaching deeper and from macro data, the inequity aspect, in the century that the most disastrous famines deeper to extract groundwater. And as the absence of adequate secondary data, has visited India. He advanced the hypothesis water table went down, their dependence on been examined at the village level. that, after an exceptional period of drought, their neighbours for water kept increasing. The study is divided into three sections. a time of comparative prosperity generally These years were also years of Tierce The first section discusses the nature of the followed, varying in length from 40 to SO debates about the use of water resources in current crisis of groundwater scarcity in Gu- years. India. Many meetings, seminars and con- jarat. Special attention will be paid to the For Gujarat specifically, we find that years ferences were held around this issue. Grass- relationship between groundwater scarcity which have been marked as 'severe famines' roots action groups voiced the needs of the and drought, and to the mutually reinforcing are 1631, 16%. 1718, 1731, 1747, 1791. 1812, poor and tried to organise themsetves and problems of overexploitation and inequity. 1899 and 1901. Of these, famines which are the people for the just implementation of The second section contains a case study of still remembered today with dread because government water schemes. At the national groundwater use in eight villages of Sabar- of their exceptional impact on mortality are level, the National Water Policy was born. kantha district, with particular emphasis on Satyasyo (1631), 1718. Sudtalo (1791) and 2 One of the debates in question concerns the problem of inequity. The third section Chappaniyo (1899-1900). the use of groundwater resources. This issue examines alternative regulatory mechanisms Large-scale starvation and mortality have has been discussed for many years, but only for preventing the overexploitation of been commonly reported during the Mugal became a matter of intense public debate groundwater resources in Gujarat. and Maratha periods, and to a lesser extent during the recent period of acute water scar- during the British period. No such events city (not only in Gujarat, but also in many I have occurred in the post-independence other parts of India). The discussion drew Drought,,Rainfall and period. This suggests that, partly as a result attention to India's vast groundwater re- of public intervention, the main damage sources, and some argued that these resour- Groundwater caused by drought is no longer a sharp in- ces were mostly unharnessed and untapped. 1(1) CHANCING NATURE OF DROUGHTS crease in mortality. On the other hand, the Groundwater experts and planners saw in hardships caused by shortage of water and them a latent potential for irrigation, Drought is not a new phenomenon in fodder are assuming increasingly serious development, increased food production and Gujarat; it has had an important place in proportions. This important aspect of the mitigation of the drinking water crisis. At both the written and the oral history of this history of drought and famines in Gujarat the same time, warnings were voiced that in region. However, the nature of droughts and will be re-examined further in this section. certain areas (especially in states like their impact on rural life are quite different At this point, it may help to recall why Gujarat) the groundwater table had reached today from what they used to be in the pasl. drought often led to famine in the pre-

A-142 Me Economic and Political Weekly December 19-26.

LtBWAWY {INTERNATIONAL REFERENCE CENTRE ' FOR COMMUNITY WATER SUPPLY, &NG] SANITATION (IRQ independence period, and how famines have autobiography, Bhailalbhai Patel (top politi- pendence India went hand in hand with a been prevented since independence. On the cian in Gujarat, leader of the opposition in strong enthusiasm for the construction of former question, Baird Smith, in his famous the 1950s and 1960s, and engineer of con- water extraction mechanisms in times of report on the famine of 1860-61, aptly siderable merit) gives a vivid picture of the drought. The building of water extraction f described Indian famines as "rather famines impact of drought on people's lives in his structures is mentioned as early as 1343, of work than of food". In other words, the own village in Baroda district. The failure when Mohammed Tuglak made advances reason why droughts often precipitated of crops was followed by the sale of milch from the treasury for the digging of wells famine in pre-independence is not so much animals and later of almost every asset in during a famine. Akbar also had canals that they reduced the availability of food, the house, including parts of the house itself made for the rich and the poor alike. The but rather that they led to a dramatic disrup- (e g, windows and door frames). Indebted- historical records give credit to the Muslim tion of economic activity and employment ness and begging sharply increased. The rulers for the construction of canals and to (especially in the rural areas). The Famine author also describes heart-rending scenes the Hindus for the construction of tanks and Commission of 1880 described this process of countless bodies being dumped in a local the digging of wells. Similarly, after the in the following words: well, while human skeletons could be found heads of state in Kutch, Palanpur (Banas- kantha) and Kathiawar adopted a policy of . as a general rule, there is an abundance on the waysides and fields even long after 'food for work' in 1812 (in replacement of of food procurable, even in the worst dis- the end of the drought. the earlier 'food distribution' approach), the tricts in the worst times; but when men who, Bhailalbhai Patel also mentions large- relief works mainly consisted of construc- at the best, merely live from hand to mouth, scale land alienation during the famine, tion of tanks, wells and roads. The post- are derprived of their means of earning especially in the state of Baroda where land mutiny period (from 1857 onwards) was wages, they starve, not from the impossibili- revenue had not been remitted (unlike in marked with further developments in this ty of getting food, but for want of the most places under British jurisdiction). The direction, including the large-scale develop- necessary money to buy it. Caekwad government chose to adopt strict ment of irrigation. In 1883, the government Following this diagnosis, the relief policy measures for the collection of land revenue. enacted the Land Improvement Act with the embodied in the Famine Codes (introduced Those who could not pay were imprisoned object of encouraging works of improve- towards the end of the 19th century) put for a few days, while the land of those ment of land and relieving the distress of greatest emphasis on the creation of employ- landlords who were living in the cities was poor cultivators in times of famine. This was ment through relief works. To this day, the auctioned. Bhailalbhai's own family proper- done by providing assistance to the 'ryots' large-scale provision of wage employment ty of 200 'vighas' was disposed of in such for financing permanent land improvements, through public works remains the main an auction, at the miserable rate of 25 paise particularly the digging of wells and the con- plank of famine prevention during periods per vigha (i e, Rs 50 in all). struction and repair of tanks and water of drought. Since independence, strong There is, in Bhailalbhai's narrative, no cor- channels for irrigating land. In the political incentives to respond to crises have responding account of hardship caused by Chhapaniyo drought of 1899-1900, one of ensured that this strategy is usually invoked groundwater scarcity. In fact, quite interest- the important relief measures involved was with sufficient speed and commitment to ingly, in his description of how "the land of the digging of wells. This was also the case avert a disaster.' the landlords was thrown away at a pittance", in Kheda district during the drought of It is interesting that while pre-indepen- Bhailalbhai uses the revealing expression 1918-19, where the opening of relief works dence accounts of droughts and famines "panine mule". This popular Gujarati ex- was deemed unnecessary but on account of abundantly mention hunger and starvation pression, which can be literally translated as massive crop failure the government liberally deaths, fodder scarcity is only occasionally "at the cost of water", conveys the fact that provided 'tagavi' loans for deepening of discussed, while water scarcity is hardly ever the land had been sold for a sum so low that 4 wells. mentioned. All sorts of descriptions can it was hardly worth counting. The use of this be found of how people coped with hunger metaphor is consistent with the continued We can thus see that traditional relief (e g, by eating roots and seeds), but there availability of groundwater during pre- policies have included a sharp keenness to is no corresponding account of the survival independence droughts in Gujarat, in sharp build water extraction mechanisms. The strategies they adopted to cope with water contrast with the present situation.6 motivation for this approach was partly that scarcity. water-related works offered a convenient way Water Scarcity and Relief Policy This observation applies, for instance, to of generating large-scale employment, and Bhailalbhai Patet's brilliant account of the Interestingly, the continued availability of partly that expanded irrigation was a means Chhapaniyo drought (1899-1900).' In his groundwater during droughts in pre-inde- to increase food production and to reduce

TABI t I: Rt\ itf OPERATIONS RH-ATED TO DRINKINO WATER SUPPLY DURINO 1985-88 DROUGHT

Category Number of Villages/Towns Covered Expenditure Incurred (In R*s Lakhs) 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88* 1985-86 1986-87 198788* 1985-88**

Plan Deep tubewells 4479 5228 7450 (7230) 2012 1926 3003 (2763) 670J New wells 6.13 277 737 (III) 220 95 299 (68) 393 Urban ccnires 24 17 29 (22) 2191 1280 6166 (3185) 6656 Other 1793 1041 2222 (1831) 3412 761 4476 (3156) 7329 Non-Plan Deepening of wells 3351 2967 2842 (1515) 428 253 368 (NA) (NA) Tanker supply 1841 3071 (2677) 393 335 1176 (NA) (NA) Conservation of reservoirs — — — (-) 16 _ 100 (NA) (NA) Water supply to cattle camps ~ — — (-) — — 100 (NA) (NA) Total Plan 6929 6563 10438 (9174) 7835 4062 13944 (9172) 21069 Total non-plan 3351 4808 5913 (4192) 837 588 1744 (2328) 3753 Grand total 10280 11371 16351 (13366) 8672 4650 15688 (II500) 24822

Norn: • These are est.maledfigures (from the Master Plan 1987-88). The figures in brackets indicate actual achievements up to 31 7 88 *• Actual expenditure incurred up to 31.7.88. p JI./.W. Soune. Government of India (1989): The Drought of 1987: Response and Management, Volume II (Ministry of Agncullure, New Delhi).

Economic and Political Weekly December 19-26, 1992 A-143 ••«

The significance of the water crisis does MAP 1: GUJARAT STATE not end there. As will be seen further on, GUJARAT STATE the water crisis is no longer confined to drought years. The depletion of groundwater PAKISTAN resources affects the livelihood of the rural r -—'" -- BANASKANTH* ' RAJASTHAN population on a permanent basis. _• (U«N Of wren 1(2) TRENDS IN RAINFALL

\ f' 1 1, „ .SABARKANTHA';, The emergence of groundwater scarcity in Gujarat, and the increasing frequency of droughts, are often blamed on an allegedly

Xf ") i AHVEDA8AD _. / pANCHMAHALS '; declining trend in rainfall. This 'explanation' i ^SURENORANAGAR^ j ^^ /"• ,-' is convenient for those in power, since it ab- solves them of any responsibility for the current crisis. The claim that a declining trend JAMNAGAB -) ».-> V v i H^~, BAROOA in rainfall is the source of increasing groundwater scarcity in Gujarat, however, has a very weak factual basis. Indeed, a number of earlier studies of rainfall data for different parts of India have seriously discredited the notion of a declin-

OatncT ing long-term trend in rainfall." A similar BoontUry conclusion emerges from a simple analysis VAlSAO i *""' of rainfall data for Gujarat. •' MAHARASHTRA Figures 1 and 2 show annual rainfall levels over the 1951-88 period for Gujarat, and over the 1901-90 period for Sabarkantha district, as well as five-year moving averages.12 It is vulnerability to future droughts. In both 1983-88, the state went so far as to transport easy to see that, prior to the 1985-88 cases, the preoccupation of these policies water to Rajkot by train across a distance drought, there was no noticeable trend in was overwhelmingly with averting starvation of more than 250 km. rainfall over these periods in either of the and mortality, rather than with water scar- The growing seriousness of the water crisis two regions. city as such. This was so because ground- in Gujarat can also be gauged from the This impression is confirmed by simple water scarcity was not a problem even in sharp rise in the allocation of funds to drink- regression analysis. A linear regression of times of drought (indeed, as we saw earlier, ing water supply in the relief budget of each rainfall on time for the period 1951-85 (i e, pre-independence accounts of droughts consecutive drought year. The provision of the 35 years preceding the 1985-88 drought) make little mention of the depletion of drinking water has now become one of the produces a small positive coefficient in the groundwater). This happy state of affairs, principal planks of the government's relief case of Gujarat, and a small negative co- unfortunately, started changing dramatically policy. efficient in the case of Sabarkantha, neither in the 1960s, when water scarcity increasingly In 1985-86, the government spent Rs 87 of the coefficients being statistically signifi- emaged as one of the most alarming aspects crore on supplying drinking water to villages cant. If 1990 rather than 1985 is taken as tht of drought in Gujarat. and towns by various means. But this left terminal year, the time coefficient is negative the problem as acute as ever, for a repeat Emergence of Water Scarcity both for Gujarat and for Sabarkantha (as performance had to be made in 1986-87 and one would expect since the reference period Acute water scarcity was noted during the again in 1987-88. The new sources that had ends with a prolonged drought), but even drought of 196041 in Gujarat, and also dur- been created were reported to have dried up. ing the subsequent droughts of 1961-62 to During the first seven months of 1987-88, 1968-69 (when drought occurred year after TAW t 2: TRLNUS IN RAINFALL: RESULTS OF A the government incurred an expenditure of LINLAR REGRESSION OF RAINFALL ON TIME year in one part of Gujarat or another), Rs 11,500 lakh (Rs 115 crore) on drinking 1972-73, 1974, 1979 and 1985-88. The water supply schemes (Table 1), including Area and Period t-ratio number of villages without adequate access Time Co- both 'short-term' measures like deepening of efficient to water, or 'no source* Milages, rose from 7 wells and supply of tankers and 'long-term' 3,844 in 1979 to 12,188 in I986. In 1987, as measures such as installing deep tube-veils Gujarat. 1951-85 0.73 0.16 many as 16,351 villages out of a total of Gujarat. 1951-90 -1.87 -0.49 1 and water pipes to transport water over long 18,114 were classified as *no source' villages. distances. In the three years 1985-88, as Sabarkantha. 1951-85 -0.30 -0.05 Drought relief measures are increasingly many as 36,901 deep tubewelis were con- Sabarkamha, 1951 90 - 3.11 -0.66 geared to this growing problem of water structed, and a mammoth sum of Rs 248 Sabarkaniha. 1901-85 -0.60 -0.42 scarcity. The public supply of water through crore was spent on these relief operations. Sabarkantha. 1901-90 -1.26 -0.96 tankers first occurred during the drought of The number of bores drilled increased year Note: Tlie •lime coefficient' indicates the trend 196041, in the coastal tracks of Dhanduka after year during the drought, from 6,612 in taluka of Ahmedabad district and the Bare change in rainfall in mm per year. As the 1985-86 to 8,125 in 1986-87 and 11,247 in last column indicates, none of these coef- tract of Bharuch district. For subsequent 1987-88.l0 drought years, one consistently reads about ficients arc statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. The official district-wise water being supplied by tankers and bullock- One can tnerefore argue that, while star- rainfall figures on which these regres- carts, wells being dug or deepened, bores be- vation deaths are now rare in Gujarat (the sions are based are given in Bhatia ing sunk, village tanks being deepen*:! or same cannot be said in Orissa or Rajasihan), (1992), 'Lush Fields and Parched repaired, tagavi loans being given for diesel drought still plagues this state in different— Throats: The Political Economy of engines, and water being supplied to cattle and no less serious—manifestations. In ad- Groundwater in Gujarat', Working by hiring 'kbshias'.' During the drought of dition to the traditional threat of a 'famine Paper, World Institute of Development 1972-73, drilling rigs were imported to drill of work', there is now an acute need to deal Economics Research, Helsinki. tubewelis, and during the drought of with the threat of a 'famine of water'. Appendix 2.

A-144 Economic and Political Weekly December 19-26,1992 National Network of Hydrograph Stations MAC 2: ARtAS OK RISE AND I-Al I IN GROUNDWATFR TABI F APRI1 1979 MAY 1987 (established by CGWB). On the basis of hydrographs and the long-term trend of groundwater level, the declines or rises in PAKISTAN ,,., '^ ^l!lll:?;l;ill'-;', water levels were calculated for 1979 to 1987. j'i--.. >.._>'''" ' '" '^W'^'^^^tif1 HAJASTHAN c ; The results are presented in Maps 2 and 3 .---! ,"""..°'."" " .:•• ••:> :sliiil-x- (see also Map 4). Map 2 shows changes in pre-monsoon groundwater levels between April 1979 and May 1987, while Map 3 shows changes in post-monsoon levels between November 1979 and November 1987. Among the eight years under examination, there were drought years (1979-80, 1985-86 :-:%*•' MAOHYA ''••••: •:"''•' PRADESH and 1986-87). These maps clearly show that there is an overall decline of water levels in almost all regions. In most of the state, water levels have fallen by more than 2 metres over this short period. In many areas, they have SIM Boundary fallen by more than 4 metres." The decline of water tables that can be e observed in Maps 2 and 3 is partly attri- i- butable to the drought conditions that MAHARASHTRA x mJ»t SO prevailed in 1987 (the terminal year in the s 0 kmt SO comparisons). Indeed, Phadtare*s own report clearly shows how water tables tend to Is decline quite drastically in drought years then the coefficients are small and statistical- central region). This very informative docu- T (Tables 4, 5 and 6)." The main reason for ly insignificant. If 1901 rather than 1951 i: ment [Phadtare, 1988], which contains the t. this phenomenon, of course, is that during taken as the base year, the results for latest available information on the geohy- i drought years recharge is practically nil while Sabarkantha remain largely unchanged drology of Gujarat, has itself not been 8 drafts continue to take place. (Table 2). published so far. In spite of its officially n Having said this, one should not fall prey * we can look at the issue of trends in rain- "confidential' nature, this document is exten- fall from another angle by considering the sively used and cited in this section, in the to the temptation of concluding that the re- 'frequency of failure' of rainfall in Sabarkan- belief that a more open information system cent decline of water tables is a short-term, le drought-induced phenomenon. There is, in •f tha district in different periods. As lable 3 is an essential prerequisite of effective public shows, there has been no noticeable increase action in this field. This section also draws fact, much evidence of a long-term decline in the frequency of failure of rainfall in the on unpublished data obtained from the recent past. In fact, in this respect the two Central Ground Water Board (Ahmedabad) TABLE 3: FREQUENCY OF FAILURE OF RAINFALL decades since 1970 have been rather and the Ground Water Resources Develop- INSAAARKANTHA DISTRICT PER 10-YEAR PERIOD favourable. ment Corporation (Ahmedabad). Period Number of Number of Even if there is a declining trend in rain- The three main manifestations of increas- Years below Years above fall, it is clear that this trend is only a slow ing groundwater depletion in Gujarat are (I) Normal Normal and insignificant one. The sharp increase in the decline of water tables, (2) salinity in- the area and population experiencing water gress, and (3) the increase in fluoride 1901-1910 6 4 is 15 crisis in Gujarat in recent years cannot be content. 1911-1920 4 6 d linked primarily to the precipitation factor. Decline of Water lables n 1921-1930 4 6 As will be seen further on, the driving force 1931-1940 6 4 The decline of water tables is the most behind increasing groundwater scarcity in 1941-1950 4 6 perceptible and widespread of the three Gujarat is not the decline of groundwater 1951-1960 5 5 'recharge' through rainfall, but rapidly grow- manifestations of groundwater scarcity men- 1961-1970 8 2 ing levels of 'draft', themselves linked with tioned above. Officials dealing with the sub- 1971-1980 4 6 the rapid expansion of modern water extrac- ject are particularly concerned about the 1981-1990 5 5 tion structures.13 lapping of resources which are beyond the Per 5-year period reach of seasonal recharge, and are therefore 1901-1905 5 0 most vulnerable to depletion. Newspapers 1(3) INDICATIONS OF GROUNDWATER 19061910 1 4 have announced shocking reports like the 1911-191? 3 SCARCITY 2 water table in parts of Mehsana district 1916-1920 1 4 What evidence is available to support the reaching a depth of 1,200 feet." Less spec- 1921-1925 2 3 widely-held belief that groundwater resour- tacular, but still alarming, is the rapid decline 1926-1930 2 3 ces in Gujarat are being dangerously deple- of groundwater levels, reported in many 1931-1935 2 3 d ted? A lot of secrecy surrounds this subject, districts of north Gujarat, Saurashtra and 1936-1940 4 1 * due to its politically sensitive nature.14 Even Kutch. 1V411945 0 5 r- the most basic facts (e g, data on water In 1988-89, the regional office of the 1946-1950 4 1 d taken enough interest in this subject to get reports highlight the occurrence of large- ,f 19761980 1 4 hold of these concealed facts. scale groundwater overexploitation during g 1981-1985 2 J the last two decades [Phadtare, 1988). it This section makes extensive use of a re- 1985 1W0 .1 i. cent report by P N Phadtare, former direc- Phadtare [I988J reports official analyses tor of the Central Ground Water Board (west of historical groundwater level data from the Soune As in Table 2.

•Economic and Political Weekly December 19-26, 1992 A-145 •\KI-.Vi l» RlSI AND I Al I IN CjkOLNDWATfcK iiic malt of groundwater overexploitation. NOVlMBIiR 1979-NOVHMBtR 1981 A brief regionwise review of the facts may help to highlight this dangerous trend." Saurashtrtr. Salinity in Saurashtra is

"AJASTHAN observed on a large scale even in the milioiite limestone region (these limestones are very useful aquifers as they are the repositories of potable groundwater in the otherwise saline coastal belt of Saurashtra). Today, a tract about 4 to 7 km from the coast, cover- ing an area of about 900 sq km, suffers from salinity ingress due to overetploitation. Other pockets of Saurashtra like Junagadh, Jamnagar. Bhavnagar and Surendranagar have to deal with the same problem. Under the Exploratory Drilling Programme,'..»- ween 19S9 and 1967, 24 wells were drilled in the coastal tertiary area of the four districts mentioned above. All these wells had to be abandoned due either to highly saline formations or to the existence of basalt at shallow depths. The groundwater in vast tracts around Surcndranagar and Wadhwan towns in Surendranagar district is saline at all depths. In addition, any excessive extraction in the shallow aquifer in water tables in most areas of Gujarat; • per beds in these formations, which receive causes upcoming of saline water from while the downward trend has a tendency to constant replenishment monsoon after mon- depths. accelerate during droughts, it is not confin- soon, have moderate fresh water storages Kutch: In the Kutch areas, due to high ed to drought yean atone. For instance, a (this is an effect of flushing of saline waters topographic gradients, salinity ingress is simple regression of water level on time for during monsoons). restricted to the narrow coastal strip and the the penod 1981-90 brings out a declining Today, many districts show an alarming low lying Bani plains. But the marine for- trend in 87 out of 96 observation wells incidence of salinity (Map 6). The problem mations which are present all around haw used by the Central Ground Water Board of salinity is partly a naturaTphenomenon, inherent salinity due to which, except for the (Ahmedabad) in its assessment of recent m but to an increasingly large extent it is also central uplands, 60 per cent of the district trends in water tables. The total decline of this 10-year period, calculated for each well TABLE 4: GROUNDWATER RESOURCES DURING DROUGHT YEARS on the basis of the observed time trend, is larger than 4 metres for nearly SO per cent Year Rainfall Groundwater Groundwater Average Decline of these wells. Further details are provided (mm) Recharge Draft between May in Table 7. (mem) (mem) 1984 and May of the Relevant m Salinity Ingress Year (m) Gujarat has the longest coast line in Saurashtra (Average annual rainfall: S50 peninsular India. Besides the 1,400 km coast mm; area; 64,339 sq 1km) 1984 506 6.426 3.737 line, there is an additional ancient shore line — (surplus) of 250 km along Rann of Kutch. This coast 1985 291 3.400 3.830 1.3 line, with its creaks and tides which invade (overdraft) the coastal plains up to 4 to 6 km from the 19X6 398 4.650 3,925 2.5 sea coast, is the main front of salinity in- (marginal surplus) gress. The normal coastal salinity is also ac- 1987 140 1.635 2,757 5.0 companied by inherent salinity of the marine (overdraft) sedimentary formations. Today, the problem kutch (Average annual rainfall: 350 mm; area: 45,652 sq kms) of salinity ingress is more widespread than 1984 335 803 282 ever before. (surplus) Salinity has now invaded as far as 7 km 1985 222 509 289 1.3 inland from the coast into the aquifer (surplus) system. The normal water flow is from in- 1986 164 422 296 2.5 land towards the coast, but due to over- (marginal surplus) exploitation of groundwater in the adjoining 1987 40 96 148 5.7 coastal plains the flow has now reversed. (overdraft) m Salinity in shallow depths is found in 34,625 Nonh Gujarat (Average annual rainfall: 625 mm; area: 37.870i sq kms) sq km, with adverse effects on the phreatic 1984 706 4,535 2,292 (surplus) aquifers. Salinity below 200 m of depth is 1985 381 2.764 2.063 observed over an area of 34,000 sq km. 1.5 (marginal surplus) This problem is further aggravated by the 1986 299 2,169 1.856 3.3 inherent salinity of the thick coastal tertiary (overdraft) and alluvial formations deposited under 1987 175 1.269 1.763 4.5 marine conditions. Due to this, the possibili- (overdraft) ty of getting fresh waters from aquifers within explorable depths is lost. Only the up- Source: Phadtarc (1988)

A-146 Economic and Political Weekly December 19-26. 1992

J.'>-.^.-1-i"**.V'..-'--'"-''-'--V.'.;' '• •.•.•' fasi rale due to the recession of water MAP 4 CONTOURS INDICATING DEPTH TO WATER LEVEL. UNC ONFONED AQUIFER. MAV 1989 levels.-'" This has caused problems of ay domestic water supply as well as fluorosis. The stiffening of limbs in some form or the PAKISTAN ,,„ v^ *-. y WV». Other is the main physical disability (discer- ite r\r- ^.-..x y-' i f / BANASKANTHA^ • l^C^v/ RAJASTHAN nible in both human and cattle population) ry caused by fluorosis. Besides, fluorisis is es known to have deleterious effects on the se teeth, the kidney, the heart and the nervous a system; it can also cause foetal damage. rr- Fluorosis is irreversible and cannot be cured m :?rT?7 once it has affected the body.21 n. 10O I5nn The permissible limit of fluoride is around h, I ppm (parts per million), although levels «r >15mt of up to I.S ppm are usually considered as er 'tolerable'. But the fluoride content of groundwater has crossed the permissible •d limit, often by shockingly large margins, in ir hundreds of villages in Gujarat. In Mehsana, Is 6ound»Y 623 villages out of a total of 1,081 are af- iy fected by excess fluoride. Studies indicate its v' .-O0AN0S; presence in all the aquifers down to the depth of 100 m in almost the entire district, A1.SAD,f MAHARASHTBA •SEA due to which, today, drinking water needs to be imported from the neighbouring districts. The worst case of fluoride excess is saline. There is brackish water below the Saurashtra and Kutch, has saline water at in Gujarat is reported from Lathi Leelia in depth of ISO m, under confined conditions. all depths and pockets of brine (salt-satu- Arnreli district, where fluoride content is as There is a possibility of upcoming of salinity rated water) at very shallow depths. This is high as 37.5 ppm. The fluoride problem has if the water levels continue receding on ac- causing sub-surface outflow of highly saline recently spread to more and more districts, count of accelerated rate of overexploitation. water in the adjoining alluvial areas of north including Sabarkantha (Map 7).22 North and Central Gujarat: The saline Gujarat, as well as in areas with semi-con- aquifers of Saurashtra and Kutch are also solidated and alluvial formations in It is worth noting that fluoride is only one affecting tracts of north and central Gujarat. Saurashtra and Kutch. of the salts of importance, and that the so- called 'total dissolved salts' (TDS) levels in The alluvial deposits in these regions are South Gujarat: Salinity ingress is very Gujarat have also shown highly disquieting showing deterioration of quality both depth- limited along the south Gujarat coast, where trends in recent years. As Maps 8 and 9 wise and from east towards west. The salinity the country rock is unpermeable basalt. The clearly show, the areas where the 'permissible ingress from deeper saline aquifers and deeper aquifers in Surat and Bharuch dis- limit' of 1,500 ppm (defined by the World western saline areas bordering Rann of tricts beyond 90 m of depth are saline. Kutch is due to progressive declines in water Health Organisation and the Indian Council of Medical Research) is exceeded have enor- levels ranging from 1 to 21 m during the last Fluoride Content of Groundwaler two decades, caused by overexploitation. The mously expanded between 1970 and 1989." most affected area is around Mehsana city. Fluoride is one of the salts found in water. In many areas, even the 'tolerable limit' of A vast low-lying tract in central Gujarat, that In recent years, the fluoride content of 3,000 ppm is now grossly violated. is the area separating north Gujarat from groundwater has been increasing at a very The evidence of increasing groundwater

TABLE 5: HIGH AVERAGE WATER LEVLIS(W.I) IN AIGUNT AIDD LOW AVERAGE WMIR LLVLIS IN OKOLGHI-AHK TED AREAS of GUJARAT DURING 1984-88

District Average w.l Average Decline Compared to Agerage w.l Average Decline Compared to in August August 1984 Level in May/ May/June 1984 Level (m) 1985 1985 1986 1987 1988 June 1984 1985 1986 • 1987 1988 (m bql) (m bql)

Saurashtra Amreli 8.8 25 23 5.0 1.7 7.3 0.5 8.3 6.7 8.8 Bhavnagar 59 4.1 5 1 7.0 2.7 9.7 1.7 3.8 5 4 7.0 Jamnagar 6.6 1.5 3.1 6.5 + 0.9 8.8 1.7 2.6 4.1 5.1 Junagadh 7.5 2.4 2.5 6.2 0.5 10.6 24 3.2 3.6 5.6 Rajkot 5.4 IX 4.0 4.4 + 2.3 9.3 03 I.I 3.4 2.4 Surendranagar 5.3 3.1 4 1 6.7 2.3 7.3 1.5 5.0 6.3 5.8 Average 66 2.6 3.5 6.0 0.7 8.8 13 4.0 4.9 5.8 kutch Average 7.7 0.3 1-4 1.6 1.6 8.8 3.0 1.2 2.8 3.0 North Gujarai Ahmedabad 3.8 0.9 1.2 2.K 1.5 7.9 0 1 1.5 + 0.1 0.4 Banaskantha 97 14 1.3 4.8 3.4 12.0 1.0 t 0.6 09 + 1.9 ndhinagar 150 1.0 1.9 — — 15.3 0.6 13 - 1.5 Mehsana 5.8 2.2 4.7 5.3 3.6 10.7 + 0.5 0 5 14 29 Sabarkantha 7.7 2.5 4.0 7.8 1.2 12.1 0.0 0.1 1.5 32 Average 6.9 1,6 2.6 5.2 2.4 11.6 0 2 06 I.I 12

Sourer. Phadiare IL988I.

Economic and Political Weekly December 19-26, 1992 A-147

'''^^iM^dsM^^ii^sMiiJS MAP V C.RF.V AND DARK AREAS BASED ON LEVEL OF GROUNOWATER ,^.\ as denudation is a cause of increasing UTILISATION FOR 1988-89 water scarcity, the disruption of the hvdro- logical cycle itself contributes to the disap- PAKISTAN pearance of forests. The latter problem

SKANTHA ^ »' RAJASTHAN should be a cause of deep concern in its own right. Trees and Water What exactly is the role performed by trees? As mentioned above, the presence of plant cover helps to increase the percolation of rain water into the ground. The soil water reservoir under a forest cover therefore tends to be preserved for a longer period « compared to barren land. Moreover, forfeits play Level of Grountfwattr Uttubon > fiS% an extremely important role in controlling ( Darfc Aiea) floods by reducing or regulating water run-

BHARUCHJ -,' ( Level ol Groundwater off, thus also reducing soil erosion and 1 -^ UMinMA 65% • 65K. landslides. (Grey Area ) From an uncut, unburned and ungrazed

Ground Aatet 2000 forest, rarely will any water emerge as sur- Resources face flow even during heavy rainfall. Almost

I Dtstnet-woe MAHARASHTRA all water is transmitted downwards... Ac- ' percentage ol cording to one calculation, if the soils of Gfoundwaier Utilisaion (19M) India's forest area had good forests onihem, they would have the capacity to store more than all the rainwater that falls in an avenge scarcity in Gujarat arising from data on and the way the society is organised. Some year on a temporary basis and more than half water tables, salinity and fluoride remains of these more basic political issues will be of it on a prolonged basis... Clear-cutting quite fragmentary. This, as was discussed examined in Section III. of forest can increase peak run-off from high earlier, is to a large extent a reflection of the intensity storms by 10 to 20 per cent... Once suppression of information on this whole 1(4.1) GROUNDWATER DEPLETION AND forest lands are denuded, soil loss can in- 14 issue However, the available information ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS crease by as much as 400 times". points clearly to the existence of a massive In addition, some experts believe.that trees Hydrological Cycle and increasing problem of depletion of help in bringing rain, by cooling the warm groundwater resources. The picture is in- The term 'hydrological cycle" refers to the air masses and thus supporting the process complete, but it is already grim enough to continuous circulation of the earth's of condensation. This view, however, is a deserve urgent concern. moisture through evaporation and precipitation. It is this cycle which makes water i TABLE 6: DROUGHT AND WATER LEVELS 1(4) CAUSES OF THE CURRENT CRISIS 'renewable' resource. The excessive pumping of groundwater District Average Water Gujarat is facing an acute and growing not in proportion to the recharge rate can Level (m)(May) problem of water scarcity, which reduces disrupt this cycle and lead to the depletion 1984 1987 many aspects of the quality of life for the of this otherwise renewable resource. The i rural poor. During the last decade, water ex- recharge rate depends on the extent of rain- Ahmedabad 1$ 17 traction through dugwells and handpumps fall (discussed in the preceding section) and Amrdi 17 27 has become increasingly difficult, the water on the rates of percolation and run-off. Banaskantha 18 22 Baroda 6 9 table has receded and groundwater has The rate of percolation depends chiefly Bharuch 9 II become inaccessible for those who cannot on the characteristics of (he soil. Coarse san- Bhavnagar 20 33 afford modern extraction devices. This is dy soils permit fast percolation, while fine Dangs 8 8 more the rule than the exception, not only clayey soils permit very slow percolation; Gandhinagar 1$ 17 in a drought year but also during non- there exist all grades of intermediate varie- Jamnagar 18 20 drought years (especially during the summer ties. Besides soil permeability, the rate of Junagadh 11 21 months). percolation also depends on the size of the Kheda 12 IS Broadly speaking, one can distinguish two resource already available. In waterlogged Kuich 21 32 (interrelated) causes of this accelerating areas, where the water table is very close to Mehsana 27 29 depletion of groundwater resources. First, the ground surface and where there is little Panchmahal 13 16 the depletion of groundwater can be seen as empty space underne? h, very little water Rajkoi 4 12 one aspect of a broader ecological crisis, in- can sink in. Sabarkantha 10 21 volving particularly the disruption of the The extent of run-off depends on the Surai 13 14 hydrological cycle. Second, there are impor- depth, porosity and compactness of the soil Surendranagar 8 II tant economic forces leading to the direct and the underlying .material, the steepness Valsad 8 9 depletion of groundwater resources, especi- and configuration of the surface, and the ally the indiscriminate expansion of modern character and density of the vegetation. If Soune: Unpublished data obtained from Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage water extraction devices and of water-inten- there is adequate plant cover, litter and Board, Ahmedabad. There appear to sive crops in areas of groundwater scarcity. humus on the earth's surface, the force of be some discrepancies between these These two causes of groundwater depletion the rainfall gets reduced and so does its figures and those reported by Phadlare will be dealt with in Sections 1(4.1) and power to dislodge mineral soil particles. In (Table 5), which may be due to dif- 1(4.2), respectively. the absence of plant cover, the run-off rate ferent methodologies (e g, different These ecological and economic processes, is accelerated. In Gujarat, denudation has averaging formulae). However, both of course, themselves have deeper causes, played an important role in accelerating run- sources reveal a clear picture of decline relating to the structure of property rights off and reducing groundwater recharge. in water levels.

A-148 Economic and Political Weekly December 19-26. 1992

v i-';/ wp^i; >«rV'. •'*>*•* • matter of some controversy. The Indian have taken the negative form of attempting has already been achieved by groundwater meteorological department denies any corre- to 'bar' people from the forests, instead of development during 1951-1985 works out to : lation between the two, but a few separate taking positive steps to promote alternative something like Rs 50,000 crore. " studies do show some correlation, especially sources of energy and livelihood. The alleged The pace of development of irrigation in in humid areas. A well known study is that success of official 'afforestation' program- Gujarat in recent decades can be appreciated of Meher-Homji [1986], who on the basis mes is little more than a myth, given that from Table 8. As the table shows, between of vegetation and rainfall studies of 29 sta- it has been largely based on the large-scale 1960-61 and 1984-85 the percentage of gross tions for over 100 years has shown that, as promotion of ecologically suspect species area irrigated to gross area sown nearly N a rule, the larger the area of deforestation, such as eucalyptus. Further, in some cases quadrupled. (he larger the number of criteria showing government policies have directly contri- Table 9 shows the area irrigated by dif- diminishing tendency of rainfall and rainy buted to the destruction of the environment, ferent sources from 1960-61 to 1983-84. It 25 days. for instance through the submergence of rich can be seen that, although the area irrigated The National Forest Policy [1952] has forests following the construction of large by wells has slightly declined in propor- prescribed that, of the total land area, 33 per dams. tionate terms (mainly due to the expansion cent should be covered by forests. Official of canal irrigation), groundwater irrigation statistics of the government of Gujarat show 1(4.2) GROUNDWATER OVEREXPLOITATION through wells remains the major contributor that the land under forests more than doubl- (76.5 per cent) to the total area irrigated.*0 Emergence of Modern Irrigation in Gujarat ed between 1960-61 and 1980-81 (from 5.1 At the same time, a dramatic change has per cent of the total land area to 10.4 per The large-scale development of irrigation taken place within the 'wells' category. In 24 cent). But independent studies lend little in Gujarat, as in the rest of the country, earlier times, irrigation through wells meant support to this extraordinary claim. Satellite- began after 1951 (the year when planned the use of 'kos' and similar water-lifting based data released in mid-1984 by the Na- development in India was initiated). Prior devices, manually operated with the aid of tional Remote Sensing Agency (NRSA) to 1951, in the country as a whole, the utilisa- bullocks. Today, however, well irrigation show, on the contrary, that Gujarat's forest tion of groundwater for irrigated agriculture usually involves energised pumps. Thus, the cover shrunk by almost 50 per cent between accounted for around 25 per cent of the total dugwells or open wells of the 60s have in- 1972-75 and 1980-82 (from 5.3 per cent of groundwater resources harnessed at that the total land area to 2.8 per cent).27 time. At the beginning of the planning era, TABLE 7: TRENDS IN WATER TABLE (1981-1990) Trfe experience of desertification has the full potential of underground aquifers IN 95 OBSERVATION WELLS found deep expression in oral histories and was not known. The availability of pumping equipment and the energy needed to operate local folklore. Umashankar Joshi, the cele- District Number Number "Trend them were also restricted. brated poet, talks about his native village in of of Wells Decline' Bhiloda taluka of Sabarkantha district as the However, once the realisation came that Obser- Showing in Water most beautiful spot on earth with its dense groundwater was an extremely cheap and 'ef- vation Declin- Table forests, rich foliage and fresh water streams ficient' alternative to major and medium Wells ing over 10 and rivers. But today, the hills at the edge irrigation works, the exploitation of the Trend in Years of the Aravalli range are completely barren (m) (Un- groundwater potential began at an accele- Water of vegetation. Table weighted rated pace. The comparative advantage that Average The real brunt of this forest loss is borne groundwater has over other sources qf irriga- over by the poor villager., especially tribals whose tion has been described by the expert B B Observa- whole economy is dependent on this resource. Vohra in the following words: Women not only have to walk longer tion ... groundwater requires no expenditure for Wells) distances for water, but also have to spend storage and transport, and can be harnessed on an average five to six hours every two or by the farmer with his own efforts—except Ahmedabad 1 1 2.75 three days on fudwood collection. The grow- possibly for a short-term loan—within a Amreli 9 9 9.53 ing scarcity of this resource, which is as matter of weeks if not actually days, and can, Banaskamha 9 9 8.25 precious as food.or water, is one of the most therefore, be developed through the efforts Bhavnagar 8 8 5.53 alarming aspects of the environmental crisis of millions of private individuals on an in- Bharuch 2 2 2.31 in Gujarat. finitely wider decentralised front and prac- Dangs 1 1 1.10 The unscrupulous exploitation of forest tically in all parts of the country within a far Jamnagar 10 10 5.61 resources for commercial and industrial pur- shorter period of time than surface water. It Junagadh 16 14 8.48 poses is a major cause of growing wood scar- also involves no environmental problems Kheda 3 3 3.13 city. However, it is not the least tragic aspect such as the submergence of good lands under Kutch 9 9 5.74 of this crisis that the poor are themselves be- storage and canals, and no evaporation and M eh sana 5 4 0.48 ing driven to participate in the destruction seepage losses which take away more than 50 Panchmahals 4 1 -2.27 of the environment on which their own sur- prr cent of the water released from reservoirs Rajkot 4 3 7.23 before they reach the farmers' fields. It also vival depends. Due to lack of any other gain- Sabarkantha 4 3 1.16 creates no problem of water logging. Above ful employment, many poor villagers in Surat 3 2 1.74 all, ii is a resource entirely under the fanner's Surendranagar 7.39 north and south Gujarat are forced to trade 5 5 control and requires no huge and corrupt Valsad 2 2 2.19 a head-load of wood for a small amount of bureaucracies before it can be put to work. cash, or in exchange for a pitcher-full of but- It can thus be applied exactly when and to Notes: (1) The time trend is obtained from a termilk on which the family survives for the extent required by the crop or land.. simple regression of water level on three to four days. Through this widely No wonder that while it required an invest- time. (2) The 'trend decline' (last col- prevalent practice, the higher-caste rich ment of Rs 15,026 crore during the years 1951 umn) is the decline over 10 years that farmers manage to maintain stacks of fuel- to 1985 to create a 'utilised potential' of 15.6 corresponds to this estimated time wood for their needs in spite of the general mha by the 'major and medium' route, at an trend (e g, if the lime trend estimate scarcity. Meanwhile, the poor become average cost of around Rs 10,000 per hectare, indicates that the water table is declin- helpless victims of this vicious circle of groundwater development by over 10 million ing at the rale of 0.3 per year, then the .economic destitution and environmental farmers created a 'utilised potential' of as trend decline over 10 years is 3). destruction. much as 19.6 mha during the same period, Source: Unpublished data obtained from the Government policies have failed (o arrest without involving the government in any Central Ground Water Board this process. To a large extent, these policies direct expenditure, the total saving which (Ahmedabad).

Economic and Political Weekly December 19-26, 1992 A-149 (1987) rightly states: 1 MAI 6: IN< inFNct OF SALINITY IN GUJARAT While drought is getting mitigated for the fanners growing cash crops, energised pumpsets are creating new drought for marginal

RAJASTHAN and poor peasants by drawing down the water table to below their reach. Private Profits and Government Subsidies What are the reasons for the recent pro- liferation of pumpsets in general, and of electric pumpsets in particular? An obvious factor is that, with the present structure of incentives and property rights, energised water extraction mechanisms represent a far more lucrative technology than dugwells in most environments. One reason why it is important to recognise this factor is that, according to some authors, tubewells started expanding only after groundwater levels had already declined beyond the reach of dugwells and, accordingly, the expansion of tubewells should be seen as a consequence rather than a cause, of groundwater scarci- MAHARASHTRA ty.33 This general view would be hard to reconcile with the fact that tubewells have mushroomed in most parts of the country in recent decades, even in regions (such as creasingly given way to the tubewells ot the For diesel pumpsets, a steady growth can many parts of Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and 70s and 80s. The dramatic increase in area be observed until 1976. After that, the rate West Bengal) where there are as yet no irrigated since the 1930s is undoubtedly due of growth seems to have slowed down. At serious signs of groundwater scarcity. This to the rapid expansion of these modern the Held level one observes that many of comprehensive expansion of tubewells and water extraction mechanisms. Indeed, as these pumpsets are not in use. This is other energised water extraction devices can Table 10 shows, the number of energised sometimes the case because the dugwell on only be explained by the highly profitable tubewdls and pumpsets in Gujarat has which a pumpset was installed has little or nature of these investments, particularly for grown at a phenomenal rate in recent years, no water and the owner does not have the fanners who own a lot of land and have ac- while that of dugwells has comparatively capacity either to deepen his dugwell or to cess to cheap credit. While it may be the case stagnated (Tables 11 and 12). get an in-well bore drilled. But, in some that, in particular regions and periods, the areas, it is also the result of a switch from In sum, the development of irrigation in expansion of water extraction mechanisms diesel to electricity, the latter being often a Gujarat, and particularly of groundwater- has followed the depletion of groundwater, cheaper source of energy.32 based irrigation, has been very rapid since in general these two phenomena are best the beginning of the planning era. Further, Interestingly, we observe that the largest seen as mutually reinforcing.34 this expansion is overwhelmingly the result proportionate increase (340 per cent) in the of the spread of energised water extraction number of electrified pumpsets and tube- The profitability of investments in tube- mechanisms such as electric tubewelts and wells over a period of five years occurred in wells has been greatly enhanced by various diesel pumpsets. The current overexploita- 1966-71. It must be recalled here that the late government policies. These include highly lion of groundwater in Gujarat is closely 1960s was also the period when the Grem subsidised electricity pricing (on which more related to these trends. Revolution was gaining a foothold in Gu- in Section III), and liberal financial 33 jarat. This period was also one of frequent assistance. Liberal provision of subsidis- Role of Electrification scarcity conditions. Drought was declared in ed credit in agriculture began with the five- The massive expansion of modern water all the districts of Gujarat in 1965-66, and year plans. Since the formation of the state extraction devices in recent years has been in 16 out of 19 districts in 1968-69. The of Gujarat in I960, agricultural credit has partly due to the official encouragement expansion of electrified pumpsets and been mainly provided through the agency of given to groundwater exploitation, beginning tubewells was also rapid during the last the Gujarat State Co-operative Land with the Grow More Food campaign laun- drought of 1985-88 (Table 12). A positive Development Bank. As Table 13 indicates, ched in 1953 at the all-India level.31 relationship seems to exist between drought an overwhelming proportion (more than 90 Another important factor, however, was the and the growth of water extraction struc- per cent) of the credit extended by the Land electrification of villages, which led to the tures. Describing the impact that these giuc- Development Bank is allocated to investment rapid energisation of pumpsets and tube- tures have during drought, Bandyopadhyay in modern water extraction devices. A large wells. Electrification was particularly rapid in Gujarat, as Tables II and 12 indicate. We TM)ii 8: DEVELOPMENT CH IRRIGATION, IN GI MRAT 1960-85 can see that while in 1960-61 only 823 Year Gross Area Sown Gross Area Irrigated Gross Area Irrigated as villages were electrified, by 1985-86 this (Sq Km) (Sq Km) Percentage of Gross figure had shot up to 17,053 (out of a total Area Sown of 18,114 villages). A corresponding increase was also observed in the number of pump- 1960-61 97,676 7,338 7.5 sets and tubewells which were electrified: in 1965-66 101.881 10,722 10.5 1960-61, this number was a mere 5,401, but 1970-7! 105.403 14,939 .14.2 by 1985-86 it had jumped to 3.17,403. In 1975-76 105.494 17,091 16.2 other words, within this 25-year period, there 1979-80 106.550 22.114 20.8 was almost a 60-fold increase in the number 198485 111.457 29,494 26.4 of electrified pumpsets and tubewells in Gujarat. Source. Bureau of bconomics and Statistics, Government of Gujarat (from Phaoiare, 1988, p 14).

A-150 Economic and Political Weekly December 19-26, 1992

s;^i^ MAP 7: DISTRIBUTION OF FLUORIDES. 19gg rate, in Sabarkantha district there used to be at least seven broad >ypes of rice: 'sutarsal', 'van', 'kharsu' 'sathi', 'panjaria', 'sengda' and 'sejani*. Many of these types have now disap- peared. In the case of wheat ?nd maize, too, .' RAJASTHAN a limited number of hybrid varieties have replaced a wide range of traditional types, some of which used to grow freely in the valleys of the north of the district even with Very little water. Most alarming is the gradual disappearance of certain species of FLUORIDES ,' nwCMMIULS T cereals which were quite widespread as ^ above 3 Omg/I » ••--C-'.' MAOHYA recently as the turn of the century, such as i, \ ;.:-• PRADESH • 1 5 to 3 Om»l 'kang' (panicum italicum), 'banti' (panicum spicalum), 'bavto' (panicum frumentaceum), 'kodra' (paspaium sceobiculatum) and 'cheno' (panicum milaceum)." The depletion of groundwater resources fits into this pattern of ecological destruction. By making vast groundwater resources widely accessible to affluent farmers, and through the promotion of water-intensive ' MAHARASHTRA crops, modern technology and the Green Revolution have played a major part in the current crisis of overexploitation. share of the credit channelled through more volve a greater use of the inputs that have This aspect of the Green Revolution is one recent institutions and schemes such as become more widely available, especially that has been somewhat neglected in the cur- NABARDand the Integrated Rural Develop- water and fertilisers. In Sabarkantha, this rent controversy (with a few exceptions, eg, ment Programme also supports such in-, shift has taken the form of an enormous ex- Bandhyopadhyay, 1987, and Shiva. 1988]. vestments, especially during and after pansion in the relative importance of non- While ecological critiques of the Green drought years. In the absence of government food crops, especially cotton (Table 14). Revolution have largely concentrated on the support in these and other forms, the pro- There has been much discussion of the issue of genetic diversity, it is arguable that, fitability of modern water extraction devices pros and cons of these recent changes in the problem of groundwater depletion is at would have been greatly reduced.36 agricultural technology and cropping pat- least as important. This is particularly so in 37 Cropping Patterns and Technological terns. On the positive side, it has been areas where groundwater resources are Change argued that these changes tend to lead to a relatively limited and vulnerable to overex- substantial expansion of output and employ- ploitation, including large parts of Gujarat. The expansion of modern water extraction ment.3* This argument is based on the fact Any assessment of the suitability of modern structures in Gujarat has to be seen as one that modern practices are not only more in- agricultural practices in these areas has to aspect of the profound changes in agricul- tensive in the use of inputs such as water and give ample recognition to this acute problem tural practices that have taken place in re- fertilisers but also typically more labour- of groundwater depletion. cent decades. These changes, often referred intensive as well as more productive. to as the 'Green Revolution', have involved 1(5) CONCLUDING REMARKS a radical shift from traditional agriculture On the negative side, some analysts have to modern cultivation methods based on an questioned whether the expansion of output In this section, we have examined the intensive use of new seeds, fertilisers and and employment have led to a reduction in nature and significance of the emerging energised irrigation. The problem of ground- poverty and an improvement in nutritional groundwater crisis in Gujarat. Before pro- water depletion has to be seen in this wider standards. Further, the destructive ecojogical ceeding to a case study of this crisis in two context. impact of the Green Revolution has been talukas of Sabarkantha district (Section II), A particularly important aspect of recent consistently underlined. and to a discussion of what can be done to changes in agricultural practices is the An important aspect of this destructive respond to it (Section III), it may help to modification of cropping patterns. The impact is the loss of genetic diversity recall the main insights that have emerged general tendency has been to shift towards associated with the concentration on a so far. crops (especially non-food crops) that in- limited number of crop varieties. To illust- First, water scarcity is a relatively new and

TABLE 9: AREA IRRIGATED BY SOURCE. 1960-84 (Sq Km)

Source 1960-61 i%:5-«6 1970-71 1975-76 1980-81 1983-84

Govt canals' 652 (9.5) 1393 (13.4) 2358 (17.2) 2844 (18.8) 3668 (18.3) 4892 (21.5) Private canals 6 (0.1) 11 (0.1) • 6 (0.04) — — Wells'* 5677 (83.1) 8625 (82-.8) 10831 (79.0) 11900 (78.6) 15884 (79.3) 17370 (76.5) Tanks 128 (19) 296 (2.8) 372 (2.7) 252 (1.6) 409 (2.0) 407 (1.8) Other sources 366 (5.4) 87 (0.8) 141 (1.0) 148 (1.0) 65 (0.4) 40 (0.2) Total net area irrigated 6829 (100) 10412 (100) 13708 (100) 15144 (100) 20026 (100) 22709" (100) Gross area irrigated 7338 10722 14939 17091 23344 27974

Notes: * Including Panchayat canals. •• Including tubewells. Sourer. Statistical Abstract oj Gujarat 1985-86, Directorate of Agriculture, Governmeni of Gujarat. The figures in brackets indicate the percentage distribution of net irrigated area by irrigation source.

Economic and Political Weekly December 19-26, 1992 A-1SI in these villages. Two types of questionnaires MAP 8: ISO-TDS CONTOURS, MAY 1970 were used: one with a sample of small farmers, and the other with a sample of big farmers. A few case studies of each category PAKISTAN were attempted. Besides this, general socio- economic information on the villages was collected. In addition to this survey of eight villages, use will also be made of official information on four villages of Idar taluka. This information was collected through a special

•> 4000ppiT. well-to-well survey conducted by the respective talatis'. One of these four, villages, 3000 10 4000 ppm r--' UADHYA Bhadresar, is also among the eight villages _j 1500 lo 3000 ppm of our own survey. | < 1500 ppm The emphasis of the field work was less on the collection of quantitative data than on a qualitative assessment of the situation prevailing in the study villages as well as on informal discussions with the people concerned. The presentation of this section reflects this bias. / VAiSAp ,' WAMARASHTRA E A The main focus will be on the question of inequity in access to groundwater the pro- 0 kmi 50 blem of overexploitation being dealt with at length in section III. However, as the con- increasingly important aspect of drought* in groundwater resources in Gujarat have to be cluding remarks of the preceding section in- Gujarat (Section 1(1)). In the past, droughts seriously considered, along with any possi- dicate, there are important links between the caused major" famines while water scarcity ble gains that might arise through increases problems of inequity and overexploitation, was a relatively minor problem. Today, relief in productivity or labour demand. and even in this section the latter problem measures are by and large effective in deal- Aside from this problem of overexploita- will not be altogether ignored. ing with the threat of starvation, but the tion, we .have had many opportunities to growing problem of water scarcity remains note how growing inequity in groundwater 11(1) BACKGROUND largely unaddressed. use is both a critical consequence and a Second, contrary to what is qften assum- major cause of overexploitation. This grow- Sabarkantha district is situated in north ed, there is no evidence of a significant long- ing inequity compounds earlier economic in- Gujarat, and is adjacent to Rajasthan term decline in rainfall levels either in equalities based on land ownership, with the (Map 10). There are 10 talukas in the district, Gujarat or in Sabarkantha district. The result that the agricultural community in out of which four are under the Integrated emergence of water scarcity in Gujarat can- Gujarat is increasingly sharply divided bet- Tribal Development Programme (ITDPX in- not be blamed on a declining trend in rain- ween a minority of prosperous farmers who cluding Bhiloda taluka itself. More than 90 fall (Section 1(2)). monopolises most of the land and the water, per cent of the population of the district lives 40 Third, groundwater scarcity in Gujarat is and a majority of small farmers and agri- in rural areas. The economy of Sabarkan- no longer confined to drought years, but is cultural labourers who are increasingly tha is dominated by agriculture, both irri- rapidly taking the form of a long-term trend alienated from both of these means of gated and (mainly) uninigaled. Only a small (Section 1(3)). The most alarming signs of production. part of the population is engaged in in- this crisis are the decline of water tables, the Inequity and overexploitation are, thus, dustrial activities or in the tertiary sector. spreading of salinity, and the increase of the two ugly heads of the monster of fluoride levels in groundwater. If this trend groundwater mis-utilisation in Gujarat. In TABLE 10: STATEMENT SHOWING GROWTH W continues at the current pact, large parts of Section II (where groundwater utilisation GROUNDWATER EXTRACTION STRUCTURES Gujarat will soon succumb to the forces of will be looked at 'from the grassroots') the desertification. main focus will be on inequity, while Sec- Groundwater Number Number flercen- Fourth, the depletion of groundwater tion III (which discusses remedial action) Extraction of Struc- of Struc- tage tn- resources in Gujarat has to be :een in the concentrates primarily on overexploitation. Structures lures in lures in crease context of a larger environmental crisis (Sec- But this is not to say that overexploitation 1980 1985 over Five tion 1(4.1)). The depletion of groundwater will be ignored in Section II, or inequity in Years means not only that drinking water has to Section III. These two aspects of thg cur- be fetched over longer and longer distances rent crisis are ultimately inseparable, insofar Dug wells 654.0 672.9 3 and that traditional wells dry up; it also as their common cause lies in the anti-social Private means a dangerous and possibly irreversi- appropriation of groundwater by a small shallow ble disruption of the 'hydrological cycle'. minority of large farmers. They can be seen lubewells 2.5 4.5 80 Fifth, a major cause of this disastrous as two sides of the.same coin. Public trend is the overexploitation of groundwater, tubewelU 2.2 3.9 77 Electric mainly as a result of the rapid spread of II pumpseis 202.9 294.1 modern irrigation methods (Section 1(4.2)). 45 A Case Study Diesel The expansion of modern water extraction pumpseis 562.5 732.5 30 devices is one aspect of the recent transfor- This section presents the main results of mation of Indian agriculture (sometimes a case study undertaken in eight villages of Source: Government of India (1986), Ground- described as the 'Green Revolution'), involv- Bhiloda and Idar talukas of Sabarkantha water Development in India, Ministry ing more intensive cropping patterns and district in the summer months of 1988. The of Water Resources, New Delhi, An- practices. The adverse consequences of this aim of the study was to understand the nexures IV to VIII, pp 36-40. All transformation on the management of distribution of and access to groundwater figures are in thousands.

A-152 Economic and Political Weekly December 19-26, 1992 MAP 9-. ISO-TDS CONTOURS, MAY 1989 Tables IS, 16, and 17 respectively dealing with dugwells, bores and pumpsets. While examining these three tables, it is useful to concentrate first on the village of Bhadresar. For this village, information is available for all water extraction structures, and detailed I, information on the caste composition of the l- population is also available. Three observa- t- tions emerge clearly from the data relating U to this village.

>5000ppm First, the ownership of water extraction s. 3000 lo 5000 ppm structures is overwhelmingly concentrated 3 among the privileged castes (especially the 2000 to 3000 ppm patidar caste, including patels and desais). <2000ppm For instance, in Bhadresar all the bores are n owned by these two caste groups, even n though they represent only 23 per cent of n all households in the village. l- Second, the inequity of ownership is more n Ownct pronounced for modern irrigation devices buntey (bores and pumpsets) than for dugwells. In £ A contrast to their total monopoly of bores, patels and desais own 'only' a little above it half of the dugwells. The ownership of l- dugwells among other castes—even the poorer ones-is fairly widespread. j- According to the 1981 Census, 8.6 per cent ween different castes (or, when applicable, ie of the population of Sabarkantha consists tribes). Thfs indicator is obviously not very Third, in spite of this the distribution of of 'scheduled castes', and 16.7 per cent reliable if we are interested in the economic dugwells is itself far from equitable. For of'scheduled tribes'. The proportion of status of individual households. However, instance, while the number-of households Muslims is very small. A large part of the for the purpose of dividing households in- per well is only 1.4 among patels and desais, land is owned by influential cultivating to broad groups of different levels of af- it is as high as 30 among vankars (a 'hari- castes such as patels, kolis and rajputs. fluence, caste is an excellent indicator in the jan' caste representing 90 households in Political power is also heavily concentrated study area. For instance, it can be said with Bhadresar). h among these communities. In fact, Sabark- For villages other than Bhadresar, we can in full confidence that, say, patels represent a antha is a stronghold of the fanners' lobby 'rich' and influential caste in the study seen from Tables IS and 16 that in these in Gujarat. villages, while say, vankars (a scheduled villages the privileged castes also have a These broad features of the economy and caste) are extremely poor in comparison. virtual monopoly of water extraction society of Sabarkantha also apply in the More precisely, the different castes en- devices. While precise information on the eight study villages. caste composition of these villages is not a countered in the eight study villages can be divided into three broad groups, according available in terms of the four groups defined a- 42 earlier, the composition of these villages is i- 11(2) INEQUITY AND GROUNDWATER USE to their level of economic prosperity. First come the well-off, land-owning, well Economic inequality is a persistent feature educated, advantageously employed and of rural India, but its manifestations and in- T\HI F II: NUMBER of VILLAGES ELECTRIFIED. politically influential caste groups, including DIESH PUMPSETS AND ELECTRIFIED tensity do change from time to time. This particularly patels, rajputs, barrots, banias, PUMPSETS/TUBEWELLS IN GUJARAT observation applies to the ownership of desais and sonis. water extraction mechanisms. As will be seen At the other extreme are the scheduled Year Number Number of Number of in this section, traditional inequalities in the castes (e g, bhambis and vankars). House- of Villages Diesel Electrified ownership of dugwells have sharply increas- holds from these castes are mostly poor, Electrified* Pumpsets Pumpsets/ ed with the acquisition of modern acces- landless and illiterate. Many of them have Tube sories such as pumpseu and bores. also severely suffered from the loss of their wells" In order to examine the 'distribution' of traditional occupation (e g, weaving in the 45,000 5,401 water extraction mechanisms, we need some 1960-61 823 case of vankars). I96S-66 1.844 112.400 15.240 indicator of the economic status of different An intermediate position is occupied by (182) households or groups of households. House- households from 'other backward castes' 1970-71 4.087 371.100 67,052 hold income (or per capita income) is fre- (e g, thakardas) as well as from scheduled (1972) (340) quently used, for this purpose. However, tribes. These households tend to own small 1975-76 6.307 422.100 121,854 household income is extremely hard to amounts of land, and this has enabled them (1977) (82) measure in rural India, and it varies enor- to rise somewhat above the position of 1980-81 12.515 NA 231.226 mously from year to year, so that the cur- scheduled castes _ in economic terms. (90) rent income of a household may be a very However, their condition remains quite 19X3-86 17.053 NA 317,403 misleading indicator of its long-term econo- depressed. Over time, their holdings have (37) mic prosperity (especially in a drought become very small due to land fragmenta- 41 year). An alternative is to use land owner- tion, and also in the case of the thakardas, Notes: ' Figures are inclusive of licensee's ship as an indicator of economic status. due to large-scale alienation of land resulting areas This, perhaps, would have been the best ap- from indebtedness. The labouring classes ** In brackets, ihe percentage increase over ihe preceding five-year period. proach in this context. However, given the consist almost exclusively of households Soun-r. Statistical Abstract of Gujarat Stale, n- difficulty of obtaining and interpreting land belonging to the last two of these three broad .11 records, another route was adopted. 1985-86 (original source: Gujarat groups. Electricity Board, Baroda). The In this case study, we will begin by looking The distribution of irrigation assets bet- figures correspond lo the end of the at the distribution of irrigation assets between different caste groups is shown in relevant fiscal year.

>2 Economic and Political Weekly December 19-26, 1992 A-153 similar to lhai of Bhadresar. The pattern of same village. The former owns 16 acres ol noi able to grow any crops. Further, his fami- sharp and increasing inequalities observed land and two bores with depths of 140 feet ly had to depend on the neighbouring wells in Bhadresar thus applies in those villages and 130 feet respectively. He shares one of ind bores for drinking water and other as well. the bores with a relative. The other bore -_., domestic needs. Land and Water drilled a few months prior to the survey. He One might expect that, during a drought, has incurred an expenditure of Rs 50,000. Inequalities in the ownership of water big landowners who derive their income from his own savings, to install these two mostly from agriculture might be among the extraction mechanisms are closely related to bores. He was able to afford the investment inequalities in land ownership. The exam- wors;-affected (in relative terms). This would on the second bore thanks to the large be the case but for the inequitable owner- ple of two villages, namely, Munai and Mau income he had been able to earn from the of Bhiloda (aluka, illustrates (his statement. ship of irrigation sources. The possession of first bore. Further, since he had already pur- these irrigation sources gives large land- In Munai village, the disadvantaged com- chased an engine of 7.5 HP to use the first munities (including "low-caste" Hindus, owners a virtual monopoly of water and fod- bore, he did not have to buy another engine der resources during drefigtn "iars. For tribals and Muslims) represent almost two- to use the second one. He grows three crops many large farmers, a drought year & a boon thirds of the total population. Yet, only a each year on his well-irrigated land. For year.44 minute proportion of the total cultivable 1987-88, the third consecutive year of severe land in the village is in their possession. drought in Sabarkantha, he reported an an- •Water Markets' and Sharecropping There has been a continuous process of land nual income much above Rs 1,00,000 from One factor that mitigates the inequality alienation, especially among the thakardas, cultivation alone (not including other of access to groundwater is the fact that many of whom have lost their land after sources of income such as the sale of milk 45 the owners of modern water extraction mortgaging it to the higher castes. Those from as many as four buffaloes). Interesting- mechanisms often 'sell' water to other pec who do own land, like the bhambis and ly, the substantial income he earned from pie for irrigation purposes.45 Some authors vankars, own at most 2 to 2.5 acres. fodder crops in that year (Rs 5,000) came have even argued that these 'water markets' Moreover, this land tends to be of very poor from sales to relief organisations running make a major contribution to the equitable quality, most of it being of the type locally cattle camps for drought-affected farmers. distribution of groundwater in Gujarat.46 known as khada-tekra, i e, uneven land, The fate of Dhanabhai during the same Poor farmers in the study villages themselves good only for the cattle to graze on. year is in direct contrast to this story of often acknowledged that this opportunity The same picture can be observed in Mau, opulence amidst general hardship. During was important for them. However, their as far as the thakardas and the "harijans" the drought, Dhanabhai's family was total- responses also highlight some important are concerned. Among the scheduled castes, ly dependent on relief works for its survival. qualifications to the view that water markets the bhambis, who have been traditionally Dhanabhai and his wife both participated work in an efficient and equitable way. landless, had to struggle for seven long years in relief works and earned approximately for 40 acres of pasture land to be allocated Rs 50-60 per week. There are five members To start with, the sale of water gives rich" to them for cultivation on a collective basis. in this family. farmers a further opportunity to enrich As was observed in the preceding section, themselves. The rates tend to be high (up to the distribution of water in these villages is Dhanabhai owns 3.4 acres of land, and a Rs 20 per hour in the study villages), also very unequal, and follows a similar caste well which is 38 feet deep. In the year especially when the seller has some mono- pattern. Thus inequalities of land and water 1986-87, when there was still a little water poly power. This is another source of in- ownership are seen to compound each other. in his well, Dhanabhai had managed-to grow creasing inequality and of greater dependen- We can further illustrate this point by con- a small seed plot, from which he earned cy of.the asset less on the more resourceful trasting the situation of Mohanbhai Rs 900. However, he was not able to deepen farmers. As a poor farmer from Naranpura Shamalbhai Patel, a rich farmer of Choriwad his well since, unlike Mohanbhai, he did not concisely put it: "Right now, those who can village, with a predicament of Dhanabhai have the necessary resources. As a result, his afford the expenditure own these bores. Madhabhai Vankar, a poor farmer in the well dried up the following year, and he was Those who cannot have to depend on them!'

TABLE 12: NUMBER o^ PUMPSETS/TUBEWEI.LS EI ECTRIHED IN GUJARAT BY DISTRICT

District 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986* PerCent

Ahmedabad 9,845 10.512 11.521 12.130 12,472 12,757 13,262 13.944 42 Amreli 7,333 8.229 10.352 10.975 11.201 11,540 12,108 13,063 78 Banaskantha 8,307 10.228 12,531 15.351 16,300 17,213 19.268 22.001 165 Baroda 9,644 10.299 10,574 10.943 11.290 11,646 12.009 12,479 29 Bharuch 4.142 4,506 4,732 4.975 5.177 5,369 5,517 5,710 38 Bhavnagar 9.921 11.857 14.136 15,749 16,662 17,407 18,997 20,872 no Dangs 13 13 13 13 14 16 16 17 31 Gandhinagar 2,788 2.886 3,006 3.100 3,176 3,237 3,379 3.504 26 Jamnagar 6,091 7.325 8.456 9,522 10,336 11.499 12,933 15.308 150 Junagadh 21.918 24,972 28.573 31.112 32,275 34.226 37,204 40,583 85 Kheda 12,394 13,327 14.306 14.910 15.233 15.572 16.111 16,758 35 Kutch 9.687 11.268 12.244 12.786 13.173 13,483 13,959 14.630 51 Mehsana 18.158 20.447 24.110 26,082 26,850 27.821 29,222 31.153 72 Panchmahals 3,415 3,991 4.418 4.777 5.050 5,296 5.667 6,167 81 Rajkol 11,372 13.184 14.851 16,262 17,031 18.211 19,899 22.917 100 Sabarkantha 18,906 23.532 27.837 30.699 31.856 33,121 35.322 38.028 101 Surat 8.454 9,320 10.503 11.244 11.679 12,209 12.931 13.803 63 Surcndranagar 5.594 6.228 7,515 8.528 8.892 9.420 9.981 10.836 94 Valsad 9.816 10,729 11.548 12.457 13.087 13,719 14.602 15.630 59 Gujarat 177,798 202.853 231.226 251.616 261.761** 273.762" 292.387 317.403 79

Moles: * In brackets, the percentage increase between 1979 and 1986. •• Kigures inclusive of licensee's areas. Source: Statistical Abstract of Gujarat State, various fiscal years (original source: Gujaral Electricity Board. Baroda).

A-154 Economic and Political Weekly December 19-26, 1992 MAP 10 SABA,KK»NIHA DISTRICT way in the higher-caste hamlet, in spite of ,-( Saver S*o#f*i«nJ D>t"icl Gartn—t I it being much smaller than the lower-caste / 0 nun ,« hamlets. When some of the women from the other hamlets braved the hostility of their neighbours and tried to get water from the 'public' handpump, they were greeted with DISTRICT I BANASKANTHA .' abuses, threats and stones. Some of them •v, A'% had their matkas broken. They obtained their rightful share of the water only after a long struggle against the rural elite and the bureaucracy. In another village (Munai), the poor had to depend on private drinking water sources during the drought, because the public sources had all dried up. While the proper- ™™£\ ( H«»T«AG.» tied classes were able to draw water from their own private sources, women from poor households had to walk a long distance in the fields to draw water from the well of a rich patd farmer. The latter did not miss this — / SSTAW, opportunity to make them feel their dependence on him, and indeed he regularly threatened to discontinue his supply. In (his case too, people had to organise and take iheir grievances to the 'mamlatdar'. They held a rally and 'dharna' outside his office Moreover, even though this system does who own pumpsets and other assets, since after which the mamlatdar granted their de- give'non-owners some access to water, many the ownership of these assets guarantees a mand that public handpumps should be hardships are involved in this process. Some relatively cheap and reliable access to their swiftly installed in the poor hamlets of of these hardships were aptly described by services. Those who own productive assets Munai. The promises of the mamlatdar, a water buyer in the following words: such as pumpsets are themselves increasingly however, only partly materialised. These landlords give access to water from keen to take land on lease (even though they These two stories are by no means stray their bores according to their will. They in- often own substantial amounts of it them- cases. In fact, every Thursday (when, during crease the rates during (he time when the selves), so as to make full use of these assets. I he drought, the mamlatdar was available to others need it the most, knowing thai they As a result of these mutually reinforcing fac- hear public grievances through represen- do not have any alternative. The others have tors, the poor are gradually losing the limited tatives), the office of the mamlatdar in to literally beg them for water. Usually, water cultivation opportunities they used to have 47 Bhiloda was resounding with a cacophony is given to them during the nights, since the through sharecropping. of complaints, while a large crowd of anx- landlords use the water for their own fields Drinking Water iously expectant villagers crowded the com- during the daytime. In this and other ways, pound. Many of these complaints related to a lot of exploitation takes place. One of the most important inequities lack of drinking water and unequal access And this is not the end of the story. relating to groundwater use concerns drink- to public sources. Sometimes, poor farmers do not have access ing water. This applies in both drought and non-drought years. Even in non-drought to water at all, even on this basis. For in- 11(3) CAUSES OF INEQUITY stance, when irrigation activities are at a years, access to drinking water is highly peak, pumpsets are often temporarily unequal. This arises partly from the uneven How do rich farmers succeed in corner- unavailable for hire. This can have a ownership of private water extraction ing the lion's share of water resources in disastrous effect on the crop, if irrigation is mechanisms, and partly from the fact that Gujarat? In a sense, there is nothing new in urgently required. the more powerful sections of the popula- (his process and it is just another example For some, water is even permanently tion also gain a privileged access to 'public' of how, in a capitalist economy, those who unavailable. In many villages, the poor and sources of drinking water. are well endowed to start with tend to be the the scheduled castes tend to own land in par- During a drought, when the ordinary winners in the competition for further ac- ticular areas (often areas of poor soils). In sources of drinking water of many poor peo- cumulation. However, in order to appreciate these areas, there would typically be few or ple dry up, the situation is particularly no bores, and the bores of more affluent critical. Although government relief policies TABI F 13: AGRICULTURAL FINANCE ADVANC ED farmers would also be out of reach. officially include schemes for drinking water TO CULTIVATORS DURINC; 1970-71 An important issue that closely relates to supply, in practice these schemes often end this whole question of water markets con- up helping the rich more than the poor. The Purpose Amount Percen- cerns the effect of groundwater development more influential groups and individuals (RsOOO) tage on sharecropping systems. In this respect, (particularly the sarpanch) usually succeed Distri- one crucial development deserves special in getting the public handpumps installed bution mention. With the recent expansion of new near their own houses. When poor people Sinking of new wells water extraction mechanisms, and the ac- (especially from 'low' castes) try to get ac- and repair of old wells 6,991 33.7 companying spread of modern agriculture, cess to these handpumps, they often face Oil engines, Heciric cultivation has become more capital- hostility or even violence. When they gel motors, etc 11.942 57.6 intensive Since most sharecropping con- water at all, it is usually after a long time Purchase of tractors 534 2.6 tracts include the sharing of cash costs bet- of queuing, while richer or higher-caste peo- Olhcr purposes 1,255 6.1 ween tenant and landlord, this has made it ple jump the queue and leisurely Till their Toial 20,722 100.0 increasingly difficult for poor and assetless numerous 'matkas' and buckets. households to take land on lease. Further, In one of the study villages, a newly- Source: Gujarat Slate Co-operative Land landlords prefer to lease their land to people constructed'public handpump had found its Development Bank (Ahmedabad).

Economic and Political Weekly December 19-26, 1992 A-IS5 the full extent of the inequalities involved, recently incurred by a fanner of lakatuka vulnerable to cheating, etc In fact, most of it is helpful to take a closer look at the to install a bore on his land (Table A). the poorer fanners in the study villages are different means through which, in the study not even aware of their eligibility for inslitu- The cost of this bore was by no means villages, the 'sukhi loko' (prosperous people) exceptional, and it must also be borne in •|l>. .o^ilS. have virtually monopolised water resources. mind that since its installation a few years Risk Viability of Holdings ago, prices have leapt up. Today, it is com- A further reason why few small farmers mon for a bore to cost Rs 50,000 or mo>>. invest in modern water extraction devices is Investments in modern water extraction Clearly, investments of this magnitude are that they have a limited ability to bear the mechanisms tend to be viable only for land- impossible for most small farmers with risks involved. Besides the risks that have holdings of substantial size. The small size limited borrowing opportunities, no matter already been referred to (e g, risks of of their holdings is a major reason why how profitable these investments may be in breakdown of collective arrangements, and many poor farmers cannot make such in- the long run. For many large farmers, on the of being cheated by credit institutions), a vestments. For instant.; in the village of other hand, short-run installation costs are major risk is that a bore will fail to strike Munai, it was found that among 110 poor not an obstacle if long-run profitability is water. thakarda households, only one owned a assured. As was mentioned earlier, the frequency bore, and the reported reason for this state of such failure in regions lit; °^arkantha of affairs was that these households owned In fact, a surprisingly large number of is high and increasing. In Malassa, we met insufficient amounts of land to invest in bores have been installed by large farmers a rich Rajput fanner who made-as many as bores. using their own income, without any need for borrowing. For instance, in the village seven attempts to install a bore, and w_^ «..-- The quality of land is also important. In- of Naranpura, where information could be cessful orfly at the last attempt. Clearly, poor vestments in bores and tubewells are most obtained on sources of funds for the 19 bores farmers cannot afford such a luxury. The attractive on flat, low-lying, fertile and that hau been 'registered' with the pan- prospect of investing a large sum of hard- stone-free lands, but in the study villages chayat, it was found that 18 of these 19 bore* earned money in a bore that may well fail such lands were almost invariably owned by had been self-financed. The bdldness of pro- deters many of them. Those who do take the large farmers belonging to the 'higher' sperous farmers in making large and risky risk sometimes bitterly regret it, as happened castes. Most of the unlevelled or stony land investments can be further appreciated by with Shamalbhai Bajubhai from Naranpura: (much less suitable for irrigation) was owned noting that no less than nine of these bores "Brother, this boring has really broken us. by poor farmers belonging to the disadvan- 'failed'.49 A similar situation of heavy The bore is 160 feet deep and cost us taged castes. reliance on self-financing was observed in Rs 42,000. We have spent so much, but we In principle, the problem of insufficient other villages as well (Table 13). have not been able to strike good waterT holding size could be dealt with through col- An additional risk of great importance is lective ownership of bores or tubewells by It may be thought that the limited ability that of 'well interference". Even if a poor poor farmers. However, such collective of small farmers to make large investments farmer does succeed in installing a bore and arrangements were virtually absent in the from their own funds is partly compensated striking water, there is a high risk that, seeing study villages. One frequent difficulty was by a privileged access to institutional credit. his success, big landowners with land in the that the holdings of poor farmers were Indeed, many credit schemes are allegedly vicinity will try to install their own—usually located on unfavourable terrain, often at 'targeted' to small farmers, and the govern- deeper—bores nearby. This results in the some distance from each other. But even ment regularly claims to provide .special assistance to the needy. The reality of credit where physical conditions were relatively TABLE A favourable to collective arrangements, the practices, however, is quite different. ability of the poor to enter into such Indeed, in village after village, it was Item Depth Cost Per Ft Total Cost arrangements appeared to be extremely found that almost all institutional loans for (ft) (Rs) (R*> limited. water extraction devices (from Dena Bank, Bore 175 45 7,875 This observation is particularly interesting co-operative societies Land Development PVC pipe 75 35 2,625 given that, among rich farmers, collective Bank, etc) had been issued to large farmers, Iron pipe 125 40 5.000 ownership of bores was not uncommon. In mostly of the patel caste. While only a limited amount of information could be ob- 7 HP motor 13.000 lakatuka and Munai, for instance, there Electricity 340 were several cases of bores being owned col- tained from credit institutions, this bias emerges clearly enough from the available connection lectively by a small number of affluent charge data as shown in Table B. fanners (up to 8 of them, usually related to Total 28.840 each other through kinship ties). By con- The regressive nature of institutional trast, in the same villages small farmers of credit (at least when it comes to water TABLE B the poor :hakarda community were unable extraction devices) arises partly from credit policies themselves. For instance, some to enter into collective arrangements, even Institution Total Total Number among brothers. banks require every applying borrower to deposit as much as one-fourth of the Amount Number of Loans There are several possible reasons for this of Loans amount to be borrowed before issuing the Issued* Issued contrast. Poor farmers find it more difficult (Rs) lo Patels to contribute their share of expenses on a requested loan! Also, bank managers (who timely basis. They are less able to bear the tend to be more concerned with the recovery Munai and risks involved in collective arrangements. of their loans than with the welfare of the Jhumsar Also, and perhaps most tragically, they bave borrowers) commonly prefer to lend to rich (Co-operative people in the dubious belief that ihey are been sharply divided by the competitive Society) 4,34,190 34 31 struggle for survival.4* more likely to repay. Clearly, such policies Takaluka work to the advantage of large farmers. (Deena Bank Credit In addition, the system works to their ad- and LDB) 96,000 6 6 Investments in modern water extraction vantage in a number of other, more 'subtle' Messan devices are very costly, especially in areas like ways: caste-based favouritism is common in (LDB) 1.10.000 16 16 Sabarkantha district where water tables are credit institutions; large farmers have * Water extraction devices only (bores, wells, now very low. This can be concretely il- better 'connections' with the sanctioning submersible pumps, etc). lustrated by the account of the expenses authorities; illiterate farmers are more

A-156 Economic and Political Weekly December 19-26, 1992 diversion of water towards their sources, speak for themselves, and no attempt will do (hat, I do not mind giving my land free. possibly to the point of cutting off the bore be made'to analyse them systematically. I have wrillen to government offices in of the small farmer from the dwindling Indeed, given their personal and informal Ahmedabad and Baroda, but I have not aquifer. nature, it would be inappropriate to draw received any reply yet (Vithalbhai Barrot, a Property Rights definite conclusions from these individual small farmer from Naranpura). statements. However, taken together they do If the government makes a bore for us and Well interference and related problems throw some interesting light on the problem if we strike water, then we can, within a set arise because, with the present understan- of public action for the protection of period, return the money invested by the ding of property rights, there is no possibility groundwater resources. This problem is the government (with interest). If we do not of controlling the use of groundwater. theme of Section III. strike water, then naturally we will not'be in Indeed, under the present law, the person Many small and marginal farmers were of a position to return the money (Mohanbhai who owns the land has an unlimited right the view that the government should install Jeevabhai Paid, a small farmer from to extract the underlying groundwater. bores for public use and should not allow Messan). Ultimately, a durable solution to the pro- private bores. This would enable people With public ownership of bores, a better blems of overcxploitation and inequity in from all castes and classes to share in the planning of their location would also be groundwater use has to concern itself with benefits of modern irrigation. possible: property rights. We shall return to this ques- We had met the mamlaldar of Bhiloda regar- We do feel that bores which could be used tion in Section III. ding a bore. We had suggested to him that by a collective and owned by the government An Illustration the government could install a bore which should be encouraged instead of private could be used for irrigation purposes by bores. From such a government-owned bore, The various factors that prevent small water £ould be bought by the individual farmers from investing in modern water small and needy farmers, who would then nave a share in the use of underground water. farmers. The principle of equality of distribu- extraction devices are well illustrated by the tion could be kept in mind. The place of the case of Rambhai Nathabhai Thakarda, a Right now, underground water is available only to the rich people who arc able to utilise installation of the bores could be such that small farmer of village Munai. Rambhai it falls in the centre of a group of farmers. it. (A small farmer from Naranpura). owns a little more than three acres of land Initially, the expenditure of the bore could Aside from the equity angle public bores and a well. Recently, three bores have been be borne by the government. After the installed near his land, as a result of which would enable a better spreading of risk over drought, in a few good years the group of his own well dried up (two of these bores large groups of people: farmers could together return the amount to are owned by patels of the same village, I have not attempted to dig a bore, because the government and the bore could then be while the third is owned by the gram pan- the bores which have been tried in the vicinity of collective ownership (a small farmer from chayat of a nearby village). of my field have failed. Hence, I do not want Naranpura). Rambhai does not want to take the risk to take the risk. I feel that the government should install bores for irrigation purposes. One reason why many small and marginal* either of deepening his well or of investing fanners aspired to some kind of government in a bore, since the chance that he would be This way, those who do not own bores could also get water, [f the government is ready to intervention was that they had little hope of able to strike water is small. This is so since the submersible pumps of the three nearby bores are at an average depth of 120 ft. In TABLE 14: AREA UNDER IRRIGATED CROPS: SABARk'ANTHA DISTRICT order to be able to strike water, he would Crops Area under Irrigation (in '00 hectares) have to install a bore in the well with a minimum depth of 55 ft. Preferably the well 1950-51 1955-56 1960-61 1968-69 1983-84 would have to be at a distance of 1/2 km. Rice 9 7 9 7 53 All this would imply costs well beyond Jowar — 2 — 3 2 Rambhai's means. Bajn — 2 2 28 57 When asked whether he had resisted the Barley 8 3 3 7 14 installation of the nearby bores, Rambhai Maize 62 49 51 66 III replied in the negative. He felt sure that, had Ragi — 1 — — — he done so, he would have been told that the Wheat 179 240 226 272 428 patels had every right to install bores on their Other cereals 24 3 10 8 own land at their own cost. Total cereals 282 307 301 391 665 Rambhai knew nothing about loan Gram 15 14 7 II 1 schemes for installing bores, or about the Other pulses 2 2 3 9 — government norm which clearly prescribes Total pulses 17 16 10 20 1 the minimum distance to be maintained bet- Other food crops 1 41 7 27 125 ween two wells. Hearing about this norm, Total food crops 300 364 318 438 791 he felt that injustice had been done to him. Groundnut _ 4 12 When it was suggested to him that he could Sesamum — 1 — _ — — file a case in the court, his reply was: Rape and mustard 3 4 1 — — — — "What's the use? The government or the Castor Cotton 1 88 168 court is most likely to say, 'you also dig a 760 Sugarcane* 3 4 2 10 6 well or install a bore deeper than your Other non-food crops II 8 5 13 132 neighbours!'. Beyond this, what can the Total non-food crops 18 103 141 1% 820 government do?" Total area under irrigated crops 318 469 459 634 1611 11(4) WHAT PEOPLE SAID Note: * In the original sources, sugarcane had been counted as a "food crop". In the present In conclusion to this case study, this table, it has betn shifted to the non-food category. section reports a few things that our — Negligible. respondents said about what can be done to Source: For the years 1950-51, 1955-56 and 1960-61: Basic Agricultural Statistics (Ahmedabad: remedy the present situation of overexploiia- Directorate of Agriculture, Gujarat State, 1968), pp 54-57. For the year 1968-69: Govern-' tion and inequity in the use of groundwater mem of Gujarat (1974) (original source: Directorate of Agriculture. Gujarat Slate). For resources. To a great extent, these testimonies the year 1983-84: Statistical Abstract of Gujarat 1984-85.

Economic and Political Weekly December 19-26, 1992 A-157 being able to discipline the large farmers on my own land. Am I digging on someone in several of the above statements, is mat their own. For instance, Lallubhai Shankar- else'i land? Are we preventing the others they attach some importance to the legality bhai Ghant, of village Naranpura, felt that from digging if they want to?" Asked of the situation (the significance of this the bores of large farmers were definitely whether he felt that the government would observation will be further discussed in the responsible for the drying up of wells, but take concrete steps, he confidently felt that next section). Some went so far as envision- he also felt that one could not resist them the government would not. ing (he prospect of actual legal action on since they were digging the bores on their Generally, the big landowners felt that groundwater issues. own land and with their own money. He felt they were not 'guneghar' (at fault), since they Only the government knows the depth to thai only external control exerted by the were not breaking any government rules or government would help, and that for this a which a bore should be installed in particular laws. They were installing the bores in their areas, and how to regulate this. We do not regulation should be introduced. own land. How could this be said to be understand this. If the well of a small farmer In contrast to these constructive and im- unlawful or reprehensible? dries up due to the installation of a bore aginative responses from small and marginal If the government had attempted to in- nearby, then he can Tile a case and thereby farmers, many rich farmers were reluctant troduce a rule or law earlier, we would not slop the functioning of the bore (Dhirubhabi to discuss the problem of groundwater have been able to dig this bore. Bui since (he Sevarbhai Patd. a medium farmer of Munai). overexploitation. Those who spoke mostly government has not made this law, we are not Some farmers, however, had difficulty in showed a lack of concern for the problem, at fault, since we have not broken or resisted conceiving of a change in currently-accepted a reluctance to acknowledge their own an existing law (Caljibhai Jethabhai property rights. For instance, Dhanabhai responsibility for its emergence, and a Bamania, a prosperous farmer from Naran- Madhabhai Vankar, a small farmer from negative attitude towards all forms of 50 pura who owns seven acres of land and a Choriwad, opined: 'Bijana kua ke bore par government interference. bore approximately 190 ft deep). haq lage? Na Lage!1." Attitudes of large fanners towards govern- These viewpoints are well illustrated by the ment intervention were resoundingly cause of Lakhabhai Jethabhai Thakarda, Ill negauve- who owns one bore of a depth of about 190 ft, from which he irrigates six acres of The government's limit is only 160 ft. If I Political Economy of his land. Initially, Lakhabhai was very happen to attempt a bore and it fails, then Groundwater^ suspicious and refused to talk. When his the government can make as many rules and This section is divided into two parts. The reaction was sought regarding the new con- regulations as it wants to, but I am ready to first recalls the various means of interven- trol of 45 m, he replied: "What is the sense go as deep as 500 ft. and nothing will stop me. After that, if the government wants to tion that are available to prevent the over- of a control of only 45 m? We have been able punish me, let it do so (Rambhai Patel of exploitation of groundwater resources. The to strike water at 190 ft. We had initially Takatuka). aim here is not to give a detailed account constructed a well which was 50 ft deep, but of each of these means of intervention, since we did not strike water, we had to dig The government should not attempt to which have been aptly discussed by a a borer When asked whether he had taken a introduce any kind of regulation, because the more the farmers are able to produce, the number of authors.51 Rather, this brief permission from the government authorities, more benefits to the government and to interpretive review seeks to provide an overall he argued: "There was no existing rule of society. Is it not?.- The government should perspective within which the different this kind, so why should I. take permission?" not introduce any regulation which is measures that have been proposed can be He further added: "How can I be said to detrimental to the interests of the- farmers assessed. The second part puts forward a have committed an offence? If- there was a (Raghjibhai Ramjibhai of village Bhadresar). particular view of what is to be done if the government regulation and I had broken it, If any control is exerted now then whatever impending tragedy of groundwater depletion then it could be said that I have committed little greenery there is will also dry up. in Gujarat is to be averted. an offence. In the absence of such a regula- Whatever little the cattle can feed on now will tion I can dig as many bores as I want and become inaccessible. All will be harassed. whenever I feel like." Hence I feel that, at this juncture, no con- 111(1) PREVENTING OVEREXPbOITATION: He was asked whether he did not feel that trol should be exerted la farmer from MEANS OF INTERVENTION Naranpura). a bore as deep as his could affect the water Broadly speaking, it is possible to iden- table of the nearby wells. His reaction was: An interesting aspect of the responses of tify four types of intervention to prevent the "I can install as many bores as I feel like on large as well as small farmers, which emerges overexploitation of groundwater resources. The first type, which has received most at- TAWE 15: CASTE-WISE OWNERSHIP ot WEI is IN FOUR VIM AOESCH IIMR TAILKA tention, consists of state regulation of the private sector. In this case, the government Caste Group Number of Wells Owned by Different Groups attempts to introduce a set of rules or in- Bhadresar Kapoda Munjpur Nadri Total centives that influence the behaviour of the private sector in the direction of a less anti- Paid 76 66 144 286 social use of groundwater resources. Within Other privileged castes* 66 2 1 6 75 this category, one can make a further distinc- Thakarda 1 4 7 II 23 tion between 'direct' and 'indirect' regula- — 4 'Harijan' 8 13 2$ tion. The former seeks to impose direct con- Other disadvantaged trols on the use of groundwater. The latter castes'* 7 7 8 12 34 operates indirectly, through other variables Unspecified 2 _ — — such as electricity rates, crop prices and Total 160 79 20 186 455 credit policies. Notes: 'These include castes such as barrot. chauhan. bhall and kolis. Individuals with the Dcsai The^econd form of intervention concerns surname (used both by some patch as well as by rabaris) have been included in this the positive involvement of the public sec- group for want of information on (heir precise casie affiliation. Among the study villages, tor in a reasoned use of water resources as ihc desais are mostly found in Bhadresar. a whole. Some examples are (1) the im- ** These include tun, ghanchi, nayak, kumhar. pandaya. ulal. among others. A small number plementation of watershed programmes and of Muslims have also been included in this group. the construction of tanks in order to en- Soutxe Based on the survey conducted by the lalalis of these villages in ihe last week of June courage greater use of surface water; (2) the and firsi week of July 1988 revival of certain forms of traditional and

A-158 Economic and Political Weekly December 19-26. 1992 ecologically sound systems of collective (2) the rates of annual recharge and extrac- contemplated by the government. A more at groundwater use and conservation; (3) the tion. (3) the adequacy of spacing between realistic measure would be to ban the in- ty channelling of groundwater resources wells, and (4) the density of wells in the area. stallation of sugar factories in water-scarce is through public tubewells. Several changes have taken place since this areas—where there are no sugar factories, ie The third approach invokes community regulation was introduced in 1967, and one sugarcane is rarely grown. The cultivation i- . management as a tool of groundwater con- cannot help noticing (hat the rules have of sugarcane in areas of groundwater scar- >n servation. Here the aim is to enable the often tended to become less and less strin- city could itself be banned altogether. village community to make use of the infor- gent over the years, when the reverse was o mation and control it possesses on local called for.5* The most striking move in that Electricity Pricing ir resources and individual behaviour in direction came in 1982 with the introduction Perhaps the most powerful of all measures 1 K order to prevent the excessive depletion of of the category of 'special case tubewells to of indirect regulation relates to the pricing ;r groundwater. be dealt with at the discretion of high-level of electricity. The two main alternative pric- •e The fourth type of intervention is con- CWROC officials. A government resolution ing systems are flat-rate pricing, involving >y cerned with redefining the structure of pro- of 1986 (December 2) candidly states: a fixed yearly charge per electric motor, and perty rights within which the private sector, "Wherever the tubewells fulfil the stipulated pro rata pricing, under which the user plays the state and the community operate. This criteria, NOC would be accorded as per for each unit of electricity consumed. It is is a more radical, but also more complex, rules. And wherever the criterion is not well recognised that flat-rate pricing creates approach to the protection of groundwater fulfilled NOC would be granted as 'special strong incentives against the conservation of 1 resources. case "! In Mehsana (the groundwater desert groundwater, because once the fiat charge The remainder of this sub-section briefly of Gujarat), 191 NOCs were granted before is paid every extra unit of water extracted examines the basic features of each of these 1981; between 1981 and 1987, as many as is 'free'. Pro rata pricing, by contrast, im- 1,591 NOCs were issued (of which 616 were poses a cost on every extra unit of water ex- approaches, and some of their respective ad- 57 vantages and shortcomings. 'special cases'). According to a GWRDC tracted, and therefore induces farmers to official: "In the last few years, all cases have economise water. From the point of view of 111(1.1) STATE REGULATtoN OF PRIVATE been 'special cases'. There have been no nor- water (and electricity) conservation, SECTOR mal cases. Most of these cases are dealt with therefore, pro rata pricing is clearly a on political grounds. To this extent, a NOC superior system.61 Indirect Regulation 5 is a mere formality:' ' In spite of this, Gujarat recently switched In theory, the best form of indirect state In sum, credit restrictions for the preser- (in June 1987) from a regime of pro rata regulation would be the introduction of vation of groundwater resources have made pricing to one of flat-rate pricing. This hap- some kind of 'water rates' applying irrespec- little headway in Gujarat. On the contrary, pened as a result of a nearly three-year-long tive of the way in which water is extracted. large amounts of subsidised credit have sup- agitation led by the big farmers' lobby.' This would induce farmers to economise ported the expansion of water extraction According to the new system (as amended water, and the overall rate of extraction of mechanisms. This has contributed not only through further concessions made to the water in a particular area could be controlled to the overexploitation of groundwater farmers' lobby later in 1987), electricity is by increasing or lowering the water rates ap- resources, but also (due to the distributive freely supplied and farmers pay flat-rate plying in that area. When water extraction biases in credit allocation discussed earlier) charges per annum related to horsepower, mechanisms are publicly-owned, this system to their inequitable distribution. To correct however, a uniform charge (fixed at Rs 500 is quite feasible. For instance, it prevailed in these excesses, government credit for water in 1987) applies to all motors above 10 China prior to .the economic 'liberalisation' extraction mechanisms should either be HP." This change is estimated to have cost of the 1980s [Kramer, 1989). However, abolished in areas of groundwater scarcity, the government of Gujarat Rs 665 million when, as in India, most water extraction or at least be restricted to small farmers.19 in 1987 alone." mechanisms are privately owned, the collec- It is worth mentioning that this successful tion of water rates is practically impossible campaign received an unexpected boost from in view of obvious problems of monitoring Cropping Patterns some influential economic arguments accor- and corruption.54 Cropping patterns depend on a wide range ding to which flat-rate pricing is superior to In practice, only three important measures of factors, some of which can be influenced pro rata pricing [for an exposition, see par- of indirect regulation have been given serious so as to discourage the more water-intensive ticularly Shah, I989|. These arguments, attention in India. These respectively relate crops. Crop prices are an obvious example. however, were developed on the basis of a (in roughly increasing order of effectiveness) However, the determination of support concern to promote the use of groundwater to (I) credit policies, (2) cropping patterns, prices in India is more a matter of political resources in areas with a large unutilised and (3) electricity pricing. Each of these pressures than of rational calculation, and potential; they have little applicability in forms of intervention deserves brief the prospects of gearing these prices to the areas where groundwater overexploitation is consideration. conservation of water are very remote. Alter- the real problem. native ways of promoting water-friendly Credit An equitable and rational system of elec- cropping patterns need further investigation. tricity pricing would be one which combines In Gujarat, credit-related measures for the Sugarcane provides a good example of the a flat-rate charge with a pro rata charge, and preservation of groundwater resources have scope for effective action in this domain. where (1) the pro rata charge is area-specific mostly taken the form of limits on the gran- Preventing the further expansion of sugar- with higher charges being levied in areas ting of loans for water extraction mecha- cane cultivation in Gujarat is a priority where it is important to '.iscourage the con- nisms in areas of actual or potential ground- measure as far as the protection of ground- sumption of water (or electricity), and (2) water scarcity. Different government rules water is concerned. Sugarcane cultivation the flat-rate charge is fixed for different users apply for wells of a depth below and above has already caused enormous damage to the so as tq achieve the greatest possible measure 150 ft. For wells of a depth of less than ISO groundwater resources of Maharashtra.10 of equity in power pricing (e g, by linking ft, there are no restrictions worth the There is a danger that the same will happen the flat-rate charge to horsepower, or—even name.33 For wells of a depth larger than ISO in Gujarat if sugarcane cultivation is better—to landholding size). There is every ft, a 'No Objection Certificate" is required adopted on a large scale in areas of ground- case for demanding a change in electricity to obtain a loan from the government. water scarcity. Among possible preventive pricing policies in this direction, away from A 'No Objection Certificate* (NOC) can measures, taxing sugar is an obvious option. the irrational system that has emerged as a be granted after considering (I) the general However, a tax on sugar would be extreme- result of political pressures from influential state of groundwater resources in the area. ly unpopular, and is unlikely to be seriously farmers.

Economic and Political Weekly December 19-26, 1992 A-159 Discussion of simple and feasible controls, such a< thr nature, such as an explicit clause giving Each specific measure of indirect regula- licensing of bores. priority to drinking water over «rn««Jion or tion tends to raise its own problems. These In Gujarat, current forms of din £*TuL to regulate the use of aiready- may include, for instance, political resistance uon go back to 1970, when a bil constructed water extraction »£uuu«n». from the bis farmers' lobby (as navhappen- duced by the Central Ground Vv^sjo^ But in spite of its '?««**1*'!r£ ed in Gujarat with electricity pricing), to regulate and control the utilisation of men! was a step in the right direction. Un- undesirable 'side effect*' (as would apply to groundwater. This bill was sent to all the fortunately, the ordinance contautmg tha the taxing of water-intensive crops if these state governments with the idea that it could amendment was allowed tt> lapse before the are also labour-intensive), or inequitable pass through the relevant legal procedures M rules necessary fonts imputation tould distribution of costs and benefits (e g, when in each state and turned into u act In be submitted to and approved by the state credit restrictions give a few rich farmers the Gujarat, this act was to be called The legislature.6* monopoly of water extraction mechanisms). Groundwater (Control and Regulation) Act, Eleven years later, a notification appeared However, the most serious weakness of in- in the government gaatte (November 26, direct regulation is that it also tends to be Nothing happened between 1970 and 1987) announcing that the government of ineffective. Being roundabout and partial by 1975. when a nation-wide emenjency (which Gujarat had fixed April 1,1988. as the date their very nature, indirect regulation mea- was to last until 1977) was declared On on which the Bombay Irrigation (Gujarat sures more often than not leave too many December 23,1976. the state government or Amendment) Act, 1976. would come into gaping loopholes to make a real dent on the Gujarat published an ordinance promul- force. But on this occasion too, the state problem, (f electricity rates are raised, gated by the president of India (by notifica- 3 legislature was unable to ensure the im- farmers can switch to diesel engines. If in- tion in the government gazette).* This or- plementation of this resolution. In fact, the stitutional credit ceases to be available for dinance contained an amendment to the issue was not even submitted to in the Bombay Irrigation Act of 1879 (which was water extraction mechanisms, farmers— assembly, as the ruling government decided especially rich ones—can turn to alternative then and is now in force in Gujarat) and was called the Bombay Irrigation (Gujarat that the drought conditions then prevailing (if more costly) sources of credit. And sup- in the state made it impossible or unwise to port prices have little influence on open- Amendment) Act, 1976. Its motivation was stated as follows: enforce the amendment. market prices, which are far more important During the following yea* the government in determining cropping patterns. In order to prevent further decline of the of Gujarat came under considerable pressure It would, therefore, be extremely naive to water table in such areas [where water table, from the central government (especially the think that the problem of dwindling ground- are falling and wells drying], it U considered Planning Commission) to formulate and im- water resources can be successfully solved necessary to regulate the construction of plement groundwater regulations.** The through indirect regulation only. The need tubewells, artesian wells and boreweils ex- National Water Policy had also been for- to consider more direct forms of interven- ceeding 45 m in depth in any land assessed mulated (in September. 1987), and while this tion is inescapable. or held for the purpose of agriculture. The two central provisions of this amend- TAW S 17: CASTE-WISE OWNE«SMIP OF DIESEL Direct Regulation ment were (I) the introduction of a system PUMI". AND ELECTRIC MOTORS IN BHAMESAB of licences to control the expansion of bores Vll.l'AliE (lOAR TALDKA) Along with indirect regulation, the con- and wells, and (2) the prohibition of ground- servation of groundwater resources can be water extraction for non-essential uses. In Number of Total pursued through the introduction of direct Casir Croup the words of the ordinance itself: Assets Owned Number state control on private uses of groundwater . Where a holder of any agricultural land Diesel Electric of For instance, one could attempt to ban the desires to construct therein any tubewell, arte- Pump- Motors House- extraction of groundwater for irrigation pur- sian well of borewdl, exceeding 45 m in depUi sets holds poses in a particular area when the water for extracting groundwater, he shall make an table falls below a pre-specified level, or to application to the Regional Canal Officer Paiel 7 21 ration the available water between different having jurisdiction for the grant of a Other privileged 160 users in an equitable way. licence.66 castes* 20 99 The main problem with direct control pro- Thakarda too cedures (again, within the present structure No holder of agricultural land in which 'Harijan' 6 2 130 there is a tubewell, artesian well or of property rights) is that of enforcement. Other disadvan borewdl exceeding 45 m in depth shall Groundwater tends to be extracted day after taged castes 1 6 150 allow any water from such well to be used Total 34 128 540 day by millions of fanners whose activities for a purpose other than for the purpose escape the dose scrutiny of the state. Given of agriculture or of drinking or to be Noir. • These predominantly include the the inefficient and corrupt nature of the wasted either through leaky casing, pipe Osats. See Table 15 for details of caste Indian bureaucracy, it would be a hopeless ratings, valves or pumps either above or groups. exercise to institute a system of detailed, below the surface or on account of any Source: Field survey, and survey conducted by centralised controls on who uses how much other reason whatsoever." the lalatis of these villages in the last water. In practice, direct regulation by the The amendment fell short of introducing week of June and first week of July state has to limit itself to a small number much-needed measures of a more radical 1988.

TABLE 16: CASTE-WISBOWNERSHIP OF BORES IN STUDY VILLAGES

Caste Group Bhadresar Choriwad Mau Messan Munai Naranpur Takaiuka Umedpura Total

Patel 1 27 8 30 33 1 24 25 156 Other privileged castes 28 1 11 J 10 6 2 59 Thakarda — _ — 1 2 — 1 4 'Harijan' — 1 — — — — — 1 Other disadvantage^ castes — — 1 — — — 1 Tout 29 29 20 30 36 19 30 28 221

Sourer. Field survey, and survey conducted by the lalatis of these villages in the last week of June and first week of July 1988. See the preceding table for details of the caste groups.

A-160 Economic and Political Weekly December 19-26,1992 FIGURE I: ANNUAL RAINFALL 1mm) IN SABARKANTHA DISTRICT. 1901-90 FIGURE 2: ANNUAL RAINFALL (mm) IN GUJARAT, 1951-90

1920 1930 1940 1950 I960 1970 I 1920 I9i5 I960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 - Annual figures + Five-year moving averages Annual figures • Five-year moving averages

document attracted various criticisms, it This brief outline of the recent history of model of accountability and competence, clearly stated.70 groundwater legislation in Gujarat gives a and past experience with public tubewells in 74 The exploitation of groundwater resources sobering idea of the obstructive role played India has been rather sobering. As far as should be so regulated as not to exceed the by the ruling classes. On at least three oc- equitable distribution is concerned, the rural recharging possibilities and also to ensure casions (1977, 1988 and 1989). the state elite usually succeeds in appropriating most social equity. legislature failed to take the necessary steps of the benefits of public supply. In the light The Bombay Irrigation (Gujarat Amend- to ensure the implementation of legal pro- of these past experiences, it would be unwise ment) Act of 1976 was revived, in a slightly visions that might have laid the basis of con- to place much reliance on public tubewells modified form, in the Gujarat Ordinance siderable improvements. Future campaigns for a more rational use of groundwater No 2 of 1989 (dated June 13). This or- to reform the law will have to challenge these resources in Gujarat. obstructive forces. dinance sought to consolidate and amend There are stronger grounds for hope as far the law relating to irrigation in Gujarat; in 111(1.2) PUBLIC SECTOR INVOLVEMENT as surface water is concerned. Indeed, India effect, the Bombay Irrigation Act (1879) has a long history of public involvement in would have stood repealed. The second of Aside from attempting to regulate the the management of surface water (through the two clauses quoted above from the 1976 private sector through direct or indirect tanks, watershed programmes, dams, etc), amendment is incorporated without change means, the government can also take an ac- and some authors have argued that pro- in the 1989 ordinance. The first clause takes tive part in the utilisation and distribution moting surface irrigation is the most sensi- the altered form of making the acquisition of water resources. In this context, we need ble means of protecting groundwater.75 An of a licence compulsory for the construction to consider not only groundwater, but also important (if not completely clear-cut) of "any tubewell, artesian well, borewell or surface water, since promoting the latter is distinction has to be made here between (1) dugwell (a) exceeding five metres in depth one possible way of protecting the former. large irrigation works (especially dams), and in a coastal area, or (b) exceeding 45 m in In the case of groundwater, current (2) small-scale works (including tanks and depth in a specified area, or (c) exceeding government involvement almost exclusively watershed programmes). 25 m in depth in the area other than the takes the form of constructing and operating 71 Planning policies in India have tended to coastal area and the specified area". public tubewells. With an accountable and give priority -to the former. It is not surpris- Besides, there is an additional clause which competent bureaucracy, public tubewells can ing that there should be influential pressures proposes to regulate the use of existing wells ensure not only an efficient but also a fair- on the government to undertake large-scale on the same principle as that of new wells. ly equitable distribution of groundwater. The irrigation schemes, since the enormous costs This new ordinance, unfortunately, Indian bureaucracy, however, is hardly a of these schemes are largely borne by rela- followed a fate similar to that of earlier attempts to affirm groundwater regulation in TVBI E 18: DETAILS REGARDING FIN\NCIAI Sot.mL M>RCONSTRICIIONot We is is lot K VII Gujarat. It was felt that some aspects of this OV \D\R TAI UkA document still needed 'improvement', and the matter was therefore referred to a 'select Source Bhadrevar Kapoda Munjpur Nadri Total committee* for detailed consideration. .The ordinance elapsed before the select commit- Bank loan 59 1 10 76 146 tee presented its conclusions.72 As Girish Own Capital 99 77 10 90 276 Patei, a renowned advocate at the Ahmeda- Bank loan and own bad High Court, puts it: "When the govern- capital — — — 14 . 14 ment does not want to take action, or wants Oiher sources 1 1 1 — 2 — — 7 to postpone action, the issue is referred to No information 1 6 160 20 186 445 a Select Committee. This way, the promise Total 79 73 is fulfilled and the result is not achieved" Source: Field survey and bank records.

Economic and Political Weekly December 19-26, 1992 A-161 lively powerless groups (unorganised tax- Guarantee Scheme for Gujarat. .Management of environmental resources. payers, displaced communities, and—in the Mm replicating these achievements elsewhere case of environmental costs—future genera- 111(1.3) COMMUNITY MANAGEMfNT wOui J require a radical transformation in the tions) whereas their benefits are mostly balance of rural power. An important alternative to state imei vcn- reaped by powerful contractors, landowners The possibility of community-based tion is that of community management. and politicians. The social usefulness of regulation of the private sector has receiv- Indeed, it is sometimes argued that large-scale irrigation schemes, however, is ed insufficient attention in the literature on democratic village institutions (e g, pan- quite controversial. They have, in fact, groundwater resources in India, and deserves chayats or gram sabhas), if properly revitalis- recently been the target of a whole range of to be more fully investigated. The potential 76 ed, can play a crucial role in environmental sharp and persuasive criticisms. of this app:cacli. however, appears to be protection.79 In the case of groundwater, In Gujarat, the most important scheme severely limited by the concentration of this would take the form of water being of large-scale irrigation is the Narmada river power in the hands of those who derive allocated through community decisions. development project (including the Sardar strong private gains from the allocation Sarovar dam and the accompanying canal An important feature of this approach is mechanism that underlies the current over- system). This is not the pjace to comment the possibility of reducing the amount of exploitation of groundwater. on the numerous problems raised by this ir- external coercion needed to prevent the over- rigation scheme.77 For our purposes it is exploitation of groundwater. if farmers feel 111(1.4) PROPERTY RIGHTS*1 sufficient to note that, as far as the conser- a genuine sense of 'participation' in com- vation of groundwater is concerned, little munity decisions, they may be much more The existing structure of property rights can be expected from the Narmada project. inclined to comply with them than with applying to groundwater is quite astoni- state-enforced regulations. In some circum- shing. These rights an governed by the Indeed, the command area of this project M bypasses most of the areas where ground- stances, community processes may even suc- Indian Easements Act of 1882. The water scarcity is a severe problem (including ceed in instilling a sense of individual Easements Act makes a crucial distinction Sabarkantha itself, as well as most of responsibility for the conservation of com- between underground running streams and munity resources, making it possible to rely underground percolating water. Rights over Saurashtra and Kutch). This is not an acci- 10 dent, but a direct reflection of the political partly on voluntary restraint to save water. the former are governed by the doctrine of pressures that have influenced the design of One difficulty with this whole approach 'riparian rights' (perceived as natural rights the project Small-scale schemes of surface is that it would require a drastic change in linked to the ownership of the riparian land), water development (such as percolation the perception of who owns water resources. which essentially states that leach coriparian tanks and check dams) avoid many of the As things stand, land owners have a legal has the right to have the water flow pass his drawbacks of large-scale irrigation projects, right to unrestrained use of whatever water lands undiminished in quantity and unim- and they also have a number of distinct ad- resources they can reach through their land. paired in quality".*' vantages. Particular mention should be The actual perception of water ownership As far as underground percolating water made of the labour-intensive nature of many rights also corresponds to this legal position is concerned, the situation is almost the of these schemes. (as the case study of Section II clearly polar opposite: according to the Easements illustrated). Obviously, community manage- Act of 1882 (Section 7), "a landowner has Efforts to protect groundwater resources ment is possible only if groundwater the right to appropriate water percolating in carry a risk that water will be preserved at resources are regarded as 'common proper- no defined channel through ° the strata the expense of employment. The main ty' resources. This would require a fun- beneath his land; and no action will lie reason for this possible dilemma is that damental change in perceived ownership against him for so doing, even if he thereby water-intensive agriculture also tends to be rights. intercepts, abstracts or diverts water whkh labour-intensive. When the extraction of would otherwise pass to or remain under the groundwater is regulated, complementary Another serious problem with community land of another"!*4 This provision removes measures must be taken to generate non- management is that its success depends on all barriers to the right to extract percolating agricultural emolovment. Otherwise, the the co-operation of those who are, at the water for private purposes. adverse consequences of water conservation moment, benefiting from the rapid exploita- will be largely borne by unemployed tion of groundwater resources. Their co- The resulting status of (percolating) labourers. operation might arise in two ways. First, underground water has been described as In this respect, labour-intensive schemes there is an obvious collective gain from the that of a 'fugitive resource', "for which of surface water development have the merit conservation of groundwater resources, and private property rights exist but these rights of simultaneously protecting groundwater users are likely to co-operate voluntarily if are indefinite among the overlying land- and promoting employment. Past experi- their share of these collective gains, is larger owners", creating a situation where "each ences with such projects (for instance, in than the private gains they currently derive user protects his rights by capturing the the context of Maharashtra's Employment from unrestrained use of groundwater. This, groundwater in the fastest possible way, as Guarantee Scheme) have been quite mixed, however, is a demanding condition that is the user knows that the deferred use is sub- but there is some hope that the more suc- not likely to be fulfilled in the case of large ject to" great uncertainty, since other users cessful experiences can be emulated. An farmers. would capture the resource in the mean 5 essential task is to investigate what are the Second, the compliance of potential 'free- time".* ingredients of success in this field, and how riders' can be sought through coercion and It is easy to see that the present structure much scope there is to recreate them sanctions (e g, the imposition of fines on of property rights in groundwater is both il- elsewhere. those who violate agreed rules of water use). logical and inappropriate. It is illogical A more general way of looking at this This approach is not likely to work, however, because it gives diametrically opposite whole issue is to see that employment gene- if community institutions are controlled or treatments to flowing and non-flowing ration and environmental protection are two dominated by those who also stand to gain underground water, even though this distinc- of the most important challenges of social from the overexploitation of groundwater. tion hardly affects the nature of the problem. planning in Gujarat.7* It is natural to look In much of rural India, unfortunately, it is It is inappropriate because it creates strong for strategies of intervention that meet these the case thai rich farmers are precisely in incentives for overexploitation of a common two challenges simultaneously. Large-scale that position. Progressive changes have been resource by private individuals. public employment programmes oriented achieved in this respect in some parts of the This odd situation largely results from the towards environmental protection satisfy this country, notably in West Bengal, where indiscriminate adoption of the principles of criterion. Programmes of this kind could de.nocratic control of panchayats has made English common law (which the Easements form the backbone of an Employment possible certain forms of community Act of 1882 closely followed). In England,

A-162 Economic and IVIiiical Weekly December 19-26, 1992

•'•^•'Ji percolation is abundant, irrigated agriculture pressures from political activists." If easy of the risks involved in drilling bores, by is practically non-existent, and also land- enforceability had been regarded as a pre- transferring these risks from private holdings tend to be quite large so that pro- condition for legislation, laws such as those individuals to the community or the blems of 'interference' between different prohibiting child marriage or bonded labour government. users of groundwater are much less acute. would never have been passed—and the Last but not least, the social ownership In this context, the legal provisions outlined eradication of these social evils would have of bores could facilitate the emergence of above (including the distinction between been correspondingly slowed down. various forms of community management. flowing and non-flowing water) may have Further, the prospects of actual legal en- Indeed, if bores are owned by the com- made some sense. However, the situation is forcement should not be completely dismiss- munity rather-than by private individuals, completely different in India, where the ed. Even if changes in property rights do not their use could also be more easily regulated. depletion of groundwater resources is a real lead to an immediate, across-the-board For instance, if a simple technology for danger, and where small, contiguous transformation in the practice of ground- monitoring the amount of water extracted holdings share common aquifers. The Indian water use, legal provisions may still con- by different individuals becomes available, Easements Act of 1882 is a relic of the col- solidate local struggles against anti-social it may be possible to introduce and enforce onial period. practices. Some rich farmers will be taken collective rules for the allocation of This statement also holds, in fact, for to court for (say) drying up their neighbours' groundwater. mote basic aspects of Indian legislation that wells, or for wasting underground water dur- The socialisation of bores would involve interfere with the protection of groundwater ing a drought If they lose, the case will a creative combination of the different forms and other environmental resources. For in- receive publicity and strengthen similar of intervention discussed earlier, and it stance, Indian legislation (including the struggles elsewhere. Even if they win. the fear would certainly represent a major step for- Easements Act of 1882) has adopted from of getting involved in a legal dispute will ward compared with the existing situation. English Common Law the notion of ex- deter other farmers from violating the law. It is interesting that this highly practical and clusive natural right of an individual owner As in many other fields, legal action and effective means of intervention should be so to private property, including the assertion social action are the two legs on which the alive in the minds of the farmers we inter- that "no use of property, which would be people stand strong. viewed (particularly the smaller ones), legal if due to a proper motive, can become while it has been overlooked in the vast illegal because it is prompted by a motive IH(l J) 'MIXED' FORM OF INTERVENTION.- literature on the management of ground- which is improper or even malicious"." The SOCIAL OWNERSHIP OF BORES water resources in India. notion that reprehensible motives do not render the interception of underground In our discussion of "what people said' in 111(2) PROPOSALS FOR ACTION water illegal has, as a matter of fact, been Section II (4), we noted that a recurring explicitly upheld in court on several occa- demand of small and marginal framers was The depletion of groundwater resources sions.*7 In contrast, modern legislation in that the ownership of bores should be in large parts of Gujarat is an alarming and countries such as France, Germany and the 'socialised', even if motors continue to be urgent problem. If present trends continue, US includes provisions that permit "only privately owned. To understand this pro- irreversible damage will be done to these reasonable use for improvement of one's posal, we have to remember that a bore (the resources, with devastating consequences for property and not acts done with intent to metal pipe running vertically from the future generations. Immediate action is injure the neighbours".1* Similar principles ground to the underlying aquifer) and a imperative. have been recommended for India. motor (the powered engine that draws the It should be clear from the discussion of water through the pipe) are two separate the preceding section that there is no quick The need for legislative change is clear objects, which need not be owned by the and simple solution to the problem of enough. What is much less clear is how alter- same person. Indeed, it is a common prac- groundwater overexploitation. While in- native property rights should be defined. tice in north Gujarat (as in many other parts dividual authors tend to argue in favour of One option would be to limit the right of of India) to put a motor on a mobile cart, one particular line of action, in practice only water extraction over a particular period to and to attach it to different bores (including, a combination of different forms of the amount of water that percolates through possibly, bores belonging to other persons) intervention can succeed in making a signifi- the land in question over the same period. according to the circumstances. In most 'cant dent on the problem. State regulation, This principle does not do away with the villages, the services of a motor or of a bore community management, etc, should not be privatisation of water, but at least it is geared can be easily hired at a standard rate. seen as mutually exclusive measures. to a sustainable and less inequitable use of groundwater resources. A more radical These arrangements make it possible to This section recapitulates a few things that departure from existing legal provisions envisage a situation where the bores ait can be done to protect groundwater would be to define some kind of collective publicly owned, while motors remain resources in Gujarat, in the light of the property rights over groundwater. privately owned with their services being preceding review of possible avenues of ac- ' Of course, neither of these two types of hired by owners to non-owners. The tion. The analytical framework used in that property rights would be easy to define and socialisation of bores would have some review will be retained, and the reader is enforce. In fact, it is quite likely that, initially major advantages (many of which were referred to the corresponding sub-sections at least, there would be large-scale violation clearly mentioned by small farmers in the of that section for further discussion of the of the law (as is already the case with responses reported in Section II (4). First, relevant themes. The intention of this sum- riparian rights), and that existing mal- it would help to prevent overexploitation, mary is not just to supply 'policy recommen- practices would continue. But this does not since public control could be exercised on dations' for the consideration of government mean that legislative changes of this kind' the number and depth of bores in a par- agencies. These conclusions are addressed to are not worth accomplishing. Indeed, social ticular area. Second, it would facilitate a the diverse audience of all those concerned perceptions of what are 'legitimate' uses of rational location of bores through co- with the protection of groundwater resources. iroundwater are partly influenced by the ordinated planning. In particular, the pro- Some of the proposed changes are legality of the matter, and changes in these blem of 'well interference' could be greatly 'moderate' suggestions that will not en- perceptions can, in turn, have an influence reduced. Third, public ownership of bores counter much resistance from the concerned 'Xi groundwater extraction practices through would permit a more equitable distribution authorities. Others can only be won through » *tnety of extra-legal processes. These may of groundwater, since large farmers would hard political battles. include bargaining between conflicting no longer have the virtual monopoly of ac- Before entering this discussion, it should Ptnies, community decisions, 'lok adalats", cess to this resource. Fourth, this arrange- be emphasised that what can be done within d sanctions, popular protests, and ment would ensure a much better 'spreading' the present institutional framework is, in-

Political Weekly December 19-26. 1992 A-163 '••-Hi evitably, limited. As we saw again and again (S)The Bombay Irrigation (Gujarat Amend- recharge rate of the concerned aquifers). in this paper, there are deep connections bet- ment) Act of 1976 should be enforced in Social Ownership of Bores ween the overexploitation of groundwater all areas of potential groundwater scar- As was mentioned in the preceding sec- resources on the one hand, and the in- city. The granting of licences for the con- tion, social ownership of bores was an im- equitable distribution of economic oppor- struction of water extraction mechanisms tunities and political power on the other. should be subject to clear guidelines and portant demand of many of the small Perhaps the most important of these con- open to public scrutiny. farmers who were interviewed in the course nections relates to the fact that, as things of our 'case study' (Section 11(4)), and this Public Sector Involvement stand, usufructuary rights to groundwater step can be seen as a creative and highly sen- are entirely derivative on ownership rights As things stand, there is little hope that sible combination of the various forms of to land. As long as land itself is privately public sector involvement in the extraction intervention discussed so far. The socialisa- and unequally owned, the scope for achiev- and distribution of groundwater in Gujarat tion of bores is quite a radical demand ing a more equitable and sustainable use of (e g, through public tubewells) would bring (especially if it applies to existing bores as groundwater is bound to be limited. The about a substantial improvement in the well as to future bores), and it remains to need for immediate action-should not make management of this resource However, there be seen whether these small fanners will ever us lose sight of the equally vital need for ' is greater scope for public involvement in the have enough political strength to obtai: !.. long-term structural changes. These alone management of surface water resources. enforcement. However, public demends hold a real promise of stopping the plunder This can help the conservation of ground- should be geared to what is just and of groundwater and other environmental water, both by raising water tables (as with desirable, and not just to what seems resources in Gujarat. percolation tanks), and by directly meeting 'realistic* under the present configuration of some of the water requirements of irrigated political forces. It is therefore important to Slate Regulation of Private Sector agriculture. In this area, a major reorienta- affirm this demand made by the small It has been argued that regulation of the tion of existing priorities and policies is farmers. private sector, in both 'direct* and 'indirect' needed. (9) All bores, or at least all new bores, should forms, is a vital ingredient of groundwater (6) Public sector involvement in the manage- be publicly owned. protection. Under the heading of indirect ment of water resources should be Some Neglected Issues regulation, we have considered credit reoriented away from large dams and A few words should now be said about policies, cropping patterns and electricity public tubewells towards the promotion several issues which have not received special pricing. Other avenues of indirect regulation of small-scale, labour-intensive works of attention in the preceding discussion, even should also be explored, but meanwhile we surface water development. though they are important aspects of the can recall some of the measures that are Community Management problem of groundwater protection and had feasible in these three areas: The notion that groundwater resources in an essential place in the earlier parts of the (1) Institutional credit for water extraction Gujarat can be sustainably and equitably paper. Three issues will be considered: mechanisms from all sources should be managed through community institutions (1) drought, (2) drinking water, and banned in areas of severe groundwater (e g, gram sabhas), in spite of the (3) information. scarcity, and reserved to small and vulnerability of these institutions to As we saw in Sect on I, the connections marginal farmers elsewhere. manipulation by the rural elite, was strong- between drought and groundwater scarcity (2) The incentives given to various crops ly questioned earlier in this section. Perhaps in Gujarat are increasingly important. (e g, through support prices) should take this assessment has erred on the side of Drought relief policies should give due into account the need to discourage undue pessimism. That would be good news. recognition to this recent development. water-intensive crops in areas of ground- Given that some promising experiments in (10) Guidelines for the protection of groundwater scarcity. community management have actually taken water resources during droughts should (3) In particular, the installation of sugar- place (usually through the leadership of be included in the Gujarat Relief cane factories should not be allowed in voluntary agencies), it would be useful to Manual. Drought relief works should these areas. The expansion of sugarcane reflect on the lessons that emerge from these be used to create permanent structures cultivation outside south Gujarat has to experiments. aimed at an expanded, sustainable use be vigorously discouraged. (7) Past experiences of community manage- of surface water. (4) The irrational and inequitable system of ment of groundwater and other environ- flat-rate electricity pricing created by In the case study included in Section II, mental resources should be methodically earlier pressures from the fanners' lobby we noted the sharp conflict that can emerge assessed (e g, through published surveys should be abolished, in favour of a mixed between the use of groundwater for irriga- and public workshops). system of flat rates and pro rata charges tion and drinking purposes. While govern- along the lines outlined in the preceding Property Rights ment documents constantly reiterate that section. The existing structure of property rights 'priority' should be given to the latter, these While helpful and necessary, indirect in groundwater is illogical and inappropriate. resolutions have no teeth. Affected people regulation is by nature a blunt instrument While it may not be easy to define 2nd en- should be given a better chance to affirm for disciplining the private sector. The driv- force alternative property rights, it has been their right to drinking water. ing force behind groundwater protection has argued that even a formal change in the (11) There should be a legal right of access to \\*. in other forms of intervention, in- legality of groundwater uses could have a to private water extraction mechanisms cluding direct regulation. Here, it is impor- crucial effect on their perceived legitimacy. for drinking water purposes when tant to remember that individual property This, in turn, would strengthen the bargain- drinking water facilities in a village are rights relating to groundwater resources ing power of the victims of groundwaier unsatisfactory. always remain "subject to the state's exploitation. For these reasons, a redefini- Last but not least, it should be stressed sovereign right...to regulate [these resources) tion of property rights is essential. that public campaigns for the protection of in the public interest" (see Section 111 (1.3)). (8) Groundwater resources should no longer groundwater resources can hardly take place While there can be serious problems in en- be governed by the Easements Act of in the absence of adequate information on forcing direct regulation measures, it has 1882. Instead, legislation should be pass- all matters relating to groundwater. At the been argued that the provisions of the ed which gives recognition to the fact that moment, even the most basic facts (e g, data Bombay Irrigation (Gujarat Amendment) underground water is a common resource on water tables) are shrouded in secrecy. The Act of 1976 are realistic and represent a steo (or, at the very least, which limits legal release of groundwater-related information forward. rights of groundwater extraction to the to public scrutiny is long overdue.

A-164 Lconomic and Political Weekly December 19-26, 1992 mm (12) Information relating to groundwater the course of this work. Aside from editing the 9 In Gujarat, the person hired to lift water resources in Gujarat should be made draft, he has co-authored Section 111. from the well through the traditional 'kos' public An annual report on the state While carrying out this research, I have (i e, the leather bag pulled by bullocks) is of groundwater resources in Gujarat benefited from extensive discussions with a known as 'koshia'. should be published by the Central number of individuals in the Central Ground 10 It is ironic that, even as water resources were Ground Water Board and made widely Water Board (Delhi and Ahmedabad), the being depleted during the drought years available. Groundwater Resource Development Corpora- 1985-88, governmert reports triumphantly tion (Ahmedabad), the Gujarat Water Supply announced how 'the efforts to maintain 111(3) CONCLUDING REMARK and Sewerage Board, NABARD, and Ahmeda- water supply during the current drought bad Municipal Corporation. I should mention year has brought to notice considerable in- The protection of groundwater resources that I have been greatly impressed and touch- formation about adequacy of the ground- in Gujarat ought to be a lively social issue. ed by their genuine concern and seriousness. water reserves to meet the requirement of As things stand, there are tremendous More than once my heart went out to them as water supply', including 'the large ground- pressures from influential farmers to adopt 1 witnessed how the indifference of the water reservoirs underlying the surface or perpetuate policies that allow the bureaucracy to their sincere efforts and insights water reservoirs in the Saurashira area' unrestrained use of these resources, for forced them to remain helpless spectators to the IPhadtare, 1988: 87, 93]. ever-worsening and irreversible destruction of short-term private gain. There is no cor- 11 See Mooley and Panhasarlhi [I984| and groundwater resources in Gujarat. I am most responding pressure group acting for the Olsen (1987), among others. grateful to them all for their co-operation. protection of groundwater. The plunder goes 12 For want of official information on rainfall on with astonishingly little resistance. The great mission of the Utopia is to make for Gujarat as a whole, the all-Gujarat Ultimately, this is perhaps the most im- room for the possible as opposed to a passive rainfall figures have been obtained as portant reuse of the disaster we are witness- acquiescence in the present actual state of af- unweighted averages of the district figures. fairs. It is symbolic thought which overcomes ing today. But this situation can be changed. These were available only from 1951 the natural inertia of man and endows him with In India as in many other parts of the world, onwards. a new ability, the ability constantly to reshape environmental issues have recently become 13 This is also one of the major conclusions his human universe. Ernst Cassirer: An Essay of a recent scientific report of the Central political issues in a way that never applied on Man.] before. Within this emerging political move- Ground Water Board [Government of ment, the groundwater question deserves an 1 Loveday (1914), pp 25-27. India, 1991]. important place. 2 The local names of these droughts, in many 14 Most of the relevant data have the label 'For cases, reflect the date of their occurrence Official Use 0111/ and are therefore covered in the Hindu calendar. The numbering of by the Official Secrets Act. Notes years in the Hindu calendar (known as 15 Aside from being indications of ground- 'Vikram Samvat') is ahead of the British water depletion (as explained further in the [This study is motivated and informed by my calendar by 56 years. Thus, the year I9S6 text), rising levels of salinity and fluoride first-hand experience of social action in the in the Hindu calendar witnessed a famine content result in a lower Quality of ground- rural areas of Sabwkantha district (north remembered as 'chappaniyo' fchappan' water. Hence, the scarcity of groundwater Gujarat) during the period 1985-90, which in- means 56 in Gujarati). increases not only in a quantitative but also cluded a severe drought. 1 would like to thank 3 Even in the pre-independence period, this in a qualitative sense. my co-workers in Shnunjivi Samaj, especially strategy was pursued on a number of oc- 16 An UNDP project carried out in 1971-74 Karsanbhai, Ramuaben, Nainabcn, Heerabhai, casions, with mixed rules. For a detailed already found the aquifers down to 225 m Chandrakanth and Mohanbhai both for their discussipn of famine prevention in India to be overexploited. According to Phadlare companionship during this period and for their Before and after independence, see Dreze (1988) and Bradley and Phadtare (1989), contribution to this research. I am also grateful (1990). overexploitation and well interference have to Khetabhai SoUnki. who helped to collect the 4 Water scarcity is clearly mentioned for the uuscd dramatic declines in water tables in village data used in the "case study' included first time by the Famine Commission of large parts of Mehsana. Recent information in this paper. 1901, which states that on account of the suggests that most of the phreatic aquifer Access to secondary data sources was greatly failure of water supply in the princely states, system in Mehsana has dried up (personal facilitated by the generous co-operation of the people were often left with no alternative communication from the Gujarat Water Centre for Social Knowledge and Action (Setu, but to emigrate to British territories during Resources Development Corporation). Ahmedabad). the Centre for Social Studies famines. The description of the drought of 17 The government has classified different (Surat), the Indian Institute of Management 1911 in Bharuch district also refers to the areas as 'white', 'grey' and 'dark', according (Ahmedabad), the Institute of Rural Manage- distress of the people on this count. But it to their level of 'groundwater utilisation'; ment (Anand), the Indian Law Institute (New is only from the drought of 1960-61 onwards dark areas being the most vulnerable to Delhi), the Institute of Economic Growth that consistent mention is made of the pro- depletion. According to official fi. \tres there (Delbi). and the Delhi School of Economics. blem of water scarcity—sec Government of were six dark talukas in Gujarat in 1984 Comments and suggestions from L K Atheeq, Gujarat (1976). Gujarat Relief Manual. (Kodinar. Veraval, Mangrol. Sidhpur, Patan, Amiya Bagchi, V BhaUabh. Robin Burgess, pp 13. 19-24. Mehsana), all situated in Saurashtra and Rema Devi, B D Dhawan, S KoUvaJu, Richard 5 Bhailalbhai Patel (1970). Bhaikakana Mehsana. The projected number of talukas Palmer-Jones, Ashok Panjwani. Girish Pate), Sasmarno, (The Memoirs of Bhaikaka'). for 1989 is as high as 10. Sec Map 5 for Jean-Philippe Platteau, Somshekhar Reddy. 6 Bhailalbhai does mention the existence of furhter details of the location of white, grey Emma Rothschild, Esha Shah, Ghanshyam a surface-water drought, and of increased and dark areas in Gujarat. Shah, Chhatrapati Singh, Madhura Swami- dependence on groundwater for water 18 lables 5 and 6 do not include south Gujarat. nathan and Achyut fegnik have been extremely needs. See J Gupta (1988) for further The latter region receives rainfall between useful. Special thanks are due to Mike Scorer discussion. 800 mm and 2,000 mm, and is assured of for producing the maps with great skill. 7 A 'no source' village is a village with no 50 per cent of the total precipitation each My colleagues and friends in Setu have public well within a distance of 1.6 km, or year on account of being near to the sea and helped in many different ways. 1 would par- where the public well dries up in the sum- in the shelter of the western ghats. However, ticularly like to thank Varsha Bhagat. Rohit mer, or where the water level is more than due to the highly sleep topography in Jain, Ashok Shrimali and Achyut Yagnik for 15 m deep. Dangs, most of the rainwater goes as runoff their unfailing moral support as well as for their 8 Government of Gujarat (1987), Memoran- and people face drinkingwater crises in the helpful comments and suggestions. dum to the Government of India on Scar- summer. There are few words in which 1 can express city. I987SS. Revenue Department. The 19 What is true for Gujarat holds true at the my sincere gratitude to Jean Dreze for his un- total number of inhabited village in the stale national level also. India is being criticised wavering encouragement and patient advice in is as per the 1981 Census. for allowing large-scale damage of good

Economic and Political Weekly December 19-26. 1992 A-165 land by salinisalion. The damage rate in considerably, so much so thai presently this terest is in the former rather than the latter. India is 36 per cent as compared to 43 In many cases they have also had to work ^:a source alone accounts for most of the ex- Pakistan's 20 per cent and China's IS per tension of net irrigated area in the coun without pay for the moneylenders over long cent [Unna. 1989). try. If, for once, minor irrigation compares periods to repay the balance of the loans 20 The depletion of groundwater, with a favourably with major irrigation in terms that remained after they had lost all their roughly unchanged amount of salts, leads of growth rate, it is due to the introduction land. to an increase in the concentration of salts of these modem techniques of groundwater 44 For a similar observation in the context of in water. No doubt, there can be other exploitation (Sengupu, 1983: 1929]. the 1970-73 drought in Maharashtra, see cause* of increasing •fluoridisalion, but 32 Some studies have found the cost per irriga- Brahme (1983) and Oughton (1982). In un- these are beyond the scope of the present tion in the case of a (ubewell operated by irrigated areas, one does sometimes observe paper. diesd to be about three times as high as that a larger proportionate decline in income for 21 Gujarat, Rajasthan and Maharashtra an the of an electric-operated tubewell [Shiva, large farmers during drought years, reflec- states most seriously afflicted by excess 1989:961. ting their dependence on agriculture |see fluorides in India. According (o recent 33 Reddy (1989: 184], for instance, suites, e g. Desai et al, 1979). euioMes, over 25 million people art af- "...what has been forgotten is (he fact (hat 45 Owners provide water either for cash fected in the country (Gujarat Water Supply tubewdls came onto the scene at a time ('bhade') or in exchange for a share of the and Sewerage Board, Gandhinagar, n d). when groundwater levels had already declin- crop Cbhage"). The following remarks apply 22 For a detailed discussion of the extent, ed beyond the reach of dugwdls. Therefore mainly to the former system. Sharecropp- causes and consequences of fluoride infilt- the large-scale sinking of (ubewetls in a ing is separately discussed further in this ration in fresh water zones (in Gujarat and region is a reflection of the declining sub-section. neighbouring states), see S Dhawan (1988), groundwaier levels in that particular region, 46 See particularly Shah (1987, 1989) and Mahadevan (1990), Nath el al (nd) and rather than the other way round". Kolavalli and Chicoine (1987). 'Water Phadtare (1988). 34 The profitability of groundwater is markets' are further discussed in Section III 23 These (wo maps are based on readings by sometimes a reflection of the fact that ac- (D- the Ground Water Resources Development cess to surface water has been reduced 47 For a general discussion of this process, see Corporation from its observation wells. As through government intervention. In several Sharma and Dreze (1990). a result, areas with no observation wells districts of north Gujarat, the propensity 48 This is not to say that co-operation cannot have been left blank in (he maps. of farmers to invest in water extraction be brought about through long-term social 24 Agarwal and Narain (1987). mechanisms has indeed been reinforced by action. A living example is provided by 25 For a more detailed discussion, see Agar- (he diversion of surface water resources to Shramjivi Samaj in Bhiloda taluka, a trade wal and Narain (1987), p 28. See also Meher other districts. This process has been par- union of landless and marginal fanners who Homji (1988). ticularly noticeable in Sabarkamha. Surface organised themselves more than a decade 26 Government of Gujarat (1984), Gujarat water has been taken away from this district ago in a major struggle for land. Today, Agriculture. Compendium (Directorate (through medium and major irrigation pro- 1,334 acres of land that have been acquired of Agriculture Ahmedabad). The figures jects such as Hathmathi, Meshvo, Guhai through this struggle are being cultivated on are originally obtained from (he forest and Dharoi), not for the drought-prone a collective basis by eight agricultural co- department. Government of Gujarat. These neighbouring districts of Banaskantha or operative societies. The activities of these misleading figures are due (o the simplistic Panchmahals, but to satisfy the industrial societies have included co-operative con- reporting system in the forest departments, and domestic water needs of cities like struction of wells and acquisition of energis- which describes the forest wealth in terms Ahmedabad and Gandhinagar, as well as ed water extraction devices. not of tree cover but of the extent of the for the development of irrigation in the 49 The depth of most of these bores was bet- areas which stand notified under one sec- richer district of Kheda. These diversions ween 200 and 250 ft. All except two were tion or another of the Indian Forest Act take place in violation of the riparian rights owned by farmers belonging to the 'higher' 1927, regardless of whether these areas of the inhabitants of the supplying districts, castes. possess any tree cover or not. Moreover, as who suffer from drinking water shortages 50 Concerning the issue of government inter- Vohra (1989) rightly points out, "there is a as well as from inadequate irrigation vention, it should be mentioned that, at the tendency on the part of the forestry esta- facilities (refer, for instance, to the high time when the survey was conducted (April- blishment to take shelter behind these court case lodged by Gujarat Lok Samiti May 1988), there was much discussion misleading figures". on riparian rights from the Dantiwada dam about a proposed government regulation 27 These NRSA-based figures are taken from in Banaskantha). aimed at controlling the construction of The Slate of India's Environment 1984-83, 35 See also Dakshinamurti el al (1973: 104). bores exceeding a depth of 45 m. The Centre for Science and Environment, New 36 As will be seen in Section II, government history and present status of this regulation Oeihi. assistance in Gujarat has been heavily bias- will be further discussed in Section 111. 28 Vohra (1987). ed in favour of large fanners and invest- 51 "Can one have a right over somebody else's 29 The figures presented in Table 8 apply to ments in modem water extraction devices bore or well? No!" Gujarat as a whole and hide some impor- remain unaffordable for a majority of small 52 This section has been written in collabora- tant regional variations. While the percen- and marginal farmers. Many of them also tion with Jean Dreze. tage of gross irrigated area to gross sown find the tubewells uneconomic or unviable 53 See Sengupu (1985), Bandhyopadhyay area in districts such as Kheda, Mehsana in view of the small size of their holdings. (1987), Shah (1987a. 1989), Shiva (1988), and Gandhinagar is as high as 40 to 45 per 37 For a survey of this vast debate, see e g, Agarwal and Narain (1989), Dhawan cent, it is less than 7 per cent in Dangs and Lipton (1989). (r989b, 1989c, 1991), Reddy (1989). Singh Panchmahals. 38 See e g, Hazell and Ramasamy (1991). (1991), among other recent contributions. 30 Data from individual districts such as 39 These varieties have more or less disap- 54 For a graphic description of irrigation- Sabarkamha show a particularly high in- peared today. See Government of Gujarat related corruption in India, see Wbde (1979). cidence of well irrigation. As per the (1974: 269| and Campbell (1880: 370-371). 55 According to a government resolution Sabarkamha Gazetteer (1974], in 1968-69 40 in Gujarat, only Dangs has a higher passed in 1963 (for dug wells), in order to wells accounted for as much as 95 per cent rural/urban population ratio. obtain a government loan to dig a well of of the irrigated area. 41 For a detailed discussion of this problem, a depth of less than 150 ft, a former needs 31 The expansion of modern water extraction see Drezc (1988). to observe area-specific spacing criteria devices has not, of course, been confined 42 It should be stressed that this grouping is fixed by NABARD. but no formal, cer- to Gujarat. As early as 1971, as much as 60 based on the economic prosperity of dif- tificate is required. For wells lying within per cent of groundwater lifted in India was ferent castes, and not on their ritual status the command area of a government well, extracted by modern methods (Dhawan, in the traditional caste hierarchy. Economic a No Objection Certificate1 (NOC) is 1975: A-35). After 1971, the rate of expan- and ritual status are, of course, often closely needed in order to obtain an electricity con- sion of tubewell irrigation has increased related. But insofar as they diverge, our in- nection; however, recent regulations

A-L66 Economic and Political Weekly December 19-26. 1992 stipulate that, if a farmer does not receive December 23, 1976, p 279. ty. On the opportunities that the Employ- a reply within 30 days of applying for a 67 Ibid, p 280. ment Guarantee Scheme of Maharashtra NOC, the application can automatically be 68 According to the Indian Constitution has opened for concerted action by the rural considered granted! (Article 250), a law made by the parliament poor, see Omvedt and Rao [1988]. 56 In Mehsana, for instance, a government at a lime when an Emergency is proclaim- 79 For a strong defence of this view, see Agar- resolution of 1973 distinguished between ed ceases to have effect on the expiration of wal and Narain [1989]. three zones: zone A, with a minimal a period of six months after the Emergency 80 The scope for promoting voluntary conser- distance between wells of 5,000 ft; zone B, proclamation applies. This period elapsed vation seems to be greater in communities with a minimal distance of 7,000 ft; and before the state legislature in Gujarat could which are relatively equal and homo- zone C, where tubewell construction was consider and approve the rules necessary to geneous, as is often the case in tribal com- barred. However, the last two categories carry out the provisions of the amendment munities. For an interest Wig-example, see have recently been abolished. Similarly, in (these rules, in fact, were not even prepared Swamy +1991 1. several districts (including Mehsana) the for consideration by the slate legislature). 81 The factual basis of this section draws heavi- regulation of 1967 has been relaxed for 'co- 69 This is evident from a number of newspaper ly on Iyer 11975:155-68], Ratanial and Dhira- operatives of members belonging (o reports which appeared in that year. See jlal (1987:311-22], Ballabh and Shah [1989], economically and socially backward castes'. especially 'Spare Groundwater. State Told' Chandrakanth |I989|. and Jacob [1989]. 57 Information obtained from a cyclostyled (77i

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