Surviving Secondary Screening at Airports While Maintaining Cover

CIA Assessment on Surviving Secondary Screening at Airports While Maintaining Cover

WikiLeaks release: December 21, 2014

Keywords: CIA, airport, screening, passport, visa, Schengen, EU, customs, security, border, Hungary, Bahrain, Mauritius, Bulgaria, Japan, Russia, Chile, Czech, Zambia, Pakistan, South Africa, Venezuela, Mexico, Kurdish, Turkish, Iraq, Israel, Egypt, Syria Restraint: SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN (originator controlled)/(no foreign nationals) Title: Surviving Secondary: An Identity Threat Assessment of Secondary Screening Procedures at International Airports Date: September 2011 Organisation: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Author: CHECKPOINT Identity and Travel Intelligence Program, from the Identity Intelligence Center (i2c) within the Directorate of Science and Technology Link: http://wikileaks.org/cia-travel Pages: 14 Description This is a secret document produced by the CIA's CHECKPOINT Identity and Travel Intelligence Program to explain and advise CIA operatives on how to deal with secondary screening at airports, as they travel to and from covert CIA operations using false ID, including into and out of Europe. The document details specific examples of operatives being stopped under secondary screening at various ariports around the world; how and why the person was stopped and offers advice on how to deal with such circumstances and minimise the risks if stopped to continue maintaining cover. The document was created for distribution within the organisation and other officials who hold appropriate clearances at Executive Branch Departments/Agencies of the US Government. The document's overarching predominant advice is to maintain cover, "no matter what". SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN

CL BY: 2313665 CL REASON: 1.4(c), (d) DECL ON: 20360926 DRV FROM: LIA s-06, Multiple Sources

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Introduction (U)

Secondary screening—a potentially lengthy and detailed look by airport officials at passengers not passing initial scrutiny—can significantly stress the identities of operational travelers. Border-control officers at international airports use primary screening to quickly evaluate arriving passengers and identify those that may not be admissible, such as illegal immigrants, narcotics traffickers and other criminals, terrorists, or intelligence officers. For countries with authoritarian regimes, airport officials may also want to deny entry to foreign political activists or nongovernmental organization (NGO) officials. Security or customs inspectors can refer travelers to secondary when they find weapons, drugs, or other contraband on their persons or in their baggage. (C//NF)

Referral to secondary screening can occur if irregularities or questions arise during any stage of airport processing—immigration, customs, or security—and regardless of whether the traveler is arriving, in transit, or departing. Officials may also randomly select travelers. The resulting secondary screening can involve in-depth and lengthy questioning, intrusive searches of personal belongings, cross-checks against external databases, and collection of biometrics—all of which focus significant scrutiny on an operational traveler. (S//NF)

This study examines triggers for secondary selection used at various international airports, the range of subsequent scrutiny of identity, and traveler responses that are most likely to pass secondary inspection with cover intact. For the study, CHECKPOINT researched available all-source intelligence reporting but also incorporated a number of secondary screening experiences from operational travelers. The information cut-off date is 31 May 2010. (S//NF)

NOTE: Although the information available is sufficient to provide general insights into the secondary screening criteria and procedures that travelers may experience at foreign airports, it is insufficiently detailed, comprehensive, and timely to provide tactical intelligence for operational travelers using nonofficial cover. Moreover, the examples cited in the study illustrate the range of potential experiences but do not evaluate specific airports. (S//NF)

This finished intelligence product contains reporting that carries the ORCON dissemination control but has been pre-approved by the originator for distribution to officials who hold appropriate clearances at Executive Branch Departments/Agencies of the US Government. Sharing this product with other Executive Branch Departments/Agencies of the US Government does not require contacting CHECKPOINT or reporting originators before dissemination. Recipients must obtain originator approval prior to written or verbal communication of any portion of this product to State, Local, Tribal, and Private Entities and for all other uses not pre-approved by the originator. (U//FOUO)

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Pre-Arrival Screening information. Countries requiring advance passenger information include Australia, Although selection for secondary Canada, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, India, screening frequently occurs while Japan, Mexico, South Korea, South Africa, travelers are at the airport answering Spain, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen, the questions from immigration officers, United Kingdom, and the United States. PNR authorities may also preselect passengers information comes from airline reservation because of some flags in their visa systems and contains personal information applications or airline records. Many countries issue visas upon arrival, however, such as credit card number, e-mail address, nearly 50 countries require US tourist- and seating preference. (U) passport holders to submit visa applications Security services lacking APIS or PNR before travel. For holders of US diplomatic information may have other arrangements to or official passports, the number of countries receive passenger manifests ahead of time. requiring visas before arrival rises to over For example, the Airport Police Intelligence 120. Security and intelligence services Brigade (BIPA) of the Chilean Investigative participating in vetting visa applications, either Police does not routinely obtain advance comprehensively or on an ad hoc basis, passenger manifests but can request the include those of Georgia, Libya, Pakistan, information from airlines on an ad hoc basis Russia, Syria, and Uzbekistan. (S//OC/NF) to search for targets of interest. Strict privacy laws covering Danish citizens extend to all Available reporting does not detail the passengers traveling through Copenhagen criteria with which security services airport such that the Danish Police screen visa applications, but confirmed Intelligence Service (PET) cannot legally or suspected government or military obtain routine access to flight manifests. affiliation almost certainly raises the However, if one of PET’s four cooperative traveler’s profile. Applications can be extensive to assist with the vetting process for airline contacts is on duty, the service can immigration authorities and the intelligence unofficially request a search on a specific and security services. For example, Russia’s name, according to August 2007 liaison visa application form requires employer name, reporting. (S//OC/NF) address, telephone number, supervisor’s Airport Primary Screening full name, and applicant’s position for the current and past two places of employment. In primary inspections, immigration inspectors The application also requires military dates examine passports and visas, if visas are of service, rank, occupation, specialized required, for validity and authenticity and to skills; experience with nuclear, biological, or verify individuals’ identities. They frequently chemical activities; and all professional, civil, query watch lists or other databases for and charitable organizations of which the immigration violations, criminal records, or applicant is or was a member, contributed to, national security concerns and ask basic or worked with. (S//OC/NF) questions pertinent to admissibility. The entire process usually lasts no more than a few Immigration officials may also receive minutes to enable airports to keep up with the advance information on arriving passengers flow of incoming travelers. If there is a watch- from airlines through an advance passenger list match or inspectors decide that travel information system (APIS) or passenger documents are suspect or have some reason name records (PNRs). APIS information, to doubt a passenger’s stated reason for which enables an advance check against travel, they refer the passenger to secondary watch lists, includes passenger name, date screening. Officials at US airports on average of birth, sex, passport details, and contact

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Secondary send about one in 30 foreign tourists and Watch-list Hit business travelers to secondary although Border-control officials in many countries particular airports may impose higher use watch lists—national, regional, and percentages for certain groups. For example, international—to screen travelers. For US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) example, the Schengen Information System agents in 2007 imposed secondary screening (SIS), an EU-wide database, contains one on 20 percent of Cubans arriving at Miami million alerts on persons wanted by the police, International Airport. Available reporting does subject to entry bans, or missing. Most SIS not indicate secondary selection percentages entries deal with other immigration issues for foreign airports. (U) such as visa denials or expulsions, and only 2.5 percent are criminal-related. Elsewhere, With the exception of Israel’s Ben Gurion the watch list focus may be different. For airport and a few others, immigration example, the overwhelming majority of names inspectors conducting primary screenings on the Directorate General for Immigration generally lack the time and tools to conduct (DGI) watch list at Soekarno-Hatta in-depth examination of travelers’ bona fides. International Airport in Jakarta, Indonesia, are EU norms stipulate that passport checks nationals suspected of corruption or financial take no longer than 20 seconds per traveler. crimes. (S//OC/NF) Dutch Royal Military Police (KMAR) officers at Schiphol Airport in Amsterdam are under instruction to spend no more than 10 seconds Good Preparation Is Key (U) evaluating each passport although few Travelers can minimize the possibility of sec- officers achieve this speed, according to July ondary by knowing how to prepare for and 2009 liaison reporting. (S//OC/NF) navigate the primary inspection and by avoiding to the extent possible the various triggers for Triggers for Secondary Screening secondary. (S//OC/NF) Referral to secondary screening can occur Watch lists maintained by security services for concrete reasons, such as a watch- can also include names of confirmed or list match or discovery of contraband, suspected intelligence officers, according to because of random selection, or because reporting from several clandestine sources the inspector suspects that something about and the US Embassy in Dushanbe. the traveler is not right. According to the CBP, inconsistencies or conflicts identified • Austria’s Federal Office for the Protection in the interview or documentation, including of the Constitution and Counterterrorism catching the person in a false statement, (BVT) and Singapore’s Internal Security unreasonable explanation for travel, or Department (ISD) list Russian intelligence anomalies in ticketing or reservations will officers. prompt a referral to secondary screening. Travelers from specific countries arriving at • Colombia’s Administrative Department international airports are more likely to receive of Security (DAS) lists Iranian and heightened scrutiny, and referral to secondary Venezuelan intelligence officers. screening, than other travelers. Behavior, dress, and demeanor also factor into an • Tajikistan’s State Committee for National inspector’s decision. However, no traveler is Security (GKNB) lists intelligence officers immune from the possibility of secondary— belonging to unidentified Western many foreign airports have an administrative countries. (S//OC/NF) requirement for a minimum number of random Available reporting does not confirm the selections. (U) presence of names of suspected or confirmed

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US intelligence officers on foreign watch traveling to Turkey. Possession of three lists; however, this probably should be passports––Iranian, Israeli, and Italian–– assumed. Hostile and probably even allied prompted the apprehension in Frankfurt in services seek to identify US and other foreign January 2008 of an Iranian citizen. Inspectors intelligence officers. (S//NF) at Baghdad International Airport specifically look for appropriate customs and immigration Discovery of Contraband stamps to ensure travelers are not using Security and customs officials have wide multiple passports. (S//OC/NF) latitude to search passengers and their checked and carry-on baggage for weapons, Immigration inspectors may look for evidence drugs, and contraband. Although drugs are of fraud even with e-passports. Media a common target of customs inspectors, reports indicate that computer researchers the definition of contraband is country- have inserted fraudulent digital images into dependent. For example, travelers at Imam e-passports. Although falsified e-passports Khomeini Airport in Tehran, Iran, found with will not have the correct digital signature, videos or photographs of protests or other inspectors may not detect the fraud if the opposition activity are directed to a secondary passports are from countries that do not questioning room where they undergo full participate in the International Civil Aviation searches of laptop computers and other Organization’s Public Key Directory (ICAO electronics. Bahrain International Airport PKD). Only 15 of over 60 e-passport-issuing security officials refer to secondary screening countries belong to the PKD program, as of travelers carrying unusual electronic December 2010. (U) equipment. (S//OC/NF) Suspicious Signs Passport Irregularity Problems with passports, the main travel Airport inspectors can also refer to secondary document worldwide, are a frequent cause of screening individuals who arouse suspicion referral to secondary. Fraudulent passports, but for whom there is no substantive cause possession of multiple passports, and for denying entry. An airport screening passports containing data in conflict with visas procedures manual published for internal may prompt secondary scrutiny. Most users of use in 2004 by International Consultants on fraudulent documents seeking to enter Europe Targeted Security (ICTS) International, an are illegal migrants from poor countries. For Israeli-founded company and world leader example, the majority of counterfeit passports in profiling techniques, lists suspicious signs uncovered in Ireland are from Brazil, China, in passenger behavior, documentation, and Romania. Officials also focus on tickets, or baggage. Although dated, the ICTS fraudulent use of genuine passports. Falsified guidelines probably are typical and remain travel documents intercepted at Santiago valid. (S//NF) International Airport in Chile are usually Behavior genuine Bolivian, Colombian, and Peruvian Foreign airports use cameras and undercover passports but with counterfeit EU or US visas. officers to identify passengers displaying Illegal travelers may carry stolen passports unusually nervous behavior. Physiological and attempt to pass themselves off as the signs of nervousness include shaking or person in the photograph. (S//OC/NF) trembling hands, rapid breathing for no The Turkish National Intelligence Organization apparent reason, cold sweats, pulsating (TNIO) assesses that possession of multiple carotid arteries, a flushed face, and avoidance passports is indicative of an individual of eye contact. attempting to obscure their real reason for

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ICTS Profiling Guidelines (U) Behavior • Unusual nervousness or anxiety by passenger or those accompanying the passenger. • Secret contact with other passengers lacking apparent ties. • Appearance of lying or withholding information.

Passport • Lack of familiarity with passport entries (biographic page, previous travel). • Stamps or visas from a terrorism-sponsoring country. • Inability to speak the language of the passport-issuing country.

Ticket • Unusual itinerary. • Purchase manner unusual to the place of issue. • Purchase or itinerary change within 24 hours of the scheduled flight.

Baggage • Baggage or contents inconsistent with the passenger’s appearance, profession, or ticket class. • Contents inconsistent with passenger’s description of contents. • Amount of baggage unusual for the ticketed itinerary. (S//OC/NF)

Source: ICTS International NV CSA Tasks, Nov 04, Confidential Proprietary

• At Budapest’s Ferihegy Airport in signs of nervousness or other suspicious Hungary, security officers use closed- behavior. (S//OC/NF) circuit television (CCTV) and one-way mirrors to monitor passengers for signs of Suspicious behavior includes continuously nervousness. switching lines or studying security procedures. Officials at Abidjan International • The Bahrain National Security Agency Airport in Cote d’Ivoire noticed a male (BNSA) deploys undercover officers in passenger frequently switching lines to the arrivals lounge of Bahrain Airport to avoid processing at a particular booth and actively look for travelers who appear to referred the traveler to secondary screening. be nervous. If officials at Narita Airport in Tokyo, Japan, notice someone who appears to be studying • Officers of the National Security Service the customs inspection process, they assume (NSS) in Mauritius use video cameras to that someone in that group of passengers observe arriving passengers as they exit must be attempting to smuggle drugs or other the aircraft and retrieve their baggage, contraband and intensify their inspection zooming on individuals’ faces to study efforts. (S//OC/NF) their expressions. Country of Origin • During passenger arrival procedures at Immigration and customs officials at various Burgas International Airport in Bulgaria, airports associate specific countries with multiple border police officials, including at illegal immigration, terrorism, or drugs and least one officer behind the passengers at are more likely to refer those travelers to passport control, monitor passengers for secondary screening. (U)

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Travel Pattern secondary interviews. Zambian immigration A travel history that indicates possible officers suspect that a pattern of short-stint association with narcotrafficking, Islamic trips between Zambia, Pakistan, and extremism, or illegal immigration can prompt a South Africa indicates possible drug referral to secondary. A review of clandestine smuggling. (S//OC/NF) reporting reveals examples of what various countries consider to be suspicious. The Ticket and Baggage Chilean Investigative Police (PICH) considers Ticket purchase anomalies can result in travel originating in East Asia with multiple a referral to secondary. Czech Airlines stops as potentially suspicious. The Gambian (CSA), the primary screening authority for National Intelligence Agency (NIA) considers passengers departing Ruzyne Airport in frequent travel to Nigeria and Guinea-Bissau Prague focus on reservation details such as as suspicious. Israel’s security personnel cash payment, ticket purchased at the airport focus on frequent travel to Islamic countries. or on the travel date or the day before, one- Venezuela’s Office of National Identification way travel, and lack of checked baggage. For and Foreign Status (ONIDEX) flags foreign example, CSA preselected a Nigerian national travelers who travel to Venezuela five or with one-way ticket and no checked baggage more times a month for subsequent in July 2009 for secondary screening,

Area of Airport Travelers’ Countries of Origin Concern

Western Africa; portions of Eastern Europe; Portela International Airport, former Portuguese colonies of Angola, Brazil, Lisbon, Portugal Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique Illegal Simon Bolivar Airport, Immigration Cuba Caracas, Venezuela

Soekarno-Hatta International Afghanistan and Iran Airport, Jakarta, Indonesia

Eleftherios Venizelos Airport, Egypt, Iran, and Iraq Athens, Greece

Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Iraq, Iran, Terrorism Phnom Penh, Cambodia Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Sri Lanka

Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Yemen, and the Saudi Arabia (various) Palestinian territories

Eleftherios Venizelos Airport, Afghanistan, India, the Netherlands, and Athens, Greece Pakistan Drug Narita Airport, Tokyo, Japan Amsterdam and Bangkok Trafficking Seychelles Airport, Victoria, Nigeria Seychelles This table is SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN.

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Secondary according to a Czech Airlines official. The • Camera quality not matching the traveler’s South African Immigration Liaison (SAIL) team profile or camera memory card insufficient at Johannesburg airport examines departing for a lengthy tourist trip. (S//OC/NF) travelers for one-way tickets, same-day ticket purchase, ignorance of final destination, Other Factors or travel rationales that do not appear to A review of clandestine reports suggests be bona fide, the US Embassy in Pretoria that a passenger’s language capability, age, reported. A Dutch Government investigation appearance, or background may all factor of the failed 2009 Christmas Day bombing into a security official’s decision to refer the concluded that the suspect should have been traveler to secondary. sent to secondary screening because of his • In an operation to screen for Hizballah cash ticket payment, ticket issuance in a third members traveling from Venezuela, the country, and lack of baggage. (S//OC/NF) Mexican Center for Investigation and April 2007 reporting resulting from a liaison National Security (CISEN) planned to take exchange with the Hungarian Special Service into secondary screening Venezuelan for National Security (SSNS) provides passport holders without a mastery of insights into factors considered by officers at Spanish. Ferihegy airport in Budapest, Hungary when • To identify operatives or sympathizers examining tickets. Officers check whether of the Kongra Gel (KGK, formerly PKK), the traveler used a business-class ticket for Kurdish passengers with a Turkish or tourist travel, whether the ticket fare code Iranian accent arriving at Irbil airport in represents a government or military discount, Iraq are automatically sent to secondary. or whether a government travel agency booked the ticket. Hotel and car reservations • Security personnel at Ben Gurion are similarly examined for unusual discounts Airport in Tel Aviv, Israel, commonly or government affiliation. (S//OC/NF) refer military-aged males traveling alone with backpacks to secondary screening, An unexplained lack of baggage probably regardless of their nationality or skin color. would raise suspicions. SSNS officers conducting baggage inspection at Ferihegy • Salvadoran security services identified airport may also further investigate a a suspected Venezuelan Government passenger if they found: courier on the basis of a military style haircut, physical fitness, casual dress, and • An amount of baggage inappropriate for little baggage. the length of stay • Japanese customs officials pay careful • Multiple new items, such as alarm clocks attention to single travelers, especially or notebooks, in baggage. young Westerners, because they may be • Carelessly packed baggage when drug couriers. passenger is purportedly an experienced • Chilean Investigative Police (PICH) business traveler. officers pay close attention to male • Unopened and unmarked maps, travelers from China, particularly those guidebooks, or other literature. Maps of between the ages of 16 to 28 because of unrelated cities in baggage for a purported illegal immigration concerns. tourist traveler. • Egyptian security officials at Cairo airport regularly select visitors of certain ethnic

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or work backgrounds for secondary undergo a wait, inspectors conduct “soft” or questioning to ascertain the nature of “hard” secondary processing. Soft secondary, their business. US-Arabs, particularly which is usually brief, is normally directed at US-Egyptians, garner a high amount of legitimate travelers who require additional scrutiny. Other backgrounds attracting processing, such as travelers arriving with increased scrutiny include Christian- immigrant visas. Inspectors most likely Arabs or Jews, human rights or other conduct additional database checks on the humanitarian workers, and individuals with travelers’ names, dates and places of birth, advanced scientific degrees. (S//OC/NF) and passport numbers and may search the travelers’ personal belongings and baggage. Random Selection Failure to pass soft secondary or suspicion Even if operational travelers do everything on the part of the inspector that criminality correctly, the possibility remains that is involved will invoke hard secondary. In airport officials will select them for extreme cases, hard secondary screening can secondary screening. The Department of involve a multi-hour, in-depth interrogation Homeland Security (DHS) estimates that with forensics-level examination of personal about 12 percent of US-bound passengers electronics, detailed inspection of personal are randomly selected for additional screening effects, and use of external databases to at overseas airports. Random selection corroborate traveler stories. (S//OC/NF) is a significant component of the security measures employed by the US Transportation Airport authorities generally use their most Security Administration (TSA). (U) experienced inspectors or intelligence personnel to conduct secondary inspections. Airport officials may also randomly select For example, a small cadre of experienced travelers for the purpose of extorting bribes. interviewers from the Police Intelligence April 2010 clandestine reporting from a source Prefecture of the Chilean Investigative Police with secondhand access indicates that the conducts secondary inspection at Santiago manager of the Mogadishu International Airport in Somalia made a habit of selecting Secondary Screening in Syria (U) at least one passenger from each flight for secondary inspection, accusing the A Syrian airport officer removed a US businessman from the immigration line at passenger of illegal activity, and forcing the Aleppo International Airport and questioned the passenger to pay a bribe for release. Although businessman in secondary for approximately official passport holders at Chittagong airport one hour. The officer explained the need to in Bangladesh receive expedited processing obtain additional information as standard and minimal scrutiny, tourist-passport procedure for all US citizens. Although holders are frequently subject to secondary other officials examined the businessman’s questioning lasting an hour until a $50 bribe is passport and mobile telephone, the airport paid. (S//OC/NF) officer questioned the businessman on his Arabic-language proficiency, reason for Secondary Screening traveling to Syria, identities of those with whom the businessman planned to meet, The combination of procedures available the businessman’s employment with an in secondary, a stressful experience emphasis on whether he was an employee for any traveler, may pose a significant or owner, where the US passport was issued, and whether someone was meeting the strain on an operational traveler’s ability businessman at the airport. Syrian officials also Individuals singled to maintain cover. demanded that the businessman telephone his out during primary inspection are sent to Syrian point of contact and asked the contact a secondary holding area. After travelers the same questions. (S//OC/NF)

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International Airport. Some officers have of access to their embassy or to other specific regional and cultural knowledge, outside assistance. (S//OC/NF) particularly on Peru and Bolivia, which they can bring to bear in verifying interviewees’ Lengthy secondary interrogation provides bona fides. At the Sri Lanka airport, only time for security officials to verify or refute the Sri Lankan Immigration and Emigration the traveler’s story and raises the pressure Department’s chief immigration officer and the on passengers attempting to hide illegal duty officer manager can conduct secondary behavior. Officers can use the time to interviews. Directorate for Border Security and consult external sources, collect additional Immigration (Direction des Frontieres et des information, and conduct an in-depth search Etrangers, DEF) officers from the intelligence of passengers and their baggage. (S//NF) unit, not regular immigration officers, staff Verification of Travelers’ Stories secondary interrogation areas at Tunisian As part of their investigation of travelers, airports. (S//OC/NF) officials can telephone their contacts. At Inspectors focus on body language during Ambouli airport in Djibouti, the senior questioning. The Hungarian National Security immigration officer’s secondary investigation Office (NSO) officers conducting secondary of a suspect traveler included telephoning screening at Budapest’s Ferihegy Airport the traveler’s sponsor. Officials at the read the body language, behavior, and Tripoli airport scrutinized 21 males with a mannerisms of those being interrogated specific given name who entered Libya from to conclude if they are lying or withholding Tunisia, making telephone calls to verify their information. During interrogations, officers information. (S//OC/NF) question travelers on their travel reasons and Officials can also access national and arrangements to see if they appear plausible. international databases and the Internet. They also examine baggage, tickets, and Immigration databases at many ports reservations. The Chilean Investigative Police of entry allow border officials to retrieve trains its secondary interviewers to look for previous travel to the country as part of nonverbal cues during interviews in addition their investigation. For example, Brazilian to evaluating general appearance, clothing, Federal Police (DPF) officers conducting and carry-on effects. If travelers at Irbil airport secondary screenings at Guarulhos Airport in Iraq are deemed evasive, screeners return in Sao Paulo can access travelers’ travel them to their city of origin. (S//OC/NF) histories. Chilean Investigative Police (PICH) Travelers can legally be held in secondary inspectors conducting secondary screenings screening for hours, if not longer. Officials conduct real-time searches of Interpol can detain travelers in secondary screening records by name, date of birth, or passport at the Tbilisi International Airport in Georgia number. Estonian Border Guard Service for up to three hours. Turkey can hold (BGS) officers access the Internet to locate foreigners in secondary screenings for up hotels, conferences, or companies identified to 24 hours. Indian authorities in January by passengers to confirm or discredit their 2011 held a Chinese national at New Delhi story. Internet access also allows airport airport for 36 hours, according to media security officials to examine travelers’ social reporting. The Brazilian Federal Police and business network accounts to confirm (DPF) can detain travelers at Sao Paulo’s that their Web presence corresponds with Guarulhos International Airport for up to 48 their persona. For example, Foursquare and hours. Travelers undergoing secondary Linked-In are business equivalents to the inspection most likely have no right Facebook social network. Security officials might also expect a sales or marketing

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Secondary traveler to have a Twitter account. The working to obtain fingerprint readers for use absence of such business-related Web in secondary with repatriated deportees and accounts probably would raise a business other travelers of interest, primarily those traveler’s profile with officials. (S//OC/NF) suspected of association with organized crime or Central American gangs. (S//OC/NF) Collection of Additional Data Officials can collect additional biographic or In-depth Search of Belongings travel data to flesh out the traveler’s story. Customs officials conducting secondary In July 2009, airport officials in Shiraz, Iran, screening at Narita Airport in Tokyo, Japan, used a screening questionnaire in secondary may ask individuals to remove all items screening to collect detailed information on from their accompanying baggage for US-Iranians holding dual nationality. An officer closer examination. Secondary screening verbally translated the questionnaire for the by immigration officials at Bole International non-Farsi speaking travelers, transcribing Airport in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia includes an the responses in Farsi onto the questionnaire. examination of pocket litter. (S//OC/NF) Required information included name, date and place of birth, current address, length Inspections can include examining belongings of time living there, other addresses, places for traces of explosives. At Ben Gurion traveled, telephone number, reason for living airport in Israel, the secondary screening in the United States, occupation, reason room contains trace-detection equipment for visiting Iran, field of study (for students), for explosive residue; tools for dismantling address in Iran, name and telephone number passengers’ personal items for inspection, of host, the host’s relation to the traveler, particularly items unfamiliar to security and other areas to be visited. Tehran airport officers; and a disrobing area, divided by security personnel also request that visiting privacy curtains, to conduct strip searches of US-Iranians log into their personal e-mail individuals, if necessary. (S//NF) accounts and the officers then review Officials can copy or confiscate a traveler’s the contacts and types of e-mails in the personal electronics. Ireland’s Garda can accounts. (S//NF) image or copy electronic devices, including Officials can collect fingerprints or other telephones, once individuals are taken into biometrics, and determine if the passenger secondary screening. Russian customs has a past record. In secondary inspection agents at Sheremetyevo airport in Moscow at Singapore airport, officials fingerprint and confiscated without explanation a laptop photograph suspect individuals and run computer, thumb drive, and removable hard queries against the Biometrics Database for drive belonging to a Department of Energy Immigration Clearance (BDIC). The database official. (S//OC/NF) contains 10 fingerprints for previously deported expellees and other criminals. In addition to using fingerprints to identify immigration offenders who attempt to re-enter Singapore using different identities, in early Personal Electronics (U) 2009, the BDIC system also incorporated Smart phones, iPods, and MP3 players, can face-recognition capabilities to allow pose a vulnerability to alias travel because of Singapore Immigration and Customs Agency their requirement for subscriptions. If border- (ICA) officers to match travelers against control officials can establish a link between photographic images of black-listed persons. the device and the traveler’s true name, According to August 2009 clandestine this could present a difficulty for someone traveling in alias. (S//OC/NF) reporting, the Salvadoran Government is

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Dealing with Secondary • Exhibit psychosomatic behavior such as swallowing, lip biting, perspiring, deep Consistent, well-rehearsed, and plausible breathing, frequent clothing adjustments, cover is important for avoiding secondary or lint picking. selection and critical for surviving it. A frequent operational CIA traveler to Asia • Qualify sentence meanings with words and Europe advises that the most effective like “typically,” “normally,” “often,” “maybe,” prevention of secondary is to have simple and or “almost” or phrases like “to be honest,” plausible answers to the two most frequently “the truth is,” or “swear to God.” asked questions, “Why are you here,” and “Where are you staying.” Travelers should • Provide overly specific responses. (U) also ensure before traveling that everything Travelers who avoid providing that officials can use to examine their bona unnecessary details probably shorten fides—passports, travel history, baggage, secondary interviews. May 2009 FBI personal electronics, pocket litter, hotel reporting indicates that a Chinese network reservations, Web presence—is consistent security company advises its employees in with their covers. (S//OC/NF) secondary to avoid appearing nervous, Mental preparation almost certainly helps keep answers simple, and not volunteer travelers pass secondary scrutiny. Although additional information, such as details on US a certain degree of nervousness is expected, contacts. (S//NF) persistent indications of deceptive behavior will almost certainly extend the secondary interview. According to a financial forensics expert in the commercial sector, deceptive persons:

• Allow a significant pause between a question and the response, or use delaying sounds, like “ah” or “um.”

The Importance of Maintaining Cover––No Matter What (S//NF) Even when the traveler does everything right, the best protection during secondary screening is to be well-prepared with a cover story, according to an experienced CIA traveler. In one incident during transit of a European airport in the early morning, security officials selected a CIA officer for secondary screening. Although the officials gave no reason, overly casual dress inconsistent with being a diplomatic-passport holder may have prompted the referral. When officials swiped the officer’s bag for traces of explosives, it tested positive, despite the officer’s extensive precautions. In response to questioning, the CIA officer gave the cover story that he had been in counterterrorism training in Washington, DC. Although language difficulties led the local security officials to conclude that the traveler was being evasive and had trained in a terrorist camp, the CIA officer consistently maintained his cover story. Eventually, the security officials allowed him to rebook his flight and continue on his way. (S//OC/NF)

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