Document of The World Bank
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Public Disclosure Authorized Report No. 16179
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT
CHINA Public Disclosure Authorized
JIANGXI PROVINCIAL HIGHWAY PROJECT
(CREDIT 1984-CHA) Public Disclosure Authorized
December 20. 1996 FILE;COPY] Infrastructure Operations Division Public Disclosure Authorized China and Mongolia Department East Asia and Pacific Regional Office
This document has a restricted distributionand may be used by recipients only in the perfonnanceof their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
Currency Unit= Yuan (Y) 1987 (appraisal) $1 = Y 3.72 1988 $1 =Y 3.72 1989 $1 = Y 3.76 1990 $1 = Y 4.78 1991 $1 = Y 5.32 1992 $1 = Y 5.53 1993 $1=Y5.76 1994 $1 = Y 8.60 1995 $1 = Y 8.50
FISCAL YEAR
January 1 - December 31
WEIGHTS AND MEASURES
I meter (m) = 3.28 feet (ft) (km) 2 0.62 mile (mi) I kilometer 2 1 square meter (m2) = 10.76 square feet (ft ) I square kilometer (km = 0.4 square miles (mi) I hectare (ha) = 0.01 km = 2.47 acr5s (ac) = 15 mu I mu = 666.7 m = 0.0667 ha I kilogram (kg) = 2.2046 pounds (lbs) I metric ton (mt) = 2,204 pounds (lbs) ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
8FYP - Eighth Five-Year Plan 9FYP - Ninth Five-Year Plan ADT - Average Daily Traffic DF - Diversion Factor ERR - Economic Rate of Return HPDI - Highway Planning and Design Institute ICB - International Competitive Bidding ICR - Implementation Completion Report MOC - Ministry of Communications JPHAB - Jiangxi Provincial Highway Administration Bureau JPHCHAB - Jiangxi Provincial High-Class Highway Administration Bureau JPTD - Jiangxi Provincial Transport Department NBC Nanchang Bridge Complex NJH - Nanchang-Jiujiang Highway NPV - Net Present Value NURCB - Nanchang Urban Rural Construction Bureau PMS - Pavement Management System RDB - Road Data Bank SAR - Staff Appraisal Report TOR - Terms of Reference VOC - Vehicle Operating Cost VPD - Vehicle per Day
Vice President (Acting) Marianne Haug, EAP Director Nicholas C. Hope, EA2 Division Chief Richard Scurfield, EA2IN Staff Member Otto Raggambi, Consultant, EA2IN FOROFFICLAL USE ONLY
*~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~W-1-
CONTENTS
PREFACE ...... v EVALUATION SUMMARY ...... , vii PART I: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT .. 1 A. Project Objectives and Description . . B. Achievement of Project Objectives . . 2 C. Implementation Record and Major Factors Affe,cting the Project .. 18 D. Project Sustainability .. 19 E. Bank Performance .. 20 F. Borrower Performance .. 24 G. Assessment of Outcome .. 25 H. Future Operation .. 27 I. Key Lessons Learned.27 PART II: STATISTICAL TABLES .30 Table 1: Summary of Assessments.30 Table 2: Related Bank Loans/Credits .31 Table 3: Project Timetable .32 Table 4: Credit Disbursements: Cumulative Estimated and Actual. 33 Table 5: Key Indicators for Project Implementation ...... 33 Table 6: Key Indicators for Project Operation ...... ,.34 Table 7: Studies included in Project ...... 34 Table 8a: Project Costs ...... 35 Table 8b: Project Cost.36 Table 8C: Project Financing ...... 37 Table 9: Economic Costs and Benefits ...... 37 Table 10: Status of Legal Covenants .38 Table 11: Compliance with Operational Manual Statements .38 Table 12: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs .39 Table 13: Bank Resources: Missions ...... 39 ANNEX 1: ECONOMIC EVALUATION .41
ANNEX 2: BORROWER'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE ICR.65
ANNEX 3, PART 1: THE ICR MISSION'S AIDE MEIMOIRE(JPTD). 78
ANNEX 3, PART 2: THE ICR MISSION'S AIDE MEMOIRE (NURCB) .83 MAPS: 1. Transport Network-Jiangxi Province-I'BRD 20254R 2. Nanchang-Jiujiang Highway-IBRD 20267R 3. Nanchang Bridge-IBRD 20282R
This documenthas a restricteddistribution and maybe used by recipientsonly in the performanceof their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosedwiihout World Bank authorization. I
I -v
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETIOPNREPORT
CHINA
JIANGXI PROVINCIAL HIGHWAY PROJECT
(CREDIT 1984-CHA)
PREFACE
This is the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the Jiangxi Provincial Highway Project in China, for which Credit 1984-CHA, for SDR 44.7 million ($61.0 million equivalent), was approved on February 7, 1989. The last disbursement was on December 13, 1995 and the credit was closed on December 31, 1995.
The ICR was prepared by Messrs. Otto Raggambi (Consultant, Highway Engineer) and Han-Kang Yen (Research Analyst) in the Infrastructure Operations Division, China and Mongolia Department of the East Asia and Pacific Region of the World Bank, and reviewed by Messrs. Richard Scurfield, Chief, EA2IN and Yo Kimura, Project Advisor, EA2DR. The borrower's implementation evaluation summary for the project is annexed to the ICR.
Preparation of this ICR began in April 1995, and an ICR mission visited Jiangxi Province in July 1995. Further consultation was held between provincial and Bank personnel regarding the preparation of the ICR in Nanchang in April 1996. The ICR is based on discussions held in the field, materials available in the project file and additional data provided by the project executing agencies. The agencies providLedthe Bank with copies of their evaluation reports for the highway and bridge components. Also, both agencies are in the process of preparing manuals for defining the administrative, managerial and monitoring requirements for the operation of the civil works facilities of the project. t -vii -
CHINA
JIANGXI PROVINCIAL HIGHWAYePROJECT
(CREDIT 1984-CHA)
EVALUATION SUMMARY
Introduction
1. The Chinese economy, which started accelerating in the early 1980s, greatly increased road transport demand. To address the proble:m of road transport constraints, the Chinese Government decided to accord high priority to increasing road capacity on the heavily trafficked segments of the national and provincial road netwvorks. The Jiangxi Provincial Highway Project reflects this priority, comibined with the much-needed transfer of technology to provincial transport departments for design, construction and construction supervision of high-class highways, and a systematic approach to the planning and maintenance of the road network.
Project Objectives
2. The project's primary objectives were to: (a) expand road transport capacity in the Province's key transport corridor between Nanchaag, the provincial capital, and Jiujiang, an important inland port city on the Chang River; (b) provide relief to two heavily congested bridges over the Gan River in Nanchang City by constructing a third bridge in the southeastern part of the City; (c) help the Province in carrying out surveys for road condition evaluation and preparing programs for investnment decisions for improving the condition of the network; and (d) train staff and procure equipment as means of acquiring technologies.
3. The objectives reflected the physical and developmental needs of the Province's highway subsector, the Central Government's development strategy, and the Bank assistance strategy for the subsector.
Implementation Experience and Results 4. The project's key objectives, the construction of a new highway between Nanchang and Jiujiang and a major bridge in Nanchang City, were achieved, although at a higher cost than estimated. Also, according to the reevaluated economic rates of return (ERRs), they were completed with a lower but still acceptable overall yield. With the Nanchang-Jiujiang Highway (NJH), the higher-than-estimated cost of construction was compensated by higher-than-forecast traffic growth, a cornbination that yielded much the same ERR in the ICR as in the SAR estimate, i.e., about 30.0 percent. However, the higher cost and substantially lower-than-estimated traffiFc growth resulted in a much - viii - reduced but still satisfactory ERR for the Nanchang Bridge Complex (NBC)-16.6 percent versus 38.0 percent.
5. Some modifications were made to the scope of civil works, including realignment of a Connecting Road between the southern end of the NJH and the NBC, construction of additional interchanges along the route, and widening of the NJH to a four-lane divided highway, although it was originally designed as a two-lane highway. This latter modification was made by the Provincial Government, and the second two-lane carriageway was opened to traffic in early 1996, about three years later than the two-lane highway. The cost associated with the widening was locally financed. Based on an assessment made in the ICR, it would appear that the widening of the NJH was somewhat premature. Nevertheless, it is expected to bring about significant traffic operational improvements, particularly with respect to road safety. The road safety record of the two- lane highway was alarmingly poor, as reflected in the very high number of accidents during the first three years of its operation. The number of accidents is expected to be substantially reduced with the widening of the highway.
6. The execution of civil works suffered delays, both in terms of SAR schedules and the implementation periods stipulated in the contracts. This was caused by the lack of experience and resources of the contractors, adverse weather conditions and, in the case of the Nanchang Bridge, the difficulties encountered during the execution of an innovative but complex design for the main bridge structure. Despite these problems, the key objective of the project, to provide increased capacity in the heavily trafficked transport corridor between Nanchang and Jiujiang and across the Gan River in Nanchang City, was achieved.
7. The equipment acquired for the maintenance of the project's civil works was considered appropriate. The procurement of the equipment was somewhat delayed, but finally accomplished in accordance with the terms of the Development Credit Agreement.
8. The staff training program was implemented according to its original objective, but administered within the framework of a Ministry of Communications (MOC) coordinated training program. Although the cost of training remained within the estimated amount, only a relatively small number of Jiangxi Provincial Transport Department (JPTD) and Nanchang Urban and Rural Construction Bureau (NURCB) personnel participated in the program because of the high per-person cost of training. The program was designed whereby the training courses were held abroad, some combined with study tours. While it is difficult to measure the impact of the training, most of the courses were regarded as beneficial. Nevertheless, as already highlighted in the ICR for the Shaanxi Provincial Highway Project, planning, preparing and executing future training programs under Bank Group-financed highway projects will need to be prepared and executed more carefully to ensure that the programs become more effective and that a larger proportion of the staff will have the opportunity to participate in the programs. - ix -
9. The collection and processing of road condition data within the framework of the Pavement Management System (PMS) made satisfactory progress. The data output from the application of the PMS is now being used to guide (lecisions for the distribution of funds for routine and periodic maintenance of the road network. While the development of the PMS met the expectations envisaged at the time of project formulation, only minimal progress has been made on development of the Road Data Bank (RDB) program. This has also been a concern in some other provinces, despite the commitment of MOC to promote RDB development nationwide under the Eighth and Ninth Five-Year Plans [8FYP (1991-95) and 9FYP (1996-2000)].
Summary of Findings, Future Operations, and Key Lessons Learned
10. Notwithstanding the implementation difficulties, the quality deficiencies and the delays encountered in the execution of civil works, the project achieved its overall objectives. The ICR estimates of ERRs, although lower than expected at appraisal, confirm that the development objectives were achieved and the condition of the civil works facilities and the benefits emanating from the investments made, as detailed in Annex 1 of the ICR, are sustainable and are not expected to be exposed to future risks.
11. The civil works of the project, such as the NJH, the Connecting Road and the NBC, are maintainable at a satisfactory level with regular maintenance. Further, to help ensure that the infrastructure components of the project will operate efficiently, JPTD and NURCB are proceeding with the preparation of manuals for administrative, managerial and operational directives, which will also outline regular monitoring parameters for key performance indicators for the operation of the facilities. The PMS program for the highway network and the traffic monitoring system for the NBC are expected to be sustained with long-term benefits. Furthermore, the impact of technology transfer through acquisition of modern equipment and staff training should have a long-term impact on institutional development.
12. The following lessons learned are relevant to still ongoing and future Bank Group-financed highway projects in China:
(a) The engineering design deficiencies identified during the implementation of this project, and also those noted in other Bank Group-financed highway projects, have prompted the Bank to involve design experts in reviewing key elements of engineering design during its preparatory phase, in consultation with local insl:itutions responsible for the preparation of design, a measure that helped improve the quality of design.
(b) The contractor's experience and available resources were not appropriately assessed during prequalification, which resulted in implementation delays and poor workmanship. The deficiencies of the prequalification process have also been noted under other Bank Group-financed projects. Although some measures were taken in the early 1990s to tighten prequalification procedures, introducing even stricter measures by the x -
project executing agencies, the Central Government and the Bank are needed to rectify this deficiency.
(c) Construction supervision must be strengthened by accelerating the buildup of local construction supervision entities so they can play a more effective role in construction supervision. The Bank Group's supervision efforts, particularly for projects with quality deficiencies, also need to be intensified.
(d) One of the issues identified relates to the unrealistic timeframe set for the completion of highway civil works, which is not commensurate with the contractors' ability to meet deadlines without the risk of inferior workmanship. The project executing agencies, the Central Government and the Bank Group will need to be more alert to this issue.
(e) Overly optimistic traffic forecasts and high yields were presented in the SAR as a result of inadequate analysis of urban development plans and relevant traffic distribution patterns. Such deficiencies have also been noted in connection with other Bank Group-financed highway projects.
(f) The alarmingly high number of accidents on the project highway highlights the urgent need for evolving a comprehensive Road Safety Strategy for China.
(g) The staff training program, which incurred relatively high person-month cost and had limited staff participation, highlighted the need for formulating more effective training programs under future Bank-financed highway projects. IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPOWT
CHINA
JIANGXI PROVINCIAL HIGHWAY PROJECT
(CREDIT 1984-CHA)
PART I: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATIOpiASSESSMENT
A. PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND DESCRIPTION
1. In the early 1980s, the shortage of capacity for all transport modes was recognized by the Chinese Government as one of the major impediments to accelerated development of the country's economy. For road transport development, high priority was accorded to providing adequate capacity in heavily congested corridors of the national and provincial road networks under the Seventh Five-Year Plan (1986-90) and subsequent Five-Year Plans. The Bank Group supported such government objectives, as reflected in the Bank Group's lending strategy for development of the hig]hway subsector. In addition to financing road improvement components aimed at easing capacity constraints, Bank Group-financed projects have been promoting policy initiatives and have helped expedite the transfer of advanced technologies through the provision of equipment and staff training programs. Moreover, Bank Group-financed projects have also supported the provincial transport departments through introducing mrethodologies for evaluating road conditions and applying comprehensive road maintenance management systems to facilitate the improvement and upgrading of the national and provinicial road networks. Between 1985 and 1996, the Bank Group approved the financing of another 15 highway projects as listed in Part II, Table 2 of this report. A PCR was issued for the first Highway Project in August 1992, and an ICR was issued for the Shaanxi Provincial Highway Project in June 1996.
2. The project's primary objective was to provide urgently needed road traffic capacity expansion in the important transport corridor between the provincial capital of Nanchang and the inland port of Jiujiang and across the Gan River in Nanchang City. The eventual capacity constraints of the existing Nanchang-Jiujiang arterial road (145 km) and the two existing bridges crossing the Gan River were already recognized in the mid-1970s. The studies carried out concluded that, due to topographic and land use characteristics along the alignments of the existing roacdbetween Nanchang and Jiujiang and the Nanchang City street network, corridor traffic capacity could be best increased by constructing a highway between Nanchang and Jiujiang, on a new alignment (112.8 km), and a third bridge over the Gan River in Nanchang City for vehicular as well as pedestrian and bicycle traffic. In addition to addressing the alleviation of capacity constraints in this key transport corridor, the project was formulated to include policy, -2 - institutional and technology transfer objectives by focusing on road network planning, pavement strengthening, road maintenance management and staff training needs.
3. The IDA credit for the Provincial Highway Project was approved by the Association in February 1989. The scope of the project was in line with investment priorities for road network development in Jiangxi Province, and was also consistent with the Central Government's policy and the Bank Group's assistance strategy for development of the road transport subsector in China.
B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PROJECT OBJECTIVES
4. Although the objectives of the project were essentially achieved, the implementation of the project did not progress smoothly. There were implementation delays and quality deficiencies due, primarily, to the inadequate experience and resources of the contractors and, to some degree, to the limited experience of the executing agencies in administering the implementation of a large, technically demanding highway project. Furthermore, the differences between the level and distribution of traffic estimated at the time of project formulation and the actual buildup of traffic on the various segments of the project roads were substantial. Such differences, combined with a greater-than- expected increase in the cost of construction, adversely affected the estimated economic rates of return (ERRs). The reevaluated ERR for the NJH differed only marginally from that of the SAR estimate because the higher cost was compensated for by higher-than- forecast traffic volumes. However, the reestimated ERR for the NBC was substantially below SAR estimates due to the combined adverse effects of higher cost and lower-than- forecast traffic. Moreover, a major conceptual change was made to the scope of the civil works. This involved the duplication of the two-lane NJH soon after its opening to traffic in early 1993. This was well ahead of the timing envisaged for the widening at the time of the project's formulation. The duplication of the NJH had been initiated and executed by the Province using its own resources.
5. The project was implemented by two executing agencies. The Jiangxi Provincial Transport Department (JPTD) was responsible for the NJH component of the project, while the NBC was executed by the Nanchang Urban Rural Construction Bureau (NURCB) of the Nanchang Municipal Government. The IDA credit was shared about evenly between Jiangxi Province and Nanchang Municipality. The key implementation features of the project components are presented below.
Nanchang-Jiujiang Highway (NJH)
6. The new 112.8-km highway was designed to Class I highway geometric standards with respect to horizontal and vertical alignments, but only as a Class II two-lane highway in terms of formation and pavement width. The new highway, which traverses hilly terrain on a substantial length of its alignment, is 57.5 km shorter than the existing arterial road. At the time of project appraisal, the existing arterial road was identified as a low-standard road in poor condition, built to Class III, and over some of its sections, to Class IV standard. Some segments of the arterial road had excessive grades and poor -3 - horizontal alignments. During the last few years, the geometry of some sections of the road were marginally improved.
7. Conceptual Changes. During the implementation of the project, some interrelated conceptual changes were made to the original scheme of the NJH and its connection to the NBC:
(a) At the time of project appraisal, it was expected that the two-lane Class II highway, together with the existing arterial road, would provide adequate corridor capacity until 2010. However, Jiangxi Province decided to bring forward the timing for the widening of the NJH to a four-lane Class I access-controlled toll highway. The construction of the second carriageway started in 1994 and was opened to traffic in January 1996. The still outstanding works are scheduled for completion by the end of 1996.
(b) Linked to the decision outlined above, the alignment and the standard for a Connecting Road between the NJH and the NBC were modified. Instead of connecting the NJH to the existing road at Jiaoqiao and providing a 6 km two-lane link from a point farther south on the existing road to the NBC as originally planned, the connection was made to the NBC by a 12 km four-lane divided highway on a direct alignment from the southern end-point of the NJH, at Jiaoqiao, to the northwestern end of the NBC (Map 2).
(c) The NJH was extended at its northern end from Jiujiang (Shilibu) to the Chang River rail/road bridge by a 12.5 km four-lane highway, to improve interprovincial connection to Hubei Prov ince.
8. Engineering Design. The preliminary engineering and feasibility study for the highway was prepared under the guidance of JPTD by the Jiangxi Transport Planning, Survey and Design Institute with assistance from other provincial highway agencies and the Highway Planning and Design Institute (HPDI) of MOC. The design was carried out by the Second Highway Survey and Design Institute of MOC in Wuhan. The design was reviewed by a foreign consulting firm engaged under bilateral aid, which made recommendations for amending some elements of the design. I)espite a seemingly thorough preparation of the design and technical specifications, the provisions made for the treatment of shoulders, roadside drainage and slc,pe protection in an environment known for high incidence of heavy rainfalls and unstable geological conditions were inadequate. Although the deficiencies were identified and, to some extent, corrected during implementation, due to budgetary constraints and concern about delaying implementation, the measures taken only marginally mitigated the adverse effects of the design deficiencies. Consequently, the two-lane NJH, as built, is substandard in terms of shoulder and drainage treatments and slope protection. Shoulders are narrow and unsealed, roadside drainage channels were not lined over some critical sections of the -4 -
alignment to protect against erosion adequately, and slope stabilization measures were less extensive than necessary in such an unstable geological environment.
9. Implementation and Supervision. The procurement of two civil works contracts for NJH was carried out following international competitive bidding (ICB) procedures. Both contracts were awarded to the same local/foreign joint venture. The principal local contractor was a contracting unit of one of the Central Government ministries. Although the arrangement between the local and foreign firm was termed a joint venture, it was a misnomer in the conventional sense, since the foreign firm did not provide capital or other resources. It was, basically, a technical cooperation agreement in which the foreign firm mobilized a team of experienced technicians and engineers to take responsibility for the execution of asphalt-paving works only; the local contractor provided the plant, equipment and other physical resources, along with preparation of the road formation for asphalt paving. The compensation of the foreign personnel was based on person-month fees, which, together with mobilization and accommodation expenses, represented only about 4.5 percent of the contract amount.
10. Originally, the construction of the NJH was scheduled to start in June 1989 and be completed in about 35 months, by mid-May 1992. While construction started with only a one-month delay under a 36-month contract, it was completed fully only in mid-1993, in about 48 months. However, the completion of the paving works allowed the opening of the highway in mid-January 1993. The main reason for the delay was the poor performance of the principal contractor, which eventually necessitated the mobilization of work units of the Jiangxi Provincial Highway Administration Bureau (JPHAB) to undertake the construction of about 80 km of subbase and base-course works, and the laying of the pavement surface course for about a 33 km section of the highway. Because the principal contractor had no resources to undertake these works, the mobilization of JPHAB work units became necessary to ensure that the paving of the highway would be completed by the end of 1992, and that the road would be opened to traffic in early 1993. This was a deadline that was firmly set by the Provincial Government.
11. The original design, between km 31 and km 35 of the NJH, specified an embankment height through a potential floodplain section based on a 25-year flood frequency. This scheme was subsequently reviewed by authorities responsible for flood control, and it was decided to raise the elevation of the highway along this section to meet a 100-year flood frequency criterion. The additional works were undertaken by a group of local contractors engaged following local procurement procedures. Since the section of the highway was built to four-lane width, IDA-financing was restricted to half of the expenditures involved, in line with the originally approved scope for the highway.
12. The IDA-financed section (6 km), the southern half of the 12-km Connecting Road, was executed partly under contracts awarded following local bidding procedures and partly as force account works. Construction works commenced only in early 1993, about 30 months later than originally scheduled, and were fully completed in October 1994, about 30 months behind the original schedule. However, the pavement of the road, -5 - without a wearing course, was completed much earlier, which allowed the opening of the road to traffic in January 1994. The delay was caused by a change in the scope of works, i.e., building the section as a four-lane divided highway instead of a two-lane road, and also a major interchange at Changling, which originally was not contemplated. The non- IDA-financed section of the Connecting Road (northern half) was built at about the same time as the IDA-financed section. The construction of this section was carried out slightly later than the southern section, i.e., between early 1993 and July 1995, in about 28 months.
13. As attested by the progress reports submitted by the executing agency, Bank Group supervision mission reports and other documents on file, the execution of civil works for the NJH and the Connecting Road did not proceed smoothly. There were recurrent problems with the principal contractor's poor performance, primarily due to lack of experience in carrying out highway projects of sirnilar magnitude and complexity. Also, the contractor lacked adequate financial resources and eq[uipment to make satisfactory progress, and frequently failed to meet the quality requirements stipulated in the technical specifications. Furthermore, the contractor was exceedingly slow in complying with repeated requests from the Jiangxi Province, MOC and the Bank Group to mobilize additional resources to improve his organization, management and the quality of works. The contractor's headquarters also failed to provide sufficient support to its on- site unit and thus could not guarantee the timely completion of the works in compliance with the terms of the contract. Moreover, there were frequent disputes between the foreign and local partners about their respective responsibilities under the joint-venture agreement that impacted adversely on both the progress and quality of works.
14. The construction of the highway was supervised primarily by provincial technical personnel, assisted by one, and for a short period by two, foreign supervising engineers. Because of the inexperience and poor performance of the contractors, particularly in the initial phase of the project, the supervision team had difficulty in ensuring effective control over the quality of the ongoing works. Having no experience in managing contracts based on internationally accepted conditionalities, the construction supervision had to rely on newly trained staff to gradually gain adequate experience in order to apply supervision procedures appropriately. The task of construction supervision was made increasingly difficult by the excessive number of subcontractors, who were inadequately guided by the principal contractor. However, with continued on-the-job training of supervision staff, the repeated efforts to strengthen and regroup the supervision units and enforce supervision procedures, the effectiveness of' the supervision organization gradually improved.
15. Nevertheless, the extent of remedial works, which became necessary during the first three years of the operation of the highway, is a sobering indication of the high risk involved in combining inexperienced contractors (engaged in the construction of high- class highways) with partially qualified supervision personnel (handiicapped by lack of experience in similar types of assignments). Furthermore, the token presence of foreign supervisors, in this case basically one foreign supervisor for more than 100 km of -6 -
highway, was able to contribute only marginally to on-site quality control. Under the circumstances, even a relatively effective supervision team would have had difficulties in preempting the quality defects. The extent of corrective and remedial works, following the opening of the highway to traffic, has been substantial. The works included extensive resurfacing of the pavement, repairing and expanding roadside drainage facilities, and shoulder and slope protection provisions. Despite the quality deficiencies and the obvious traces of poor workmanship, the condition of the highway could be stabilized if: (a) critical remedial works are continued as deemed necessary; (b) routine and periodic maintenance works are carried out with the required frequency; and (c) emergency repair works, which will most likely emerge because of the climatic and geological conditions in the highway corridor, are undertaken as soon as deterioration is noted.
16. The decision of the Provincial Government to commence the widening of the NJH from a two-lane to a four-lane divided highway in 1994 was influenced by the alarmingly high number of accidents on the two-lane NJH. During the first 30 months of the highway's operation (January 1993-July 1995) there were 1,080 accidents, resulting in 156 fatalities and 522 personal injuries. The total number of accidents reached 1,325 by the end of 1995. There was a relatively high number of head-on collisions, which raises the risk of constructing high-speed, two-lane highways in China. The reason for the high number of accidents could primarily be the drivers' inexperience in driving at relatively high speeds on two-lane highways. However, the generally poor condition of the vehicle fleet could have been a contributing factor to a fair proportion of the accidents.
17. Environmental Protection. During the design and construction of the highway, attention was paid to environmental protection, including measures for roadside drainage and slope protection. However, due to the characteristics of the terrain and the soil along the highway, the roadside drainage systems are still deficient on several sections of the highway, and the risk of erosion and water pollution is still substantial. Wherever possible, the slopes of embankments and excavated areas have been protected by grass coverage and other vegetation. However, additional and, in some areas, repeated planting will be required before the slopes can be better stabilized and protected against erosion. Unfortunately, the property of some soils along the highway are such that the risk of erosion and slope failures cannot be entirely eliminated. The Jiangxi Provincial High- Class Highway Administration Bureau (JPHCHAB), which is responsible for the operation and maintenance of the highway, is fully aware of the deficiencies and the environmental risks involved, and a program has been prepared for carrying out the necessary improvements and maintenance works. The regular reporting of environmental protection and maintenance activities will be made according to the formats and frequencies stipulated in the administration, management and operation manual under preparation (para. 81).
18. Land Acquisition and Resettlement. Land acquisition, resettlement and compensation procedures agreed at negotiations have been substantially followed. However, the scale of the requirements have changed because of design changes and more accurate delineation of the right-of-way boundaries, which resulted in an increase in -7 - the area of land required by about 29 percent. There was also a significant increase in the number and area of affected houses and attached structures. Requirements for infrastructure relocation (power and telephone lines, roads, canals and wells) also increased over and above earlier estimates. The number of individuals affected by the highway construction more than doubled from about 2,792 to 5,938. The additional requirements, combined with the higher cost of compensation than originally envisaged, increased the overall cost of land acquisition and resettlement compensation from Y 21.2 million to Y 34.8 million.
19. The land acquisition and resettlement compensation for the Connecting Road amounted to Y 9.0 million. Although there are no estirnates on record for comparison, this relatively high cost is understandable since the road traverses partially residential and industrial development areas. Furthermore, the location of two interchanges and provisions for grade separations at the points the Connecting Road intersects local roads required the acquisition of substantial areas of partially developed land.
20. The Bank's Resettlement Review Mission visited Jiangxi in November/December 1994, and confirmed that, in general, the compensation process was executed satisfactorily, although some township and village administrations were withholding a portion of the compensation payments for the financing of public works. Moreover, there were indications that some of the people affected may not have been able to restore their standard of living immediately following the dislocation. However, such occurrences have not been frequent, and Bank Group staff were assured that the individual grievances had been followed up by the entities responsible for compensation matters. Also, because of evidence of accelerated economic activity in the NqJH corridor, according to the information provided by the executing agency, job opportunities and income levels have been increasing.
21. Construction Cost. The civil works cost of the two-lane NJH at the time of project appraisal was estimated at Y 169.83 million, including physical and price contingencies. Although the contract award amount was only Y 144.7 million, the final cost of the construction came to Y 432.62 million, representing a cost increase of about 155 percent over the appraisal estimate and about a 200 percent increase over the initial contract amount, at current prices. The cost increase is a combined result of the increases in physical quantities and the cost of additional works undertaken due to work variation orders and price escalation, in a proportion of about 64 percent and 36 percent, respectively.
22. The cost of the 6 km, two-lane Connecting Road at the time of project appraisal was estimated at Y 20.49 million, including physical and price contingencies. The aggregate value of the two local civil works contracts amrountedto Y 50.92 million. The Bank Group also approved the undertaking of civil works by force account, based on priced Bills of Quantities totaling Y 13.78 million, related to paving works of the 6 km IDA-financed highway section, bringing the total contract amount for works to Y 64.7 million. The final cost of civil works for the 12 km Cormecting Road became Y 228.45 -8 -
million, comprising Y 90.47 million for the IDA-approved contracts (about a 40 percent increase over the contracted amount), and Y 137.98 million for the works undertaken by JPHAB. This includes Y 27.85 million for the construction of buildings for toll operation, administration and maintenance facilities. The relatively high cost of Y 19 million per kilometer can be explained by the requirement for building two interchanges (one at Changling and one at Shalljia) and several other structures necessary to provide grade separation for local and through traffic, particularly near the new residential and industrial area, Changbei Development (Map 2). The construction of the Connecting Road was financed primarily by Jiangxi Province, although Nanchang Municipality also contributed Y 10.0 million. The IDA contribution to the construction of the Connecting Road was about $4.5 million equivalent, representing about 20 percent of the total cost of civil works for the Connecting Road, at a disbursement percentage of 50 percent.
23. The civil works cost of widening the two-lane NJH to a four-lane divided highway was expected to be Y 508.9 million or about 80 percent higher than the construction of the two-lane portion of the NJH, at current prices. In addition to the widening of the NJH, Jiangxi Province also proceeded with the extension of the NJH from Jiujiang to the Chang River Bridge at the Hubei provincial boundary. This involved the construction of a 12.5 km four-lane divided highway between Jiujiang (Shilibu) at a cost of Y 217.8 million, which was fully financed by the Province.
24. Economic Evaluation. An updated economic evaluation for the NJH is presented in Annex 1. Because of the major changes in the originally envisaged scope of the NJH, the economic reevaluation was carried out not only for the two-lane NJH, as a comparison to the evaluation presented in the SAR (Case I), but also for the four-lane divided-highway version, which has been in operation since January 1996 (Case II). An economic evaluation was also made as if the widening of the two-lane NJH had been justifiable only in the year 2003 (Case III). Furthermore, an economic evaluation was made for the 12 km four-lane Connecting Road as well. No economic evaluation was presented in the SAR for the originally planned 6 km road linking the NJH with the NBC.
25. The ICR estimate of the ERR for the NJH (Case I) is 30.2 percent, compared to the SAR estimate of 30.1 percent. Although the ERR estimates under the ICR evaluation and those presented in the SAR are much the same, it should be noted that: (a) the economic cost of investment for the highway, at constant December 1995 prices, has almost doubled; (b) the cost increase, in terms of ERR comparison, has been compensated by about 50 percent higher corridor traffic than forecast, except for the first section of the highway, for which the SAR forecast was inexplicably high; (c) traffic diversion from the existing arterial road to the new highway has, so far, corresponded closely to SAR estimates, which resulted in an about 50 percent higher traffic volume on the new highway than originally forecast; and (d) in estimating benefits, the ICR has taken into account the effect of capacity constraints of the two-lane highway beyond 2005. -9 -
26. For the four-lane NJH (Case II), the ERR estimrateis 23.4 percent, based on the additional Y 504.98 million investment made during 1994-96, at constant December 1995 prices. Based on ICR assumptions, a lower ERR for th[e four-lane NJH (Case II) versus the two-lane NJH seems to indicate that, despite a higher-than-expected traffic growth, the investment in the widening was premature. An ICR analysis indicated that close-to- optimum timing for providing the second carriageway would be in 2003, by which time the traffic volume would reach 6,000-7,000 vehicles per day (vpd), the threshold of capacity constraint for a two-lane highway. The estimated ERR for such a scenario (Case III) is 29.3 percent (Table 5C of Annex 1), which is very close to the ERR percentage for the two-lane NJH (Case I) of 30.2 percent (Table 5A of Annex 1).
27. The ICR's estimate of ERR for the Connecting Road, based on the economic cost of investment of Y 253.55 million and the traffic census data since its opening to traffic, is only 4.3 percent. The reasons for such a low rate are: (a) the cost of construction has been high, primary because of the requirement to construct two interchanges and several structures through a residential/industrial development area; and (b) only about half of the traffic of the NJH has been diverting to the Connecting Road, while the other half has been using the existing arterial road and street networks and the two old bridges in Nanchang City.
28. Since the Connecting Road is an integral part of the corridor improvement scheme, the economic costs and benefits of the Connecting Road hLavebeen combined with that of the NJH. This has resulted in an ERR of 25.0 percent, only slightly less than the ERR estimate for the NJH Case I. Notwithstanding this, the question arises whether, in light of the about-even split of traffic at the southern end of the NJH and an almost 53 percent less traffic usage of the NBC as forecast (para. 22 of Annex 1), the Connecting Road could have been initially built only as a two-lane highway. However, such a consideration ignores the potential for accelerated buildup of traffic generated by the residential/industrial development area along the corridor of the Connecting Road, which has not been taken into account in the analysis.
29. Regarding the question of the appropriate timing for duplication of the highway, it can be concluded that the rate of traffic growth between 1986 and 1995, and the number of vehicles that diverted to the new highway were higher than estimated at project appraisal. The higher-than-expected rate of growth can be attributed itothe designation of the Nanchang-Jiujiang corridor in 1992 as a Special Economic Zone. It appears that this decision contributed to the accelerated economic development in the corridor and, consequently, to a higher-than-expected traffic growth. The ICR estimate of an annual average traffic growth rate in the range of 8.3 to 8.6 percent for the 1993-2015 period (including actual traffic for 1993-95) could be a somewhat conservative assumption if the economy of the corridor grows at an even faster rate in the future than during recent years.
30. In the SAR, the highway investment cost used to arrive at the ERR was based exclusively on an estimated cost of civil works. To maintain comparability of the - 10- economic evaluations between the SAR and ICR, the ICR economic evaluation of Case I is based on the actual cost of civil works, amounting to Y 500.81 million (in constant December 1995 prices). A more common evaluation methodology is to include in the highway investment cost well-identified cost items, such as the cost of land acquisition and resettlement, construction supervision and the cost of design. When such additional costs, which represent about 15 percent of the civil works cost, are also taken into consideration in the economic evaluation, the ICR's ERR of 30.2 percent for Case I would drop to about 29.7 percent, which was not considered to be a significant variation. Therefore, sensitivity analysis was not extended to Case II and Case III scenarios because of additional investment costs over and above the cost of civil works.
Nanchang Bridge Complex
31. The construction of a new bridge over the Gan River had been under consideration since the mid-1970s in anticipation of eventual traffic congestion on the two substandard Bayi and Ganjiang bridges. They served urban as well as interprovincial traffic to the neighboring provinces of Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Hunan, Hubei and Anhui. The NBC, located on the southeastern side of the City is about 9 km long and comprises the main 2,000 m bridge, including approach structures, a 130 m long bridge over the Fuhi River, and approach roads and other associated structures (Map 3).
32. Engineering Design. The feasibility study and preliminary engineering for the bridge complex were undertaken by the Nanchang Municipal Planning and Design Institute, while the detailed engineering for the bridge was prepared by the Shanghai Municipal Design Institute. Foreign experts were involved in the review of the design and the preparation of the tender documents. The concept for the design of the main bridge was innovative but complex. Designed as a continuous, prestressed, concrete- girder structure with a double-deck, it provides for six traffic lanes on the upper deck and pedestrian and bicycle passages on the two lower decks, cantilevered under the main deck on each side of the bridge.
33. Implementation and Supervision. Two contracts for the major works were awarded following ICB procedures at Y 132.7 million, and three contracts for minor road works were awarded following local bidding procedures at Y 42.4 million. A further contract for the construction of the Simamiao Interchange, located at South Yuanjiang Road, the contracting of which was not contemplated at project appraisal, was awarded at Y 33.0 million following domestic contracting arrangements. Although the design change was endorsed by MOC and the Bank Group in recognition of its merits, the contract for the construction of the interchange was financed entirely from the Nanchang Municipality's own resources.
34. The construction of the main bridge was expected to commence in October 1989 and be completed in 36 months. Although the bridge was opened for traffic in October 1994, the bridge works were completed fully only in January 1995, with a delay of 21 months. This does not include a roughly six-month delay in the commencement of works after the contract was awarded due to some disputes betveen NURCEBand the contractor regarding the delay in handing over the site and mobilization payment. The slow progress was due mainly to the complexity of the task, which required some design changes during implementation to accommodate a revised methodology for the construction of the upper structure of the main bridge. Also, major flooding of the Gan River in 1993 compounded the delay. Other contracts also suffered from delays largely due to design changes, adverse subsoil and weather conclitions and the poor performance of some of the contractors.
35. Although the contractor for the main bridge had extensive bridge construction experience, the overall organization and programming of works was deficient. Also, as reflected in the quarterly progress reports and the Bank Group supervision mission reports, the quality of construction was a recurrent concern. There were frequent references made to the lack of the main bridge contractor's own internal quality control system, which took quite some time to formulate, but its effectiveness in assuring quality did not live up to expectations. The quality problems contributed to the slower-than- expected progress of works.
36. For supervision of the NBC works, a supervision unit was established under the direction of NURCB, with a total of about 70 technical and administration personnel. The unit was assisted by an experienced foreign structural engineer who was engaged for the project in an advisory capacity. Despite the commendable efforlt of the supervision unit, the limits of the effectiveness of supervision were noticeable. T he main reason for this was that most of the supervision personnel lacked experience in working with contract conditionalities required under ICB procedures.
37. Prior to the final takeover of the works from the contractors, the quality of works were assessed. For the main bridge, the poorest-rated work items included the deck system (concrete deck, curbs, railings, paving of the pedestrian/bicycle passage at the lower deck of the bridge), although no risk was detected concerning the structural safety of the bridge. The quality of bitumen pavements of the western approach roads was also rated as deficient. Although extensive remedial works were carried out by the contractors on all contracts during the defect liability periods, the appearance of some elements of the NBC still have traces of less-than-desirable workmanship. Notwithstanding the difficulties encountered and the quality deficiencies identified during implementation, the completion of the NBC is a commendable achievement and speaks highly of the ability and technical competence of the personnel involved from all participating units: the contractors, supervision unit and the executing agency. The supervision unit made conscious efforts to identify and reject works that did not meet technical specifications, and it is to their credit that no critical deficiencies have been detected since the NBC opened to traffic.
38. Environmental Protection. Whatever disturbances were made to the environment in the Nanchang Bridge corridor during construction, NIJRCB took steps to mitigate the detrimental impacts of such disturbances. Moreover, during the latter phase - 12 - of execution, extensive landscaping and green belts were provided along the river banks in the vicinity of the main bridge, and the adjacent areas were given a facelift with environmental and aesthetic considerations. At the eastern bridge head, 11 hectares of land area were reserved for public use, which has been programmed for stage-by-stage development. Similar landscaping schemes are being established on the two sides of the Fuhe Bridge, in the Simamiao Interchange area and at the western bridgehead. Noise levels on the Nanchang City street network have been lowered as a result of traffic diversion to the new Nanchang Bridge.
39. Land Acquisition and Resettlement. The land acquisition, resettlement and compensation procedures agreed at negotiations were substantially followed. However, design changes necessitated the expansion of the scope of land acquisition and resettlement, which resulted in a higher-than-budgeted cost. The initial estimate of Y 6.1 million for land acquisition and resettlement compensation increased about sevenfold to Y 42.1 million. The area of land required increased fourfold; from about 268 mu to 1,190 mu, and the number of individuals affected by the construction of the NBC increased from 3,560 to 6,141. The observations made on the resettlement issues regarding the NJH in para. 20 are equally pertinent to the NBC component.
40. Construction Cost. The SAR estimate for the NBC was Y 166.5 million, including physical and price contingencies, compared to aggregate contract amounts of Y 208.1 million. The actual cost of construction amounted to Y 302.09 million, representing a cost increase of about 81 percent over SAR estimates and about 67 percent over the contract amounts. The cost increase is a combined result of the increases in physical quantities and the cost of additional works undertaken through variation orders, and price adjustments due to price escalation, in a proportion of about 60 percent and 40 percent, respectively. The above amount includes the construction of the Simamiao Interchange at Y 46.8 million. However, the Nanchang Municipality also financed work items not taken into consideration at project appraisal, at an aggregated amount of Y 22.45 million. These items were necessary for improving the operation and sustainability of the NBC. They included lighting, traffic and navigational signaling, toll facilities, essential river training, landscaping, and pedestrian and bicycle accesses ramps to the main bridge. Thus, the total cost of works for the NBC in the ICR was taken as Y 324.53 million in current prices, corresponding to Y 379.03 million in economic cost at constant December 1995 prices.
41. Economic Evaluation. As detailed in Annex 1, the ICR estimate of the ERR for the NBC is 16.6 percent compared to the SAR's estimate of 38 percent. The main reasons for the about 56 percent lower ERR are as follows: (a) the actual traffic on the new bridge in 1995 was only 53 percent of the SAR forecast because: (i) the corridor traffic, i.e., the sum of the traffic crossing the Gan River using all three bridges, was only about 62 percent of the forecast traffic, and (ii) the share of traffic of the new bridge was only about 58 percent of the corridor traffic compared to the SAR's estimate of 68 percent; (b) the economic cost of investment exceeded the SAR estimate by about 95 percent in constant 1995 prices; and (c) the ICR estimate of the traffic growth rate from - 13 -
1996 onward has been lower compared to SAR estimates because of the traffic distribution pattern that evolved following the opening of the bridge.
42. The significantly lower-than-expected traffic on the NBC could be attributed to the following: (a) since the bridge is located in the southeastern corner of Nanchang City, it appears that most of the local traffic, despite congested traffic conditions, prefers using the two old bridges, which evidently provide shorter origin-to-destination routes to the greater part of the city; (b) the buildup of through traffic, which supposedly would have bypassed Nanchang City, has been considerably slower than it was expected at appraisal; and (c) the tolling of the new bridge is likely to present a greater-than-expected deterrent to road users. In the absence of a comprehensive traffic origin and destination survey, it can be assumed that the actual growth rates of recent years and the distribution of traffic will not change substantially in the foreseeable future. This is so mainly because Nanchang Municipality has recently commenced the construction of a new Bayi Bridge in the city center to increase overall corridor capacity across the Gan River to ease the bottleneck effect of the present Bayi Bridge. Consequently, the ICR's traffic growth forecast for the new Nanchang Bridge has been lowered to 4.5 percent per year compared to the SAR's estimate of 8.7 percent from 1995 onward.
43. Overall E1RRfor Civil Works. The ICR's estimate for the overall ERR on the investment made in the two-lane NJH (Case I), the ComnectingRoad and the NBC was 22.6 percent. This compares to the SAR estimate of 30.1 percent for the highway and 38.0 for the NBC, according to the original scheme. The SAR did not provide an ERR estimate for the Connecting Road and a combined ERR estimate for the NJH and the NBC.
Equipment Procurement
44. Provisions were made under the project for the purchase of the following groups of equipment at an estimated overall cost of $2.23 million, including physical and price contingencies:
For JPTD: (a) road maintenance equipment, comprising graders, bulldozers, asphalt and cement concrete mixers, pavers, traffic counters, trucks, etc., $1.32 million; (b) road condition measuring equipment and instruments for RDB and PMS programs, $0.53 million;
For NURCB: (c) inspection and maintenance equipment for the Nanchang Bridge, $0.16 million (local financing only); and (d) traffic management information system, $0.22 million.
45. The final cost of equipment amounted to $7.83 million. It was distributed as $6.60 million, $0.57 million, $0.38 million and $0.28 million with respect to (a), (b), (c), and (d) above. IDA financing covered about $2.9 mi:llion (about 37 percent) of the acquisition cost. - 14 -
46. Seventeen units of maintenance equipment were procured through international and local shopping as stipulated in the Development Credit Agreement, for an aggregate amount of $4.90 million. Seven of these units were IDA-financed for $2.32 million, while the remaining four units, at $2.57 million, were financed from the Province's own resources. The cost of locally procured road maintenance equipment (11 units) and trucks (35 units), which were not budgeted at the time of appraisal, was financed by Jiangxi Province at Y 9.85 million ($1.70 million equivalent).
47. Under item (b) of para. 44, three units of road condition survey equipment were procured only in the fourth quarter of 1995 with considerable delay, and these units have not yet been put to full use. Computer hardware and software for the PMS program were obtained using JPTD's own resources.
48. Four units of equipment were procured for the maintenance of the Nanchang Bridge, at a total cost of $380,000 equivalent under NURCB's own financing. The cost of the equipment for the Nanchang Bridge traffic monitoring system ($280,000) (para. 78) was 66 percent IDA-financed.
49. The equipment procured is regarded as appropriate in type, quality and number to meet the anticipated routine and periodic maintenance needs of the NJH and the NBC. The units of the road condition survey equipment procured are important requirements for the application of the PMS.
Staff Training Program
50. The objectives of the staff training program were to: (a) improve the proficiency of engineers and other staff by sending selected personnel abroad to attend academic and practical training courses, as well as relevant international conferences; (b) strengthen the capacity of highway institutes and technical schools of JPTD by providing equipment, training aids and books; and (c) invite foreign experts to help upgrade the schools' curricula. JPTD's project budget for staff training was about $800,000 for 85 person- months of training abroad, and for local training by two foreign experts over a two-month period for an unspecified number of trainees. NURCB's staff training budget was about $135,000 for 24 person-months of training abroad and for 45 person-months for local training.
51. Soon after the startup of the project, it was recognized that organizing training courses on various topics for a relatively small group of trainees from just one provincial transport department was neither practical nor economic. At IDA's initiative, and after consultation with MOC and transport departments of other provinces, an understanding was reached in late 1989 that most of the staff training programs under ongoing Bank Group- financed highway projects would be coordinated by MOC. Accordingly, MOC has prepared and administered training programs, the cost of which was shared by the provinces receiving Bank Group assistance for highway projects being implemented more or less concurrently with the Jiangxi Provincial Highway Project. However, it was also agreed that - 15 - some training programs could also be arranged independently by any of the provincial transport departments for their own staff.
52. Training for JPTD personnel included 15 courses and study tours abroad. This involved 58 trainees, for a total of 68.6 person-months, at $508,000. All courses were coordinated by MOC. The courses covered: (a) RDB and PMS fundamentals and operations as practiced abroad; (b) project preparation and economic evaluation methodologies; (c) advanced highway geometric and pavement design techniques, including computer applications; (d) road and bridge maintenance equipment types and their operational characteristics; (e) traffic engineering fundamentals; (f) project management, including financial aspects; (g) contract administration and construction supervision; and (h) organization and management aspects of high-class highways. These areas of training were well chosen, and provided JPTD staff with both irmmediateand long- term benefits. The above-listed program does not include about 60 person-months of training abroad in construction supervision and contract management of local personnel assigned to the construction supervision units. Such training was carried out by the foreign consulting finn contracted to provide supervision services. The cost was covered under the consultant services contract.
53. The training for NURCB staff included three training courses abroad in financial management, project management and traffic engineering. They involved four staff members for 3 person-months at a cost of about $40,000. This corresponded to only about one third of the originally envisaged training program for NURCB staff under the project. Largely due to the slowing down of the MOC coordinated program during 1994 and 1995, NURCB missed the opportunity to fully utilize the buclget assigned for staff training. However, NURCB has benefited from staff training provided abroad under bilateral aid in 1989 (19 trainees, 18.6 person-months). Local training was also provided to about 40 personnel of the contractors, totaling 24 person-months, under bilateral aid in the same year. Moreover, 64 technical personnel of JPTD, with a total of 64 person-months, participated in a variety of locally financed training courses, seminars, technical conferences and study tours during 1989-94.
54. The MOC-coordinated approach to staff training was expected to be more economical than organizing training separately for each province. Although the actual cost of about $7,434 per person-month is lower than the estimated cost of training abroad (for about $9,400 per trainee for JPTD staff), it is still considered to be too high for involving only 58 trainees. While it was accepted at the time of project preparation that training abroad will be the dominant element of the program at a relatively high cost, it is now questionable whether this approach has indeed been appropriate to meet technology transfer needs for a transport department with a large technical staff in need of training in a variety of disciplines, and with an urgent need for improving road transport infrastructure for all classes of roads in a province where the condition of the road network was regarded to be below national average. A less ambitious and costly tra:ining progranmabroad, balanced with courses/seminars organized through local institutions with selective involvement of foreign experts in areas where local expertise may have been in short supply, could have - 16- been a better alternative to providing an opportunity for training more staff. Such an approach could have resulted in greater benefits to the institution. While the high cost of training is a concern, warranting the exploration of alternative ways to conduct training courses financed under similar future highway projects, the program provided exposure to advanced technologies being applied in the countries visited and has been a beneficial and suitable avenue for technology transfer.
Programs for Road Planning, Pavement Strengthening and Maintenance
55. When the project was prepared, it was assumed that the initial programs for data collection in the Province (to improve methods of road planning and practices of strengthening and maintaining pavements) would be part of a study, the objectives of which included: (a) establishing a road data base compatible with national guidelines that would include an inventory of permanent features and current conditions of existing paved roads; (b) beginning regular monitoring of the current conditions of paved roads; (c) identifying pavement overlay and strengthening needs and resource requirements for about 4,500 km of paved roads; and (d) conducting a pilot program for planning and managing maintenance operations. The study was expected to take 15 months and involve about 80 person-months of local and foreign personnel input (see the terms of reference in SAR Annex 2).
56. However, the study was not carried out as planned because it was superseded by Government policies that instituted a nationwide approach to road planning, pavement strengthening and maintenance. A group was set up under MOC, headed by its Director of Highway Administration, to guide and coordinate the programs. MOC had already begun to plan a nationwide RDB program in 1985 in each province and autonomous region of the country. The idea was to use the data to improve highway planning and project formulation, as well as for statistical purposes. The RDB framework was developed in MOC's Highway Planning and Design Institute (HPDI) in the late 1980s and the development of the Chinese PMS began in MOC's Highway Scientific Research Institute (HSRI) in the late 1980s as well.
57. By the early 1990s, reasonably good progress had been made with both the RDB and the PMS programs. Therefore, MOC and the Bank Group agreed that it would be more efficient and consistent to develop local capability for both of these systems, rather than approach them separately in each of the provinces with external assistance. To introduce the PMS, 15 provinces/municipalities were selected, which included Jiangxi Province and the following nine provinces that had Bank Group-financed highway projects scheduled for implementation during the Eighth Five-Year-Plan (8FYP) and 9FYP periods: Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, Guangdong, Shaanxi, Zhejiang, Sichuan, Xinjiang and Henan. The Bank Group supported MOC's endeavor, and the highway projects helped finance the acquisition of equipment, including computer hardware and software, instruments for land-based land surveys and geographic information systems. -17-
Road Data Bank Development and Application
58. The development of the RDB and PMS programs in Jiangxi Province started in 1991 with the establishment of a Leading Group with seven senior personnel and a Working Group with a staff of seven, including personnel from JPHAB, the Nanchang- Jiujiang Highway Project Office and the Research Office of JPTD. In addition, 11 implementation teams were created at district levels. The activities to date have been limited to basic data collection on national and provincial highways including historical information on construction, location and general informattion on culverts and bridges, pavement structures, roadside facilities, design speed and classified traffic counts. However, the RDB software developed by HPDI of MOC has not as yet been introduced to the Province. The setting up of the RDB program has not started because the Province is still awaiting firner directives from MOC regarding the transfer of the appropriate software package to be used. It is expected that with the successfully completed pilot RDB development program in Shaanxi Province, there will be more incentives to pursue the establishment of the RDB in Jiangxi as well as in other provinces. However, MOC's leadership and guidance are essential for this to happen.
Pavement Management System Development and Application
59. The Chinese PMS system, which was formulated by HSRI, was introduced first to two prefectures in 1992. The system was extended to five additional municipalities/ prefectures in 1993, and to the remaining municipalities/prefectures in 1994, covering an overall paved network of about 5,000 km. Road condition data, including pavement deflection, roughness and surface distress parameters are collected by 95 maintenance divisions in the 11 prefectures/municipalities. Each prefecture/municipalityprepares yearly road maintenance programs, based on the output data from the PMS. JPHAB compiles the information, which is then used to assist in deciding the distribution of maintenance funds according to identified priorities. Considering that the national/provincial network under the jurisdiction of JPHAB include about 700 km of concrete paved roads and about 9,500 km of gravel surfaced roads, JPHAB has taken steps to expand the capability of the PMS to handle the analysis of these types of road surfaces as well. It would be beneficial if MOC, through HSRI, could provide technical input to such an effort, which could have nationwide application.
60. The contribution of the project to PMS development has been the acquisition of advanced equipment for road condition data collection. This will replace the more conventional, less accurate and more time-consuming methods used thus far. However, the project's main impact has been, as far as the PMS is concerned, that it provided a stimulus for adopting this new methodology to help the management of the national and provincial road network. The satisfactory progress made so far benefited from the firm support of the senior personnel of JPTD and JPHAB, and the dedication of the personnel involved in the operation of the PMS program. - 18-
61. While the setting up of the PMS has been expeditious, and its expansion to cover the paved national and provincial road network has been achieved, the progress on development of the RDB has been minimal. The main reason for the slow progress made on the development of the RDB in Jiangxi Province, and in some other provinces, has been that MOC was reluctant to urge the provinces to proceed more expeditiously with the setting up of the RDB systems until there was sufficient evidence that the system formulated by HPDI was appropriate and functional. These aspects were tested through a pilot program in Baoji Prefecture in Shaanxi Province, demonstrating that the system could be made operational. However, it was also recognized that the setting up and sustained upkeep of an RDB is costly, and some provinces felt that the investment may not yield sufficient benefits to justify its expeditious development. It seems that it will take considerably more effort and time than was originally envisaged for RDB to become operational and usable as an overall planning tool not only in Jiangxi, but also in several other provinces of China.
62. On the other hand, the PMS has more transparent objectives and the outputs from the system are more readily perceived as beneficial to reaching rational technical and budgetary decisions. However, despite the good progress made in Jiangxi province, more effort, budgetary support and overall acceptance of the PMS output for planning and budgeting purposes will be needed to operate the PMS more effectively.
C. IMPLEMENTATIONRECORD AND MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROJECT
63. No extraneousmajor factorsaffected the implementationof the project. However, becauseof inflationand design changes,the originalcost estimateof the project increased by about 132 percent in local currencyterms and by about 59 percent in US dollar terms (Part II-Tables 8A and 8B). The percentage difference reflects the effect of the devaluation of the local currency during 1987-95. The implementationdelays were substantial for some of the project components but less so overall. The SAR indicated the completion of the project by the end of 1994 and the closing date of the credit as December31, 1995. This implied the recognitionof an above-averagerisk of an overall delay in implementation. The projectas a whole was substantiallycompleted by the end of 1994, as reflected by the level of disbursements at that time. However, the disbursement pattern highlights the slower-than-expectedprogress of works during FY91-93 (Part Il-Table 4). The creditwas fully disbursedon December13, 1995. 64. The major factorthat adverselyaffected the implementationof the projectwas the poor performance of the contractors,both in terns of implementationdelays and the quality of works. These problemswere more dominantand transparenton the NJH than on the NBC component. Documentationon file revealsthat the poor progressand quality of works on the NJH were a recurrent issue. Even the pressure exerted in a coordinated manner on the contractor's units on-site and at its headquartersby Jiangxi Province, the Central Governmentand the Bank Groupbrought about only limited improvementin the contractor's performance. Having little prospects for satisfactory improvementin the contractor's ability to complete the contractedworks by the deadline set, the Province - 19 - was prompted in mid-1992 to mobilize JPHAB force account units to take over the completion of paving works over a substantial length of the highway. This included the asphalt works on the 33 km northern-end section of the N.H. Poor cooperation between the local contractor and the foreign partners responsible for asphalt works also interfered with the orderly execution of the works. This was one of the reasons for the decision to involve provincial road construction units in the execution of the paving works. Unfortunately, the lack of experience of JPHAB constiuction units in high-standard pavement works, along with the pressure to get the paving works finished in a hurry, led to premature deterioration of the pavement over several sections of the highway, which resulted in substantial remedial works soon after the January 1993 opening of the highway to traffic.
65. Although the delay in completing the NBC was even longer than that for the NJH (para. 34), there had been some mitigating circumstances for these delays, including the complexity of design, adjusting the design to facilitate the erection of the superstructure, and the flooding of the Gan River, which set back the progress of works beyond the control of the contractors. There were also quality defects, but these had a good chance to be detected by supervision and corrected during implementation. Also, during the inspection prior to the takeover of works from the contractors, deficiencies were identified and corrections were executed within the defects liability period. The extent of remedial works during the operation phase of the NBC were not excessive.
D. PROJECT SUSTAINABILITYV
66. Despite the inadequacies of design and the risk of the quality deficiencies emerging as a consequence of poor workmanship during construction, if routine and periodic maintenance works are carried out in a systematic and timely manner, and prompt remedial actions are taken in the case of emergencies, which are likely to occur in the future due to the generally unfavorable weather and geological conditions in the NJH corridor, the project's civil works components should be sustainable. H[owever, because of the elements of risk mentioned above, it is likely that a higher-than-usual proportion of the toll revenues will be necessary to cover the maintenance expenditures of the civil works.
67. The equipment fleet acquired under the project should provide adequate long-term service since operators have been trained, sufficient stock of essential spares has been purchased and maintenance facilities have been made available along the NJH, and in the vicinity of the NBC, for the regular maintenance of the units.
68. The Province has shown interest in the development of the PMS program, and regards its operation as an important tool for road maintenance and road improvement decisions. The program is expected to be maintained, input data regularly collected, and output information used more extensively in the future to distribute road maintenance funds according to well-documented priorities of roacd network maintenance and improvement needs. - 20 -
69. The information from the staff training program, despite the involvement of a relatively small proportion of staff, is expected to be disseminated throughout both organizations to reach the majority of personnel and have a longer-term impact on improving administration, management methods and highway-specific technology in JPTD and NURCD.
E. BANK PERFORMANCE
70. The project was consistent with the sectoral investment priority of Jiangxi Province and the Nanchang Municipality, the development objectives of the Central Government and the country assistance strategy of the Bank Group. The identification of the components, preparation, appraisal and supervision of the project were satisfactory. However, partly through hindsight, the following weaknesses have been noted:
(a) The Bank Group could have been more alert to the risk involved in the preparation of the engineering design for the project highway (para. 8). However, since Bank Group resources are normally limited to undertaking the examination of design packages in depth, the design documentation for the NJH, which was completed by local design institutes, were reviewed by foreign experts under bilateral aid. This was in line with the practice for the first five Bank Group-financed highway projects, including that in Jiangxi Province. However, there had been a strong reluctance by the executing agencies to introduce design changes once the documentation had been completed. For highway projects prepared for Bank Group financing in FY92 and thereafter, the Bank Group used Consultant Trust Funds to involve consultants in the preparation phase of engineering design to work jointly with local design institutes. Such an approach was aimed at improving the quality of design documentation through consultant participation in the design process, rather than getting an already completed design package reviewed. Recently, the Bank Group achieved the same objective through including in project preparation mission teams a highway design specialist to scrutinize the engineering design.
(b) The poor performance of the contractors, particularly for NJH (para. 13), raises the question of the Bank Group's responsibility regarding contract awards, since full compliance with Bank Group procedures on the selection of contractors should assure that the contractors recommended for contract award have the necessary experience and resources to undertake the contract. However, Bank Group staff are normally constrained in obtaining reliable information about the experience and qualification of the contractors. One of these is the executing agencies' firm assurances that such assessments had been made to the satisfaction of the executing agencies. Since the first step to assess the capabilities of contractors should be in the prequalification phase, as from FY92, the -21 -
Bank Group, following consultation with MOC, made the prequalification process more stringent by insisting that the criteria for prequalification be based on past performance records of a particular unit of the major construction enterprises, rather than the past practice of prequalifying major "umbrella" enterprises with a number of construction units with unknown experience and resources. Some improvements were noted in the outcome of the prequalification process for projects initiated after FY92. However, there is a further need to tighten the prequalification requirements and introduce measures to establish the credentials of the contractors more conclusively at prequalification, and also prior to contract award.
(c) The possibility of terminating the contract for the NJH, in light of the unsatisfactory performance of the contractor, was raised by Bank Group staff repeatedly but it was not pursued since it could not be established conclusively that terminating the contract and rebidding would have been necessarily an advantageous alternative. It would have introduced additional delay due to the time needed for rebidding. Furthermore, the lack of experienced contractors in China tc undertake the construction of high-class highways offered no assurances that another contractor's performance in terms of progress and quality would have been a better alternative than making continued efforts to get the contract finished with the contractor already on site.
(d) It was recognized at an early stage of implementation that the Borrower and the Bank Group had to deal with a problem project, and the Bank Group staff involvement was intensified accordingly. During the critical period of implementation between May 1989 and October 1992, there were five Bank supervision missions in the field and there was frequent written communication between the executing agencies and the Bank Group on implementation issues. The Bank Group supervision missions were comprehensive and staff provided constructive advice and guidance for dealing with the problems identified. During the visi-tsto construction sites, the quality deficiencies noted were brought to thc attention of the contractors, supervision and executing agencies with firm requests for taking well-defined and appropriate remedial actions. These suggestions were generally well received and helped sharpen the focus on some of the deficiencies noted by the missions. But the measures taken by the executing agencies were not necessarily ef-Fectiveenough to bring about adequate improvements.
(e) The implementation of the project was rated unsatisfactory over a period of about 24 months, because of poor management and unsatisfactory performance of the contractors in terms of progress and quality. This was primarily due to the problems associated with the implementation of the - 22 -
NJH, and, to a lesser extent, concerning the execution of the NBC. The Bank Group's concerns about the project were raised at high levels in the Provincial and Central Governments. Also, at the initiative of the Bank Group, high-level meetings were held in Beijing involving the officials at headquarters of the NJH contractor, to address the critical problems facing the implementation of the NJH component of the project. Such efforts helped in mitigating the situation, but were far from resolving the problems. The circumstances described in the preceding highlight the dilemma faced by Bank Group staff in dealing with projects under which the insufficient experience of contractors and supervision and the executing agencies' administrative constraints limited the ability of staff to control project implementation effectively. The extent of the responsibility of the Bank Group for project implementation in such circumstances, particularly in the context of "project ownership," becomes a complex issue.
(f) The Bank Group showed flexibility in dealing with the design changes, which seemed to be rational and justifiable so as to avoid interrupting and delaying the execution of works. Some of the changes added to the cost of the project, such as widening and extending the Connecting Road and building the Changling Interchange, which involved a limited amount of IDA financing. However, there were investment decisions made by the Province, without prior consultation with the Bank Group. These had a bearing on the overall concept of the project's scope, such as the duplication of the NJH, notwithstanding the fact that the relevant works were entirely financed by the Province.
(g) Actual traffic volumes compared with the forecast at the time of project preparation, so far, have shown substantial divergences, which led to conceptual changes in the scope of the project, and also impacted ERR estimates. At project appraisal, the Bank Group's assessment indicated that the new two-lane NJH and the existing arterial road should provide adequate capacity in the Nanchang-Jiujiang corridor until 2010. However, the actual traffic on the new two-lane NJH in 1995 was about 50 percent higher than the assumption presented in the SAR, creating a scenario that indicated an earlier-than-expected need for the duplication of the highway from two lanes to four lanes. The Province decided to move on this matter quickly and began the widening of the highway in early 1994. The second carriageway of the NJH was opened to traffic in early 1996, about 14 years earlier than would have been needed according to an assessment made at project appraisal. According to ICR assumptions, the opening of the second carriageway of the NJH could have waited until 2003. The only mitigating factor in favor of bringing forward the duplication was the excessively high number of accidents on the two-lane highway (para. 16). While it appears that the Bank Group's assessment that a second - 23 -
carriageway for the NJH would only be reqluiredin 2010 was based on an underestimation of traffic growth, it should be noted that forecasting traffic in the Chinese environment is difficult because the rate and location of development is irregular. There is normally only limited information available on future land use and associated traffic-generating parameters that could be taken into account at the time of traffic forecasting. Furthermore, in 1992 the Central Govennment declared the Nanchang- Jiujiang corridor to be a Special Economic Zone, which raised the prospect of higher economic growth and higher-than-expected traffic growth in the NJH corridor. Such developments could not be foreseen in 1987 when the scope of the project was formulated.
(h) The significantly lower ERR estimate in the ICR (16.6 percent versus 38 percent in the SAR) for the NBC could be viewed more critically in the context of the SAR's assumption for future traffic using the new Nanchang Bridge. Even with the benefit of hindsight, a close to 54 percent overestimate of traffic for 1995 across the new bridge lacked sufficient understanding of a plausible traffic distribution in the larger Nanchang City area in relation to the expanse of the Nanchang City and the location of the two older bridges and the new Nanchang Bridge. Although the revised ERR of 16.6 percent, which reflects not only the lower-than-expected traffic levels but also the substantial cost increases involved, still represents a viable investment, the large margin of discrepancy in the estimated ERRs can be regarded as a conceptual oversight in forecasting traffic distribution in the Nanchang City area. This discrepancy could even worsen in future years because the Nanchang Municipality's decision to replace the Bayi Bridge lowers the prospect for an increase in traffic diversion. Thus, it is unlikely that the share of corridor traffic of the Nanchang Bridge will increase in the foreseeable future.
(i) The limited progress made on the introduction of the RDB program to the Province could have been more firmly handled by the Bank Group. However, the leading role of MOC in this matter was c]learlyunderstood. The Bank Group routinely raised this issue with MOC in the context of broader policy and strategy discussions. MOC confirmed to the Bank Group its intent to pursue the development ,f RDB nationwide. However, it appears that some of the provinces are more receptive and more prepared to proceed with the program than others, cLependingon the resources available, and the level of perception of the program's overall benefits. - 24 -
F. BORROWER PERFORMANCE
71. JPTD of Jiangxi Province and NURCB of Nanchang Municipality were first-time executing agencies for Bank Group-financed projects. This fact was a notable element in the way the project was administered, particularly in the early phases of implementation. The two agencies were not well prepared for the administrative requirements associated with Bank-Group borrowing and for the management of major contracts based on ICB conditionalities. It seemed that JPTD was short of personnel at high- and mid-levels, which placed a heavy burden on the capable but relatively few officials who had to cope with a heavy workload. A broader distribution of responsibility may have been constrained by the scarcity of sufficiently qualified and experienced staff to administer the project. This constraint turned out to be more critical than initially perceived because of the poor performance of the contractors and the involvement of numerous work units of JPHAB as subcontractors in the implementation of the NJH. These units were poorly guided in their tasks by the principal contractor. As the implementation proceeded, there were some improvements in administering the project, although much the same personnel had responsibility for the management of the additional civil works contracts implemented under the Province's own financing along with the original project components, such as the northern 6 km section of the Connecting Road, the widening of the NJH from two lanes to four lanes and the further extension of the NJH from Jiujiang to Chang River Bridge at the Anhui provincial boundary.
72. JPTD's major mistake was the acceptance of the local/foreign joint venture to undertake the construction of the NJH without first establishing the local contractor's experience, ability and resource availability to carry out the works. The reason for this relates to the deficiency in the prequalification process at that time. The practice had been to prequalify major "umbrella" enterprises without identifying the capability of the particular construction unit that eventually was assigned to execute the contract. By the time JPTD recognized that the unit assigned was unqualified to execute the contract satisfactorily, it was difficult and too late to take the drastic action of terminating the contract. Although JPTD made great efforts to bring the contractor up-to-strength, the headquarters of the "umbrella" enterprise made a less-than-prudent contribution to back up its work unit in the field.
73. Despite shortfalls in overall coordination and management, the exposure offered by the IDA-financed project was beneficial to JPTD in gaining experience in the organization, management and execution of a high-class highway project. The project provided the opportunity to gain managerial skill and technical know-how for the execution of similar projects in the Province. Because of the relatively confined work area, the administrative task was less demanding, and the administrative constraints were not as transparent in NURCB's organization as in JPTD. Also, in relative terms, there was a larger group of technical personnel involved in the management and execution of the NBC than of the NJH. - 25 -
74. A reference was made in para. 15 to the relatively premature deterioration of some elements of civil works of the NJH soon after the highway was opened to traffic. One of the reasons for the quality deficiencies relates to the lack of balanced judgment of the provincial governments about the advantages and disadvantages of accepting some delay in implementation in situations in which insistence on rneeting implementation target dates would, in all probability, lead to serious quality deficiencies. It is not uncommon that the provincial governments insist on the completion of the works by a given deadline, contractual or otherwise determined, when such deadlines are not being based on realistic work programs, ignore the capability an(d resources available to the contractors and extraneous circumstances, such as seasonal climatic conditions. In such situations, the risk become too high to expect that the works could be completed satisfactorily and in compliance with the technical specifications. Particularly during the last critical phases of implementation, it is common to see 'inferior quality of works done, often involving pavement works, which are likely to lead eventually to excessive rehabilitation and maintenance expenditures, burdening provincial budgets or toll revenues. The acceleration of works in the interest of meeting unrealistic deadlines also reduces the effectiveness of the construction supervision units. Under such circumstances, the vigilance of the supervision is impaired because the issue of quality becomes secondary to meeting deadlines. The above observation is nolt confined to this project but has also been noted in several other completed and still ongoing Bank Group- financed highway projects.
G. ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOME
75. Despite the serious difficulties encountered during the implementation of civil works, the implementation of the project can be regarded as satisfactory, primarily because the developmental objectives of the project have been achieved and are expected to be sustainable. The stream of benefits is expected to be maintained, although at a somewhat lower level than originally forecast, particularly for the NBC component. Some of the components suffered implementation delays that exceeded SAR expectations but were within the broader timeframe envisaged at project appraisal (para. 63). The NJH component was completed in mid-1993, with about a year delay, while the NBC was delayed substantially, from mid-1992 to mid-1994; about the same delay as that of the completion of the Connecting Road.
76. The local contractor's performance on the NJH was unsatisfactory. To assess the performance of the foreign partner is difficult because the progress for asphalt works was heavily dependent on the preparatory work for which the local contractor was responsible according to the joint-venture agreement. The poor performance of the local contractor for the NJH resulted primarily from limited experience with high-class highway construction and unfamiliarity with international contract conditionalities. The contractor's limited resources, lack of managerial experience and its headquarters' unwillingness or inability to provide greater support also hLd a detrimental effect on the contractor's overall performance. While the contractor for the main Nanchang Bridge incurred even longer implementation delays, the complexily of the bridge structure and - 26 - its demanding technology for the erection of the superstructure allow for taking a less critical stance regarding delays and quality problems. Overall, both the NJH and NBC works will provide satisfactory service but not without some emerging problems that will require early detection and prompt remedial actions.
77. The less-than-desirable performance of the contractors increased the burden and responsibility of the construction supervision teams, which were coping with their tasks with difficulty. At best, the performances of the teams were only marginally effective, particularly in the initial phases of the implementation. There were gradual improvements thereafter, and the teams learned to cope with their tasks better and with greater confidence. However, during the final phases of the implementation, the completion of the works became the primary objective and that had an adverse impact on quality, and its effective control by the supervision units. The presence of a foreign supervisor/advisor had been useful but, like on several other Bank Group-financed projects, the number of foreign supervisors was insufficient in relation to the magnitude and complexity of the works. Thus, foreign consultants have been confining their involvement mainly to formulation of procedures, endorsement of major variation orders, advising solutions in key technical matters and training-oriented activities. These functions are important but the limited number of experienced foreign supervising engineers in a joint local/foreign supervision team unavoidably constrains the foreign consultants' involvement and responsibility for on-site quality control, which require daily presence. This important function rests predominantly with the local supervision staff whose experience and effectiveness are limited.
78. The outcome on sectoral development under the project, in the context of the RDB and PMS programs, was mixed. While the development and application of PMS outputs for achieving an improved mechanism for the distribution of road funds for the maintenance and improvement of the road network was satisfactory, the RDB development did not take off as expected, and its development is likely to remain slow. The establishment of a traffic surveillance and monitoring system for the Nanchang Bridge was regarded as useful, particularly in light of the plan to integrate such a system with the overall traffic monitoring system designed for the major arterial street system of Nanchang City.
79. The level of technology transfer through training was not easy to measure due to a lack of well-defined baseline parameters. The training program, although for a price, provided a satisfactory level of exposure to new concepts and incentives for adopting new approaches. However, the program involved fewer trainees than it could have had with a better mix of training abroad and locally organized courses/seminars, involving local institutions and a well-balanced participation of local and foreign experts. The technology transfer through modern equipment for the operation and maintenance of the highway should achieve its objectives and ensure that the new facilities will be efficiently operated and adequately maintained. - 27 -
80. Overall, the project was implemented within the terms of the Development Credit Agreement and in substantial compliance with Bank Group procedures. IDA financing was not extended to any component of the project without obtaining prior clearance from the Bank Group.
H. FUTURE OPERATION
81. The Jiangxi Provincial High-Class Highway Administration Bureau (JPHCHAB) is responsible for the operation and maintenance of the NJH. A manual for the administration, management and operations of the NJH is under preparation. JPHCHAB intends to carry out an economic and a financial evaluation every three years, using the following monitoring parameters: traffic volumes, traffic accident records, toll rates, toll revenues, maintenance and repair expenditures, reestimated ERRs, net benefits, net present values and the status of credit repayment. Regarding the PMS, JPHAB intends to make an even better use of the system by attempting to optimize the benefits through a more critical allocation of maintenance funds based on PMS output data. The Province will make further efforts to build up its RDB, for which MOC's more active support will be needed. The Province's primary objective will be to collect and maiintain information on the recently built and improved highways.
82. A Traffic Monitoring System has already been established for obtaining continuous records of traffic movements on the Nanchang Bridge. It will be fully integrated into the Nanchang City's traffic surveillance system. NURCB intends to prepare a manual for administration management and operations for the Nanchang Bridge Complex similar to that of the manual being prepared by JPHCHAB.
I. KEY LESSONS LEARNED
83. The key lessons learned, which also take into consideration the Bank Group's experience on still ongoing but substantially completed prcjects, are presented as follows. They highlight critical issues that will require urgent attention and actions in the interest of improving the implementation of ongoing and future hig,hwayprojects in China.
(a) The quality of highway civil works cornstruction in China has been uneven, and the implementation of the civil works under this project is indicative of the high risk of encountering quality deficiencies on highway construction works. The shortage of experienced contractors and, in general, the contractors' lack of adequate resources seemnto be the major reasons for eventual quality defects. Although there has been some tightening of the prequalification criteria under Bank, Group-financed highway projects approved in FY92 and thereafter, there is an urgent need for a stricter insistence on establishing thal prequalification requirements are met in order to prevent the prequalification of ill-prepared construction enterprise for high-class highway contracts. To achieve sufficient improvement in this area in the future, the provincial transport departments involved should be required to document to the Bank Group - 28 -
conclusively that the prequalified contractors have the technical and managerial experience, manpower, equipment and financial resources to carry out the construction of the project highway to the required technical standards. Such documentation should be endorsed by MOC.
(b) As indicated above, the quality problem is closely related to the shortage of experienced contractors in China to carry out civil works in compliance with technical specifications for high-class highways under stringent contracting requirements. There should be, therefore, an urgent follow-up on the recommendations of the recently completed Japanese Grant-funded Highway Construction Industry Study and Survey, which identified some of the key impediments to the efficient operation of the highway construction industry in China. The Central Government and the Bank Group will need to work together intensively, and fornulate a strategy and an action plan for addressing the multifaceted issues constraining the development of a more capable highway construction industry.
(c) There is a tendency to stipulate contract periods that are not commensurate with the size and complexity of the contracts, and the capacity and resources of the contractors. Furthermore, the target dates commonly set for the opening of the newly built highways to traffic disregard the technical realities of the status of works in relation to the contractors' ability and resources to meet such targets. Such a practice is detrimental to the quality of works, and increases the risks of premature deterioration of the condition of the highway, higher-than-normal maintenance expenditures and higher cost to the road user because of poor pavement conditions and reduced road safety. The Central and Provincial Governments should recognize that arbitrarily set targets for completion of highway construction works are counterproductive. The Bank Group should also be more alert and circumspect in clearing contract documents with unreasonably short construction periods.
(d) The Bank Group should be more alert to ensure that Bank Group financing does not cover seriously defective phases of works. To mitigate such risks, further efforts should be made to strengthen highway construction supervision capability and efficiency nationwide. There should be a strategy for the establishment of local consultant entities for construction supervision services as a matter of high priority, aiming for the creation of a competent and independent construction supervision consultant industry in China. Such an industry could initially provide supervision services in joint ventures with foreign consulting firms, and eventually on its own. An initiative along these lines has already been made under the Second Henan Provincial Highway Project, which should be monitored, and if found satisfactory, be followed up expeditiously by the Central Government and the Bank Group. In addition, the Bank Group should - 29 -
mount frequent and intensive technical supervision missions for projects with implementation and quality problems. These could take the form of well-timed thematic technical audits involving foreign and local experts and senior Central Government personnel.
(e) The major discrepancy between forecast and de-facto traffic levels on the Nanchang Bridge and the Connecting Road could be related to the inadequate analysis of land use and probable traffic patterns in the larger Nanchang City area during the preparation of the feasibility study for the project's civil works. Similar deficiencies have been noted in connection with the Shaanxi Provincial Highway Project (ICR Report No. 15700, May 15, 1996) and on several ongoing 'Bank Group-financed highway projects that include highways with alignments encroaching on urban or suburban areas. The lack of more stringent analysis of key parameters in the feasibility study phase could lead to poorly formulated investment decisions or costly design changes to accommodate urban growth. The issue of inadequate information on land use planLning, uncritically formulated traffic forecasting and lack of coordination between provincial and municipal authorities during project preparation warrant nationwide attention, as well as the Bank Group's greater attention to these matters during the preparation of highway projects.
(f) The excessively high rate of accidents on the new NJH highlights the importance of formulating a comprehensive road safety policy and strategy for China. The Bank Group should continue its initiatives and intensify its efforts to engage the Central Governnment in China in dialogues leading to the formulation of a comprehensive Road Safety Strategy for China.
(g) Considering the relatively high person-months cost and the small number of staff participation noted under the project's staff training program, the planning, preparation and execution of future training programs under Bank financed highway projects will need to be prepared and executed more carefully to ensure that the programs become more effective and a larger portion of the staff will have the opportunity to participate in the programs. It is, therefore, highly desirable that the Ministry of Finance, MOC and the Bank address this issue, pe:rhaps by appointing a technical training institute in China to coordinale highway subsector training programs nationwide. - 30 -
PART II: STATISTICAL TABLES
TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF ASSESSMENTS Achievement of Objectives Substantial Partial Negligible Not Applicable
Macroeconomic policies x Sector policies x Financial objectives x Institutional development x Physical objectives x Poverty reduction x Gender issues x Other social objectives x Environmental objectives x Public sector management x Private sector development x
Project Sustainability Likely Unlikely Uncertain
x
Bank Performance Highly Satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient
Identification x Preparation assistance x Appraisal x Supervision x
Borrower Performance Highly Satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient
Preparation x Implementation x Covenant compliance x Operation (if applicable) x
Assessment of Outcome Highly Satisfactory Satisfactory Unsatisfactory Highly Unsatisfactory
x -31 -
TABLE 2: RELATED BANK LOANS/CREDITS
Year of Loan Title Purpose Approval Status
Preceding Operations Highway Provincial road network expansion/ FY85 Completed Ln 2539-/Cr 1954-CHA improvement
Following Operations
Beijing-Tianjin-Tanggu Expressway See footnote /1 FY87 Completed Ln 281 1/Cr 1792-CHA Sichuan Provincial Highway See footnote /I FY88 Ongoing Ln2951/Cr 1917-CHA
Shaanxi Provincial Highway See footnote /1 FY88 Completed Ln 2952-CHA Shandong Provincial Highway See footnote /1 FY89 Ongoing Ln 3073/Cr 2025-CHA Jiangsu Provincial Transport See footnote /1 FY91 Completed Ln 3316/Cr 2226-CHA Zhejiang Provincial Highway See footnote / FY92 Ongoing Ln 347 1-CHA Henan Provincial Highway See footnote /L FY93 Ongoing Ln 353 1-CHA Guangdong Provincial Highway See footnote /1 FY93 Ongoing Ln 3530-CHA Fujian Provincial Highway See footnote /1 FY94 Ongoing Ln 3681-CHA Hebei/Henan National Highway See footnote /1 FY94 Ongoing Ln 3748-CHA Xinjiang Highway I See footnote /1 FY95 Ongoing Ln 3787-CHA Shanghai-ZhejiangHighway See footnote /1 FY96 Ongoing Ln 3929-CHA Second Shaanxi Provincial See footnote /1 FY96 Ongoing Highway Ln 3986-CHA Second Henan Provincial Highway See footnote /1 FY96 Ongoing Ln 4027-CHA /1 These highway projects, typically, have had the following components: (a) construction of a major highway; (b) improvement of provincial roads; (c) procurement of road maintenance equipment; and (d) institutional development components, such as RDB and PMS programs, staff training and selected subsector-oriented studies. -32 -
TABLE 3: PROJECT TIMETABLE
Steps in project cycle Date planned Date actual
Identification N/A 03/87 Initial Executive Project Summary N/A 11/87 Preparation 07/87 07/87 Preappraisal N/A 10/87 Appraisal 10/87 01/88 Negotiations 02/88 12/88 Board Presentation 04/88 02/07/89 Signing 02/89 03/16/89 Effectiveness 05/89 05/31/89 Project Completion 12/31/94 12/31/94 (substantially) Credit Closing 12/31/95 12/31/95 - 33 -
TABLE 4: CREDIT DISBURSEMENTS: CUMULATIVEESTIMATED AND ACTUAL ($ million)
FY89 FY90 FY91 ]FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96
Appraisal estimate 0.00 5.00 27.00 43.00 49.00 55.00 61.00 61.00
Actual 0.00 8.18 17.00 25.94 42.19 56.82 61.37 62.11
Adjusted appraisal estimate/a 0.00 5.09 27.49 43.78 49.89 56.00 62.11 62.11 Actual as % of adjusted 0.0 160.7 61.8 59.3 84.6 101.5 98.8 100.0 estimate
Date of final disbursement December 13, 1995
LaAppraisal estimate adjusted for SDRI$ exchange rate variation.
TABLE 5: KEY INDICATORS FOR PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION
Estimated Actual Start Complete Start Complete
1. Construction of Nanchang-Jiujiang Highway Jun-89 May-92 Jul-89 Jun-93
2. Construction of Nanchang Bridge and Approaches Oct-89 Jun-92 May-90 Jan-95
3. Construction of Connecting Road Jun-90 Jun-92 Oct-92 Dec-94
4. Consulting Services for Supervision
(a) for items I & 3 Jan-89 May-92 May-89 Dec-92
(b) for item 2 Jan-89 Jun-92 May-89 Dec-93
5. Equipment for PMS and RDB Jul-91 May-92 Jul-95 Dec-95
6. Traffic Monitoring System for Nanchang Bridge Feb-89 Sep-90 Jul-95 Dec-95
7. Staff Training Feb-89 continuous Jun-91 May-95 - 34 -
TABLE 6: KEY INDICATORS FOR PROJECT OPERATION
Length (km) Traffic (1995 ADT) Estimated Actual Estimated Actual
Nanchang-Jiujiang Highway Jiaoqiao-Aicheng Section 39.20 38.98 5,811 4,522 Aicheng-De'an Section 27.00 24.54 2,160 3,294 De'an-Tongyuan Section 22.00 27.09 2,137 3,271 Tongyuan-Jiujiang Section 24.60 22.21 2,575 3,220
Total 112.80 112.82
Nanchang Bridge Section I - East Approach 1.32 1.32 23,371 12,421 Section II - East Approach 2.10 2.10 23,371 12,421 Section III - Main Bridge Complex 2.78 2.78 23,371 12,421 Section IV- West Approach 1.09 1.09 23,371 12,421 Section V- West Approach 1.69 1.69 23,371 12,421
Total 8.98 8.98
Connecting Road Southern (Bank-Financed) 6.00 6.00 N/A 5,392 Northern (Province's own resources) 0.00 6.00 N/A 5,392
Total 6.00 12.00
Grand Total 127.78 133.80
TABLE 7: STUDIES INCLUDED IN PROJECT
A Jiangxi Highway Data Bank Preparation, Pavement Evaluation and Strengthening Program and Maintenance Management Study was included in the Project (Terms of Reference, Annex 2 of the SAR).
However, as elaborated in paras. 55-57 of Part I of the ICR, the study has not been executed as envisaged, although the objectives of the study have been partially achieved through the development and application of the PMS, and to a much lesser extent the RDB program, by JPTD with the assistance of MOC. The programs were supported by the Bank through the acquisition of equipment for road condition survey. - 35 -
TABLE8A: PROJECTCOS1TS (Y million)
Appraisal estimate Actual/latest Item Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total
Nanchang-Jiujiang Highway (NJH)
Nanchang-Jiujiang Highway 67.91 83.00 150.91 194.68 237.94 432.62 Connecting Road 6 km 10.00 10.00 20.00 45.24 45.23 90.47 Consultant services for supervision 2.46 2.46 6.14 2.46 8.60 Equipment for road maintenance 0.00 4.40 4.40 9.85 28.15 38.00 Equipment and expertise for RDB&PMS 0.00 2.60 2.60 0.00 4.72 4.72 Staff Training 0.00 1.80 1.80 0.00 2.08 2.08
Base Cost 77.91 104.26 182.17 255.91 320.58 576.49
Physical contingencies (10%) 7.80 10.42 18.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 Price contingencies 10.02 13.48 23.50 0.00 0.00 0.00
Subtotal 17.82 23.90 41.72 255.91 320.58 576.49
Land acquisition cost 21.17 0.00 21.17 34.78 0.00 34.78
Total NJH Cost 116.90 128.16 245.06 277.08 320.58 611.27
Nanchang Bridge Complex (NBC)
Nanchang Bridge and approaches 51.70 88.01 139.71 120.08 204.45 324.53 Consultant services for supervision 7.02 2.00 2.00 7.02 3.17 10.19 Equipmentformaintenance 0.51 0.00 0.51 0.15 1.93 2.08 Equipment for traffic management 0.00 0.74 0.74 0.80 1.60 2.40 Staff Training 0.00 0.48 0.48 0.00 0.20 0.20
Base Cost 59.23 91.23 143.44 128.05 211.35 339.40
Physical contingencies (10%) 5.23 9.12 14.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 Price contingencies 6.73 11.78 18.51 0.00 0.00 0.00
Subtotal 71.19 112.13 176.30 128.05 211.35 339.40
Land acquisition cost 6.10 0.00 6.10 0.00 40.45 40.45
Total NBC Cost 70.27 112.13 182.40 128.05; 251.80 379.85
TOTAL PROJECT COST 187.14 240.29 427.46 128.05 292.25 991.12 - 36 -
TABLE8B: PROJECTCOST ($ million)
Appraisalestimate Actual/latest Item Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total
Nanchang-Jiujiang Highway (NJH)
Nanchang-Jiujiang Highway 18.36 22.43 40.79 32.92 40.23 73.15 Connecting Road 6 km 2.71 2.71 5.42 7.39 7.39 14.78 Consultant services for supervision 0.00 0.66 0.66 1.12 0.50 1.62 Equipment for road maintenance 0.00 1.20 1.20 1.70 4.90 6.60 Equipment and expertise for RDB&PMS 0.00 0.48 0.48 0.00 0.57 0.57 Staff Training 0.00 0.72 0.72 0.00 0.51 0.51
Base Cost 21.07 28.20 49.27 43.13 54.10 97.23
Physical contingencies (10%) 2.11 2.82 4.93 0.00 0.00 0.00 Price contingencies 1.16 1.49 2.65 0.00 0.00 0.00
Subtotal 3.27 4.31 7.58 43.13 54.10 97.23
Land acquisition cost 5.72 0.00 5.72 7.40 0.00 7.40
Total NJH Cost 30.06 32.51 62.57 50.53 54.10 104.63
Nanchang Bridge Complex (NBC)
Nanchang Bridge and approaches 13.97 23.80 37.77 21.32 36.29 57.61 Consultant services for supervision 0.00 0.54 0.54 1.30 0.85 2.15 Equipment for maintenance 0.14 0.00 0.14 0.03 0.35 0.38 Equipment for traffic management 0.00 0.20 0.20 0.09 0.19 0.28 Staff Training 0.00 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.04 0.04
Base Cost 14.11 24.66 38.77 22.74 37.72 60.46
Physical contingencies (10%) 1.40 2.47 3.87 0.00 0.00 0.00 Price contingencies 0.78 1.36 2.14 0.00 0.00 0.00
Subtotal 16.29 28.49 44.78 22.74 37.72 60.46
Land acquisition cost 1.65 0.00 1.65 8.60 0.00 8.60
Total NBC Cost 17.94 28.49 46.43 31.34 37.72 69.06
TOTAL PROJECT COST 48.00 61.00 109.00 81.86 91.83 173.69 -37 -
TABLE8C: PROJECTFINANCING ($ million)
Source Appraisalestimate Actual/latestestimate
IDA 61.0 62.11
CentralGovernment 24.2 36.50
Jiangxi Province 7.4 4.94
NanchangMunicipal Government 9.9 36.60
Jiangxi ProvincialTransport 6.5 33.54 Department
109.0 173.69
TABLE9: ECONOMICCOSTS AND 13ENEFITS
Costs /a Elenefits/b NPV /c ERR (%)
SAR Nanchang-JiujiangHighway 242.46 55.66 n.a. 30.1 NanchangBridge Complex 194.45 72.95 n.a. 38.0
Total 436.91 128.61 n.a. n.a.
ICR Nanchang-JiujiangHighway (Case I) /d 500.81 97.21 927.10 30.2 NanchangBridge Complex 379.03 58.15 106.10 16.6 ConnectingRoad 12 km 253.55 9.95 -139.40 4.3 Total 1,133.39 165.31 934.0 22.6 Nanchang-JiujiangHighway (Case II) /e 1,005.79 178.38 926.40 23.4 Nanchang -Jiujiang Highway (Case III) If 1,005.79 432.64 1,105.60 29.8
/a December 1995 prices Lb First year benefits (December 1995 prices) Lc Discount rate = 12% /d Two-lane NJH, opening in 1993. /e Four-lane NJH, opening in 1996. Lf Four-lane NJH, assumed opening in 2003. - 38 -
TABLE 10: STATUS OF LEGAL COVENANTS
Cove- Original Revised Agree- nant fulfillment fulfillment ment Section type Status date date Description of covenant Comments
Credit 2.02(b) I C N/A N/A Opens Special Account and operates it according to Schedule 4 of the Development Credit Agreement
3.01(a) 5 C N/A N/A Commitment to project objectives and meeting obligations by Beneficiary under the Project Agreement
3.01(b) 3 C N/A N/A Satisfactory onlending arrangement to Beneficiary
3.02 5 C N/A N/A Compliance with Schedule 3 of the Development Credit Agreement
3.03 5 C N/A N/A Meeting requirements of General Conditions, Sections 9.03-9.08
4.01 1 C N/A N/A Maintaining adequate financial recording and auditing reporting requirement
Project 2.01 5 C N/A N/A Commitmentto project objectives and meeting obligations by Beneficiary under the Project Agreement
2.02 5 C N/A N/A Compliance with Schedule 3 of Development Credit Agreement
2.03 5 C N/A N/A Meeting requirements of General Conditions, Sections 9.03-9.08
2.04(a) 9 C N/A N/A Exchange of views with the Bank 2.04(b) 9 C N/A N/A Informationon interference with project implementation
2.05 12 C N/A N/A Carry out staff training plans as agreed
2.06 7 C N/A N/A Carry out resettlement actions as agreed
Covenant Class: Status: I = Accounts/audits 8 = Indigenous people C = covenant complied with 2 = Financial performance/revenue 9 = Monitoring, review, and reporting CD = complied with after delay generation from beneficiaries 10 = Project implementation not 3 = Flow and utilization of project covered by categories 1-9 funds 11 = Sectoral or cross-sectoral 4 = Counterpart funding budgetary or other resources 5 =Management aspects of the allocation project or executing agency 12 = Sectoral or cross-sectoral policy/ 6 = Environmental covenants regulatory/institutional action 7 = Involuntary resettlement 13 = Other
TABLE 11: COMPLIANCE WITH OPERATIONAL MANUAL STATEMENTS There was no significant lack of compliance with an applicable Bank Operational Manual Statement (OD or OP/BP) -39 -
TABLE 12: BANK RESOURCES: STAFF INPUTS (staff weeks)
FY 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Total
Preappraisal 7.8 19.0 ------26.8
Appraisal - 6.7 11.7 ------18.4
Negotiations - - 7.6 ------7.6
Supervision - - 2.8 8.0 7.2 6.8 9.9 3.8 5.3 5.2 - 43.8
Completion ------7.7 6.0 13.6
Total /a 7.8 25.7 22.1 8.0 7.2 6.8 9.9 3.8 5.3 12.9 6.0 110.3
/a As of July 31, 1996.
TABLE 13: BANK RESOURCES: MISSIONS
Performance rating Specializedl Imple- Devel- Stage of project cycle Month/ No. of Days staff skills mentation opment Type of year persons in field represented ta status /b objectives problems
Identification 03/87 3 6 EN,EC,TE Preparation 07/87 3 6 EC,TS,RA Preappraisal 10/87 3 4 EN,EN,TE Appraisal 01/88 2 5 EN,TE Negotiation 12/88 4 - EN,TE,LC,DO Board approval 02/89 - Signing 03/89 Effective 05/89 - -
Supervision 1 05/89 2 3 EN,EN I I Supervision 2 11/90 1 6 EN 3 1 Supervision 3 06/91 2 6 EN,TP 3 1 Supervision 4 06/92 3 7 EN,EN(cons), 3 1 Lc Op.0 Supervision 5 10/92 3 5 EN,CIS,Op.O 2 1 Supervision6 04/94 1 5 EN 2 1 Supervision 7 and Completion 1 07/95 1 4 EN S S Completion 2 04/96 1 5 RA
LaEN: Engineer, EC: Economist; TE: Transport Economist; TS: Transport Specialist; LC: Legal Counsel; DO: Disbursement Officer; RA: Research Analyst; CIS: Construction Industry Specialist; Op.O: Operation Officer (RMC).
Lb 1: Highly satisfactory; 2: Satisfactory; 3: Unsatisfactory; S: Satisfactory.
/c Typical problems included: poor performance of contractors, the executing agencies' lack of effective management, excessive quality defects. I -41- ANNEX 1
ANNEX 1: ECONOMIC EVALUATION
Preface
1. In the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) for the Jiangxi Provincial Highway Project (Report No. 7430-CHA), the economic evaluation was presented for the construction of: (a) a two-lane highway between Nanchang and Jiujiang; and (b) a new major bridge and approach roads in the southeastern part of Nanchang City.
2. The economic analysis presented in the ICR is based on updated data on traffic, vehicle operating cost (VOC), economic cost and r oad user benefits and revised assumptions regarding future traffic growth rates. The methodology used in the economic analysis for this ICR is similar to that used in the SAR and is summarized as follows:
(a) capital investment and maintenance costs have been revised to reflect constant December 1995 prices and are included in the cost stream;
(b) the benefit stream, also reflect December 1995 prices, and consists of savings in VOC, reduced traffic congestion on the existing road, and cost savings on account of accident reduction;
(c) a project life of 20 years has been assumed and the capital investment period for all roads is from 1989 to 1994 or 1996 depending on the alternatives considered; and
(d) full benefits started to accrue on the Nanchang-Jiujiang Highway in 1993 and on the Nanchang Bridge in 1994.
NANCHANG-JIUJIANG HIGHWAY (NJH)-Two LANE (CASE I)
3. As in the SAR, the NJH was divided into four sections for economic evaluation.
(a) Section 1: from Jiaoqiao (north of Nanchang City) to Aicheng (38.98 km);
(b) Section 2: from Aicheng to De'an (24.54 km);
(c) Section 3: from De'an to Tongyuan (27.09 km); and
(d) Section 4: fromnTongyuan to Jiujiang (22.21 km).
Cost and benefit analysis were carried out separately for each section as well as the highway as a whole. - 42 - ANNEX 1
Corridor Traffic
4. The 1995 corridor traffic and its distribution between the arterial road and NJH is presented in the following table, indicating SAR forecast and actual traffic census data.
NUMBER OF MOTORIZED VEHICLES PER DAY (ADT) FOR 1995
The Arterial Road The New Highway Total Corridor Diversion Factor (DF) (1) (2) (3)=(1)+(2) (4(2)/(3)
SAR Section 1 6,922 5,811 12,733 45.6% Section 2 925 2,160 3,085 70.0% Section 3 534 2,137 2,671 80.0% Section 4 644 2,575 3,220 80.0%
Actual Section 1 1,721 4,522 6,243 72.4% Section 2 1,215 3,294 4,509 73.1% Section 3 993 3,271 4,264 76.7% Section 4 1,451 3,656 5,107 71.6%
(Actual/SAR) Ratios Section 1 24.9% 77.8% 49.0% - Section 2 131.4% 152.5% 146.2% - Section 3 186.0% 153.1% 159.6% - Section 4 225.3% 142.0% 158.7% -
Sources: Jiangxi Provincial High-Class Highway Administration Bureau and Bank staff.
5. As shown above, the 1995 corridor traffic (i.e., the sum of traffic on the parallel sections of the existing arterial road and the new highway), except for Section 1, was much higher than the SAR estimates. The distribution of the corridor traffic between the existing arterial road and NJH, on Sections 2, 3, and 4 were not substantially different from that expected at project appraisal in percentage terms. However, on Section 1 the percentage of traffic diverted was about 27 percent higher than the SAR estimate, based on the SAR forecast and actual volumes of traffic. The Diversion Factor (DF) indicates that in 1995, about 75 percent of the corridor traffic preferred to use the NJH. Although, DF, on the average, differed only slightly from SAR prediction, with the significantly higher corridor traffic growth than forecast, the volume of traffic in 1995 was more than 50 percent higher on the NJH than forecast, except on Section 1 for which the SAR forecast was inexplicable high.
Traffic Projection
6. Normally, the buildup of traffic on a new highway, particularly when it operates as a toll facility, is gradual. Compared with toll highways opened for traffic recently in -43 - ANNEX 1
China, the traffic diversion factor in the early years of opening has been higher on the NJH than on the others. This is likely to be a consequence of the difference of 58.5 km in the length between NJH and the arterial road (171.3 km versus 112.8 km). Because of the high rate of traffic growth in the recent years on most sections of the highway, the ICR estimate for the long-term traffic growth rate (1993-2015) for the NJH is in the range of 8.2 percent and 8.6 percent.
7. The traffic projections by sections are summarized as follows:
TRAFFICFORECAST COMPARISON (ADT)
Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 Section 4 Jiaoqiao- Aicheng- De'an- Tongyuan- Aicheng De'an Tongyuan Jiujiang
SAR 1993 4,693 1,748 1,725 2,088 1994 5,221 1,943 1,919 2,318 1995 5,811 2,160 2,137 2,575 2000 9,983 3,692 3,679 4,390 2010 22,867 8,525 8,602 9,963 2015 34,841 13,042 13,234 15,140 Average growth p.a. 1993-2015 9.6% 9.6% 9.6% 9.6%
ICR 1993 3,239 2,190 2,267 2,432 1994 4,016 2,879 2,903 3,114 1995 4,522 3,294 3,271 3,656 2000 7,118 5,186 5,149 5,756 2010 14,329 10,442 10,367 11,585 2015 18,288 13,327 13,232 14,786 Average growth p.a. 1993-2015 8.2% 8.6% 8.3% 8.6%
Note: All figuresare rounded.
8. The projected traffic for the four sections of the NJH for year 1993-2015, by vehicle type, is detailed in Table IA of this Annex. For years 1993-1995, actual traffic data have been used. For subsequent years, the following growth rates have been assumed: (a) normal traffic is estimated to increase by 9.5 percent between 1995 and 2000, thereafter, the growth rate has been reduced by 1.5 percent for each five-year -44 - ANNEX 1 period to 5 percent in 2015, and (b) the generated traffic in the ICR was assumed to be 10 percent of normal traffic.
9. By comparison, in the SAR the normal traffic growth rate for the NJH was 11.4 percent between 1995 and 2000; 8.6 percent between 2000 and 2005; 8.7 percent between 2005 and 2010; and 8.8 percent between 2010 and 2015. The generated traffic growth rate was assumed to be 10 to 20 percent of the normal traffic. In the SAR, it was assumed that railway passengers would be inclined to divert to the new highway. However, the railway passenger diversion assumption has been eliminated since there has been no sufficient reason to assume that bus fares would be attractive enough to bring about the diversion of rail passengers.
Economic Costs
10. The economic cost reflects the financial cost of civil works (Table 2), adjusted for shadow prices (Table 3). The overall effect of the differences in shadow prices and in financial costs between the SAR and ICR estimates of the economic costs of the NJH, the economic cost in the ICR ( in constant December 1995 prices) is 106.6 percent higher than the SAR estimate.
ECONOMIC COSTCOMPARISON (CASE I) (Y million)
SAR SAR ICR ICR/SAR (Jan 1988) (Dec 1995) (Dec 1995) (in%)
Jiaoqiao-Aicheng 66.20 84.22 202.19 +140.1% Aicheng-De'an 45.60 58.01 90.37 +55.8% De'an-Tongyuan 37.20 47.33 110.01 +132.4% Tongyuan-Jiujiang 41.58 52.90 98.24 +85.7%
Total 190.58 242.46 500.81 +106.6%
Economic Benefits
11. The economic analysis includes the benefits derived from: (a) VOC savings on the new highway for normal and generated traffic, (b) relieved congestion on the existing road, and (c) saving in accident costs. The updated VOC per km for the various types of vehicles is presented in Table 4.
12. Based on the actual redistribution of corridor traffic after the opening of the NJH for traffic, it is estimated that about 75 percent of the vehicles would travel on the new highway. Consequently, congestion on the existing arterial road is expected to be -45 - ANNEX I resulting in 15 percent saving of the VOC between 1993 and 1995. Thereafter, because of the gradual buildup of traffic on the existing arterial road, the savings would be reduced by 1 percent for each of remaining five-year periods to 11 percent by 2015.
13. In 1990, there were, on the average, 1.47 accidents per km per year on the existing arterial road. After the opening of the new highway for traffic, in 1993, the average number of accidents on the arterial road was reduced lto 1.10 per km per year. For estimating road accident cost savings, it was assumed thai:the reduction in the number of accidents, resulting from the construction of the new highway, would be 0.4 accident per km per year at a cost of Y 10,000 for each accident.
Economic Evaluation and Sensitivity Analysis (Case I)
14. Cost and benefit streams, economic rate of return (ERR) and net present value (NPV) for the highway are presented in Table 5A and for the four individual sections of NJH in Table 5a-5d. The overall ERR on the highway investment is estimated to be 30.2 percent versus the SAR estimate of 30.1 percent. Sensitivity Analysis information for SAR and ICR is presented the following table.
Section I Section 2 Section 3 Section 4 Jiaoqiao- Aicheng- De'an- Tongyuan- Total Aicheng De'an Tongyuan Jiujiang Highway
SAR Bestestimate of rate of return 33.6% 31.4% 30.0% 21.9% 30.1% NPV (12%, million Yuan) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 20% increase in costs and best estimate of benefits 30.6% 28.4% 27.2% 19.9% 27.5% NPV (12%, million Yuan) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 20% decrease in benefits and best estimate of costs 29.9% 27.4% 26.6% 19.4% 26.7% NPV (12%, million Yuan) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 20% increase in costs and 20% decrease in benefits 27.2% 25.6% 24.9% 17.6% 24.2% (%) NPV (12%, million Yuan) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
ICR Best estimate of rate of return 39.3 34.8 18.8 14.4 30.2 NPV(12%,millionYuan) 620.0 222.6 64.9 19.6 927.1 20% decrease in benefits and best estimate of costs 33.9 29.9 15.7 11.7 25.8 NPV (12%, million Yuan) 459.9 161.9 32.3 (1.9) 652.2
NANCHANG-JIUJIANGHIGHWAY (NJH)-FoUR-LANE (CASE II)
15. The implementation of the two-lane NJH was still proceeding when Jiangxi Province decided to widen the NJH from two lanes to a four-lane divided highway, financed from the Province's own resources. The construction of the widening started in 1994 and is expected to be fully completed by the end of 1996. However, the second carriageway was already opened for traffic in early 1996. The estimated economic cost of the investment is about Y 505.00 million (in constant December 1995 prices) (Table 2). The four-lane NJH is expected to further reduce VOC in terms of less fuel consumption, increased travel speed and reduced congestion. The ERR for the four-lane -46 - ANNEX I highway is estimated to be 23.4 percent. (Table SB). Moreover, there is a potential for a higher rate of generated traffic than assumed because NJH has been operating as a four- lane divided highway from early 1996, and therefore, traffic and ERR estimates for the ICR could turn out to be somewhat conservative.
16. Nevertheless, a lower ERR for the four-lane alternative (Case II) versus the two- lane version of the NJH indicated that despite a higher-than-expected traffic growth, the investment in the widening of the NJH may have been premature. An additional analysis has indicated that a close to optimum timing for providing the second carriageway would have been in year 2003, by which time, according to ICR assumptions, the traffic volume would be in the range of 6,000-7,000 vpd, a threshold of capacity constraint for a two- lane highway. The estimated ERR for such scenario (Case III) is 29.8 percent (Table 5C), which is very close to the ERR percentage for the two-lane NJH (Case I) of 30.2 percent (Table 5A).
CONNECTING ROAD
17. Originally, the southern point of the NJH was supposed to be joined to the existing arterial road at Jiaoqiao, and from a point south on the arterial road, a 6-km connecting road was planned to link up with the Nanchang Bridge Complex (NBC). The economic cost of the connecting road was estimated at Y 24.22 million (or Y 30.81 million in December 1995 prices) but an economic evaluation for this 6-km link was not presented in the SAR. This earlier concept for the Connecting Road had been reconsidered by the Province and JPTD submitted to the Bank a feasibility study for a revised scheme in 1992, according to which the southern end of the NJH was to be connected to the NBC with a 12-km four-lane Class 1 highway on a more direct alignment. The feasibility study's proposal was reviewed by the Bank in December 1992 and was found to be viable with an ERR of 14.7 percent at an economic cost of Y 204.5 million, which included the cost of the construction of the Changling Interchange. Because the need for an additional interchange at Shalljia and several other structures to provide grade separation for local and through traffic, the economic cost of the Connecting Road increased by about 24 percent to Y 253.55 million (Table 2).
18. The feasibility study's traffic forecast of an average 8,500 vpd for 1995 have not materialized. As indicated in Table lb, the 1995 traffic reached the level of only about 5,400 vph on the average, about 37 percent below the expected level, which represents only about 50 percent of the traffic of the NJH at its southern end. This indicates that about half of the NJH traffic is diverting to the existing arterial road as its main access route to the Nanchang City area.
19. The actual and forecast traffic for the Connecting Road is shown in Table IB, indicating an estimated average annual growth rate of about 7.1 percent (1995-2015). Because of the substantially lower traffic level and the higher financial cost than forecast, the ERR estimate for the Connecting Road is only 4.3 percent (Table 6). Since the Connecting Road is the extension of the NJH and its main purpose is to provide a direct -47 - ANNEX 1 link to the NBC, it could be treated as an integral part of the overall corridor improvement. The combined ERR or the two-lane NJEI (Case I) and the Connecting Road is estimated at 25.0 percent.
NANCHANG BRIDGE COMPLEX (NBC)
Background
20. Until the completion of the NBC, the Nanchang City and the national and provincial road networks traversing the City had been served by two bridges across the Gan River: (a) the Ganjiang Bridge, built in 1963 primarily as a railway bridge, is located on the north side of the city. It also accommodates road traffic but only cars and small-size trucks. Its pavement has been in poor condition and its capacity is severely limited, and the average speed of traffic across the bridge is only about 10 km per hour; and (b) the Bayi Bridge, built in 1937 to a low standard, is located on the northwestern side of the city. Despite its geometric and structural limitations, the bridge still carries a high proportion of the east-west traffic across the Gan River. Without the new Nanchang Bridge, which is located in southeast Nanchang City, land transport across the Gan River would have been severely constrained.
Traffic Demand
21. After the opening of the NBC the distribution of the traffic among the three bridges has been as shown in the following table compared to SAR estirnates.
TRAFFIC DISTRIBUTION ACROSS THE GAN RIVER (ADT) IN 1995
Bayi Ganjiang Nanchang Bridge (New) Diversion Factor (DF) Bridge Bridge From From Grand Bayi Ganjiang Overall (Old) (Old) Bayi Ganjiang Total Total Bridge Bridge Average (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)= (6)= (7)= (8)= (9) 3+4 1+2+5 3/(1+3) 41(2+4)
ICR (actual) 6,686 2,114 9,437 2,984 12,421 21,221 58.5% 58.5% 58.5% SAR(estimate) 9,176 1,584 17.038 6,333 23,371 34,131 65.0% 80.0% 68.4% ICR/SAR 72.9% 133.4% 55.4% 47.1% 53.1% 62.2% - - -
Sources: City Construction Bureau of Nanchang and the Bank staff.
Traffic on the New Nanchang Bridge
22. Compared with the SAR, the traffic demand across the Gan River in 1995 was only 62.2 percent of the SAR forecast. Traffic diversion to the new bridge has also been lower than expected; 58.5 versus 68.4 percent. Combined effect of these factors is that the traffic on the new Nanchang Bridge is only 53.1 percent of the SAR forecast (12,421 versus 23,371 AADT). The lower-than-expected traffic on the Nanchang Bridge could be attributable to the following: (a) despite the poor conditions of the two older bridges, still - 48 - ANNEX I more than 40 percent of the corridor traffic uses these bridges, which most likely provide shorter origin and destination routes for the central part of Nanchang City; (b) the buildup of through traffic that would bypass the City or traffic which would have more convenient entry to the southeast part of the City from the new bridge, still has not taken place; (c) the tolling of the new bridge likely presented a greater-than-expected deterrent to road users.
23. In the absence of a comprehensive traffic origin and destination survey, it could be assumed that the actual growth rates of the recent years and the distribution of traffic will not change substantially in the foreseeable future, particularly, since Nanchang Municipality has recently commenced construction of a new Bayi Bridge in the city center to increase overall corridor capacity across the Gan River, which will eliminate the bottleneck effect of the present Bayi Bridge.
Traffic Projection
24. Consequently, a conservative approach was taken for the ICR's traffic projection for the NBC because overall traffic demand across the Gan River has been much lower than expected, and it is unlikely that present DF would increase more than marginally in the foreseeable future. Therefore, the long-term traffic growth rate (1995-2015) for the new NBC was assumed to be in the range of 4.5 percent versus 8.8 percent assumed in the SAR. Traffic volumes and traffic growth rates for each of the three bridges are shown in Table I B, and summarized below:
TRAFFIC FORECASTFOR THE THREE BRIDGES(ADT)
Bayi Ganjiang Nanchang Total Bridge Bridge Bridge Traffic
SAR 1995 9,176 1,584 23,371 34,131 2000 14,887 2,589 37,994 55,470 2010 32,328 5,755 83,040 121,123 2015 47,931 8,599 123,390 179,920 Average growth p.a. 1995-2015 8.6% 8.8% 8.7% 8.7%
ICR 1995 6,686 2,114 12,421 21,221 2000 9,272 2,360 15,819 27,451 2010 16,302 3,662 24,568 44,532 2015 20,690 4,455 29,890 55,035 Average growth p.a. 1995-2015 5.8% 3.8% 4.5% 4.9%
Note: All figures are rounded. -49 - ANNEX 1
Economic Costs
25. All costs necessary for the completion of the civil works have been taken into account in the economic evaluation. All inputs and outputs have been evaluated in constant December 1995 economic prices (Table 2). Financial costs have been converted to economic costs by shadow pricing using a factor of 0.98, which is the overall conversion factor used for civil works.
26. In the ICR, the overall effect of shadowed economic costs for the NBC (in constant December 1995 prices) was 16.8 percent higher than the current costs (Table 2) and 94.9 percent higher than the SAR estimate.
PROJECT ECONOMIC COST COMPALRISON (Y million)
SAR SAR ICR ICR/SAR (Jan 1988) (Dec 1995) (Dec 1995) (in %)
Nanchang Bridge 156.00 194.45 379.03 +94.9% Complex
Economic Benefits
27. Based on the actual traffic volumes, it was estimated that about 58.5 percent of traffic from the two existing bridges would divert to the new bridge. Less traffic on the two existing and the inner city street network would reduce the congestion and VOC of the vehicles. It was assumed that 15 percent of the VOC would be saved between 1993 and 1995. Thereafter, because of the gradual buildup of traffic on the two existing bridges and the street network, the savings would be reduced by 1 percent for each of the remaining five-year periods to 11 percent by 2015.
28. In 1993, before the completion of the new bridge, the total number of accidents for the two old bridges were more than 10 accidents per year. In 1995, after the opening of the new bridge for traffic, the total number of accidents for the two old bridges was reduced to two accidents per year. For estimating road accident cost savings, it was assumed that the reduction in the number of accidents, resulting from the construction of the new bridge, would be nine accidents per year at a cost of Y 10,000 for each accident.
Economic Evaluation and Sensitivity Analysis
29. Table 5D presents the ERR, NPV, first-year return and sensitivity calculations for the NBC. The ERR of the new bridge is estimated 16.6 percent versus the SAR estimate - 50 - ANNEX 1 of 38 percent. Compared with the SAR, the sensitivity of the ERR and NPV of the project to variations in costs and benefits are summarized as follows:
SAR ICR
Best estimate of rate of return 38.0% 16.6% NPV (12%, Y million) n.a. 106.1
20% decrease in benefits and best estimate of costs 33.6% 13.8% NPV (12%, Y million) n.a. 28.5
THE OVERALLECONOMIC RATE OF RETURN
30. The overall ERR for investment in the civil works components of the project, including the two-lane NJH (Case I), the Connecting Road and the NBC is 22.6 percent and NPV (at 12 percent) is Y 934 million. In the SAR, an overall ERR and NPV for the same components were not presented.
Bridge Highway Total
Best estimate of rate of return (%) ICR 16.6 25.0/a 22.6 SAR 38.0 30.1 n.a.
NPV (12%, Y million, December 1995 prices) ICR 106.1 827.9 934.0 SAR n.a. n.a. n.a.
/a Including the Connecting Road. Table I A: Nanchang-Jiujiang Highway Traffic Summary (ADT)
Width (DD)/_LI N. ot o lane Geodkrlert(1k. I.%)12 Road clss Road6 ud4loe Ag. peed k..oer) > I Ii III IV I II Ill IV I II Ill IV I ItIIl IV I 11 III IV I It III IV
Old rood: Oroad7.00 7.50 6.00 6.00 3 2 2 F F It U It it 11 It rd FairForn Far ok as1 5 33 5 31 0 b 7.75 7.75 6.75 6.75 13.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% (Paved) (Paved) (Po.ed) (Paved) New road: o 9.0 9.0 9,0 9.0 2 2 2 2 F F If hl I I I I Good Goodood Cood 70 70 70 70 b 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 2.0% 3.5% 3.1% 4.0% (Paved) (Po.d) (Paved) (Paved) Z
-S .. II Car ------Medloa. B.- -- L.oge ou-- --- S..l Trudk-- -- Medlom Truck- -- LArge Trock-- -Trclor-Traer--- To-- Rood Wilbot- Wilboul Wlihoot WUhlol Wll.ott Without Without Wiltout kegtb (hok) pr,ject Wdbl Proje)t project Will Prj,ect project Will Project prolect Wllb Projelt project Wilh ProJect project Wlth Project project Wll Project project Wltb ProJect
Old New Old New Old Old New Old Old New Old Old New Old Old New Old Old Now Old OW New Old Old New Old > rood rood road rood rood rood rood rd rood road road road rood rood rood rood rod road rood road rood rood rood rood road road >
SectIon 1: .Ilooqloo Akl.oerg
1993 75.00 35.98 993 710 283 757 561 196 254 182 112 742 426 316 1.261 970 291 4119 256 233 170 134 36 4.706 3,239 1,467 t 1994 1.423 994 429 969 713 256 310 203 107 871 597 274 1,385 1,103 2U2 497 269 225 157 137 20 5.612 4,016 1.596 C_ 1995 1,717 171,42 573 1.,I115 93 315 3214 223 151 917 655 232 1,454 I.212 272 525 303 222 135 154 4 6.2,43 4.522 1,721 1~ > 20G0 2.6 04 1.76 126°43 442 493 31 142 1.403 5785 3225 2.209 1.958 381 700 477 312 2458 242 6 9,531 7,115 2 413 ' 2005 3.827 i642 1,185 I561.857 649 724 516 208 2.562 1.584 478 3.363 2,803 560 1,158 701 457 364 356 8 14.004 10,459 3.545 Z 2010 5.243 3,620 1,623 3.433 2544 889 992 707 253 2.825 2,170 655 4,608 3.840 768 1,587 960 627 499 488 11 19.187 14,329 4,858 2015 6,692 4.620 2072 4.382 3,247 1.135 1.266 902 364 3,606 2,770 836 .5081 4,901 980 2,525 1,225 806 637 623 14 24,489 18,255 6,201 0 Accoo26005 5.355 ~' . Setlcdo 11:W Akh.- Dea-
1553 42.00 2454 834 530 304 549 386 163 162 113 49 583 318 265 915 611 304 251 152 99 118 80 38 3.412 2190 1.222 = 1994 1,113 769 344 654 516 178 ISO 134 46 760 461 299 947 731 216 234 177 57 101 91 10 4,029 2879 1,150 1995 1.196 847 349 784 556 198 235 161 74 805 500 297 1.088 867 221 254 216 68 117 109 8 4,509 3,294 1,215 2W0 18622 1335 489 1.201 923 278 3157 253 104 1,217 505 417 1,670 1.365 515 435 340 9S 183 172 11 6.890 S.186 1.704 > 2005 Z6,7 1.959 719 1.764 1,356 408 524 372 152 1,787 1,175 612 2,461 2,056 455 640 500 140 269 223 16 10.123 7.621 2,52 2010 3.569 2,054 905 2.417 1,358 559 719 315 209 2,445 1.610 039 3.372 2,748 624 877 651 192 370 247 23 13,873 10.442 5,431 2055 4,664 3.026 19258 3,805 2371 714 918 651 267 3,125 2055 1,070 4.303 3,507 72 1.119 874 245 472 543 29 17,700 13.327 4,379 0 Al..oaRood 0.35o Sec..G 111 DII aTo-T-gy"a
1993 3070 2709 719 549 170 509 400 109 172 117 55 491 329 162 852 633 219 357 157 200 149 82 67 3.249 2267 982 _ 1994 1,055 761 294 665 519 146 167 138 29 S42 A57 85 96 7 ?52 215 243 i83 60 1UY 93 16 3,748 2903 845 °995 ::77 030 367 7SU 579 171 182 162 20 628 498 130 1.116 865 251 276 225 51 115 112 3 4?264 3,271 993 15503 1822 3007 SIS l,ISt 911 240 283 255 ?3 966 724 182 1,7U4 1,362 3S2 426 354 72 1I0 176 4 6.542 5,149 1,393 25s 2,676 1,920 756 1,691 1.339 352 416 375 41 1,420 1,152 268 2,318 2,001 517 625 520 105 265 259 6 9,611 7,366 2,045 0 2010 3667 2,631 1.036 2318 1,935 483 570 514 56 1.945 1,378 367 3.451 2742 709 856 712 144 363 355 8 13,170 10,367 2803 U 2015 4.681 3,358 1.323 2958 2342 616 728 656 72 2,482 Z,14 468 4.404 3,500 904 1,093 909 14 464 453 11 16,810 13.232 3,578 A".. Road a 00 ; S-coUoIV: Tgy0a -Jlujimng 3 1993 23.60 22.21 857 587 270 605 433 172 209 125 84 656 352 304 1,118 695 423 227 157 70 124 83 41 3,796 2,432 1,364 I994 979 799 180 706 561 145 253 152 101 852 479 373 1.402 844 558 287 184 103 124 95 29 4,603 3.114 1,409 1995 1.275 914 361 804 653 231 297 183 114 793 548 245 1,439 1,007 432 287 233 54 132 118 14 5.107 3,656 1,451 205w 1,945 1,439 506 1,352 1,028 324 448 286 160 1.207 063 344 2,191 1,S59 606 443 367 76 206 116 20 7.792 5,756 2,036 25063 8N5 2,114 744 i.986 1I310 476 658 423 235 1.773 1,268 305 3,219 2,329 8590 650 539 III 302 273 29 11,446 8,456 2,990 2010 3,915 2,896 1.019 2.721 2,69 652 902 580 322 2,429 1.737 692 4,411 3.191 1,220 090 738 152 414 374 40 153682 11.585 4.097 2015 4,997 3,690 1,301 3,473 2641 032 1,131 740 411 3,100 2,217 883 5,630 4,073 1,557 1.137 942 195 527 477 50 20,015 14,786 5,229 Ac.e. Rood 0.00 Tolo 1L3 N.Dcbaoogy.Jlblg HlIIrway A: 171.30 112.02 1: 171.30 113.87 ,
II: a Road poemeoo b: Wih oodbed. /_2: F: FIK H: Hidy. M: Muow.Ooio.r. 1 3: WA 0d01the accea.rod; B: d:th occh roa. . /4: All 1h. bgora a.ood.d.ace Table I B: Nanchang Bridge Complex and Connecting Road Traffic Summary (ADI) m
Southern AcceSS Rond: Grtktlt Awverge No. of of Ion.I Aver-g, oped (kbo ,>) Vidth No. of (m,nL Rood Rood perd Bridge Wdth to) Li (o,lepkt$. Yor) C-dtlon/(Paveet) T.tl blddgtengthb() (0,)'_3 tn. b%) doss condtiton Qsdbour)
Con- a, Gon. NMn- C..- NMo-o.8n- Nun- Old Iood 81Yt II Fdor 45.0 Doyi pW.g ch"^g Ba3yl panyg otrg Hoyt oig oboe5 Boyt (tng rhung a 9.00 2 ------b ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1.505% -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~Noevrood@ A. 7.0 9.0 21.0 2 2 12 Pole Peor CGod I5-0 10 40 72.50 4 Ylo I Good 80.0 > b. 10.0 18.7 10.4 (5933) (1l63) (19"4) (Pa0d) (Pawd) (PAved) 1,26.50 1,226.13 2,790.00 b 2.50 2%
Trn-.port -- S.o C -- -Medlum Bu.--- - Lre Hu- -- 1 Truck- -Medium Trueb------l.rg Truck- -. Troctr(Trker- T-Utl; 0tt.0- 1k.u) WVtbout vWh Proleot vWthout With Projeot sAth.ot Witb Projet Without Wit Proect Withuot With Project Wtihout WmthProject Withorut Wih Projeot Witiout With Project by ul.g /2 project - - projeCt proeJct --- projet pr,*ftt ____-_ proj.ot project - prqeclt Shift4t1. StoYlO Shiftttu styti - Ibtttto ittt 1. Shifito sty -.- -. Ot L. sheyho ShOtto stoy h - - Shitttftt. 5y0 - - Shifttt Stoyt Old N O0d the new tb eld Old the oe theoid Od the oe thheold Old the ne, the old Old the uce the old Old the new theold Otd the resw tht old Old the .,w tbrold brldg bldgp bridge bridge brdgp bridge bridge briddg bridge brbrldde dg. bridge bridge bIdge brbt bVidge brldp bhldd bridge brdge bbridge 0dg4 bridge bridge bridge /Rood IRe d ARood /IRoed /Rood Mond /Rmod /Rod /Rood (Rood (Rood (Rood (Rosd /Rood /Rnod Mood (Rood (Rood fRood (Rood /Rood (Rood (Road /Rood (Rood oRnod
Royl Bridge: 17.00 13500 1995 4.070 2855 2,023 4,360 2.552 1,.00 152 89 63 3.658 2.141 1.517 1,630 954 676 919 538 381 526 308 218 161.23 9.437 6,6K0 > 2000 80700 3,815 4,965 3,90 3.410 2.498 982 59 063 3.523 2,861 662 1,559 1,275 294 719 719 0 411 411 0 21S82 1Z610 9272 ., . > 2005 10.03) 4,951 6,807 6.750 4.425 3.464 1.122 154 1,156 4,025 3713 918 1,781 1,654 394 821 932 0 470 534 0 25.000 16.363 12,S57 2010 t0,031 6,070 8,729 6.750 5.425 4.392 1,l22 189 1,518 4,025 4.552 1,164 1.751 2.020 499 sit 1,143 0 470 654 0 25,000 20,061 16,302 < > 2013 10.031 7,441 11,07j 6.750 6,651 57: :,122 232 1.926 4,025 3.780 1,477 1.781 2,487 634 t21 1,40! A 470 802 0 25.000 24,594 20,690
tloftuu Bridge: 20.00 13.00 20.0e 4030affi 401 284 579 339 240 277 162 1IS 514 301 213 164 96 6a ,652 567 0s 1,227 71S 509 5.098 2.984 X114 2000 10064 431 633 635 364 271 175 175 0 1,342 323 1.019 540 103 437 1,040 1,040 0 773 77 0 5.569 3.209 2,3600 2005 1322 315 007 781 435 346 205 209 0 1,060 256 1.300 600 123 357 1,241 1,241 0 522 522 0 6,841 t831 3,010 2010 1587 005 902 533 312 421 240 246 0 27035 454 1.581 823 tOS 670 1,400 1,460 0 1,0S5 1.085 0 8.169 4.507 3.662 2015 1,96 711 1,1953 1,112 601 511 205 209 0 2,458 534 1.924 95 170 323 1.716 1,716 0 1.275 1.275 0 9,751 3206 4,453 NeenehoogBridge: 13.00 1990 7.256 2,091 251 2.442 1.050 1,505 1.026 12.421 2000 4.246 3,774 294 1084 1.378 1,759 1.1I4 15,819 2003 5.466 4,060 363 4,099 1.777 2,173 1.456 20.194 2010 6.675 5,937 435 5,096 2,173 2,603 1,739 24.536 2015 8,152 7,252 521 6.114 2,657 3.117 2.077 29.S0 o
Connetdng Rood > 9.00 12.500t 1994 3,1376 .23 1,S98 1,515 833 982 458 215 253 1,451 743 708 2.456 1.182 1.274 310 274 36 173 141 32 9,809 ,626 5,183 1995 3504 1,499 2,085 Z031 957 1.061 490 239 251 1,560 055 669 2462 1.295 1.164 342 522 20 177 163 12 10.654 5.392 3.262 2550 323 2206 2,924 2.900 1.492 1.480 720 360 552 2.321 1.305 530 3.616 1,903 1.633 523 495 28 271 254 17 15,661 8.281 7.380 2005 7.694 5,388 4,256 4.376 2t192 2.186 1.55 441 5127 3.410 2032 1,378 5,313 2914 2399 760 727 41 398 373 25 23.009 12.167 15.842 2010 10478 4,642 50836 59.9 3.003 2995 1,449 741 708 4.672 2,784 1,080 7,279 3,552 3,287 1.052 996 56 595 311 84 31.523 16,669 14.854 2015 132436 5924 7512 7.65 3,833 3,822 1,850 946 044 5.563 3.553 Z410 9.290 5.095 4,195 1.312 1,271 71 605 652 43 40,231 22,274 18.957 _
1_1: roudtmdbd b: WAindthtofthe bridge. LI2 The loW oWupon dieto.ose, b n Qiuyounpu (or Ji3prshw) od Chnngloio (m Chrgbeo). we: * QiOrrpu-oky-.0*isnridp-Cthwibe;: 20.400 k. b. QvOryuopu-yBuiBrIWdV-ChoS&but 17.08 khm. c. Qinomupo-ctky.Nnhro WSidge-Ctha 13.00 Som. d. Chagbei-ChegglAo& S.00 ten. _3: Rooo povp urnd. b: Rln od. -53 - ANNEX 1
TABLE 2: PROJECT COST SUMPVARY (Y million)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Total
A. Financial Cost (current price)
Nanchang-Jiujlang Highway- Two-Lane (NJH-Case 1) Jiaoqiao-Alcheng 17.56 9.19 24.05 40.36 24.03 59.39 174.58 Alcheng-De an 7.91 4.14 10.83 18.17 10.81 26.30 78.16 Dean-Tonyuan 9.61 5.02 13.17 22.09 13.16 31.98 95.03 Tongyuan-JiuJiang 8.57 4.49 11.75 19.70 11.32 28.52 84.85
Subtotal 43.65 22.84 59.80 100.32 59.82 146.19 432.62
Connecting Road 41.54 :141.22 45.69 228.45
NJH-Case 1 43.65 22.84 59.80 141.86 201.04 191.88 661.07
NanchangBridgeComplex(NBC) 12.02 23.94 50.70 55.98 150.16 31.73 324.53
Total 55.67 46.78 110.50 197.84 151.20 223.61 985.60
Nanchang-Jiujiang Highway- Four-Lane (Case II) Jiaoqiao-Aicheng 62.26 83.66 48.64 194.56 Aicheng-De'an 32.34 43.46 25.27 101.07 De'an-Tongyuan 38.71 52.02 30.24 120.97 Tongyuan-Jiujlang 29.54 39.70 23.08 92.32
NJH-Case II 162.85 218.84 127.23 508.92
Grand Total 55.67 46.78 110.50 197.84 351.20 386.46 218.84 127.23 1494.52
B. Economic Cost (December 1995 constant prices)
NanchangJiujiang Highway- Two-Lane (NJH-Case 1) JiaoqiaG-Alcheng 24.27 11.47 30.87 47.91 26.S2 60.85 202.19 Alcheng-De an 10.90 5.16 13.87 21.52 12.04 26.88 90.37 De'an-Tongyuan 13.26 6.25 16.89 26.19 14.67 32.75 110.01 Tongyuan-Jlujiang 11.84 5.59 15.07 23.36 [3.19 29.19 98.24
Subtotal 60.27 28.47 76.70 118.98 !66.72 149.67 500.81
Connecting Road 49.27 157.50 46.7S 2S3.55
NJH-Case I 60.27 28.47 76.70 168.25 2.2 196.45 754.36
Nanchang Bridge Compler (NBC) 16.06 32.42 64.39 65.69 168.08 32.39 379.03
Total 76.33 60.89 141.09 233.94 392.30 228.84 1133.39
NanchangJujiuang Highway- Four-Lane (Case II) Jlaoqlao-Alcheng 63.6S 83.66 45.72 193.06 Aicheng-De'an 33.08 43.46 23.75 100.29 De an-Tongyuan 39.59 52.02 28.42 120.03 Tongyuan-Jiujiang 30.21 :39.70 21.69 91.60
NJH-Case II 166.56 218.84 119.58 504.98
Grand Total 76.33 60.89 141.09 233.94 39230 395.40 218.84 119.58 1638.37
1_1: Al the figures are rounded.
Aug-96 Table 3: Shadow Price Calculation (Y million)
Jlaoilao-AUcbeng Alcheng-Deaa De'an-Tongyua TonguasJlAjlaag Conver ...... Total *loen- --- Financal-.------Economic ----- Finacal------Ecomc ------Economic -- Flnncial------Ecoaomk project factor Local Foreign Total Total Local Foreign Ttotl Total Local Foreign Total Total Local Foreign Total Total
Land 1.00 13.49 0.00 13.49 13.49 6.07 0.00 6.07 6.07 7.38 0.00 7.38 7.38 6.60 0.00 6.60 6.60 Labor: Unskilled 1.00 1.94 0.67 2.61 2.61 1.46 0.50 1.96 1.96 1.07 0.36 1.43 1.43 1.90 0.00 1.90 1.90 Seml skilled/Tecaiciam 0.67 5.83 2.02 7.85 5.93 2.62 0.89 3.51 2.65 3.20 1.09 4.29 3.23 3.17 0.00 3.17 2.12 Supervleor 2.00 2.37 1.01 3.38 5.75 1.07 0.45 1.52 2.59 1.30 0.54 1.84 3.14 1.16 0.18 1.34 2.50 Materls: Steel 1.00 8.53 3.47 12,00 12.00 2.96 1.23 4.19 4.19 4.66 1.86 6.52 6.52 2.91 1.80 4.71 4.71 Tlmber 1.00 1.29 0.45 1.74 1.74 0.58 0.19 0.77 0.77 0.71 0.24 0.95 0.95 0.63 0.47 1.10 1.10 Cement 1.00 10.37 3.60 13.97 13.97 3.79 1.29 5.08 5.08 5.67 1.92 7.59 7.59 3.80 0.92 4.72 4.72 Sand 0.80 2.63 0.91 3.54 3.01 1.48 0.51 1.99 1.69 1.44 0.49 1.93 1.64 1.60 0.00 1.60 1.28 Stone 0.80 10.60 3.68 14.28 12.16 5.06 1.72 6.78 5.77 5.80 1.97 7.77 6.61 5.50 0.00 5.50 4.40 C Bitumen 1.00 3.59 1.70 5.29 5.29 2.20 0.94 3.14 3.14 1.96 0.90 2.86 2.86 2.39 0.00 2.39 2.39 Others 0.80 13.20 4.59 17.79 15.15 5.95 2.02 7.97 6.78 7.23 2.46 9.69 8.24 6.45 0.66 7.11 5.82 Fuel:O ^ Diesl 1.00 8.78 3.05 11.83 11.83 3.95 1.34 5.29 5.29 4.81 1.63 6.44 6.44 4.29 0.00 4.29 4.29 GasolIne 1.00 1.29 0.45 1.74 1.74 0.58 0.19 0.77 0.77 0.71 0.24 0.95 0.95 0.63 0.00 0.63 0.63 BeasyoIl 1.00 0.13 0.05 0.18 0.18 0.06 0.02 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.07r Others 1.00 0.38 0.13 0.51 0.51 0.17 0.06 0.23 0.23 0.20 0.07 0.27 0.27 0.18 0.00 0.18 0.18 Water 0.80 0.23 0.08 0.31 0.26 0.11 0.14 00.00.2 0.13 0.04 0.17 0.14 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.08 Electricity 1.50 3.11 1.08 4.19 5.75 1.40 0.48 1.88 2.58 1.70 0.57 2.27 3.12 1.52 0.00 1.52 2.28 _ Construction 1.00 9.72 3.37 13.09 13.09 4.37 1.49 5.86 5.86 5.32 1.81 7.13 7.13 4.75 0.00 4.75 4.75 Mechanicalequlpmnest 1.00 23.90 13.91 37.81 37.81 10.78 6.13 16.91 16.91 13.12 7.44 20.56 20.56 11.72 13.20 24.92 24.92 Others 0.80 8.20 0.78 8.98 7.34 3.67 0.35 4.02 3.29 4.46 0.44 4.90 4.01 3.98 4.27 8.25 7.45
Total 129.58 45.00 174.58 169.61 58.33 19.83 78.16 75.82 70.94 24.09 95.03 92.30 63.35 21.50 84.85 S4.85
Overall conversion factor 0.97 0.97 0.97 1.00 0.98
/1: All the figuree are rounded. /2: Shadow encbange rate . 1.0.
Aug-96 -55 - ANNEX I
TABLE 4: ECONOMIC VEHICLE OPERATING COSTS (Y per km, December 1995 prices)
- PFa'ir - Poo r FlatRoil Hill Mount. Flat Roll Hill Mount. ilatRol Hill Mount
A. Highway(2 lanes)
SmaUcar 0.472 0.493 0.509 0.557 0.579 0.595 0.721 0.743 0.759 Smallbus 0.880 1.044 1.178 1.212 1.408 1.568 1.551 1.729 1.S89 Medium bus 1.387 1.611 1.805 1.961 2.246 2.478 2.585 2.835 3.067 Large bus 1.541 1.879 2.180 2.267 2.730 3.111 2.747 3.194 3.575 Smalltruck 0.664 0.830 0.955 0.745 0.911 1.035 0.911 1.056 1.201 Mediumtruck 0.698 0.860 1.022 0.769 0.945 1.105 0.929 1.105 1.281 Large truck 0.920 1.127 1.334 1.050 1.276 1.475 1.249 1.475 1.688 Tractor/trailer 1.736 2.290 2.769 1.999 2.602 3.110 2.380 2.951 3.475
B. Highway(4 lanes)
Smallcar 0.440 0.460 0.475 0.518 0.538 0.553 0.671 0.691 0.706 Smallbus 0.813 0.965 1.089 1.052 1.222 1.361 1.346 1.500 1.639 Mediumbus 1.281 1.488 1.667 1.702 1.949 2.150 2.244 2.461 2.662 Large bus 1.436 1.751 2.031 1.975 2.378 2.710 2.393 2.782 3.114 SmaDtruck 0.625 0.781 0.899 0.702 0.858 0.975 0.858 0.995 1.132 Mediumtruck 0.664 0.818 0.972 0.730 0.897 1.049 0.882 1.049 1.216 Large truck 0.880 1.078 1.276 1.006 1.223 1.414 1.197 1.414 1.618 Tractor/trailer 1.646 2.171 2.625 1.898 2.471 2.953 2.260 2.802 3.300
C Bridge
Smallcar 0.511 0.534 0.551 0.636 0.661 0.679 0.824 0.849 0.867 Smallbus 1.107 1.314 1.483 1.676 1.947 2.168 2.144 2.389 2.610 Medium bus 1.744 2.026 2.270 2.712 3.106 3.426 3.576 3.922 4.242 Large bus 1.982 2.417 2.803 3.162 3.807 4.339 3.831 4.454 4.986 Smalltruck 0.681 0.851 0.980 0.788 0.963 1.094 0.963 1.117 1.271 Medium truck 0.714 0.880 1.046 0.810 0.995 1.164 0.979 1.164 1.349 Large truck 0.933 1.143 1.353 1.095 1.331 1.539 1.303 1.539 1.761 Tractor/trailer 1.796 2.369 2.864 2.102 2.737 3.271 2.503 3.103 3.654
Note: Withoutthe project,both the road conditionand flowwill deteriorate quicklly with high traffic growth and shifttowards heavier vehicles. Considered 2% p.a.cost increase.
Sources:Jiangxi Provincial Transport Departmernt and the Bank.
Aug-96 - 56 - ANNEX 1
TABLE 5A: ECONOMIC EVALUATION AND SENSITIVE ANALYSIS NANCHANG-JIUJIANG HIGHWAY-TWO-LANE (CASE I) (Y million, December 1995 prices)
Base Case
Cost - Benefi - VOC Reduced Net /2 Net Gemr- Cong.On Reduced Net Total Consit Road Sav- ated Exisd Accid- Cash Benefits Year -ction MainL Total mtga Traffic Road ens Total Flow (-20%)
Total Nanchang-Jiujiang Highway
1989 60.27 60.27 (60.27) (60.27) 1990 28.47 28.47 (28.47) (28.47) 1991 76.70 76.70 (76.7) (76.70) 1992 118.98 118.98 (119.0) (118.98) 1993 66.72 25.04 91.76 86.13 4.32 6.30 0.46 97.21 5.45 (13.99) 1994 149.67 25.04 174.71 113.38 5.66 6.42 0.46 125.92 (48.79) (73.98) 1995 0.00 25.04 25.04 135.79 6.80 7.08 0.46 150.13 125.09 95.07 1996 0.00 25.04 25.04 156.11 7.12 7.24 0.46 171.63 146.59 112.26 1997 25.04 25.04 179.55 S.99 7.41 0.46 196.41 171.37 132.10 1998 25.04 25.04 206.57 10.34 7.59 0.46 224.96 199.92 154.93 1999 25.04 25.04 237.77 11.90 7.77 0.46 257.90 232.86 181.28 2000 25.04 25.04 273.79 13.70 7.94 0.46 295.89 270.85 211.67 2001 25.04 25.04 308.79 15.44 8.09 0.46 332.78 307.74 241.18 2002 25.04 25.04 348.32 17.41 8.25 0.46 374.4 349.40 274.52 2003 /-1 37.56 37.56 392.97 19.63 8.41 0.46 421.47 383.91 299.62 2004 /_1 37.56 37.56 443.41 22.14 8.57 0.46 474.5S 437.02 342.10 2005 25.04 25.04 500.43 25.03 8.74 0.46 534.66 509.62 402.69 2006 25.04 25.04 500.43 25.03 8.74 0.46 534.66 509.62 402.69 2007 25.04 25.04 500.43 25.03 8.74 0.46 534.66 509.62 402.69 2008 25.04 25.04 500.43 25.03 8.74 0.46 534.66 509.62 402.69 2009 25.04 25.04 500.43 25.03 8.74 0.46 534.66 509.62 402.69 2010 25.04 25.04 500.43 25.03 8.74 0.46 534.66 509.62 402.69 2011 25.04 25.04 500.43 25.03 8.74 0.46 534.66 509.62 402.69 2012 25.04 25.04 500.43 25.03 8.74 0.46 534.66 509.62 402.69 2013 25.04 25.04 500.43 25.03 8.74 0.46 534.66 509.62 402.69 2014 25.04 25.04 500.43 25.03 8.74 0.46 534.66 509.62 402.69 2015 25.04 25.04 500.43 25.03 8.74 0.46 534.66 509.62 402.69
Total 500.81 EIRR - 30.2% 25.S%
NPV (12ff) = 927.1 652.2 First Year Retun- 13.7%
/_1: Major resurfacing. /_2: All figures are rounded -57 - ANNEX 1
TABLE 5a: ECONOMIC EVALUATION AND SENSITIVE ANALYSIS (SECTION 1) NANCHANG-JIUJIANG HIGHWAY-TWO-LANE (CASE I) (Y million, December 1995 prlices)
Base Caew
Coals Benest VOC Reduced Constru Net /_2 Not Gener- CongOn :Reduced Net Total -ction Road Sav- ated FEis Accid, Csh Benefits Year 1/3 Maint Total inp Traffic Road enb Total Flow (-20%)
Secton 1: Jisoqiao-Aicheng
1989 24.27 24.27 (24.27) (24.27) 1990 11.47 11.47 (11.47) (11.47) 1991 30.S7 30.87 (30.87) (30.87) 1992 47.91 47.91 (47.91) (47.91) 1993 26.82 10.11 36.93 55.70 2.78 2.49 0.16 61.13 24.20 11.97 1994 60.85 10.11 70.96 71.09 3.54 2.79 0.16 77.53 6.62 (8.90) 1995 0.00 10.11 10.11 83.46 4.18 3.10 0.16 90.90 80.79 62.61 1996 0.00 10.11 10.11 95.17 4.77 3.17 0.16 103.27 93.16 72.51 1997 10.11 10.11 108.53 5.44 3.24 0.16 117.37 107.26 83.79 1998 10.11 10.11 123.76 6.20 3.32 0.16 133.44 123.33 96.64 1999 10.11 10.11 141.13 7.07 3.40 0.16 151.76 141.65 111.30 2000 10.11 10.11 160.95 8.06 3.48 0.16 172.65 162.54 12S.01 2001 10.11 10.11 180.43 9.03 3.55 0.16 193.17 183.06 144.43 2002 10.11 10.11 202.27 10.12 3.62 0.16 216.17 206.06 162.83 2003 /_1 15.17 15.17 226.75 11.34 3.69 0.16 241.94 226.78 178.39 2004 /_1 15.17 15.17 254.20 12.71 3.76 0.16 270.83 255.67 201.50 2005 10.11 10.11 284.98 14.26 3.82 0.16 303.22 293.11 232.47 2006 10.11 10.11 284.98 14.26 3.82 0.16 303.22 293.11 232.47 2007 10.11 10.11 2S4.98 14.26 3.82 0.16 303.22 293.11 232.47 2008 10.11 10.11 214.98 14.26 3.82 0.16 303.22 293.11 232.47 2009 10.11 10.11 284.98 14.26 3.82 0.16 303.22 293.11 232.47 2010 10.11 10.11 284.98 14.26 3.22 0.16 303.22 293.11 232.47 2011 10.11 10.11 284.98 14.26 3.82 0.16 303.22 293.11 232.47 2012 10.11 10.11 284.98 14.26 3.82 0.16 303.22 293.11 232.47 2013 10.11 10.11 284.98 14.26 3.82 0.16 303.22 293.11 232.47 2014 10.11 10.11 284.98 14.26 3.82 0.16 303.22 293.11 232.47 2015 10.11 10.11 234.98 14.26 3.82 0.16 303.22 :293.11 232.47
Total 202.19 EIRR - 39.3% 33.9% - NPV (12%) - 620.0 459.9 First Year Return - 21.4%
/L1:Majore-nacin& /_2: Nct of the nuintnce saijg on the proposed expresway and the exsn road /_3: Inchuling the capital iwestment on Southn accs road /4: Al figures are rounded. - 58 - ANNEX 1
TABLE 5b: ECONOMIC EVALUATION AND SENSITIVE ANALYSIS (SECTION 2) NANCHANG-JIUJIANG HIGHWAY-TWO-LANE (CASE I) (Y million, December 1995 prices)
Base Case
Costs Benefits VOC Reduced Net /_2 Net Gener- Cong.On Reduced Net Total Constru Road Sav- ated Exist Accid- Cash Benefits Year -cdon Maint Total ings Traffic Road ents Total Flow (-20%h)
Section 2: Alcheng-De'an
19S9 10.90 10.90 (10.90) (10.90) 1990 5.16 5.16 (5.16) (5.16) 1991 13.87 13.87 (13.87) (13.87) 1992 21.52 21.52 (21.52) (21.52) 1993 12.04 4.52 16.56 18.S2 0.96 1.59 0.10 21.47 4.91 0.62 1994 26.88 4.52 31.40 25.62 1.27 1.51 0.10 28.50 (2.90) (8.60) 1995 0.00 4.52 4.52 30.97 1.55 1.65 0.10 34.27 29.75 22.90 1996 0.00 4.52 4.52 35.42 1.77 1.69 0.10 38.98 34.46 26.66 1997 4.52 4.52 40.51 2.02 1.73 0.10 44.36 39.84 30.97 1998 4.52 4.52 46.33 2.31 1.77 0.10 50.51 45.99 35.89 1999 4.52 4.52 52.99 2.64 1.81 0.10 57.54 53.02 41.51 2000 4.52 4.52 60.62 3.03 1.85 0.10 65.60 61.08 47.96 2001 4.52 4.52 68.11 3.40 1.88 0.10 73.49 68.97 54.27 2002 4.52 4.52 76.53 3.S2 1.92 0.10 82.37 77.85 61.38 2003 /_1 6.78 6.78 85.99 4.29 1.96 0.10 92.34 85.56 67.09 2004 /_1 6.78 6.78 96.61 4.82 2.00 0.10 103.53 96.75 76.04 2005 4.52 4.52 108.54 5.43 2.03 0.10 116.10 111.58 88.36 2006 4.52 4.52 108.54 5.43 2.03 0.10 116.10 111.58 88.36 2007 4.52 4.52 108.54 5.43 2.03 0.10 116.10 111.58 88.36 2008 4.52 4.52 108.54 5.43 2.03 0.10 116.10 111.58 88.36 2009 4.52 4.52 108.54 5.43 2.03 0.10 116.10 111.58 88.36 2010 4.52 4.52 108.54 5.43 2.03 0.10 116.10 111.58 88.36 2011 4.52 4.52 108.54 5.43 2.03 0.10 116.10 111.58 88.36 2012 4.52 4.52 108.54 5.43 2.03 0.10 116.10 111.58 88.36 2013 4.52 4.52 108.54 5.43 2.03 0.10 116.10 111.58 88.36 2014 4.52 4.52 108.54 5.43 2.03 0.10 116.10 111.58 88.36 2015 4.52 4.52 108.54 5.43 2.03 0.10 116.10 111.58 88.36
Total 90.37 EIRR - 34.8% 29.9% NPV (12%) - 222.6 161.9 First Year Return- 16.8%
/1: Mapor refacin& /_2: Net of the maintane savins on the proposed expnrway and the existing road. /3: All figures are rounded. -59 - ANNEX 1
TABLE 5c: ECONOMIC EVALUATION AND SENSITIVE ANALYSIS (SECTION 3) NANCHANG-JIUJIANG HIGHWAY-TWO- LANE (CASE 1) (Y million, December 1995 prices)
Base Case
Costs Bencfits- VOC Reduced Netl 2 Net Gener- Cong.On Reduced Net Total Constru Road SNy- ated Exit Accid Cash Benefits Year -ctoni MainL Total ings Traffic Road ents Total Flow (-20%)
Section 3: Desan-Tongyuan
1989 13.26 13.26 (13.26) (13.26) 1990 6.25 6.25 (6.25) (6.25) 1991 16.S9 16.S9 (16.S9) (16.S9) 1992 26.19 26.19 (26.19) (26.19) 1993 14.67 5.50 20.17 8.40 0.42 0.96 0.11 9.89 (10.28) (12.26) 1994 32.75 5.50 38.25 11.54 0.58 0.82 0.11 13.05 (25.20) (27.81) 1995 0.00 5.50 5.50 14.26 0.70 0.94 0.11 16.01 10.51 7.31 1996 0.00 5.50 5.50 16.78 0.83 0.96 0.11 18.68 13.18 9.44 1997 5.50 5.50 19.75 0.98 0.98 0.11 21.82 16.32 11.96 1998 5.50 5.50 23.24 1.16 1.00 0.11 25.51 20.01 14.91 1999 5.50 5.50 27.35 1.37 1.02 0.11 29.85 24.35 18.38 2000 5.50 5.50 32.17 1.61 1.04 0.11 34.93 29.43 22.44 2001 5.50 5.50 36.78 1.84 1.06 0.11 39.79 34.29 26.33 2002 5.50 5.50 42.05 2.10 1.03 0.11 45.34 39.84 30.77 2003 /_1 8.25 8.25 48.08 2.40 1.10 0.11 51.69 43.44 33.10 2004 /_1 8.25 8.25 54.97 2.74 1.12 0.11 58.94 50.69 38.90 2005 5.50 5.50 62.87 3.15 1.15 0.11 67.28 61.78 48.32 2006 5.50 5.50 62.37 3.15 1.15 0.11 67.23 61.78 48.32 2007 5.50 5.50 62.87 3.15 1.15 0.11 67.28 61.78 48.32 2008 5.50 5.50 62.87 3.15 1.15 0.11 67.28 61.78 48.32 2009 5.50 5.50 62.87 3.15 1.15 0.11 67.28 61.78 48.32 2010 5.50 5.50 62.37 3.15 1.15 0.11 67.2S 61.78 48.32 2011 5.50 5.50 62.17 3.15 1.15 0.11 67.28 61.78 48.32 2012 5.50 5.50 62.37 3.15 1.15 0.11 67.23 61.78 48.32 2013 5.50 5.50 62.S7 3.15 1.15 0.11 67.28 61.78 48.32 2014 5.50 5.50 62.87 3.15 1.15 0.11 67.23 61.78 48.32 2015 5.50 5.50 62.87 3.15 1.15 0.11 67.28 61.78 48.32 62.87 3.15 1.15 0.11 Total 110.01 EERR- 18.8% 15.7% _ NPV (12%) 64.9 32.3 First Year Retum 6.4%
/1: Major resurfacing. /_2: Net of the maintancesavings on the proposedexpressway and the existingroad. /3: Allfigures are rounded. - 60 - ANNEX 1
TABLE 5d: ECONOMIC EVALUATION AND SENSITIVE ANALYSIS (SECTION 4) NANCHANG-JIUJIANG HIGHWAY-TWO-LANE (CASE I) (Y million, December 1995 prices)
Base Case
Cost- Benefits VOC Reduced Net 1_2 Net Gener- CongOn Reduced Nct Total Consiu Road San- ated Exist Accid- Cash Benefits Year -tion Maint Total ings Traffic Road ents Total Flow (-20%)
Section 4: Tongyuan-Jiujiang
1989 11.84 11.B4 (11.84) (11.84) 1990 5.59 5.59 (5.59) (5.59) 1991 15.07 15.07 (15.07) (15.07) 1992 23.36 23.36 (23.36) (23.36) 1993 13.19 4.91 18.10 3.21 0.16 1.26 0.09 4.72 (13.38) (14.32) 1994 29.19 4.91 34.10 5.13 0.27 1.30 0.09 6.79 (27.31) (28.67) 1995 0.00 4.91 4.91 7.10 0.37 1.39 0.09 8.95 4.04 2.25 1996 0.00 4.91 4.91 8.74 0.45 1.42 0.09 10.70 5.79 3.65 1997 4.91 4.91 10.76 0.55 1.46 0.09 12.86 7.95 5.38 1998 4.91 4.91 13.24 0.67 1.50 0.09 15.50 10.59 7.49 1999 4.91 4.91 16.30 0.82 1.54 0.09 18.75 13.84 10.09 2000 4.91 4.91 20.05 1.00 1.57 0.09 22.71 17.80 13.26 2001 4.91 4.91 23.47 1.17 1.60 0.09 26.33 21.42 16.15 2002 4.91 4.91 27.47 1.37 1.63 0.09 30.56 25.65 19.54 2003 /_1 7.37 7.37 32.15 1.60 1.66 0.09 35.50 28.14 21.04 2004 I_1 7.37 7.37 37.63 1.87 1.69 0.09 41.28 33.92 25.66 2005 4.91 4.91 44.04 2.19 1.74 0.09 48.06 43.15 33.54 2006 4.91 4.91 44.04 2.19 1.74 0.09 48.06 43.15 33.54 2007 4.91 4.91 44.04 2.19 1.74 0.09 48.06 43.15 33.54 2008 4.91 4.91 44.04 2.19 1.74 0.09 48.06 43.15 33.54 2009 4.91 4.91 44.04 2.19 1.74 0.09 48.06 43.15 33.54 2010 4.91 4.91 44.04 2.19 1.74 0.09 48.06 43.15 33.54 2011 4.91 4.91 44.04 2.19 1.74 0.09 48.06 43.15 33.54 2012 4.91 4.91 44.04 2.19 1.74 0.09 48.06 43.15 33.54 2013 4.91 4.91 44.04 2.19 1.74 0.09 48.06 43.15 33.54 2014 4.91 4.91 44.04 2.19 1.74 0.09 48.06 43.15 33.54 2015 4.91 4.91 44.04 2.19 1.74 0.09 48.06 43.15 33.54
Total 98.24 EIRR - 14.4% 11.7% - NPV (12%) 19.6 (1.9) First Yrar Retur - 5.3%
/: Maor resurfachqg /_2: Net of the maintance savings on the proposed expressway and the existing road. /_3: All figur are rounded. -61- ANNEX 1
TABLE 5B: ECONOMIC EVALUATION AND SENSITIVE ANALYSIS NANCHANG-JIUJIANG HIGHWAY-FOUR*-LANE (CASE II) (Y million, December 1995 prices)
BaseCaw
Costs Benefit- VOC Reduccd Net /_2 Net Gnae Cotq.On Reduced Net Total Constru Road Say- ated EDSL Accid- Cash Benefits Year -ction Maint Total ings Trafflic Road ents Total Flow (-20%)
Total Nanchang-Jiujiang Highway
19S9 60.27 60.27 (60.27) (60.27) 1990 28.47 28.47 (28.47) (28.47) 1991 76.70 76.70 (76.7) (76.70) 1992 118.98 118.98 (119.0) (118.98) 1993 66.72 50.28 117.00 86.13 4.32 6.30 2.27 99.02 (17.98) (37.77) 1994 316.23 50.28 366.51 113.38 5.66 6.42 2.27 127.73 (238.78) (264.33) 1995 218.84 50.28 269.12 135.79 6.80 7.08 2.27 151.94 (117.18) (147.57) 1996 119.58 50.28 169.86 157.63 7.89 8.32 4.54 178.38 8.52 (27.16) 1997 50.28 50.28 183.11 9.17 9 78 4.54 206.60 156.32 115.00 1998 50.28 50.28 212.84 10.66 11.49 4.54 239.53 189.25 141.34 1999 50.28 50.28 247.59 12.40 13.50 4.54 278.03 227.75 172.14 2000 50.28 50.28 288.23 14.43 15.88 4.54 323.08 272.80 208.18 2001 50.28 50.28 324.48 16.24 16.19 4.54 361.45 311.17 238.89 2002 50.28 50.28 365.31 18.29 16.50 4.54 404.64 354.36 273.43 2003 I 1 75.42 75.42 411.33 20.58 16.82 4.54 453.27 377.85 287.19 2004 /1 75.42 75.42 463.20 23.18 17.14 4.54 508.06 432.64 331.03 2005 50.28 50.28 521.67 26.11 17.48 4.54 5690.0 519.52 405.56 2006 50.28 50.28 576.91 28.87 17.17 4.54 627.49 577.21 451.72 2007 50.28 50.28 638.05 31.92 16.87 4.54 691.38 641.10 502.83 2008 50.28 50.28 705.69 35.30 16.57 4.54 762.10 711.82 559.41 2009 50.28 50.28 780.55 39.04 16.27 4.54 840.40 790.12 622.04 2010 50.28 50.28 863.43 43.18 15.98 4.54 927.13 876.85 691.43 2011 50.28 50.28 938.66 46.94 14.60 4.54 1,004.74 954.46 753.51 2012 50.28 50.28 1,020.48 51.02 13.33 4.54 1,089.37 1,039.09 821.21 2013 50.28 50.28 1,109.46 55.47 12.17 4.54 1,181.64 1,131.36 895.03 2014 50.28 50.28 1,206.24 60.30 11.11 4.54 1,282.19 1,231.91 975.47 2015 50.28 50.28 1,311.48 65.57 10.16 4.54 1,391.75 1,341.47 1,063.13
Total 1005.79 EIRR = 23.4% 19.6% NPV (12%) - 926.4 579.6 First Year Retumn- 11.7%
I1: Major resurfacing. /2: All figures are roundeA -62 - ANNEX I
TABLE 5C: ECONoMIC EVALUATION AND SENSITIVE ANALYSIS NANCHANG-JIUJIANG HIGHWAY-FOUR-LANE (CASE III) (Y million, December 1995 prices)
Base Case
Costs Bene fi- VOC Reduced Net /_2 Net Gener- Con&On Reduced Net Total Constru Road Sav- ated Exist Accid- Cash Benefits Year -ction Maint Total ingp Traffic Road ents Total Flow (-200/%)
Total Nanchang-Jiujiang Highway
19S9 60.27 60.27 (60.27) (60.27) 1990 28.47 28.47 (28.47) (28.47) 1991 76.70 76.70 (76.7) (76.70) 1992 118.98 118.98 (119.0) (118.98) 1993 66.72 25.04 91.76 86.13 4.32 6.30 0.46 97.21 5.45 (13.99) 1994 149.67 25.04 174.71 113.38 5.66 6.42 0.46 125.92 (48.79) (73.97) 1995 0.00 25.04 25.04 135.79 6.80 7.08 0.46 150.13 125.09 95.06 1996 0.00 25.04 25.04 156.11 7.82 7.24 0.46 171.63 146.59 112.26 1997 0.00 25.04 25.04 179.55 8.99 7.41 0.46 196.41 171.37 132.09 1998 0.00 25.04 25.04 206.57 10.34 7.59 0.46 224.96 199.92 154.93 1999 0.00 25.04 25.04 237.77 11.90 7.77 0.46 257.90 232.86 181.28 2000 0.00 25.04 25.04 273.79 13.70 7.94 0.46 295.89 270.85 211.67 2001 166.56 25.04 191.60 308.79 15.44 8.09 0.46 332.78 141.18 74.62 2002 218.84 25.04 243.88 348.32 17.41 8.25 0.46 374.44 130.56 55.67 2003 /_1 119.58 37.56 157.14 392.97 19.63 8.41 0.46 421.47 264.33 180.04 2004 /_1 75.42 75.42 463.20 23.18 17.14 4.54 508.06 432.64 331.03 2005 50.28 50.28 521.67 26.11 17.4S 4.54 569.80 519.52 405.56 2006 50.28 50.2S 576.91 28.87 17.17 4.54 627.49 577.21 451.71 2007 50.28 50.28 638.05 31.92 16.87 4.54 691.38 641.10 502.82 2008 50.23 50.23 705.69 35.30 16.57 4.54 762.10 711.82 559.40 2009 50.28 50.28 780.55 39.04 16.27 4.54 840.40 790.12 622.04 2010 50.28 50.28 863.43 43.18 15.98 4.54 927.13 876.85 691.42 2011 50.28 50.28 938.66 46.94 14.60 4.54 1,004.74 954.46 753.51 2012 50.28 50.28 1020.48 51.02 13.33 4.54 1,089.37 1,039.09 821.22 2013 50.28 50.28 1109.46 55.47 12.17 4.54 1,181.64 1,131.36 895.03 2014 50.28 50.28 1206.24 60.30 11.11 4.54 1,282.19 1,231.91 975.47 2015 50.28 50.28 1311.48 65.57 10.16 4.54 1,391.75 1,341.47 1,063.12
Total 1005.79 ERR = 29.8% 25.4% NPV (12%) = 1105.6 767.9
I_1:Major resurfacing. /2: AUfigures are rounded. -63 - ANNEX 1
TABLE 5D: ECONOMIC EVALUATION AND SENSITIVE ANALYSIS NANCHANG BRIDGE COMPLEX (Y million, December 1995 prices)
Base Case
CosJts Benefit VOC Reduced Net I_2 Net Gener- Cong.On Reduced Net Total Conatu Road Sav- aed ExiL Accid- Cash Benefits Ycar -clion Maint Total inp Traffic Road ents Total Flow (-20%)
NanchangBridge:
19S9 16.06 16.06 (16.06) (16.06) 1990 32.42 32.42 (32.42) (32.42) 1991 64.39 64.39 (64.39) (64.39) 1992 65.69 65.69 (65.69) (65.69) 1993 163.03 16S.03 (163.03) (163.03) 1994 32.39 9.43 41.37 40.40 2.03 15.63 0.09 5S.15 16.23 4.65 1995 0.00 9.4U 9.43 45.23 2.27 15.93 0.09 63.62 54.14 41.42 1996 0.00 9.43 9.43 50.75 2.54 16.34 0.09 69.73 60.25 46.30 1997 9.43 9.43 56.39 2.35 16.71 0.09 76.54 67.06 51.75 1993 9.43 9.43 63.76 3.19 17.09 0.09 S4.14 74.66 57.83 1999 9.43 9.43 71.47 3.5g 17.47 0.09 92.61 S3.13 64.61 2000 9.4S 9.43 30.11 4.01 17.37 0.09 102.08 92.60 72.13 2001 9.48 9.48 32.96 4.15 17.97 0.09 105.17 95.69 74.66 2002 9.49 9.41 35.90 4.30 13.03 0.09 103.37 93.S9 77.22 2003 9.43 9.43 83.96 4.45 13.19 0.09 111.68 102.20 79.S7 2004 /I_1 14.22 14.22 92.12 4.61 13.29 0.09 115.11. 100.19 77.97 2005 /-1 14.22 14.22 95.39 4.77 13.40 0.09 113.65 104.43 30.70 2006 9.43 9.43 94.67 4.73 17.77 0.09 117.27 107.79 34.33 2007 9.43 9.43 93.95 4.70 17.17 0.09 115.91. 106.43 33.25 200S 9.43 9.43 93.24 4.66 16.53 0.09 114.53 105.10 32.13 2009 9.4S 9.43 92.54 4.63 16.02 0.09 113.27 103.79 31.14 2010 9.43 9.43 91.34 4.59 15.47 0.09 111.99 102.51 80.11 2011 9.4S 9.43 90.57 4.53 14.12 0.09 109.30 99.32 77.96 2012 9.41 9.48 19.32 4.46 12.33 0.09 106.76 97.23 75.93 2013 9.43 9.43 33.09 4.40 11.76 0.09 104.33; 94.95 73.99 2014 9.41 9.41 36.37 4.34 10.73 0.09 102.03 92.55 72.14 2015 9.48 9.43 35.67 4.23 9.79 0.09 99.13 90.35 70.33
Total 379.03 EIRR - 16.6% 13.3% _ NPV (1296)- 106.1 23.5 First Year Return - 10.Sff
/_1: Major resurfacing. /_2: All fgures are rounded. 64 - ANNEX 1
TABLE 6: ECONoMIc EVALUATION AND SENSITIVE ANALYSIS CONNECTING ROAD (Y million, December 1995 prices)
Base Case
Costs Benefi VOC Reduced Constru Net /2 Net Gener- Cong.On Reduced Net Total -ction Road Say- ated Exit Accid- Cash Benefits Year / 3 Maint Total ings Traffic Road ents Total Flow (-20%)
Connecting Road
19S9 0.00 0.00 0.00 1990 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1991 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1992 49.27 49.27 (49.27) (49.27) 1993 157.50 157.50 (157.50) (157.50) 1994 46.78 12.68 59.46 0.69 0.04 9.19 0.03 9.95 (49.51) (51.50) 1995 0.00 12.68 12.6S 1.51 0.08 9.50 0.03 11.12 (1.56) (3.78) 1996 0.00 12.68 12.68 2.10 0.11 9.72 0.03 11.96 (0.72) (3.11) 1997 12.68 12.68 2.92 0.15 9.95 0.03 13.05 0.37 (2.24) 199S 12.68 12.68 4.07 0.21 10.13 0.03 14.49 1.31 (1.09) 1999 12.68 12.68 5.67 0.29 10.42 0.03 16.41 3.73 0.45 2000 12.68 12.68 7.91 0.39 10.66 0.03 18.99 6.31 2.51 2001 12.68 12.68 9.61 0.47 10.37 0.03 20.93 3.30 4.10 2002 12.68 12.68 11.68 0.57 11.03 0.03 23.36 10.63 6.01 2003 / 1 19.02 19.02 14.19 0.69 11.30 0.03 26.21 7.19 1.95 2004 / 1 19.02 19.02 17.24 0.34 11.52 0.03 29.63 10.61 4.68 2005 12.68 12.68 20.95 1.04 11.75 0.03 33.77 21.09 14.34 2006 12.68 12.68 24.17 1.20 11.54 0.03 36.94 24.26 16.87 2007 12.68 12.63 27.89 1.39 11.33 0.03 40.64 27.96 19.83 2008 12.68 12.68 32.13 1.61 11.13 0.03 44.95 32.27 23.23 2009 12.68 12.68 37.13 1.36 10.93 0.03 49.95 37.27 27.28 2010 12.68 12.68 42.34 2.14 10.74 0.03 55.75 43.07 31.92 2011 12.68 12.68 47.33 2.39 9.S1 0.03 60.06 47.38 35.37 2012 12.68 12.68 53.40 2.67 3.96 0.03 65.06 52.33 39.37 2013 12.68 12.68 59.62 2.98 3.13 0.03 70.31 53.13 43.97 2014 12.68 12.63 66.57 3.33 7.47 0.03 77.40 64.72 49.24 2015 12.63 12.68 74.33 3.72 6.83 0.03 84.91 72.23 55.25
Total 253.55 EIRR - 4.3% 1.9% NPV (12%) = (139.4) (168.2)
1L: Major rsurcfagn& 1_2: Net of the maintance savings on the proposed expressway and the existing road. / 3: Including the capital investment on Southern access road /4: All figures are rounded. -65 - ANNEX2
ANNEX 2: BORROWER'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE ICR
NANCHANG-JIUJIANGHIGHWAY COMPONENT-JIANGXI PROVINCE
1. The scope of the Jiangxi Provincial Highway Development Project is defined in the Development Credit Agreement (Credit No. 1984-CHA) which was signed between the People's Republic of China and the International Development Association (IDA) on March 16, 1989, and became effective on May 31, 1989. All the subprojects defined in the project evaluation document and the Development Credit Agreement and the Project Agreement signed between IDA and Jiangxi Province, also on March 16, 1989, have been completely implemented and are formally evaluated in this Report.
Project Introduction
2. The project packages designed in the evaluation document and the Credit Agreement that were implemented by Jiangxi Provincial Transport Department (JPTD) are: (a) construction of a 113-km long Nanchang-Jiujiang (Nan-Jiu) Highway; (b) construction of a 6-km long Highway that links Nan-Jiu Highway and Nanchang Bridge; (c) staff training for JPTD on construction supervision and quality control; (d) establishment of a computerized road data bank and pavement management system for helping JPTD to improve road planning; (e) overseas training for selected personnel from JPTD; and (d) procurement of road maintenance equipment.
3. The completed projects are: (a) construction of a 112.82-km long Nanchang- Jiujiang two-lane highway. The horizontal and vertical alignment of the Highway was designed to Class I standards and the width of subgrade and pavement to Class II standards, which are 12 m and 9 m, respectively; (b) construction of a 12-km long four- lane highway that links Nan-Jiu Highway and Nanchang Bridge, of which the first 6-km section composed of Contracts A&B was financed by IDA, the remaining 6-km section was fully financed by the Government; (c) foreign consultant service of Nan-Jiu Highway was undertaken by a Danish consulting firm and foreign experts did a remarkable job when they were in Jiangxi. They did not only work as consultants, lbut also took part in construction supervision. They have done 36 man-months of training on project management and construction supervision in accordance with the requirements of the Contract; (d) using the CPMS to manage the bituminous pavement of trunk highways (national and provincial roads) all over 11 cities and prefectures in Jiangxi Province; (e)the computerized road data bank, which uses plentiful data and charts, has been established to provide and store basic data for planning, designing, construction and maintenance of highways; (f) completed 68.6 man-months of overseas training on project planning, highway design, road data bank, pavemenl management system, operating administration for expressway, and maintenance for roads and bridges; and - 66 - ANNEX2
(g) procurement of 11 different types of maintenance equipment totaling 19 sets and 3 sets of road data measuring and collecting vehicle.
Project Identification
4. Approved by the State Planning Committee (SPC), the Ministry of Communications (MOC) and the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Nan-Jiu Highway Project was selected, by the end of 1986, as the waiting one of the Sixth Group of World Bank Group Projects. The Bank Group Mission visited Jiangxi Province for the first time for project identification on March 4, 1987. After that, the Bank Group Mission evaluated the Project three times, respectively, in July and October 1987 and in January 1988, and formally appraised the Project from January 20 to 26, 1988. The Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) was presented in January 1989. The Credit Agreement was signed on March 16, 1989 and became effective on May 31 of the same year.
5. During the appraisal period, after many negotiations with JPTD, the Bank Group officials fully understood that insufficient capacity of all transportation modes, especially of highway transportation mode, is the main obstruction for economic development in China. In order to improve and extend the road network in Jiangxi Province, meeting rapidly increased demand for road transportation and decreasing jams of railway transportation for passengers and freights, it is very necessary for JPTD to cooperate with the Bank Group in highway construction and in transfer of advanced technique for planning, designing, construction and maintenance of highway. Through financing for a highway with high capacity and a bridge connecting Nanchang city and the Highway, the Bank Group could help Jiangxi to meet road transportation demand in corridor from south to north. The Highway, beginning at Jiaoqiao in the north suburb of Nanchang city and ending at Shilipu in Lushan district of Jiujiang city, is 112.82 km long. In addition, a 12-km long highway was constructed to connect the Highway and Nanchang Bridge. The subprojects are targeted on establishing a road data bank and pavement management system, consultant service for construction supervision, staff training and procurement of equipment.
Project Planning and Designing
6. The following project targets were planed in the SAR: (a) introducing advanced technique on design of road and traffic engineering and providing continuous assistance in designing, construction, testing and preparation of Technical Specifications and Conditions of Contract; (b) providing assistance on competitive bidding of highway engineering and setting up of construction supervision system; (c) establishing a computerized road data bank to help JPTD on improvement of road planning; (d) establishing a pavement management system to prepare a program of pavement strengthening and road maintenance; (e) providing assistance on improvement of road safety; and (d) procurement of advanced equipment for maintenance and inspection.
7. To realize the above-mentioned targets, the designing work of the Project includes: (a) construction of a 112.82-km long two-lane auto-only highway from -67 - ANNEX2
Nanchang to Jiujiang, (b) construction of a 12-km long four-lane Class I highway to connect Nanchang Bridge and Nan-Jiu Highway, (c) with the help of consultant service training of personnel of JPTD on road construction supervision and quality control, (d) evaluating the existing road to prepare program of pavement strengthening, reconstruction and maintenance of roads, (e) establishing computerized road data base to help JPTD for improving the technique of highway planning, and (f) overseas staff training.
Project Implementation
8. According to the scope of procurement defined in the SAR, JPTD designated China Machinery Import and Export Corporation (CMC) to execute International Competitive Bidding for the civil works of Nan-Jiu Highway. Prequalification of contractors was completed in August 1988, and the bidding for civil works was carried out and approved by the Bank during the time September 1988 to March 1989. The agreement of consultant service for construction superviision was signed with Kampsax International A/S of Denmark, who undertook the construction supervision in association with Jiangxi Provincial Communications Engineering Consultant Company (JPCECC). The joint venture of China Metallurgical Construction Corporation (CMCC) and INGRA, Yugoslavia commenced construction of the Highway on July 28, 1989, and the Highway was completed and opened to traffic on January 18, 1993.
9. Approved by the Bank, the construction of connecting road between Nan-Jiu Highway and Nanchang Bridge was executed by Jiangxi Provincial Highway Administration Bureau, Nanchang Engineering Corporation of Shanghai Railway Bureau and the Fifth Bureau of China Construction Corporation which was selected through procedures of Local Competitive Bidding. The construction supervision was undertaken by JPCECC. The construction of the connecting road was commenced in early 1993, and completed and opened to traffic on December 28 of the same year.
10. Road data bank was developed according to requirements stated in Annex 2 of the SAR and under integrated arrangement of MOC. Leading Group for development of road data bank was established at JPTD level and the corresponding Working Group established in Provincial Highway Administration Bureau (PHAB) and its branches in cities or prefectures. Since 1992 software preparation, data collecting and system operator, and revision was been carried out. Data regarding road conditions and traffic volumes on the National and Provincial Roads in the 11.cities and prefectures has been collected and treated. The road data bank has being operated.
11. The establishment of pavement management system was also commenced in 1992. The Leading Group at JPTD level and the Working Group in PHAB and its branches were set up to undertake development of CPMS software, staff training, data collection, and testing and operation of CPMS. By the end of 1995, the system model parameters and pavement evaluation criteria were defined, modified in accordance with - 68 - ANNEX2 the local conditions of Jiangxi province. Development of CPMS has been completed and was accepted by MOC.
12. Staff Training. Fifteen groups of overseas training totaling 68.6 man-months were carried out during the period June 1991 to April 1995, of which 32.7 man-months were on project management, highway planning and designing, inspection of maintenance equipment, financial management executed in England, Australia, the United States, Germany and France in 1991; 3.5 man-months on expressway administration and CPMS in England, France, Italy and Canada in 1992; 25.4 man- months on road data bank, CPMS, traffic engineering and maintenance for road and bridge in the United States, France, Australia, Canada and Spain in 1993; and 7.0 man- months on administration organization and operation management for expressway in Italy and Germany in 1994 and 1995.
13. Procurement of Equipment. Procurement of maintenance equipment was commenced in 1993 by following the World Bank's procedures. Nineteen sets of maintenance equipment, e.g., multifunction maintenance vehicles, asphalt plant and paver, etc. were imported from the United States, Germany, Italy and Canada, and delivered to the site in 1994 and 1995. Approved by the Association, inspection equipment was procured according to direct shopping procedures. Sets of inspection equipment such as Road Geometry Detector and Multilasers Profiler, etc. were procured from Australia and delivered in late 1995.
Operation Experience
14. Nan-Jiu Highway has been operated for three years. According to the statistical results, the annual average daily traffic volume (ADT) by sections in 1995 are: 4,522 vehicles per day on section Jiaoqiao-Aichen; 3,294 vehicles per day on section Aichen- Dean; 3,271 vehicles per day on section Dean-Tongyuen; 3,656 vehicles per day on section Tongyuen-Jiujiang. It shows that the actual ADT on Nan-Jiu Highway reaches closely the forecast volume, except that the section Jiaoqiao-Aichen where traffic is much lower than the forecast volume, mainly resulted by poor conditions of the feeder road, which was under reconstruction, in Hubei Province connecting to the Highway. The issue of traffic safety on Nan-Jiu Highway was serious in three years after open to traffic with 1325 accidents encountered. In 1995, 516 accidents happened, averaging 4.14 accidents per kilometer. As the secondary carriageway is completed, it is expected that accidents on the Highway will be decreased rapidly.
15. The road data bank has been operated in 11 cities and prefectures in Jiangxi Province. It efficiently satisfied the requirement of various types of information inquiry and statistics and played an important role in saving inputs of labor and improving the efficiency of road maintenance management. The road data bank can provide reliable information for pavement evaluation and for scientific decision-making of road maintenance, and is a effective tool for road management modernization. -69 - ANNEX2
16. According to the experience of CPMS operated in 11 cities and prefectures in Jiangxi Province, the maintenance management on allocation of funds for both project and network level can be prepared by using CPMS in long-, middle- and short- term programs. CPMS is now used for making five-year programs of improvement on trunk highways in Jiangxi Province and accordingly fo)r guiding preparation and implementation of the annual maintenance plan. By operating CPMS, management of trunk highways has been transferred from traditional practice to a scientific and advanced one.
Work by the Contractors and the Consultants
17. The procedures of International Competitive Bidding was followed for procurement of civil works of Nan-Jiu Highway. There was two contract packages for civil works in the whole project. The joint venture of MCC and INGRA was awarded both contracts. Consulted with and approved by the Association, the construction of pavement works from km 80 to km 112.82 was executed by Ganzhou Branch of Jiangxi Provincial Highway Administration Bureau, and the construction of subgrade and structures from km 31 to km 35 executed by Nanchang Engineering Corporation of Shanghai Railway Bureau and The Fifth Bureau of China Construction Corporation. Thirty months of construction period was defined in the Contract; because of delays in the early stage after commencement of the work, the aclual construction period was 36 months. The quantities completed by the Contractors are: 7.46 million m3 of earth and stone work, 33 bridges totaling 2,540 m in length, 825 culverts and underpasses, 6 interchanges, 19 grade-separated crossings and 1.15 millilonm2 of pavement work. The quality of construction is good. MOC carried out the acceptance of the Highway in July 1994 according to state standards.
18. The construction of the connecting road between Nan-Jiu Highway and Nanchang Bridge was executed by Nanchang Engineering Corporation of Shanghai Railway Bureau, The Fifth Company of China Construction Corporation and Jiangxi Provincial Highway Administration Bureau. A total of 2.95 million m3 of earth and stone work, 8 bridges totaling 829 m in length, 127 culverts and underpasses, 3 interchanges 15 grade- separated crossings and .34 million m2 of pavement work were completed and the quality is good.
19. Two foreign supervising engineers assigned by a Danish consultant firm acted as deputy representatives during two different periods in the Engineer's Representative Office of Nan-Jiu Highway Project and undertook the consultant service. Their cautious working attitude and high sense of responsibility gave people a deep impression. The consultants made lots of important recommendations for construction of key processes and helped the contractors to solve technical problems encountered during construction. Their work played a significant role in quality control on Nan-Jiu Highway. The consultants had trained the local supervision engineers for JPTD. By training and giving examples of their work, the supervision team in Jiangxi now is capable of independent supervision for highway construction. - 70 - ANNEX2
20. The construction of Nan-Jiu Highway was supervised fully following FIDIC's procedures and Conditions of Contract. The effective supervision organization, which consisted of three levels of the Engineer's Representative Office, Senior Resident Engineer and Resident Engineer, was established carefully and adjusted in timely manner according to the progress and changes in nature of construction. At an early stage, two Senior Resident Engineers were appointed and their offices with the same functions and duties were set up under the Engineer's Representative Office for supervision of construction of earthwork and structures. After activities of construction for pavement became the center of the work at the final stage, one more Senior Resident Engineer was appointed for supervision of construction of the pavement work. The effective supervision organization ensured the work was implemented smoothly and played a very important role in control of quality, progress and cost of the Project.
21. Experience. (a) It is the basic foundation for realization of project targets that the Contractors, who were prequalified carefully to be technically and financially capable of firms with good reputation, were selected by following procedures of International Competitive Bidding; (b) implementation of independent supervision system is a efficient method for ensuring of quality, control of progress and investment and improvement of project management level; (c) the foreign experts did remarkable work in training of Chinese supervision engineers and improvement of construction supervision and project management; (d) the Executing Agency, as an organization center of project implementation, played an important role in control of quality, progress and investment by coordinating the relationships of units involved; and (e) consciously obeying the instructions issued by and actively cooperating with the Bank Group ensured the Project be implemented successfully.
Work by the Executing Agency
22. Project Preparation. JPTD, as the Executing Agency, did large amounts of preparation work for the Nan-Jiu Highway Project. The Feasibility Study Report was prepared in 1984. A Plan for the Project was submitted to and approved by the Jiangxi Provincial Planning Committee (JPPC) in 1985; the Project was applied for MOC to be listed as one of key projects of Seventh Five-Year Plan in same year. Approved by SPC, MOF and MOC in 1986, the Project was selected as the waiting one of the Sixth Group of World Bank Group-financed Projects. Pre-evaluation for the Project was executed by the Bank Group staff and assisted by JPTD in March 1987, and the appraisal was in January 1988. The Credit Agreement became effective in May 1989. JPTD assigned the Second Highway Survey and Design Institute and Jiangxi Provincial Communications Design Institute to undertake the project design for Nan-Jiu Highway and the Connecting Road between Nan-Jiu Highway and Nanchang Bridge respectively. During preparation of the Project, JPTD was forcefully supported by the Association, SPC, MOC, MOF and JPPC. In addition, JPTD did a big volume of work in establishment of a Leading Group and the executing agency for project implementation, designation of project targets, ascertaining of the necessary funds for the Project, selection of the Consultants for construction supervision and staff training. -71- ANNEX2
23. Project Implementation. To implement the Nan-Jiu Highway Project, the Jiangxi Provincial Government established a Leading Group, its leader was acted by the Commissioner of JPPC, for construction of IDA-financed Highway and Bridge Project in Jiangxi, and Nan-Jiu Highway Project Office was set up within JPTD. These two agencies were responsible for management and coordination of the work, e.g., land acquisition, demolition and resettlement, procurement and supplying of construction materials, payment and financial management, call for construction molbilizationmeeting in the dry season and coordinating the relationships between the Contractors and local authorities, etc. In addition, the Land Acquisition and Demolition Office for Nan-Jiu Highway was set up in cities or prefectures along the route, these Offices were responsible for the assistance of land acquisition and demolition and coordination of the relationships with local authorities. The efficient organization and management of JPTD ensured the Project be implemented smoothly.
24. Experience. (a) The establishment of an executing agency carefully organized and staffed and with high efficiency is the sound foundation for implementing successfully the Project; (b) strictly following the requirements of the Association, implementing the independent supervision system and enforcing the function of supervision enable the quality, progress, and cost be controlled efficiently; (c) the establishment of the Office in cities or prefectures along the route, fully understanding of and supporting for the Project by local residents could provide basic condition for land acquisition and demolition, so that these played an important role in successful implementation of the Project; (d) the amount of contract packaging should not be too large to avoid the situation of delaying because the Contractors' input cannot meet the requirements of the construction schedule; and (e) the investment scale was not efficiently controlled because of many modifications of design resulting by low design standards adopted in the designing stage and price escalation.
Work by the Bank
25. Project Preparation. The Bank Group Missions visited Jiangxi four times from March 1987 to January 1988 to investigate, inspect and pre-evaluate the Nan-Jiu Highway Project, and formally appraised the Project in January 1988. The SAR, which gave a detailed description, analysis and arrangement regarding justification, benefit and schedule for the Nan-Jiu Highway and defined the project and subproject objectives clearly, was presented in January 1989.
26. Project Implementation. During project implementation, the Bank Group had a close, efficient and good cooperation with the Executing Agency. The Bank Group overviewed the progress of the Project through Progress Reports submitted by the Engineer, visited the construction site of the Nan-Jiu Highway for three times, made many practical recommendations and solved various types of problems encountered. All the work done by the Bank Group ensured the Project be implemented smoothly. - 72 - ANNEX2
27. Cooperation with the Executing Agency. The Bank Group officials fully understood that it is very necessary for Jiangxi Province to develop transportation infrastructure to release the constraints of economic development. The Bank Group gave large assistance and guidance for and kept a very good cooperation with the Executing Agency during implementation. After fully realizing the situation of development in the Chang-Jiu Industrial Corridor and Changbei Open Area, the Bank agreed that the connecting road extend to the beginning point of the Nan-Jiu highway, so that the a fast traffic route from Nanchang Bridge to Jiujiang Yangtze Bridge was formed. This matter will give an active impact for economic development in Jiangxi. Jiangxi Provincial Government and its JPTD are very appreciated for and hope to be supported by and to have further and better cooperation with the Bank.
28. Experience. (a) The Executing Agency should benefit from the experience gained from the IDA-financed projects and actively pursue construction supervision practices so as to improve project management level, strictly follow the procedures ensure the quality and to decrease the cost of the Project. (b) By execution of subprojects and personnel training, a batch of professional talent were trained for JPTD on project management, construction supervision, road design, highway maintenance, financial management, road data bank and pavement management system. These persons became key technicians in the highway sector in Jiangxi. (c) As for the establishment of the Road Data Bank and CPMS, by fully consulting with and supported by the Bank, the project target was defined in accordance with the conditions in China and Jiangxi Province. The establishment of these systems played an important role in overcoming the subjectivity and blindness on highway maintenance and having the management of highway maintenance be more scientific and modem. (d) The procurement of equipment for maintenance and inspection was guided usefully and correctly by Bank Group staff, so as to create a good condition for mechanical maintenance on the Nan-Jiu Highway.
Operation Plan
29. Reference Comments on Future Operation Plan:
(a) To establish a modem management system, a plan will be established for future operation and a set of operational manuals will be prepared to direct the future operation and management of the Nan-Jiu Highway. By building the Class 1 highways from Nanchang to Zhangshu and from Jiujiang to Jingdezhen, to extend the high-class highway network to attract more traffic. To adjust the toll rates timely, develop transportation of high-class highway, and speed up increasing of transportation of passengers and freights and develop the land at both sides of the Highway, so as to improve the overall benefit of the Nan-Jiu Highway.
(b) To utilize CPMS for making financial decisions in cities and prefectures; work out the priority of maintenance requirements for bituminous pavement on trunk highways under the constraints of a limited budget. -73 - ANNEX2
(c) To improve continuously the Road Data Bank; upgrade timely the Road Data Bank by the use of new data collected on highways recently constructed and reconstructed.
30. Monitoring Indicators. The economic evaluation and financial analysis will be carried out every three years to monitor the implemenitation of Operation Plan. The monitoring indicators will be: internal return rate (IRR), net benefit, benefit-cost ratio, ratio of repayment for loans, traffic volumes, toll rates and toll revenue, expenditure of maintenance and traffic accidents, etc.
NANCHANG BRIDGE COMPLEX-NANCHANG MUNICIPALITY
Project Establishment
31. With the approval of the National Planning Committee (NPC) as stated in the Document No. (1986) 2578 on December 16, 1986, the Nanchang Bridge Project (NBP) was included in the Jiangxi Provincial Highway Development Project (JPHDP) for financing by the World Bank (WB). On January 1988, WB sent a delegation to formally appraise NSP. On January 12, 1989, the appraisal report No. 7430-CHA was finalized. In March 1989, China signed Development Credit Agreement No. 1984-CHA with the International Development Associations. The appraisal clocuments and Credit Agreement had been implemented and assessed.
Project Briefing
32. The work components included in the appraisal documernts and the Credit Agreement cover: (a) Nanchang Bridge works starting fiom Tangzhikou to the westward, across the Fuhe River and Gan River linking Changlin Town of Xinjian County, in total length 8,982.63 m, divided in five work sections; (b) tlhe section No. 1 & 2 as the east approach road is 3,230 m long and 31-60 m wide, comprising the cement concrete pavement, one Fuhe Bridge No. 2 in 4 x 30 m and three minor bridges in length 10 m, respectively; (c) the section No. 3 is the RC continuous main bridge components with 6 vehicle-lane and double decks, in total length 2,780 m consisting of the main bridge 992.59 m long, the east approach road 196.41 m and the east approach bridge 241.58 m long, as well as the west approach bridge 748.28 m and the west approach road 601.14 m. The major navigational channel covers 13 spans, with the maximum span of 80 m. The west approach bridge, paved with the bituminous concrete the deck, consists of 16 spans, 48 m per span; (d) the sections No. 4 & 5 cover the west approach road 2,782.63 m long and 24.5 m wide, paved with the bitumen concrete. There are also a newly-constructed tollgate and a viaduct of 7 x 20m; (e) the local government raised funds to have constructed a clover leaf type interchange with three decks, 190 m long in the east-west and 772.5 m long in the north-south, in the Yenjiang Road South. The decks are paved with the bituminous concrete.
33. The 6-km Connecting Road linking Nan-Jiu H[ighway (NJH) whose costs are borne by NSP and NJH in half, was executed by JPTD for the design and construction - 74 - ANNEX2 and Nanchang Municipal Government (NCMG) for the land acquisition and demolishing works.
34. The miscellaneous works cover the underpass in Fusheng Road, the removal of the east embankment of the Gan River, the green belts, lighting, traffic marks and navigational works as well as the traffic data bank and monitoring system.
Performance of Employer
35. To better the execution of works, NCMG set up the NBP Leading Group composed of the key staff of NCMG, Nanchang Urban and Rural Construction Bureau (NURCB) was appointed as the project's execution agency (Employer).
36. The Employer compiled and submitted the construction program of NBP, for approval of National Construction Commission in May 1982. In May 1982, the Shanghai Municipal Engineering Designing Institute (SMEDI) was entrusted to design Nanchang Bridge. By the end of 1984, the Jiangxi Provincial Transport Planning and Designing Institute was entrusted to conduct the hydraulic model tests. In July 1985, the Nanchang Urban Planning and Designing Institute (NUPDL) was entrusted to design the road sections of NBP. In May 1987, Jiangxi Provincial Geological Minerals Bureau (JPGMB) was entrusted to make drilling in the location of Nanchang Bridge.
37. In February 1988, the International Tendering Company was entrusted to be responsible for the international bid of NBP in accordance with the international practice. Through the bidder evaluation, the successful contractor for the Contract No. 1 (main bridge) was the Major Bridge Engineering Bureau (MBEB) under the Ministry of Railways, the contractor for the Contract No. 2 (road sections) is the China Road and Bridge Engineering Company, respectively. On August 12, 1989, the contracts were signed.
38. Staff Training. In order to carry out the project management and supervision, 120 persons in 19 groups accepted training courses, among which 24 persons in 6 groups accepted courses abroad. Through these courses to absorb the foreign undated technology and management method, the works progressed smoothly, with satisfactory results.
39. Land Acquisition and Removal. The Municipal Government set up the specialized organization to carry out the land acquisition according to the guideline of united leadership, planning and implementation. Totally 79.3 hectares (1,189 mu) of land were acquired. 11,451.8 m of houses were demolished. The compensations for the land acquisition and demolishing had been provided. The factories removed were restored to normal operation elsewhere. The farmers, the removed families had been resettled and employed.
40. Investment of Project. In January 1988, World Bank Group staff appraised NBP and added the items of the technical consultation, scientific experiments and the data -75 - ANNEX2 bank, etc. With approval of Jiangxi Provincial Planning Commission, the total investment of NBP is Y 192,400,000, including IDA Credit of $29,830,000. In July 1993, the estimated budget, due to the design variations and price escalation of labor, construction materials and machinery equipment, the estimated budget was adjusted to Y 363,940,900.
41. Implementation Experience: (a) The works of the project were executed under the united leadership of organizations of the municipal government. On sites, the project management system was adopted. The local funds were provided as planned. The land acquired and power and water supply as well as accesses to work sites had been prepared in advance to ensure the progress of works; (b) to be alone with the expansion of socialist market economy, the nation issued the rules and regulation, so as to ensure the scientific project management and the strict contract implementation.
Project Supervision
42. The supervision system was introduced in the performance of NBP. In accordance with the FIDIC conditions of contracts, the Engineer controls the works quality, cost and the progress. The quality control as the key point of supervision should be based on the procedure of "Supervision to be carried out at the beginning, in the middle as well as at the end of the construction." No payment was made to low-quality construction. In line with the national status quo, "strict supervision and warm-hearted services" were put forward, under which the supervising engineers were asked to strengthen supervision on the sites, so as to heighten the quality of services. The National Ministry of Construction carried out special investigation to the supervision on the construction of NBP and wrote articles of introduction to it.
43. Foreign Consultation. A Danish senior engineer was appointed as the technical advisor of NBP and had provided the technical consultation services for four years. He had always taken his duties seriously, and did his best to conduct training courses for the supervisors. He often supervised the works on the site under all the contracts, giving the instructions to the contractors strictly. Moreover, he was active: in site meetings. Concerning the problems arising from the course of construction, he treated them seriously all the time. Owing to his contributions to NBP, he received an award from the Municipal Government.
44. Implementation Experience. (a) By adopting the supervision system, the quality, progress and costs were controlled effectively. (b) The supervisors not only had a good command of the technology capability to deal with the technical problems, but grasped the procedure of supervision, rules and requirements. Therefore, the training courses for the supervisors had been enhanced accordingly.
Project Evaluation
45. The double decks of the main bridge to disperse the traffic volume is the first one in China. The bridge type due to the nice appearance and safety was spoken in flowing - 76 - ANNEX2 terms widely. Nanchang Bridge was engineering as an up-to-date and sophisticated, by adopting the multiple points incremental launching method; a total weight of 35,000 tons, 60 tons for each of the box girder, and unbalanced traveling carriage concreting as well as simultaneous construction in three enclosed segments. All these break the records in the history of the bridge engineering, ranking among the first famous bridges of China.
46. Three-deck Simamiao Interchange costs less by reducing the dried land occupation, river channels and the work quantities on water, to gain the good results. After completion, the beautiful interchange, decorated with flowers and lawns, became one of the urban scenic spots.
47. In road section No. 4, the embankment was elevated with fine sands. As shown in the tests, the moisture content control and compulsory vibrating compaction was regarded as the key to its successful completion. The settlement of embankment through two-year traffic operation is minor, with good results, which accumulated valuable experiences in the field of backfilling the embankment with fine sands in China.
48. To modernize the management of Nanchang Bridge, a traffic data bank and monitoring system was established, including vehicle detection TV monitoring and traffic data bank management of the approach road and the main bridge. This system is composed of the multimedia main computer and TV main monitoring system management for the road and bridge, which has the function of monitoring, control and the data management.
Cooperation between Employer and World Bank Group
49. The National Planning Committee approved NBP to be included in the development projects of highways of Jiangxi and to borrow funds from the World Bank Group. Technical and economic delegations of the Bank Group repeatedly came to Nanchang to investigate, analyze, pre-evaluate, evaluate and fully confirm the project after careful appraisal on the designing of the construction. They hold it that the designing of NBP is advantageous, with evident economic benefit and perfect preparations. Officials from the Bank Group fully understood the restrictions of transportation on the economic development of our city, actively supported the constructions of basic transportation facilities and expressed their hearty thanks to the Municipal Government of Nanchang.
50. WB had been making efforts to help the implementation of the project. Bank Group missions visited Nanchang for examination each year and supplied opinions and suggestions. By the year 1995, they had come totally for 12 times, with a meeting memo at the end of each time. Delegation from World Bank Group and representatives of the employer had been working according to the requirements in memo respectively. Both parties had been cooperating conscientiously and carefully, which led the project to be developed along a direction of procedure, standardization and activity. As a result, satisfactory outcome has been achieved. 77 - ANNEX2
(a) Under the guidance of World Bank Group, the project has been carried out according to the regulations of FIDIC. In the management of construction, internationalized practice is carried out gradually. Organized, standardized working procedures have been adopted and quality of management has been achieved.
(b) Under the supervision of Bank Group staff, sincere attitude of confirming long points and pointing out shortcomings was adopted, which improved the construction quality of NBP.
(c) With the help of the World Bank Group, data bank and supervising system of NBP was established, which prom.1oted the rnodernization of management of the project.
Generally speaking, the cooperation of the parties is friendly and successful.
Opinions on the Development Plan for Future Operation
51. Nanchang Bridge has been operating well since it opened to traffic on January 10, 1994. It has reached the expected result and promoted the development of economy. However, plans and arrangements remain to be worked out. Further capital needs to be invested so as to complete the auxiliary constructions such as bridge-head park, etc.
52. Traffic data bank and monitoring system helps to realize the overall intercommunication within the scope of Nanchang Bridge. If it is expanded to intercommunication with monitoring center of the city, investigation, research and data collection for overall monitoring of Nanchang shall be realized.
53. The full range modernized system of management of Nanchang Bridge remains to be established and complete plan for future operation as well as operating guidelines for management to be compiled, in order to guide the management of operation. - 78 - ANNEX3 Part 1
ANNEX 3, PART 1: THE ICR MISSION'S AIDE MEMOIRE
Executing Agency: Jiangxi Provincial Transport Department (JPTD)
1. This Aide Memoire records the major points of discussions and understandings reached among representatives of the Jiangxi Provincial High-Class Highway Administration Bureau (JPHHAB) (Mr. Xia Zeng Yu), Ministry of Communications (MOC) (Mr. Zhang Dehua) and the World Bank (Messrs. 0. Raggambi and Huang Bang Ben) regarding the implementation of the Jiangxi Provincial Highway Project, during July 20-23, 1995.
NANCHANG-JIUJIANG HIGHWAY
Civil Works
2. The construction of the Nanchang-Jiujiang Highway (113 km) and associated structures was substantially completed at the end of 1992 and it was opened for traffic on January 18, 1993. The acceptance certificate for the works was issued to the contractor (MCC/China and INGRA/Yugoslavia joint venture) on December 31, 1994. The contractors have been fully paid and respective disbursements have been made from the Credit proceeds.
3. As it was noted during the visit of the April 1994 Bank supervision mission, the riding quality of the highway was reasonably good. However, on some sections the pavement was showing signs of premature deformation, most likely due to poor compaction in the lower layers of the pavement or compaction of earthworks. On some other sections, there have been surface deteriorations requiring patching or asphalt overlay. These deficiencies have been taken care by the JPHHAB at a cost of about RMBY 2.15 million. Other emergency and corrective works, -which have been done on the highway since its opening to traffic included slope protection works, involving the construction of retaining walls, lining of side drain ditches and replacement of construction joints on structures at a cost of about RMBY 6.60 million. The cost of routine maintenance of the highway has averaged about RMBY 11,000/km/year. Corrective works are expected to continue, and in addition to the type of works indicated in the preceding, it is intended to seal the shoulders.
4. JPHHAB was established at the end of 1992 to administer the operation of the Nanchang-Jiujiang Highway. Its functions at present extend to toll collection, construction, maintenance and general administration. The Bureau presently employs about 500 persons, about half of them on toll collection. The construction of nine -79 - ANNEX3 Part 1 administration buildings combined with living quarters for personnel, and buildings for highway maintenance facilities have been completed.
5. Traffic on the highway has increased from the average of 2,700 vpd in 1993 to an average of 3900 vpd during 1994. The about 44 percent increase can be explained by the January 1994 opening of the Nanchang Bridge for traffic. During the first half of 1995 the traffic reached 4,200 vpd, about 14 percent higher than during the same period in 1994. One of the major concern with the operation of he highway is the high frequency of accidents. During the 30 months of operation of the highway, there have been 1080 accidents resulting in 156 fatalities and 522 personal injuries. Unfamiliarity with driving on a high-speed, two lane highway is regarded as a major cause of accidents, which included a relatively high number of head-on collisions. Partly because of the accident hazard, the Province had decided to add a second carriageway to the existing one, and construction works on the duplication of the highway started in June 1994. Over a 3-km length the second carriageway is now open for traffic. 'The full length of the second carriageway is scheduled for completion by the end of 1996.
6. A 12-km long Connecting Road between the Nanchang Bridge and the Nanchang-Jiujiang Highway was substantially completed and opened to traffic on January 10, 1994. A six-km section of the connecting road is Bank-financed while the other six km is financed from the Province's own resources. Civil works contracts A and B, which have been awarded following LCB for the construction of the Bank-financed section of the connecting road, did not include paving works which had been carried out under force account operation, and were fully completed by the end of 1994. Documentation for this phase of the works was provided to the mission.
Other Project Components
7. Equipment Procurement. JPHHAB had proceeded with the procurement of highway maintenance equipment, and thirteen units of seven types of equipment have been procured at a total cost of $ 2.58million. All equipment has been-delivered.
8. Road Data Bank/Pavement Management System. On the RDB only some preparatory work has been done and some data collection hbastaken place. RDB software has not been installed and tested. On the other hand, CPMISis operational in all the 11 prefectures and municipalities of the Province. Condition survey covers all the paved national and provincial network (about 5,000 km). Each prefecture/municipality prepares a one year maintenance plan based on CPMS outputs, which are taken into account in the allocation of the maintenance funds. There has been a considerable delay in the initiation of procurement of road condition survey equipment. It was therefore agreed that JPHHAB will initiate the procurement of a road roughness meter, a skid resistance measuring device and a deflection measuring vehicle immediately, in accordance with para 1, Part C, Schedule 3 of the Development Credit Agreement. Since the equipment is - 80 - ANNEX3 Part 1 not available on the local market, it was agreed that international shopping procedures will be followed. The estimated cost the above items is $350,000.
9. Staff Training. The staff training program, involving 68.5 man-months and covering 13 topics, have been completed.
Other Matters
10. Utilization of Credit Proceeds. The still undisbursed balance of the credit is SDR 1,322,723, which includes a deposit of SDR 827,947 in the Special Account. JPHHAB share is SDR 428,824, which is expected to be utilized as follows: SDR 198,824 for Civil Works, Category (1-A) and (1-C) and SDR 230,000 for Goods (pavement condition survey equipment), Category (2).
11. Resettlement. The mission informed JPHHAB and Nanchang Urban and Rural Construction Bureau (NURCB) about the Bank's November/December 199 Resettlement Mission's (RM's)findings and conclusions concerning the execution of resettlement actions. JPHHAB and NURCB agreed that the problems encountered in the course of the resettlement process have been identified reasonably fairly by the RM. The major issues raised by the RM have been examined, and information regarding these will be submitted to the Bank separately by the respective executing agencies by the end of August 1995.
Preparation of an Implementation Completion Report (ICR)
12. The Bank, in its letter dated May 26, 1995, informed JPHHAB about the scope of and procedures for the preparation of an ICR for the Project. Regarding the economic reevaluation for the Nanchang-Jiujiang Highway, request for the submission of relevant data was also attached to the Bank's letter. During the course of discussions the following key points were covered:
13. Economic Evaluation
(a) JPHHAB will make direct contact with Mr. Han-Kang Yen, Research Analyst, Transport Division for clarification of some aspects of the data, such as vehicle classification, shadow pricing, costing etc.;
(b) A traffic flow diagram along the full length of the highway indicating the volume of through and turning traffic at interchanges will be provided;
(c) All investments made using provincial resources which could have an impact on the traffic distribution on the highway, such as the adding of a second carriageway, will be provided on a year to year basis, including past, ongoing and scheduled future investments; -81- ANNEX3 Part 1
(d) In addition to routine maintenance cost, costs associated with elimination of defects, further protection or improvement cost will be provided in sufficient detail on a year to year basis; and
(e) All relevant information will be submitted to the Bank by August 31, 1995.
14. JPHHAB's Report. It was agreed that JPHHAIB's implemerLtationreport(s), covering all project components (highway, equipment procurement, staff training, RDB/PMS development) will be submitted to the Bank by September 30, 1995. It was further agreed that the reports, in addition to providing factual information and data, would also cover the qualitative aspects of the activities. Regarding civil works, all major deviations from original plans and major variation orders will be reported and discussed with sufficient explanation for the changes.
15. Draft CIR Report by Bank Staff. Based on the report(s) and information provided by JPHHAB, and records available in the Bank, Bank staff wi][lprepare a draft CIR report, which is expected to be sent to JPHHAB for review by the end of January 1996, and JBHHAB's comments on the report are expected to be received in the Bank by the end of February 1996.
16. JBHHAB's Summary Evaluation Report (ER). A summary evaluation report, not exceeding 10 pages will be prepared by JPHHAB by mid-February 1996 and submitted to the Bank, through MOC/MOF by mid-March 1996.
17. Future Operation Plans and Monitoring. It was agreed that as part of its plan for the future operation of the Nanchang-Jiujiang Highway, JPHHAB would undertake the following actions:
(a) Prepare and thereafter maintain an Administrative Operation Manual for the overall management and the day to day operation of the Nanchang- Jiujiang Highway. The manual will include (i) a schedule for taking measures for improving the operational efficiency of the highway, such as enforcing traffic regulations, taking measures for reducing accidents, etc.; (ii) procedural instructions and formats for the regular monitoring of traffic volume, prevailing toll rates, toll revenues, budgets and expenditure statements, maintenance costs, cost of addiitional investments to improve the efficiency of the highway system, accident records and any other items which have a bearing on the operation of the system; (iii) monitoring land use changes in the highway corridor, which could be attributed to the highway; (iv) provision for the re-evaluation of the economic benefits, from the end of 1995 in three year intervals. -82 - ANNEX3 Part 1
(b) The format for the storage and presentation of information will be determined by JPHHAB within the framework of JPHHAB's administration system.
Nanchang, July 23, 1995
Note: The original of the Aide Memoire, signed by representatives of JPHHAB and the Bank Group, is in the Project File. -83 - ANNEX3 Part 2
ANNEX 3, PART 2: THE ICR MISSION'S AIDE MEMOIRE
Executing Agency: Nanchang Urban and Rural Cons truction Bureau (NURCB)
1. This Aide Memoire records the major points of discussions and understandings reached among representatives of the Nanchang Urban and Rural Construction Bureau (NURCB) (Messrs. Ma Bao Guang and Tao Wei Chang), Ministry of Communications (MOC) (Mr. Zhang Dehua) and the World Bank (Messrs. 0. Raggambi, Huang Bang Ben) regarding the implementation of the Jiangxi Provincial Highway Project, during July 20-23, 1995.
Civil Works
2. The Nanchang Bridge Component of the Project (9 km) was substantially completed and opened for traffic on January 10, 1994. Works on all six civil works contracts, except Contract No. 1, have been formally accepted. The acceptance of works under Contract No. 1 is under preparation.
3. NURCB has continued the carrying out of some rectification and further improvement works related to the bridge and bridge approaches, such as traffic marking, lighting, plantation of trees and other tidying up works. Iimprovements have been made also to intersections, such as a round-about and underpasses for non-motorized and pedestrian traffic at Fushang Road.
4. The Nunchang Municipality has undertaken several construction projects under its own financing which are supplemental to the Bank-financed project. These include a major interchange at the starting point of the bridge approach road and the Jinggangshan Avenue with elevated roadways connecting to the interchange. The interchange ensures smooth traffic circulation at this critical point of the City's street network.
5. The operation of the Nanchang Bridge is the responsibility of the Nanchang Bridge Management Department (NBMD) of the NURCB. The mrain functions of NBMD, in addition to general administration, cover toll collection, maintenance and loan repayment management. NBMD's administrative staff strength is about 20 and there are 150 toll collectors employed. However, several function, such as traffic management, are contracted to other municipal government entities.
6. The daily traffic on the bridge is about 15,000 vehicles, which corresponds to about 22,000 pcus. - 84 - ANNEX3 Part 2
Other Project Components
7. Staff Training. NURCB staff has participated in the training program coordinate by MOC as follows: Financial Management (two persons for half-month); Project Management (one person for one month) and Traffic Engineering (one person for one month). NURCB Is participation in two more MOC coordinated training programs have been envisaged (Project Management, and Road Maintenance and Project Evaluation), however there has been a slowing down in the arrangements of MOC-coordinated training courses, and it is now doubtful that the remaining part of the original training program can be completed prior to the closing date of the Credit.
8. Traffic Monitoring System. Under the Bank Credit, $200,000 was provided for equipment and expertise to assist NURCB to develop information system for planning and maintenance and traffic management purposes as briefly described in paras. 3.13 and 3.14 of the Bank's Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) for the Project. Since only a relatively small amount is available for a multiplicity of objectives, NURCB has requested the use the available funds for equipment needed for the setting up of a traffic surveillance and data bank system for the Nanchang Bridge. This would be a sub-system of the traffic monitoring and management system of Nanchang City. It was agreed that equipment and accessory items will be procured according to para 1, Part C , Schedule 3 of the Development Credit Agreement. The list of items to be procured has been provided to the mission. Since there is a variety of foreign makes of the equipment is available locally, it was agreed that local shopping procedures will be followed. The installation of the equipment will be made under contract financed from NURCB's own resources.
Other Matters
9. Utilization Credit Proceeds. The still undisbursed balance of the credit is SDR 1,322,723, which includes a deposit of SDR 827,947 in the Special Account. NURCB's share is SDR 892,899, which is expected to be utilized as follows: SDR 710,599 for Civil Works, Category (I-B),and SDR 182,300 for Goods (equipment for traffic surveillance), Category (2).
10. Resettlement. The mission informed NURCB and the Provincial High-Class Highway Administration Bureau about the Bank I s November/December 1995 Resettlement Mission I s (RM I s) findings and conclusions concerning the execution of resettlement actions. JPHHAB and NURCB agreed that the problems encountered in the course of the resettlement process have been identified reasonably fairly by the RM. The major issues raised by the RM have been examined, and information regarding these will be submitted to the Bank separately by the respective executing agencies by the end of August 1995. -85 - ANNEX3 Part 2
PREPARATION OF AN IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (ICR)
11. The Bank, in its letter dated May 26, 1995, informed NURCB about the scope of and procedures for the preparation of an ICR for the Project. Regarding the economic reevaluation for the Nanchang Bridge, request for the submission of relevant data was also attached to the Bank's letter. During the course of discussions the following key points were covered:
12. Economic Evaluation.
(a) NURCB will make direct contact with Mr. Han-Kang Yen, Research Analyst, Transport Division for clarification of some aspects of the data, such as vehicle classification, shadow pricing, costing etc.;
(b) A traffic flow diagram along the full length of the 9-km bridge and bridge approaches section, indicating the volume of through and turning traffic at interchanges will be provided;
(c) All investments made using provincial resources which could have an impact on the traffic distribution on road segment, such as the adding of interchanges or grade separations, will be provided on a year to year basis, including ongoing and scheduled future investments;
(d) In addition to routine maintenance cost, costs associated with elimination of defects, further protection or improvernent cost will be provided in sufficient detail on a year to year basis; and
(e) all relevant information will be submitted to the Bank by August 31, 1995.
13. NURCB's Report. It was agreed that NURCB's implementation report(s), covering all project components (bridges, roads, equipment procurement, staff training, RDB/PMS and traffic management system development for Nanchang city) will be submitted to the Bank by September 30, 1995. It was further agreed that the reports, in addition to providing factual information and data, would also cover the qualitative aspects of the activities. Regarding civil works, all major deviations from original plans and major variation orders will be reported and discussed with sufficient explanation for the changes.
14. Draft ICR Report by Bank Staff. Based on the report(s) and information provided by NURCB, and records available in the Bank, Bank staff will prepare a draft ICR report, which is expected to be sent to NURCB for review by the end of January 1996, and NURCB's comments on the report are expected to be received in the Bank by the end of February 1996. - 86 - ANNEX3 Part 2
15. NURCB's Summary Evaluation Report (ER). A summary evaluation report, not exceeding 10 pages will be prepared by NURCB by mid-February 1996 and submitted to the Bank, through MOC/MOF by mid-March 1996.
16. Future Operation Plans and Monitoring. It was agreed that as part of its plan for the future operation of the Nanchang Bridge, NURCB would undertake the following actions:
(a) Prepare and thereafter maintain an Administrative Operation Manual for the overall management and the day to day operation of the Nanchang Bridge. The manual will include (i) a schedule for taking measures for improving the operational efficiency of the bridge and bridge approaches, such as enforcing traffic regulations, taking measures for reducing accidents, etc.; (ii) procedural instructions and formats for the regular monitoring of traffic volume, prevailing toll rates, toll revenues, budgets and expenditure statements, maintenance costs, cost of additional investments to improve the efficiency of the bridge/road system, accident records and any other items which have a bearing on the operation of the system; (iii) monitoring land use changes in the Nanchang Bridge corridor, which could be attributed to the construction of the bridge and bridge approaches; (iv) provision for the re-evaluation of the economic benefits, from the end of 1995 in three year intervals.
(b) The format for the storage and presentation of the information will be determined by NURCB within the framework of NURCB's administration system.
Nanchang, July 23, 1995
Note: The original of the Aide Memoire, signed by representatives of NURCB and the Bank Group is in the Project File. i
MAP SECTION D.~ ~ ~ ~ ~~p
*0.855' 5 0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~c
N~~~~~-
550 ANHUI~~~~~~~~~~UJA
it' C H I N A7 I'-'--- f)".'< 7 IANGX PRO IN IA
Oss, Idil "'-AA 159A
1' 09511119 /5111199195111~~~S-- .. .. d
5,11019-'5-,. ~ ~ ~ o 1 l
GUANGDONG C AN T 55118
-. . 5lT9,' 5 N 1 6>AN T 111. IBRD20267R CHINA t JIANGXI PROVINCIAL HIGHWAY PROJECT NANCHANG - JIUJIANG HIGHWAY X ~HUBEI z ProposedProject: Highway SHI Bridges 0 Interchange / I\ - - - - Port of Project Not Financed by the World Bank JIUJ G ConnectingRoadJuj - National Roads Tong/i
-- __- Secondory Roads -4---1 Railroods /U SHAN Rivers A(1474) PrefectureBoundaries Province Boundaries ongyuan
g-_9\ r> /SHANGz
0 10 210 30 S ou Duoboo KILOMETERS UN
otherD toootiaotangf \
TI,. Worshld Bodk \.pu deno,ino,o\o2neony oJy jod Inonthe eheng oh
or oreetat (y Henghu
-91-s 8 @,,~~~Xinqiz;u ,
Th. o-e-io-o ofsuchI 'Th.,P° Anyiiabu Qiaoshe t
bounoor,r./ /
i .; kF;NAN A~~~~~~~~~O~A n Ct ft C *\DEM. REP. - P..do S d.\./ I flIAi4ip.,J•' - *- o.enos. ue_et. PHIUPlNES , | | > NOVEMBER1996 1BRD202232R The ho-do,e. oior To Jwio,,Og f / other mnf-nt,o shw othi. -po do not/ ._,,opt. th~ P.,t of Th- World Bo-k G-oo. -nyj,~dgn7-t -n the lega or- an nosmn Yongzizhou e . 'on-I a r .h X D~~~~~~~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ANJINDIO ROADR ToJiui/on9 / BRiDG Changbei /4. Connecring Rood to /-~ Nonchang -JiujiongHhwy / 9~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ .4~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~4 To Xiojiaoop edProecf G0 tI interchange Roads 'nGs L,~' 4\ Rivers~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~oDe /~~~~~~~~~~~~4U~ZO2,4J YUNN- / / 71~~~~~~~GANX JIANOXIPROVINCIALHIGHWAY PROJECT /~~~~~~~~~~~NVEMER 99