As 2011 Ended, the Syrian Uprising That Had Begun in March 2011 Showed No Signs of Abating. Quite the Contrary; Estimates Put the Number of Dead As High As 5,000

2012

BashirIgnoresCriticism–theArabLeagueisRebuffed–DifferingRebelObjectives– VestedInterests–RussianIntransigence–Arab Froideur

As 2011 ended, the Syrian uprising that had begun in March 2011 showed no signs of abating. Quite the contrary; estimates put the number of dead as high as 5,000. Bashar al-Assad’s government appeared indifferent to international criticism, wavering between a stance of dismissive impatience with what were described as ‘terrorist’ incursions to announcing luke-warm reforms that generally failed to see the light of day. China and Russia, probably for different rea- sons, demonstrated a more calculated indifference, steadfastly opposing United Nations (UN) initiatives to bring the Syrian government into line. Syria itselfwasdeepinitsmostacuteisolationandfastbecomingapariahstate.

TheUprisingContinues Those countries that – under the aegis of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisa- tion (NATO) – had been willing to intervene in Libya baulked at a similar ap- proach to Syria. In contrast to the ethnically and religious homogeneity of Libya, Syria is an altogether more complex mosaic of tribes, religions, sects and loyalties. By the end of 2011, the prospect of the uprising metamorphosing into civilwarloomednearer. In December the Arab League voted, rather half heartedly, to send a number of observers to report on the situation. However, the mission’s ability to report and observe was severely hindered by the constant presence of government ‘minders’, quick to intervene if it was felt that meetings or conversations might be detrimental to the interests of the regime. Not only Syria, or even its immedi- ate neighbours, but also the Arab League states, the United States (US), the Eu- ropean Union (EU), neighbouring Turkey and Iran, not to mention Israel, all haveavestedinterestintheeventualoutcomeoftheSyrianunrest. Syria’s isolation had hardly happened overnight, but in August 2011 Presi- dent Barack Obama of the US finally ran out of patience and called for Syria’s PresidentBasharal-Assadtostepdownandstophistroopsfromattackinghis subjects. Mr Obama also ordered a new set of official US sanctions including thedramaticstepoffreezingallSyrianassetsinthe US andbanningAmerican individuals and companies from transacting any business with the Syrian government.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��9 | doi:�0.��63/978900439�533_035 302 2012 The prospect of a fully effective economic blockade is simply impossible without the co-operation of Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan. Turkey, a member of NATO, is the joker in the pack. By the end of 2011 Ankara seemed to have found itself, perhaps unwillingly and certainly surprisingly, to have assumed the role of Sunni leadership, in the face of Shi’ite heretics, mostly from Iran (but also Iraq, Alawites in Syria and Hezbollah). Under the NATO aegis, Ankara allows the deployment of missile defense systems in its territory, directed not only against Iran but also against Russia. Neither Russia (which has built its large, and only, Mediterranean naval base in Tartus on Syria’s coast, nor the Assad regime, was stillabletopretendthatallwasnormalattheendof2011.

TheSyrianNationalCouncil The Syrian opposition grouping – the Syrian National Council (SNC) – appears largely to consist of Muslim Brotherhood members, with a sprinkling of Kurds. The leader, Burhan Ghalioun, is described by many commentators as an oppor- tunist Paris exile with minimal credibility. In an interview with the Wall Street Journal he seemed intent on calming the fears of the United States and, more particularly Israel, claiming that a new Syrian government would sever all Syria’s links with Iran and cease support for Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. The military grouping, the Free Syrian Army (FSA) claims to have as many as 15,000 army defectors. That figure probably includes mercenaries and what many Syrian civilians describe as ‘armed gangs’. There is a clear fault line between the SNC and the FSA. The SNC is supposedly opposed to force, while the FSA is armed, increasingly well organised and carries out attacks on Syrian sol- diersaswellas Ba’athpartyoffices. The SNC needs to persuade interested parties that Syria must at all costs avoid the nightmare of another massacre, which, in late 2011 looked quite likely to happen in Homs. Perhaps ironically, although both groupings are based in Istanbul, the SNC and the FSA seem unable to agree on a great deal. But if the Syr- ian opposition wasn’t able to sort itself out, the same was the case with the Arab League. The Arab League working party on Syria consisted of the six Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) monarchies plus Morocco and Jordan. The League’s observers belatedly ventured in to Syria at the beginning of 2012, but generally found themselves on a hiding to nothing, dodging crossfire while try- ing to listen to a beseeching public on the one hand, their government minders ontheother. NATO’s tactics regarding Syria have been less than clear cut. Probably be- cause with all the will in the world, the Syrian situation takes some patience for evenhardenedSyriawatcherstofollowandunderstand.