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Africa Report, a nonpartisan magazine of African affairs, is pu- action Inc., Rutgers—The State University, New Brunswick. New blished bimonthly in July-August, September-October, Novem- Jersey 08903. Telephone: (201) 932-2280. Subscription rates— ber-December, January-February, March-April, and May-June, Individuals: U.S.A. $15, Canada $18. air rate overseas $29; and is scheduled to appear at the beginning of each date period at Institutions: U.S.A. $18, Canada $21, air rate overseas $32. 833 United Nations Plaza, New York, NY 10017. Editorial corre- Second-class postage paid at New York, NY. and at additional spondence and letters to the Publisher should be sent to this mailing offices- Telephones: Publisher (212) 949-5717; Editor address Correspondence regarding subscriptions, distribution, (212)949-5731. advertising, and other business matters should be sent to Trans- © The African-American Institute, Inc., 1981 IN WASHINGTON Reagan and Africa
By RICHARD DEUTSCH he Reagan administration's African led Mr. Reagan and his aides, and they well. A situation short of open hos- T policies may not come into sharp intend to counter this perceived threat tilities — such as Soviet-Ethiopian aid focus for weeks or months after the to U.S. interests. Primarily, they will for a "liberation movement" inside inauguration, but broad themes under- "link" strategic arms limitation nego- Somalia — could provoke clandestine lying the new administration's policies tiations to Soviet behavior in Africa as U.S. arms shipments to Mogadishu. are already evident. well as in other regions. Secondly, they The new Republican-controlled Senate African concerns — such as the will be tempted to move decisively to is expected to open the way for these struggle for majority rule in South Af- provide America's "friends" in Africa activities by removing many current rica — are not expected to be high- with "defensive" arms. statutory controls on the CIA and vastly priority issues during Mr, Reagan's increasing U.S. defense spending. In the Horn of Africa, the Reagan presidency, as they were in the early The Reagan administration will also administration will at first be justifiably years of the Carter administration. But seek to counter Soviet influence in the wary of establishing a "defensive al- neither will Africa — U.S. policy to- Horn of Africa by substantially in- liance" with Somalia. Washington will wards the continent — be considered creasing U.S. economic and military not support Somali claims to the Oga- largely insignificant as was the case assistance to Kenya and Sudan, both den, nor openly send arms to throughout most of the Nixon-Ford important Western supporters in the re- Mogadishu that can be used inside years. gion. Ethiopia. However, the Reagan ad- The Reagan administration's preoc- ministration will retain U.S. access to In North Africa, the new administra- cupation with global superpower com- Somali "military facilities" at Berb- tion will be inclined to move carefully petition for control of resources will era. If the situation in the Persian Gulf but deliberately to counter Libyan in- ensure Washington's attention to Afri- remains unstable, and Western control fluence. Egypt's and Sudan's defenses can issues. over events in the region continues to against Libyan forays will be bolstered. "We're talking about a global con- deteriorate, the U.S. "facilities" at France will be encouraged to try once text in which the problems and issues Berbera will soon become a full- again to bring about a diplomatic solu- that occur anywhere are related to those fledged American base along with ad- tion to the civil war in Chad, and to in other regions, and it's not possible to ditional new U.S. bases in Egypt. bring pressure to bear for the with- assume that Africa is in an arena all by drawal of Libyan troops from that na- itself. That note of realism is a central Criticism of an expanded U.S. mili- tion. If such efforts fail, as they have one," says an informed source at the tary presence in the Horn of Africa by many times in the past, Washington center of the new administration's some African governments will be may seek a renewed flow of Western thinking on African issues. shrugged off in Washington. "We're arms to anti-Libyan factions in Chad. It was no accident that Ronald Rea- not going to be intimidated by such More arms sales to Tunisia are to be gan used his first postelection press criticism," says a Reagan aide. "Many anticipated as well. conference to state categorically, "I African governments are delighted that The Reagan administration will also believe in linkage." This was a clear the U.S. recognizes the problems in the give unequivocal public backing to signal that Mr. Reagan and his advisors Persian Gulf, and that we intend to de- King Hassan of Morocco, including consider Soviet actions anywhere in the fend our interests." additional supplies of "defensive world to affect U.S.-Soviet relations. Unstated, of course, is the under- arms" for use against the Polisario. At If Mr. Reagan's word is good, the standing that if Ethiopia uses force to the same time, U.S. officials will work United States will no longer tolerate keep the United States out of Ber- quietly for a negotiated settlement of Soviet "policies of aggression" in Af- bera, Washington will respond with the Western Sahara dispute. rica: neither direct Soviet intervention, force. In the face of Ethiopian belliger- "Don't pull the rug out from under nor aggression by Soviet client states ence, such as an invasion of Somalia, people oriented our way," says a Rea- such as Libya or Ethiopia will go un- the Reagan administration is far more gan aide, objecting to attempts by challenged in Washington. In particu- willing than its predecessor to arm congressional liberals to block arms lar, the Soviet-Cuban military presence Somalia and provide troops from other sales to Morocco in an effort to pressure in Ethiopia and Angola has long rank- "friendly" Third World nations as King Hassan into negotiations with the
AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 Polisario. "We have the most influence Angola may await a settlement in which has targeted most assistance to over our friends, and if we weaken our Namibia. The Luanda government has meet the needs of "the poorest of the friends to get negotiations we are said it will be in a position to ask the poor." Reagan administration sources creating a formula for chaos ..." Cuban troops to leave once Namibia is say that aid will not be used as a form of In fact, "support for our friends" independent. "international charity," but to meet may well be one of the major precepts The Reagan administration is ex- outstanding humanitarian needs such as of Reagan administration policy- pected to support Namibian indepen- disaster and refugee relief, and to sup- making, if for no other reason than that dence, and to encourage the continua- port U.S. policy goals. The new ad- Mr. Carter's abandonment of the shah tion of negotiations to end the war ministration can be expected to get the of Iran set off a chain reaction of insta- there. Not to be discounted is an early necessary congressional approval to bility that appears to have left the Soviet attempt by the Reagan administration to make these projected changes in assis- Union poised over the West's oil orchestrate a negotiated settlement to tance policies. Even the outgoing 96th supplies. Hopefully, the Reagan ad- the Namibian dispute, with or without Congress, considered far more liberal ministration will judge individual re- the United Nations. At this point, such than the 97th, refused to raise most gimes by their actions and not by an attempt has a greater chance of suc- bilateral aid levels over the past two ideological labels, leaving the door cess under Mr. Reagan than Mr. Carter. years. Only by tying U.S. assistance to open for friendship with Congo and Reagan has far more clout in Pretoria policy goals can the administration Mozambique as well as Gabon and than his predecessor and is likely to hope to coax higher aid levels from Kenya. have at least as much influence with the Congress, or even maintain present It seems clear, however, that many Frontline states and with SWAPO, par- levels given the current state of the Reagan aides with previous experience ticularly if the United States continues American economy. in African affairs have a score to settle to support Robert Mugabe's govern- A similar streak of pragmatism will in Angola. The Reagan administration ment in Zimbabwe and avoid the obvi- lead the Reagan administration to make will probably approach Jonas Savimbi ous tilt towards South Africa expected strong efforts to maintain good rela- as a legitimate nationalist leader with a from a conservative Republican ad- tions with Nigeria, the second-largest major role to play in helping govern ministration. source of U.S. imported oil and perhaps Angola, and the United States will push The Reagan administration may well the most promising new experiment in for political accommodation between open with a strong gesture of confi- democracy in the developing world. Savimbi and the government in dence in Mr. Mugabe, perhaps with a The Reagan administration is also Luanda. At the same time, conservative high-profile U.S. effort to support a aware that the U.S. balance of pay- forces in the U.S. Senate will press for a flow of private American capital into ments deficit with Nigeria exceeds that lifting of legislative restrictions on the Zimbabwe. Mr. Mugabe's Marxist with any other nation, and would like to covert provision of arms or assistance statements will tend to be forgotten by see this gap begin to close. In doing so, to factions in Angola. These restric- Reagan officials, as long as Mr. the administration might find it advan- tions, originally embodied in the Clark Mugabe leaves such political sym- tageous to accommodate Nigeria's Amendment, barely survived a conser- pathies in the past and avoids the temp- commitment lo the achievement of vative onslaught during the last days of tation to emasculate Mr. Nkomo and majority rule in South Africa. the 96th Congress and are not expected establish a one-party state. The Reagan administration is ex- to last long in the 97th. With these re- A pledge of greater U.S. assistance pected to back off from official criti- strictions removed, the Reagan admin- to Zimbabwe and sizable U.S. help to cism of South Africa's racist system. istration will be able to implicitly get an independent Namibia off the The "codeword" for U.S.-South Afri- threaten as well as encourage the ground would come as part of a larger can relations may well become "frank Luanda government to send the Cubans effort by the Reagan administration to talk" or "private persuasion." Ameri- home and reach a settlement with reorder U.S. assistance policies. The can officials will stress that Washington Savimbi's UNITA forces. new U.S. administration will try to use is not trying to impose an American "We can't function in the world if assistance to facilitate a greater flow of model for change in South Africa, be- only the Soviet Union's allies and private American investment to Africa. cause a Carter administration attempt at friends get tangible support when they Aid will also be used to promote devel- this seemed only to create a backlash. need it... the ultimate goal is to get the opment of raw material and mineral re- At the same time, U.S. officials will Cubans out of southern Africa and get sources, to support U.S. involvement make clear that it is in the West's inter- conciliation in Angola. We want to do in national efforts to achieve agricul- est to see genuine and rapid movement this, and to make it clear to Africa that tural self-sufficiency, and especially to towards majority rule in South Africa, external powers should not be allowed bolster African governments consid- or towards a racial power-sharing ar- to create African governments through ered friendly and strategically impor- rangement in that country that meets the the force of arms," says an informed tant to the United States. acceptance of most South African Reagan source. Such an assistance policy is a clear blacks. In taking this approach, the Such an approach to the situation in departure from recent U.S. practice, Reagan administration hopes to avoid
AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 having to choose between black Africa public mood as expressed in the pected to do the same with backing and white South Africa. November elections. from the Congressional Black Caucus. Washington will also emphasize that The Senate chamber will also, how- But liberals who survived the elections as long as African governments not ec- ever, become home to a growing num- face intimidation from New Right po- onomically dependent on South Africa ber of senators associated with the litical action groups that have already continue to trade with Pretoria, the "New Right" movement and consid- targeted 20 moderate and liberal United States will not seriously enter- ered ideological soul mates of Senator senators for defeat in 1982. Liberals, tain appeals for American disinvest- Jesse Helms (R-N.C). The New Right now a clear minority, will have to ment. Not to be counted out, on the bloc in the Senate can be expected to choose their causes more carefully, and other hand, is a request by Mr. Reagan press the Reagan administration to form gather political energy for fights on the for congressional legislation requiring an open alliance with Pretoria against most pressing and basic issues. U.S. corporations to follow fair em- the expansion of "communist" influ- Looking to the future, two different ployment practices in South Africa. ence in southern Angola spreading political scenarios seem to have an Mr. Reagan's ties to big business would from Mozambique and Angola. These equal chance of emerging in Washing- seem crucial in such an effort. senators will be on the lookout for ton. Mr. Reagan may move to form a Such an approach fits nicely with "communist tendencies" on the part of broad mode rate-conservative coalition Republican campaign rhetoric that Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe, will on most domestic and foreign issues, Reagan's administration is to be probably denounce SWAPO' s Sam holding New Right influence to a "realistic" and "pragmatic." Most Nujoma as a communist and try to de- minimum. If so, liberal efforts on Af- African governments would probably rail U.S. support for Namibian inde- rica policy may prove to have a mod- not be ecstatic over such a U.S. stance pendence, and will call for immediate erating effect on a wide range of issues. on southern Africa, but most could armed assistance to Jonas Savimbi in Mr. Reagan, on the other hand, probably live with it, and it would be Angola. In taking such positions, these might support broadscale New Right backed by prominent Republicans with senators may "outflank Reagan on the attacks on basic civil rights legislation any degree of international sophistica- right,'' and prove as much an irritant to and domestic social programs that will tion. It may, however, raise hackles in a Reagan's "pragmatic" policies on engage most liberal and Black- growing right-wing faction of the U.S. southern Africa, as Senator Helms and American political energy, leaving lit- Senate. his followers have been to Carter's tle for foreign concerns. If so, perhaps The new Senate, controlled by the "idealism." If New Right Senate only New Right policy on southern Af- Republicans for the first time in more forces become a dominant influence on rica will arouse sharp opposition be- than two decades, is far more conser- Reagan's Africa policies, this will ig- cause of its racial overtones, while the vative than that of the 96th Congress. nite charges of U.S. racism in southern Republican right-wing will be given a Republicans now control Senate legis- Africa. At the very least, it will in- free hand to "arm America's anti- lative committees, enabling conserva- furiate black Americans and many lib- communist friends" in Africa. tives to direct both the flow of legisla- erals, and could hand the Soviet Union During the last days of Mr. Carter's tion and the little-noticed but highly a propaganda coup. reign and the opening of Mr. Reagan's, influential work of committee staffs. The new House of Representatives many in Washington concerned with The Foreign Relations Committee is to has also shifted hard to the right fol- Africa policy hoped the new president have only about a dozen staff members lowing the elections. The Democratic would follow the first path. But fearing chosen by Democratic senators com- majority in the House has been sliced so he would choose the latter, they tended pared to three times that number picked thin that conservative Democrats from to agree with this assessment of a lead- by conservative Republicans — a situ- southern and southwestern states have ing Washington activist on African ation symptomatic of a general reversal formed a caucus to "battle with the policy: "I don't want to forecast, but of roles for liberal and conservative liberals on the House floor." Although the future is not very hopeful. Every- staff in the Senate. the new group will avoid joining with thing Reagan has said so far on Africa The new Senate can be expected to the Republicans on party-line votes, its has been marked by an inability to un- do away with most restrictions on U.S. practical effect will be to push the derstand the situation or by racism. So I intelligence activities, to take the lid off House to the right of the liberal Demo- am not hopeful about this administra- foreign military sales, and give Mr. cratic leadership on many issues. "We tion. Its instincts, not only of Mr. Rea- Reagan the leeway to take a far tougher now mean to moderate the liberal lean- gan but also of those around him, are stand with the Soviets. In particular, the ings of the House leadership," says all out of sync with the directions and new Senate may ask Mr. Reagan to lift Democratic Congressman Charles attitudes of the African world. I would the ban on the sale of U.S. goods to Stenholm of Texas, the group's leader. expect U.S. relations with Africa to South Africa's military and police, on In the Senate, Paul Tsongas (D- worsen over the next few years, unless grounds that this restriction discrimi- Mass.) will continue to fight an uphill the Reagan administration comes nates against U.S. business. In taking battle for liberal policies on African is- quickly to its senses and recognizes these positions, the nev; Senate will sues; and in the House, many members new African realities. There is some claim to be reflecting the dominant of the Africa subcommittee can be ex- possibility of this." •
AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 SOUTHERN AFRICA
A U.S. Policy for the '80s
By CHESTER A. CROCKER with MARIO GREZNES and ROBERT HENDERSON
n the early 1960s the rise of numerous independent Washington, we were told, would stop reacting to Soviet I African states helped to foster the impression that south- moves and treating Africa as an arena for waging the cold ern Africa, beset by a historic clash between African nation- war. Henceforth, we would use a "pro-African" policy, alism and white power, was moving toward an abyss of greatly expand our diplomatic ties in Africa, and base our racial conflict. The perception was premature, and policy on "African solutions" and human-rights goals. American policy subsided into a posture of living with the Ambitious diplomatic efforts were undertaken on Namibia region's contradictions. I he major Western allies straddled and Rhodesia. South Africa's apartheid (institutionalized, African nationalism. Portuguese colonialism, and contin- legalized racism) was condemned in shrill terms. Washing- ued rule by the white minorities of Rhodesia and South ton adhered to a mandatory arms embargo under Chapter Africa. Vll of the UN Charter, and started conducting a strong By 1975 American interest was rudely reawakened. The verbal tilt toward nationalist guerrillas in Namibia and Portuguese imperial butler protecting Rhodesia (Zim- Zimbabwe. babwe). Namibia (South-West Africa), and South Africa Today, the southern African outlook appears less gloomy was suddenly stripped away in 1974-75. I he Western nations than five years ago. The climate lor Western policy is more appeared to be ill-prepared and impolent to deal with favorable, and the communist powers appear to have been decisive Soviet-Cuban military intervention that created the largely confined to their embattled Angolan strongpoint Marxist MPLA government of Angola. The previously where UN IT A guerrillas continue to tie down large numbers low-level Rhodesian bush war expanded rapidly as the white of government troops and the still !arge(2O,OOO-25.OOO men) authorities lost control of their Mozambique border. communist expeditionary force. Namibia is not yet Militant rhetoric and communist arms were in increasingly independent, but fragile progress has been made toward an plentiful supply. The !97(S Soweto riots in South Africa internationally recognized settlement. Rhodesia has become seemed to echo developments further north, sending a shock Zimbabwe under the leadership of a Marxist ex-guerrilla wave through South Africa and the capitals of the West. leader. Robert Mugabe, who has apparently committed This gloomy prospect caused Washington once again to shift himself to a moderate path of mixed economy principles and gears. President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry multiracialism. Mugabe's relations with Moscow are icy. Kissinger started to back away from the Nixonian straddle and the Soviets are not doing particularly well in of the early 1970s, a mo\e which required a more active neighboring Mozambique. Mugabe's wartime sanctuary. In diplomacy with African nations, stronger verbal pressure for South Africa as well, there arc at last signs of a new change in white-ruled areas, and American involvement in pragmatism and flexibility in the policies of the P.W. Botha the search for accommodations in Rhodesia and Namibia. government that assumed power in I978. Though this does Washington could no longer simply enjoy its varied interests not make meaningful change certain, it makes it seem at least in southern Africa: it would have to work actively to possible for the first time since the Afrikaner Nationalists preempt Soviet-backed revolutionary change and deter took over in 1948. further communist adventurism in the mineral-rich region We are thus in a new phase. Does it mean that the tide of stretching from Zaire's Shaba province to Cape Town. racial conflagration and Soviet adventurism has been The Carter administration carried the new perception turned? Or, is this simply a lull in the storm as the parties further, and devised new tactics for implementing it. lake a breather during the Mugabe "honeymoon" period, before a future crisis over Namibia and the big battle over South Africa itself? What role did Washington's rhetorical and diplomatic activism play in improving the prospects, Chester A. Crocker is director of African Studies at the and what is the correct policy for the 1980s? Theanswersare Center for Strategic and International Studies, George- less obvious than appearance might suggest. town University, Washington, D.C. Mario Greznes is re- search intern and Robert Henderson is research fellow of The Southern African Choices Third World Studies, both also of the center. This paper was commissioned by Freedom House as a guide for its I n the first place, we Americans are too quick to apportion own formulation of policy on the crucial choices facing credit and blame. The Zimbabwe settlement resulted from American policy-planners in southern Africa. It was origi- several ingredients, and the U.S. role had mixed results, nally published in the November/December issue of (iiven the long background, the 1979 Lancaster House Freedom at Issue, by whose permission it is reproduced agreement and Mugabe's electoral victory are probably the here. © 1980 Freedom House Inc. best that could be hoped for. But it was British political
AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 courage and diplomatic virtuosity that brought the tangle south to north; and the raw materials, labor, and political and the war to an end. And the settlement occurred only pressures that generally move north to south. This network because all parties had exhausted their diplomatic and is vital to the survival of the political systems and economies military options, creating a window for peace. Even then, of the region, as most of its African leaders are quick to London had little choice but to operate on the premise that recognize (though reluctant to dwell upon in public). the military struggle would drag on unless Mugabe's wing of The network of ties also helps to explain southern Africa's the Patriotic Front (PF) was satisfied with the election economic importance. It accounts for most of Africa's outcome. Zimbabwean voters, operating on the same nonfuel mineral output. Southern Africa (including Zaire premise, made sure thai it was. By sticking to the "high and Tanzania) contains about one-third of the population of ground" and offering the PF a virtual veto over [he sub-Saharan Africa, but it accounts for 45 percent of its settlement process at key stages in the struggle. Washington GDP. If Nigeria is excluded, the latter figure rises to nearly helped to write this scenario in which militant guerrillas 60 percent. gained power through Western democratic forms. Nearby African states are noi doing South Alrica a favor We can only hope that there is compensation in the fact by maintaining such ties; nor are we doing so by encouraging that Zimbabwe's new leader is probably the most able them to build upon what already exists. The greatest nationalist in the country. He faces a balancing act ol heroic obstacle to development in olhcr parts of Africa is precisely proportions in the months ahead. But he does so having the absence ol those things that southern Africa can inherited one of Africa's most productive economies and continue to enjoy: mobility of capital and labor; trade and efficient administrations. He has the potential, therefore, lo transport links; currency convertibility; regional electric turn Zimbabwe into a major success story in southern power de\elopment; and mobility of scarce management, Africa, a center of growth and stability that could have technical, and entrepreneurial skills. What would happen if beneficent effects on all its neighbors, not least South Africa they were disrupted by political confrontation, the hosting itself. But this script is not yet written. of guerrilla movements aimed at South Africa, and the The American visitor to southern Africa hears a babble of triumph of ideological economics'.' voices and conflicting assessments adding up to a dissonant The answer is all too predictable. South African chorus. This is especially true within South Africa itself. preponderance in the region does not derive from these links because that society is both more open and fragmented than but from its own economic dynamism and technological most African countries. In the new period that has opened advancement. These ties rarely translate into the satellitiza- up since Zimbabwe's independence, Americans must learn tion of African states, as Pretoria has frequently discovered to live with the babble of voices, resisting the specious already. But if ties are cut. South Africa is in a position to argument that we face simple choices between black and extract a fearful price from its less developed neighbors. white Africans, between pro-Western and Marxist govern- Development and mineral output in nearby African states ments, or between our interests and our principles. In reality. will stagnate, and Western dependence on South Africa as a American interests and principles cut across the shifting beleaguered mineral giant would only increase. Western ideological and color lines of southern Africa, just as they economic interests would suffer, as access to markets and cut across the divisions within South Africa itself. investment opportunities became further fragmented. And In our approach to the stability and development of which outsiders would be prepared to step in to undo the southern Africa, we in the West are well advised to be as region's own lolly? pragmatic as the politically diverse states of the region- The Western nations face another choice between Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa, Zambia. Lesotho, pragmalism and ideological stereotypes as the\ define their Swaziland and, now, Zimbabwe have shown themselves to relations wuh the various tvpiw of African government \ that be. This means that, where possible, we should try to build exist in southern Africa. I he American purposcshould be to on and strengthen linkages between them on conditions they pursue our economic interests and capitalize on Moscow's are prepared to accept. It would be tragic if the United States current isolation from most of the region. 1 his means listens to the racially polarizing instincts of more distant concentrating our capital, talents, and aid on the region as a Africans and some in the West who want us to promote the whole not operating as though ihe African states consisted "de-linking" of the region's economies and infrastructures of easily distinguished "hostile!." and "friendlies," using along racial lines. It would also, in all likelihood, be futile. Marxist rhetoric as the litmus test. (It is a fact that most These links represent more than a past history of colonial African governments utilize Marxist verbiage while pursu- convenience and domination by white-ruled South Africa; ing ideologically eclectic policies.) The behavior ol both they also signify a basis lor the survival and future Mugabe and Mozambique's president. Samoia Machel. development of highl> vulnerable economies. demonstrates an avid interest in Western lies and a highly The integrity and interdependence of the region as an de\eloped sum\al instinct that bears almost no relationship arena for U.S. policy is not obvious, and is contested by to East-Wesi polarities; even Moscow's Angolan client many. But coherent policy toward the individual countries appears uneasy within the fraternal socialist embrace. that comprise the subcontinent depends on our recognizing Angola remains a special case while a major international- that the region's substantial potential rests on such ized civil war continues there. But. in general, (he United integration and on rational economic policies. For States must play an active regional role if our interests and understandable reasons, African-ruled states would prefer the region's own potential are to be realized Meaningful to reduce their dependence on rail lines to South Africa's levels of official economic support and in\estment are one ports, and they can be expected to move in this direction way to strengthen stability and economic pi ogress. In the where possible. But unless outside aid flows into these case of Zimbabwe, it is deplorable that the American countries in truly massive proportions a most unlikely political system can come up with no more than roughly $50 event they recognize that their South African links can be million for this year and next as a response to that country's moderated hut not ended. At present, the infrastructure of urgent foreign exchange needs tor such purposes as restoring railroads, harbors, roads, airfields, and telecommunications rural health and education, refugee resettlement, land provides a network for the food, manufactured goods, reform and agricultural de\clopment. and legalization of capital, technology, and expertise that generally flow from the country's outdated capital stock. Zimbabwe's foreign
8 AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 exchange shortfall could approach U.S. $500 million during the first post-independence year. Failure of ihe West to support the pragmatism reflected in Mugabe's early policies and first budget plan could help create a self-fulfilling prophesy if his government is unable to deliver to its supporters in key areas. Of course, there is a conditionally implicit in such Western support ot African governments in the region, but we cannot expect them to perform he/ore we support their efforts. Ihe same logic applies to such countries as Mozambique and Zambia, whose precarious economies and weak governmental systems could slide further in the absence of constructive outside involvement. Military assistance and flexible budget aid are also appropriate policy tools in this region. So far. Western abstinence and a peculiar American complex about such matters have prevented Washington from playing any useful role in the security assistance field in southern Africa. 1 his. more than any other factor, explains Zambia's recent turn to the USSR for arms in 1979-80. at a time when it faced regular pounding from Zimbabwe-Rhodesia's far superior forces. The end of the Zimbabue war has removed, at least for now, that contested political vacuum from the map of southern Africa, and denied Moscow the chance to exploit an indeterminate civil conflict in the name of "liberation." But Washington must be prepared to respond to regional security needs in the 1980s. If South Africa's relations with its neighbors turn sour or if African go\ernments begin to lose control of guerrillas targeted against Pretoria the fragile polities of the region could disintegrate in short order. This threatened to happen at the height of the Rhodesian conflict as the governments of Zaire. Zambia, Botswana, and Mozambique faced the pressure of well-armed guerrillas Jonas Savimbi: "The U.S. would serve its own interest by and retaliatory strikes from both Salisbury and Pretoria. We admitting publicly the legitimacy of the UNITA struggle" must be prepared to help governments to retain primacy Luanda, were it not for the domestic political repercussions over guerrillas on their own territory and to defend their of being seen to accommodate yet another Soviet-Cuban fail sovereignty if South Africa overplays its military accompli and to legitimize the large communist military superiority. Failure by the West to play such a role could presence in Angola.) lead to a proliferation of dangerous power vacuums on This school of thought believes that the only way to get the South Africa's periphery. Cubans out is by stopping the regular South African raids into Angola and by obtaining reconciliation between the In sum. the West must engage itself effectively in southern MPLA government and its UNITA opponents who operate Africa's black states, and this will require that meaningful in central and southern Angola. Presumably, a Namibian resources stand behind U.S. policy. Commenting on the settlement would accomplish both objectives, since prognosis for the 1980s, the Economist {London) recently UNITA—it is argued - would lose South African support noted that "each of the black countries of the region is now that is critical to its continued anti-MPLA struggle. By such finely poised between stability and disaster." While it is true, reasoning, it follows that the Soviet-Cuban presence is the magazine added, that "socialism in southern Africa has somehow justified or legitimate until Namibia is settled and had a dreadful decade" Angola apart it is clear that now UNITA finally defeated. In any event, the pressures of UN is no time for Western timidity or neglect of the region. and African diplomacy have now placed Namibia on the top of the Western calendar, while the Angolan war is hardly on The Problem of Namibia and Angola it at all. Ihe end of the Zimbabwe conflict is only the beginning of A different view of the situation is held by many centrists a new set of challenges for U.S. and Western policy. In the and conservatives in America and Europe (as well as the short to medium term these will probably center on the governments of China and most pro-Western Arab states) closely intertwined conflicts in Namibia and Angola. So that Angola is the logical focal point for policy. It is in great is the overlap between these two wars, in fact, that we Angola, after all. that anticommunist forces arc effectively outsiders sometimes have a problem deciding which is the engaged in trying to liberate their country from the new key to the other. The Carter administration and many imperialism of Moscow and its allies. Not only is Jonas observers in Europe and Africa prefer to operate as though Savimbi's UN II A movement a genuine nationalist grouping the Angolan civil war were simply an extension of South with unquestioned popular support in its ethnic home base; Africa's battle with the Angola- and Zambia-based it is also succeeding in bloodying the Cubans, raising the guerrillas of the South-West African People's Organization price of adventurism to Moscow, and raising doubts in many (SWAPO). In this view, Angola should be considered a Angolan minds about the benefits of the socialist alliance. fullfledged member of the Frontline States grouping, a This process should be encouraged with the aim of getting diplomatic partner whose cooperation in the search for a the Cubans out so that a genuine political reconciliation can Namibian settlement is essential. (Washington would lake place. As for Namibia, while a settlement is important probably already have recognized the M PL A government in there, it will not by itself end the Angolan strife, because
AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 reduce or eliminate the communist combat presence in southern Africa and to bring about a political compromise acceptable to all major political forces in Angola. We should identify with the desire of Angolans themselves to rid their land of foreign troops and the fighting they represent. In Namibia, the low-level guerrilla conflict continues while the parties (South Africa, SWAPO, the Western parties, and the Frontline States) maneuver over two distinct political tracks—both, in theory, aimed at an independent Namibia. The "internal" track sponsored by South Africa entails the creation and support of local political and administrative authorities of moderate ("safe") stripe to whom power would be transferred. The "international" track leading to UN-supervised elections and internationally recognized independence has the support of the Western powers, the Frontline States, the UN itself, and (in varying degrees) SWAPO and South Africa. The government of Prime Minister P.W. Botha in Pretoria is pursuing both tracks, using the first as a lever to obtain improvements (from its standpoint) in the second. It is a complex tangle, and the military dimension of it is likely to grow costlier and bloodier. South Africa argues that its presence as an administering power is legal (derived from a League of Nations mandate since revoked by the UN), and it insists on the right to prevent SWAPO intimidation of Namibian voters during the elections that would precede independence. Most other nations (including the United States) consider South African presence in Namibia to be "illegal," and they maintain that the UN-- not South Africa—will determine the definition of a "free and fair" election. In practice, neither Pretoria nor SWAPO has much confidence in the concept of "free and fair" elections. This problem is aggravated by the folly of the UN General- Assembly majority, which declared in 1976 that SWAPO "What useful role can we play to help South Africans was the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian toward a nonraclal future?" people, a position that undermines UN credibility and feeds South African distrust. For their part, African diplomats are Savimbi is by no means the tool of South Africa. He could quick to note that SWAPO will not gain office under the UN continue to operate with the active support of other African transition plan unless it can win the election; but the more states and governments elsewhere. Accordingly, the West candid among them also concede that SWAPO is unlikely to should back UNITA. until such time as the MPLA is lose, since the Namibian people -if given the chance by prepared to negotiate and to expel the communist forces Pretoria -will probably vote for the party that will "end the from Angola. Namibia, according to this argument, is a war." separate and less important issue. The U.S. position in this puzzle should consist of three There are flaws of logic in both views. There is little doubt elements. Washington should not align itself with any that Savimbi could survive the loss of the logistical proposed "internal settlement" created by South Africa cooperation UNITA now gets from the South Africans, unilaterally. Such an arrangement makes sense only as an assuming his important African. European, and Arab interim step toward an international settlement. The United supporters do not desert him. Hence, the Angolan problem States and its allies have nothing to gain from backing a will not go away just because Namibia is settled. Moreover, South African client government in circumstances that it is difficult to see how a meaningful reconciliation between assure a continuation of internationalized warfare. Second, the MPLA and UNITA could occur if UNITA were first American diplomacy should press hard to allay Pretoria's weakened decisively. This would be the reconciliation of concern about the impartiality of any planned UN victor and vanquished. The West has few reasons for peacekeeping and election-monitoring operation in Nam- supporting any such reconciliation, given UNlTA's strong ibia. The General Assembly has set a frightful precedent in anti-Soviet record and strong popular support in the backing SWAPO that makes a mockery of democratic country. principres and procedures—especially when one recalls the On the other hand, should Washington change course and tendency of a largely illiterate rural populace to vote for the back UNITA outright, it is not obvious how this path would men with the guns. Third, the United States should retain its lead to reconciliation either. It could produce an escalation flexibility about the modalities of an international of conflict, and it would probably rule out responding to settlement for Namibia. Washington, under the Carter frequent hints from the MPLA of a desire to reduce sharply administration, has invested considerable energy and skill in its Soviet-Cuban ties. As far as the Angolan conflict is the Western Five-UN transition proposals, but this should concerned, the United States would serve its own best not blind us to the need for a fall-back position if these interests by admitting publicly the legitimacy of the UNITA proposals go off the track. Let us hope that we Americans struggle and maintaining the pressure for a departure by can be humble enough to recognize that our best diplomatic communist combat forces. The ultimate goal should be to effort on this track could fail.Other frameworks can
10 AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 presumably be devised, and our goal should be to avoid Africa is the inadequate level of public understanding on becoming boxed into our own proposals if they appear which it is based, loo few Americans comprehend how incapable of bridging the remaining gaps. This is especially much South Africans and we in the West have to lose if the pertinent in a situation where we have limited leverage over process of change is thwarted or degenerates into any ot the parties and are obliged to operate jointly with our internationalized civil strife. South Africa is not a minor NATO allies to give our views real weight. issue. A second weakness is the highly polarized opinions about South Africa that exist at the fringes of our political Coping with South Africa's Complexity process where, regrettably, there is greatest interest in the The American stance toward the Republic of South problem. Proposals for disinvestment, for complete Africa is inevitably the centerpiece of our regional policy. economic disengagement, for support of nationalist ^Politically. South Africa is the focal point of intense pressure guerrillas, make as little sense as arguments on the other side •for basic change toward a more just, nonracial society. Such that call for a close political-military relationship with pressure flows from within South Africa, much of the Pretoria. The latter ignores the fact that the monopoly of African and international community, and from within our political power held by 4.5 million whites over some 22 own society. Consequently, any U.S. regional policy must be million Africans, Coloureds (mixed race), and Asians consistent with and based upon an understanding of where cannot long continue. The former arguments ignore the base we are headed in our relationship with Pretoria. Second, for cautious optimism that does exist, and neglect to specify South Africa is by any definition an important regional what useful consequences might follow from such action. power on the world scene, and it is by far the most important The West can neither embrace South Africa, in its current country in the southern African region. Militarily, form, nor can it walk away from the problem. In political economically, technologically, and in most other respects terms. South Africa is not embraceable without our the Republic towers over its neighbors. To take but one incurring massive diplomatic damage and risking severe measure. South Africa accounts for 65 percent of the GDP domestic polarization. However, that country is also by its of southern Africa (even when defined to include Zaire and nature a part of the West. It is an integral and important Tanzania). Third, it is in South Africa that the West's most element of the Western global economic system. Historical- important regional interests are at stake —both our tangible ly, South Africa is by its nature a part of us. In our judgments economic and strategic interests and also our political and of it. we reflexively apply Western standards of political moral interests in nonviolent change. behavior. We also see much of ourselves and project many of our domestic agenda there. A major weakness of American policy toward South
South African troops in Namibia: "The U.S. should retain flexibility about the modalities of a settlement"
AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 11 The long-term objective is the emergence of a domestic tactical and leadership issues, but united in the confidence order in South Africa that will permit the United States to that basic change is coming through whatever combination pursue a full and normal relationship with it- Whether this of violent and nonviolent strategies is available. The real happens depends on the pace of change, how change occurs, optimists in South Africa are in the black (i.e., African, and who participates in it. The things we value democratic Coloured, and Asian) communities; that optimism is principles, a strong market economy, nonracialism are tempered by the knowledge that quite a few black lives and unlikely to take root if we wash our hands ol South Africa or material interests may have to be sacrificed in order finally to play down its problems. The task, therefore, is to steer a convince whites to sit down and bargain without course between destabilizing the Republic there has been preconditions. Their greatest obstacle is the problem of enough destabilization of important countries in recent organizational unity: how best to organize themselves as years and aligning ourselves with the cause of white guerrillas, trade unionists, civic associations, students, minority rule. It is not our task to prejudge basic questions consumers, cultural-political movements, and participants about the ultimate blueprint that ought to be resolved by in business and government service -for the ultimate South Africans themselves. bargaining process. Our guide in relations with Pret6ria needs to include This set of circumstances docs not justify giving up on common sense and fundamental American principles. If South Africa. Its future has not yet been written, despite the U.S. history has meaning for Africa, it is that a multiracial storm clouds that gather. Unlike most, the South African society with guarantees of individual and minority rights is economy is showing the capacity to generate resources for possible and can work. As a democracy, we cannot endorse growth and social change. I he still enormous disparity in the situations or constitutions that are racist in purpose or kinds of physical power in the hands of whites and the effect; nor can we endorse the abuse of Western norms by nonwhite majority provides a slim margin of lime and a firm people of whatever race dedicated to seizing or holding check on sudden political disintegration. For the West to power through violence. Such an approach to the problem write off the place prematurely, whether for domestic- of encouraging evolutionary change must include a clear political convenience or to shed an embarrassing interna- recognition that some South Africans and quite a few tional burden, would be an action of the highest moral outsiders do not support this goal since it would limit their cowardice. power and influence. If we are to be serious in southern The second question what is at stake? has already been Africa (probably the biggest "if in the minds of those who partially answered. Our political principles and multiracial live there), we must act in ways that permit the supporters of society give us an inherent interest in democratic change. evolutionary change to gain and hold the initiative. The diversity of our international and African interests also predisposes us to change that is consistent with our world Reading the above, many Americans will pose two basic role and the values we stand for abroad. But there are also questions: Is it possible for the United States to play such a some very important tangible interests involved. role? And, why is it so important that we do so what is at In military and strategic terms, the Cape Route linking the- stake'.' On the first question, some close observers of the South Atlantic and Indian oceans is a conduit tor the South African scene doubt that it is still possible for majority of Western imports of petroleum and nontucl moderates of all races to coalesce around an effective minerals. At present, it is not vulnerable to imminent strategy for change, no matter what outside well-wishers disruption in any credibly foreseeable peacetime scenario. In might do. Analogies drawn from the American civil-rights fact, in peacetime, the potential threat to Western oil and experience, it is argued, do not fit, while analogies from mineral supplies is greater on land than at sea. But there are places like Rhodesia or Algeria are not encouraging. two worrisome contingencies, and they are important ones. Moreover, in the history of National Party rule since 1948. there is little basis for either trust between the races or First, at a time of general war or even limited contlici that optimism in the West. Skeptics argue that, in general, could break out elsewhere, these supplies remain vital. It is Afrikaner nationalism and the quest for "cultural survival" clearly more than a mere convenience that South Alrica's of this unique white tribe has translated into the domination excellent port and air facilities not be in the hands of a or brutal coercion of everyone else. Even if the Afrikaner potential adversary (or be made available to such an elite now recognizes that apartheid is a dead end. it is not adversary) at such a time. The Soviet Union is unlikely to clear that controlled change is possible. By the time blacks start a war by disrupting Western shipping in the southern have acquired the tangible bargaining power to challenge oceans because this is what such action would lead to. white rule, they are likely to have lost interest in meaningful Besides, there are far more convenient places from which compromise over power-sharing. Moscow might seek to disrupt oil traffic further north. But the USSR would have major advantages once war occurred These arguments cannot be dismissed, but they can be if political forces hostile to the West were in control of South answered. In the past five years, and especially since Botha Africa. This concern is applicable both to a wartime scenario took office in 1978, the obscure politics of Afrikanerdom in Europe and to a large-scale Middle East conflict in which have become more pragmatic and rational, less tribal and the Western nations became involved. ideological. The best talents within this determined but Second, for the same reasons, it is clearly not in the U.S. intellectually isolated community of white Africans appear interest that change in South Africa lead toward a to be coalescing around that leadership in the press, the government that was dependent for its existence and military, business, the church, and the universities. On survival on Soviet military power (as in Angola). This is a grounds of both political ethics and practical politics, possibility that must be faced if change in South Africa leading Afrikaners may now be coming to realize that degenerates into large-scale destruction and revolutionary purposeful change is absolutely essential. The immediate violence. In such a scenario, the very presence of Soviet obstacle, in their view, is not the feasibility of such change forces at Africa's sensitive southern tip would constitute a (though that is hotly debated); rather, it is the problem of powerful basis for the political intimidation of the Western how to organize and lead Afrikanerdom away from the dead nations during conditions ol tension and crisis. This is all the end and to do so in a more or less democratic context (for more true since maritime leverage would be supported by whites). control over critical mineral exports from South Africa Black politics, meanwhile, are increasingly fragmented on itself.
12 AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 Ill I
Prime Minister Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe is committed to 'a moderate path of mixed economic principles and multiracialism" I hese military interests, il must be emphasized, do not and Japanese vulnerability to possible supply disruptions. argue for a U.S. or Western embrace of white-ruled South price manipulation, or stagnant exploration and output will Africa; nor do ihe\ mean that Washington should be get progressively more acute in the next twenty >ears. opposed to African majorit> rule in a unitary South African Substitution and technological innovation may offer relief stale. But they do imply a strong preemptive interest in as prices of key commodities rise, but only in some cases and forestalling a Soviet combat presence in southern Africa. with quite long lead times. In the meantime. Africa as a and they reinforce the political reasons for the West to whole has emerged as the world's most important source of oppose the militarization of political change in South many imported minerals, and a significant source of most Africa. others. What gives African mineral reserves their In addition, the United States has a hroader concern for importance for Western interests is the fact that the bulk of the way major powers behave in regions of tension and output is exported and wilt continue to be for the long-term conflict. It is not in our interest that the use of military force I u t u re. become established as the principal means for effecting South Africa holds a special place among African political change in southern Africa or anywhere else. I his raw-materials exporters. It is by far the dominant region is not a Western sphere of influence in any formal producer-exporter of nonoil minerals in Africa and the I hird sense; but it is far more important to the West than it is to the World; only the United States, the USSR, Canada, and Soviets and their allies (except as a source ol anti-Western Australia outstrip the Republic as minerals-producers. pressure). There can be no presumptive communist right to Because of its output and export of coal and uranium, create political fads and fails accompli by the use ol superior diamonds and precious metals, ferro-alloys that are central military power there. How the United States conducts itself to Western steel production (manganese, chrome, and globally and regionally in southern Africa will determine vanadium), platinum group and base metals, it is a fact not whether or not Moscow is offered such an opportunity. opinion or propaganda, as is sometimes alleged that South U.S. and Western economic interests in South Africa fall Africa is the Saudi Arabia of minerals. into three basic categories. First. South Africa is one of There is, futhermore. a regional dimension to South Africa's few growth points. U.S. investors, like their African minerals prominence. Although Namibia, Botswa- European counterparts, have clear interests in participating na. Mozambique. Zimbabwe. Zambia. Zaire, and Angola in such a market. As the scale of the U.S. trade deficit in are also important producers of some minerals, it is not Africa continues to grow the continent accounted for realistic to view them as alternatives to South Africa. In few nearly 50 percent of the world-wide deficit last year there if any cases would they be able to take up the slack if. for are strong incentives to expand sales and profit remittances whatever reason. South African production were to fall from South Africa. Although there is a large U.S. trade defi- sharply or be purposefully curtailed. In the event of serious cit with South Africa, that country is nonetheless by lar our regional conflict or of Western economic sanctions against largest market in Afiica. with the single exception ol Egypt Pretoria, one should not assume that nearby black African (where U.S. aid brings exports to about the same level as to ores would reach the market and displace South African South Africa). exports. If South Africa itself slides into protracted civil Second, there is the need to retain and expand U.S. and conflict sufficient to affect mineral exports, there is no Western access to a reliable supply of imported minerals at reason to suppose that the neighboring economies and reasonable prices. I he long-term trend toward severe transport-power networks would remain unaffected. Western minerals-import dependence is well documented A third category of economic interest in South Africa is and needs only summary treatment here. The key points to related to that country's potential to serve as a regional bear in mind are stark and straightforward. U.S.. European. engine of development. Neighboring African states such as
AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 13 Zimbabwe will not be content to play the role of Pretoria's diplomacy must include the capacity to back friendly satellites, nor should we urge them to do so. But the governments with tangible assistance technical, economic, Republic offers neighboring Africa things that no other political, and military. It must be backed by the evident state African or external can offer as readily or in as involvement of our highest political levels. Diplomatic substantial a scale: jobs and training in the modern sector, a efforts toward regional accommodation will prove little if demand for electric power and port facilities, a source of our posture is simply to align ourselves verbally with capital seeking external investment outlets, substantial whatever trends and forces appear to have the upper hand in market potential for raw materials and processed goods, and southern Africa. a source of expertise and experience in a wide range of Second, a serious policy will restrain our tendency to developmental fields. All of this, of course, becomes a stereotype local factions and will thereby broaden our mirage or a delusion if meaningful, evolutionary change fails options to conduct a flexible policy. Continued blacklisting to occur in South Africa or if the region becomes engulfed in of Mozambique for U.S. assistance regardless of its international strife. professed desire for an opening to the West is shortsighted. At the very least, Washington must have the capacity to Summing Up explore the potential for fostering realignments that are in The preceding discussion makes clear that it matters how our own interest.Similarly, in relations with South Africa change occurs in South Africa and how the Republic relates our interest is best served by an opening up of attitudes- to the region of which it is an integral part. The catalogue of most particularly in the white community something that U.S. and Western interests does not present us with a cannot be done by isolating it. Every effort should be made, clearcut choice between short-term interests on the one hand by the public and private sectors of the Western nations, to and longer-term interests and principles on the other. The expand contacts that could promote attitudinal change and issue is not. can we live with change? Rather, it is: what kind the opening up of social and economic relations. The of change do we want and how do we limit the costs of strength of Western societies lies in the diversity of getting from here to there? The right kind of change in South institutions and bases of influence within them; such Africa and the region will not require the destruction or pluralism is seldom seen in the Third World, and southern dismantling of existing dynamic economies, efficient Africa is no exception. South Africa urgently, perhaps administrative services, and developed infrastructure. Nor desperately, needs new avenues and organizations in which does it require the eclipse of Western political values and different racial and income groups can deal with each other strategic interests such as minerals access. Not, that is, unless openly. The failure to strengthen such institutions inside the we contribute to such a scenario by the creation of Republic can only encourage violent confrontation. More self-fulfilling prophesies. thought should be given to how Western governments and societies can respond to this need. Western policy in southern Africa in the 1980s will demand a careful sophistication that is unlike our past Third, U.S. effectiveness in southern Africa will be a performance. U.S. parsimony over aid to Zimbabwe colors function of its global credibility and sense of purpose. Our perceptions of our policy throughout the region as local capacity to discourage radicalization will depend on whether actors wonder about the seriousness of American purpose we have alternatives to offer. By the same token, our ability there. Our tendency to stereotype black and white Africans to deter Soviet-inspired militarization of local conflicts into neat cliches undermines the flexibility needed for an relates to the Soviet perception of us on a world-wide basis. imaginative policy. Because they have to live there. Africans Certainly, there is no place in our policies for attitudes that are more pragmatic than distant observers. Americans are suggest that Soviet and American goals are equally unlikely to do well if they persist in viewing southern Africa legitimate. through the lens of contending propaganda machines for Finally, we need a stronger basis for approaching the various factions. The region will be shaped by forces more question of nonviolent change within South Africa. It is no substantial and concrete than journalistic conventions like longer enough to maintain general political pressure —e.g.. "racist regim s" or "Marxist guerrillas." through the arms embargo—and to talk about the goal of The U.S. inclination to downplay the role of tangible "full political participation" for blacks in the system. Given power realities in faraway places also bedevils our approach. the magnitude of the task, the American call for an all-parties Southern Africans have to live within the context of existing national convention to "settle" the South African problem power relations, just as they must adapt to changes in those has an artificial ring. The dismantling of institutionalized relations that may occur. When Westerners fail to support racism in South Africa will require hundreds of decisions, those forces that could support their interests—or when they not one. and it has to start somewhere. Indeed, it has already do not appear to know what side to be on, as in the view that started. The question, therefore, is what useful role we can Cubans are "stabilizing" Angola- they simply become play to help South Africans of all groups think their way irrelevant. from today's situation toward a nonracial future. If the United States is to have a serious policy in southern Some will call this intervention, and in a sense it is. But the Africa, it must include some basic decisions. First, our policy purpose is benign, and our failure to do anything at all proposals and initiatives must be backed by tangible and except talk about the ultimate goal accomplishes rather intangible resources that are relevant to the region. We little. Pressure in necessary, yet the sources of effective cannot compete with the other world power in the region if pressure are severely limited. We do not want to destabilize we ignore its aims and have little to offer ourselves. Recent South Africa or jeopardize our own economic and strategic experience makes clear that Moscow believes it will profit interests. The power to coerce South Africa is not in our from the destabilization or overthrow of governments and hands, especially not in the hands of the U.S. government. systems that are tied to us, politically or economically. Far Hence, our limited influence must not be wasted in largely from resolving conflicts or meeting regional development symbolic gestures or undermined by ignorance of internal needs, Moscow and its allies profit from keeping the pot South African timing and dynamics. In the final analysis, we boiling. In conditions of economic slide and political are likely to find that our ability to support the things we uncertainty. Western investment will be deterred and want to see is greater than our ability to dictate or Western hopes for nonviolent change undermined. Our threaten. D
14 AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 WORLD TRADE
The Search for Commodity Stability
By JOHN PARRY
arly in the morning of November getting our integrated program on com- didn't budge, and ended up getting E 15, 1980, producers and major modities off the ground. If we had what they wanted. African countries consumers reached agreement in had that program in operation last year, should do the same in negotiations on Geneva on the terms of a new three- the current crisis in primary products subjects such as cocoa — but the work year pact regulating world trade in would not be so severe." has got to be done at home, in Africa. cocoa. The compromise agreement And what will happen to Third It's no good coming here to Geneva and satisfied nobody — the United States, World, and particularly African expecting to work out some kind of the world's largest consumer, refused economies, if the integrated program Pan-African compromise here. It just to be associated with it, and Ivory on commodities fails to take hold? "1 doesn't work." Coast, which produced 22 percent of dread to think," says Corea, simply. What is the integrated program for the world's cocoa in 1979, also refused Corea is critical of African nations commodities? Basically it is the to accept the pricing mechanism con- for allegedly not being assertive enough umbrella-like parent of the Common tained in it. But the very fact that in international commodity negotia- Fund, a plan devised by UNCTAD to agreement was reached at all signified a tions. "Too often they simply sit there put together a whole series of interna- realization on the part of all concerned and let events sweep them along," he tional agreements covering a dozen that something has to be done to said. "What's needed is for African commodities. The agreements would stabilize world commodity prices. governments to get together before be basically designed to ensure price This realization lies behind the negotiations on a given commodity, stability through an agreed floor and grudging acceptance earlier in 1980 of work out their joint position in advance, ceiling price of each commodity, the idea of a "Common Fund" to and stick to it when the time comes to maintained through the use of buffer stabilize prices of all major com- modities. The brainchild of Gamani Corea of Sri Lanka, secretary-general of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the fund is scheduled to start operating in 1982. Its stated aim is to link the various individual commodity agree- ments together, thus enabling them to help each other in supporting prices in times of economic crisis. "Without some sort of order in commodity markets in the next decade, the economies of developing countries will be exposed to enormous stresses and strains," Corea said in an inter- view. "This is particularly true of Af- rica, where many countries are heavily Cocoa being harvested in Ivory Coast, the world's leading producer of the dependent on commodities such as commodity cocoa for their foreign trade. In fact Africa has the biggest stake of all in talk with the consumer nations. That's stocks or national stockpiles managed the way the major world producers of by an international organization that natural rubber did it when we were would have the right to buy or sell at a John Parry is a British writer based in negotiating an agreement on that par- given moment to keep the price stable. Geneva, reporting on international af- ticular commodity. They came to the So far UNCTAD has negotiated fairs. negotiating table with a united front. agreements on natural rubber, cocoa,
AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 15 tin, coffee, and sugar. But some of commodities-oriented economies of Ihese agreements are on shaky ground. developing countries. The United J The cocoa pact, while accepted by 80 States says they inhibit a free-market percent of the producer nations and all economy. the major consumers (with the excep- The United States has also been ac- tion of the United States) was criticized cused of trying to "sabotage" the by many participants at the Geneva negotiations on a new tin agreement by meeting as not going far enough to- unilaterally selling off tin from the vast wards price stabilization. The fragile stockpile held by the U.S. government. agreement on tin is also being assailed But UNCTAD sources say this has ap- from all sides — by the tin producers, parently had little effect on world prices who claim their demands for a higher so far. floor price are not being heeded, and by Negotiations for the conclusion of an the consumers, who claim that any at- international pact on tea are being ham- tempt to regulate the world's tin supply Gamani Corea, secretary-general of pered by a basic dispute between pro- UNCTAD: "Africa has the biggest stake by abandoning a free-market economy ducers in Asia and those in Africa. As in getting our commodities program off in favor of controlled supply and de- Corea explains it, this dispute stems the ground" mand would knock the bottom out of from the desire of the traditional pro- their key industries. But it's our job to the market. ducers of tea, particularly India and Sri persuade them that international regu- The United States, the world's Lanka — China does not, as yet, play lation, far from hindering them, will largest consumer of tin, is once more an active part in the international help them because it will bring the price cast as the villain in these negotiations negotiations on commodities — to limit stability without which planned growth because it holds out for the principle of production to an agreed overall figure. is impossible. That's what we're trying a free-market economy and wants buf- The major African producers — Tan- to do with lea." fer stocks, financed jointly by produc- zania, Kenya, Uganda, and Malawi — One of the problems in putting to- ers and consumers, to be created to are opposed to any such limitation be- gether an international pact on tea, ac- stabilize prices. The major tin produc- cause, they say, it will inhibit the cording to UNCTAD, is the stagnation ers say this is neither necessary nor ec- growth of the tea industry domestically. of import demand in consumer coun- onomically feasible. According to Corea this is a tries as a result of the economic reces- The United States is also opposed to shortsighted attitude. "We have to sion. Producing countries are unhappy the inclusion in a new International Tin show them that they have no stake in over falling prices, particularly since Agreement, supposed to come into investing in a declining and unhealthy these are accompanied by increased force in 1981, of export controls. These industry," he says. "Prices will con- production costs: at a meeting in are an integral part of the current ag- tinue to fall in a free market. Of course Malawi in 1979 it was generally agreed reement, and the producers claim they it's easy to understand that developing that a system of export quotas was the are necessary because they protect the countries don't like to see brakes put on best means of stabilizing prices, but the African nations went along with this decision reluctantly and it has yet to be implemented. Although Corea likes to cite the In- ternational Sugar Agreement as one of UNCTAD's major achievements, it has in fact signally failed to achieve its ob- jective of stabilizing world prices. Hardly had the agreement been con- cluded when prices moved from below the floor level to well above the "ceil- ing." They have continued to fluctuate wildly ever since, thus rendering the agreement to all intents and purposes impotent. The United States, according to members of its delegation at the UN- CTAD Cocoa Conference here in November, expects equal fluctuations to affect the New International Cocoa Agreement, which is due to come into force on March 31, 1981 — provided a sufficient number of producing and Tea fields in Kenya: A pact of tea is hampered by a dispute between producers in Asia and Africa consuming countries ratify it. "We feel
16 AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 question of commodity stabilization, that his country could "perfectly well" addition to government contributions, and this is certainly true today as it was build up its own cocoa stockpile and each individual international commod- five years ago," he said. "But the deal independently with consumers. ity agreement will pay an entrance fee process of translating this broad policy Other countries' could certainly make equivalent to a third of its maximum commitment into deeds is something the same claim: it has been estimated financial requirements for buffer else. It takes some time for a commit- that Ghana could produce up to stocks. From this capital, UNCTAD ment like this to filter down. You can 800,000 metric tons of cocoa without hopes that the fund's management can convince the generals, but the soldiers even replacing any of the 60 percent of then raise substantial borrowing from are still in the trenches!" Ghanaian cocoa trees that are over 25 international capital markets. Will the advent of the Reagan ad- years old. In many cases the commodities pro- ministration make this process even But the troubles which OPEC itself duced in African countries are unsuita- slower? Corea doesn't believe so. "I has incurred as a result of the Iraq-Iran ble for stocking, and thus the "second don't expect a reversal of the basic pol- war have tended to put a brake on such account" offers the greatest benefits for icy commitment, but what we've got to "go it alone" talk and it seems likely them. In both cases, however, the suc- do is persuade the new administration that most producers will put their faith, cess of the fund ultimately depends on to continue working as hard as possible at least in the immediate future, in the how many international commodity for implementation of the integrated Common Fund. j agreements can be put together by UN- program for commodities." he said. "I But will the fund, which in its pres- CTAD in the next 24 months, thus think we've got a lot of hard lobbying to ent form is a much truncated version of highlighting the urgency of Corea's do with the Federal Trade Commission, what was originally proposed, suc- search for solutions. but I think there's one thing very much ceed? Most UNCTAD officials insist "Second account" money will be in our favor: we know that the Ameri- that it is the only viable alternative to loaned to Third World commodity pro- cans now see regulation of world com- unfettered chaos in all world commod- ducers on concessional terms, with modity markets not just as part of the ity markets, but some diplomats from loans concentrated on the least-devel- North-South dialogue, but in its true industrialized countries are less san- oped countries, which have a high global context. I'm optimistic about the guine. The pact, put together in June degree of dependence on one or two commodities. Many of these, of course, are in Africa. The idea behind 170 170 COMBINED INDEX the "first account" is that it will pro- 160 Index of nominal prices 160 Index of leil prices 5/ vide low-interest loans to member 150 150 Index in terms of SDRs 140 140 commodity agreements for buffer 130 130 stocking: Third World nations origi- 120 120 nally wanted all member commodity 110 110 agreements to be called on to put up the 100 100 money to save another agreement that 90 90 would be in danger of defaulting, but 80 eventually conceded that this was not 70 feasible.
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I II I I I I I I I I I I I I M I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I The fund is envisaged by UNCTAD I 1976 1 I 1977 1 I 1978 I I 1979— 1 I 1980 ' as acting as a catalyst in the establish- a/ Weiglrtinj 1975-1977, see Annex. i ment of commodity agreements anx- b/ Index in current dollars divided by the United Nations index of export unit values of manufactured goods. ious to take advantage of its financial Used with permission of UNCTAD, Monthly Commodity Price Bulletin, October 1980. sources. But many Western diplomats feel that it offers too little to make any appreciable difference. way we can work with the new admin- 1980 after four years of North-South Corea, however, is optimistic about istration." wrangling, will probably have at its the fund's future — as indeed, he is Key to the success of the integrated disposal less than half the resources about the entire future of commodity program for commodities is the bring- originally planned for it — $6 billion. agreements. "It's wrong to say that the ing together of producers and consum- The total initial capital contributions fund has only $750 million," he says. ers for joint action. Already in some from direct and voluntary government "That $750 million is the capital of the discussions — the tin conference has commitments will be $750 million, fund, just like a bank has capital. We been a prime example — there has been split into $400 million for the "first could easily raise $6 billion on that talk by producers of setting up their account," to be used for financing capital if we had to, but at the moment own OPEC-style cartel to regulate buffer stocks, and $350 million for the we're concentrating on putting the in- world prices irrespective of what the "second account," for financing other dividual agreements together. The $6 consumers want. At the cocoa talks, measures, such as market research, billion can come later — if we need Ivory Coast's Bra Kanon threatened promotion, and related activities. In it." •
18 AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 MOZAMBIQUE
Creating a New Legal System
By ALLEN ISAACMAN and BARBARA ISAACMAN
hen Mozambique became inde- the lack of judicial safeguards charac- $70 or less, whose owners were pri- Wpendent on June 25, 1975, it in- teristic of all totalitarian regimes. In the marily poor shanty town dwellers, was herited a repressive legal system. Even rural areas, where 90 percent of the considered a minor offense. Political before Frelimo had assumed power, its Mozambican population lived, local opposition of any form was not toler- experience in the northern liberated administrators served both as prosecu- ated; and dissidents, both black and zones had convinced the leadership that tor and judge. As Rui Balthazar, a white, were apprehended by the notori- it would not be sufficient merely to Af- prominent white critic of the colonial ous secret police (PIDE) and sent to ricanize or Mozambicanize the existing regime and Mozambique's first minis- Machave Prison, the penal camp at Ibo state's apparatus. The colonial state, ter of justice, recalled: Island and the cacao plantations of Sao including police, judges, lawyers, and Thome. Many never returned. laws, had to be dismantled and replaced ... at local and district levels adminis- In 1964 Frelimo initiated the armed with new institutions designed to serve trative and judicial functions were struggle. In those areas liberated from the interests of the Mozambican people merged in the same office. The colonial Portuguese control, Frelimo had to de- administration thus concentrated in his within an emerging socialist context. hands all the means necessary to velop a new legal system, however It has been more than five years since safeguard and maintain colonial exploi- rudimentary, to fill the void created by the euphoric days of independence. tation. The administrator supervised the the collapse of the colonial regime. Sufficient time has elapsed to make a economic sectors; secured the recruit- Colonial criminal law vanished with the ment of forced labour for the plantations, flight of the Portuguese administrator; preliminary assessment, however ten- public works or works abroad; collected tative, of the extent to which the new taxes; was the person responsible for se- and the old property, tax, and labor government has achieved these objec- curity; distributed favors and judged and laws had no meaning with the planters' tives and to identify the nagging prob- punished at his discretion. It was hard to departure. Starting from the proposi- lems that have yet to be overcome. find an administration without the con- tion that "laws do not arise [spon- stant ritual of palmatorias [beat- taneously] ... but to defend the interest Any discussion of postindependence ings] I transformations must necessarily in- of certain social classes," Frelimo clude a brief examination of the coloni- I sought to formulate a new juridical al legal system and of that developed in Numerous United Nations and Interna- system to reflect both the needs of the the liberated zones, both of which nave tional Labor Organization reports peasants on whose support it depended had a profound impact on the redefini- document his claim of capricious and and the concrete experience of the tion of the law and the judicial process. excessive punishments. armed struggle. In a somewhat tele- Under the colonial government, race In the urban centers, the court system scoped account, Sergio Vieira, a mem- and class discrimination exacerbated served to protect the property rights of ber of the Frelimo Central Committee, the settler population and to prevent any described the debates within Frelimo Allen Isaacman is a writer and teacher agitation for change. That theft of $300 and between militants and the rural at the Department of History, Univer- was treated as a serious crime punisha- population that underpinned this pro- sity of Minnesota. Barbara Isaacman ble by long-term imprisonment sym- cess. is an attorney. During the past two years they have been teaching at the bolized the settler community's preoc- University Eduardo Mondlane, cupation with crimes of property, since And so we began to pose the prob- Maputo, in the faculties of history and few Africans could amass such wealth. lem .... Precisely what was the object law, respectively. Conversely, robbery of goods valued at of the struggle? To accomplish what?
AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 19 that the price adjustment and financing each other — in negotiating new ag- Corea some cause for concern is the provisions (of the new agreement) are reements, and on the other hand we are election of Ronald Reagan, and with deficient, and we do not believe they asking the consumers to take a more him the entry into force in Washington will be adequate to deal with what we realistic attitude and accept that the of a more conservative line in interna- see as a potentially serious surplus situ- producers, too, have a role to play in the tional trade negotiations. Will this ation in the world cocoa economy," open market and Ihe pricing structure." mean that the United States takes a less U.S. delegate Douglas W. McMinn "Basically," he says, "we have to active role in the formulating of inter- said. promote a policy of awareness, of the national commodity agreements? Basically, the new cocoa agreement desperate need for putting our house in Corea hopes not — but he's not sure. represented a compromise between order." The United States indicated in the producers and consumers. Minimum One recent development that gives 1970s that it has a new approach to the and maximum prices will be $1.10 and $1.50 a pound, and cocoa will be bought or sold from a buffer stock to try to keep international market prices within this range. There are provisions for adjusting the minimum and Africana Library maximum prices through stages to $1 and $1.60 a pound it' conditions de- The Afrikaners p Africana mand heavy use of ihe buffer stock. Edited by Edwin S Mungei J12 library Notes These timely ny«t are bv South Africans chown by the The Ivory Coast has consistently editor and individual introduced Aid" Palon. The VohrnntXIi IM01W1 Subscription Price SI2 Alrikjnei a I knixn Nm ( hnstiaan Barnard Therreedo' held out against the new pact because, it an Arnlanc Pel ("ill* Ihf while uitr, W A Oe Klerk An Atnkaner revolution Tim Vorslei. G'Owrng op at an says, the "floor" price is too low. AlnUncr Madeleine Van B'ljon MereJi jn Africaner, In Publication Willem De KIM Jam an Afrikaner, Ebbe Dommisse T(w Ivory Coast's Agriculture Minister changing role oi tfov 4/r'Aaans press The •unVfui Commotion (4 The Commission is considering the future of Natal and Denis Bra Kanon has consistently Samuel Mcrtsuenyane A ?st*ana growing upwih constitutional changes Inwards a new open society in called for a minimum price of $1.20, Ainkinen Enka 1 heron Afrikaner-Coloured fe'jiion. South Africa Documentation includes speeches hy Catsha |H Coeuee. 7he fat I and falter ml our image, lohn H Buthele?i concerning the Commission, iis membership but at the Geneva conference he re- Chetlle Afrit anm and ihc future • Henry kaizesv the Inkatha Movement, commenis by prominent South Africans and photographs ceived little support from other produc- Vil|oen An Atrtkine, (oils ahead Ther a per al fim-word bs Ihe editor pholographs ers, particularly Brazil and Ecuador, UfSK, Hi Communin Allin, tnd Southern Atrki, Ihe c and an *nde» b, David E Albright S* the major Latin American cocoa na- A superb and intormed analysis ot contemporars Sosiet tions. Ghana, which had originally polnv m Southern Atnca with entensive lootncne!. ciimg Russian and Western sources been a supporter of the Ivory Coast Also published by the Library ftippir Hongrni by iht foubert A Summary 12 position, went along with the majority Ihe Hiinter and Hn *rt An English summary o' a heanrendmg novel bjsecf on A Survt k Arr decision to set up the new pact because, mierviews with Poppie." a blaik Soulh Afrnan woman It details her struggle sRainsI the inhuman^ of according to its delegation at the con- apartheid regulations and rjc ial dist nmination lalmar and km- Rudnot fit' This bestseiling novel ol all lime in Alnkaans created a ference, they felt that the Ghanaian 60 col.lr plaies \ great political and literar, siorm among Atnkanert The 1 B blai k and wlhit*- riraiAings V *vsue includes at extensive summarv copious hook economy could not face a 1981 without diagrar reviews from South Atnca ar>d f ngland photographs and maps some kind of international regulation of He- 10>. l)', iriihes er ill 00 an minview with Ihe author The Rudners *e well Imiiwn bolhardd insidcov e and outside South cocoa. The country's economy is so Africa tor their work iri art haeologi and ethnology Their S*n#lt Fifurrf of AngoU. bv Mary and Louis Leakes 1~ studies in mans remote corners t>1 South Atrica. South heavily dependent on cocoa that an un- Seprmt oi a 'are publication t urrentlv costing upwards Wesl Alrica. Rhrxiesid Angola. Lesotho, and BfibMd.ru jn- ol S5Q when ii can be found in Aincana bookshops rejected in this sun/ev nl rock art in Southern Alriu fettered free market could have disas- Diagrams by Dr Mary Leakey on how lo produte the DutinR their 20 year", ol travel, the Rudners made hundreds figures, photographs trous consequences. of tracings from the original paintings and engravings selerlinR Irft In be ifpnidui eri m color in this bout alonR *.ilh numer.H,., othei d'Jwings in black and wh>u- Since ihe political and economic un- San Nujomi: Profile r>« S-jpo i leader, b, Colleen Hendnks il Aln i Bv certainties that have played havoc with Ms Hendnks spent three vears as a military correspondent world commodity prices over the past Edited b\ Aonj II Smilh in Namibia tor the Argus Mewipaper. She interviewed Nufomj s parents m Namibia and look photographs oi two years seem certain to continue for 28 drawings jnrl phoMRia them These she gave lo Nuioma when she inten. iewer! 1 OTpage v 6 • t inc heshand (ovpr tfa 00 him eniensivelv .n Pans al the SWAPO corfererne. the next two — if not longer — what jliended by ambassadors of some twenty countries, The dean ot Atntatia libraries in Souih Atrica has gaihe including the foreign mimsie' ot tuba Color photograph should the world be doing to put its and edited a lasi malmg jnd valuable series of articles o' interest to IrM- Alncana (oll«loi The pieces. Mi hy commodities house in order? Accord- acknowledged i-.peits m Iheir f*lds. (overhistorK^I Munger Africana Library Noles air ecle< in within Ihe field photographs fppnn^ o! Alncana books. kjhanriesbu'R ol Atncana Issues are generated from seminars b\ ing to Corea, the basic problem is one newspapers frcmuhe period 16B7 188^ botanical distinguished visitors reports i>f c urrenl field i-esearcti illusiraiinns early unoocs and hktebele arts and ciafti unpublished historical manuscripts and other maienai of education, and education in a dual and nthers There is a dela'led t B-page indei deemed useful lo Atricanists Large tolot photographs oi fashion, directed at consumers on the African art obfecls oi of subjects iHusttalive ot the lent are Report OK Ponuga' ^ m Cti -Bi a Iralure of mosi issues
one hand and producers of major com- Al | Vemrvpr SirtHcnptions are 112 a volume Pmn of individual issue modities on the other. "I think we 23 photographs 2 map* van but the total cosi of a war s issues is alvvays in e AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 17 Were the zones not ours, colonialism legal personnel to formulate new legal period the labor courts were used to had left them, and now what? codes. Indeed, during the transitional stifle worker discontent and protect the We posed this question, and a new prop- government, which ruled for eight privileged position of employers. Since erty law began, and the collective fields months before independence, not a only employers could afford lawyers, started. With a new system of distribu- single Mozambican was appointed to the claims of unrepresented workers tion in operation, we began to give to each person according to his work and exercise judicial or prosecutorial func- were generally dismissed on technical- not according to his ownership. . . . And tions, and at independence only about ities. The new labor commissions, so a new property law arose as well as a 25 lawyers remained in the country. founded in September 1975, had the new fiscal law. The colonial taxes had That the Portuguese codes were cum- task of protecting the working class. disappeared, bin there was a contribu- bersome, procedurally complicated, tion toward out power — the part of the Staffed by laypersons, they used prin- product that was for the Popular forces, and extremely legalistic further com- ciples of common sense and popular for the schools, for the kindergarten, for plicated the initial efforts to rewrite the justice to resolve employee grievances the hospitals. law. against their employers. By adopting The government immediately took this standard rather than the archaic In a similar way, though not without two steps to reduce many of the am- rules of the past, the labor commissions debate and error, new commercial laws biguities and abuses inherent in the col- have been able to counter many inequi- were formulated to govern the opera- onial codes. Five days before indepen- ties built into the colonial codes, which tion of the cooperatives, a new military dence, the Frelimo Central Committee remain intact and have had an important law was enacted to guarantee the rights approved a new constitution, which impact in improving conditions of em- of Portuguese prisoners, and Frelimo automatically revoked all laws in con- ployment and the workplace. took an unequivocal position against flict with its fundamental objectives. The government also gave im- the exploitation of women. The constitution recognizes work as the mediate priority to restructuring the Independence held out the prospect criterion for the distribution of national family and ending the exploitation of of continuing this process throughout wealth, commits the state to the battle women. During the armed struggle, ihe country. There were, however, against illiteracy and to the emancipa- Frelimo had begun in the liberated powerful obstacles that prevented tion of women, and outlaws all acts zones to attack practices that kept overhauling immediately the legal sys- creating divisions or privileged posi- women subordinate. Its concerted tem, not the least of which was the lack tions based on color, race, sex, ethnic campaign against polygamy, child of lawyers, judges, and other trained origin, place of birth, religion, level of marriages, initiation rites, and bride- education, social position, or occupa- price has been intensified since inde- tion. In one fell swoop the legal basis of pendence and is the major task of the race and class discrimination was Organization of Mozambican Women eliminated. (OMM). To consolidate gains made A month later the legal profession, against these exploitative practices and which had served the interest of the enshrine in the law the concept of mar- settler community, was nationalized. riage as a partnership of equals, it was Thereafter, all citizens, regardless of necessary to scrap the colonial Family race or class, had the right to free legal Code, which reflected Portuguese pat- representation. This decision, which riarchal attitudes, and the reactionary further accelerated the emigration of ideology of the Portuguese Catholic many of the remaining lawyers, Church. The new Family Code is ready exacerbated existing shortages and in- to be promulgated, and its principles — sured long delays. The flight of Por- built around equality of the spouses in tuguese lawyers also accelerated the their rights and responsibilities toward process of giving Mozambicans with- each other and their children — are out formal legal training important being studied at neighborhood and vil- positions in the judicial system, just as lage meetings throughout the country. had been done in the liberated zones. The new Family Code will serve an Along with these far-reaching ac- important educational function and will tions, the government introduced spe- provide a model of the new family to- cific legal reforms to redress the most ward which all are expected to strive. grievous colonial abuses. Given the The most significant legal develop- exploited position of workers and the ment has been the creation of a new central role that Frelimo assigned to the judicial system. During the past two working class in the Mozambican rev- years more than 200 courts have been olution, it was natural that labor rela- established in all provinces, in the tions would be one of the first areas to major urban centers, and in some dis- be reconstructed. During the colonial trict seats, localities, and communal 20 AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 villages in each province. For most Mozambicans living in rural areas this is the first time they can have theircases tried in a court of law. The election of lay judges to all tri- bunals ensures popular participation in the judicial process. It also both re- quires that the formalistic colonial pro- cedures be drastically simplified and means that decisions are generally based on common sense and principles of popular justice rather than on the letter of the colonial law. According to the senior judge of Maputo Province, there has been a substantial reduction in penalties for property crimes as well as a concerted effort to rehabilitate con- victed criminals through work pro- grams and political reeducation, rather Court in Maputo: Mozambique has created a new judicial system than incarceration. Penal records indi- cating that of the more than 12 million All criminal trials, except those that been found guilty, receiving sentences Mozambicans there are currently only deal with issuesof national security, are ranging from three years to death. Since 3.800 in jail — a figure well below that open to the public, and the accused is the independence of Zimbabwe nine of the colonial period — bear out this constitutionally guaranteed represen- months ago and the reduction of merce- claim. tation by either a public defender or a nary activity, only six people have been At the local level and in the com- person of his choice. The trials we wit- convicted, and three have been exe- munal villages the tribunals are com- nessed in the Maputo provincial court cuted after losing their appeals. posed entirely of lay judges selected were characterized by a presumption of The government has also taken steps either by the legislative assembly or by innocence, cross-examination of wit- to reform the penal system. In highly members of the community. The court nesses, the transcription of testimony, publicized actions, prison guards and meets weekly and deals primarily with and judicial review. other officials, including the director of family disputes and petty crimes The small number of prosecutors, Machave Prison, have been jailed for punishable only by fines. At communal public defenders, and trained judges mistreating prisoners. Of far greater village 25th of September, in Inham- makes delays in bringing accused per- potential significance is the recent deci- bane Province, we were told by the sons to trial quite common. Teodato sion to close down the antiquated colo- ten-person tribunal that the most fre- Hunguana, the Minister of Justice, ac- nial jails and move the prisoners to rural quent scenario involves a married knowledged this difficulty to us but centers where rehabilitation through woman who has cohabitated with held out the hope that the combination education and collective labor — both another man while her husband is of crash courses and a new generation very difficult in the confining quarters working in the South African mines. At of university-trained lawyers would of the urban prisons — will be em- communal village M'sawize in Niassa alleviate the problem within two to phasized. As of August 1980, there Province, domestic problems were the three years. Presently, of the 3,800 were prison centers operating in almost major issue with which the tribunal prisoners in jail, 2,900 are awaiting every province, and about 1,000 dealt. trial. Mozambicans have been transferred More serious crimes and compli- In addition to the civilian court sys- there. cated civil matters are resolved by dis- tem, a Revolutionary Tribunal was es- The most controversial components trict and provincial courts, where at tablished in March 1979 to deal with of the Mozambican legal system are the least one judge must have some formal the serious threat created by the infil- reeducation centers, which were first legal training. Orland Joao, a district tration of mercenaries from Rhodesia. organized in the liberated zones and judge in Inhambane, is typical. He has a Between 1976 and 1979, there had been increased in numbers during the un- sixth-grade education supplemented by more than 350 attacks, and Frclimo stable period immediately after inde- a year's legal training course. At the leaders felt that drastic legal, as well as pendence. provincial level the presiding judge military, steps at deterrence had to be We had heard rumors and read West- must have a university law degree. At taken. Since its inception the tribunal ern press allegations about harsh con- both levels lay judges act more like has heard cases of espionage, ter- ditions and brutality in Mozambique's juries — making findings of fact — rorism, murder, and other crimes reeducation centers, which invited while the trained judges draw conclu- "against the people and state secu- comparison, it was said, with Siberian sions of law. rity." Less than 50 defendants have labor camps. What we actually saw at AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 21 M'sawize, a camp housing ex-secret few kilometers from the camp, are un- that the residents' daily experience in police and colonial collaborators, was supervised, although each has a "re- working jointly, developing self- completely unexpected. The sentries at sponsible" elected from among its reliance, and participating in collective the rope gate were detainees, and the members. The two hours before lunch decision making within the brigades only weapon we noticed throughout our are devoted to literacy classes and polit- reinforces and adds meaning to the new visit was in the hands of a camp resident ical education. The afternoon includes values instilled in the classroom. going off to hunt for the center's food. a discussion of the day's national and Although exact statistics are unavail- The center had no armed guards, no international news, a work stint, show- able, according to high-level Justice dogs, no barbed wire fences, and no ers, and supper. After dinner there are Ministry officials, the reeducation cells. sports and cultural activities until 9:00 centers are in the process of being The center's 33-year-old comman- P.M. This schedule is repeated without phased out. They emphasize that the dant and his eight assistants mingled variation Monday through Saturday reeducation centers were established as easily with the detainees and expressed moming. a temporary measure to fill a vacuum no concern that their families lived less Living conditions are harsh. The created by the paralysis of the colonial than 300 yards from the prisoners" bar- food, primarily com porridge and re- legal system and the flight of almost all racks. When we pressed him about the lish, is not terribly interesting by West- judges on the eve of independence. lax security, he acknowledged that em standards, but it is no worse than the During the past year at least three cen- when the center had first opened in diet of most rural Mozambicans. Simi- ters have been closed, and 2,000 in- 1977 there had been a number of unsuc- larly, housing and health facilities are mates, including several hundred po- cessful attempts at escape. The remote- rudimentary though comparable to litical offenders, have been reintegrated ness of the center and the speed with those we observed in rural communities into Mozambican society. This repre- which neighboring peasants reported throughout the country. sents close to 50 percent of all de- the fugitive to authorities had soon con- The most startling aspects of all the tainees. vinced the residents of the futility of reeducation centers is the lack of coer- Justice officials concede that there such attempts. cion. Not one center has barbed wire, were abuses in the uncertain period The political background of the pris- high walls, or even gates, and all the after independence. Local vigilance oners at M'sawize makes it unique. detainees with whom we spoke indi- groups, police, soldiers, and rural ad- When we spoke with detainees who had cated that they had never suffered or ministrators sometimes overstepped been held at other centers, we learned witnessed corporal punishment. When their authority. Direct intervention by that most had been arrested for theft or we expressed our skepticism one day, President Machel in 1977 ended most related crimes. Ramon Sainda, a mer- Mario Balate, a resident and veteran of of these abuses but not before a number chant caught selling stolen property, several camps, angrily interrupted, "I of Mozambicans were arbitrarily ar- and Ricardo Mungey, accused of em- am describing what happened. I am not rested and sent without trial to the cen- bezzling $12,000 from the factory he trying to defend the government. If they ters for an indefinite period. Since the managed, were typical of the residents hit us I would say so." Problems, such establishment of the popular tribunals at the Chibutu center, while at Inhas- as petty thefts, fights, and laziness, are in 1978, all those accused of crimes sune most were "'marginals" — unem- resolved at weekly brigade meetings have been publicly tried and, if found ployed petty criminals — detained for where members recommend appropri- guilty, given determinate sentences in theft and vagrancy. ate action to the commandant, who prison and not sent to reeducation Nevertheless, conditions at the vari- makes the final decision. Extra work, in camps. ous centers were remarkably similar. one form or another, on Saturday after- Although Mozambique cannot yet Inmates are organized into a series of noon or Sunday, is the typical punish- guarantee to all its citizens their day in brigades. Brigade members live and ment. court, it has made great strides in the work together and are responsible both Instead of coercion, the organizing first five years of independence in dis- for each other's health and welfare and principle of the centers, according to mantling the colonial legal system. for deciding how fellow members who their staffs, is rehabilitation with the which protected only the rich and pow- infringe the camp codes should be dis- aim of reintegrating the detainees into erful. Today all citizens have access to ciplined. Mozambican society. The twin mech- the small number of courts and lawyers A typical day, according to inter- anisms are literacy training and politi- that exist, and the most glaring abuses views with 30 residents from seven cal education. The daily literacy classes of the past have been eradicated. Even centers, begins at 4:30 A.M. After an provide the first access to education for without the complete revocation of all hour of exercise followed by breakfast, many of the camps1 residents (at the colonial legislation, the involvement detainees working in brigades start their time of independence it was estimated of workers and peasants in the judicial assigned tasks. Most residents farm, that 95 percent of the population was system ensures that the principles of but we observed smaller groups con- illiterate). Political education occurs in social justice enshrined in the constitu- structing houses, forging hoes, weav- formal classes, informal discussions, tion, rather than the oppressive rules of ing, and repairing roads. All the bri- daily news announcements, and cul- the colonial codes, will guide the new gades, including those clearing fields a tural events. Frelimo officials believe courts in their decision making. D 22 AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 african January-February 1981 UN sets multi-party Namibia talks in January to end impasse "Acute mistrust and lack of confi- out that "the task of drawing up and meeting by its senior official in dence" in the Namibia negotiations adopting a constitution is the func- Namibia, the administrator-general, led Dr. Kurt Waldheim. the UN sec- tion of the constituent assembly" officials of the Foreign Affairs Min- retary-general, to schedule a "prc- which will be chosen in the UN-su- istry and several of the territory's in- implementation |of UN resolution pervisedelections. ternal political parties in face-to- 435] multi-party meeting" for Janu- face talks with SWAPO. The Botha ary 7-14 somewhere in southern Af- The vague nature of the January government, this argument runs, rica, probably Maputo. meeting, to build trust and confi- can then claim that not it but the According to Waldheim's No- dence, apparently stems from Preto- Namibian politicians accepted a set- vember 24 report, the UN did not get ria's concern that the National tlement which could install SWAPO Pretoria to agree to a ceasefire date, Party's right wing will threaten on South Africa's northwest border. which, the secretary-general said, Prime Minister Pieter Botha's rule The other concerned parties in the "should be set in the early part of if. as appears likely. South Africa's negotiations—the front-line African 1981." foe. the South-West African Peo- states, Nigeria, the OAU and the ple's Organization, wins a UN-su- five Western powers conducting the South Africa however apparently perviscdelection. dropped its reported demand that prolonged discussions—will send the meeting write a constitution To avoid a sell-out charge. West- observers to the January confer- guaranteeing rights for Namibia's ern diplomats said. South Africa is ence. white minority. Waldheim pointed expected to be represented at the Continued on next page Zimbabwe's coalition rule threatened by feuding and violence By all accounts, Zimbabwe's security police, apparently in retali- was demonstrated in December economy is recovering rapidly from ation for the Bulawayo violence, when a rally in Bulawayo for Tanza- eight years of warfare, but Prime which Zanu supporters blamed on nian President Julius Nyerere had Minister Robert Mugabe has his Nkomo's party. Nkomo. who said to be called off because of poor hands full with the 25,000 war-hard- he was disillusioned by the arrests, turnout. Bulawayo is Nkomo's ened guerrillas who have not yet persuaded his party officials, how- stronghold and Nyerere was a ma- been integrated into civilian life. ever, to seek talks with Zanu-PF in jor backer of Mugabe during the Sporadic factional fights between an effort to prevent further out- war. guerrillas loyal to Mugabe's Zanu- breaks of factional fighting. Mugabe has disowned some of PF party and to Minister of Home Nkomo's supporters have been the statements made by radical min- Affairs Joshua Nkomo's Patriotic especially angered by controversial isters such as Nkala and Tekere but Front erupted into open warfare in a statements made by senior govern- he warned in late November that his township outside Bulawayo, the ment ministers. Manpower Minis- government will deal severely with country's second-largest city, in ter Edgar Tekere said Nkomo was "political malcontents and hooli- November. More than 50 people in the government as a matter of gans." He said he might set up "vig- were killed and over 300 injured— "charity" and Finance Minister ilante groups" to identify trouble- most of them civilians—after vola- Enos Nkala called for the formation makers and report them to the tile political rallies for municipal of a one-party state. It was not clear authorities. elections. Zimbabwe's new na- what effect the December 7 acquit- Zimbabwe's economy, mean- tional army moved in and separated tal of Tekere on a charge of murder- while, is reported thriving, with its the combatants. The government ing a white farmer will have on the GNP expected to jump 6 percent in plans to disarm the guerrilla forces. political scene. 1980. Although wary of the political Later, nine senior officials of That the feud between the two strife, multinationals are flocking to Nkomo's party were detained by parties was not likely to end quickly Continued on next page AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 23 Guinea-Bissau coup leaders to try Cabral Namibia continued President Luis de Almeida Cabral condemned the coup and offered Prior to Waldheim's report, both was overthrown in a coup launched asylum to all its citizens in Guinea- Botha and Foreign Minister Roelof by his Prime Minister, Maj. Joao Bissau. The new government, how- Botha told South Africans to brace Bernardo Vieira, on November 14, ever, to allay Cape Verde's fears, for economic sanctions. "It is time and was to face charges on the al- banned all acts of intimidation and we must accept that sanctions are leged torture and murder of hun- banditry against Cape Verdeans. going to come," said the Foreign dreds of political prisoners. Two The government also told Lisbon's Minister, warning that South Africa senior government officials were ambassador that it would like to was "not without the powerto retali- killed in the coup: Antonio Buscar- strengthen Guinea-Bissau's links ate," an allusion to strategic min- dini, in charge of state security, and with Portugal. erals bought by the West. Otto Schatt, a senior member of the At a rally in the capital, Bissau, ruling African Party for the Libera- one week after the coup, Vieira al- Roelof Botha visited several tion of Guinea-Bissau and Cape leged that more than 500 political Western capitals in November and Verde (PAIGC). prisoners were executed during Ca- reported that the West was exerting bral's six-year rule. Journalists "intensive pressure" for a speedy The coup apparently was the out- were taken to see mass graves settlement. He warned that this come of a long power struggle be- which contained, in part, the bodies pressure could lead to a breakdown tween the blacks of Guinea-Bissau of black soldiers formerly in the of the negotiations. (Johannesburg and the mixed-race people from the Portuguese colonial army who were Star, November 22, 180; London Cape Verde Islands, Guinea-Bis- involved in an attempted coup in Guardian, November 18 and 26, sau's sister republic. Cabral is Cape 1978. Cabral, who is being held un- 1980; Johannesburg Radio, Novem- Verdean, as were many members of der house arrest in Bissau, will be ber 17, 1980; London Times, No- his government, and had supported tried for the murders, as well as for vember 17, 1980.) D the merger of Guinea-Bissau and corruption and economic misma- Cape Verde into one nation. nagement. The ousted President's Following the coup, a Council of chief adviser, Jose Araujo, who was Zimbabwe continued the Revolution was formed, com- out of the country during the coup, Salisbury and some of them have posed of six army officers and three and the Cape Verdean President, moved their Africa regional head- civilians, all of whom are Guinean Aristides Pereira, are to be tried in quarters from other countries to blacks. The coup was supported by absentia for complicity in the al- Zimbabwe's capital. {Business the military and met with little pop- leged murders. (New York Times, Week, December 15, 1980; Finan- ular resistance, largely due to wide- November 17,23 and 28, 1980: Lon- cial Times, November 18 and De- spread dissatisfaction over the poor don Times, November 18 and 24, cember 5, 1980; London Times, De- state of the country's economy. 1980; Economist, November 22, cember 1, 1980; Salisbury Radio, 1980; London Guardian, Novem- November 30, 1980; Washington Observers noted that another rea- ber 17. 1980.) • son behind the coup may have been Post. November 24, 1980.) • the adoption of a new constitution in early November which made the president the executive head of the Big edge for Motlana in poll of Soweto government and eliminated the Soweto's black consciousness Buthelezi's Inkatha movement powers of the Prime Minister, a post Committee of Ten has overwhelm- would also result in a huge victory Vieira had held for two years. ing support among the township's for Motlana's group—69 percent Vieira was one of the PAIGC guer- residents, a Johannesburg Star versus 9 percent for Inkatha and 5 rilla leaders during the 11-year war opinion poll found in November. percent for Thebehali's group. for independence from Portugal, The poll tended to confirm the Motlana was unanimously re- and also served as commander of committee's contention that the elected chairman by the committee the armed forces and president of government-set up body to run the in November and several activists the national assembly. were appointed to bring the com- township, the Soweto Council, and plement up to ten. The new com- One of the first acts of the new its chairman, David Thebehali, who mittee comprises: Rev. Lebamang government was to release from were elected with only 6 percent of Sebidi, vice chairman; Tom Man- prison Rafael Barbosa, former pres- eligible voters participating, have thata, general secretary; Mrs. Zola ident of the PAIGC's central com- little backing among the estimated Khumalo, organizing secretary; mittee. Barbosa was serving a life 1.5 million township residents. Leonard Mosala, treasurer; Mrs. sentence for conspiring to over- The poll found that if elections Ellen Khuzwayo. social welfare throw Cabral and for advocating a were held with Thebehali running and health; Legau Mathabathe, ed- cut in Guinea-Bissau's links to Cape against Committee of Ten chairman ucation; John Molala, transport; Verde. He is also a close friend of Dr. Nthato Motlana. Thebehali Philip Wauchope, sport; and Pat Guinea's President Sekou Toure, would receive 7 percent and Motla- Ndabezitha, administration. whose government welcomed na 73 percent. A three-way election (Voice, November 25. 1980; Johan- Vieira's takeover. posited between the committee, nesburg Star, November 15 and 22, Cape Verde, on the other hand. the Soweto Council and Gatsha 1980.) • 24 AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 creasing economic cooperation be- $650 million pledged to southern Africa tween the two nations. {West Africa, November 3, 1980; Lisbon in effort to halt dependency on Pretoria Radio, October 25. 1980.) Industrialized nations and inter- One priority will be reducing national lending organizations have trade links, conceived in the colo- pledged $650 million to the nine nial era. which are directed toward Chad southern African states which are doing business with overseas in- • Libya's involvement in the Chad economically dependent on South dustrial countries rather than with civil war on the side of President Africa for food, transportation and one another. Goukouni Woddeye's Popular communications links. The meeting follows the confer- Armed Forces (FAP) was escalat- The nine met in Maputo in No- ence of heads of slate of the coun- ing in October and November, with vember with delegates from 32 na- tries involved—Angola. Botswana. the arrival in Chad of an estimated tions and 17 donor organizations in Lesotho. Malawi. Mozambique. 1.500 to 3,000 Libyan troops and the an effort to win some $1 billion in Swaziland. Tanzania, Zambia and introduction on a large scale of Lib- pledges for the top priority projects Zimbabwe—in Lusaka last April. yan weaponry and planes. Col. aimed at reducing dependency on The Maputo meeting comes at a Muammar Qaddafy's government Pretoria over the next ten years. time when South Africa has been is pouring in military assistance to Among the invited were delegates steadily increasing its exports— Woddeye's forces to enable them to and observers from most European mostly food—to the rest of Africa, wrest control from former Defense nations, the Soviet Union and the a projected $1.2 billion in 1980. Minister Hissene Habre's Armed U.S.. which promised $25 million. South Africa is the principal or sec- Forces of the North (FAN) and to Also attending were the EEC, ond-biggest trading partner of all implement a military solution to the Comecon, OPEC, the UN. the Af- but two (Angola and Tanzania) of 16-year-old civil war. rican Development Bank (which the nine nations. The head of South Jet bombers were employed for pledged nearly $400 million) and Africa's biggest business organiza- the first time in the war in late Octo- Scandinavian development agen- tion, the Association of Chambers ber. The aircraft, which strafed po- cies, among others. of Commerce, noted recently: sitions held by Habre's FAN, were Priority will be given to building "For most of these countries we believed to be the type used by the a communications and transport are the best and the closest—prob- Libyan air force. Libyan troops network independent of South Af- ably the cheapest—market. More were reported deep into Chad, rica. Emphasis will be on develop- and more of these countries will some in and around the capital city ment of Mozambique's infrastruc- come to rely on us for essential im- of Ndjamcna where a virtual mili- ture because its railways and ports ports." {Financial Times, Novem- tary stalemate between FAP and are a principal alternative trade ber 27, 1980; Economist, Novem- FAN exists, and others holding the route for the landlocked nations of ber 22. 1980; Modern Africa, Aouzou strip, the northern border southern Africa. November/December 1980.) • between the two nations annexed by Libya and believed to be min- eral-rich. Three airfields in various Pretoria begins education experiment locations in Chad are reportedly be- The South African government is schools and half of them drop out at ing manned by Libyan planes, in- introducing compulsory education age eight or nine. • cluding Soviet-built bombers. for blacks on "an experimental The Libyan news agency, J ANA, basis" in six townships near Preto- maintained that Qaddafy met with ria beginning with the new school WESTERN AFRICA Woddeye in early November in a term in January. former Habre stronghold, the The pilot program, which will be Cape Verde northern city of Faya-Largeau, to extended to other areas in 1982 if • According to a late October re- demonstrate their hold over the ter- successful, will make education port on Lisbon Radio, Cape Verde ritory, but FAN spokesmen denied mandatory and free for blacks up to has turned down Soviet requests for that the city had been taken over. the age of 12. Currently, so-called naval facilities in its archipelago. Observers believe that Qaddafy Bantu education, which blacks con- The Soviet Union had reportedly re- aims to install a Chad government sider inferior to that for whites—an quested access to a port in Cape favorable to the Tripoli regime to le- inequity which has caused consid- Verde to replace its loss of naval fa- gitimize its annexation of the erable unrest—is voluntary. Educa- cilities at Conakry, Guinea. Aouzou strip, which is said to con- tion is free and compulsory for Cape Verde's refusal to grant ac- tain uranium and manganese de- whites, Coloureds (mixed-race peo- cess was said to reflect its commit- posits. Another Libyan objective is ple) and Asians up to the age of 16. ment to a policy of non-alignment believed to be Qaddafy's desire to The government spends about $900 and its desire not to alienate West- create an Islamic Saharan republic annually on each white pupil and ern countries providing economic encompassing all the Moslem coun- $89 on each black child. assistance. tries in north and central Africa. It is estimated that about one-half The Cape Verde Premier, Pedro With two unfriendly countries to of the country's eight million black Pires, visited France in mid-Octo- Libya's east and west, Egypt and children attend 12.000 black-only ber, where talks were held on in- Tunisia, Qaddafy is attempting to AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 25 strike southward into Saharan Af- has been working openly to over- Graphic, one of the country's lead- rica. throw Senghor and establish an Is- ing newspapers, to protest the fact Other African nations have con- lamic republic there, has been re- that only the government's side of demned Libya's involvement in the cruiting citizens from both the story in the Buller affair had war. The OAU, at the July summit countries from his base in Libya. been published. Subsequently, the in Freetown, denounced in vague After the Senegalese troops ar- Graphic printed an article in which terms "foreign power involve- rived in Banjul, the government of Rawlings was said to have threat- ment" in Chad and its ad hoc com- President DawdaJawara reportedly ened that in the next revolution, ci- mittee on the war has been seeking a banned two small opposition par- vilians, including journalists, would negotiated settlement based upon ties, the Movement for Justice in die. The paper protested the alleged the Lagos Accord which united the Africa, the Gambian offshoot of the statement as an undue threat to the 11 rival factions into a transitional Liberian MOJA. and the Gambian freedom and safety of journalists. national unity government and im- Socialist Revolutionary Party. After the story appeared, five plemented a ceasefire. Most of the parties' leaders were members of the editorial staff of the In mid-October, an OAU "peace detained. (West Africa, November Graphic who had attended the conference" was held in Lome, 10 and 17, 1980; Africa Research meeting with Rawlings along with Togo, under the auspices of the ad Bulletin, November 15, 1980.) editor J.K. Addo-Twum, disassoci- hoc committee, composed of Togo, ated themselves from the paper's Guinea, Congo and Benin. All the Ghana remarks, saying that Rawlings had major factions were represented • Tensions between the govern- not made such a statement. and both Woddeye and Habre ment of President Hilla Limann and Observers believed that the ten- briefly attended the meeting. Al- Flight Lieut. Jerry Rawlings, former sions between the government and though a five-point peace plan was head of state and chairman of the the former AFRC head would con- drawn up with provisions for a Armed Forces Revolutionary tinue, as the state of the Ghanaian ceasefire, a neutral peacekeeping Council, reached a peak in late Oc- economy declines steadily and pop- force and free elections, and the tober, with Rawlings' detention for ular discontent with the govern- propositions were agreed to in prin- alleged subversive activities. ment increases. The Limann gov- ciple by all parties, radical differ- Rawlings was brought in for ques- ernment has become increasingly ences in the amendments brought tioning and later released in connec- security-conscious in recent up by each caused the meeting to tion with the arrest of Wilhelm months and Rawlings' popular ap- end inconclusively. (Washington Harrison Buller, a British Hondu- peal as something of a folk hero con- Post, November 7 and 25, 1980; ran picked up for overstaying his tinues to concern officials. (West West Africa, October 27 and No- visa. Buller, according to the Inte- Africa, October 20, 27, November 3 vember 19, 1980; London Times, rior Ministry, claimed he was in and 10, 1980; London Times, No- November 10, 1980.) Ghana at Rawlings' request to orga- vember 1, 1980; London Guardian, nize, mobilize and train revolution- October 29 and November 1, 1980.) aries to subvert constitutional rule. The Gambia He allegedly also maintained that • President Hilla Limann carried • The Gambian government broke two of Rawlings' close associates, out a cabinet reshuffle in November, off diplomatic relations with Libya Capt. KojoTsikata, formerly of the shifting the Finance and Economic in late October, alleging that Tripoli Ghana army, and Tsatsu Tsikata, an Planning Minister, Dr. Amon Ni- was recruiting Gambian citizens to Accra lawyer, were also involved in koi, to a newly created post, eco- engage in subversive activities. The the scheme. Rawlings denied the al- nomic adviser to the President. Two government also claimed that the legations, claiming that they were new departments were formed as a Libyan embassy in Banjul had made an attempt to provide justification result of the shake-up; the Labor "direct contacts with clandestine for Military Intelligence's harass- and Social Welfare Ministry, subversive elements whose sole ment of Capt. Tsikata. headed by Adisa Munkaila, and the aim is to spread confusion and dis- The former army captain had ear- Ministry of Information and Tour- order in the Gambia." lier filed a writ before the Accra ism, headed by Opoku Afriyie. Following the rupture in relations high court seeking an injuction to Eight of the 16 cabinet ministers between the two countries, 150 Sen- restrain Lieut. Col. Annor Odjidja, retained their posts, including the egalese troops were flown into Ban- deputy director of Military Intelli- Foreign Minister, Isaac Chinebuah, jul and stationed at the airport, gence (MI) and 18 other Ml officers and Defense Minister R.S.K. Riley- State House and a police camp out- from unlawful interference with his Poku. Many deputy ministers and side the capital for what was termed constitutional rights to life, liberty regional ministers were changed, "combined maneuvers." Senegal and privacy. Tsikata claimed that however. had broken off relations with Libya since June 1980, he had been a vic- Observers believed that the re- in June, accusing the Tripoli gov- tim of constant harassment and sur- shuffle was undertaken in response ernment of subversive acts aimed at veillance by MI officers. In late Oc- to the mounting criticism of the Li- the overthrow of President Leopold tober, he maintained that Ml mann government from all sectors Senghor. personnel had tried to kill him in an of the population over its apparent Both Senegal and the Gambia automobile accident. inability to deal with the country's have maintained that Sheikh After being detained, Rawlings serious economic crisis. Strikes, Ahmed Niasse, a Senegalese who went to the offices of the Daily demonstrations, and rioting have 26 AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 been on the increase in the past few the first time voters were given a proved by 63 of the 67 countries at months, with Limann maintaining choice of candidates. Approxi- the conference, but the four dissent- what many call an increasingly ten- mately 650 PDCI members con- ing nations included the world's uous hold over the political scene. tested the 147 seats in the assembly largest producer, the Ivory Coast, Criticism of the government has and a first round of elections was and its largest consumer, the U.S. been particularly harsh from Gha- followed by a run-off. Voter turnout Togo and Gabon also withheld their na's political parties. The minority was low in the first round of the approval. The chairman of the con- party in the governing coalition, the elections—only 30 percent—due to ference, Felipe Jaramillo. was United National Convention a poorly run voter registration and hopeful that those countries would (UNC), ended its alliance with Li- identification program. adhere to the pact prior to the April mann's People's National Party It was estimated that two-thirds 1 deadline for signatures. (PNP) in September. of the deputies elected are new- The most contentious issue was In November, the UNC issued a comers. Only 14 deputies were re- the setting of the floor price for co- statement in Accra which said: "It elected in the first round, 27 were coa. The agreement sets the mini- appears that the Limann adminis- defeated and 39 faced the run-off mum price at $1 per pound and the tration has not yet woken up to the election. Only six government min- maximum at $1.50, with lower and grave national crisis which if not ur- isters stood for re-election; the Min- upper intervention prices at $1.10 gently resolved can lead to anarchy ister of Mines, Paul Gui Dibo. was and $1.50. If market prices are equal and chaos." The statement listed returned to office as were the presi- to or fall below the lower interven- several actions that the government dent of the national assembly. Phi- tion figure, the buffer stock will buy should take immediately to act "as lippe Yace, and Defense Minister cocoa until the price is over the a catalyst to solving the country's Kouadio M'Bahia Ble. A former $1.10 level. If prices are at or above mounting problems." Among them Minister of Finance, Henri Konan the $1.50 level, cocoa from the were revamping the machinery of Bedie, relinquished his post with stock will be sold until the price the government to achieve econ- the World Bank to run for his dis- falls. omy and efficiency, providing in- trict's seat and was successful. Be- The Ivory Coast, which exports centives to foreign exchange-earn- die is currently being touted as a about 23 percent of the world's co- ing industries, giving maximum possible successor to the 75-year- coa, a figure which is expected to financial support to those industries old Houphouet-Boigny, particu- rise to 28 percent in 1981. is object- that produce or import basic neces- larly since Yace. long considered ing to the agreement because it be- sities, and refraining from using the heir-apparent, fell from favor lieves the pact would allow prices to high-handed methods to deal with and had his position as secretary- fall too low. The U.S.. conversely, labor unrest. {West Africa, October general of the PDCI abolished in maintained that it would not allow 27, November 3 and 17. 1980; Lon- September. prices to reach a "realistic low" be- don limes, November 15, 1980; Ac- The daily newspaper, Fraternite cause of world surplus production. cra Radio, November 13, 1980.) Matin, reported that bribing of Cocoa prices have fallen sharply voters by candidates was wide- in the past three years because of Guinea spread and that money played an expanding production and surplus • In October, President Sekou important role in the campaign. supplies. The Ivory Coast resorted Toure, in a policy shift, announced Nevertheless, observers indicated to stockpiling cocoa in 1980 in a bid Guinea's readiness to consider for- that the new national assembly will to raise world prices. (London eign investment, both private and be much different in character from Times. November 20, 1980; Finan- public, in most sectors of the econ- its predecessor, since a majority of cial Times, November 17 and 18, omy. the deputies are new. A new cabinet 1980.) will also be formed from among Toure was offering guidelines for those elected to the legislative Liberia the next five-year plan currently be- body, as part of Houphouet- • In early November, the ruling ing drawn up in Guinea. He also Boigny's "democratization" pro- People's Redemption Council proposed the setting up of private gram begun last June to improve the (PRC) released from jail 23 political enterprises both in the rural and in- nation's economic performance. prisoners who had been imprisoned dustrial sectors to increase their (West Africa* November 3 and 17, since the April 1980 coup in which production, with the implementa- 1980; New York Times, November President William Tolbert was tion of a system of incentives. {West 9, 1980: Economist, October 18, killed. Africa, October 13. 1980.) 1980.) The Liberian head of state. Mas- ter Sgt. Samuel K. Doe. freed the Ivory Coast • A new international cocoa agree- detainees, warning them to follow • President Felix Houphouet- ment was adopted in Geneva in No- his government and not be influ- Boigny, sole candidate of the ruling vember after three weeks of negoti- enced by "reactionary forces." Democratic Party of the Ivory ations. Producer and consumer Among those released were the Coast (PDCI), was re-elected to a nations met under UN auspices to late President's son, Stephen Tol- fifth term of office in mid-October, develop a pact to replace the one bert, and a former Education Minis- with 99.9 percent of the vote. which expired in March. ter. Bernard Blamo. Elections to the national assem- Aimed at stabilizing world cocoa A government spokesman said bly were held in November, and for prices, the new agreement was ap- that trials of the remaining political AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 27 prisoners would take place as soon selves to Libya out of financial the public's support for the party. as possible. The Minister of Justice, concerns." (Washington Post, De- As a result, the congress may be re- Chea Cheapoo, appealed to the cember 2, 1980.) organized and party leaders possi- PRC in late October to provide bly replaced. {West Africa, October "speedy and impartial" trials to the Mali 20, 27 and November 17, 1980; Ra- detainees, and blamed the military • After months of student unrest in dio Bamako, November 19, 1980.) court for unwarranted delays. Mali, most of the nation's second- Nigeria (West Africa, November 3 and 17, ary and higher education institu- 180; London Times, November 10, tions were re-opened in mid-No- • The controversial revenue alloca- 1980; Monrovia Radio, November vember. The Minister of National tion bill, based on the report of the 9, 1980.) Education, Lieut. Col. Sekou Ly, Okigbo Commission on how Nige- made the announcement and dis- ria's revenues, 85 percent of which • In a major policy statement in cussed changes to be implemented are derived from oil, should be di- November on the condition of the in the structure of secondary educa- vided among the 19 states and fed- Liberian economy, Master Sgt. Sa- tion, means of access to higher edu- eral government, was sent by Presi- muel Doe announced two new mea- cation and distribution of scholar- dent Shehu Shagari to the national sures to be implemented to reduce ships. assembly for approval in Novem- government spending and raise rev- He noted that due to the wide- ber. enues: a freeze on government hir- spread nature of the student unrest, A heated debate in the assembly ing, and a requirement that all wage only 7 percent took examinations at arose over the issue of what per- earners lend the government money the end of the last academic year centage of the revenue should be al- by purchasing national savings and announced that those who located to the states and what per- bonds. refused to do so and are no longer centage to the government. The bill The hiring freeze will apply to all eligible to repeat are to be expelled. gives the federal government 55 government employees and will in- Several schools where the unrest percent, the state governments 34.5 clude agencies and public corpora- was particularly volatile will not be percent, and the remainder split be- tions. All employees who earn in reopened, including the Teacher tween local governments and a spe- excess of $750 per month gross sal- Training Institute and the National cial fund for the new federal capital ary will be required to forgo two at Abuja. 1 School of Administration. months net salary to be applied The governors of nearly all the against the purchase of savings Primary school teachers went on states are united in their position bonds, and those earning under strike in October, led by the Com- that the government is receiving too $750 will have to forgo one month's mission of Labor Committees, in much of the revenues. In addition, salary. The government will repay protest over the continued deten- the governors of the five oil-produc- the amount with interest. tion of 12 teachers who were ar- ing states maintained that they Doe characterized the state of the rested last July. The detainees— should receive a larger share of the economy as "desperate" and said exam graders and supervisers—had funds, while the poorer states ar- that when his government took over struck because of the government's gued that they are most in need. power in April, there was only $5 failure to pay salaries. Ly pledged Observers characterized the de- million in cash in the vault of the that overdue salaries would be paid bate on revenue allocation as the National Bank. He said the former "very shortly." first serious test of the American- government owed $700 million to The government of President style civilian constitution. It was other governments and financial in- Moussa Traore has reacted very se- believed that the issue, which cuts stitutions, owed $80 million to pub- verely to student unrest throughout across party lines, would not be re- lic corporations and $20 million to the year. Demonstrations in March solved before the Christmas recess. the National Bank. (West Africa, in Bamako were put down by police The bill must be passed by the na- November 24, 1980.) and military units, resulting in some tional assembly before it can be- In early December, following a deaths and alleged maltreatment of come law. {Economist, November visit to Liberia by the assistant sec- imprisoned student leaders. The 15,1980, London Times, November retary of state for African affairs, students focused their complaints 14, 1980; West Africa, November Richard Moose, it was announced on the failure of Mali's only party, 10, 1980.) that the U.S. government will pro- the Democratic Union of Malian vide the Doe government with $10 People (UDPM), which was created • A public and governmental de- million in emergency aid, bringing to return the country to constitu- bate over sky-rocketing price of the total of U.S. funds provided tional rule, to address the people's rice, one of Nigeria's staple foods, there since the coup to $28 million. needs. was raging in Lagos in October and Moose told reporters that the In a speech in October, Traore November. Imported rice, at a cost U.S. government is concerned said that the party's aim had not of $36 per 50 kilogram sack on ar- about the future of its strategic elec- been achieved. He said that a spe- rival in Nigeria, is being resold by tronic installations in Liberia, and cial UDPM congress would soon be wholesalers for as much as $180, also about Monrovia's growing ties held to "realize the legitimate aspi- and by small retailers at up to $230 to Libya. Moose emphasized to Li- rations of the militants and thus to per sack. berian officials that "it was not nec- re-launch the party." He blamed Many Nigerians were reportedly essary for them to obligate them- the party militants for failing to gain blaming the rising prices on hoard- 28 AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 inquiries.(Africa Research Bulletin, vice-chancellor and forced him to unions in their confrontation with November 15, 1980; West Africa, lead a demonstration from the the government. The government November 3, 1980.) campus to State House. Police used maintained that it would not negoti- tear gas to break up the unrest and ate with the strikers until they re- Sierra Leone detained several students. They turned to work. The strike was sus- • President Siaka Stevens paid an were protesting the lay-offs of uni- pended in an apparent conciliatory official visit to Britain in early No- versity lecturers. (West Africa, No- move just days before the coup. vember, receiving a promise of $7 vember 17, 1980; London Times, (New York Times, November 26, million in development aid over a November 6,1980.) 1980; West Africa, October 27 and three-year period from Prime Min- November 17,1980.) ister Margaret Thatcher's govern- Upper Volta ment. British officials projected • President Sangoule Lamizana EASTERN AFRICA that the aid will be used to develop was overthrown in a nonviolent Sierra Leone's transport system, coup in November led by Col. Saye Djibouti including bridge construction and Zerbo, a former foreign minister purchases of road-making equip- and the commander of armed forces • Djibouti's President Hassan Gou- ment. in the Upper Volta capital of Ouaga- led again appealed for a negotiated dougou. In a radio broadcast, Zerbo peace in the hostilities between British aid to Sierra Leone to- Ethiopia and Somalia and between taled approximately $4 million in said the, coup was necessary be- 1980, most of which was provided cause of the political and economic Ethiopia and Eritrean guerrillas. for technical cooperation, particu- situation in the country. The President made his appeal— emphasizing that he was seriously larly manpower assistance. Aid was Upper Volta had been paralyzed also allocated to the Sierra Leone concerned about the "danger of ex- by a series of strikes begun in early pansion" the fighting repre- Produce Marketing Board and the October by the National Union of Guma Valley Water Corporation. sented—in a nationwide broadcast African Teachers of Upper Volta. in mid-October, following an Au- Britain also administers a capital aid The union threatened a boycott of program of $4 million for an agricul- gust 29 plea made while on a pri- end of term examinations last June vate visit to France, whose Foreign tural extension training scheme and after its general secretary, Baba workshops for the repair and main- Legion provides Djibouti's de- Ouedraogo, was demoted from his fense. tenance of agricultural machinery. post. The union was also protesting a scheme to select teachers to train Also in October, a Djibouti dele- In addition to shoring up ties be- gation had talks in Nairobi with the tween Britain and Sierra Leone, in France, claiming it was being used as a reward to strikebreakers. Kenyan government, another East Stevens, in his capacity as chairman African state concerned about the of the OAU, held talks with That- Lamizana's government pledged Somalia-Ethiopia conflict. The cher and other officials on issues of to address itself to the problem, talks concluded with the two gov- concern to the African continent as averting the boycott. However, it ernments agreeing to cooperate on a whole, particularly Namibia and failed to meet the union deadline for trade, including civil aviation, com- South Africa. discussion of the issues. Primary munications and tourism. (Djibouti Meanwhile in London, apolitical school teachers then refused to go Radio, October 5 and 19, 1980; Af- movement opposed to Stevens, to work at the start of the new term rica Research Bulletin, October 15, called the Sierra Leone Alliance in October. The government threat- 1980.) Movement (SLAM), announced its ened to block all teachers' salaries if formation at a press conference on they did not sign new contracts stat- November 7. The organization is ing that they will not strike. That Ethiopia headed by a lawyer, Ambrose Gan- action provoked a three-day sup- • Sudan's President Gaafar al-Ni- da, who also founded and has co- port strike called by the Trade Un- meiry, has once again offered to edited the opposition monthly Si- ion Federation. mediate the dispute between the erra Leone Report, for the past two In late October, the teachers' un- Ethiopian government and Eritrean years. ion for secondary schools went out guerrillas, after five days of talks Ganda, characterizing the objec- on an open-ended strike to support with Ethiopia's leader in Addis tive of the movement, said, the National Union's cause and in Ababa. "SLAM has taken upon itself the early November, a general strike by Nimeiry reportedly proposed a historic mission of rescuing our be- all Upper Volta's trade unions was seven-point solution to the 18-year- loved motherland from further de- implemented. Ouagadougou was long conflict, a program that was cline, and inevitable disaster and virtually shut down for two days immediately accepted by the major chaos." and six federation members were Eritrean group, the Eritrean Peo- In addition, Stevens was met with reportedly arrested. ple's Liberation Front (EPLF), but signs of serious discontent on the Lamizana addressed the nation in not by the Ethiopian government. part of the student population upon late October on the subject of the la- The proposal calls for a ceasefire his return to Freetown. A sit-down bor unrest, hinting that the unions supervised by an international strike at the University of Sierra were being manipulated in opposing committee, followed by a referen- Leone in late October was followed the government. The opposition dum among the Eritreans to choose by an incident in which students at party, the Voltaic Progressive one of three options—full indepen- Fourah Bay college kidnapped its Front, has been supportive of the dence, federation with Ethiopia or 30 AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 regional autonomy within Ethiopia. clared a state of emergency in Octo- that the amendment to the anti- Complicating the peace negotia- ber, said in December that Kenya trade union law banning strikes be tions was a two-month-long civil and Ethiopia were planning to in- repealed. (Intercontinental Press, war between the EPLF and the Eri- vade. The Mohamed Siad Barre re- November 10, 1980; New African, trean Liberation Front (ELF), gime is already involved in a war October 1980.) which reportedly resulted in a se- over Ethiopia's Ogaden region. vere setback for the ELF. There What prompted the invasion charge Seychelles were reports that the ELF was try- was a December meeting in Nairobi ing to negotiate with the Ethiopian between Ethiopia's leader, Col. • A study into proposed new devel- government. At the same time gov- Mengistu Haile Mariam, and Presi- opment on Mahe, the main island of ernment forces took advantage of dent Daniel arap Moi. Both coun- the Seychelles archipelago, which the fighting to mount a series of tries have had a mutual defense pact would include new engineering pro- large-scale assaults on the domi- for several years, largely because of jects to cater to the growing tourist nant EPLF positions and a major their suspicion of Somalia's expan- industry as well as to the fishing in- offensive in December. (Washing- sionist claims. (New York Times, dustry, has been financed by the ton Star, December 1 and 7, 1980; December 8, 1980; London Times, World Bank. Eritrea Radio, November 25, 1980; December 2, 1980; Nairobi Radio, The feasibility study will be car- Africa Research Bulletin, Novem- November 11,1980.) ried out by a British consulting engi- ber 15, 1980.) neers company in association with a • Many Kenyans were outraged in Netherlands firm and a Seychelles • Ethiopia's major offensive October at the $70 fine imposed by company. It will look at projected against ethnic Somali insurgents in a British judge on an American land reclamation, new roads and a the Ogaden reportedly has driven sailor convicted of killing a Kenyan fishing port. Because of the growth the guerrillas out of much of the prostitute in Mombasa, a liberty of tourism, the government wants desert region. port for the U.S. navy. to build a new coast road between The Ethiopians were positioned The light sentence even the capital, Victoria, and the airport along the disputed border in No- prompted the Attorney-General, and an extension of the existing vember, reports said. The Ethio- James Karugu, to say in parlia- commercial seaport. (Financial pians said they had won major en- ment, "I ami not satisfied that jus- Times, November 24, 1980.) gagements in September and tice was done," but he added that October with elements of the regu- he could do nothing about it be- Somalia lar Somali army, who are assisting cause of the independence of the • Somalia's President Mohamed the Western Somali Liberation judiciary. (Washington Post, Octo- Siad Barre declared a state of emer- Front guerrillas. (WashingtonPost, ber 21, 1980.) gency on October 21 and four days November 23, 1980.) later announced a crackdown on dissidents. • The U.S. navy reported that the Mauritius Soviet navy has established an an- In an address marking the 11th chorage in Dahlak Islands in the • Thirteen trade union leaders and anniversary of his taking power in a Red Sea, 30 miles from the Ethio- workers ended their hunger strike bloodless coup, Siad Barre invoked pian port of Massawa. after 13 days in September after the emergency powers adopted by the At the moment, U.S. sources government made concessions. new constitution of 1979, asserting said, the Soviet presence is proba- The 13 included the president and that "opportunists" were threaten- bly related to the support of Rus- general secretary of the General ing the country's stability at a time sian ships carrying supplies to Ethi- Workers Federation and a negotia- of Ethiopian "aggression." opia and Southern Yemen. (New tor for Federation des Travailleurs Western diplomats in neighbor- York Times, October 28, 1980.) Unis—Mauritius' two main trade ing Kenya suggested that the state union groupings—as well as Paul of emergency was aimed at neutral- Kenya Berenger, leader of the parliamen- ized supporters of the anti-Siad tary opposition party, the Mauritian Barre Somali Salvation Front, • The Kenyan government im- Militant Movement. which is based in Ethiopia and posed a dusk-to-dawn curfew and The unionists went on the fast to beams its radio broadcasts into So- called a military alert in Northeast- demand that 678 workers who were malia. Last August's alleged inva- ern province in November after six among 2,350 workers fired during sion of Somalia by Ethiopian forces people were machine-gunned to the 1979 general strike be given was in fact a cross-border raid by death by bandits. back their jobs. All but the 678, this guerrilla group, diplomats said. Nairobi claims that this attack mostly transport workers, had been Under the emergency powers, and another were carried out by eth- reinstated. ! Siad Barre reinstated the disbanded nic Somalis who live in the province The government agreed that all Supreme Revolutionary Council, a or who perhaps crossed the border the workers still employed would 17-man body of senior armed forces from Somalia. Tensions between immediately be hired by the Devel- officers who carried out the 1969 Kenya and Somalia, which has laid opment Works Corp. until other coup. (Africa Research Bulletin, claim to the province, were running jobs could be found for them. November 15,1980; London Times, high. The government apparently did October 22, 1980; Mogadishu Ra- Somalia's government, which de- not accede to the other demand— dio, October 21,1980.) AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 31 ing by Syrian, Indian and Lebanese sulted in the withdrawal from the in- view with the Nigerian independent merchants, as well as on the govern- ternational market of the 3.5 million newspaper Punch, Awolowo de- ment policy of limiting imports to barrels per day sold by the two nied allegations that he and his save foreign exchange and encour- countries. party were plotting to cause civil age domestic production. The four African members of disorder in the country. He said his The House of Representatives OPEC—Algeria, Nigeria, Libya quarrel with President Shehu Sha- and Senate voted in September to and Gabon—met in Algiers in early gari and the ruling National Party of return to the past policy of unre- November to discuss oil supplies to Nigeria was over performance, and stricted rice imports by private indi- developing countries and the latest a political crisis would be "an ill viduals, a move to which the gov- developments on the international wind that blows no one any good." ernment of President Shehu Shagari oil market. It was agreed that the (West Africa, November 7 and 18, is adamantly opposed. The unre- four nations will divert part of their 1980.) stricted import policy had been production to African countries hit banned two and a half years ago by hard by the loss of exports from Iran Senegal the military government then in and Iraq. They also reportedly de- • Prime Minister Abdou Diouf was power and Shagari continued to fol- cided against increasing production slated to take over the presidency of low the policy. or restoring cuts made during the oil Senegal by the end of 1980, upon Finance Minister Sunday Essang glut. (Washington Post, November President Leopold Senghor's resig- maintained that to revert to the old 1 and 10, 1980; London Observer, nation. system, would "deal a blow to the November 9, 1980; London Times, Senghor, 74, made public his very existence of small rice-grow- November I, 1980; West Africa, plans to step down when he told Le ers and imperil the objectives of the October 20. 1980.) Monde: "I am going at the end of green revolution," a plan to make the year, but this will only be a par- Nigeria self-sufficient in food pro- • The leader of the opposition tial retirement. I shall continue, in duction. Demand for rice in Nigeria Unity Party of Nigeria, Chief Oba- particular, to concern myself with is estimated at more than one mil- femi Awolowo, criticized the gov- the setting up of an African interna- lion tons annually, while only ernment's policy on South Africa in tional socialist movement." 650,000 tons are locally produced. November, attacking officials' statements that Nigeria would be According to Senegal's constitu- Currently, only the government tion, the Prime Minister automati- is authorized to import rice through forced to acquire a nuclear capabil- ity if the Pretoria regime did so. cally succeeds the President until various licensed para-statal organi- the latter's term of office is com- zations. During the assembly de- Awolowo said: "We should pleted, in Senghor's case until 1983. bate, some legislators claimed that never dream of. let alone attempt, The President's resignation would other government officials were to use nuclear power for military enable Diouf to consolidate his po- benefiting from the current licens- purposes." He also criticized the sition before the next presidential ing arrangements. Senator Olusola Nigerian army, saying that if the elections in February 1983. (Lon- Saraki, the Senate leader, was said soldiers could not even shoot don Guardian, December 2. 1980; to have been among the beneficia- straight, how could they use nuclear West Africa, November 3, 1980.) ries of the controversial licenses. firepower. He said it was dangerous (West Africa, October 27 and No- to continue threatening to use the • Force was used by Senegalese vember 17. 1980; Africa Research oil weapon to pressure changes in police to break up an unauthorized Bulletin, November'^, 1980.) foreign policies toward South Af- public meeting of the Sole and Dem- rica because it would encourage oil ocratic Teachers' Union (SUDES) in consumers to find alternative Dakar in late October, resulting in • Nigeria cut its oil output by 20 sources. percent in September, from an esti- several wounded. mated two million barrels per day to Awolowo was also critical of the SUDES called the meeting, 1.6 million, due to a glut on the South African liberation move- which was banned by the governor world market. The slump in sales ments, and said Nigeria could not of the Cap Vert region, to protest resulted in a loss of revenues of $13- be expected to shoulder their bur- government measures taken earlier 15 million per day. den. He said the South Africans in the year, including suspensions The decision to cut output was should resort more to urban and ru- and relocations of teachers. More undertaken in line with an informal ral guerrilla warfare. than a thousand people attended the agreement by OPEC members to re- Earlier in November, in an inter- meeting, including delegations of duce the glut. Nigerian top quality teachers from all over the country crude, one of the highest priced in A November-December 1980 Up- and from other trade union organi- the world, sells for approximately date article on Nigeria inadvertently zations. $37 per barrel, and the government erred in reference to Nigeria's polit- Police broke up the demonstra- has remained determined to main- ical parties. The "ruling party" tion with truncheons, injuring six tain that price level. mentioned in the article should people. Four SUDES leaders, in- However, some observers be- have been the National Party of Ni- cluding Mamadou N'Doye, the un- lieved that sales would pick up to- geria (NPN). The "political alli- ion's secretary, were brought to the ward the end of 1980 because of the ance" mentioned is between the authorities for questioning and were disruption in oil supplies caused by NPN and the Nigerian People's told to remain at the disposal of the the Iraq-Iran war. The war had re- Party (NPP). Justice Department pending further AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 29 Tanzania fair. Nine Commonwealth officials coincided with the visit to Came- and a 60-person observer team were roon of Britain's Trade Minister Ce- • In parliamentary elections on Oc- to judge whether the election was cil Parkinson to confer with the tober 28, Tanzania's voters ousted free and fair. Prime Minister, Paul Biya. Parkin- more than half the sitting MPs, in- Prior to the poll, the three parties son led a high-level business mis- cluding one cabinet minister and a lined up against Dr. Milton Obote's sion to Cameroon and Gabon to bol- deputy minister, apparently in pro- Uganda Patriotic Congress—the ster Britain's trade share in those test over the country's economic Democratic Party, Obote's chief ri- two countries. He was accompa- troubles. val, the Uganda Patriotic Move- nied by representatives from com- President Julius Nyerere was re- ment and the Conservative Party— panies including Plessey and Ley- elected in a yes/no referendum with over the ruling by the interim land Vehicles. Trade opportunities 93 percent of the vote. In pre-elec- government, which was dominated for exporters in West Africa are be- tion speeches, Nyerere said the ec- by Obote supporters, that each lieved to lie in the fields covered by onomic problems were largely party should have separate ballot those companies, as well as in agri- caused by factors beyond his con- boxes at every polling place. culture. (Financial Times, Novem- trol such as soaring oil prices, But after a meeting in Tanzania, ber 26, 1980; London Guardian, drought and falling commodity November 20, 1980.) prices. whose security forces were still in Uganda, it was agreed on separate Following the election, Nyerere ballot boxes, instead of one, along reshuffled his cabinet, replacing ail- with safeguards to ensure that the Central African Republic ing Prime Minister Edward So- counting was fair. It was also agreed • In an interview published in late koine, who resigned, with Cleopa that the President did not have to September in the French satirical David Msuya. Tanzania's ambassa- run for parliament and would be weekly, Le Canard Enchafne, dor to the UN, Salim Salim, was chosen by a majority of the 126 former Emperor Jean-Bedel Bo- named Foreign Minister. These two elected MPs. kassa blamed French President Va- men are considered leading candi- As election day approached there lery Giscard d'Estaing for forcing dates to succeed Nyerere, 58, who him to leave what was then the Cen- has said he will step down in 1985. was still considerable lawlessness in Uganda and famine in Karamoja tral African Empire. Bokassa was Nyerere also made changes in the province. In the West Nile, fighting quoted as saying, "It was not my top leadership of the country's only in October after an alleged invasion people who threw me out, it was political party, Chama Cha Mapin- by Idi Amin supporters resulted in Giscard." duzi, and named a new army chief depopulation of the area, according In addition, he blamed his police of staff and a new army com- to UN officials. Some 230,000 peo- forces for the massacres of school- mander, Maj. Gen. David Msuguri, ple were said to have fled into neigh- children in Bangui who were dem- who heads the Tanzanian forces in boring Zaire and Sudan. There were onstrating against compulsory pur- Uganda. The former army com- reports that no invasion occurred chases of new uniforms. Bokassa mander, Lieut. Gen. Abdallah Twa- but that the newly formed Ugandan alleged that Giscard falsely impli- lipo, was appointed Defense Minis- army killed hundreds of people in cated him in the deaths, "since he ter. (London Times, November 6 West Nile in retribution for the was out to get me." and 8, 1980; Dar es Salaam Radio, slaughters by Amin, whose home The French government has con- November 7, 1980.) base used to be in the province. tinued to play a strong role of sup- • An American company. Agrico (Kenya Weekly Review, November port for the government of Presi- Chemicals subsidiary of Williams 28, 1980; London Guardian, No- dent David Dacko since it backed Co. of Oklahoma, will build jointly vember 26, 1980; London Times, his coup against Bokassa. French with the Tanzanian government a November 17 and 21, 1980.) troops have remained in the country $450 million ammonia fertilizer to ensure stability. In late October, plant. The plant, one of the biggest CENTRAL AFRICA the French army began an airlift op- of its kind in Africa, will be built at eration to bring 60 tons of foodstuffs Kilwa Masoko near Tanzania's off- Cameroon and medicine to the famine-stricken shore Songo Songo gas fields, • In late November, the British Birao region in the northeast of the which will fuel the project. Kilwa Overseas Development Adminis- country. A shortage of food there Masoko has a natural deepwater tration announced its plans to pro- was said to be the result of locusts, harbor and when the plant is com- vide Cameroon with a $20 million floods and an influx of refugees pleted in about four years, fertilizer loan tied to the purchase of British from the Chad civil war. will be exported from there. (Finan- capital goods for the 1982-83 period. Meanwhile, according to a report cial Times, October 30, 1980.) The loan is designed to make in- on Bangui Radio in mid-November, roads into the French-dominated Dacko appointed the former Minis- Uganda West African market. France pro- ter of Planning, Jean-Pierre Le- • As Uganda headed toward its De- vides more than 40 percent of Cam- bouder, as Prime Minister. Dacko cember 10 elections, the first time in eroon's imports and Britain less had placed the previous Prime Min- 18 years citizens had the chance to than 5 percent. The Cameroon gov- ister, Christian Bernard Ayandlo, choose their leaders, the politicians ernment will propose projects in- under house arrest in August. finally agreed on ground rules in an volving the use of the British goods. Sylvestre Bangui, deputy prime effort to ensure that the poll was The announcement of the I6an minister in charge of foreign affairs, 32 AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 reportedly resigned as a result of Zaire Although a list of the arrested was Lebouder's appointment. not made public, they were said to Dacko also announced that a • According to a report in the Lon- include: Patrick Chisanga, a former "national seminar" was scheduled don Observer, President Mobutu cabinet secretary, Edward Sham- to be held in mid-December with the Sese Seko sent the Zairian 31st pa- wana, a prominent lawyer, Valen- participation of political move- rachute battalion, a crack French- tine Musakanya, a former governor ments, labor, youth, women's orga- trained force, to the northwest re- of the Bank of Zambia, and Elias nizations, and the army to bring gion of the country along the Chipimo, a former high commis- about "a national union for the in- Ugandan border in late October, af- sioner to Britain. Maj. Gen. Chris- dependence and renaissance of the ter border violations by Kampala topher Kabwe, recently appointed Central African Republic." (Bangui troops pursuing pro-Idi Amin rebels airforce commander, and Maj. E.F. Radio. November 12, 19 and 21, into Zaire. Mumba, an air force officer, were 1980; West Africa. October 27, Mobutu denied Ugandan allega- suspended from their posts and then 1980; Africa Research Bulletin, Oc- tions that Zaire had been aiding the detained. tober 15, 1980.) rebels against the Kampala govern- Kaunda said that the gang discov- ment. The Zairian President visited ered at the farm had in their posses- Gabon the region to investigate the border sion detailed maps with key installa- incursions in late October and re- tions marked, and were caught only • President Omar Bongo paid an of- turned to Kinshasa with calm in the hours before the coup was to have ficial visit to France in late Septem- area restored. He said he regarded been launched. He alleged that ber, where he conferred with Presi- the issue as serious because the South Africa was behind the plot dent Vale"ry Giscard d'Estaing. northwest is an important coffee- and that South African troops were Two accords were signed, one pro- producing and tourist zone. to have crossed into Zambia from viding for the creation of a mixed And in early November, Mobutu Namibia once the gang attacked key commission on economic coopera- lodged a complaint with the Belgian installations in Lusaka. He said that tion, which will hold its first meet- Foreign Minister, Charles No- South Africa had "tanks, troops ing in February in Libreville, and thomb, over activities in Belgium of and armored cars" poised opposite the other on provisions for citizens Zairian opposition groups. the Zambian border town of Sesha- of each country working in the Nothomb, on a visit to Zaire, re- ke, ready to move to support the other. plied that Belgium could not alter its plotters. Bongo told Giscard that in the status as a free land. Mobutu was The South African Minister of event that the Iraq-Iran war contin- reportedly particularly angered Foreign Affairs, Roelof Botha, de- ued to disrupt oil supplies to over the activities of Mangul Diaka, nying Kaunda's allegations, said: France, Gabon would be willing to a former Education Minister, who "Just as little as South Africa is re- increase its deliveries. Gabon cur- currently heads the Congo-Kin- sponsible for Martians being green, rently sells approximately 20 per- shasa Liberation Council, an um- just as little do we have to do with cent of its oil output to France. brella organization of anti-Mobutu Dr. Kaunda's problem and what's Bongo also came out in favor of movements formed in Brussels in more, Dr. Kaunda knows it." Many "justified interventions" in Africa July. (West Africa, November 17, observers remained skeptical as by foreign powers. 1980; London Observer, November well of South African involvement, Giscard said: "Our two nations 2, 1980; Kinshasa Radio, October noting that it would serve no useful have been engaged for 20 years in an 30 and 31, 1980.) purpose to have Kaunda removed, intense cooperation founded on mu- as Zambia is already heavily depen- tual understanding of our problems Zambia dent on Pretoria for many economic and a just appreciation of our re- needs. spective needs." {Le Monde, Octo- • President Kenneth Kaunda an- ber 2 and 4, 1980.) nounced in late October that Zam- Kaunda's government has faced bian security forces had thwarted mounting criticism from within an attempted coup involving Zam- since the end of the war in Zim- Sao Tome and Principe bian dissidents and Zairian merce- babwe, which turned people's at- • According to a report on Lisbon naries, allegedly trained and backed tention on domestic economic prob- Radio in November, two Portu- by South Africa. Kaunda unveiled lems no longer war-related. The guese diplomatic officials were ex- the coup plot to the public one week labor movement has been a particu- pelled from Sao Tome and Principe after an armed gang, numbering be- larly harsh critic of the government, as personae non gratae after they tween 50 and 200, was discovered and Kaunda implied that it was con- protested the detentions of three by police at a farm at Chilanga, nected to the coup plot when he said Portuguese citizens on charges of south of the capital. After a few of it was more just a coincidence that involvement in a conspiracy to the gang members, allegedly includ- the powerful Zambian Congress of overthrow President Manuel Pinto ing some Katangese rebels, were Trade Unions (ZCTU) was planning de Costa. caught, the government launched a nationwide strike. Sao Tome officials claimed that the largest security crackdown in Two senior union leaders, Fred- military firearms were found at the years, imposing a dusk-to-dawn erick Chiluba, chairman of the home of one of the detained Portu- curfew and detaining several promi- ZCTU, and his deputy, Newsted guese nationals. One of the three nent Zambians, including three Zimba, had their passports with- was released for lack of evidence. members of the military. drawn in the wake of the plot revela- AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 33 tions. In addition, Francois Cros, ber 1. 1980; London Guardian, Oc- the issue was "a crisis of democ- regional director of Agence France- tober 31. 1980; New York Times, racy and freedom." Presse news agency in Lusaka, was October 31, 1980.) Al Ahram responded with a two- arrested and held incommunicado page rebuttal, which brought Al under the Preservation of Public Se- Egypt Shaab to public prominence. The curity Act, which allows for deten- • In the first major test of the new newspaper prints 50,000 copies a tion without charge for up to 28 U.S. Rapid Deployment Force, 1.400 week and is popular among stu- days. Kaunda ordered his contin- American troops were flown to the dents. ued detention in late October. Cairo-West air base in November to In late November, two members Trials are to be held of those ac- conduct joint exercises with the of the New Wafd Vanguard, a group cused of involvement in the coup Egyptian forces. The exercise was trying to revive the Wafd Party, plot. Kaunda said, "Those who to prepare for delivering a combat- were arrested for demonstrating in have been arrested have no need to ready battalion to the Persian Gulf one of Cairo's main squares. fear if they are innocent. We follow within 48 hours, to be followed by a And in October, former Vice Pre- the rule of law in Zambia." (London brigade-sized force within a week mier Mohamed Abdessalam Zayyat Times, October 29, 31 and Novem- and two divisions within 30 days, was arrested and later released, re- ber 8, 1980; Financial Times, Octo- should a political crisis in the area portedly in connection with his re- ber 27, 28, 29 and November 6, arise. cent book. Whither Egypt? The 1980; London Guardian, October Live-fire field exercises were book is critical of the political and 27, 28, 31 and November 5, 1980; conducted in the desert near the economic system and of the type of Economist, November 1, 1980.) Wadi el-Natrun oasis, in which A-7 democracy practiced by the Sadat tactical planes and Cobra attack government. The book was re- NORTHERN AFRICA helicopters were utilized. The Pen- garded by officials as an incitement tagon estimated the cost of the oper- against the regime and 3,000 copies Algeria ation at $25 million. One incident were seized from the printer before • Algeria's first President, Ahmed marred the combined effort, how- it went on sale. (New York Times, Ben Bella, was given his freedom af- ever: a C-141 transport plane deliv- December 3. 1980; London Guard- ter 15 years in prison by President ering equipment to U.S. forces ian, October 6, 1980.) Chadli Benjedid, to mark the No- crashed, killing seven Americans. vember anniversary of the begin- • One of the first joint ventures be- While Egypt welcomed the op- tween a private American com- ning of the Algerian war against portunity to train with U.S. forces France. pany, Warner-Lambert, and a pub- and has offered the U.S. air and na- licly owned Egyptian firm, Bisco Ben Bella, 64, was jailed in 1965 val "facilities," President Anwar when his government was over- Misr, was announced in November. Sadat said in a November interview The two companies will build a $5 thrown by the late President Houari that he would tell President-elect Boumedienne. He spent 14 years in million plant in Alexandria to pro- Ronald Reagan to "go to hell" if he duce the American company's best- a three-room prison apartment near demanded permanent military Algiers, and in July 1979, was al- known product, Chiclets chewing bases in Egypt. (New York Times, gum. lowed to live in M'Sila under house November 12, 19 and 21, 1980; arrest. Ben Bella's continued im- Washington Post, November 14, The Egyptian government has prisonment had been a source of 1980; Washington Star, November been trying to attract foreign invest- embarassment to the two-year-old II. 1980.) ment, but has had difficulties be- Chadli regime, as he is highly re- cause of its highly protective atti- garded by other third world nations • The Egyptian government con- tude toward its public companies. for his struggle against French rule. {Financial Times, November 18, tinued to crack down on its opposi- 1980; Washington Post, November Chadli also pardoned Tahar tion critics late in 1980, in a move 16, 1980.) Zbiri. who was condemned to death characterized by the Socialist La- in absentia in 1967 for an attempt to bor Party as "a campaign aimed at overthrow Boumedienne. Zbiri was giving the impression that the par- Libya the colonel who arrested Ben Bella liamentary opposition is collaps- • In October. Libyan leader in 1965 during Boumedienne's ing." Muammar Qaddafy threatened war coup. He later became army chief of The minority Socialist Labor with the U.S. if Washington does staff, but broke with Boumedienne Party, headed by former Minister of not withdraw its force from Oman over socialist doctrine. After his Agriculture Ibrahim Shukri, holds and Somalia, the two countries coup attempt failed, he fled to Tuni- only 27 of the 392 seats in parlia- where the U.S. is attempting to sia and then to Switzerland. ment, but is a vocal critic of govern- strengthen its military presence Chadli announced the pardons ment policies. In November, its with regard to the Persian Gulf. during a speech to the national as- newspaper, Al Shaab, accused the Qaddafy issued the warning in a sembly, but also warned that the re- Al Ahram publishing house of try- cable addressed to President Jimmy leases were not to be interpreted by ing to stop its publication by saying Carter and Ronald Reagan, which opposition groups as a sign of his there was a shortage of newsprint. was carried by the state-run news government's weakness. He said: The party said it used less than one agency, JANA. "Unless America "We are all jointly responsible for percent of the amount of paper used withdraws its bases from Oman and our past." (London Times, Novem- by Al Ahram, and maintained' that Somalia, a military confrontation. 34 AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 or a war with all the meaning of the keep out of this country, but if they The Moroccan economy is word, is a must, since we must continue, we will have to consider plagued by severe balance of pay- shoulder the responsibility of pro- taking drastic action." (London ments and debt-rescheduling prob- tecting our independence and Times, November 27 and December lems. In addition, high defense lands," Qaddafy said. 1, 1980; New York Times, October spending from the Western Sahara Saudi Arabia broke off diplo- 29, 1980; Washington Star, October war, rising oil prices and declining matic relations with Libya in late 17. 1980.) revenues from phosphates, its main October, following a speech made export, have multiplied Rabat's ec- by Qaddafy in which he declared Morocco onomic woes. Its current account that Moslem holy places there were • According to a report from the deficit doubled from the start of the under "U.S. occupation," and Saudi News Agency. Moroccan Sahara war in 1975 to 1979. to $1.6 urged Moslems not to make the an- Foreign Minister Mohamcd billion, and may reach $1.8 billion in nual pilgrimage to Mecca. Boucetta said in late November that 1980. The statement referred to the fact the Rabat government had agreed to The IMF. in addition to the $1 bil- that King Khalid's government re- a request of the OAU "Committee lion credit, is providing a regular quested and received four Ameri- of Wise Men" on the Western Sa- credit tranche of $48 million. But can radar surveillance planes, hara war to hold a referendum in the with the continuation of the Sahara Awacs, and their crews, to observe disputed territory. The Boucetta war and the likelihood of future oil the progress of the Iraq-Iraq war. In statement came amid a report of se- price rises, the prospect is not good a strongly worded message to Qad- cret negotiations being conducted for a rapid economic recovery. dafy. Khalid said, "it is regretful to between high-level Algerian and (World Business Weekly, Novem- see you join Israel, the enemy of Is- Moroccan officials on the war. (See ber 24, 1980; Financial Times, Oc- lam and the Moslems, in opposing also Western Sahara, p. 36j tober 31. 1980.) our requests. You have proved that The ad hoc committee had held a you have become a spearhead conference in Freetown, Sierra against Islam and its Islamic sancti- Leone, in September, where all the Sudan ties." parties to the dispute met in face-to- • Five international banks which In recent months, several African face talks. But Morocco refused to are the most substantial lenders to countries have broken relations accept the committee's recommen- the financially strapped Sudan with Libya. Senegal, the Gambia, dations to end the five-year war, agreed in October to reschedule Gabon and Ghana have all alleged which included a ceasefire and ref- their portion of the country's $600 that Libya has interfered in their in- erendum. million debt, over a seven-year per- ternal affairs. In late November, it In October. Morocco suffered iod. Citibank, Chemical Bank, was reported that Nigeria was con- two defeats at the UN on Sahara-re- Deutsche Bank. Union des Ban- sidering declaring the Libyan am- lated issues. The Decolonization ques Arabes et Franchises, and bassador there persona non grata. Committee rejected a resolution Arab African International Bank, Abdulkaddin Sharafeddin was born proposed by Morocco and Senegal hold about one-quarter of Sudan's of a Nigerian mother in Nigeria and requesting the OAU to continue to debt. There are approximately 200 was a wealthy businessman in strive for a solution to the conflict. other creditors as well with whom Lagos until appointed Libya's am- The proposal, which made no men- Sudan is hoping to conclude resche- bassador in 1975. The Nigerian tion of the Saharan peoples' rights duling agreements. press maintained that he was re- to self-determination, was defeated In addition, the IMF agreed to cruiting mercenaries secretly into by 41 votes to 40 with 58 absten- make available an additional $200 Nigeria to fight on Goukouni Wod- tions. million per year for the next three deye's side in the Chad civil war. Another resolution put forward years, contingent upon certain con- Relations between Nigeria and by Algeria reaffirming the Sa- ditions the fund will impose. In Libya have been steadily deterio- harans' right to self-determination 1979, Sudan agreed to follow IMF rating in recent months. In October, and independence and condemning prescriptions for its troubled econ- Qaddafy criticized Nigeria and Mali Morocco's "occupation" of the omy in return for 200 million Special for ill treatment of its Tuareg-Arab Western Sahara, was adopted by 88 Drawing Rights over three years. refugees who he claimed were being votes to six with 44 abstentions. The austerity measures included: used for "undignified labor." In the Guatemala, Guinea. Israel, Senegal switching incentives to favor cotton end of October, two Libyan military and Zaire joined Morocco in voting production, reducing the budget aircraft were intercepted at Maidu- against the proposal. (Saudi News deficit, altering the exchange rate of guri, near the Chad border, for Agency, November 22, 1980; West the Sudanese pound and curbing transgressing Nigerian air space. Africa. November 10. 1980.) luxury imports. Nigerian Foreign Minister Ishaya Nevertheless, Sudan's economic Audu told the London Times that • In October, Morocco reached an crisis is expected to continue for senior Libyans are purchasing large agreement with the IMF for a rescue several years with an estimated an- quantities of food and other mate- package for its deteriorating econ- nual deficit of between $500 and rial in Maiduguri for shipment to omy, which includes a three-year $ I $700 million. (Financial Times, Oc- Chad, without the permission of the billion stand-by credit, the second tober 28 and November 12, 1980; Nigerian government. Audu said, largest ever administered by the Wall Street Journal, October 27, "I sincerely hope that they will fund. 1980.) AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 35 Tunisia on the war organized by the OAU Angolan puppet groups which were ad hoc committee on the Sahara is- shamefully defeated on the eve of • The French Prime Minister, Ray- sue in September ended inconclu- independence," apparently a refer- mond Barre, paid an official visit to sively when Morocco refused to ac- ence to statements made by Presi- Tunisia in October to hold discus- cept the terms of the proposed dent-elect Ronald Reagan to the ef- sions with his Tunisian counterpart, settlement, including a ceasefire fect that the U.S. should support Mohamed Mzali, on the develop- and referendum. Savimbi. ment of the two countries' political A concern over growing Libyan And in a related event, Luanda and economic relations. influence in North Africa shared by government officials maintained in The establishment of a $250 mil- both the Algerian and Moroccan late October that France had lifted lion Franco-Arab-Tunisian invest- governments has reportedly moti- its embargo on arms exports to An- ment bank, supplied by 30 percent vated the latest round of discus- gola. Angola was said to be inter- French, 30 percent Arab, and 40 sions on the Western Sahara. Libya ested in buying 12 long-range fish- percent Tunisian capital, was has made efforts recently to gain in- ery protection boats. The French agreed upon. It was originally be- fluence in Polisario, Algerian decision was reportedly reached af- lieved that Iraq would supply the sources reported. {Financial Times, ter persistent warnings from the An- Arab capital, but since Baghdad's November 4, 1980.) golan ambassador to Paris, Luis de war with Iran, the United Arab Almeida, that economic progress Emirates or Qatar may instead be SOUTHERN AFRICA between the two nations could not involved. develop unless the arms embargo Tunisia also agreed to unfreeze 85 Angola were lifted. {West Africa, Novem- percent of the blocked bank ac- • Amove by U.S. conservative Re- ber 24, 1980; New York Times, No- counts held by French citizens. publicans to lift the congressional vember 20, 1980; London Times, France pledged to implement mea- ban on assistance for military or October 31, 1980.) sures to relieve the present trade covert operations against the Ango- imbalance between the two coun- lan government of President Jose Mozambique tries, and to increase French invest- Eduardo dos Santos was defeated in ment in Tunisia. • During a mid-October meeting November by House of Represen- between Zimbabwe's Prime Minis- Tunisia has recently been beefing tatives Democrats. ter, Robert Mugabe, and Mozam- up security measures along its bor- The effort to repeal the ban was bique's President Samora Machel, a der with Libya, because, according led by Sen. Jesse Helms (R-NC) security pact between the two coun- to Interior Minister Driss Guiga, during a Senate-House conference tries was signed, aimed at coopera- some of the regions close to the bor- on a foreign aid authorization bill. tion in battling anti-government dis- der "are in a state of clear instability The bill that was adopted contains sidents. stemming from the choice of sowing the requirement that any Presiden- The Mozambique Resistance anarchy, disorder and instability in tial proposal to aid "military or the life of peoples." Movement, a guerrilla group paramilitary operations" in Angola formed in opposition to Machel's In mid-November, members of be submitted to Congress. Congress government, has stepped up its ac- the Tunisian army out on patrol sur- can only approve such assistance tivities in recent months, and in prised three Libyans in a police car by a joint resolution of both houses. mid-October derailed a train on the equipped with communications Rep. Stephen J. Solarz (D-NY), 155-mile railway line from the Zim- equipment several miles inside Tu- chairman of the House Foreign Af- babwe town of Umtali to the Mo- nisian territory and forced them fairs subcommittee on Africa and zambique port of Beira, causing a back into Libya. The incursion was leader of the fight against lifting the two-week shutdown of the line. the latest in a series of Libyan infil- ban, said: "This maintains the es- In the past the rebel organization trations into Tunisia in recent sential element of Congressional months, according to government received assistance from the former control." Solarz noted that even a white Rhodesian government, but officials. {Afrique-Asie, November threat of U.S. intervention in An- 23, 1980; Tunis Radio, October 25 lost its base of support when Zim- gola on the side of the opposition babwe became independent. and 26, November 15 and 17, 1980; movement, Unita, led by Jonas Jenue Afrique, November5, 1980.) In late October, the Zimbabwe Savimbi, could have a "disastrous government handed over to the Mo- effect" on current negotiations for Western Sahara zambique security forces an undis- Namibia's independence. closed number of the rebels, who • According to a report in the Fi- The Ford administration had pro- were captured in Salisbury. Three nancial Times in early November, vided covert aid to Savimbi's fac- men tried for "espionage and mili- secret high-level negotiations be- tion during the Angolan civil war tary sabotage" were executed by tween Algeria and Morocco over the until Congress put an end to it. firing squad in Mozambique in Oc- disputed Western Sahara have re- In November, the Angolan Presi- tober. (Africa Research Bulletin, sumed, although both sides deny dent accused the U.S. of plans to re- November 15, 1980; Washington that the talks are taking place. new its support for the dissident Post, October 26, 1980; Financial The two nations were said to be guerrillas, referring to statements Times, October 16, 1980.) discussing a compromise agree- made during the Presidential cam- ment to achieve a solution to the paign in the U.S. Dos Santos said, • President Samora Machel led a five-year-long war. A conference "Calls are being made to resurrect high-level delegation of Mozambi- 36 AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 can officials on an official visit to had participated in the attack in leged exploitation of black journal- Moscow in November, to discuss which three gunmen and two of ists. Zwelakhe Sisulu, Mwasa Maputo's membership in Comecon their hostages were killed by the po- president, said, "White capitalists and to strengthen economic ties be- lice. who made millions of profits thought tween the two nations. Machel was The condemned men, Ncimbithi they owned black employees as accompanied by his Foreign Minis- Johnson Lubisi, 29, Petrus Tsepo well. Mwasa believes that manage- ter, Joaquim Chissano; the Planning Mashigo, 20, and Naphtali Menana, ment should pay striking workers and Agriculture Minister, Mario 24, had admitted their part in the because . . . they created the situa- Machungo: the Industry Minister, Soekmekaar raid but claimed the at- tion that made blacks strike." Antonio Branco; and the governor tack was intended to harass and not White journalists have generally of the national bank, Sergio Viera. to harm any one. They fired 56 been indifferent to the strike after While the Soviet Union is Ma- rounds from AK-47s and hurled two their union's offer of a merger with puto's major military backer, Mo- hand grenades at the police station. Mwasa was rejected. There have zambique has stronger economic They testified that the ANC had also been defections from the strike: ties with other East European coun- chosen the northern Transvaal sta- Mwasa members at the East London tries, including East Germany, Bul- tion as a target because of anger Daily Dispatch returned to work and garia and Romania. It was believed over resettlement of blacks in the with half the Cape Herald staff back that this issue was addressed by area. at work at the end of November the Machel in his meetings with Soviet Defense attorney Jules Browder paper prepared to resume publica- President Leonid Brezhnev and argued for a reduction in sentences tion. (London Times, November 21 Prime Minister Nikolai Tikhonov. on the ground that the crimes were and 29, 1980; Voice, November 25, Soviet officials were reportedly "outrageous offenses to some por- 1980; Johannesburg Star, Novem- seeking Machel's assistance in gain- tions of the community [but]to ber22,1980.) ing influence with Zimbabwe Prime other sections of the community Minister Robert Mugabe, whose re- taken to be part of the political lations with Moscow have been scene and the times." • Both NATO and EEC were em- cool since independence. The So- The trial judge gave permission barrassed in November when it was viet Union had supported Joshua for the three men under sentence of learned that separate South African Nkomo and the Zimbabwe African death to appeal their convictions delegations had talks with top offi- People's Union during the war. and sentences, but denied the right cials of the two organizations. The Soviet Union and Mozam- of appeal to the others. (Washing- South African Foreign Minister bique issued ajoint communique at ton Post, November 27, 1980; Roelof Botha met privately in Brus- the end of the visit, in which Machel Transvaal Post, October 16 and 17, sels with NATO's secretary-gen- expressed his support for Soviet 1980.) eral. Dr. Josef Luns—the first ac- foreign policy. The statement knowledged meeting between a warned the U.S. to stay out of Af- • The entire staff of black journal- South African minister and a senior rica and pledged to work toward ists on the Transvaal Post, the paper NATO official in many years. A making the continent a nuclear-free edited by blacks for black readers, NATO spokesman said: "Nothing zone. (London Times, November was dismissed on November 28 by whatsoever was discussed which 24, 1980; Washington Star, Novem- the Argus Company, which, along might be regarded as at variance ber 24, 1980; London Guardian, with South African Associated with long-standing NATO policy." November 18, 1980.) Newspapers, the other English-lan- Apparently Luns had given assur- guage newspapergroup, has been hit ances in 1976 that there would be no South Africa by a nationwide strike of black news- cooperation between NATO and • Three young black nationalists paper workers. South Africa. were condemned to death in No- Argus fired 71 journalists, most of In the other incident, an avow- vember for their role in the January them from the Post. edly propagandist South African armed attack on rural Soekmekaar The strike by the Media Workers' delegation, which included the police station in which a policeman Association of South Africa leader of the Lebowa homeland, was slightly injured. (Mwasa) started at the end of Octo- met with senior EEC officials after The three and six others, who re- ber as a sympathy action with black the EEC president and the commis- ceived stiff sentences ranging from journalists who struck the Argus- sioner for development aid had in- ten to 20 years1 imprisonment, were owned Cape Herald, a weekly read structed their staffs to have nothing also convicted of "high treason" by Coloureds (mixed-race people), to do with the South Africans. The for being in possession of weapons and quickly encompassed virtually delegation met with external rela- and admitting membership in the the entire corps of black journalists tions department officials but a banned African National Congress, in the country. Cape Herald, Post spokesman said the meeting "does which had trained them in guerrilla and its weekend sister Sunday Post not imply any modification of the warfare following the 1976 unrest. ceased publication, while nine other commission's position." However, all nine were acquitted papers lost the servicesof their black The two groups of South African of the charge of complicity in the staffs. politicians were touring Europe ap- Silverton bank siege last January The Mwasa action has become a parently as part of a diplomatic of- because the prosecution could not demonstration of anger at the white- fensive to persuade the West to be prove conspiracy and none of them owned newspaper companies for al- more cooperative toward Pretoria. AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 37 (London Guardian, November 19, tral Selling Organization, which to implement boycotts of concerts by 20 and 21, 1980; London Times, No- controls the sale of virtually all the foreign artists, persuaded two So- vember21, 1980.) world's diamonds. (Financial weto promoters in November to • A report in the Financial Times in Times, November 13 and 26, 1980.) cancel plans to bring black Ameri- November said there is circumstan- can singer Barry White and Jamai- • The revelation last January that can Peter Tosh to South Africa. tial evidence of "collusion" be- the Geneva-based International tween South Africa and the Soviet Azapo maintains that tours by University Exchange Fund had been black Americans and others "give Union over the sale of gold, dia- infiltrated by a South African secu- monds, platinum and other precious credibility to the South African re- rity police captain has led to the im- gime." Azapo's publicity secretary metals of which the two nations are pending closure of the fund. the world's largest producers. said that visiting musicians and ath- The fund, which uses its grants to letes were "part of the exploitative The Financial Times noted that it fight apartheid, went through is "striking that this year both the machinery." (Voice, November 25, months of sackings, squabbles and 1980.) Russians and the South Africans recriminations after Capt. Craig have been following broadly similar Williamson's cover as deputy direc- Swaziland marketing policies by holding back tor of the fund was blown. The some of their gold production from South African government, by leak- • In September, the Swaziland world markets to help bolster ing documents stolen by William- Prime Minister, Prince Mbandla prices." Gold production in South son, has been trying to wreck the Dlamini, put an effective end to the Africa is projected at 680 metric fund by smearing it and other apart- work of a commission of inquiry tons this year, down from 703 in heid foes, arousing suspicions into alleged government corruption 1979, and Soviet sales are expected among the exiled South African lib- and bribery, by assuming supervi- to reach only 50 tons, down from eration movements. sory control over the commission's 229 last year. The five governments which sup- work. The FT article gave prominence ported the fund with an annual The group, set up earlier in 1980 to a chance sighting in Moscow of budget of $9 million—the Nether- and headed by Justice Ismail Maho- Gordon Waddell, a key figure in the lands, Sweden, Norway, Denmark med to investigate the activities of South African mining industry. and Canada—have begun to search high government officials, issued a Waddell and an official of the giant for alternative financing for the statement which said that the new conglomerate Anglo American fund's 1,600 remaining scholar- provision "detracts from the inde- Corp. were spotted in the company ships for refugee students, many of pendence, credibility, public image of two Soviet officials. The Soviet them from South Africa and Nami- and dignity of the commission, and Union and South Africa do not have bia. (London Guardian, November the commission has decided in diplomatic relations and officially 3 and 19, 1980.) these circumstances that it would do not trade with each other. The not be proper for it to investigate Soviets do, however, sell their dia- • The Azanian People's Organiza- any new matters." (Johannesburg monds through the De Beers Cen- tion (Azapo), which has promised Star, September 27, 1980.) Business Briefs ALGERIA: A West German consortium of four com- Thomas and Partner KG of West Germany and Ce- panies and Brazil's Brazpetro were awarded contracts ments AB of Malmo, Sweden, to renovate and expand a of $170 million and $32 million respectively by Sona- cement plant in Sokoto. West Germany's Brown Boveri trach for the research and development of hydrocarbon and CIE, a subsidiary of the Swiss engineering group, in Algeria. won a $100 million contract to supply a gas turbine- based power plant. BENIN: Czechoslovakia signed a contract worth $23 million to build a brewery and soft drinks' plant at Abo- SOUTH AFRICA: Britain's Babcock and Wilcox Engi- mey, 100 miles from Cotonou. neering firm won a $411 million share of $1.1 billion contract to build six turbo-generators for a coal-fired EGYPT: Siemens AG of West Germany won a $1.8 bil- power station in South Africa. Germany's MAN group lion contract to provide Egypt with 50,000 new tele- and France's Alstom Atlantique were given the $566 phone lines and to rehabilitate 25,000 existing lines by million contract for the boilers. 1985. A French consortium headed by Merlin Gerin was awarded a $13 million contract together with the TANZANIA: Britain's Hawker Siddeley Power Engi- Egyptian Electrica Authority to supply electricity to neering Ltd.'s industrial division won a secured con- three new cities. tract to supply electrical equipment to Tanzania. ETHIOPIA: The East German government concluded TUNISIA: Sweden's L.M. Ericsson won a $35 million an agreement to build a cement factory valued at $105 order to install its AXE computerized telephone equip- million for Ethiopia. Cement output is expected to in- ment to Tunisia. crease to 500,000 tons a year. ZIMBABWE: Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nuernberg NIGERIA: Cement Co. of Northern Nigeria awarded a AG of West Germany and Alsthom-Atlantique of $105 million contract to a group of European companies France were awarded a $29 million contract to deliver consisting of O&K Orenstein Koppel AG and Michael four 120,000-kilowatt steam turbine engines. 38 AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 REFUGEES An African Tragedy By POUL HARTLING refugees in their midst, from Ethiopia, ' 7 do not believe that dealing with the problem of 3.5 million people, Uganda, Chad, and Zaire, that the and giving them a chance to rebuild their dignity and their lives, is an Sudanese government declared 1980 impossible task for 46 nations and their 350 million inhabitants," "The Year of the Refugee in the -President Nverere of Tanzania, Arusha. May 1979 Sudan" and organized an international conference on June 20 — Africa Refu- f all the regions of the world where cal equipment. UNHCR has gee Day — to focus international atten- Othe United Nations High Commis- supplemented basic food rations pro- tion on the problem. The presence of sion for Refugees (UNHCR) is active, vided by the World Food Program and large numbers of refugees, mainly from Africa has the largest number of re- also helped meet transport costs, pur- rural backgrounds, in urban centres fugees and displaced persons. Al- chase vehicles, improve the water sup- suffering from high unemployment and though African countries practice a ply, and provide educational assis- inflation rates, aggravated existing generous open-door policy towards tance. Small-scale agricultural schemes problems in Sudan of house rents, pub- refugees, large-scale assistance by have been extended and assistance has lic transport, food supplies, and job UNHCR and the international commu- also been provided to some 200 urban competition. nity is needed to alleviate the often des- refugees, living mainly in Mogadishu. The fine tradition of the extended perate plight of those who, for various UNHCR, conscious of the massive family in Africa is often stretched be- reasons, have had to flee from their international effort required to cope yond its limits when refugees arrive. homes. In 1980. half the total UNHCR with the problem, sought additional This is what makes relief support from budget of $500 million is being spent in technical expertise for the program to outside, by members of the United Na- Africa. strengthen the government's imple- tions family and the many voluntary The largest refugee problem on the mentation capacity to meet the in- agencies, who serve so unstintingly in continent is in the Horn of Africa. In creased requirements. Various other the field, essential. One of the answers Somalia, according to the government, organizations within and outside the in a situation such as Sudan is a pro- approximately one million are regis- United Nations systems made major gram of establishing settlements in tered in 30 camps, while additional contributions, particularly in the areas rural areas, which will eventually help large numbers are living outside or- of food and water supply, education refugees to cease being a burden on ganized settlements It will take an im- and agriculture. UNHCR has also con- their host community and become self- mense international effort to solve the siderably strengthened its presence in sufficient. After attaining economic in- problem within the regional context. In Somalia, both in Mogadishu and in dependence, refugees could become an March 1980. UNHCR launched an ap- three new sub-offices in the regions of asset to the community, through peal for $40.7 million for assistance Gedo. Hiran, and the North West. In small-scale farming or wage-earning other than food to refugees in Somalia, the neighboring small country of Djib- opportunities. Another answer is the while food requirements were esti- outi, about one in 10 of the population program, now being started, of semi- mated at $80 million. The rate of new is a refugee. While relief supplies have urban or suburban settlements which arrivals and the magnitude of the refu- been provided to refugees, assistance provide refugees access to wage- gee problem made it necessary to con- for the promotion of self-sufficiency earning opportunities. centrate a substantial part of assistance projects, including a pilot project in In Ethiopia, UNHCR activities have measures on the provision of immediate agriculture, has continued. continued to focus on the special pro- relief in the camps: shelter, clothing, In this same region, the huge influx gram initiated in 1978, within the domestic items, medicines, and medi- of refugees into Sudan has been placing framework of the Horn of Africa ap- great strains on the country's limited peal. In cooperation with the Ethiopian resources and caused serious problems. government, an initial project is being Poul Hartling is the United Nations It was to draw attention to the difficul- established to provide assistance to- high commissioner for refugees. ties caused by the presence of 441,000 wards the reception and rehabilitation AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 39 of refugees who have returned or are ganized refugee settlements of its kind have fled across the Chari River from returning to Ethiopia from neighboring in Africa, a self-sufficient community civil war in neighboring Chad. A $7.6 countries. Measures cover the con- has been created for some 27,000 refu- million program was launched for struction and equipment of reception gees from Burundi. Fully integrated emergency supplies, including sup- centers, the immediate material needs into the Tanzanian economy largely plementary food, household equip- of returnees while in the centers, and through their own efforts, they are ex- ment, and utensils, and to launch a the provision of a basic self-supporting pected this year to earn about $1 million school building program. activity as rapidly as possible. Close through sales of their products: maize, Educational aid to refugee students monitoring of the situation is taking cassava, sorghum, tobacco, and bricks. continues to be an important part of place so that, after a certain period, Another group, some 36,000 mainly UNHCR activities, particularly with further needs and financial require- from Rwanda, have recently been nat- regard to refugees from South Africa ments can be assessed. uralized by the Tanzanian government and Namibia. Assistance to the some 150,000 ref- in a series of mass ceremonies, unique By the end of 1980, there were some ugees in Tanzania has centered on as- in Africa. five million refugees in Africa. Most of sistance to organized rural settlements. In northern Cameroon, UNHCR is them remain on the continent. There At Ulyankulu, one of the largest or- assisting some 100,000 refugees who may be some exceptions to this, not always of a. permanent nature. Fortu- nately, voluntary repatriation — the AFRICAN REFUGEES (tteproduced fion Dept. of State Bulletin, April 1980) best solution to all refugee situations — Country Number Principal Country was possible in many cases. of Asylum of Refugees of Origin Comments Sudan, which has an outstanding re- Algeria, 9,100 Western Sahara Access not allowed to deter- cord in refugee asylum and protection Morocco, mine accurate numbers. typical of Africa, experienced a mas- Tunisia Angola 61,000 Namibia sive voluntary repatriation in 1972 after Zaire agreement was reached to end the 17- Botswana 20,300 South Africa Repatriation to Zimbabwe Namibia should end substantial year civil conflict there. This repre- Zimbabwe problem. sented the biggest-ever movement of Lesotho population organized to date by Burundi 50,000 Rwanda Self-settled, some for as long as 20 years. UNHCR on the African continent. Cameroon 30,000 Equatorial Guinea Political refugees becoming UNHCR was called upon to provide for economic refugees. Djibouti 20,000 Ethiopia (mostly Urban refugee problem special; initial rehabilitation measures for the Eritreans) govt. encouraging resettle- returnees as well as for the large num- ment in third country. ber of Sudanese who had been dis- Ethiopia 10.9001 Sudan Somalia placed by events in their country. Gabon 60,000 Equatorial Guinea Refugee status being with- UNHCR was also engaged in the re- drawn Mar. 1, 1980. Kenya 6,500 Uganda Numbers decreasing. warding task of helping returnees to Ethiopia Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Lesotho 250 South Africa and Equatorial Guinea. Events in Zim- Mozambique 120,000 Zimbabwe Repatriation should end prob- lem. babwe over the past 12 months have Nigeria 370 Equatorial Guinea Political refugees becoming meant an equally happy outcome for economic refugees. Rwanda 8,500 Burundi Fairly well integrated. many thousands of Zimbabweans who Uganda have now returned home mainly from Somalia 500,000a Ethiopia 22 camps; great, long-term aid Botswana, Mozambique, and Zambia. needed. Sudan 330,000 Ethiopia Additional assistance required. At the request of Prime Minister Robert Uganda Mugabe, the UN Secretary-General Zaire asked UNHCR to coordinate the re- Swaziland 3,700 South Africa Mozambique habilitation program of humanitarian Uganda 112,400 Rwanda assistance for 660,000 returnees and Zaire Tanzania 160,000 Rwanda Many long-term; self-settled. displaced persons. This is now in full Burundi swing, with distribution of agricultural Uganda tools, and seeds for planting. Zaire 653,000 Angola Rwanda African hospitality to, and protection Burundi Zambia 80,000 Zimbabwe Severe problem should be ob- of, refugees has been taken a step fur- Angola viated by repatriation to ther than the universal 1951 Conven- South Africa Zimbabwe. tion on Refugees and the 1967 Protocol with the 1969 Convention on Specific 1 Does not include displaced persons, estimated to be as many as 1 million. "Does not include 500,000-700,000 refugees outside camps. Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. 40 AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 This was drawn up by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in consultation with UNHCR. This not only carries the definition of the term refugee further than the previous instruments but also deals positively with asylum and vol- untary repatriation. The OAU Conven- tion, which came into effect in 1974, states that "the granting of asylum is a peaceful and humanitarian act, and shall not be regarded as an unfriendly act by any member state." Further, it acknowledges that no person should be compulsorily or forcibly returned by an African state to the territory he has left and where his physical integrity or lib- erty would be threatened. At the same time, the OAU Convention excludes acts of subversion by refugees against the territory they have left, and exempts criminals from the protection of refugee status. So far 18 of the 50OAU member states have acceded to the 1969 Con- Mothers and children make up more than 90 percent of the one million refugees in vention, while 33 have acceded to the Somalia more general 1951 Convention or 1967 on the measures needed for incorpora- international conference for assistance Protocol. tion into national legislations. UNHCR to refugees in Africa, to be held in It was to review the increasing, ur- is also studying procedures and specific Geneva on April 9-10, will obtain fur- gent refugee problem on the continent arrangements concerning the identifi- ther resources to enable African coun- that the Pan-African Conference on the cation of refugees, which could be of tries to meet the already strenuous re- Situation of Refugees was held in benefit to African states confronted sponsibility of hosting several millions Arusha, Tanzania in May 1979. At- with large-scale influxes of asylum of refugees. Detailed projects of assis- tended by 38 African states (including seekers. tance now are being worked out that all countries that have received refu- Another major concern of the Arusha will help refugees. The conference, gees), 5 liberation movements, as well conference was that the refugee burden sponsored by the UN, the OAU, and as the major Western industrialized na- of Africa should be shared more equally UNHCR, will also provide the occasion tions, UN agencies, and 37 voluntary among all African states. In his ad- to increase the awareness of the inter- agencies and nongovernmental organi- dress. President Nyerere of Tanzania national community to the plight of ref- zations active in the field of service to appealed to those countries that have ugees in Africa. refugees, the conference spelled out very few refugees to provide rural refu- While solutions in some areas are detailed policies to be followed to al- gee settlements or at least to contribute being found, elsewhere new problems leviate the situation of refugees in the to the heavy local costs involved for may arise or existing ones may require specific African context. These include those countries that do give such hos- increased assistance. However, thanks a recognition of the basic rights of refu- pitality. to the hospitality of the countries of gees to asylum, "nonrefoulement" (no Until durable solutions can be found asylum and the efforts of the interna- forcible return to a country where a for refugees, UNHCR tries to devise tional community, no refugee situation refugee fears persecution), declaration projects to enable them to be occupied is without hope. In the constant search of amnesties to encourage voluntary re- and become self-supporting, providing to improve the lot of the uprooted, those patriation, naturalization where inte- them with seeds and agricultural im- helping them — whether in the field in gration in asylum countries has taken plements, where applicable. If volun- Africa or among the international place, free movement to facilitate tary repatriation is not yet possible, ref- community -— act with the conviction study, training or resettlement in third ugees are given assistance by UNHCR that the world, which today provokes countries, and rural resettlement together with the host government, to the departure of so many who are des- schemes. A joint OAU-UNHCR become self-sufficient, usually in ag- titute and helpless, also works con- working group has been established to riculture, or in the case of urban refu- stantly to find solutions forthem. In this monitor progress achieved in the im- gees, through training in skills leading humanitarian task, supported by the plementation of the Arusha recommen- to wage-earning opportunities. international community, UNHCR has dations. Guidelines are being drawn up We have high expectations that the an essential role to play. • AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 41 INTERVIEW Thozamile Botha, South African Trade Union Leader Interviewed by RICHARD DEUTSCH Thozamile Botha rose to prominence in South Africa with BOTHA: There was the UAW (United Automobile, Rub- his founding in 1979 of the Port Elizabeth Black Civic Or- ber and Allied Workers Union) which did not want to par- ganization (Pebco), like Soweto's Committee of Ten an al- ticipate in the Ford strike, saying the strike -was political ternative to the government-set-up councils for administer- because Pebco (Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organization) ing the nation's black townships. Part of the renascent was involved and it was a political organization. black consciousness movement that was silenced in the Oc- AFRICA REPORT: What is the purpose of Pebco? tober 1977 crackdown, Pebco organized on the emotional BOTHA: Pebco was formed in a township near Port issue of the government's plan to forcibly relocate Walmer Elizabeth because of the problems we had with the poor township, an enclave of 6,000 blacks in an expanding craftmanship of houses. We were given houses without "white" area. Botha, a popular political figure who drew floors, without ceilings and plaster, and we had to pay exor- crowds of up to 10,000 to Pebco's meetings, would tell his bitant rentals. We had to pay for metered water and the audiences their real leader was not himself but Nelson streets were not tarred, so we also raised other issues about Mandela, the imprisoned African National Congress the problems that affected the black community as a leader. whole—like the enforcement of Bantustan citizenship for Port Elizabeth is a major manufacturing area, the center blacks, the poorly built black schools, the mass removal of of South Africa's mainly foreign-owned auto industry. The blacks from one area to another, especially in one instance growing defiance to the government articulated by Pebco where people were moved 30 kilometers away from town was reflected in the increasing militance of auto industry and from their workplace. Pebco was fighting for the im- workers. Botha worked at the Ford Motor Co. subsidiary provement of these things. It was because of my involve- and led a wildcat strike in November 1979 that quickly ment in Pebco that Ford decided to give me an ultimatum to spread to other factories. The Ford strike touched off a choose between Pebco and my work and I therefore chose series of strikes throughout 1980 which involved tens of Pebco. thousands of black workers in the biggest year of labor unrest since the 1973 Durban strikes. Botha was inter- AFRICA REPORT: After the whole series of upheavals at viewed while on a November-December speaking tour of the Ford the end result was that the workers went back to work United States and Canada. with pay and you were arrested and banned by the govern- ment. AFRICA REPORT: What led you to become involved with the trade union movement? BOTHA: Immediately after the strike was settled, the BOTHA: I saw the role of the trade union as the only American consul went down to talk to the Ford workers' mouthpiece of the workers and I saw the need for workers to committee and Ford agreed to reinstate everybody. A day organize into a union because they have grievances within later I was arrested, kept in detention for eight days without the workplace—problems like those raised by the Ford trial and on release I was banned, meaning that I could not workers when they went on strike demanding the scrapping work any more, could not go to any factory, could not go of job reservation, demanding equal pay for equal work, out on public holidays or weekends. From 6 p.m. to 6 a.m. I demanding integration of training facilities, and also de- had to stay indoors, could not be visited by friends at home, manding the promotion of blacks to senior positions. These and could not meet with more than one person at a time in are some of the things that made me more interested in trade the street. Even my wife, if she wanted to meet friends, had unionism and also in raising these issues, organizing people to go into the street. Under those conditions I decided to around them, and fighting for the rectification of these leave the country for Lesotho. problems. AFRICA REPORT: What is the basic message that you AFRICA REPORT: Was there a union at Ford when you are bringing to people in the United States? arrived there? BOTHA: I am mainly advocating the divestment of foreign 42 AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 investment in South Africa. Those who have invested in I think it is growing because in each university that I have South Africa should withdraw their investments, should im- gone to there is a committee examining investment in South pose economic sanctions against South Africa, should dis- Africa. courage people who go to South Africa to sell their skills, AFRICA REPORT: Have you been to other places be- their expertise, taking opportunities that could have been sides universities? What's your impression of the opinions provided to blacks. Because blacks are denied this opportu- and attitudes in the United States with respect to the situa- nity to be trained as technicians, the country is now hungry tion in South Africa? for expertise, and companies go to other countries and re- BOTHA: I have met with some trade unionists and with cruit people for South Africa. In overseas companies, when some government people. Both parties give me the impres- the workers go on strike, they threaten to close these busi- sion that if they divest from South Africa they are going to nesses and open businesses in South Africa. For instance, lose a lot. They would rather remain in South Africa, wish- Firestone and Ford closed plants in the United States in ing to change the system. In fact, they know fully well there 1977 and 1976 when they had businesses in South Africa. are laws in South Africa that they have got to operate un- They are concerned about human rights in South Africa and der—laws they cannot change. But of course many gov- not concerned about human rights here. They lay off a num- ernment officials contradict themselves by saying that if ber of workers here because there is a cheap labor system in they pull out they won't have leverage to influence the South Africa. They know that there is a boom in South South African government to bring about change, yet they Africa and they can open businesses there. say that they invest there to bring about change or to im- AFRICA REPORT: So your position is that no matter prove the quality of life of the blacks. what rules American corporations and companies follow in AFRICA REPORT: So it is your opinion that "attempts South Africa their very pressure in that country is exploita- for change" like the Sullivan principles are basically tion of the black worker? worthless? BOTHA: Certainly. In fact, their very existence there is in BOTHA: Certainly the Sullivan principles and the Euro- order to benefit from the cheap labor system. That is why pean Economic Community code, etc., are just an excuse they are even prepared to be voluntarily involved in building for the perpetuation of the system that obtains in South arms for South Africa, even building military and police Africa. These companies signed the Sullivan principles cars. more than five years ago, but today not one of them has AFRICA REPORT: What has been the response that you implemented those principles to the letter. In fact, if they have received in the United States? make them law it is only then that the companies will oper- BOTHA: I must say that so far I am impressed by the role ate under these laws and say they are implementing them. of the students in the colleges. They are taking a very posi- Yet this will not bring about change, because they are not tive step in fighting for divestiture from South Africa, espe- attacking the system but just aiming at bringing about re- cially the withdrawal of university funds invested in compa- forms. nies that have links with South Africa, and I regard this as a AFRICA REPORT: Would you say that this particular step forward. Although the campaign is now on a low note, point of view is the general feeling of black people in South Ford, South Africa: The Ford strike, led by Botha, touched off a series of strikes throughout 1980 AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 43 Africa, or not? How do most people in South Africa feel Inkatha are members because they have to obtain certain about American and European investment there? necessities. BOTHA: It is clear that this is the view of the people. AFRICA REPORT: No matter what happens between When Reverend Sullivan went to South Africa recently, he your group and Mr. Buthelezi's group, eventually there will and his principles were attacked by trade unionists through- be a struggle for majority rule in South Africa, a struggle for out the country and he was told to go away with his princi- the black people to assume their rights. What role do you ples. Divestiture is the general view of the people. People see in the struggle for the workers? are now prepared to suffer for meaningful change which BOTHA: The role of the worker, first of all, is to organize, would bring about change sooner than it would take while to take over the means of production. That's what the work- these companies remain in South Africa. ers are fighting for: to take control, to fight against monopoly capital and also against imperialism. That is the AFRICA REPORT: Now there are groups in South Af- battle of the worker. Their struggle is part and parcel of the rica, for instance Inkatha led by Gatsha Buthelezi, which do total struggle that is fought for the liberation of the oppres- not advocate disinvestment by the United States. Would you sed majority of the people of South Africa. say that this organization has a great deal more support or AFRICA REPORT: Once the oppressed people are liber- less support than yours? ated, will there be a role in South Africa for the white BOTHA: Gatsha is one of the homeland, or Bantustan, minority? leaders whose constituency is KwaZulu. He is leading by BOTHA: The freedom charter., which is a program of ac- force a certain percentage of the people of KwaZulu because tion of the African National Congress, says in its preamble the Zulus, in order to work in Natal, must by force become that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and members of Inkatha. Otherwise, a person cannot work in white, and that no government can justly claim authority the civil service or be a teacher or whatever until he be- unless it is based on the will of all the people. comes a member. If one wants a home, a travel document, AFRICA REPORT: Your organization in Port Elizabeth, or a passport, first of all he must obtain homeland citizen- Pebco, is kind of an offshoot—is it part of the African ship of KwaZulu—which means those that are members of National Congress, or did you join the ANC after you left South Africa? BOTHA: 1 joined the ANC in exile because I could not join when I was inside ihe country. It is a banned organiza- tion and I would be arrested. AFRICA REPORT: In your opinion, does the ANC offer the best hope for South Africa's black people in terms of liberation? BOTHA: I regard it as the only authentic liberation group and vanguard of the struggling people of South Africa. AFRICA REPORT: Are you going to work from Lesotho with the ANC to help bring about change? BOTHA: I am working with the ANC as well as with the South African Congress of Trade Unions, which is a trade union operating in exile because they could not operate inside, due to harassment. AFRICA REPORT: Do you have a message for the read- ers of Africa Report which might be a little bit more specific than the type of message you have been bringing to the students? BOTHA: I have been calling (or the withdrawal of funds from South Africa, so people should withdraw funds in- vested in any corporation or bank that has links with South Africa. And workers, or any other interested party, should support the workers in South Africa materially, physically, and morally when they go on strike in South Africa, because a worker is a worker. There is a disparity between the wages that Ford pays to workers in the United States and the wages they pay to workers in South Africa. Nothing is being said about this in the discussions I have had with different peo- ple. They are not concerned about that, they don't talk about the disparity between Ford here and in South Africa which is benefiting much more than they are benefiting here by paying higher wages in the United States than they do in Thozamile Botha, founder of the Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organization South Africa. D 44 AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 DOCUMENT U.S. Firms and South African Divestment .^ Extracted from U.S. House of Representatives Africa Subcommittee Proceedings The following excerpts are from the edited text of testimony ness with South Africa whose economies are not dependent and questioning of South African trade union leader Thozamile on South Africa for survival. Botha when he appeared before the African subcommittee of BOTHA: So, as long as the United States remains in South the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee on Africa, it continues its responsibility for the destruction, the November 13, 1980. The subcommittee chairman is Stephen slaughtering, and the exploitation and oppression of the Solarz, liberal Democratic party representative from New York black people in South Africa ... SOLARZ: My view is even if we were successful in bring- ing about this divestment, whites would continue to remain BOTHA: I think we must make one point clear, that we are just as much in charge of South Africa as they are today, not fighting for reforms. This must be clear. which is to say even this divestment would not fundamen- SOLARZ: Who is we? tally undermine the economic foundations of apartheid. BOTHA: The black people. The oppressed people are not The future of South Africa will primarily be determined fighting for reforms. We are fighting for a change of the basic within South Africa itself. I think the rest of the world can structure of the South African government. We want to par- make a contribution, albeit a marginal one, toward helping ticipate in decision making.... I remember the statement to shape it, but anybody who believes this divestment will you made that divestment from South Africa is a nonstarter. produce the instantaneous or imminently eventual elimina- That statement was very dangerous, in fact, because it sup- tion of apartheid is living in a dream world. ported the government of South Africa. BOTHA: You are right when you say South Africa's future SOLARZ: Whether it was helpful or not, history will judge; will be determined by South Africa, but we don't want the but it certainly was true, and the statement is a reality. I think involvement of other foreigners in South Africa. If you are it would be best for those concerned about the need for not bringing about change, then get out, and we will deal change in South Africa to recognize it. with the South African government. I think it is quite clear that the black people of South Africa SOLARZ: Until that happy day arrives, in spite of the best want fundamental change, want an opportunity to play their efforts of many of your friends from the Congress, it is not proper role in determining the future of the country, but I must possible to bring about divestment. American investment fundamentally disagree with you if you say to me because will remain, and so long as it remains, are you interested in they are primarily committed to the elimination of apartheid the kind of economic opportunities it provides and would they are totally uninterested in bringing about meaningful you, like many of the black people I spoke to in South Africa, changes in the apartheid state on the way to the ultimate favor an effort to at least make sure, as long as the invest- achievement of their objectives. ment is there, the firms involved do provide equal pay for If you are to be taken at your word literally, nothing we can equal work, do provide promotional opportunities, do do short of bringing about total change instantaneously does negotiate with independent black labor unions; or are you any good. If that is in fact the case, I am afraid even your essentially indifferent to whether tne firms involved provide friends would have to opt out of the struggle, because while those opportunities? changes clearly are desirable and necessary, everybody BOTHA: They can never do what you are talking about knows it is not going to happen today or tomorrow. now as long as that system is there ... BOTHA: It amazes me that it is difficult to divest from South SOLARZ: If the gentleman will yield, look at it from the Africa. The U.S. finds it very easy to divest in other instances. other point of view. The examples you cited were Cuba, It divested from Cuba, from China for 25 years; it divested China, and perhaps Vietnam. We still have an embargo on from Vietnam. Why can't they divest from South Africa? Why Cuba, and the embargo was imposed originally to help bring would they divest from those countries and they can't divest Castro down, but 20 years and five American presidents from South Africa? later he is still in. SOLARZ: I can give you a long political analysis as to why it In China it was imposed because we didn't like the Com- is not possible. The problem is essentially political, not eco- munist regime in Beijing. Thirty-two years later they are still nomic. It is certainly not in the cards not to do business with there. Of course, the embargo has been lifted, but it didn't South Africa, because, I think, it is unrealistic to expect the do very much good, apparently, and I think the same is true United States to be more catholic than the pope on this with Vietnam. decision. What I think Mrs. Fenwick is trying to suggest is that while A substantial number of African countries—not just those there may be some symbolic value in this divestment, the immediately contiguous, whose economics are completely experience we have had in imposing these embargoes is dependent on South Africa, but many other African coun- they don't really produce the results they were originally tries, whose economies are not inextricably tied into South intended to. You consume an enormous amount of political Affrica—do business with it as well. energy trying to achieve an objective that ultimately will I think so long as they continue to do business with South have limited consequences. That doesn't mean if you are Africa it is unlikely we can persuade the U.S. Congress to concerned about the situation in South Africa you should do prohibit Americans from doing business with South Africa. nothing, but it does suggest we perhaps ought to look for BOTHA: But those countries depend entirely on South Af- other ways of influencing the future course of events in rica for their economy. South Africa than thwarting the business efforts in this SOLARZ: I exempted the southern African states in my country that are represented in South Africa to obstruct statement. I pointed out other countries that also do busi- such legislation. • AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 45 PERSONAL OPINION Africa Between Republican and Democratic Administrations By ALI A. MAZRUI o African observers the difference nign neglect as an appropriate policy Another possible characteristic of a T between Republicans and Demo- for black Americans. Henry Kissinger Republican administration is likely to crats in the American political system extended the policy of benign neglect to be a reduction of foreign aid to Africa, sometimes appears to be relatively cover blacks everywhere. except to those countries that are re- marginal. But do African observers un- And then, one fine morning, the garded as strategically critical in terms derestimate the real difference between Russians and the Cubans were in An- of East-West relations. Foreign aid is Reagan and Carter, between Democrats gola. The Portuguese empire had col- not very popular in Congress anyhow and Republicans? lapsed and the so-called power vacuum — whatever administration is in power. Some of the differences are in terms in Angola was apparently about to be Among Western powers, the United of nuance and style. Curiously enough, filled by the Soviets. A major shift in States is among the meanest in percent- American policy towards Africa under the policy of the Republican adminis- age of gross national product given to a Republican administration is likely to tration took place. A new interest in foreign aid. The United States comes be very similar to Chinese policy to- solving the problems of southern Af- after Holland, Sweden, France, Bri- wards Africa since the 1970s. Beijing's rica emerged. Before long Kissinger tain, Norway, and some others. The African policy has been almost com- was off on another mission in shuttle United States is also well below the pletely based on Beijing's anti-Soviet diplomacy — this time designed to contributions made by several members policy. If the Soviet Union backs one pre-empt the Russians in Rhodesia and of the Organization of Petroleum Ex- political faction in a particular African solve the problem there before it was porting Countries. Both Democrats and country, China immediately considers too late. To everyone's surprise, Kis- Republicans in Congress are responsi- backing the opposing faction almost re- singer seemed to have done it again: he ble for this poor American perfor- gardless of the issues involved. China's achieved a breakthrough with Ian Smith mance. But when we judge by the per- favorites in black Africa are at times the and got him to accept the idea of formance of the executive branch. Re- same as South Africa's favorites — negotiating for majority rule. The in- publican administrations tend to be less ranging from such right-wing dissi- itiative was then passed on to the enthusiastic about foreign aid than dents as Jonas Savimbi in Angola to British, who bungled it all with weak Democratic presidents. such unpopular regimes as Mobutu leadership at a conference in Geneva. Perhaps African White House Sese Seko's government in Zaire. Britain was then under a Labour gov- watchers should bt more discerning A Republican administration in the ernment. after all. There may be more difference United States is likely to have an Africa It took a British Conservative gov- between Jimmy Carter and Ronald policy that, to some extent, is al- ernment under Margaret Thatcher to Reagan than meets the African eye. most a mirror reflection of China's match Henry Kissinger's earlier With the help of efficient political bin- policy — a tendency to look at African breakthrough in Rhodesia. But whereas oculars there should be no risk of mis- issues neither on their merits nor from Kissinger's perspective on the issue had taking one for the other. the perspective of direct U.S.-African been almost entirely in terms of East- relations, but from the perspective of West relations, Margaret Thatcher was U.S.-Soviet relations. also concerned about North-South re- This tendency was certainly strong in lations, especially between black Af- the days of Nixon, Ford, and Kissinger. rica and Great Britain and within the Kissinger thought of the world as a broader framework of Commonwealth five-sided structure consisting of West- relations. Nigeria especially was brea- ern Europe. North America, the Soviet thing heavily down Thatcher's neck: Union, China, and Japan. The rest of and Nigeria's breath smelled of petrol. the world only mattered to the extent to Anti-Soviet as her government might which it affected relations among these itself have been, the Tories looked at five major actors. Senator Daniel Pat- Zimbabwe/Rhodesia as an African rick Moynihan once recommended be- problem and not merely as a pawn in East-West relations. This was a major Dr. Mazrui is professor of political sci- difference from the perspectives of the ence and director of the Center for President-elect Ronald Reagan: Policy Afro-American and African Studies at Republican administrations under towards Africa is likely to be "almost a the University of Michigan. Nixon, Ford, and Kissinger. mirror reflection of China's policy" 46 AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 stained. Africa, after Olympio's mur- der, braced itself for an era of military coups. America braced itself for the era of Vietnam and its aftermath. Lyndon Johnson's administration did not even try to revive the entente cordiale between Africa and the United States. Johnson was a great friend of American blacks but he was no special friend of Africa. Domestically his policies on the great society helped to expand significantly the economic op- portunities and electoral weight of Afro-Americans. But U.S. policy to- wards newly independent black Africa became increasingly apathetic. Foreign aid took a dramatic tum downwards. The U.S. military involvement in 1964 in the Stanleyville hostage rescue oper- ation in the Congo neutralized some of the goodwill America had gained by supporting the Congo's territorial in- Former South African Prime Minister Vorster with Henry Kissinger: Angolan war prompted a new interest in southern Africa's problems tegrity. Johnson's war in Vietnam also alarmed a number of African leaders. Jimmy Carter had a number of the Congo (and now Zaire). Kennedy's After Johnson the Republicans took "firsts" in his career. Amongthemwas administration did Africa a favor by over. Suffice it to say that Washington the fact that he was the first American insisting on the territorial integrity of remained relatively indifferent until the president to have visited black Africa the Congo — in the face of attempts by military coup in Portugal in April 1974 while in office. He visited Nigeria and the province of Katanga to secede. On and the consequent collapse of the Liberia in 1978. Partly because of that issue the United States differed Portuguese empire in Africa. that, West Africans especially followed from several of its Western allies (in- Jimmy Carter and Andrew Young Carter's short presidential career with cluding Belgium, France, and to some later began to pick up the pieces of added interest. extent Britain). The Kennedy adminis- U.S.-African relationships. Policy on Twenty years ago it was John F. tration found itself in accord with radi- southern Africa began to be more sen- Kennedy, another Democrat, who was cal African states and with the Soviet sitive to human rights. Relations with campaigning for election. 1960 was not Union. Nigeria were improved. Foreign aid only the year when John F. Kennedy On the other hand, the United States was still meagre, though that was partly was elected president, it was also the was not happy with radicalism within the fault of Congress. year when over 15 African countries the Congo itself. Kennedy continued And then Andrew Young, partly in became independent and thus became the Eisenhower policy of backing Con- response to the pro-Israeli lobby in the members of the United Nations. The golese conservatives like President United States, was ousted after being two events together — Kennedy's Kasavubu and opposing the nationalist compromised in the company of a election and Africa's independence — legacy of former Prime Minister Patrice Palestinian, an official of the Palestine seemed to set a new stage for U.S.- Lumumba, who was murdered in the Liberation Organization. Some Afri- African relations. The torch seemed to Congo almost as soon as Kennedy took cans interpreted this to mean that Africa have been passed to a new generation of office in Washington. was being put in its place. Andrew both Africans and Americans. Then came 1963. If 1960 was the Young was a valuable asset for U.S.- The Kennedy years were a kind of year of the dual promise of Kennedy's African policy, but Africa was not im- honeymoon for Africa and the United election and Africa's independence, portant enough to outweigh an embar- States. Aided by a major figure from 1963 was the year of dual assassination. rassment in U.S. policy towards Israel. Michigan, Mennen Williams. Kennedy It was in that year that independent Af- Young had to go. began to formulate a doctrine of "Af- rica experienced its first presidential as- Since those Kennedy days a lot of rica for the Africans" as a basis of his sassination, the killing of President water has passed under the African- administration's policy towards Africa. Sylvanus Olympio in Togo. It was also American bridge. The water was Mennen Williams traveled in Africa in 1963 that the United States sustained sometimes mixed with the blood of as- reaffirming precisely that message, to the shock of John F. Kennedy's assas- sassinated leaders. It remains to be seen the indignation of many white settlers sination. The dual promise of Africa's what other bridges need to be crossed in in eastern and southern Africa. independence and the New Frontier of U.S.-African relations in the years The first test came in what was then the United States was now blood- ahead. • AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 47 DOCUMENT Africa in World Development Extracted from World Development Report of the World Bank Sub-Saharan Africa disappointing, both in the middle- of merchandise exports (though income and in the low-income not all are suitable for processing; Most of the countries in the region countries (see Table 7.1). The two see page 23). In some countries became independent in the 1960s. groups are distinguished mainly exports have stagnated because of They inherited acute deficiencies by differences in natural resources poor domestic agricultural perform- in skills, institutions and general rather than in economic structure, ance; many more have had to education; overcoming these has institutional development or hu- increase their food imports. Grain been a major concern of most of man skills. GNP per person (which, imports into Sub-Saharan Africa their governments. Progress has in the absence of reliable infor- rose from about 1.6 to 2.6 million been considerable, yet severe mation on the large subsistence tonnes between 1965 and 1975 (and shortcomings remain. The region's sector, can be measured only ap- the US Department of Agriculture experience illustrates that human proximately) either fell or grew projects a rise to 4.5 million tonnes and institutional development are less than 1 percent a year in 11 by 1985). long, slow processes—their neglect countries during 1960-78; it rose The importance of agriculture today is not easily overcome to- more than 3 percent a year in four goes far beyond its effect on trade. morrow. And while they are countries. (Some of these meager As the region most dependent on costly, so is their neglect: as the gains have been wiped out by analysis of Chapters 4 and 5 would deteriorating terms of trade.) predict, educational and institu- Agriculture has been almost uni- tional deficiencies coexist with low formly sluggish; food output per Figure 7.2 Literacy, by region, 1945-75 life expectancy, high fertility, in- person appears to have declined efficient investment and slow agri- in 25 countries (mainly in the Adult HltTaqt 'alt * cultural progress. Sahel) between 1969-71 and 1976-78. midiile-intome Growth The constraints that hampered so The growth of incomes has been growth in the past have not eased 70 much. The discouraging prospects for growth in both low- and middle- 60 The tables and text reprinted income African countries—and here with permission of the the resulting likelihood of an in- World Bank are excerpts from crease in the proportion of people 52 the World Banks World Devel- in absolute poverty—were de- 40 opment Report 1980. Refer- scribed in Chapter 2 (page 11). ences to other chapters and How the international economy 30 pages in the report are made in affects African countries will de- the text that follows. Those in- 20 terested may obtain copies of pend on aid levels and on primary the report in its entirety from commodity prices, but importantly 10 Oxford University Press in New on their own actions as well. The York for $13.50 hardcover and potential gains from processing $5.75 paper. primary products for export remain 0 largely untapped. Primary products l«40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 typically account for 80-100 percent i. Trends before I960 are approximate 48 AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 Figure 7.1 GNP per person, agriculture—the main activity of that aid donors, especially in the 1960, l°70 and 1980 more than 70 percent of its 360 first half of the 1980s, should U977 dollars) million people—accelerating growth substantially increase their efforts and reducing poverty and malnu- to help African governments trition in Africa depend more than avoid such false economies (while 1,847 anywhere else on improved agri- maintaining the already very low cultural performance. Evidence that consumption levels of most of / farmer literacy affects the adoption their people). of new farming methods (see page Poverty / 48) has obvious implications for that improvement. But the prob- Given the trend in average incomes 1,398 lem is clearly much wider. Modern (particularly in agriculture), the agricultural "packages" (of seeds, proportion of the population living // fertilizers and cultivation tech- in absolute poverty has probably 1,140^ /x niques) have yet to be developed increased in many countries since / L.Hn b for many African localities and the early 1960s; in 1975 an esti- 1,036 America subsistence crops. Agricultural mated half of the people in the programs generally have not re- region were absolutely poor. Most flected the considerable role that are subsistence and small-scale 781 A African women play in agriculture. farmers, but in some countries 679 683 Middle Easl and And there are basic deficiencies (such as Somalia) a sizable pro- N.Africa1' in credit, infrastructure, agricultural portion are nomads. As compared incentives, extension services and with the low-income countries of 399j Sub-Saharan market integration (the World Asia, poor agricultural conditions Africa11 Development Report, 1978 consid- and farming methods are a more \ ered in more detail the require- important cause of low agricul- 222 164 ments for faster growth in Africa). tural incomes than unfavorable 125 \ 147 In large measure these deficien- land-man ratios. South Asia cies reflect institutional weak- Human development issues 1960 1970 1980 nesses and the related scarcity of experienced, trained people. Nor Despite substantial gains since Afghanistan. Urael and Turkey arc their effects confined to agri- 1960, life expectancy remains be- t Excludes ipntrally planned eionomics (China. Lai>s. Cambodia, North Korea and Virtnjml culture. In several countries a sig- low 50 and adult literacy rates d EM ludes Suulh Africa and Nigeria nificant industrial sector is already below 25 percent in most coun- emerging, but the scarcity and high tries. Both are generally below cost of suitably skilled labor and expected values for countries at management remain major im- their income levels. For example, Figure 7.3 Life expectancy, pediments to African industriali- the norm for life expectancy I960 and 1978" zation. Yean (Figure 7.4) is about 50 years for While administrative weaknesses countries with average incomes of will take time to overcome, the about $350; but Senegal, with that effectiveness of many programs income level, has a life expectancy is also hampered by difficulties in of only 42 years. Africa is the only financing operating costs, espe- region where fertility still shows cially for materials and supplies. no sign of decline—women surviving Progress could be more rapid if to the end of their child-bearing aid donors were to relax their years average 6 to 8 children. And traditional preference for funding it is the only region where nutrition capital rather than operating costs. has steadily worsened. In addition, there is a serious danger that economic stringency FERTILITY. The contribution in the next few years will lead to that slower population growth can cutbacks in human development make to raising incomes is par- programs, despite the importance ticularly marked in Africa. The of their contribution—often ex- region's high infant mortality and ceeding that of additional physical low adult literacy are major investment—to Africa's long-term reasons that population growth a. Weighted by population. Excludes S Atrici. Cambodia and Israel. development potential. It is essential remains high. AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 49 Studies in Nigeria and Tanzania Figure 7.4 Sub-Saharan Africa: life expectarcy in relation to income found that education among wives per person, 1978 reduced fertility and infant mortality Llh t If'i'i III lli U iVt'iir —though some studies in Africa have suggested that the initial im- pact of schooling (by increasing health and fecundity sooner than it reduces desired family size) may 55 — be to increase fertility. The con- Kenya trast between Kenya and Lesotho Tanzania • Lesotho is also suggestive: among African 50 Sierra Leone * countries, they both have better- than-average records of literacy, Ivory Coast life expectancy and child death Sudan Congo Togo Cameroon 45 — rates—yet Kenya has the highest Madagascar fertility rate in Africa and Lesotho Malawi Mauritania the lowest. Data from the early 'Senegal 1960s show that in Kenya many ' Angola more men than women were lit- erate, while in Lesotho it was the Elhiopia Upper Volta other way round. I I I I I That is unlikely to be the whole oL 0 200 300 400 500 000 700 800 explanation, of course; other pos- GNP per pertint Iturrent tii-Uur> sible reasons include the migration a. Derived from cross-country equation relating life expectancy to CNP per person of men from Lesotho to South Africa, and differences in cultural values—which are strongly pronatal the low-income countries (and developing countries on this count. in many parts of Africa, so that (in could be financed to some degree For them, the key issue is not contrast to other regions) desired by a reallocation of government increasing education's share of the family size often exceeds its actual expenditure away from urban hos- budget but (as in other African size. pitals); but since it is administra- countries) using funds more ef- Partly for this reason, and partly tively demanding, progress is likely fectively, improving educational because of the virtual absence in to be slow. quality and tackling serious prob- most countries of a primary health A few countries such as Mali, lems of dropout and wastage. care network onto which family Kenya and Tanzania have begun Costs are a major obstacle to planning programs could be grafted, to establish the necessary admin- raising enrollment and school such programs in Africa have been istrative structure. Village health quality in Africa: costs per pupil few and feeble. Extending and workers can be trained cheaply, as a percentage of GNP per person strengthening family planning as has been demonstrated in are the highest of all regions. Com- efforts, however, would cause an Niger; but a study of Mali's health pared with Asia, this ratio in West earlier and faster decline in fertility. system noted that "at the village Africa is more than twice as high level, the most serious manpower for primary, five times for second- HEALTH. Primary health care constraint is the near total lack ary and seven times for tertiary can be provided inexpensively of literate people who can be education. The high cost largely (about $2-3 a person) in some of trained as village health workers." reflects the fact that teacher salaries (which typically account for 75 EDUCATION. Typically, educa- percent of educational costs) are Table 7,,1 Sub-Saharan Africa: tion accounts for 15-25 percent of high in relation to average incomes. GNP per person the budget and 3-6 percent of In Upper Volta (which has the Average annual GNP; less than half the total is for lowest literacy rate in Africa—5 percentage growth Level, primary education. Recent growth percent) teachers' salaries are 24 Countries 1900-70 1970-80 I9t>0-80 tJollar>i in school enrollment has been times larger than GNP per person, Low- impressive, particularly in Benin, compared with less than four income 1.6 0.2 O.o 186 times in Liberia. High salaries for Middle- Congo, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, income !7 2 1'- 1." 493 Somalia and Zambia. These coun- all educated people are partly a Nolt: Excludes South Africa. tries spend more than 5 percent colonial legacy; but the main cause a. 1977 prices. of their GNP on education and has been a shortage of qualified b. If oil-exporting Nigeria is excluded, this figure falls to 1.5 percent are in the top 25 percent of all teachers, which is now starting to 50 AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 ease. Salaries have fallen in real percent, respectively, between be with better economic policies, terms in several countries, includ- I960 and 1975. Such programs, since Sub-Saharan Africa badly ing Benin, Tanzania and Sierra however, lack the socializing needs more people with professional, Leone. effects of school attendance. There scientific and administrative skills. There are various other ways of is also a risk that literacy skills Their shortage has been one of making education less expensive may decay if they are acquired in the biggest brakes on development without making it worse, as dis- circumstances that do not require projects—as reviews of World cussed in Chapters 5 and 6. In their frequent use. This argues for Bank project experience amply some countries, such as Nigeria programs that are not too brief testify. But African countries also and Sierra Leone, average class and have an emphasis on such need to train them more econom- sizes are small enough (about 30 practical subjects as numeracy, ically (see page 50) in order both pupils) to be raised without much hygiene, nutrition, family planning to increase their supply and to adverse effect on quality (see box and agriculture. release resources for primary school- on page 52). In Togo local com- There are politically difficult ing and other human development munities pay part of teachers' choices to be made in higher edu- programs. salaries; in Somalia and Tanzania cation. Governments often give Despite the conspicuous scarcities, they contribute to construction stipends as well as free education there is concern about incipient costs. to university (and sometimes even unemployment among secondary- While school enrollments have secondary) students. Many govern- school graduates in some countries. risen markedly, few countries have ments have also felt obliged to This reflects the fact that job require- tried to deal with the large backlog guarantee jobs to all university ments and expectations tend to of illiterate adults. Literacy cam- graduates—in activities whose change more slowly than the supply paigns that relied on students, productivity does not always match of qualified people (see box on volunteers and government ser- their salaries. Secondary and higher page 51). But as graduates find vants were mounted in Somalia education is thus a doubly serious it harder to get jobs, they will be and Tanzania, with spectacular drain on budgets; and its social likelier to respond to the needs of success: literacy rates are estimated returns have been pushed well the economy for more people to to have risen from 2 percent and below the private returns to indi- work in rural areas as extension 10 percent to bO percent and 66 viduals—and below what they might agents, teachers and administrators. Figure 4.1 Three decades against poverty Income CNP per person (1980 dollars) 1 $50 woe 19K0 0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 t>,000 7,000 8,000 9,000 Industrial iied countries Industrialized countries 3,84! 5,107 0,O84 Middle-income countries 625 802 1,521 Low-income countries 164 174 245 Average annual growth iprrttnii 1950-tO Industrialized countries 3.1 3,2 Middle-income countries 2.5 3,3 Low-income countries 0.6 1,7 a. Excludes all centrally planned economic Population IoUl population (billions) II - 100 million people Developed countries" I9CO-70 1980 tmttmt! Industrialized countries 1.2 1.0 0.7 2000 mmiimi Middle-income countries 2.4 2.5 2.5 Middle-income countries" 1930 Low-income countries 1.9 2.5 2.3 •MMMffl 2000 Centrally planned TtrtttttTttTTTfi economies 1.9 1.7 1,3 Low-income countries 1980 tmttmtHNttttt a. Includes Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German DR, Hungary. 2000 Poland, Romania, USSR NNtmtimtttm b. Includes Albania, Cuba. North Korea, Mongolia c. Includes China AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 51 sary) to enter into partnership agree- ments with African governments in de- velopment schemes, contrasting its support with the behavior of older, more entrenched MNCs in different countries. One concern is with how Lonrho has developed and expanded, the means by Books which it has established (or attempted to establish) itself in African states. Lonrho worked one way in white-ruled societies where capitalist mores and conventions were well established—in Rhodesia and South Africa, and in re- lations with Portuguese Mozambique. THE MULTINATIONALS Corporation, the British-based MNC Here the expansion of Lonrho's inter- CONTROVERSY: whose spectacular growth in sub- ests, from a minor ranching corporation EXPLOITATION OR sidiaries in Africa in the 1960s and in Rhodesia into mining, agrobusiness DEVELOPMENT? 1970s attracted wide attention. It is a (mainly sugar plantations and refining), wide-ranging book that takes the reader and various services followed fairly into the manifold activities, behavior, conventional lines. However, Lonrho and corporate and political relation- also expanded into virtually all the Suzanne Cronje, Margaret Ling, Gil- ships of a company operating in widely English-speaking states of East Africa lian Cronje, The Lonrho Connections: diverse sectors and environments. The (Malawi, Tanzania, Kenya, and A Multinational and Its Politics in Af- foci of the book are many and not al- Uganda), the Sudan, and major areas in rica, Encino, Cal.: Bellwether Books, ways drawn together tightly. The book West Africa (Ghana, Nigeria, and 1976, 316 pages, $15 cloth. is organized around how Lonrho devel- Ivory Coast), while also attempting to oped and spread from its early Rhode- expand into Zaire and elsewhere. The Thomas Biersteker, Distorfion or De- sian base, sectors of Lonrho invest- chief executive, Tiny Rowlands, has velopment?: Contending Perspectives ments (e.g., mining and agrobusiness), cultivated and capitalized upon per- on the Multinational Corporation, its expansion into different areas of Af- sonal relationships with African leaders Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978, 199 rica, its corporate behavior and in- and members of the rising comprador pages, $17.50 cloth. tracompany conflicts, the contrasts bourgeoisie in many African states. He between its investments in white-ruled has offered the ability of Lonrho to These are two very different but val- Rhodesia and South Africa on the one mobilize capital, technology, and man- uable contributions to the small but hand and its posture as a friend of Afri- agerial capacities in order to create growing literature on the activities and can development in black-ruled states large-scale development projects— impact of multinational corporations on the other, and certain major and am- sugar plantations and refineries in (MNCs) in Africa. The study of the bitious projects of Lonrho, e.g., its Malawi, Sudan, and the Ivory Coast, behavior and impact of MNCs in devel- serving as a consultant to the Organiza- railways in Malawi and Zaire (both fell oping countries has animated substan- tion of African Unity (OAU) and its through), and the organization of oil tial controversy as radical and Marxist interest in strategic railway building in transport and refining for all OAU analysts, drawing in large part on the southern Africa, where the colonial ec- countries (a prospect that backfired). dependency and underdevelopment lit- onomic and transportation grid has More important, Tiny Rowlands has erature on Latin America, have argued locked states into South Africa's eco- frequently contrived to arrive on the in recent years that MNCs have tended nomic sphere of influence. scene under timely political circum- to generate underdevelopment rather Linking these subjects is a series of stances—in Malawi immediately fol- than development in African soci- concerns that dwell pointedly on the lowing its independence, in Sudan at eties — in terms of economic, social, character and impact of MNCs in Af- the time of the 1971 coup attempt to and political capabilities. The Lonrho rica. However, the authors do not really overthrow Gen. Numeiry (when the Connections contributes to this critique generalize from Lonrho and acknowl- Lonrho jet was placed at the disposal of of MNCs, though Biersteker's Distor- edge that Lonrho is in some senses those rallying to Numeiry), at the OAU tion or Development? does so even atypical, in part because it has been as it confronted the economic disaster more effectively by its careful testing of quite willing to take political risks in its of quadrupled oil prices in 1973-74 and radical and conventional theories re- investments (indeed, has acquired a as its staff was casting about for some garding the impact of MNCs. number of its subsidiaries at somewhat ways to cope with the economic costs. What was crucial was not only the tim- The Lonrho Connections, by several discount prices from others who feared ing but the personal linkages Rowland women researchers and a journalist, is a the winds of change), in part because of developed with African political and readable, critical study of the Lonrho its greater willingness (where neces- 52 AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 economic leaders. Such linkages are Malawi, Zambia, and Mozambique, as arguments of the critics and neocon- the sinews by which MNCs create ves- the latter two sought to avoid continu- ventionals. He assesses the theses in ted class interests among Africa's po- ing economic relations with Rhodesia four major areas of the impact of litical and economic elites, tying them under sanctions and white rule. MNCs: the impact on international lo the muscle of international capital. Another concern throughout the capitalist movements (inflows vs. out- One sees the competition between sec- book is to delineate the character of flows); the displacement of indigenous tors of international capital, but perhaps corporate behavior, which in Lonrho is production (artisanal, firm, market, loo liltle attention is devoted to ihe fact not atypical: the "unacceptable face of and preemptive displacement); tech- that African leaders often perceive capitalism" (the British prime minis- nology transfer and consequent pat- common temporary interests with ter's phrase) in its payments and hold- terns of consumption (extent and ap- MNCs and have then moved to cut ing companies in the lax-exempt propriateness of technology transfers, wholly or refashion these ties in their Bahamas; ihe wealth and privileges of appropriateness of induced patterns of own interests when circumstances the corporate elite as compared with consumption); and social stratification seemed more appropriate. Lonrho has austerity in Britain, poverty in Africa; and inequality (e.g., extent of support had to cope with nationalizations in the extensive interlocking of corporate of allied indigenous comprador Malawi, Zambia, Tanzania. Uganda, ties, holding companies, and dummy bourgeoisie elements, contributions to and Ghana and indigenization measures corporations by which corporate income inequality and widening of in Nigeria. holdings are concealed; and the se- elite-mass gaps). A second concern is lo demonstrate crecy and wheeling and dealing of cor- Biersteker then compares the argu- how MNCs that appear to concern porate elites. ments of the critics and neoconven- themselves with African development A last major concern, and one in tional. noting carefully arguments that — and few have protested their virtues which the authors are only peripherally are matched and contrasting, mis- as energetically as Lonrho - perceive successful, is to suggest that the con- matched and not addressed by one side no conflict between this and continu- tributions of MNCs like Lonrho to de- or the other, or simply not raised. The ing to amass large profits in the velopment are slight. This task is not latter brings out the central and con- white-ruled, racist stales in southern approached systematically, and ihe trasting assumptions of critics and Africa. From the time that Lonrho criteria are conventional: extremely neoconventionals: the critics assume started to stake out investments and low wages in mines in South Africa that in the absence of MNC invest- create subsidiaries in black-ruled and on sugar plantations, low con- ment, local capabilities would exert stales, it was at pains to disguise its tributions to employment, and profit themselves, whereas neoconventionals increasing investments in Rhodesia repatriation. The authors are quite wil- assume that in the absence of MNCs and South Africa, leaving all specifics ling to acknowledge where Lonrho has there simply would not be investment out of annual reports, declaring such appeared to contribute to development, and development at all, an assumption investments were "historic" and in- as in new sugar projects, but little that that permits them to assume further significant. At the same time that is systematic emerges. that any MNC contributions are sig- Lonrho. in 1973-74, was striving to Distortion or Development?, by nificant and worthwhile. offer itself as a consultant to the OAU, Tom Biersteker. a Yale political sci- Biersteker tests the arguments of the and all member stales, lo help them entist, has a much narrower and more critics and neoconventionals with data cope with their oil problems, it was academic focus. It is equally readable, drawn from the manufacturing sectors increasing the number and value of its however, and ultimately a more im- in Nigeria (eliminating, crucially, oil, subsidiaries in Rhodesia. The OAU portant book. In the debate regarding where comparisons with Nigerian secreiary-general's acceptance of the impact of MNCs on development, firms was not possible). Biersteker Lonrho as consultant to (he OAU radical critics and conventional draws upon data from industrial sur- created an enormous controversy be- apologists o\' MNC behavior have veys, the central bank, and extensive cause of Lonrho's southern African tended to talk past one another, though interviews with MNC subsidiaries and interests, the ending of the Lonrho radical critics have been much more Nigerian firms, primarily in four sec- consultancy, and the resignation of the energetic in testing for the alleged de- tors — textiles, cement, sawmilling, OAU secretary-general. The authors velopment contributions of MNCs. and sugar refining — for 60 firms for also investigate at some length the Biersteker has performed the ex- the years 1963-72; though he also contrast between Lonrho's support for tremely valuable task of lucidly setting makes use of incomplete data from two development in African states and the forth the major theses of critics and other areas (tobacco and beer brew- successful efforts of its Rhodesian sub- neoconventional proponents of MNCs ing), he actually has complete data for sidiaries to avoid the UN sanctions (the neoconventional advocates recog- only slightly more than half the 60 against Rhodesia, contributing to nize fewer virtues of MNCs than the firms for the 10 years. Biersteker's Rhodesia's resistance to black rule. conventional ones do. Biersteker testing of his data is careful and sensi- The authors devote a full chapter to clearly outlines (chapters I and 2) the tive. He deals with the assumptions of Lonrho's interest in the strategic trans- mechanisms of MNC behavior and the critics and neoconventionals by portation system in southern Africa, first- and second-order consequences examining the possibilities for alterna- which created so much difficulty for of MNC investments in terms of the tives in Nigeria in the absence of AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 53 MNCs in these fields. First he notes more frequently correct in their as- Biersteker's effort is the most com- Nigeria's substantial population and sessment of the impact of MNCs but plete testing of crucial theses on the large internal market, the relative skills that their theories are better in that they impact of MNCs that I have seen. and education levels of its people, the provide a larger number of new facts, There are numerous criticisms that one country's relative wealth and savings, discoveries, and useful generaliza- could make. I think that the most im- and its historical production. The tions. His tests with Nigerian data con- portant is that in breaking down the "what-if" problem regarding what clude that MNCs in manufacturing arguments of the critics for testing would be done by Nigerians in the ab- contribute to a net outflow of capital, them, he never puts them together sence of MNCs is posed by whose consequences are less serious again. Therefore, his own conclusions Biersteker's examining the response of for Nigeria with its petrodollars than it lose much of their force, for the critics eastern Nigerians (in Biafra) when, would be for most African countries; — radical and Marxist — link their during the civil war, they were cut off generate artisan and preemptive dis- theses, much of which are here sub- from MNCs and crucial imports. He placement oi' production, some of stantiated, into a total critique of the finds that Biafrans maintained existing market displacement, none of firm pattern of development, and of industrial establishments with local re- displacement (which does occur in capitalist development, and of the way sources and adapted and created new Latin America); do contribute to tech- in which power and social forces in the technologies, developed an extensive nology transfers; do employ more in- society work to benefit the relative few weapons industry of a conventional appropriate (because capital intensive) at the expense of the many. Nonethe- and innovative kind, and demonstrated technologies, though the differences less, this effort is highly original, hon- the capability to develop an advanced are not great, thus contributing to un- est, rigorous, and exceptionally clear technology to refine petroleum for employment; introduce inappropriate and readable. Biersteker points out their own purposes and on a large consumption patterns, often following where both critics and neoconventional scale. Thus, he is convinced that in the lead, however, of Nigerian firms proponents of MNCs must think Nigeria there exist alternatives to and government; and require and sup- through their arguments more clearly. MNCs. port local comprador groups in in- This is undoubtedly a landmark book Biersteker concludes from his tests vestment, trade, and the state and by in the field. of the theses of critics and neoconven- paying higher salaries in most sectors Jon Kraus tionals not only that the critics are much do contribute to inequalities. SUNY/Fredonia The University of Michigan Mangedwa Nyathi AN A Mairul ( Student Member! (Chairperson) Valerie Mims Qtcsr Qiah (Student Membor) (Associate Chairperson) Leonard Suransky Eaward Dougherty (Coordinator) David F Gordon Murray Jackson Consultants Miriam Mauler Richard Porter Ban Yablonky Jo«l Samoff Committee on Southern flfric a Raymond Tanter THE RE-CREATION OF ZIMBABWE: PROSPECTS FOR EDUCATION AND RURAL RECONSTRUCTION FEBRUARY 4-6, 1981 These themes will be broadly interpreted, the educational thrust embracing both secondary and post-secondary education and including adult, community, technical, agricultural and informal education; and the rural thrust focusing on issues such as the re-apportionment of land, up- grading the former "tribal trustlands," agricultural strategies, and the re-settlement of refugees. The conference will begin with a socio-political overview of the first year of Zimbabwe's inde- pendence. The meeting which will be intimate and informal in nature, specifically geared to an audience familiar with Southern Africa, is to be held in the Michigan League, at the Ann Arbor campus of The University of Michigan, Wednesday to Friday, February 4-6, 1981. The committee invites late submissions on the above themes. We request that prospective participants submit to us two copies of a two-page summary of their intended presentations, a preferred title for it, and a copy of their resume. In addition please include instructions about any audiovisual or other apparatus that may be needed. Materials should be sent to the ZIMBABWE MINI-CONFERENCE SELECTION COMMITTEE at the above address by January 10th, 1981. Conference accommodation can be booked directly at The Bell Tower Hotel, 300 South Thayer, Ann Arbor, MI. 48104, (313-769-3010) at $28 (single) and $36 (double) per night (please mention the Zimbabwe Conference when booking). 54 AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 Letter to the Editor Serapiao Criticizes Review about the assimilados-mesticos. Does Tempo, the issue of race in Mozam- he think that there are no blacks bique is even becoming inter- Allen isaacman's review of my book among the assimilado-mestico group? nationalized. Foreigners have bluntly Mozambique in the Twentieth Century His apparent misapprehension is re- asked white ministers and mulattoes (Africa Report, September-October vealed when he stresses my "obses- heading Mozamibican delegations ab- 1980) demands a reply because of er- sion" with the race issue because I road the following questions: "Are you rors and innuendos that misrepresent refer to assimitados and mesticos try- really representing Mozambique? Are both me and the reality of Mozambique ing to neutralize Frelimo's socialist ef- you really a Mozambican? But are today. Isaacman says that it is incor- forts and because I observe (rightly) there no blacks in Mozambique?" rect to talk about "black revolution in that Frelimo's leadership comes from {Tempo, August 17, 1980, p. 35). Mozambique against Portugal" be- assimilado-mestico group. It is rather On the issues of regionalism and cause the expression "black revolu- quite simply a statement of fact. tribalism in Mozambique, the reviewer tion" connotates racism — the enemy Isaacman's reference to Mondlane, ascribes to me "an essentially un- being colonialism, not whites. To this Machel, and others as evidence that I documented claim of powerful tribal assertion I must remind the reviewer somehow thought that blacks were and regional animosities and tensions" that I clearly defined the enemy as col- excluded from Frelimo's leadership (his words). To this allegation I must onialism by saying "the enemy was not because this leadership came from reply that there are not today in Mo- the Portuguese people, nor the Por- assimilado-mestico group demon- zambique "powerful tribal animos- tuguese settlers in Mozambique but strates his misunderstanding of the ities," nor did I assert that there the colonial system" (p. 90). I quoted concept of assimilado-mestico. The were. Indeed I denied that such things President Machel (p. 91) when he reviewer contends that I maintained existed in Mozambique, when, as an reasserted that it was not the whites that Frelimo's leadership comes from example, I compared Mozambique who were the true enemy: "to shoot a "somewhat privileged racial class with Kenya or Nigeria (p. 160). The Portuguese soldier who surrenders or group and was distinctly different from existence of regionalism, on the other deserts would be a crime as taking a the majority of the militants." This is hand, I clearly documented (p. 162, ft. knife to a comrade." To analyze Mo- neither what I wrote nor intended to nt. 6). May I remind the reviewer that zambique as a black country where convey. This is rather his misinterpre- like all Mozambicans I am perfectly blacks are trying to solve their prob- tation which arises again from Isaac- aware of these problems and, unlike lems should not be equated with taking man's confusion in trying to analyze an outsider, I do not need a reminder a racist stance. Although Mozambique the assimilado-mestico concept on ra- as to extraneous evidence required to is a multiracial society. Frelimo's lead- cial terms. The assimilado-mestico substantiate. ers do identify exclusively as blacks in who joined Frelimo pointedly rejected confronting certain issues. Recently, and discarded their privileged status. The review's claims that I did not President Machel challenged that They believed that they no longer be- discuss labor problems in Mozam- Europeans (i.e., whites) do not believe longed to the privileged group like bique ("nowhere is there discussion of that Mozambique can embrace true those assimiiado-mesticos who re- labor migration to South Africa") socialism because blacks are intel- fused to join the revolution. I stated this should be corrected. All these issues lectually incapable of mastering scien- clearly (p. 143) when I noted that are treated in the section on "labor and tific socialism (Tempo, March 30, President Machel admitted that he was racism' (p. 77) and "The significant 1980, p. 7). His wife. Graca Machel, an assimilado in the colonial period role of the liberated zone" (pp. 93- arguing along the same lines as Presi- (Tempo, November 16, 1977, p. 62). 128). dent Machel, reiterated at the women's conference in Copenhagen that some On the whole problem of race in Mo- Finally, Isaacman has tried to repre- people are wondering how those zambique, the reviewer says: "The last sent me as a Salazar and Caetano blacks (Mozambicans) in Africa can voices of nationalism and racism ... sympathizer (for reasons not clear to establish socialism [Tempo. August were thrown out of Frelimo in 1969." me but perhaps best known to himself) 17, 1980, p. 35). Does he mean that those voices by making totally out-of-context quota- ceased to exist after 1969, or only that tions and self-serving interpretations. It is quite erroneous to attribute ra- they were condemned in 1969? Presi- To maintain that I "rehabilitated" two cism to my observation that Frelimo's dent Machel still today condemns ra- former dictators flies in the face of my government had to neutralize mesticos cism in Mozambique (Tempo, March fundamental and deeply-held anti- and assimilados. Here the reviewer 19, 1980, p. 39; Tempo, August 3, colonial stance and ignores all my pre- appears to entertain some confusion 1980, p. 21). In fact, according to vious publications and writings on the AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 55 subject — which unequivocally attest grate splinter groups, his claim that re- his disclaimer, Serapiao's racial ob- to my personal commitment and gionalism was an important factor in session surfaces in the negative qual- adherence to that philosophy. contemporary Mozambique, and the ities he attributes to Mozambicans who emphasis he places on race. Since he happen to be mesticos Imulattoes] Luis Benjamin Serapiao only takes issue with the final two (pp. 149, 150, 152, and 158), and his African Studies and Research points — on regionalism and race — I claim that whites became citizens to Program, will limit my discussion to them. "join mestizos and assimilados to Howard University, Little needs to be said on the ques- thwart Frelimo's programs" (p. 158). Washington, D.C. tion of regionalism which Serapiao Moreover, his discussion of Frelimo's claims he has well documented. His policy toward mesticos and assimi- argument rests in part on a set of lados is also totally inaccurate. Frelimo sweeping regional stereotypes quoted has never identified either group as Allen Isaacman's Response: below: targets to be neutralized. Consistent with its Marxist analysis, it does speak In my recent review of Mozambique These people |from Southern Mozam- of the threat of the "internal bourgeoi- in the Twentieth Century: From Col- bique! came to believe that they have a sie" — which includes Mozambicans onialism to Independence, I acknowl- "civilizing mission" to the rest of the of all racial complexions. Frelimo has country. People from the Center have been unequivocal in its opposition to edged that the inherent difficulties in been eager to excel and have shown writing a national history were com- themselves to be academically orien- any analysis based on race since the pounded in the case of Mozambique tated and quick to voice their opinions split in 1969 when a minority faction by the limited primary research on on national concerns. The people of was expelled from the movement on which to base such a study. Allowing the North can pride themselves on their that issue, among others. This does early and constant resistance to co- not mean :hat racism has been wiped for these difficulties, I nevertheless lonialism: indeed, they have been came to the conclusion that the chap- known to claim that they are the most out in Mozambique, but rather that ters written by Luis Serapiao, unlike courageous people in the country, (p. both the government and the party those of his co-author, Mohammad 160) have mounted an ongoing campaign El-Khawas, lacked coherence, analyti- against it in all its insidious forms. cal rigor, and contributed very little to It is interesting to note that the Finally, the author claims that I un- our knowledge of Mozambique. Speci- documentation he cites to sustain his justly depicted him "as a Salazar and fically, I found the study to be deficient "Southern civilizing mission" claim are Caetano sympathizer (for reasons not in five ways which I will briefly sum- "personal interviews with Mozambican clear to me but perhaps best known to marize. refugees in Lisbon (emphasis mine I, himself) by making totally out of con- Despite its title, the book is neither a August 20, 1978." Whoever these text quotations and self-serving in- history of Mozambique in the twentieth anonymous refugees are, they hardly terpretations." Quoted below are century nor a series of essays on constitute a scientific and reliable Serapiao's statement about Salazar the major events over the past eight source. As to the rest of the quote, and Caetano. I leave it to the reader to years. Nowhere is there a serious dis- neither the fact that Mozambicans make his or her own judgment on this cussion of the broad process of social from the central part of the country are issue: eager to excel academically (as are and economic changes which were a Beiore Salazar, Portugal was a bad fundamental part of the legacy of co- Mozambicans from other parts of the joke in the European Chancellories. lonialism. The author's response that country as well) nor the fact that peo- Her currency was worthless, her army he spent three pages on the labor ple from the north take pride in their an obsolete remnant, her political in- issue misses the point, since this is long tradition of resistance (as do other tegrity nopelessly fragmented and Mozambicans) demonstrates that re- beggared. Yet, within a few years, hardly sufficient to deal with the single Salazar balanced the budget, restored most important aspect of twentieth- gionalism is a factor in Mozambican the currency, started a modern century Mozambican history. My sec- politics. While there have been a few army,and constructed thousands of ond criticism, which is linked to the isolated incidents in the Beira region homes. Salazar had become the Savior previous point, is that Serapiao gives which may have had regional over- of Portugal, (p. 37) disproportionate emphasis to both the tones, as Serapiao claims, given Mo- Serapiao goes on to note: zambique's economic difficulties, re- Later, Salazar would advocate a multi- theories by Portuguese historians on racial society he believed would bring the motivation for Lisbon's expansion peated Rhodesian attacks, and the peace to the colonies. The Portuguese (chapter 1) and to the philosophy and concerted campaign of the Salisbury policy, he once said, was not one of self-justifying ideology of the colonial regime to stir up anti-Frelimo senti- racial superiority, but one of human brotherhood, (p. 39) regime (chapter 2). Almost 40 percent ment, the absence of divisive tenden- of Serapiaos study is devoted to these cies is the clearest indication of how Caetano comes off equally well: successful the new government has Like Salazar, Caetano believed that two subjects which, though of some the objective that brought Portugal to interest, are not nearly as central as been in the process of national build- Mozambique, as well as to other parts many of the social and economic as- ing. of Africa, was not economic profit. He pects of Mozambican history which are emphasized humanitarian reasons and With regard to the vexing issue of especially the expansion of the Christ- not treated. race, Serapiao contends that "it is ian faith, (p. 43) Beyond these two general criti- quite erroneous to attribute racism to Allen Isaacman cisms, I also questioned his "commu- my observations that Frelimo's gov- Department of History and Afro- nication gap thesis" which he used to ernment had to neutralize mesticos American and African Studies, explain the inability of Frelimo to inte- Imulattoes) and assimilados." Despite University of Minnesota 56 AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 Books Received (Inclusion in this list does not preclude the review of a book at a later date) WESTERN AFRICA SOUTHERN AFRICA Anamaleze. John, The Nigerian Press. The People's Conscience7 New Adelman, Kenneth L., African Realities, New York, Crane Russak & Co York. Vantage Press. 1979, $6.95. 142 pp. Inc., 1980 $16.50, 192 pp. Ayandele, E.A.. Nigerian Historical Studies, London, Frank Cass and Co., 1979, $25.00, 294 pp, Bledsoe, Caroline H., Women and Marriage in Kpelle Society, Stanford, SOUTHERN AFRICA California, Stanford University Press, 1980, $16.50, 217 pp. Decalo, Samuel. Historical Dictionary of Niger, Metuchen, N.J., Scarec- Adelman, Kenneth L., African Realities, New York. Crane, Russak & Co,, row Press, Inc.. 1979, $17.50, 376 pp. Inc., 1980. $16.50. 192 pp. Dosumu-Johnson, T.O , Reflections of an African Nationalist, New York, Buthelezi, M. Gatsha, Power is Ours: Buthelezi Speaks on the Crisis in Vantage Press. 1980, $9.95, 301 pp. South Africa, New York, Books in Focus. Inc.. 1979, $12.95, 198 Olaloku, F.A. et at.. Structure of the Nigerian Economy, New York, SI. PP Martin s Press, 1980. $19.95. 260 pp. Carter, Gwendolen M., Which Way is South Africa Going?, Bloomington. Oyedi ran, Oyeleye, Nigerian Government and Politics under Military Rule, Indiana University Press, 1980, $12.95, 162 pp. New York. St. Martins Press. 1979. $25.00. 331 pp. Charton. Nancy, ed., Ciskei, London, Croom Helm Ltd., 1980, $32.50, 247 Sundiata. I.K , Black Scandal. Philadelphia, Institute for the Study of PP Human Issues (ISHI), 1980. $15.00. 230 pp. Child, Daphne, ed., Zulu War Journal, Hamden, Conn.. The Shoe String Press, Inc., 1980. $10 50. 84 pp. Colclough. Christopher and McCarthy, Stephen. The Political Economy ol EASTERN AFRICA Botswana, New York, Oxford University Press, 1980, $34.50, 287 pp. Boesen, J. & A.T. Mohele, The Success Story" of Peasant Tobacco Cornevin, Marianne, Apartheid: Power and Historical Falsification, Paris, Production in Tanzania, Uppsala, Scandinavian Institute ol African UNESCO, 1980, $14.25, 138 pp. Studies, 1980, Skr. 25. 169 pp. Crosby, Cynthia A.. Historical Dictionary of Malawi, Metuchen, New Jer- Falke. Rev. H.. From Uganda with Love, New York. Vantage Press, Inc., sey. Scarecrow Press, Inc.. 1980. $14.00, 280 pp. 1980, $8.95, 201 pp. Greenberg. Stanley B., flace and State in Capitalist Development, New Hazlewood, Arthur, The Economy of Kenya, Oxford. Oxford University Haven, Yale University Press. 1980, $40.00 cloth. $11.50 paper, Press. 1979, $24.50 cloth, $12.95 paper. 204pp. 477 pp. Hyden, Goran, Beyond U/amaa in Tanzania. Berkeley, University o! Lappe, Frances Moore and Beccar-Varela. Adele, Mozambique & Tan- California Press, 1980, $18.50 cloth, $7.50 paper, 280 pp. zania: Asking the Big Questions, San Francisco. Institute for Food Kongstad. Per and Metti Monsted, Family, Labour and Trade in Western and Development Policy, 1980. $4.75, 126 pp. Kenya, Uppsala. Scandinavian Institute of African Studies. 1980. Libby. Ronald T., Toward an Africanized U.S. Policy lor Southern Africa: Skr. 25. 186 pp. A Strategy tor Increasing Political Leverage, Berkeley, University Schneider, Harold K., Livestock and Equality in East Africa: The Eco- of California, 1980, 120 pp. nomic Basis for Social Structure, Bloomington, Indiana University Lye. William F. & Murray, Colin, Transformations on the Highveld: The Press, 1979, $17.50. 301 pp. Tswana and Southern Sotho, Totowa, New Jersey, Barnes & Noble Stein, Leslie, The Growth of East African Exports, Totowa. New Jersey, Books, 1980, $19.50, 154 pp. Croom Helm Ltd., 1979, $28.50, 272 pp. Macaskill. Frederick, In Search of Liberty: Incorporating a Solution to the Swainson, Nicola. The Development of Corporate Capitalism in Kenya: South African Problem, New York, Books in Focus, Inc., 1979, 1918-1977, Los Angeles. University of California Press, 1980, $9.95. 230 pp. $20.00, 320 pp. Martin. Phyllis M.. Historical Dictionary of Angola, Metuchen. New Jersey, The Scarecrow Press, 1980. $11.00, 196 pp. Moodie. T. Dunbar, The Rise of Atrikanerdom, Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1980, $5.95, 348 pp. Morris-Jones, W.H. and Austin, Dennis, ed.. From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe CENTRAL AFRICA (Studies in Commonwealth Politics and History No. 9), Totowa, New Jersey, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1980, $25.00, 123 pp. Kofele-Kale, Ndiva. ed., An African Experiment m Nation Building: Tni Munger. Edwin S., ed., The Afrikaners, Cape Town, Tafelberg Publishers Bilingual Cameroon Republic Since Reunification, 1980, $26.50. Ltd , 1979. R 9.50, 180 pp. 421 pp. Myers, Desaix et al., U.S. Business in South Africa, Bloomington, Indiana Schatzberg, Michael G., Politics and Class in Zaire, New York, Afncana University Press, 1980, $17 50, 375 pp. Publishing Co. 1980, $29.50, 221 pp. Ngubane, Jordan K., Conflict of Minds: Changing Power Dispositions in South Africa, New York. Books in Focus, Inc., 1979, $14.95, 336 pp. Price, Robert M., and Rosberg, Carl G.. eds.. The Apartheid Regime NORTHERN AFRICA (Research Series, No. 43) Berkeley, California. Institute of Inter- national Studies (University of California), 1980. 376 pp. Rotberg, Robert I. and Barratl. John, Conflict and Compromise in South Eidelberg. Paul. Sadat's Strategy, Quebec, Dawn Publishing Co., Ltd., Africa, Lexington, Mass.. Lexington Books, 1980, $22.50, 213 pp. 1979, $3.50, 159 pp. Rotberg, Robert I., Suffer the Future. Cambridge: Harvard University Ling, Dwighl L., Morocco and Tunisia: A Comparative History, Washing- Press, 1980, $15.00, 295 pp. ton. D.C., University Press of America, Inc., $9.00, 213 pp. Seller. John, ed.. Southern Africa Since the Portuguese Coup, Boulder, Waddams, Frank C. The Libyan Oil Industry, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Colorado, Westview Press. 1980, $24.50, 252 pp. University Press, 1980, $30.00, 334 pp. Simson, Howard. The Social Origins of Afrikaner Fascism and its Apart- Woodward, Peter, Condominium and Sudanese Nationalism, New Jersey, heid Policy (Uppsala Studies in Economic History 21) Stockholm: Barnes & Noble Books, 1979, $22.00, 182 pp. Almquist & Wiksell Int'l (Distrib.), 1980, SEK 100, 234 pp, AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 57 Turkalenko, Nikolai, Africa South: Imperialist Plots S Miscalculations, July, Robert W., A History or the African People, third edition. New York, Moscow, Novosli Press Agency, 1979, 75 pp. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1980, $20.00 hardcover, $10.95 pa- Wannenburgh, Atf, The Bushmen, Photography by Petef Johnson & An- perback, 816 pp. thony Bannister, New York, Mayflower Books, 1979, $24.95 Krantz, Grover S.. Climatic Races and Descent Groups, North Quincy. Mass.. Christopher Publishing House, 1980, $14.95, 273 pp. AFRICA GENERAL AND INTERNATIONAL Lappe, Frances Moore & Collins, Joseph with Fowler, Cary, Food First, New York, Ballantine Books, 1978, $2.75. 579 pp. Marnham, Patrick, Fantastic Invasion, New York, Harcourt Brace Albright, David E., ed., Communism m Africa, Bloomrngton. Indiana Uni- Jovanovich, 1980. $10.95, 271 pp. versity Press, 1980, $12.95, 279 pp. Mazmi, Ali, The African Condition, London, Cambridge University Press. Alexander, Yonah & Fnedlander. Robert A., Self-Determination: National, 1980, 138 pp. Regional and Global Dimensions, Boulder, Westview Press, 1980, Miller, Joseph C, ed., The African Past Speaks, Hamden, Conn., Anchor $27.50, 378 pp. Press. 1980, $27.50. 279 pp. Arnold, Guy, Aid in Africa, London: Kogan Page Ltd., 1979, 240 pp. Mohamed, H.E., The Asian Legacy in Africa and the White Man's Color Barongo, Yolamu R., Neocolonialism & African Politics, New York, Van- Culture. New York, Vantage Press, 1979, $8.95, 285 pp. tage Press, Inc., 1980, $7.95, 106 pp. Mwaipaya, Paul A,, The Importance of Quality Leadership in National Biersteker, Thomas J., Distortion or Development? Cambridge, Mas- Development with Special Reference to Africa, New York, Van- sachusetts, MIT Press, 1978, $17.50, 199 pp. tage Press, Inc., 1980, $4.95, 73 pp. Charles, Milene, The Soviet Union and Africa: The History of the Involve- Onyioha, Chief K.O.K., African Godianism, New York, Conch Magazine ment, Lanham, Md., University Press of America, 1980, $18.50 Ltd. (Publishers), 1980, $15.00, 124 pp. hardcover, $9.50 paper, 250 pp. Rembe, Nasila S., Africa & The International Law of the Sea, Al phen aan Chenery, Hollis. Structural Change and Development Policy, New York, den Rijn, The Netherlands, Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980. 237 pp. Oxford University Press, 1979, $14.50 hardcover, $5.95 paper, Rogers, Barbara, The Domestication of Women. New York, St. Martins 544 pp. Press. 1980. $22.50. 199 pp. Chernoff, John Miller, African Rhythm and African Sensibility, Chicago, Scarritt, James R.. ed.. Analyzing Political Change in Africa, Boulder, University of Chicago Press, 1980, $20.00, 222 pp. Westview Press, 1980, $26.50, 351 pp. Cronje, Suzanne. Ling, Margaret and Crortje, Gillian, The Lonrho Con- Schmidt, Elizabeth, Decoding Corporate Camouflage: U.S. Business nections. Encino, California, Bellwether Books, 1976, $15.00, 316 Support for Apartheid, Washington, D.C., Institute lor Policy PP. Studies, 1980. $4.95, 140 pp. Duignan, Peter and Rabushka, Alvin, The United States in the 1980s, Sears, Mason. Years of High Purpose, Washington, D.C.. University Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1980, $20.00, 858 pp. Press of America, 1980, $14.50 hardcover, $7.75 paper, 205 pp. Fredland, Richard S., Africa Faces the World, Indianapolis, Indiana Sewell, John W. et al, The United States and World Development: University-Purdue University of Indianapolis. 1980, $15.00, 217 Agenda 1980, New York, Praeger, 1980, 237 pp. PP. Smith, Anthony: The Geopolitics of Information, New York, Oxford Univer- sity Press, 1980, $13.95. 181 pp. Ignatyev, Oleg, Secret Weapon in Africa, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1977. 189 pp. Sow, I., Anthropological Structures ol Madness in Black Africa, New York, International Universities Press, Inc., 1980. $17.50, 248 pp. U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Africa Institute, Africa In Soviet Studies, STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP. MANAGEMENT AND CIRCULATION ' ° Moscow, "Nauka" Publishing House, 1976, 343 pp. MHICA REPORT Bi-Monihly r ••.»-*".- 6 j •••!• sls LITERATURE BJ1 U.N. Ftau, New York, N,y. 1001? Breytenbach, Breyten, A Season in Paradise, New York, Persea Books, UU UN. Plan. New Yor*. N.V. 10017 1980, $13.95. 291 pp —~ "— Brink, Andre, A Dry White Season, New York, William Morrow & Co., Inc . 1980, $10.95, 316 pp. Brink, Andre. Rumours of Rain, New Ycrk, William Morrow and Co.. Inc . 1978, $10.95, 446 pp. Gellhom. Martha. The Weather in Africa, New York, Dodd Mead, 1980, $7.95, 236 pp. Hall, Richard, Lowers on the Nile, New York, Random House, 1980, ••warn $10.95, 245 pp. La Guma, Alex, Time of the Butcherbird, London and Exeter. N.H., Heinemann Educational Books, 1980, $2.95, 119 pp. Levine, Faye, Solomon and Sheba, New York, Richard Marek Publishers, -^-—— r — _ 1980, $10.95, 227 pp. ~" NfcHB ' ^ NONE Little, Kenneth, The Sociology of Urban Women's Image in African Liter- ature, Totowa, New Jersey, Rowman & Littlefield, 1980, $27.50. 161 pp. MacPherson, Malcolm, Protege, New vOrk, E.P. Dutton, 1980, $11.95, 274 pp. Ngongwikuo, Joseph Anchangnayuoh, 7"a£>oo Love, Hicksville, New York, Exposition Press, 1980, $10.00, 192 pp. .,,...«» ..tun O'C..C"..»». Palmer, Eustace, The Growth of the African Novel, London, Heinemann •»»««•" ••"••"— Educational Books, Ltd., 1979, $26.95 cloth, $13.95 paper, 333 pp. 10.420 Walker, Barbar K. and Warren S. eds , Nigerian Folk Tales, Hamden, Conn.. Shoe String Press. Inc., 1980, $13.50, 157 pp. fc.100 Zake, S. Joshua L., Truckful of Gold, South Bend, Regnery/Gateway, Inc., 7,100 , ™™t«,.,..«UL«™««.f..i.-.™, 1980, $10.95, 269 pp. . ,.,.. e_» BLACK DIASPORA Bolt, Christine and Descher, Seymour, eds., Anti-Slavery, Religion & Re- . •" • » form, Hamden, Conn., Shoe String Press, inc., 1980, $2.7.50, 366 ...... i...».rj»-UM«wii«iw in 4jr> 1 1 dm pp. I IctMtly Ihil [h. mttmnili nrnli by ™ ^^^ Fowler, Carolyn, A Knot in the Thread: The Life and Works of Jacques •bo*e •« cottttt wtd cumpltre ^^r Roumain, Washington, D.C., Howard University Press, 1980, $12.95, 400 pp. Miller, John Chester, The Wolf by the Ears, New York, New American Library, 1980, $5.95, 323 pp. UNESCO, The African Slave Trade from the 15th to the 19th Century, Paris, Imprimenes Reunies de Chambery, 1979, $17.00, 325 pp. Vass, Winifred Keltersberger, The Bantu Speaking Heritage of the United States, Los Angeles, UCLA Center for Afro-American Studies. 1980, $6.50 soMcover, $12.00 hardcover, 122 pp. 58 AFRICA REPORT • January-February 1981 Behind the headlines from AFRICAN A 12th year AFRICA CONTEMPORARY THE AFRICAN-ARAB RECORD 1979-80 Colin Legum CONFLICT IN THE SUDAN The new volume of this annual survey focuses on Dunstan M. Wai relations between the superpowers and Africa, and Wai offers a comprehensive and specific examina- includes the role of Cuba, the road to Lancaster tion of the Southern Sudanese quest for selfhood House and Zimbabwean independence, and a re- and discusses the international implications of se- view of ongoing tensions in southern Africa and the cessionist politics in Africa. Horn. It also contains essays on the conflict in the 240pp. lea $21.50 western Sahara, Afro-Arab relations, and the return to civilian rule in West Africa. Volume 12: ca 1300 pp. I $125 ETHIOPIA: Volumes 1-11 are also available. EMPIRE IN REVOLUTION Marina and David Ottaway POLITICS AND CLASS "This is the book for students of the Ethiopian revo- IN ZAIRE Michael G. Schatzberg lution, and a crucially important resource for stu- dents of comparative revolutions or comparative "This study brilliantly demonstrates how the com- communism."->4mencan Political Science Review plete centralization of power in Zaire has not led to 250 pp. I $27.00 more effective governance but to the total exploita- tion of most of the population The description of the effects of the 1973 "Zairianization1 of the coun- CRISIS: try's entire commercial sector... is particularly com- pelling. "-Foreign Affairs 228 pp. I $29.50 IN THE THIRD WORLD Andre Gunder Frank THE POLITICAL ECONOMY Frank systematically examines the complex and changing roles of Africa, Latin America, Asia, and OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION the Middle East in the world economic system. He IN NIGERIA Edited by analyzes the provocative correlation in Third World countries between the growth of internal violence, Henry Bienen and V.R Diejomaoh international conflict, and the inroads of international The Nigerian economy, in the midst of an oil boom capital. and massive rural to urban migration, is distin- 380 pp. 1 $29.50t cloth; $9.75t paper guished by rapid industrial growth and minimal growth in the rural sector. This volume throws light AFROCOMMUNISM on Nigeria's political economy by analyzing the complex relationship between growth and income David and Marina Ottaway distribution. Volume 2 of the Political Economy of This book weighs the character and possible future Income Distribution in Developing Countries series. direction of "Marxist-Leninist" states in Africa-An- Other volumes focus on Turkey, Egypt, and Mexico. gola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia. The authors ex- ca550 pp. I $45.00 plain the successes and failures of these regimes in terms of African aspirations, and offer fresh insight into one of the most important political phenomenon WHITE MAN, WE WANT of this decade. TO TALK TO YOU ca225 pp. I ca $24.00 Denis Herbstein The first serious study of the Soweto riots of 1976. Write for our complete catalog "Herbstein's lively prose and handling of events """ AFRICANA PUBLISHING COMPANY make this book entertaining as well as informative. a division of His vivid portrayal of conditions in black Soweto, Holmes & Meier Publishers the politics of the Bantustans, and the siege mental- 30 Irving Place ity of the whites leaves a memorable impression." New York, N.Y. 10003 - Library Journal 2 70 pp. I $14.50 The ancient Kingdom of Da- homey exchanged ambassadors with the court of Louis XIV. Part of the fun of West Africa is bargaining. So here are three hints for successful bargaining: 1. Start at half of what you're willing to pay. 2. Never hurry. 3. Keep a sense of humor. Handshaking is an important social grace in West Africa, so re- member to shake hands with ev- Tb see the "Venice of Africa" travel to In the 5th century A.D. eryone in the room when you're Benin (Dahomey) and the village of Gan- while the Roman Empire was being introduced. Also, always t , •' vie. Here over 10,000 people live in stilt falling in Europe, the Kingdom shake hands (pass food or gifts, houses, high and dry over a lagoon. Need- of Ghana was a full-fledged etc.) with your right hand. That's less to say, they're fabulous fishermen. political state in West Africa. important! NOTE: Elephants have the right of way The air is so clear in Mauritania that scientists gathered there to witness the solar eclipse in 1973. Abidjan, Ivory Coast is often referred to as the "Manhattan of Africa". It has a "Central Park", skyscrapers, and the Hotel Ivoire is often com- pared to a glass-enclosed Rockefeller Center. While you're on a photo-safari in Gabon, per- haps you'll get a pictures the extremely rare situ- tongas. And perhaps i^i won't. ferred to as the "Pari NOTE: When driving through the national parks re- member that elephants have the right of way. They're bigger than you are. Africa's "Macy's" and "Gimbels" are the open markets in Abidjan, Ivory Coast. They're not to be missed. Air Afrique offers regularly scheduled, luxurious, non-stop jets from JFK to Dakar, Senegal, and then on to the rest of Africa. It's the only way to fly! JUR i& AFRIQUE Now what are you waiting for? Isn't it time you discovered Africa begins with Air Afrique. West Africa? Just call your Travel Agent or your nearest Air And it's just seven hours to the New Sun, Afrique/Air France office today. Hurry! West Africa.