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Bios Jane Anderson Dr. Jane Anderson Is Assistant Professor In
Bios Jane Anderson Dr. Jane Anderson is Assistant Professor in the Centre for Heritage and Society, Department of Anthropology, University of Massachusetts and Adjunct Professor of Law at New York University School of Law. Jane has a PhD in Law from the Law School at University of New South Wales in Australia. Her work is focused on the philosophical and practical problems for intellectual property law and the protection of Indigenous/traditional knowledge resources and cultural heritage. Since 2007 Jane has worked as an Expert Consultant for the World Intellectual Property Organization on a number of policy proposals for the protection of traditional knowledge and cultural expressions. These include developing a framework for an international alternative dispute resolution/mediation service for intellectual property and Indigenous knowledge disputes, international guidelines for cultural institutions with collections of Indigenous cultural material and the development of site‐specific intellectual property protocols that help local communities enhance and support already existing knowledge management practices. Her most recent publications include Law, Knowledge, Culture: The Production of Indigenous Knowledge in Intellectual Property Law, Edward Elgar Press, 2009 and the Indigenous/Traditional Knowledge and Intellectual Property Issues Paper, Centre for the Study of the Public Domain, Duke University, 2010. Email: [email protected] Derek Bambauer Derek Bambauer is an Associate Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School, where he teaches Internet law and intellectual property. He has published articles on Internet censorship, cybersecurity, intellectual property, and health law. He has also written technical articles on data recovery and fault tolerance, and on deployment of software upgrades. A former principal systems engineer at Lotus Development Corp. -
To Sell Or Scale Up: Canada's Patent Strategy in a Knowledge Economy
IRPP STUDY August 2019 | No. 72 To Sell or Scale Up: Canada’s Patent Strategy in a Knowledge Economy Nancy Gallini and Aidan Hollis UNLOCKING DEMAND FOR INNOVATION To Sell or Scale Up: Canada’s Patent Strategy in a Knowledge Economy ABOUT THIS STUDY This study was published as part of the Unlocking Demand for Innovation research program, under the direction of Joanne Castonguay and France St-Hilaire. The manu- script was copy- edited by Clare Walker, proofreading was by Barbara Czarnecki, edi- torial coordination was by Francesca Worrall, production was by Chantal Létourneau and art direction was by Anne Tremblay. Nancy Gallini is professor emeritus in the Vancouver School of Economics at the University of British Columbia (UBC). Her research, which has been published in numer- ous peer-reviewed articles, focuses on the economics of intellectual property, technol- ogy licensing and competition policy. She has served on the governing council of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, the Mitacs Research Council, and the editorial boards of the American Economic Review, the Canadian Journal of Economics and other journals in economics. She was dean of the Faculty of Arts at UBC (2002-10), chair of the Department of Economics at the University of Toronto (1995-2000), and president of the Canadian Economic Association (2016-17). Aidan Hollis is professor of economics at the University of Calgary and president of Incen- tives for Global Health, a US-based NGO focused on the development of the Health Im- pact Fund proposal. His research focuses on innovation and competition in pharmaceutical and electricity markets. -
Curriculum Vitae
1 CURRICULUM VITAE Nancy T. Gallini June, 2020 University Address: Vancouver School of Economics University of British Columbia 6000 Iona Drive Vancouver, BC, Canada V6T 1L4 Email: [email protected] DEGREES: Ph.D. University of California, Berkeley Resource Economics 1980 M.A. University of Missouri at Columbia Economics 1974 B.A. University of Missouri at Columbia Mathematics 1973 ACADEMIC POSITIONS: July, 2017 - Emeritus Professor Vancouver School of Economics University of British Columbia Acting Director July, 2014 - June 2015 Peter Wall Institute for Advanced Studies July 2002 - June 2017 Professor Vancouver School of Economics University of British Columbia Dean July 2002 – June 2010 Faculty of Arts University of British Columbia July 1991 – June 2002 Professor Department of Economics, Faculty of Arts and Science University of Toronto Research Fellow Jan 2002 –June 2002 Centre for Innovation Law and Policy University of Toronto Law School Chair, Department of Economics July 1995 – June 2000 University of Toronto 2 Jan 1992 - June, 1994 Associate Chair of Graduate Studies Department of Economics University of Toronto July 1985 – June 1991 Associate Professor Department of Economics University of Toronto July 1979 – June 1985 Assistant Professor Department of Economics University of Toronto July 1974 – June 1975 Lecturer Department of Economics Montana State University VISITING POSITIONS 2011-2013 Stern School of Business, New York University, Hitotsubashi University; University of California, Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research (Cambridge); University of New South Wales; University of Auckland; Delhi School of Economics March – June, 2002 World Trade Organization, Geneva and University of Geneva Sept. - May 1994 Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique Paris, France Jan. -
Private Agreements for Coordinating Patent Rights: the Case of Patent Pools
IEL PAPER IN COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONS, ECONOMICS AND LAW NO. 5 Private Agreements for Coordinating Patent Rights: The Case of Patent Pools Nancy Gallini June, 2011 This paper can be downloaded without charge at the IEL Programme – Institutions Economics and Law Working Paper Series http://www.iel.carloalberto.org/Research-and-Pubblication/Working-papers.aspx or http://polis.unipmn.it/index.php?cosa=ricerca,iel Private Agreements for Coordinating Patent Rights: The Case of Patent Pools Nancy Gallini* Abstract Inventors and users of technology often enter into cooperative agreements for sharing their intellectual property in order to implement a standard or to avoid costly litigation. Over the past two decades, U.S. antitrust authorities have viewed pooling arrangements that integrate complementary, valid and essential patents as having pro‐ competitive benefits in reducing prices, transactions costs, and the incidence of legal suits. Since patent pools are cooperative agreements, they also have the potential of suppressing competition if, for example, they harbor weak or invalid patents, dampen incentives to conduct research on innovations that compete with the pooled patents, foreclose competition from downstream product or upstream input markets, or raise prices on goods that compete with the pooled patents. In synthesizing the ideas advanced in the economic literature, this paper explores whether these antitrust concerns apply to pools with complementary patents and, if they do, the implications for competition policy to constrain them. Special attention is given to the application of the U.S. Department of Justice‐Federal Trade Commission Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (1995) and its companion Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition (2007) to recent patent pool cases.