COMMENTARY

The Death of :

1 Islamophobia Goes to America

By Dr. Ayla Göl*

t was a bullet that killed a terrorist and burial within 24 hours and to prevent his grave revived a presidency. On the morning becoming a shrine, while Obama hailed the opera- of May the second 2011, the world tion as “the most significant achievement to date woke up to the breaking news of Osa- in our nation‟s effort to defeat al-Qaeda” [4]. Alt- ma Bin Laden's (OBL) death. He was hough there is no question that OBL‟s death has I murdered in a top-secret operation by brought to an end an 11-year-old man hunt and is the elite US Navy Seal Team Six with two shots - a the beginning of the end for the so-called War on „double tap‟ maneuver - once in the torso and then Terror (WOT), the defeat of al-Qaeda is far from in the head to ensure the enemy‟s death [2]. “We being any closer. Achieving the latter is far more got him!”, President Barak Obama added as he complicated than killing Bin Laden and requires a heard what he had long wanted to hear: „Geronimo new set of strategies. Four of them will be EKIA‟ („Enemy Killed in Action‟). The enemy was, of discussed here: course, OBL, America‟s Public Enemy Number One and, since 9/11, the personified embodiment of The first strategy consists in ending the „war on ter- „‟. The US Special Forces captured ror‟ rhetoric and policy. Since the Bush administra- him in a fortified compound locally known as tion launched the WOT in order to combat al- „Waziristan Mansion‟, in the military garrison town of Qaeda‟s the terrorist activities, the exhausted and Abbottabad, in North-West . Curiously, he age-old discourse of a „clash of civilisations‟ be- was not hiding in a „cave‟ in the mountainous area tween the West and the Rest resurfaced with spe- of Tora Bora in Eastern Afghanistan, as the world cific reference to Islam. Yet for many of us in the had been led to believe. Indeed, „Waziristan Man- Muslim world, the ideologies and terrorist activities sion‟ was located just one kilometre away from the of al-Qaeda under the leadership of OBL did not at Pakistani Military Academy and about 100km (62 all reflect how true Muslims should act and live. A miles) from the capital Islamabad [3]. Pentagon faith of peace and love for the overwhelming majori- officials and the US media claimed that OBL‟s body ty of Muslims, Islam is nevertheless all too often was „buried at sea‟ following the Muslim practice of portrayed as „uncivilised‟, „traditional‟, „irrational‟,

29 www.cesran.org/politicalreflection Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

The Death of Osama Bin Laden | By Dr. Ayla Göl

„violent‟, and „alien‟ by Orientalist and essentialist plaining the new set of challenges of global affairs. understandings that are deep-seated and centuries- A critical study of terrorism must therefore contextu- old [5]. Influenced by these assumptions, much of alise the particular historical, political, social, and the current literature and debate continues to adopt ideological power structures that lead an individual a rather simplistic and stereotypical view of Islam as or a group to use force and violent tactics (See Crit- a violent, irrational, and backward religion that has ical Terrorism Studies, 2009) [7]. Without engaging the potential to turn its believers into potential ter- with contextual dimensions, any study is bound to rorists (such as OBL himself). Hence, the US-led fail to understand the complex realities of interna- WOT can be identified as the continuation of such tional terrorism and, particularly, so-called „Islamic orientalist, ethnocentric and cultural biases that terrorism‟[8]. characterize the relationship between the West and the East - or the „Orient‟ or „Islamic world‟ - in the A careful student of Middle Eastern politics and form of violent conflicts between „us and them‟. „Islamic terrorism‟ can easily identify historical, so- Such simplistic views impede the understanding of cial and political connections between key regional WOT by creating a „false-consciousness‟ for non- events and Super-Power involvement during the Muslims – „us‟ - as rational, non-violent, and peace- Cold War – links that led precisely to the rise of the ful beings in the West, while monstrous OBL phenomenon. alienating the dedicated (and The first chain of regional diverse) followers of Islam events unfolded in 1979 with worldwide - them - as irrational the rise of Islam as a revolu- and violent. Although it seems tionary and political force in that the Obama administration . Afterwards, the unprece- stopped using the „War on Ter- dented impact of the Iranian ror‟ expression at the level of Revolution of 1979 on the So- policy and rhetoric, the idea of viet invasion of Afghanistan being „at war with Al-Qaeda‟ led to the rise of mujahedeen has never been abandoned in the 1980s as well as the and indeed it has recently been Taliban in the 1990s. “The first used to justify the killing of OBL time Bin Laden had seen the [6]. Reactions to his death var- Tora Bora caves, he had been ied from the celebrations and a young mujahedeen fighter chanting of Americans, to the and a recent university gradu- condemnations for the way he ate with a degree in civil engi- was killed and „buried at sea‟ neering. It had been some 20 by his followers and ordinary years before, during Washing- Muslims. There were also Osama ton's first Afghan war - the some critical voices in the Bin Laden decade-long, C.I.A.-financed West. Hence, the US Special jihad of the 1980‟s against the Forces‟ operation has raised Soviet occupation” [9]. For many questions about the legality of the killing and those who had heeded these warnings, the „West‟s the handling of his burial among Muslims and non- road to 9/11‟ was paved with the consequences of Muslims alike. short-term planned policies to gain wider geopoliti- cal interests [10]. The second strategy requires a comparative and critical approach to understanding „religious terror- However, those who ignored these warnings found ism‟ in the contemporary world. In the post 9/11 an easy answer: Islam was, for them, the primary era, it has become fashionable to attribute terrorism referent in the theory and praxis of political violence to „religion‟ or „religious extremism‟ (Islam especial- and terrorism. This is not only based on an implicit ly) while the majority of a burgeoning literature on assumption that Islam – in all its complexities, con- „religious terrorism‟ contains almost nothing about tradictions and cultural differences, as well as in its „Christian terrorism‟, „Jewish terrorism‟, or „Hindu different political trajectories – is monolithic and terrorism‟. By singling out Islam as a „violent‟ reli- homogenous, but also obscures a better under- gion, mainstream understandings of terrorism and standing of the diversities and complexities of reli- counter-terrorism do more harm than good in ex- giously-motivated terrorist acts. From Afghanistan

30 Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011 www.cesran.org/politicalreflection

The Death of Osama Bin Laden | By Dr. Ayla Göl

to Turkey via Pakistan, Muslim societies are neither society and administration. Unlike other phobias unique in terms of religious beliefs, nor homogene- such as the fear of spiders (Arachnophobia) the fear ous in terms of a mythical „Islamic identity‟ that of heights (Acrophobia) and the fear of England or would transcend the cultural, national, and regional English culture (Anglophobia), the fear of Islam differences of Asia, the and North Afri- (Islamophobia) is a special form of „social anxiety‟ ca. that is “increasingly used to refer to religiously- motivated hostility directed at Muslims” [16]. While The third strategy, I suggest, questions the implica- Europeans historically had a longer and closer en- tions of the OBL‟s killing in the long term. The US‟s gagement with Muslims as immigrants and minori- supposed „Islamic burial‟ of OBL at sea raises an ties of the colonial and post-colonial period the interesting question: why was the Obama admin- American engagement with Muslims is relatively istration afraid of his body? How can a dead person new. be a threat? Washington‟s explanations that such a burial was meant to prevent OBL‟s grave from be- In contemporary politics, „Islamophobia‟ was intro- coming a shrine for his followers actually exposes a duced to Britain by the publication of the Runny- considerable level of ignorance about Islam and mede Trust‟s report in 1997 [17]. It highlighted eight Muslim traditions. As a Saudi, Osama bin Laden main „closed views‟ of Islam that characterised Is- belonged to the Wahabi tradition of Islam, the fol- lamophobia in Britain as follow: lowers of which do not actually build or visit shrines (the practice of visiting shrines is more common in i. Monolithic: Islam is seen as a „monolithic the Sufi branch of Islam). Moreover, according to bloc, static and unresponsive to change‟. Muslim scholars, Bin Laden‟s burial was completely ii. Separate: Islam seen as separate and other unjustified because while “sea burials are permissi- – (a) not having any aims or values in com- ble for Muslims in extraordinary circumstances”, mon with other cultures; (b) not affected by OBL‟s death was not one of them [11]. Moreover, them; and (c) not influencing them. according to Islamic belief, “the land and the sea iii. Inferior: Islam seen as inferior to the West – belong to God, who is able to protect and raise the barbaric, irrational, primitive, sexist. dead at the end of times for Judgment Day”, there- iv. Enemy: Islam seen as violent, aggressive, fore it would not be a significant concern to his fol- threatening, supportive of terrorism, engaged lowers where exactly his body was buried [12]. Is- in „a clash of civilisations‟. lamic scholar Montasser el-Zayat stated that alt- v. Manipulation: Islam seen as a political ideo- hough the reason behind American fears of creating logy, used for political or military advantage. a shrine to OBL is understandable, they made a vi. Criticism of West rejected: Criticisms made „strategic mistake‟. Put it simply, “they don‟t want to by Islam of „the West‟ rejected out of hand. see him become a symbol, but he is already a sym- vii. Discrimination defended: Hostility towards bol in people‟s hearts” [13]. Furthermore, the killing Islam used to justify discriminatory practices of OBL might serve to incite new fervour and “may towards Muslims and exclusion of Muslims further provoke militant calls for revenge attacks from mainstream society. against American targets” in the long term [14]. viii. Islamophobia seen as natural: Anti-Muslim Therefore, Bin Laden is likely to be regarded as a hostility accepted as natural and martyr in the hearts and minds of his followers [15]. „normal‟ [18].

The last but not the least significant strategy focus- The overall intention of the report was twofold. First, es on the implications of OBL‟s death in the long it challenged „Islamophobic assumptions that Islam term relations between the West and the Islamic is a single monolithic system without internal deve- world. In fact, the handling of OBL‟s body and US lopment, diversity and dialogue‟. Second, it drew fears of creating a shrine for his followers reflect „attention to the principal dangers which Islamopho- widespread Islamophobic anxieties in American bia creates or exacerbates for Muslim communities, and therefore for the well-being of society as a who- “...the killing of OBL might serve to incite le‟ [19]. Similar views have become more widely new fervour and “may further provoke accepted in as a whole after the publication of the EUMC (European Monitoring Centre on Ra- militant calls for revenge attacks against cism and Xenophobia) Islamophobia reports of American targets” in the long term.” 2001, 2003 and 2005 [20]. Until 2001, American

31 www.cesran.org/politicalreflection Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

The Death of Osama Bin Laden | By Dr. Ayla Göl

society was not engaged in similar concerns about term and might even backfire on America, some- Islam and Muslims. Within the last decade, espe- thing which has already been seen in Bin Laden‟s cially after the 9/11 and 7/7 terrorist attacks, Euro- curious transition from young mujahedeen involved pean and American political discourses and anxie- in a CIA-supported war, to US Public Enemy Num- ties about Islamophobia converged in the percep- ber One. While Washington‟s mission to kill OBL tion of Islam as a new and existential threat to may have been successfully accomplished, its ob- Western interests, and have found a common re- jective of defeating Al-Qaeda has only just begun. sponse in the „war on terror‟. However, it is im- Unless the US tackles the „real threat‟ – those Ori- portant to note that these contemporary Islamopho- entalist and Islamophobic assumptions that repro- bic assumptions are historically embedded within duce and exacerbate the Muslim/Western divide – it Orientalist discourses [21]. Therefore, a miscalcu- will be a difficult mission to accomplish. This is lated short term policy (such as killing the enemy in much more challenging, unfortunately, than firing a action) might have stronger implications in the long single bullet at an unarmed man.

Notes: * Director, Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence (CSRV); Lecturer in International Politics of the Middle East and Islamic Studies; Department of International Politics; Aberystwyth University. 1) Some parts of this extract are taken from, “the Editor‟s Introduction: Views from the „Others‟ of the War on Terror”, Special Issue, Critical Studies on Terrorism, Vol.3, No.1, April 2010, pp. 1-5; and Ayla Göl, „The War on Terror and the Rise of Neo- in the 21st Century‟, e-IR

32 Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011 www.cesran.org/politicalreflection